Hubbry Logo
Palestinian Preventive SecurityPalestinian Preventive SecurityMain
Open search
Palestinian Preventive Security
Community hub
Palestinian Preventive Security
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Palestinian Preventive Security
Palestinian Preventive Security
Palestinian Preventive Security
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Palestinian Preventive Security
Al-'amn al-wiqa'i
الأمن الوقائي
Agency overview
Formed1994
JurisdictionState of Palestine, Gaza Strip (until 2007)
HeadquartersRamallah, West Bank
Agency executives
  • Abdul Qader Al-Taamari, Director
  • Taher Mohammed Aqraa, Deputy Director
Parent agencyPalestinian Security Services
Politics of Palestine
Coat of arms of Palestine
Officeholders whose status is disputed are shown in italics
National symbols
Administrative divisions
Government
Legislative Council
Elections
Local elections
Political parties
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) factions
Other parties
Palestinian Electoral Lists
Leaders
Map shows birthplaces or family origins
Foreign relations
Arab League Member state of the Arab League
flag Palestine portal

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS; Arabic: الأمن الوقائي, romanized: Al-’amn al-wiqā’ī), also known as Preventive Security Force (PSF; Arabic: جهاز الأمن الوقائي) or Preventive Security Service (PSS), is one of the security organs of the State of Palestine. It was established in 1994 by president Yasser Arafat in accordance with the Oslo Accords.

The PPS is an internal intelligence organization, part of the Palestinian Security Services, and led by the Minister of the Interior. Its main tasks are protecting the internal security of Palestine and the Palestinian Authority, and preventing crimes which target governmental departments and public bodies and institutions. It was the keeper of the Oslo peace process.

Organization

[edit]

The PPS is one of several intelligence services of Palestine. According to some sources, 5,000 plain-clothed members served in separate units in the West Bank and Gaza in 2006.[1][2] In Gaza Strip, PPS security forces were led by Mohammed Dahlan until he and his soldiers were forced to leave by Hamas in 2007 after their defeat in Battle of Gaza.[3]

In the late 1990s, the "Security and Protection Department" or so-called "Death Squad" was established, aimed at activists of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In 2007, the estimated strength was 3,500 in the West Bank and 4,500 in Gaza.[4] SPD worked closely with Israel’s Internal Security Agencies in arresting, interrogating, and sometimes torturing Palestinians who were then arrested by Israel. In 2005, following Yasser Arafat's death, the PPS's Security and Protection Department was disbanded as part of the security sector reform process.[3]

Many Palestinians think that Israel's military occupation, alleged repression, and displacement are facilitated by the Palestinian Authority and its forces. The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Palestinian think tank located in Ramallah, found that in March 2023, for the first time since the authority's establishment, the majority of Palestinians believed that its dissolution or collapse was in their best interests. 66% of Palestinians living in West Bank, according to a June PCPSR survey, were in favor of the creation of armed groups that are not under the control of the government security forces.[5]

2007 reform

[edit]

In November 2007, President Mahmoud Abba issued "Decree Law No. ( ) of 2007 Concerning the Preventive Security", which re-defined the Preventive Security. The Law is not approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council.

The Preventive Security is led by the Minister of the Interior and headed by the Director-General of the Directorate-General of the Preventive Security. According to the 2007 Law, the duties of the Preventive Security are:[6]

  1. Working to protect the Palestinian internal security.
  2. Following up on crimes which threaten the internal security of the National Authority and/or those imposed thereon, as well as working towards their prevention.
  3. Uncovering crimes which target governmental departments and public bodies and institutions, as well as the employees thereat.

Leadership

[edit]
  • Jibril Rajoub (West Bank) 1994–2002 headed the Force until July 2002.[7][8]
    • Majid Faraj [ar; he] joined the PSF from 1994, when the Preventive Force was established, and headed by Jibril Rajoub. In 2000, he was in charge of the Bethlehem district. In 2006, Faraj was promoted to the head of military intelligence in the West Bank. Abbas appointed him chief of the General Intelligence Service in 2009.[9]
  • Mohammed Dahlan (Gaza) (1994–2002) was the first chief of the Palestinian Security Force in Gaza from 1994 to 2002.
  • Rashid Abu Shabak (Gaza) (2002–2004)
  • Zuhair Manasra (West Bank) (2002–2004)
  • Rashid Abu Shabak (2005–2007) In April 2005, Rashid Abu Shbak became head of the PSF in both West Bank and Gaza. In February 2006, he was appointed head of the new Palestinian Security Services, which included the PSF.[10]
    • Suleiman Abu Mutlaq (Gaza) (2005–2006)
    • Yousef Ali Issa (Gaza) (2006–2007)
    • Ziad Hab Al-Reeh (West Bank) (2005–2007)
  • Ziad Hab Al-Reeh (2007–2021)
  • Abdul Qader Al-Taamari (2021–present)
    • Deputy Director Taher Mohammed Aqraa

Developments

[edit]

Second Intifada

[edit]

The PPS was accused by Israel of playing a covert role in the Second Intifada that erupted in September 2000 after Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount. In 2001, it shelled the house of General Jibril Rajoub, then colonel, who at the time was the PPS director. A number of PPS officers were also assassinated, injured and arrested. In April 2002, Sharon ordered the Operation Defensive Shield, the largest Israeli military campaign in the West Bank since its occupation in 1967. The headquarters of PPS in Beitunia was placed under a military siege, with intensive shelling by tanks and Apaches, reducing the headquarters to rubble, and injuring dozens of officers.[citation needed]

2007

[edit]

On 14 June 2007, Hamas militants took over the Preventive Security building in Gaza City and the intelligence service headquarters in Gaza.[11]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Palestinian Preventive Security

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Palestinian Preventive Security Service (PSS), also referred to as the Preventive Security Organisation (PSO), is an internal intelligence and security branch of the Palestinian Authority tasked with preventing threats to the Authority's stability, conducting activities, and exercising powers within Palestinian-controlled areas. Established in 1994 by as part of the security apparatus created under the , the PSS operates under the Ministry of Interior and is headed by a Director-General appointed by the President, with historical leadership including in the and Muhammad Dahlan in Gaza. The organization has played a central role in maintaining Fatah-dominated control in the by targeting rival groups such as and , often through arrests and operations that prioritize regime security over broader national interests. Its defining characteristic includes extensive coordination with Israeli security services and the , which has facilitated intelligence sharing and joint efforts to neutralize militant networks but has fueled persistent controversies over alleged with occupying forces, undermining Palestinian unity and independence. A notable low point occurred in 2007, when CIA-supported PSS forces attempted to wrest control of Gaza from , resulting in violent clashes and the agency's effective expulsion from the territory, confining its operations to the thereafter. Reports have documented systemic abuses by the PSS, including arbitrary detentions, , and extrajudicial killings of perceived opponents, practices that reflect its evolution from a post-Oslo preventive force into a repressive instrument for internal political suppression.

History

Establishment and Early Years (1994–2000)

The Preventive Security Service (PSS), an internal intelligence and security apparatus of the Palestinian Authority (PA), was established in 1994 following the of 1993 and the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of May 4, 1994, which transferred limited administrative control to the PA in parts of Gaza and Jericho. Created under Arafat's direction as part of the broader General Security Service framework formalized by the of May 1994, the PSS was tasked with preventive measures against subversion, counterespionage, and threats to PA stability, including opposition from militant groups like that rejected the . Operating primarily in PA-controlled Areas A and B, it complemented other branches such as the civil police, focusing on rapid-response intelligence to safeguard governmental institutions and the interim Oslo arrangements. Muhammad Dahlan, a Fatah affiliate who returned from exile with Arafat, was appointed head of the PSS in Gaza in 1994, overseeing its expansion into a force numbering around 20,000 personnel by the late 1990s, with funding and training support from international donors including the . In the , the service similarly built capacity under separate leadership, emphasizing surveillance and disruption of networks deemed hostile to PA authority. The PSS's early structure prioritized loyalty to , drawing recruits from PLO factions and local affiliates, which enabled quick deployment but also fostered factional tensions. From 1994 to 2000, the PSS conducted arrests of suspected activists, particularly after attacks like the October 19, 1994, bus bombing, detaining over 150 individuals in the ensuing weeks to preempt further violence and maintain coordination with under protocols. These operations aimed to neutralize militant cells opposing the PA's monopoly on force, but reports highlighted procedural irregularities, including warrantless detentions and allegations of against political prisoners, as noted by in its monitoring of PA practices. By the end of the decade, the service had solidified its role in internal policing, though its effectiveness was constrained by limited resources, overlapping mandates with other PA agencies, and growing Islamist resistance.

Role in the Second Intifada (2000–2005)

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS), primarily responsible for internal intelligence and countering threats to the Palestinian Authority (PA), underwent a significant operational shift during the Second Intifada, which began on September 28, 2000, following Ariel Sharon's visit to the . Under Jibril Rajoub's leadership in the , the PPS initially advocated restraint; Rajoub warned prior to the escalation against pursuing a military confrontation with , favoring mass demonstrations over armed conflict, but these cautions were disregarded as Arafat directed PA security forces to prepare for violence post-Camp David Summit in July 2000, including training thousands of youths in summer camps to conduct attacks on Israeli targets. This preparation reflected a broader PA strategy where formal security apparatuses like the PPS were integrated into the uprising, diverging from their Oslo-era mandate to suppress anti-PA militants and protect the . In the early months of the (September–November 2000), PPS units engaged Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in firefights alongside militias, but demonstrated limited effectiveness, inflicting minimal casualties due to poor coordination, inadequate marksmanship, and rapid depletion of ammunition amid inter-agency rivalries among the PA's 12 security branches. The PPS failed to fulfill commitments, such as maintaining public order or safeguarding Jewish holy sites, often joining demonstrators or standing by passively; Arafat's centralized control issued contradictory orders to units, sidelining the PPS in favor of informal Fatah-linked groups for in the popular uprising. Despite its internal intelligence focus, the PPS was accused by of covertly supporting terrorist operations, with some members participating in attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets, blurring lines between preventive security and offensive actions against . Israel responded aggressively to PPS involvement, viewing PA security forces as complicit in the violence that included over 1,000 Israeli deaths from suicide bombings and shootings by ; during in March–April 2002, IDF forces reentered cities, destroying PPS headquarters and infrastructure, which killed or arrested numerous PPS personnel and created a security vacuum exploited by militant groups. This dismantling reflected causal realities of the conflict: PA security coordination with collapsed as PPS elements openly battled IDF units, prioritizing resistance over internal stabilization, though the force's pre-Intifada training and equipment proved insufficient against 's superior firepower and intelligence. By the Intifada's end in , the PPS had been severely weakened, prompting post-conflict reforms under international pressure to refocus on countering and other rivals rather than external engagements.

2007 Reforms and Gaza Split

In June 2007, Hamas forces launched a violent offensive against Palestinian Authority (PA) security installations in the , culminating in the seizure of the Preventive Security Force's (PSF) headquarters in on June 14. This assault, part of the broader Battle of Gaza, involved direct attacks on PSF personnel and facilities, including bombings and executions, leading to the collapse of PA-aligned security presence in the territory. As a result, the PSF's operational structure fractured along the Fatah- divide, with the force's remnants and loyalty shifting exclusively to the under PA President , while established parallel security mechanisms in Gaza. The Gaza split prompted immediate legal and structural adjustments to the PSF in PA-controlled areas. On an unspecified date in 2007, Abbas issued Decree Law No. 11, designating the PSF as a directorate-general integrated into the , with mandates to safeguard internal security, monitor threats to PA stability, and pursue crimes endangering national order. The law stipulated that PSF activities must comply with Palestinian legal frameworks and obligations, aiming to formalize its role amid the power vacuum created by Hamas's expulsion of elements. These changes coincided with intensified U.S.-led security sector reforms in the , coordinated by Keith Dayton, who had been appointed U.S. Security Coordinator in 2005. Following the June 2007 takeover, the U.S. committed $80 million in direct aid on July 16 to overhaul PA security services, including the PSF, emphasizing depoliticization, unified command under oversight, and training for approximately 13,000 personnel through Jordanian facilities. The initiative prioritized countering infiltration, dismantling unauthorized militias, and fostering operational coordination with Israeli forces to maintain order and prevent spillover violence. By late 2007, these efforts had begun consolidating PSF ranks, reducing overlapping intelligence functions, and enhancing capabilities against militant networks, though challenges persisted due to factional remnants and resource constraints.

Developments Since 2007

Following the takeover of Gaza in June 2007, the Palestinian Preventive Security (PSS) apparatus fragmented along the lines of the ensuing Fatah- schism, with its Gaza branch effectively dismantled amid clashes that resulted in the deaths of numerous Fatah-aligned security personnel, including over 100 reported fatalities in the Battle of Gaza. In the , PSS operations continued under Palestinian Authority (PA) control, shifting focus to suppressing affiliates and other militant groups as part of broader PA security reforms aimed at restoring order and facilitating coordination with Israeli forces. In November 2007, PA President promulgated Decree Law No. 11, formally redefining PSS as a within the , tasked with protecting Palestinian internal security, investigating threats to national stability, and preventing crimes that could undermine PA authority. This legislation, partially applied in Gaza by the de facto administration for its own internal policing, emphasized PSS's role in gathering and proactive threat neutralization in PA-controlled areas. By 2008, PSS personnel, estimated at around 4,000-5,000 in the , integrated into U.S.- and European-backed training programs under the PA's Fayyadist reform agenda, enhancing capabilities in counter-terrorism and to dismantle militant networks, including the of over 1,000 operatives between 2007 and 2010. Post-2010, PSS expanded its internal mandate, conducting operations against both Islamist militants and perceived PA dissenters, such as during crackdowns in and refugee camps where it targeted armed factions amid rising violence. Coordination with Israel's General Security Service persisted, enabling joint sharing that contributed to the neutralization of dozens of planned attacks, though this drew from Palestinian factions for prioritizing anti-Hamas efforts over resistance activities. In Gaza, former PSS elements sporadically reemerged in anti-Hamas militias, exemplified by groups led by ex-officers like Husam al-Astal, who leveraged residual networks for sporadic clashes amid the 2023-2025 Israel-Hamas war. By 2024-2025, amid discussions of post-war Gaza governance, reports emerged of Egyptian-led training for PA security units, potentially including PSS veterans, to prepare for internal policing roles, though implementation remained contingent on political reconciliation and Israeli approval. PSS in the maintained a force of approximately 6,000 personnel, focusing on crime prevention and militant suppression, but faced challenges from escalating Iranian-backed activities and PA legitimacy deficits.

Organization and Structure

Command Hierarchy and Oversight

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS) operates as a within the Internal Security Forces (ISF), which are subordinate to the Palestinian Authority's (PA) Ministry of the Interior. This placement positions PPS as the PA's primary internal intelligence entity, focused on countering threats to governmental stability, with operational branches across governorates and a training center in . Command authority vests in a Director-General, appointed by PA President for a four-year term, renewable once for one year, based on recommendations from the Minister of the Interior, the ISF Director-General, and an officers' committee. The Director-General oversees internal sections including operations, investigations, and control, with authority to delegate to a deputy, while maintaining accountability to the Minister of the Interior and ISF Director-General. Despite formal reporting lines through the Ministry, PPS maintains direct operational oversight from the president, reflecting the PA's centralized executive control over security apparatuses amid factional divisions. Oversight mechanisms include quarterly performance reports submitted by the Minister of the Interior to the president and prime minister, alongside subjection to the Security Forces Justice Commission for disciplinary matters. In practice, President Abbas exercises ultimate authority, including appointments and strategic directives, which has enabled PPS to function with limited legislative or judicial independence, particularly in the West Bank where it remains under PA control; in Gaza, post-2007 Hamas takeover, PPS structures were supplanted by the Hamas-led Internal Security Agency under a parallel Ministry of Interior. This dual-layered hierarchy—ministerial administration paired with presidential dominance—stems from Decree Law No. 11 of 2007, enacted to formalize PPS roles while preserving executive primacy in internal security.

Personnel, Training, and Resources

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS) maintains a personnel strength of approximately 5,630 members as of 2024, with around 4,030 deployed in the and the remainder in Gaza, reflecting the post-2007 territorial split between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and governance. This force operates primarily as an internal intelligence and preventive apparatus, with personnel drawn from PA-controlled areas and vetted for loyalty to Fatah-aligned leadership. Historical expansions saw numbers peak at 30,000–40,000 by the late 1990s under , but reductions followed inefficiencies, political purges, and the 2007 Gaza takeover, prioritizing quality over quantity for counter-militant roles. Training for PPS personnel emphasizes , intelligence gathering, and internal security tactics, often conducted through PA academies like the Police Academy and supplemented by international programs. U.S.-led initiatives since have focused on professionalizing forces via the Palestinian Authority Security Sector Program, including courses in criminal procedures, interagency coordination, language skills (English and Hebrew), and non-lethal tactics to build capabilities without heavy armament. Additional training occurs in , where PA forces, including PPS elements, attend police and military courses in dating back to the 1993 Oslo agreement, with recent expansions for potential Gaza operations. These programs aim to enhance operational effectiveness amid criticisms of past inefficiencies, though logistical challenges like restricted mobility in the persist. Resources for the PPS derive from PA budgetary allocations, international aid, and limited equipment provisions, with the PA devoting a significant portion of its expenditures to —often exceeding combined and funding. U.S. assistance, totaling tens of millions annually (e.g., $46.5 million allocated for civilian-security projects in fiscal ), supports , infrastructure like operations centers, and non-lethal gear, though recent PA requests seek $680 million over four years for advanced and special forces enhancements amid escalating threats. remains modest, focusing on tools, light vehicles, and small arms rather than heavy weaponry, constrained by Israeli oversight and donor conditions prohibiting offensive capabilities; underfunding has led to reliance on aging assets and vulnerability in confrontations with armed groups.

Roles and Responsibilities

Internal Intelligence and Crime Prevention

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS), the Palestinian Authority's principal internal intelligence agency in the West Bank, focuses on preempting threats to governmental stability through surveillance, investigations, and proactive interventions. Governed by Decree Law No. 11 of 2007, PPS is mandated to safeguard internal security by uncovering espionage, preventing crimes against national institutions, public bodies, and their personnel, and providing actionable intelligence to PA leadership. Its operations emphasize countering opposition groups, such as Hamas affiliates, that challenge PA control, often through arrests targeting weapons proliferation and planned disruptions. With 4,030 personnel deployed across all 11 West Bank governorates as of 2023, PPS maintains a headquarters in Ramallah and conducts activities via specialized sections for operations, investigations, and counter-narcotics. In internal intelligence, PPS gathers data on potential subversive activities, including militant recruitment and coordination with external actors, to avert challenges to the framework. This involves monitoring dissident networks and collaborating with international partners like the CIA for training and technical support, which has enhanced its capacity to disrupt threats without direct external intervention. Notable operations include the July 2025 raid in , where PPS dismantled a terror cell possessing explosive devices, thereby preventing an imminent attack. Earlier efforts, such as arrests of over 100 members in 2015, underscore its role in suppressing internal militant infrastructure that could escalate into broader unrest. PPS's crime prevention extends to organized offenses that erode security, prioritizing those facilitating insurgencies like arms smuggling or funding via illicit trade. Its counter-narcotics section targets drug trafficking networks, which contribute to social disorder and militant financing in the . Investigations cover internal security cases such as antiterrorism and weapons violations, aiming to deter crimes against PA infrastructure. However, these activities have involved interrogations that PA critics, including monitors, describe as coercive, with 279 complaints of arbitrary lodged against PA forces in 2021, some linked to PPS detentions for perceived threats to stability. Such measures have arguably sustained PA authority in the relative to Gaza's post-2007 collapse, though they risk alienating segments of the population by blurring lines between security enforcement and political suppression.

Counter-Terrorism and Militant Suppression

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS) has conducted numerous operations to arrest and disrupt militant networks affiliated with , (PIJ), and emerging local groups such as the and in the . These efforts intensified following the 2007 takeover of Gaza, as the Palestinian Authority (PA) sought to consolidate control and prevent militant challenges to its authority. PPS units, often deploying in coordination with other PA security branches, have targeted weapon caches, safe houses, and operational cells, with arrests focusing on individuals planning attacks against Israeli targets or undermining PA governance. For instance, in September 2022, PPS forces entered to detain Musab Shtayyeh, a senior operative and commander, amid reports of Israeli requests for assistance in curbing rising violence. Post-October 7, 2023, PPS escalated raids in refugee camps and urban areas, detaining hundreds of suspected militants to avert a broader uprising or Hamas-led in the . Operations frequently involved nighttime arrests and searches in hotspots like and , where PPS confronted armed resistance from embedded fighters. A notable example occurred in December 2024, when PPS initiated a large-scale campaign across , , and , deploying armored vehicles and engaging in firefights that resulted in militant casualties and equipment seizures; PA officials framed the action as essential for restoring order against "outlaw groups." These raids have yielded confessions and intelligence on planned attacks, though they have provoked backlash from militants labeling PPS as collaborators. Challenges persist due to militants' entrenchment in civilian areas and limited resources, with U.S. assessments noting that Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operations sometimes constrain PPS mobility while highlighting PA efforts to counter terrorist financing and propaganda. Despite occasional successes, such as dismantling PIJ cells in , PPS actions have faced internal Palestinian criticism for prioritizing security coordination over broader governance reforms, contributing to cycles of confrontation.

Leadership

Historical Leaders

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PS) was established in 1994 following the , with separate commands for the and . In the , served as its first commander from 1994 until his dismissal by in 2002, during which he oversaw internal intelligence operations aimed at preventing threats to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Rajoub's tenure focused on countering militant opposition to the , though his forces faced criticism for alleged abuses and rivalries with other PA factions. In Gaza, Muhammad Dahlan headed the PS from 1994 to 2002, building it into a key plainclothes force of approximately 5,000 personnel tasked with surveillance and disruption of anti-PA elements. Dahlan's leadership emphasized coordination with international partners, including early U.S. training programs, but was marked by internal power struggles and accusations of . Following the Second Intifada and leadership shakeups, Ziad Hab al-Reeh assumed command of the PS around 2003, serving until approximately 2022 and later extending oversight until 2024. Under Hab al-Reeh, the underwent reforms to enhance counter-terrorism capabilities amid the 2007 PA-Hamas split, prioritizing stability in PA-controlled areas through intelligence-driven arrests. In Gaza, prior to the 2007 takeover, figures like Rashid Abu Shabak briefly led remnants of the PS, attempting to maintain operations against rising Islamist militancy. These leaders operated in a fragmented structure, with and Gaza branches often pursuing divergent strategies due to political divisions.

Current Leadership and Transitions

As of May 2025, Iyad al-Aqraa serves as the Director of the Preventive Security (PPS), having assumed the position amid a broader of Palestinian Authority (PA) security leadership. Al-Aqraa's appointment reflects the PA's efforts to refresh command structures under President , with the PPS continuing to operate primarily in the under the Ministry of Interior while maintaining direct reporting lines to the presidency. The transition to al-Aqraa occurred in early 2025 as part of Abbas's purge of senior security officials, which included replacements for heads of the Preventive Security Service, general security forces, police, civil defense, and intelligence apparatus. This wave of changes, initiated in recent months prior to March 2025, aimed to consolidate loyalty and address internal factional tensions within Fatah-dominated institutions, though specific reasons for the PPS leadership shift—such as performance evaluations or political alignments—remain undisclosed in official PA statements. Prior to al-Aqraa, the PPS had lacked publicly prominent individual commanders since the post-2007 era, with operational control often diffused across regional deputies amid the Gaza-West Bank divide. These transitions underscore the PA's centralized control over preventive security apparatuses, which have historically prioritized countering threats in coordination with international partners, despite criticisms of opacity in succession processes. No further leadership changes have been reported through October 2025, maintaining al-Aqraa's tenure amid ongoing instability.

Key Operations and Events

Pre-2007 Engagements

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PSS), established in 1994 as part of the Palestinian Authority's security framework following the , initially focused on internal policing and preventive measures against militant activities threatening the nascent peace process. In Gaza, under Muhammad Dahlan's leadership, the PSS rapidly expanded to around 20,000 personnel, conducting arrests and intelligence operations to suppress groups opposing the agreements. These efforts included coordination with Israeli and U.S. intelligence agencies, such as the FBI and CIA, to share information on potential threats and facilitate joint preventive actions. A pivotal engagement occurred in 1996 amid a wave of suicide bombings attributed to , when PSS forces in Gaza arrested approximately 2,000 members as part of a crackdown ordered by to stabilize the region and bolster negotiations with . The PA's apparatus, including PSS, prevented several planned attacks and detained suspects involved in aimed at derailing the process, though these operations drew accusations from of excessive force and torture during interrogations—claims Dahlan denied, attributing any excesses to isolated errors. Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, PSS continued targeted arrests and surveillance of and Islamic Jihad activists, establishing specialized units to counter internal dissent and militant networks undermining PA authority. During the Second (2000–2005), PSS operations shifted toward containing factional violence amid broader chaos, including sporadic confrontations with militants in the and Gaza, while maintaining a mandate to prevent attacks on Israeli targets as stipulated in interim agreements. Escalating Fatah- rivalries by 2006 led to increased PSS deployments against enforcers in Gaza, foreshadowing the 2007 takeover, with armed clashes resulting in deaths on both sides in the preceding months.

Post-Hamas Gaza Takeover Actions

Following Hamas's forcible seizure of control in Gaza on June 14, 2007, Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces in the , including the Preventive Security Service (PSS), launched an immediate crackdown on Hamas affiliates to prevent replication of the Gaza events and consolidate PA authority. PSS personnel, focused on internal intelligence and threat prevention, conducted raids and arrests targeting Hamas operatives, supporters, and infrastructure, with operations beginning within days of the Gaza takeover. By late June 2007, PA forces had detained hundreds of individuals linked to , including mid-level activists and suspected militants, in cities such as , , and . The scale of the response escalated through 2007 and into 2008, with PA security units arresting approximately 1,500 supporters across the , many held in PSS-run detention facilities without prompt charges or access to legal counsel. These actions dismantled local networks, seized weapons caches, and disrupted recruitment efforts, contributing to a relative stabilization of PA control in the compared to Gaza's descent into -dominated governance. PSS operations often involved of political factions and preemptive interventions against potential armed cells, though reports documented instances of family assaults and coercive interrogations during raids, such as an August 21, 2007, incident in which PSS members targeted relatives of a detainee. In parallel, post-2007 security sector reforms, initiated under U.S. Lieutenant General Keith Dayton's oversight starting in late 2007, bolstered PSS capabilities through training programs emphasizing law enforcement and counter-militancy, with an explicit aim to neutralize Islamist threats like Hamas. By 2009, reformed PSS units had executed targeted operations dismantling multiple Hamas cells in the West Bank, including arrests of operatives planning attacks, which PA officials credited with enhancing internal security. These efforts, supported by international funding exceeding $200 million annually for PA security by 2008, prioritized non-partisan policing but disproportionately affected Hamas due to its militant posture and rivalry with Fatah. While effective in curbing Hamas's territorial ambitions in the West Bank, the crackdown drew international scrutiny for procedural irregularities, underscoring tensions between security imperatives and due process.

Recent Counter-Militant Operations (2010s–2025)

In the 2010s, the Palestinian Preventive Security Force (PPS) intensified efforts to dismantle militant networks affiliated with and other Islamist groups in the , aiming to avert coordinated attacks and preserve Palestinian Authority (PA) authority amid rising tensions. In November 2014, PPS units under Ziad Hab al-Reeh coordinated the arrest of approximately 250 Islamist operatives, primarily members, to thwart potential violence during fragile cease-fires with . Earlier that year, in January 2014, PPS-led operations apprehended two cells attempting to smuggle explosive devices into from the . These actions formed part of broader PA campaigns that arrested dozens more affiliates in early 2015, including the son of a former military commander, reflecting systematic targeting of cells planning abductions and bombings. By mid-decade, such operations escalated, with PA security forces, including PPS, detaining over 100 members across the in July 2015 alone, amid accusations from of political suppression. Into the early , PPS continued preventive arrests against threats to PA leadership and stability; in January 2020, it dismantled a cell plotting an attempt on the PA's chief, seizing weapons and materials. Reports from 2019 highlighted PPS countermeasures against infiltration of PA ranks, where militants had recruited officers as spies, prompting intensified internal vetting and raids. In the 2020s, amid heightened militant activity following the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, PPS operations focused on curbing recruitment and arms smuggling by and (PIJ). A senior PPS official stated in July 2023 that the force was actively disrupting efforts by these groups to enlist disillusioned youth for attacks, emphasizing prevention of destabilization. This culminated in large-scale crackdowns, including a December 2024 PA operation in targeting the —a of , PIJ, and local militants—where security forces, incorporating PPS preventive tactics, engaged in direct confrontations, imposed curfews, and arrested fighters to reassert control over refugee camps and urban areas. The Jenin campaign, extending into 2025, involved battles resulting in militant casualties and temporary truces, though armed groups fired on PA positions as late as January 2025. Further actions in 2025 underscored PPS's role in neutralizing immediate threats: in July, it arrested an entire militant cell in possessing explosive devices intended for attacks, according to Palestinian media reports. In September, PPS detained Khalila, a figure linked to potential Hamas-aligned governance initiatives in Gaza, preventing cross-factional coordination. These operations, often conducted with intelligence from PA networks, have faced militant retaliation but contributed to containing West Bank-wide insurgencies, though PA forces reported resource strains and occasional setbacks against entrenched cells.

Security Coordination

Collaboration with Israel

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS) has engaged in security coordination with since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) under the 1993 , primarily through intelligence sharing and joint counterterrorism efforts aimed at preventing attacks by militant groups such as and . This collaboration involves the PPS exchanging operational intelligence with 's agency, facilitating arrests of suspects planning attacks on Israeli targets, and coordinating movements to avoid clashes during Israeli military operations in the . Such arrangements have been formalized in protocols dating back to the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement, where PA security forces, including the PPS, committed to combating in Areas A and B under PA control. A key focus of PPS-Israel cooperation has been suppressing activities in the to prevent a replication of the group's 2007 Gaza takeover. Following 's victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and subsequent violent seizure of Gaza, the PPS, alongside other PA forces, arrested over 400 operatives in early 2009 raids across the , often based on intelligence provided or corroborated by Israeli sources. This pattern continued into the 2010s and 2020s, with PPS-led operations targeting recruitment and weapons smuggling; for instance, in 2021, PPS units defied court orders to release detainees while intensifying crackdowns on militants amid ongoing coordination with . In recent years, despite periodic PA announcements suspending coordination—such as in January 2023 following an Israeli raid—practical collaboration has persisted, driven by mutual interests in stabilizing the against militant escalation. The PPS has led large-scale sweeps, including a 2024 operation in , , and refugee camps targeting cells affiliated with Iran-backed groups, which aligned with parallel Israeli efforts to dismantle terror infrastructures. U.S. diplomatic assessments confirm that such PA actions, supported by American training programs, have thwarted numerous attacks, with exchanges preventing dozens of and incidents annually in the mid-2020s. This coordination, while effective in operational terms, has drawn internal Palestinian criticism for perceived alignment with Israeli security priorities over national .

Partnerships with U.S. and Other International Actors

The has provided extensive training, equipment, and funding to the Palestinian Authority's , including the Preventive Security organization, primarily through the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) program established in 2005 and expanded after Hamas's 2006 election victory. This assistance, channeled via International Narcotics Control and (INCLE) funds, has totaled nearly $1 billion since 2007, focusing on professionalizing forces to counter internal threats like militant groups. The (CIA) has played a direct role, collaborating closely with Preventive Security on intelligence operations and supporting efforts to reclaim control in Gaza from in 2007, though these initiatives faced setbacks amid political tensions. U.S. programs have included curriculum development for and internal security training, equipping Preventive Security personnel with skills in gathering and rapid response, as verified in congressional benchmarks and Government Accountability Office reviews. However, cooperation has been intermittent; the Palestinian Authority suspended security ties with the U.S. in May 2020 amid disputes over annexation plans, and in February 2025, the Trump administration halted all funding and delayed training programs for Palestinian , citing ongoing concerns over diversion and . Despite these pauses, prior U.S. efforts emphasized non-lethal and reforms to enhance Preventive Security's capacity against groups like and , with over $3 million allocated in early 2021 for weapons handling training before subsequent reviews. Beyond the U.S., the supports Preventive Security through the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), launched in 2006 to bolster and sector reform, including training in and internal investigations. This multilateral effort, involving member states like the and , has provided technical assistance and workshops to integrate Preventive Security into broader Palestinian efforts against and , though it prioritizes police and judicial components over units. Preventive Security also leads Palestinian international cooperation, engaging partners in the and bilateral channels, such as joint exercises with Jordanian forces on border , though these remain less formalized than Western programs.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Human Rights Abuses

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS), a key branch of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) security apparatus, has faced repeated allegations of abuses, particularly in the detention and interrogation of suspected militants, political opponents, and critics of the PA. (HRW) documented in 2018 that PA security forces, including PPS operatives, routinely subjected detainees to arbitrary arrests without judicial warrants, prolonged incommunicado detention, and physical such as beatings with batons, whipping, and forcing individuals into painful stress positions like the "shabeh" (suspension). These practices were reported to extract confessions or suppress dissent, with at least 25 detailed cases from 2016-2018 involving PPS facilities in the , where detainees described systematic mistreatment lasting days or weeks. A 2022 HRW report highlighted ongoing impunity, noting that PA forces, encompassing PPS, continued arbitrary detentions and torture of Palestinians perceived as threats to PA stability, including Fatah rivals and social media critics, with over 1,000 complaints filed annually to the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) between 2017 and 2021, many implicating preventive security units. The U.S. State Department's 2022 human rights report corroborated these claims, recording complaints from detainees held by the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF)—of which PPS is a core component—regarding abuse and torture, including electric shocks and sexual threats, though PA investigations rarely led to prosecutions. UN experts in 2023 urged the PA to bolster safeguards against such ill-treatment, citing inadequate access to lawyers and medical exams during initial PPS detentions, which violated international standards under the UN Convention Against Torture, ratified by Palestine in 2014. Earlier patterns trace to the post-Oslo era, with International's 1996 report detailing PPS involvement in prolonged political detentions without trial and deaths in custody from , such as beatings causing internal injuries, amid efforts to consolidate PA control over Islamist factions. HRW's analysis of intra-Palestinian conflicts described PPS-led operations in the as featuring extrajudicial executions and of affiliates, contributing to a cycle of abuses that persisted into the , with ICHR data showing 2,429 complaints against in 2016 alone, a portion tied to preventive security interrogations. Critics, including Palestinian NGOs, argue these tactics stem from security coordination imperatives but often exceed necessity, fostering resentment and undermining PA legitimacy, though PA officials have denied systematic abuse, attributing incidents to isolated excesses.

Accusations of Political Repression and Collaboration

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS) has been accused of engaging in through arbitrary arrests, detentions, and mistreatment of perceived opponents, particularly members of and other Islamist groups, as well as critics of the Palestinian Authority (PA). (HRW) documented cases in the where PA security forces, including PPS, conducted arbitrary arrests targeting individuals based on suspected political affiliations, often involving torture or ill-treatment to extract confessions or suppress dissent. In September 2012, PPS and other PA forces arrested at least 71 individuals across cities such as (19 arrests), (18), and (15), many linked to activities. A July 2015 operation saw PA security, including PPS, detain over 100 members in the amid heightened factional tensions, with detainees held without clear charges related to non-violent political organizing. Critics, including Palestinian rights groups and international observers, have highlighted PPS involvement in suppressing protests and detaining journalists and activists voicing opposition to PA policies. On June 24, 2021, PPS forces arrested , a prominent PA critic who used to denounce and ; he died shortly after from severe beatings during the and initial , prompting accusations of deliberate killing to silence . reports have noted patterns of PPS detentions involving prolonged incommunicado holding and coercive tactics against those affiliated with opposition factions, exacerbating intra-Palestinian divisions. In July 2023, PPS questioned and briefly detained photojournalist Huthia Abu Jamous for opinion pieces critical of PA governance, illustrating claims of targeting media voices. Accusations of collaboration with Israel center on PPS participation in security coordination that allegedly prioritizes suppressing Palestinian militants over national interests, effectively aligning with Israeli objectives to neutralize threats like . Opponents, including , have labeled such actions as "," pointing to PPS thwarting of planned attacks—such as a plot involving $8.5 million seized from operatives—which indirectly bolsters Israeli security without reciprocal benefits for Palestinians. This coordination, formalized under PA-Israel agreements, has involved intelligence sharing leading to arrests of cells, as reported in PA operations that mirror Israeli targeting priorities. -affiliated sources and PA critics argue that PPS arrests serve to maintain dominance by eliminating rivals, framing the force as an extension of occupation-era enforcement rather than independent security. While PA officials defend these measures as essential for countering militancy and upholding , detractors contend they foster a repressive apparatus that stifles political pluralism in the .

Effectiveness and Impact

Achievements in Stability and Security

The Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS), a branch of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) security apparatus, has played a role in enhancing stability by conducting intelligence-driven operations to preempt militant threats, particularly from and (PIJ). Following U.S.-led security sector reforms initiated around 2007, PPS improved its capabilities in surveillance, arrests, and disruption of attack planning, contributing to a decline in successful terrorist incidents originating from PA-controlled areas compared to Gaza. These efforts included routine patrols, informant networks, and raids that confined militant activities to isolated pockets, thereby reducing the risk of widespread unrest or cross-border attacks. Notable achievements encompass the dismantling of operative cells and seizure of weaponry. For example, in 2012, PA forces, including PPS elements, arrested 11 Hamas operatives in overnight raids across the , interrupting planned subversive activities. Similarly, during the 2024–2025 Jenin operation, PPS units helped isolate armed groups within refugee camps, preventing them from executing attacks against Israeli targets and maintaining localized control amid escalating presence. Such interventions have been credited with averting deployments and shootings, with PA security deployments enabling successful actions throughout the territory. PPS's preventive focus has also supported broader , including the disruption of routes for arms and funds to extremists, which indirectly bolsters economic and social stability by curbing cycles of retaliation. Intelligence cooperation with international partners has amplified these outcomes, leading to the neutralization of plots that might otherwise escalate into larger conflicts. However, these successes are measured against persistent challenges, with empirical data from security assessments indicating a net reduction in West Bank-originated attacks during periods of heightened PA enforcement.

Challenges and Failures

The Preventive Security Force (PSF) experienced a catastrophic operational failure in June 2007 during the takeover of Gaza, known as the Battle of Gaza. Despite covert CIA support and leadership under , PSF units were swiftly overwhelmed by Hamas Executive Force militias, who executed coordinated attacks on PA security compounds, resulting in over 160 deaths among Fatah-affiliated personnel and the flight of survivors to the . This defeat dismantled PSF presence in Gaza entirely, ceding control to Hamas and exposing vulnerabilities in training, coordination, and loyalty amid factional rivalries, as PSF forces fragmented under superior Hamas motivation and tactics. In the , the PSF has struggled to fulfill its preventive mandate against Islamist militants, constrained by limited sovereignty, resource shortages, and deep-seated political divisions with . Ongoing recruitment by and —targeting impoverished youth for attacks—has evaded effective disruption, as evidenced by a senior PSF officer's 2023 admission that these groups exploit despair to build networks in areas like refugee camps. Operations against armed cells in and since 2022 have yielded arrests but failed to eradicate threats, partly due to public backlash portraying PSF actions as extensions of Israeli interests, which erodes recruitment and operational legitimacy. Institutional dysfunction and corruption have further undermined PSF effectiveness. During the Second Intifada (2000–2005), PSF units—despite U.S.- and Egyptian-trained battalions equipped with anti-tank missiles and snipers—inflicted negligible casualties on Israeli forces due to Arafat-era command rivalries, where 12 parallel security branches reported directly to him, fostering infighting and contradictory orders like arresting then releasing Hamas operatives. Corruption, including ghost payrolls and nepotistic appointments, persisted post-reforms, diluting combat readiness and public trust, as documented in analyses of PA security sector failures. Leadership instability, such as the 2002 ousting of PSF head Jibril Rajoub and Dahlan's 2007 expulsion, compounded these issues, preventing cohesive strategy against internal threats.

References

  1. https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/preventive_security_ps/
  2. https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/guide_to_the_Palestinian_security_and_justice_sectors-26mar2024.pdf
  3. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/meria99_lug01.html
  4. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/west-bank-and-gaza
  5. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/11/palestinian-authority-secuirty-forces-west-bank-faq/
  6. https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.gi/
  7. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/mohammed-dahlan
  8. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/palestine/mohammed_dahlan.htm
  9. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-183368/
  10. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/mde150701996en.pdf
  11. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/28893/06_08_Nov.pdf
  12. https://jcpa.org/article/the-palestinian-authoritys-responsibility-for-the-outbreak-of-the-second-intifada-its-own-damning-testimony/
  13. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/meria00_lug01.html
  14. https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/the-palestinian-authority-security-forces-whose-security/
  15. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hamas-takes-gaza-security-compound/
  16. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/world/middleeast/14mideast.html
  17. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/14/israel3
  18. https://security-legislation.ps/latest-laws/decree-law-no-11-of-2007-concerning-the-preventive-security1/
  19. http://passia.org/media/filer_public/4d/59/4d59b0e4-c9b2-4f1c-a466-4b7678799c44/palestinian_security_sector_english.pdf
  20. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070716-7.html
  21. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA514197
  22. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/update-on-reform-of-the-palestinian-security-apparatuses/
  23. https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/68-after-gaza.pdf
  24. https://www.merip.org/2014/01/securing-oslo/
  25. https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/H16MrM3sU
  26. https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/west-bank-and-gaza
  27. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/10/19/profiles-of-anti-hamas-militias-in-the-gaza-strip/
  28. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-training-palestinian-forces-govern-post-war-gaza
  29. https://www.ict.org.il/images/Francesco%2520Dotti%2520-%2520PASF%2520%281%29.pdf
  30. https://www.gao.gov/assets/a304335.html
  31. https://2017-2021.state.gov/palestinian-authority-security-sector-reform-program-evaluation-summary/
  32. https://jcpa.org/is-u-s-aid-to-the-palestinian-authority-fueling-terror/
  33. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/palestinian-authority-requests-security-assistance-us-amid-jenin-raids
  34. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/05/palestinian-authority-security-forces-gaza/
  35. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/palestinian-reports-pa-security-forces-busted-nablus-terror-cell-seized-explosive-devices/
  36. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33384295
  37. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/30/palestine-impunity-arbitrary-arrests-torture
  38. https://jerusalem.24fm.ps/17017.html
  39. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/14/world/middleeast/palestinian-authority-west-bank-israel.html
  40. https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-authority-jenin-hamas-islamic-jihad-131b0b0d82608142d979919330ab96c5
  41. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hkwlivsvje
  42. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/01/analysis-west-bank-terrorism-persists-idf-launches-operation-in-jenin.php
  43. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/PASF-Benchmarks-Congressional-Report-Fall-2024-Accessible-9.10.2025.pdf
  44. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/20/palestinian-authority-security-forces-jenin/
  45. https://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacyresearch/2014/06/05/jibril-m-m-al-rajoub/
  46. https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/jibril_rajoub_fatah_cc/
  47. https://www.palestinecabinet.gov.ps/portal/Government/ViewMinisterEn/6861b274-0844-430f-a6ed-f7a502bdac23
  48. https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/ziad_hab_al_reeh/
  49. https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/palestine/pss.htm
  50. https://www.gmtc.sec.ps/home/news/14629?culture=en-US
  51. https://www.timesofisrael.com/abbas-planning-to-replace-longtime-spy-chief-capping-off-purge-of-pa-security-heads/
  52. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R40664.html
  53. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-814300
  54. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/04/gaza200804
  55. https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/terrorism/1996Report/middle.html
  56. https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-talented-mr-dahlan/
  57. https://jcpa.org/muhammad-dahlan-succession-palestinian-authority/
  58. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/28/world/middleeast/28mideast.html
  59. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/MDE210202007ENGLISH.pdf
  60. https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/29/internal-fight/palestinian-abuses-gaza-and-west-bank
  61. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/16/world/middleeast/16westbank.html
  62. https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/amnesty/2008/en/61403
  63. https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/06/palestinian-security-reform-a-moment-of-truth/
  64. https://pchrgaza.org/arrests-against-hamas-supporters-continue-in-the-west-bank-families-of-detainees-assaulted-and-detainees-tortured-and-mistreated/
  65. https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/07/29/occupied-palestinian-territories-new-arrests-highlight-abuses-hamas-fatah
  66. https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/98-squaring-the-circle-palestinian-security-reform-under-occupation.pdf
  67. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2009/08/palestine-the-schism-deepens?lang=en
  68. https://www.timesofisrael.com/pa-arrests-250-islamist-operatives-to-prevent-west-bank-violence/
  69. https://www.timesofisrael.com/despite-arrests-pa-forces-growing-weaker-in-west-bank/
  70. https://www.timesofisrael.com/son-of-former-hamas-military-chief-arrested-in-fatah-sweep/
  71. https://www.timesofisrael.com/palestinian-cell-arrested-for-alleged-hit-attempt-on-pas-intel-chief-sources/
  72. https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-infiltrated-pa-security-forces-recruited-officers-as-spies-report/
  73. https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-pa-security-official-hamas-pij-recruiting-youth-with-nothing-to-live-for/
  74. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/12/14/residents-must-live-in-peace-palestinian-authority-launches-counterterrorism-operation-in-west-bank/
  75. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/palestinian-authority-said-to-arrest-purported-candidate-for-gaza-administration/
  76. https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-pa-security-forces-are-cracking-down-on-palestinian-terror-groups-in-west-bank/
  77. https://www.jpost.com/israel/fatah-cracks-down-on-hamas-in-w-bank
  78. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/palestinian-authority-steps-up-crackdown-on-activists-rivals-in-west-bank-681877
  79. https://www.timesofisrael.com/pa-announces-halt-to-security-coordination-with-israel-us-cautions-against-move/
  80. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/12/13/the-palestinian-authority-s-conflicted-security-relationship-with-israel-in-the-west-bank_6337789_4.html
  81. https://intelnews.org/2020/05/22/01-2784/
  82. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-842845
  83. https://freebeacon.com/biden-administration/biden-admin-quietly-funneled-3-mil-to-palestinian-government-security-forces-for-weapons-training-after-its-members-carried-out-attacks-on-israelis/
  84. https://eupolcopps.eu/en
  85. https://south.euneighbours.eu/story/palestinian-women-networks-become-stepping-stones-to-more-inclusive-security-and-justice-sectors/
  86. https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/23/two-authorities-one-way-zero-dissent/arbitrary-arrest-and-torture-under
  87. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/palestine1018_web4.pdf
  88. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/415610_WEST-BANK-AND-GAZA-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf
  89. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/09/palestine-must-strengthen-torture-prevention-measures-un-body-finds
  90. https://imemc.org/article/64265/
  91. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/06/justice-remains-elusive-two-years-after-the-killing-of-palestinian-dissident-nizar-banat/
  92. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/22/35
  93. https://www.state.gov/report/custom/73d8385a1f
  94. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-road-to-october-7-hamas-long-game-clarified/
  95. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/pdf/PDF_19298_2.pdf
  96. https://miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=26124&CategoryId=5
  97. https://www.state.gov/reports/2017-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/israel-golan-heights-west-bank-and-gaza/israel-golan-heights-west-bank-and-gaza-west-bank-and-gaza
  98. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/evolution-palestinian-authority-security-forces
  99. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/israel/
  100. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-209350/
  101. http://www.gov.il/en/pages/inss18b032025
  102. https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/regions/africamiddleeast/219007.htm
  103. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-505.pdf
  104. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP07-60/RP07-60.pdf
  105. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/pa-hamas/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.