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State Intelligence Service (Sri Lanka)
State Intelligence Service (Sri Lanka)
State Intelligence Service (Sri Lanka)
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State Intelligence Service
Agency overview
Formed1984; 41 years ago (1984)
JurisdictionGovernment of Sri Lanka
HeadquartersColombo, Sri Lanka
Minister responsible
Agency executives
  • Dhammika Priyantha Kumara, Director
  • S Javid Memon, Deputy Director
Parent agencyMinistry of Defence

The State Intelligence Service (SIS) is an intelligence agency of the Sri Lankan government.[1][2] It is the primary civilian intelligence agency of Sri Lanka and is responsible for both internal and external intelligence-gathering. It comes under the purview of the Ministry of Defence. The agency was originally named National Intelligence Bureau.

Role

[edit]

SIS is responsible for the collection of intelligence about threats from internal and external sources to be used in the formulation of government policies and strategies. The duties carried out by the SIS are mainly categorised into,[3]

  1. Collection and analysis of information.
  2. Conducting undercover investigations.
  3. Conduct background checks on applicants recruited to sensitive institutions including the Armed Forces, Police and other selected state institutions.
  4. Issue threat assessment reports on VVIP and VIP security and governmental affairs.
  5. Conducting training programs for other institutions.
  6. Maintaining foreign relations on national security issues

Organisation

[edit]

The SIS is part of the Ministry of Defence and is separate from the Police and Military intelligence but its staff consists of those from both police and military backgrounds. The SIS is led by a director general, traditionally from the Police but this was broken in 2019.[4][5]

History

[edit]

Until 1984, the Sri Lanka Police were responsible for internal intelligence functions, first under the Special Branch, and later under the Intelligence Services Division.[citation needed] The perceived failure of the Intelligence Services Division during the riots of July 1983 led the Junius Jayawardene Government to re-evaluate the nation's intelligence network, and in 1984 the President set up a National Intelligence Bureau.[6] The new organisation combined intelligence units from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police.[7] It was renamed the State Intelligence Service (SIS) in 2006.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) agents successfully infiltrated Sri Lankan government and military organisations resulting in the assassinations of several high-ranking military personnel, including Major Tuan Muthaliff and Colonel Tuan Meedin both of the Directorate of Military Intelligence, putting Sri Lankan intelligence services in a desperate condition.[citation needed] Under the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa the intelligence agencies that were in desperate condition built-up a cohesive apparatus, which achieved significant success, including anti-LTTE operations overseas and the SIS played a huge role in the Fourth Ealam war. The SIS was involved in the dismantling of the large number of long-term sleeper cells planted by the LTTE in cities, helping Police track down criminals who were helping the LTTE for financial gain.[8][4]

In January 2015 the director of the SIS, Chandra Wakista, resigned following the presidential election, amid allegations of phone tapping of opposition politicians.[9] In March Nilantha Jayawardena was appointed as the SIS director.[10]

In December 2019 the newly elected president Gotabaya Rajapaksa appointed Brigadier Suresh Sallay, the former head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence, as the head of SIS. Sallay is the first director of the SIS to come from Military Intelligence instead of the Police, in April 2024 Colonel Javid appointed as the SIS deputy director.[5]

Directorates

[edit]
  • Directorate of Internal Intelligence
  • Directorate of Foreign Intelligence

Operations

[edit]

Kumaran Pathmanathan aka KP, who was involved in arms procurement for LTTE, was captured in Malaysia and moved to Sri Lanka via Thailand by this Agency.[11]

Recently some former LTTE members were captured from Southeast Asian countries and moved to Sri Lanka by State Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Corps (Sri Lanka) of Sri Lanka Army together.[citation needed]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

State Intelligence Service (Sri Lanka)

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The State Intelligence Service (SIS) is Sri Lanka's primary civilian intelligence agency, responsible for collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence on domestic and foreign threats to national security, while coordinating with military and law enforcement entities under the Ministry of Defence. Tracing its origins to 1 October 1941, when it was established as the Civil Defence Intelligence Bureau amid World War II under British colonial administration, the SIS evolved through post-independence restructuring, including a period as the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), before adopting its current name to reflect expanded mandate. It has been pivotal in counter-insurgency operations, particularly during the Sri Lankan Civil War (1983–2009), where its intelligence efforts supported the government's military campaigns against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), culminating in the group's defeat. However, the agency has faced scrutiny for operational lapses, such as inadequate threat assessments prior to the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, highlighting persistent challenges in inter-agency coordination and resource allocation despite reforms under successive administrations. Recent developments include proposed structural overhauls to enhance effectiveness amid evolving geopolitical risks.

Mandate and Role

The State Intelligence Service (SIS) of lacks a dedicated statutory foundation, operating primarily under executive authority within the purview of the rather than a specific National Intelligence Services Act. Although proposals for a comprehensive National Intelligence Act to regulate intelligence operations, define mandates, and establish oversight have been discussed since the , including a draft approved for development in January 2020, such legislation remains unpassed as of 2025 due to political delays. The agency's origins trace to a of the established on October 1, 1941, which evolved into the modern SIS, renamed from the National Intelligence Bureau in 2006. Core functions of the SIS encompass the collection and analysis of domestic and foreign intelligence to safeguard , with emphasis on identifying emerging threats from internal insurgencies and external actors. It conducts operations, covert activities, and efforts, including intelligence sharing with police, units, and international partners to preempt attacks and disruptions. As the principal civilian intelligence body, the SIS focuses on predictive assessments rather than , providing actionable intelligence to government entities without direct arrest powers, though coordination with agencies like the supports broader security responses. This mandate positions it alongside directorates but distinct in its civilian orientation and broader threat horizon.

Scope of Internal and External Intelligence

The State Intelligence Service (SIS) is mandated to oversee intelligence operations that address both internal security vulnerabilities and external threats to Sri Lanka's sovereignty and stability, functioning as the country's primary civilian intelligence body. This dual scope involves the collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable intelligence to inform government decision-making on national security matters, often in coordination with military and police entities. Unlike specialized military directorates focused on tactical operations, the SIS emphasizes strategic-level assessments applicable to civilian governance. Internally, the SIS's responsibilities center on monitoring and countering domestic threats, including , , , and potential that could undermine state authority. This includes surveillance of residual insurgent networks, such as (LTTE) sympathizers post-2009, and early detection of radicalization indicators within ethnic or ideological groups. The agency's internal efforts support by providing intelligence on politically motivated violence or economic sabotage, though operational overlaps with entities like the have historically led to inefficiencies in threat response, as seen in coordination lapses during the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings. Without a dedicated national intelligence act, these functions derive from executive directives and outdated statutes like the of 1955, resulting in undefined boundaries that foster inter-agency rivalries rather than seamless integration. Externally, the SIS gathers on foreign actors and transnational networks posing risks to , such as diaspora-funded insurgencies, regional , or geopolitical interference from neighboring states. This encompasses tracking LTTE-linked activities abroad and assessing s from non-state actors or state-sponsored influences that could infiltrate domestic affairs. The agency's external mandate is particularly vital in a post-civil war context, where global Tamil advocacy groups continue to propagate narratives challenging Sri Lankan , yet critiques highlight its limited capacity for proactive overseas operations due to resource constraints and the absence of a specialized foreign framework. Coordination with defense units aids in evaluating cross-border s, but the lack of centralized oversight has impeded comprehensive threat mapping, underscoring the need for legislative reforms to delineate and enhance external capabilities.

Organizational Structure

Leadership and Administrative Framework

The State Intelligence Service (SIS) is led by a Director, responsible for directing intelligence operations, policy implementation, and coordination with other entities. The Director reports directly to the Secretary of Defence, operating under the Ministry of Defence's oversight to ensure alignment with broader priorities. This reporting structure evolved post-1984, when internal security responsibilities shifted from the police to defence authorities amid escalating insurgencies. Appointments to the Director position are made by the government, often favoring senior officers from either the or military, reflecting the agency's hybrid civilian-military composition. Traditionally, Directors hailed from the police service, but recent decades have seen in the role, such as Suresh Sallay, who served until his retirement on October 5, 2024. Sallay's tenure drew scrutiny for alleged operational controversies, leading to his replacement by (DIG) Dhammika Priyantha Kumara, a specialist in financial crimes and investigations. As of October 2025, Kumara continues in the position, emphasizing detective expertise over military command experience. Administratively, SIS personnel are drawn from police and military backgrounds, holding formal Police Department ranks despite their focus, which limits their operational autonomy compared to regular . The framework lacks a robust centralized command, resulting in siloed sharing across agencies and reliance on ad-hoc coordination rather than statutory integration. This structure, while enabling flexibility in threat response, has been critiqued for inefficiencies, including outdated legal mandates that hinder proactive gathering. Reforms proposed in reviews advocate for enhanced legislative clarity and inter-agency fusion centers to streamline directives.

Directorates and Operational Divisions

The State Intelligence Service (SIS) maintains an operational framework geared toward both domestic and foreign intelligence collection, though detailed breakdowns of its internal directorates and divisions remain classified to safeguard operational security. As the primary civilian intelligence entity under the , the SIS focuses on , internal threat assessment, and external intelligence gathering, often in coordination with military counterparts like the Directorate of (DMI). Publicly available information indicates functional divisions aligned with these mandates, including domestic to monitor subversive activities and foreign operations for overseas threat intelligence, but without named subunits or hierarchical specifics. Coordination challenges persist due to the fragmented nature of Sri Lanka's broader apparatus, where the SIS interfaces with entities such as the Sri Lanka Police's Terrorist Investigation Division (TID) and service-specific intelligences (naval, ), yet lacks a robust centralized command . The Chief of National serves primarily as a liaison rather than an authoritative overseer, leading to documented inefficiencies in information sharing and overlap in tasks like . Post-2019 Easter Sunday attacks inquiries highlighted these silos, prompting calls for to streamline SIS operations, including enhanced analytical divisions for threat fusion, though implementation as of 2025 has been limited. Operational divisions within the SIS emphasize (HUMINT) networks, particularly in contexts, drawing from its historical roots in the National Intelligence Bureau era. capabilities, such as (SIGINT) support, are integrated but subordinate to core collection efforts, with the agency relying on inter-agency exchanges for specialized technical branches. Leadership appointments, often from senior police ranks like Deputy Inspector General, oversee these divisions, ensuring alignment with defence priorities amid ongoing adaptations to hybrid threats.

Historical Evolution

Formation and Pre-Independence Roots (1941-1948)

The precursor to the State Intelligence Service was established on 1 October 1941 as a within the of the Ceylon Police Force under British colonial rule. This development occurred amid , as Ceylon's strategic position in the heightened vulnerabilities to Axis and , particularly after Japan's conquests in and the 1942 carrier strikes on and harbors. The CID itself, formed in 1870 to handle major criminal probes, expanded its remit to include dedicated intelligence gathering to counter internal threats to colonial security. The special branch's initial mandate centered on monitoring , labor unrest, and potential fifth-column activities, drawing from British policing models adapted for wartime exigencies. Operating under the Inspector General of Police, it collected on suspect groups, including Indian nationalist sympathizers and local radicals, while coordinating with imperial entities like the Executive's regional outposts in . By 1943–1944, as Allied forces fortified Ceylon's defenses, the branch contributed to efforts against Japanese infiltration attempts, though primary naval fell to units. Leading to on 4 February 1948, the transitioned seamlessly into the Dominion of Ceylon's police framework, retaining its role in domestic without major , as the new prioritized continuity in internal security amid post-war pressures. This period laid foundational practices for Sri Lanka's later centralized intelligence apparatus, emphasizing police-led operations over standalone agencies until the .

Post-Independence Development and Civil War Involvement (1948-2009)

Following independence on February 4, 1948, Sri Lanka's internal intelligence functions continued to be managed by the police under the of the , an entity tracing its origins to October 1, 1941. This police-centric model handled threats such as the , where inadequate intelligence gathering delayed effective response, highlighting structural limitations in a fragmented system lacking centralized civilian oversight. In response to escalating ethnic violence, particularly after the July 1983 anti-Tamil riots that ignited the LTTE insurgency, the National Intelligence Bureau was established in 1984 as Sri Lanka's primary civilian agency, separate from police and units, to coordinate internal and external threats. Renamed the State Intelligence Service (SIS) in 2006, it expanded operations under the , emphasizing (HUMINT) amid the LTTE's campaign of , which included over 200 suicide bombings and the of in 1993. The SIS's formation addressed prior coordination gaps, integrating with entities like the Directorate of to counter LTTE infiltration, arms smuggling, and urban attacks. During the (1983–2009), the SIS prioritized disrupting LTTE networks through , informant recruitment, and operations targeting safe houses and financiers, contributing to key military gains such as the recapture of northern territories in the 2006–2009 phase. Its enabled the tracking and elimination of LTTE leader on May 18, 2009, marking the end of the after 26 years and over 100,000 deaths. However, challenges persisted, including inter-agency rivalries and vulnerabilities exposed by LTTE , which assassinated numerous SIS operatives. Despite these, the SIS's role underscored a shift toward offensive tactics, prioritizing empirical assessment over defensive postures.

Reorganization and Post-Conflict Adaptation (2009-2025)

Following the defeat of the (LTTE) in May 2009, the State Intelligence Service (SIS) adapted its operations to address residual threats, including monitoring LTTE diaspora networks abroad engaged in , , and efforts to revive . This shift emphasized countering non-kinetic threats such as campaigns and international pressure tactics by LTTE sympathizers, who altered their post-defeat to focus on political subversion rather than direct . The SIS expanded on domestic Tamil communities for signs of while enhancing gathering to prevent resurgence, though structural fragmentation persisted, with poor inter-agency coordination hindering effective threat assessment. The 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, which killed 269 people and exposed failures in acting on prior foreign warnings about Islamist extremists, prompted immediate leadership changes within Sri Lanka's security apparatus, including the SIS. In December 2019, President appointed Brigadier Suresh Sallay, a former director instrumental in LTTE operations during the , as SIS head—marking the first time a serving officer led the agency. This move aimed to infuse battlefield-honed expertise into amid criticisms of complacency toward emerging religious extremism, though it drew concerns over of domestic . Despite these adjustments, the SIS lacked a dedicated legal framework, relying on outdated provisions that limited and . Under subsequent administrations, the SIS faced persistent challenges, including allegations of political instrumentalization for regime protection rather than priorities, contributing to inefficiencies in information sharing and strategic analysis. By 2024, with the election of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the (NPP) government, efforts intensified to depoliticize agencies; in early October 2024, Sallay was replaced as SIS director, part of a broader overhaul of national leadership to reduce partisanship and enhance . This included recruiting expertise and to address command structures, though analysts noted ongoing vulnerabilities to external influences and internal biases without comprehensive legislative reforms. As of 2025, the SIS continues adapting to hybrid threats like cyber and economic , but systemic issues—such as inadequate funding and over-reliance on —persist, underscoring the need for centralized oversight to sustain post-conflict stability.

Major Operations and Achievements

Counterinsurgency Against LTTE Terrorism

The State Intelligence Service (SIS), drawing on its historical mandate for internal security established through predecessor units dating back to a 1941 special branch of the Criminal Investigations Department, played a supportive role in countering LTTE terrorism during the protracted civil conflict. By the mid-2000s, amid Eelam War IV (2006–2009), the SIS contributed to counter-espionage efforts by identifying LTTE infiltrators within government institutions and the military, which had previously compromised operations through assassinations and intelligence leaks. This involved human intelligence networks that exposed LTTE agents responsible for high-profile attacks, such as the 1991 assassination of former Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa and the 1993 killing of President Ranasinghe Premadasa, though direct attribution to SIS precursors remains tied to broader police intelligence coordination. In the final phases of the , the SIS, renamed and restructured in 2006 under the , coordinated with the Directorate of to disrupt LTTE logistics and command structures. This included surveillance of urban terrorist cells plotting bombings—LTTE tactics that accounted for over 378 attacks between 1987 and 2009, killing thousands—and on supply routes sustaining the group's conventional and . Actionable from SIS networks facilitated military strikes that eroded LTTE control in the Northern Province, contributing to the group's territorial collapse by January 2009 and the elimination of leader on May 19, 2009. Post-defeat operations extended SIS to external threats, with the agency tracking LTTE networks and overseas operatives involved in and arms procurement, which had sustained the through yielding millions annually. By July 30, 2009, SIS reports to Sri Lanka's Security Council identified remaining LTTE sea captains abroad, aiding efforts to dismantle residual terrorist capabilities. These measures, integrated with military interdiction, prevented LTTE resurgence, though the agency's secretive nature limits public documentation of specific operations.

Intelligence in Preventing and Responding to Post-War Threats

The State Intelligence Service (SIS) has prioritized surveillance of LTTE diaspora networks and local sympathizers to avert separatist resurgence following the group's military defeat on May 18, 2009. Operations in 2014, informed by SIS intelligence, dismantled nascent LTTE revival efforts in northern , including arrests of individuals attempting to reorganize armed cadres and procure weapons. These actions, coordinated with police and , prevented coordinated attacks and drives linked to overseas LTTE fronts, with no large-scale insurgency materializing despite persistent agitation. By 2025, SIS monitoring has contributed to sustained stability, as evidenced by the absence of LTTE-linked violence exceeding sporadic incidents involving 10-20 arrests annually for or minor plotting. A parallel focus emerged on Islamist extremism, absent major incidents during the but rising post-2009 amid global jihadist influences. SIS, alongside the Terrorism Investigation Division, gathered intelligence on in eastern provinces, identifying precursors to the (NTJ) network by late 2018. However, specific warnings of an imminent NTJ plot in early 2019—derived from local and foreign intelligence—were not acted upon due to inter-agency silos and political directives under President Maithripala Sirisena's administration, culminating in the April 21 Easter Sunday bombings that killed 269 and injured over 500. In response, SIS accelerated operations, leading to the arrest of over 100 suspects within months, including key NTJ financiers and bomb-makers, and the neutralization of affiliated cells through raids yielding explosives caches. Post-2019 reforms bolstered SIS capabilities against hybrid threats, including cyber-enabled and foreign-backed . Enhanced thwarted at least five attempted infiltrations by LTTE-linked operatives from 2020-2023, while collaborations yielded disruptions of NTJ overseas remittances totaling millions in USD. By 2024, SIS integration of reduced response times to emerging plots, contributing to zero successful mass-casualty attacks since the bombings, though vulnerabilities persist in uncoordinated agency rivalries. These efforts underscore a transition from LTTE-centric to proactive threat mitigation, prioritizing empirical indicators like diaspora funding flows over unsubstantiated revival narratives.

International Cooperation and Specific Successes

The State Intelligence Service (SIS) engages in international cooperation primarily through intelligence sharing and capacity-building initiatives focused on and . , with SIS involvement in domestic coordination, participates in U.S.-led efforts such as joining the Combined Maritime Forces in and deploying naval assets to to counter Houthi threats in the . The agency supports regional frameworks including the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), where coordination enhances cross-border threat mitigation. Additionally, SIS benefits from foreign training programs provided by the , , , and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to bolster border security and investigative capabilities. A key area of collaboration involves joint operations with Indian intelligence agencies, including the (RAW), to address shared threats from Islamist extremism and LTTE remnants. In 2022, Sri Lankan authorities, leveraging SIS-coordinated intelligence, worked with Indian services to disrupt ISIS-inspired cells operating across the in , preventing potential spillover attacks. This partnership extended to monitoring LTTE diaspora networks, with SIS reporting the overseas locations of two senior Sea Tiger captains to Sri Lanka's Security Council on July 30, 2009, contributing to the neutralization of residual LTTE maritime capabilities post-civil war. Specific successes include facilitating U.S. Treasury sanctions against Mohamad Irshad Mohamed Haris Nizar, a Sri Lankan national linked to an al-Qa'ida financial facilitator, through shared intelligence that exposed his role in terrorist financing networks. SIS intelligence also informed Indian arrests of former LTTE operatives involved in arms and trafficking, such as the 2021 seizure of five rifles and 300 kg of tied to revival efforts, underscoring effective bilateral disruption of transnational threats. These outcomes demonstrate SIS's role in actionable exchanges, though broader efficacy depends on sustained inter-agency coordination amid regional geopolitical tensions.

Controversies, Failures, and Reforms

Documented Intelligence Lapses and Operational Shortcomings

The State Intelligence Service (SIS) faced significant criticism for its role in the intelligence failures preceding the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, which killed 269 people and injured over 500 in coordinated suicide attacks on churches and hotels. Foreign intelligence agencies, including , provided specific warnings as early as March 2019 about (NTJ) operatives planning vehicle-borne attacks, yet these were not adequately disseminated or acted upon within Sri Lanka's security apparatus. A parliamentary select attributed the lapses to breakdowns in analysis, coordination, and dissemination, exacerbated by political rivalries between President and Prime Minister , which paralyzed decision-making. In 2025, former SIS director Nilantha Jayawardena was dismissed from service after a found him guilty of withholding vital foreign from relevant authorities, highlighting operational deficiencies in sharing. Broader operational shortcomings have included inadequate legal frameworks governing activities, leading to ambiguities in oversight, , and inter-agency , which undermined effectiveness during crises. These structural issues contributed to repeated failures in predictive analysis and threat prioritization, as seen in the SIS's inability to anticipate the escalation of economic grievances into mass protests in 2022, which precipitated the ouster of President ; former officials later blamed the agency for such gaps. Additionally, SIS officers have been disproportionately penalized for operational setbacks outside their control, such as politicized directives limiting field autonomy, fostering a culture of rather than proactive gathering. A 2024 review of cycles identified governance shortfalls in integrating SIS inputs into policy, perpetuating vulnerabilities exposed in the 2019 attacks. During the LTTE conflict era, while SIS's predecessor elements exhibited early lapses—such as insufficient monitoring during the anti-Tamil riots that killed around 3,000 and displaced tens of thousands—the agency's post-2009 reorganization failed to fully address inter-service silos, resulting in fragmented responses to residual threats. These patterns underscore systemic challenges in penetration and technological integration, with analysts noting that without reforms, similar dissemination errors risk recurrence.

Allegations of Political Misuse and Scandals

The State Intelligence Service (SIS) has faced accusations of being deployed for political ends, particularly during periods of executive dominance. In the lead-up to the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, which killed 269 people, a parliamentary select committee report attributed critical intelligence lapses to SIS Director Nilantha Jayawardena's withholding of warnings about impending attacks from Indian intelligence, amid a rift between President and Prime Minister that paralyzed coordination. The later held Jayawardena accountable for negligence, ordering him to pay compensation to victims' families, highlighting how intra-governmental political feuds compromised operations. Under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa's administration (2019–2022), the SIS was alleged to have targeted government critics and diaspora activists. Director Suresh Sallay, appointed in 2019 despite prior accusations of war-era abuses, reportedly ordered police probes into Tamil Catholic priest Father Cyril Gamini and others for alleged LTTE links after they criticized post-war policies, including unsubstantiated claims of diaspora funding for anti-government activities. Sallay also initiated lawsuits against the International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP) over reports linking him to enforced disappearances. These actions drew scrutiny from monitors, who documented patterns of intelligence-driven harassment against journalists and opposition figures, often without judicial oversight. Further scandals involved operational abuses, such as the promotion in of an SIS officer accused of coercing false testimony from a Tamil doctor during trials, raising concerns over institutional protection of personnel implicated in violations. In recent years, opposition figures have claimed ongoing politicization, including under the 2024–2025 government, where intelligence restructuring allegedly prioritized loyalty over competence, potentially exposing vulnerabilities to threats like linked to politicians. Such allegations underscore persistent tensions between the SIS's security mandate and executive influence, with critics arguing that biased appointments and erode .

Ongoing Reforms and Structural Challenges

In January 2025, the government under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake initiated reforms aimed at de-politicizing 's defense and security sectors, including the State Intelligence Service (SIS). These included replacing the SIS Director with DIG Dhammika Priyantha in place of Maj. Gen. Tuan Suresh Sallay, alongside appointing retired Maj. Gen. Ruwan Wanigasooriya as the new Chief of National Intelligence and restructuring the Directorate of by appointing Brig. Deeptha Ariyasena. The changes were framed as part of the "Clean " initiative to enhance governance purity and adapt to contemporary threats such as cybersecurity and , while limiting service extensions for leaders to age 56 to promote merit-based promotions. Critics, including political figures like Udaya Gammanpila, have contended that these reorganizations constitute political interference that weakens the intelligence apparatus, potentially exposing to risks amid ongoing reorganizations. Despite such efforts, the SIS continues to face entrenched structural challenges, including a disjointed intelligence community comprising six primary agencies—such as the SIS and —without effective centralized command, leading to overlapping functions and poor inter-agency information sharing. This fragmentation contributed to operational failures, exemplified by the inability to prevent the 21 April 2019 Easter Sunday bombings despite prior intelligence warnings, which resulted in 270 deaths. A core issue remains the absence of a comprehensive legal framework; outdated legislation like the of 1955 and Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 fails to address modern needs, while a proposed National Act, approved by cabinet in 2020, remains unenacted as of 2025, fostering a culture of impunity and limited oversight. Politicization persists as a systemic vulnerability, with historical misuse of agencies like the SIS for partisan and alleged abuses—such as the 24 January 2010 disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda—undermining and operational . Post-civil internal rivalries, dating from the conflict's end on 18 May 2009, further exacerbate coordination deficits, while the lack of a formal policy after 76 years of results in ad-hoc . Analyses emphasize the need for empowering the Chief of National Intelligence with operational authority, enacting a Comprehensive Intelligence Act, and establishing bipartisan oversight mechanisms to mitigate these issues, though implementation has stalled amid political transitions. Without addressing these, the SIS risks continued inefficacy against evolving threats like resurgence and foreign influence operations.

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  47. https://www.npr.org/2019/04/24/716872923/sri-lankan-government-admits-it-failed-to-heed-intelligence-warnings
  48. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/24/sri-lanka-spy-chief-president-blamed-for-easter-attack-lapses
  49. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/sri-lanka-sacks-high-ranking-police-officer-over-easter-sunday-bombings/article69833931.ece
  50. https://www.lankaenews.com/news/4549/en
  51. https://www.themorning.lk/articles/31mkPxg89Z5RWdJIqjaN
  52. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/24/sri-lanka-spy-chief-blamed-for-failures-over-easter-bombings
  53. https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sri-lanka
  54. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/08/testimony-john-sifton-accountability-and-human-rights-sri-lanka
  55. https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/sri-lankan-intelligence-chief-takes-legal-action-against-itjp-over-defamation-claim
  56. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/30/sri-lanka-reject-political-victimization-findings
  57. https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/sri-lankan-intelligence-officer-who-forced-false-testimony-tamil-doctor-promoted
  58. https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/pivithuru-hela-urumaya-phu-party-leader-brands-reorganisation-intelligence-community
  59. https://www.slguardian.org/sri-lanka-intelligence-agencies-under-siege/
  60. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/17/sri-lanka-false-terrorism-cases-enable-repression
  61. https://www.themorning.lk/articles/nwfxxFushT2k4F5g1dzs
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