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National Security Intelligence
জাতীয় নিরাপত্তা গোয়েন্দা
Seal of National Security Intelligence
Agency overview
Formed29 December 1972; 52 years ago (1972-12-29)[1]
TypeIntelligence agency
JurisdictionGovernment of Bangladesh
HeadquartersNSI Building, Segunbagicha, Dhaka, Bangladesh[2][3]
MottoCommitted to national security.
EmployeesClassified
Annual budgetClassified
Agency executive
Parent agencyChief Adviser's Office

The National Security Intelligence, (Bengali: জাতীয় নিরাপত্তা গোয়েন্দা;) commonly known as the NSI, is a principal civilian intelligence agency of Bangladesh. It serves as the government’s lead organization for internal security, counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, and foreign intelligence operations, providing strategic analysis and intelligence support for national security decision-making. As the largest intelligence agency in the country, The NSI operates under the direct authority of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh and it's forms part of the Bangladesh Intelligence Community.[4]

It is an independent civilian intelligence agency. Today, its internal security functions are similar to the British security service MI5, while the foreign intelligence function does not quite resemble the MI6. The NSI also has territorial units in all 64 districts of Bangladesh, headed by a joint director/deputy director.[4]

Being the only independent civilian intelligence agency in Bangladesh, the NSI's principal activities are gathering information about foreign governments, individuals, corporations, political parties, and different religious groups; counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, political intelligence, and giving protection to the VIPs and VVIPs are among its major functions.[1]

Organization

[edit]
  • National Security Intelligence is headed by a director general (D.G.), who is a Secretary of Bangladesh Government or two-star military officer from Bangladesh Army. The key posts of this organization are director, additional director, joint director, deputy director, and assistant director. Some other posts are computer engineer, telephone engineer, and research officer. Some directorates of NSI are Internal, Dhaka Wing, Border, External, Security, Media wing, Training, Political, Eco-Security, Administration, Research, Counter-Terrorism cell, and intelligence.
  • The force is mostly staffed by civil personnel. Officers are recruited by the Prime Minister's Office, Class-1 officers directly recruited by the agency start with the post of assistant director (Grade-9).[5]
  • Officers are also seconded from Bangladesh Police, Armed Forces of Bangladesh, and Bangladesh Ansar.

List of directors general

[edit]

Duties

[edit]

The principal activities of the NSI National Security Intelligence are:

  • Gathering information by any or all means about foreign governments, organizations, individuals, and politicians; monitor Bangladeshi government officials, political parties, politicians, extremist groups, separatists, religious bodies, unions, popular movements, NGOs, and any other group or person who might be relevant to national security;
  • Analysing that information, along with intelligence gathered by other Bangladesh intelligence agencies, to provide intelligence assessments to the PM and the National Committee for Intelligence Coordination
  • Upon executive orders carrying out or overseeing covert activities overseas, by its own employees, by members of the military, or by other partner forces.

Notable foreign operations

[edit]

Yemen

  • On 11 February 2022, Lt. Col. (Retd.) Sufiul Anam, a Bangladeshi individual employed by the United Nations, was abducted from Yemen's Mudiah province by members of Al-Qaeda. A ransom of $3 million was demanded for his release. After 18 months in captivity, he was successfully rescued by the National Security Intelligence.[16]
  • India

On 2004 NSI operated a hit to kill mission against Indian narcotics smugglers, who were accused to be linked with Indian R&AW. The objective was to make easier to get narcotics for the Bangladeshi youths.Targeted cities were Delhi ,Calcutta ,Mumbaiand Agartala, from where most of the operatives work to smuggul drugs specially phensedyl inside Bangladesh.

About 17 places and 27 men were eliminated.1nsi officer was arrested at the end of the mission. However,the mission was successfully accomplished.

Controversies

[edit]

Human rights abuses

[edit]

According to Human Rights Watch's May 2009 issue, during the 2006–08 Bangladeshi political crisis in Bangladesh, the NSI was actively involved in harassment and arbitrary arrest of labor activists.[5]

Killing of labour activists

[edit]

NSI's name had appeared several times during the trial of the mysterious murder of labor rights activist Aminul Islam in April 2012. The only convict, Aminul's friend Mostafijur Rahman, was found to be a mystery man, about whom no one knew much, who apparently had a cover job at an EPZ clinic and regularly met with security officers, is believed to be linked with NSI, though the court has not asked the agency for clarification and nor did the prosecution try to bring them, media has speculated on such controversies, though denied by the agency.[17]

In fiction

[edit]
  • In the web TV series Contract (2021), Arifin Shuvoo played the character of Bastard, a fictional codename of a retired NSI agent and hitman who was given the last task to hunt down an underworld drug lord named Black Ranju (played by Chanchal Chowdhury)

See also

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Notes

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References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

National Security Intelligence

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
National Security Intelligence (NSI) is Bangladesh's primary agency, tasked with gathering and analyzing information on internal security threats, counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence operations, and foreign to safeguard national interests. Headquartered in Dhaka's Segunbagicha area, the agency reports directly to the Chief Adviser or and is led by a , often a senior such as a major general, reflecting its close ties to the armed forces despite its mandate. Established in the aftermath of Bangladesh's 1971 independence, NSI has played a pivotal role in advising executive leadership on security matters, including during political crises and regional challenges like the Rohingya refugee influx, where it has coordinated intelligence efforts on cross-border threats and repatriation dynamics. Its operations emphasize external intelligence collection, distinguishing it from domestic-focused entities like the , though overlaps exist in practice. The agency has been embroiled in controversies, including allegations of abuses during the 2006–2008 political crisis, where it was implicated in arbitrary detentions and interrogations, as well as recent claims of against protesters, journalists, and medical personnel amid the 2024 unrest. scandals have also surfaced, with former TM Jobayer accused of amassing illicit wealth through graft during his tenure. These issues, compounded by a lack of transparency and —common critiques in post-authoritarian reforms—have prompted calls for structural overhaul following the 2024 people's uprising, highlighting systemic weaknesses in oversight and operational ethics.

History

Establishment and Early Years

The National Security Intelligence (NSI) was established in via an executive order issued by , shortly after gained independence from on 16 December 1971. As the country's principal civilian intelligence agency, NSI was tasked with collecting and analyzing intelligence on internal and external threats to , consolidating functions previously managed by wartime networks during the 1971 Liberation War. It operated under the direct oversight of the Prime Minister's Office, with a mandate to safeguard the fledgling state's stability amid post-independence challenges such as economic reconstruction, refugee repatriation, and political factionalism. In its early years, NSI maintained a low public profile while building domestic surveillance capabilities, focusing on monitoring subversive elements, including remnants of pro-Pakistan groups and emerging domestic dissent. The agency drew personnel from civil bureaucracy and former operatives, establishing headquarters in Dhaka's Segunbagicha area. However, NSI encountered operational limitations due to limited resources and institutional inexperience in the volatile political environment. A critical early test came with the and much of his family on 15 August 1975, which exposed significant intelligence gaps in preempting the military coup orchestrated by disaffected army officers. This event, described as Bangladesh's first major intelligence failure, prompted subsequent reviews of NSI's structures but did not immediately alter its foundational role.

Evolution Through Political Regimes

The National Security Intelligence (NSI) was established in December 1972 under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's government, shortly after Bangladesh's , as the country's primary civilian tasked with gathering internal security and foreign intelligence to counter threats to national stability. During Rahman's one-party BAKSAL regime (1975), the NSI focused on consolidating state control amid post- insurgencies and political fragmentation, though its operations were hampered by the 1975 military coup that assassinated Rahman and fragmented intelligence coordination. Under President Ziaur Rahman's military-backed rule (1975–1981), the NSI continued domestic monitoring but was overshadowed by the newly formed (DGFI) in 1978, which prioritized military-led foreign intelligence and counter-insurgency against leftist and separatist groups; Zia's regime emphasized Islamization and economic stabilization, directing NSI toward suppressing domestic dissent linked to the 1971 liberation war's ideological divides. Successive military governance under (1982–1990) further militarized intelligence, with NSI relegated to auxiliary roles in internal surveillance while Ershad's Jatiya Party regime used it to track opposition movements amid widespread protests that culminated in his 1990 ouster; this period saw fragmented agency performance, contributing to intelligence failures like unmitigated . The transition to parliamentary democracy in 1991 under Khaleda Zia's BNP government reinvigorated NSI's civilian mandate, emphasizing coordination with police for counter-terrorism against rising Islamist militancy and ; during BNP tenures (1991–1996 and 2001–2006), NSI expanded operations to monitor cross-border threats and internal stability, though it faced criticism for inadequate responses to events like the 2004 grenade attacks on rallies. Under Sheikh Hasina's governments (1996–2001 and especially 2009–2024), NSI's role evolved toward centralized surveillance, including the 2009 formation of the National Committee for Intelligence Coordination (NCIC) to oversee multi-agency efforts, but it was increasingly deployed for political ends, such as tracking opposition figures and enabling digital monitoring programs funded by $190 million in foreign acquisitions from 2015 onward. Department reports documented NSI involvement in politically motivated violations, including arbitrary detentions, during this era, reflecting a shift from security-focused operations to regime protection amid allegations of authoritarian consolidation. Following Hasina's resignation in August 2024 amid mass protests, the interim government led by prioritized intelligence depoliticization, replacing NSI leadership aligned with the prior regime and initiating reforms to restrict domestic operations and enhance oversight, aiming to restore focus on empirical threat assessment over partisan activities. These changes address longstanding critiques of NSI's evolution under alternating regimes, where civilian agencies often yielded to priorities, as evidenced by persistent gaps in counter-terrorism despite expanded resources.

Organizational Structure

Leadership and Directors General

The (DG) of the National Security Intelligence (NSI) serves as the agency's chief executive, directing its core functions of intelligence collection, threat assessment, and advisory support to the on matters of . The DG holds a rank equivalent to a or a two-star general and reports to the Chief Adviser (or ) and the . Appointments are executed by the executive authority, typically announced via the (ISPR), with selections drawn predominantly from senior officers on deputation, reflecting the agency's emphasis on expertise in oversight. The tenure of the DG is not fixed by statute and can be influenced by governmental priorities and political stability, as evidenced by short terms during periods of transition. For example, Md. Hossein Al Morshed assumed the role around 2024 but was replaced after approximately four months amid the interim government's formation following the ouster of the prior administration.
Director GeneralTerm StartNotes
Md. Hossein Al Morshedc. 2024Brief tenure ended in removal; prior role included command of infantry regimental centre.
Abu Mohammad Sarwar Farid13 August 2024Current as of October 2025; previously commandant of .
Earlier appointments have similarly featured army majors generals, such as M. Manzur Ahmed, who took office on 17 2009, underscoring a of continuity since NSI's inception. The role demands impartiality in operations, though alignments with ruling regimes have occasionally drawn scrutiny in media reports on politicization.

Internal Organization and Coordination

The National Security Intelligence (NSI) maintains a centralized hierarchical structure under the (DG), a position conventionally filled by a two-star general from the to leverage expertise in intelligence operations. As of August 14, 2024, Abu Mohammad Sarwar was appointed DG, continuing the tradition of in this agency. This setup ensures unified command, with the DG overseeing strategic direction, resource allocation, and operational approvals from headquarters in . Internally, NSI organizes its functions through specialized wings and directorates focused on core mandates such as internal security, counter-terrorism, and counter-intelligence. A prominent example is the Counter-Terrorism Wing, established in 2004 amid rising domestic threats and international pressure following events like the U.S.-led global counter-terrorism efforts post-9/11; this unit handles specialized collection, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence to build in-house capacity independent of military counterparts. Other functional areas likely include domestic and foreign liaison desks, though precise departmental delineations remain classified, reflecting standard practices in intelligence agencies to protect operational integrity. Coordination within NSI occurs through an executive office that integrates inputs from field operatives and analytical wings, facilitating deconflicted operations and timely reporting to senior government officials. This internal mechanism emphasizes vertical reporting lines to the DG, minimizing silos while allowing specialized units autonomy in tactical execution; however, turf overlaps with have occasionally strained resource sharing, as noted in discussions. Reforms since the early have incrementally strengthened internal cohesion, such as by enhancing the Counter-Terrorism Wing's analytical tools, but comprehensive overhauls remain limited due to political sensitivities and security imperatives. Publicly available details are sparse, as NSI prioritizes operational over transparency, a common feature in Bangladesh's intelligence community where institutional opacity aids effectiveness against adaptive threats.

Mandate and Operations

Core Duties and Responsibilities

The National Security Intelligence (NSI) Directorate functions as Bangladesh's principal civilian , primarily responsible for collecting foreign intelligence and monitoring internal affairs to safeguard interests. Established under the Prime Minister's Office, its mandate emphasizes gathering actionable intelligence on external threats, including geopolitical developments, economic influences from abroad, and transnational risks such as or proxy activities by foreign entities. This role positions NSI as a key advisor to the government on strategic threats, distinct from military-focused agencies like the (DGFI). In domestic operations, NSI conducts and analysis of internal stability factors, including political movements, potential insurgencies, and economic vulnerabilities that could undermine . Its responsibilities extend to counter-intelligence measures, aimed at detecting and neutralizing or subversive activities by foreign actors within . NSI also plays a coordinating function among Bangladesh's intelligence community, facilitating information sharing between civilian, police, and military entities to ensure comprehensive threat assessment, though operational overlaps with agencies like have occasionally led to inefficiencies. Counter-terrorism forms a critical component of NSI's duties, involving the identification of radical networks, financing trails, and ideological propagations that pose risks to public order, often in collaboration with . For instance, NSI has been involved in tracking external support for militant groups, such as alleged Indian intelligence operations exporting , based on reports attributing to NSI findings as of October 2025. Beyond reactive measures, NSI contributes to proactive national stability by assessing risks from migration crises, like the Rohingya situation, where it has influenced policy through on camp dynamics and repatriation feasibility since at least 2023. NSI's analytical outputs support high-level decision-making, including briefings to the on emerging threats, with an emphasis on empirical data from human and sources. However, its effectiveness is constrained by legal frameworks limiting transparency, as NSI is exempt from certain disclosure requirements under the Right to Information Act 2009, reflecting its classified operational nature. Overall, these duties prioritize causal linkages between inputs and outcomes, focusing on verifiable threats rather than speculative assessments.

Domestic Intelligence Activities

The National Security Intelligence (NSI) engages in domestic intelligence activities primarily through monitoring internal affairs that could threaten national stability, such as political subversion, extremism, and activities linked to foreign influences within . Established by cabinet decision in without a statutory basis, NSI's mandate includes collecting intelligence on these domestic risks alongside its foreign focus, providing assessments to the as a key adviser. This role distinguishes NSI from the of police, which handles routine domestic collection, while NSI emphasizes higher-level threats to and . Key operations involve surveillance of domestic networks potentially involved in destabilizing events, including militant groups and political unrest. For instance, NSI has analyzed internal dynamics during crises like the 2005 serial bombings, 2007 , and the 2009 Bangladesh Rifles mutiny, contributing intelligence to prevent escalation. In counterterrorism efforts, NSI identifies domestic links to transnational threats, supporting operations against , though primary execution falls to units like the . Coordination challenges persist due to siloed structures, with NSI sharing findings through the National Committee for Intelligence Coordination but lacking centralized fusion for domestic threats. NSI also monitors socioeconomic vulnerabilities, such as labor unrest in the ready-made garments sector, to forecast risks to internal order. In management, the agency has conducted activities in camps, including urging Rohingya to mitigate long-term domestic security burdens from cross-border militancy. These efforts underscore NSI's focus on preventive intelligence rather than direct enforcement, though overlaps with from the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence can lead to redundancies in addressing hybrid domestic-foreign threats.

Foreign Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence

The National Security Intelligence (NSI) Directorate of conducts foreign intelligence operations to identify and assess external threats, including geopolitical risks from neighboring states and transnational non-state actors. Established under the 1972 Special Powers Act and reporting directly to the Prime Minister's Office, NSI's external focus complements the military-oriented (DGFI) by emphasizing civilian-led analysis of foreign policy dynamics, economic vulnerabilities, and hybrid threats such as cross-border . These activities involve sourcing from diplomatic channels, open-source monitoring, and liaison with international partners, though operational details remain classified due to the agency's secretive mandate. Key foreign intelligence priorities include surveillance of activities by regional powers, particularly and , that could undermine Bangladesh's sovereignty or economic stability. NSI gathers data on potential border encroachments, water-sharing disputes, and foreign funding of domestic insurgencies, informing policy responses such as enhanced maritime patrols in the . In counter-terrorism contexts, NSI tracks the overseas movements of Bangladeshi extremists, including networks linked to Afghan-based groups, to prevent of trained militants; reports indicate monitoring of at least 25 such individuals as of October 2025. Counter-intelligence functions center on neutralizing by foreign services within , such as intercepting agents collecting military or infrastructural data. This entails vetting foreign diplomats, businesses, and NGOs for covert operations, with NSI employing to disrupt communications and physical to expose infiltration attempts. Efforts also extend to protecting critical assets from , including thwarting cyber intrusions traced to state actors; for example, NSI has contributed to defenses against campaigns targeting networks, amid rising digital threats documented in 2024-2025. Coordination with allies like the has bolstered these capabilities through shared threat assessments on Islamist financing flows, though NSI's reliance on domestic assets limits deep overseas penetration compared to larger agencies. Despite these roles, NSI's foreign operations face challenges from resource constraints and overlapping mandates with DGFI, leading to occasional redundancies in threat reporting. Post-2024 political upheaval has prompted calls for NSI to prioritize external threats over internal politicization, with analysts recommending stricter prohibitions on domestic activities to sharpen its counter-espionage edge. Successes remain opaque, but NSI's inputs have supported diplomatic maneuvers, such as negotiations over , where intelligence on Myanmar's internal dynamics influenced Bangladesh's positioning despite unverified allegations of coercive tactics.

Key Achievements

Counter-Terrorism Successes

The National Security Intelligence (NSI) has played a pivotal role in Bangladesh's counter-terrorism framework through its Counter Terrorism Wing, which focuses on intelligence collection, , and coordination to disrupt militant networks. Following the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack in , claimed by ISIS-affiliated Neo-Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (Neo-JMB), which resulted in 29 deaths, NSI contributed to a nationwide crackdown that dismantled key operational cells of JMB and its offshoots. This involved intelligence-led arrests of over 12,000 suspects and the neutralization of senior leaders, significantly degrading the groups' capacity for large-scale attacks. NSI's establishment of the Combined Threat Assessment Centre (CTAC) has enhanced inter-agency collaboration, enabling proactive threat identification and prevention of plots targeting high-profile figures, including . By 2022, ongoing operations supported by NSI intelligence led to the arrest of Neo-JMB operatives planning assassinations and bombings, contributing to a sharp decline in domestic terrorist incidents. In recent years, NSI's efforts have aligned with broader national strategies, resulting in zero reported instances of transnational terrorist violence in 2023, as authorities rigorously pursued militants through surveillance and informant networks. This success is evidenced by the disruption of financing channels for groups like JMB, with intelligence operations uncovering links to external actors and preventing resurgence. U.S. assessments note that such pursuits have maintained low indices, with ranking outside the top tiers of global threat levels by 2023.

Contributions to National Stability

The National Security Intelligence (NSI) has contributed to Bangladesh's national stability primarily through its mandate to monitor internal political dynamics and foreign influences that could precipitate unrest or governmental disruption. As the lead civilian agency for such , NSI provides actionable assessments to policymakers, enabling preemptive interventions against threats like subversive activities or coordinated opposition movements. Analyses of Bangladesh's intelligence framework credit the —including NSI—with notable successes in averting crises that might otherwise escalate into broader , thereby supporting continuity of governance and public order. These contributions are evident in the sustained absence of large-scale militant disruptions following effective operational responses, which have underpinned a decade of relative internal calm since and facilitated socioeconomic progress without major interruptions from organized violence. NSI's focus on field-level coordination with other agencies has enhanced threat detection, particularly in politically sensitive regions, reducing the risk of cascading failures in apparatus that could undermine state cohesion. However, the secretive nature of intelligence work limits public documentation of specific operations, with available evaluations emphasizing overall preservation of over isolated incidents.

Controversies

Allegations of Human Rights Violations

The National Security Intelligence (NSI) of Bangladesh has faced allegations of involvement in enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary detentions, particularly during the Awami League government from 2009 to 2024. Human rights organizations and international reports document patterns where NSI agents, often in plainclothes, abducted individuals suspected of opposition activities or dissent, holding them in secret facilities for interrogation. For instance, between January and September 2023, local groups reported 32 enforced disappearances attributed to intelligence services including NSI, with victims typically opposition leaders or activists released without charge or formally arrested after prolonged incommunicado detention. Over 700 such cases occurred under the prior regime, with nearly 100 individuals remaining missing as of late 2024, according to estimates by domestic monitors. During the July-August 2024 student-led protests, NSI collaborated with other security entities to facilitate mass arbitrary arrests totaling 11,702 detentions, including children, by providing targeting intelligence in late July. Agents abducted student leaders, subjecting them to torture to extract coerced statements renouncing protest involvement, and surveilled hospitals to interrogate patients, intimidate medical staff, and confiscate records or CCTV footage concealing evidence of violence. NSI also contributed to suppressing information by pressuring media outlets and witnesses, while internal reporting acknowledged 314 unreported deaths during the unrest, including 40 children, beyond official tallies. These actions formed part of a broader systematic repression, with NSI's role in intelligence-sharing enabling violations like obstructions to medical care and Internet shutdowns from 18 July to 5 August 2024, which incurred an estimated $10 billion economic loss. Torture allegations against NSI include maintaining secret detention cells for beatings, , and other coercive methods to extract information from suspected militants or critics, with persisting due to lack of independent investigations. Released victims from facilities linked to NSI and similar agencies reported and auditory evidence of ongoing of others. Post-2024 regime change, the interim government established a commission on enforced disappearances and acceded to the UN International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from in August 2024, though prosecutions remain limited and families await accountability. NSI has denied systematic abuses, attributing operations to counter-terrorism necessities, but international bodies like the UN Committee Against have rejected such defenses, citing patterns incompatible with obligations.

Political Interference and Partisanship

The National Security Intelligence (NSI), as a civilian agency reporting directly to the Prime Minister's office, faced repeated allegations of political partisanship during the 's tenure under from 2009 to 2024, with critics asserting it functioned as an extension of ruling party interests rather than an impartial national security body. Reports documented NSI's collaboration with the military-linked (DGFI) in supporting campaigns against electoral opponents, including the (BNP), through selective intelligence gathering and . For instance, during the 2018 municipal and national elections, opposition figures reported NSI and threats aimed at extracting information on BNP strategies, followed by arrests of non-compliant individuals. These actions aligned with broader patterns where political affiliation influenced prosecutions and detentions, disproportionately affecting opposition members. NSI's domestic operations extended to pervasive surveillance of perceived government critics, including organizations, groups, and opposition activists from parties like BNP and . monitors alleged that NSI employed informers and conducted intimidating visits to NGOs to suppress dissent, while contributing to monitoring cells designed to detect and counter "rumors" critical of the regime. Such practices escalated ahead of elections, with NSI implicated in interrogations focused on opposition affiliations, as evidenced by detainee accounts of torture-linked questioning about BNP or Jamaat links. Government denials emphasized counter-terrorism mandates, but patterns of selective enforcement—sparing affiliates while targeting rivals—suggested instrumentalization for partisan advantage. Allegations intensified regarding NSI's role in enforced disappearances, with over 600 cases documented by groups since 2009, many involving opposition figures abducted by including units. These abductions, often followed by secret detention or extrajudicial outcomes, were linked to NSI and DGFI operations targeting suspected Islamist militants but extending to political dissidents, as verified through victim family testimonies and leaked records. Post-2024 uprising inquiries under the interim government corroborated early evidence of high-level involvement in such abuses, recommending for systemic misuse of agencies like NSI to maintain ruling party dominance. While NSI's overlapping mandate with DGFI blurred lines of responsibility, the agency's direct subordination to the facilitated unchecked partisan application, eroding public trust in its neutrality.

Surveillance Practices and Privacy Concerns

The National Security Intelligence (NSI), as Bangladesh's primary civilian intelligence agency, employs surveillance practices including electronic monitoring, , and gathering to address threats such as , , and foreign interference, often authorized under the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulation Act of 2001, which permits of communications for purposes. These methods have expanded with the adoption of advanced technologies, including and cyber tools procured from international suppliers, enabling real-time tracking of individuals deemed security risks. During the tenure of the government prior to August 2024, NSI's infrastructure was integrated into a broader state apparatus that facilitated monitoring of opposition figures, journalists, and activists, with documented instances of and site blocking to suppress . Privacy concerns have intensified due to the absence of robust legal safeguards and oversight mechanisms, allowing arbitrary access to personal data from national ID databases and telecommunication networks without consistent judicial warrants. reported in 2020 that such practices violated rights to free expression and privacy, exemplified by the blocking of investigative sites like Netra News after publications critical of government figures. Critics, including independent research from the Tech Global Institute, argue that over 20 laws enable unchecked "monitoring" and interception, often applied politically rather than proportionately to genuine threats, fostering a digital that erodes . Following the 2024 uprising and the fall of Hasina's administration, the interim government initiated discussions on reforms, including potential revisions to laws to introduce stricter oversight, though remains pending as of late 2025. Proposals for a Cyber Security Ordinance in 2024 raised further alarms over expanded state powers without adequate protections, prompting calls from for independent audits of agencies like NSI to prevent abuses. Despite these efforts, persistent challenges include the legacy of politicized tools and insufficient data protection frameworks, as Bangladesh's Protection Act has yet to fully address unauthorized intrusions. from post-uprising analyses indicates that without causal reforms targeting institutional biases toward regime loyalty over impartial threat assessment, erosions will continue to undermine in operations.

Reforms and Recent Developments

Post-2024 Uprising Reforms

Following the resignation of on August 5, 2024, amid mass protests known as the Monsoon Revolution, Bangladesh's interim government under Chief Adviser prioritized depoliticizing key institutions, including the National Security Intelligence (NSI). This involved immediate leadership transitions to remove officials perceived as aligned with the ousted administration, which had reportedly used NSI for partisan surveillance and suppression of dissent. On August 13, 2024, Abu Mohammad Sarwar Farid of the was appointed of NSI, succeeding Md Hossein Al Morshed, who had taken the role in April 2024 but was removed amid the post-uprising reshuffle. This change aligned with similar purges in agencies like the (DGFI) and , targeting Hasina-era appointees accused of enabling state repression during the protests. The (ISPR) confirmed the appointment, emphasizing continuity in operational mandates while signaling a shift toward non-partisan intelligence gathering. Broader reform efforts focused on structural adjustments to prevent future politicization, including proposals for a centralized, civilian-led National Committee on Intelligence Coordination (NCIC) with a nonpolitical head analogous to the U.S. . The interim government established advisory committees to review intelligence oversight, aiming to enhance interagency coordination among NSI, DGFI, and others for addressing internal threats like and external geopolitical risks from neighbors such as and . However, implementation has been gradual, with analysts noting that while leadership changes addressed immediate loyalty concerns, deeper mechanisms—such as independent audits of past abuses—remain pending as of October 2025. These steps reflect Yunus's emphasis on restoring in intelligence operations, though critics from human rights groups argue for mandatory transparency in appointments to curb military dominance.

Ongoing Challenges and Future Directions

The National Security Intelligence (NSI) faces persistent institutional fragmentation, with overlapping mandates and rivalries among agencies such as NSI, the (DGFI), and the (SB), resulting in duplicated efforts and critical intelligence gaps that contributed to failures during the 2024 uprising. Under the prior administration (2009–2024), NSI and affiliated bodies were heavily politicized, prioritizing domestic , dissident intimidation, and enforcement actions like the 11-day internet blackout in July 2024 over genuine national security threats, eroding operational credibility and public trust. Evolving security landscapes exacerbate these issues, including a resurgence of faith-based targeting minorities such as Ahmadis and , heightened risks from Rohingya camps involving armed groups and illegal cross-border activities stemming from the 2017 incursion, and insurgencies in the by groups like the , which have included attacks on . Cyber vulnerabilities represent an additional challenge, with inadequate preparedness against cyber warfare, radicalization via online platforms, and terror migration trends, compounded by systemic weaknesses in sectors like . Future directions emphasize depoliticization through the removal of regime-aligned —evident in post-July dismissals and arrests—and a reorientation toward core functions like and foreign intelligence gathering. Proposed reforms include establishing a centralized coordinating mechanism, potentially modeled on a , to enforce clear role divisions, such as NSI's focus on internal security and alongside DGFI's military-oriented efforts, while fostering inter-agency information sharing. Enhancing capabilities will require workforce diversification beyond military personnel to include analysts, diplomats, and cyber experts, coupled with targeted training for multifaceted threats and investments in cybersecurity infrastructure to address geopolitical pressures from neighbors like India, Myanmar, and China. Implementing robust oversight mechanisms, independent of political influence, is essential to prevent future misuse and ensure accountability, aligning with broader security sector reforms under the interim government as of late 2024.

References

  1. https://www.isdp.eu/bangladesh-needs-an-intelligence-reform-after-peoples-revolution/
  2. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26535023
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  4. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/bangladesh/ohchr-fftb-hr-violations-bd.pdf
  5. https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/un-report-shows-how-dgfi-nsi-rab-intimidated-journos-blackout-brutalities-1067906
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  21. https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/im4okvjkmt
  22. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/M_Manzur_Ahmed
  23. https://weeklyblitz.net/2025/04/06/story-of-a-rogue-intelligence-chief-in-bangladesh-who-siphoned-millions-of-dollars-to-dubai-singapore-britain-and-other-countries/
  24. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/364753220_Bangladesh_Intelligence_Culture_and_Reform_Priorities
  25. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329962692_Explaining_Recent_Intelligence_Reforms_in_Bangladesh
  26. https://ndcjournal.ndc.gov.bd/ndcj/index.php/ndcj/article/download/51/45/90
  27. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/169205/at-a-glance-intelligence-agencies-of-bangladesh
  28. https://file.portal.gov.bd/uploads/8ef2a505-c131-4a8f-b6d0-2ac4760cc936//64c/09b/de8/64c09bde825ac530337614.pdf
  29. https://southasiajournal.net/bangladesh-intelligence-unmasks-raws-strategy-of-exporting-extremism-regionally/
  30. http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/upload/act/2021-11-17-11-22-38-37.-The-Right-to-Information-Act-2009.pdf
  31. https://www.eurasiareview.com/05102025-fragmented-and-vulnerable-time-to-rethink-bangladeshs-intelligence-system-oped/
  32. https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/longform/360094/a-close-examination-of-bangladesh%25E2%2580%2599s-intelligence
  33. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2022/bangladesh
  34. https://techglobalinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/TGI-Cyber-Surveillance-Practices-in-Bangladesh-F.pdf
  35. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2023/bangladesh
  36. https://www.msiworldwide.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Violent-Extremism-and-Insurgency-Bangladesh.pdf
  37. https://apgml.org/sites/default/files/documents//Bangladesh_MER_2016_-_published_version.pdf
  38. https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bangladesh/
  39. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/bangladesh
  40. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/bangladesh-un-report-finds-brutal-systematic-repression-protests-calls
  41. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/783263/files/A_HRC_25_NGO_42-EN.pdf
  42. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/07/committee-against-torture-examines-situation-bangladesh
  43. https://2017-2021.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bangladesh/
  44. https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bangladesh/
  45. https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/08/16/where-no-sun-can-enter/decade-enforced-disappearances-bangladesh
  46. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/early-evidence-suggests-bangladeshi-ex-premier-involved-in-forced-disappearances-finds-commission/3424872
  47. https://techglobalinstitute.com/research/the-digital-police-state/
  48. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/08/bangladesh-online-surveillance-control
  49. https://thegreatwave.thedailystar.net/news/beyond-the-shadows-reforming-surveillance-practices-in-bangladesh
  50. https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/how-bangladesh-has-been-building-digital-police-state-3960706
  51. https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/01/27/after-monsoon-revolution/roadmap-lasting-security-sector-reform-bangladesh
  52. https://techpolicy.press/bangladesh-interim-governments-right-to-uninterrupted-internet-access-is-a-sham
  53. https://www.tbsnews.net/thoughts/problem-bangladeshs-data-protection-framework-and-its-solutions-480030
  54. https://www.isdp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Blog-55-Bangladesh.pdf
  55. https://dailyasianage.com/news/343671/terrorism-in-bangladesh-minimal-threat-yet-new-trend-of-cyber-radicalization-and-migration
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