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Economy of Oman
Economy of Oman
Economy of Oman
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Economy of Oman
Ruwi, the central business district of Muscat, Oman's capital and largest city
CurrencyOmani rial (OMR)
US$1 ≈ 0.3845 OMR
Calendar year
Trade organisations
WTO and GCC
Country group
Statistics
Population5,281,538 (2024 est.) [3]
GDP
  • Increase $109.99 billion (nominal, 2024)[4]
  • Increase $220.05 billion (PPP, 2024)[4]
GDP rank
GDP growth
  • 1.3% (2023) 1.0% (2024e)
  • 3.1% (2025f) 4.4% (2026f)[4]
GDP per capita
  • Decrease $20,248 (nominal, 2024[4]
  • Increase $41,664 (PPP, 2024[4]
GDP per capita rank
GDP by sector
agriculture 1.7%
industry 45.2%
services 53% (2017 est.)[5]
1.3% (2024)[4]
Population below poverty line
NA%
30.72 (2010)[6]
0.30 (2023)[7]
  • Increase 0.858 very high (2023)[8] (59th)
  • Increase 0.750 high IHDI (50th) (2023)[8]
Labour force
Increase 2,578,897 (2023)[9]
UnemploymentPositive decrease 2.6% (Apr 2024)[10]
Main industries
crude oil production and refining, natural and liquefied natural gas (LNG) production; construction, cement, copper, steel, chemicals, optic fiber
External
ExportsIncrease $69.701 billion (2022)[11]
Export goods
petroleum, reexports, fish, metals, textiles
Main export partners
ImportsIncrease $46.326 billion (2022)[11]
Import goods
machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods, food, livestock, lubricants
Main import partners
FDI stock
Increase $5.652 billion (2022 est.)[5]
Positive decrease $37.5 billion (31 December 2024 est.)[4]
Public finances
Positive decrease 34.1% of GDP (2024 est.)[4]
Revenues$29.334 billion (2018 est.)[5]
Expenses$35.984 billion (2018 est.)[5]
Standard & Poor's:[14]
AAA (T&C Assessment)
Outlook: Stable[15]
Moody's:[15]
Aaa
Outlook:
Fitch:[15]
AAA-
Outlook: negative
All values, unless otherwise stated, are in US dollars.

The economy of Oman is mainly centered around its oil sector, with fishing and trading activities located around its coastal regions. When oil was discovered in 1964, the production and export increased significantly. The government has made plans to diversify away from oil under its privatisation and Omanisation policies.[16] This has helped raise Oman's GDP per capita continuously in the past 50 years. It grew 339% in the 1960s, reaching a peak growth of 1,370% in the 1970s. Similar to the pricing of all other commodities, the price of oil is subject to significant fluctuations over time, especially those associated with the business cycle. A commodity's price will rise sharply when demand, like that for oil, outpaces supply; meanwhile, when supply outpaces demand, prices will fall.

It scaled back to a modest 13% growth in the 1980s and rose again to 34% in the 1990s.[17] Oman joined the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 with the aim of establishing a customs union, a common market and a common currency.[18][19]

Petroleum is responsible for 64% of all export revenue, 45% of government income, and 50% of GDP. Given that it accounts for half of the Sultanate of Oman's GDP, the petroleum products industry is one of the most significant in the Omani economy.

Oman's economy heavily relies on cement, a vital component of the construction industry. Cement plays a crucial role in facilitating urbanisation, infrastructure development, and overall economic expansion. The cement industry contributes to Oman's economy by providing employment opportunities, both directly and indirectly. It also generates revenue through taxes and fees and contributes to the development of related sectors, such as logistics and transportation. Oman advocates currently for a mixed economy.[20][21]

Macro-economic trend

[edit]

This is a chart of trend of the gross domestic product and gross domestic product per cap das cap of Oman at market prices by the International Monetary Fund.[22]

Year Gross Domestic Product
(in millions US$)		 Per Capita Income
(US$)		 Per Capita Income
(as % of USA)
1980 6,342 4,674 38.16
1985 10,395 6,129 34.65
1990 11,686 6,341 27.33
1995 13,803 6,355 22.84
2000 19,450 8,097 22.97
2005 30,905 11,806 27.70
2010 58,814 23,351 49.88
2015 81,550 24,024 43.03

Overview

[edit]
Traditional souqs like this one at Muttrah are very common in Oman and have formed the bulk of the Omani economy in the past.

Oman liberalised its markets in an effort to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and gained membership in 2000.[23] The Director of the Sultanate of Oman's delegation to the WTO is Hilda al-Hinai.[24] Further, on 20 July 2006 the U.S. Congress approved the US-Oman Free Trade Agreement. This took effect on 1 January 2009, eliminating tariff barriers on all consumer and industrial products. It also provides strong protections for foreign businesses investing in Oman.[23]

The government also undertook some important policy measures during 2018 with the establishment of a commercial arbitration center, the adoption of a new commercial companies' law, and a further streamlining of licensing processes through Invest Easy in order to improve the business and investment climate and promote private sector-led growth in the Sultanate.

Oman's economy and revenues from petroleum products have enabled Oman's dramatic development over the past 50 years. Notably however, Oman is not a member of OPEC, although it has coordinated with the group in recent years.[25]

Petrochemical tanks in Sohar

Oil was first discovered in the interior near Fahud in the western desert in 1964. Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) began production in August 1967. The Omani Government owns 60% of PDO, and foreign interests own 40% (Royal Dutch Shell owns 34%; the remaining 6% is owned by Compagnie Francaise des Petroles [Total] and Partex). In 1976, Oman's oil production rose to 366,000 barrels (58,000 m³) per day but declined gradually to about 285,000 barrels (45,000 m³) per day in late 1980 due to the depletion of recoverable reserves. From 1981 to 1986, Oman compensated for declining oil prices, by increasing production levels to 600,000 b/d. With the collapse of oil prices in 1986, however, revenues dropped dramatically. Production was cut back temporarily in coordination with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and production levels again reached 600,000 b/d by mid-1987, which helped increase revenues. By mid-2000, production had climbed to more than 900,000 b/d where they remain. Natural gas reserves, which increasingly provide the fuel for power generation and desalination, stand at 18 trillion ft³ (510 km3). The Oman LNG processing plant located in Sur was opened in 2000, with production capacity of 6.6 million tons/YR, as well as unsubstantial gas liquids, including condensates.

Oman's 10th five-year plan (2020–2025) is the first implementation plan of Vision 2040,[26] and will focus its efforts towards achieving economic diversification.[27] The plan for economic diversification aims to move Oman away from the oil-and-gas-based sources of income, and has earmarked five sectors that have high growth potential and economic returns. These are agriculture and fisheries, manufacturing, logistics and transport, energy and mining, and tourism.

According to the Central Bank of Oman's Annual Report 2018,[28] the Omani crude oil price averaged at US$69.7 a barrel in 2018 as compared to US$51.3 per barrel during 2017. The recovery in oil prices also contributed to growth in non-oil economic activities, reflecting inter-linkages, although the dependency of non-oil activities on oil activities has somewhat weakened in the last few years.[29]

According to the World Bank growth is expected to increase over 2020–21, driven in part by a large increase in gas production from the new Khazzan gas project, and infrastructure spending plans in both oil and non-oil sectors.[30] Notably, with Khazzan phase-I becoming operational, the natural gas under the petroleum sector is also emerging as a significant contributor to the Omani economy, with BP committing to invest US$16 Billion developing the field.[31] Meanwhile, the Special Economic Zone Authority of Duqm (SEZAD) attracted $14.2 billion worth of investments in the form of usufruct agreements signed till the end of 2018.[32] With a land area of 2,000 km2 and 70 km of coastline along the Arabian Sea, the Duqm Special Economic Zone is the largest in the Middle East and North Africa region and ranks among the largest in the world. Duqm is an integrated economic development composed of zones: a sea port, industrial area, new town, fishing harbor, tourist zone, a logistics center and an education and training zone, all of which are supported by a multimodal transport system that connects it with nearby regions.[33]

On the fiscal front, government expenditure also increased noticeably in 2018 due to higher spending on oil & gas production, defence, subsidies and elevated interest payments. The government debt also increased to RO 14,492 in 2018 – with the debt to GDP ratio expected increased to 58 percent by 2020,[34] leading to constraints on the ability of fiscal spending to support growth and raising sustainability concerns.

Omanisation

[edit]

The Omanisation programme has been in operation since 1999, working toward replacing expatriates with trained Omani personnel. The goal of this initiative is to provide jobs for the rapidly growing Omani population. The state has allotted subsidies for companies to hire local employees not only to gradually reduce reliance on foreign workers but also to overcome an overwhelming employment preference on the part of Omanis for government jobs.[35]

By the end of 1999, the number of Omanis in government services exceeded the set target of 72%, and in most departments reached 86% of employees. The Ministry has also stipulated fixed Omanisation targets in six areas of the private sector. Most companies have registered Omanisation plans. Since April 1998 a 'green card' has been awarded to companies that meet their Omanisation targets and comply with the eligibility criteria for labour relations. The names of these companies are published in the local press and they receive preferential treatment in their dealings with the Ministry. Academics working on various aspects of Omanisation include Ingo Forstenlechner from United Arab Emirates University and Paul Knoglinger from the FHWien.[citation needed]

Omanisation, however, in the private sector is not always successful. One of the reasons is that jobs are still filled by expatriates because of the lower wages. Studies reveal that an increasing number of the job openings in the private sector pay the official minimum salary for nationals, which is an unattractive employment prospect for the locals.[36] There is also the problem of placing Omani workers in senior positions due to the fact that a significant chunk of the workforce is composed of young and inexperienced workers.[37]

Training and Omanisation

[edit]

In order to meet the training and Omanisation requirements of the banking sector, the Omani Institute of Bankers was established in 1983 and has since played a leading role in increasing the number of Omanis working in the sector. The Central Bank monitors the progress made by the commercial banks with Omanisation and in July 1995 issued a circular stipulating that by the year 2000, at least 75% of senior and middle management positions should be held by Omanis. In the clerical grades 95% of staff should be Omanised and 100% in all other grades. At the end of 1999, no less than 98.8% of all positions were held by Omanis. Women made up 60% of the total. During 2001 the percentage of Omanis employed at senior and middle management levels went up from 76.7% to 78.8%. There was a slight increase in the clerical grade percentage to 98.7%, while the non-clerical grades had already reached 100% Omanisation in 1998. The banking sector currently employs 2,113 senior and middle managers supported by 4,757 other staff.[citation needed]

The Ministry has issued a decision regulating tourist guides, who in future will be required to have a license. This Ministerial decision aims at encouraging professionalism in the industry as well as providing career opportunities for Omanis who will be encouraged to learn foreign languages so as to replace foreign tour guides. In January 1996, a major step forward in the training of Omanis in the hotel industry came with the opening of the National Hospitality Institute (NHI). The institute is a public company quoted on the Omani Stock exchange. In February 1997, the first batch of 55 male and female trainees, sponsored by the Vocational Training Authority, were awarded their first level certificates and were given on-the-job training in several hotels. In May 1999, the fourth batch of 95 trainees obtained their NVQs, bringing the number of Omanis trained by the institute to around 450. Omanis now make up 37% of the 34,549 employees in the hotel and catering business, which exceeds the Omanisation target of 30% set by the Government. The NHI has also trained catering staff from the Sultan's Armed Forces and has launched a two-year tour guide course, which includes language training, safe driving, first aid and a knowledge of local history and geography.[citation needed]

In 2025 Oman become the first country in the Gulf to impose a personal income tax. Oman, will impose a 5% tax on taxable income for individuals earning over 42,000 Omani rials ($109,091) per year starting from 2028.[38]

Investment

[edit]

The stock market capitalisation of listed companies in Oman was valued at $15,269 million in 2005 by the World Bank.[39]

In 2025 Moody's upgraded Oman's long-term issuer and senior unsecured ratings to "Baa3" from "Ba1", due to expectations of continued improvement in debt ratios and resilience to lower oil prices.[40]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Economy of Oman

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The economy of is a hydrocarbon-reliant system in the , where oil and exports have historically generated the bulk of and foreign exchange since large-scale production began in the late , though depleting reserves and fluctuating global prices underscore the urgency of diversification. In 2024, real GDP expanded by 1.7 percent year-on-year, propelled primarily by non-oil activities including —which achieved 8.3 percent growth—and , while overall nominal GDP reached approximately OMR 37.7 billion (USD 98 billion) at constant prices. Vision 2040 guides these reforms by prioritizing investments in hubs like ports and free zones, infrastructure, fisheries, and downstream industries to build resilience against volatility and foster private sector-led growth. Fiscal prudence, including subsidy rationalization and debt reduction, has yielded surpluses, enabling medium-term stability despite rates hovering around 15 percent and heavy expatriate labor dependence in key sectors.

Historical Development

Pre-Independence and Early Economy

Prior to the commercial exploitation of oil resources beginning in 1967, Oman's economy was characterized by subsistence activities in , , and rudimentary , reflecting the sultanate's geographic constraints and historical maritime orientation. , limited by arid conditions to coastal plains such as al-Batinah and highland oases, primarily produced dates, limes, bananas, , and for local consumption, with date cultivation dominating exports alongside dried fish and other staples. sustained coastal communities through traditional artisanal methods, contributing to but yielding minimal surplus for commerce. herding, including goats, sheep, and camels, supported nomadic and rural populations in interior regions. Oman's strategic position on ancient routes historically elevated from Dhofar as a premier export, linking the region to Mesopotamian, Egyptian, and Mediterranean markets as early as the 3rd millennium BCE; this resin, harvested from trees, served medicinal, religious, and preservative purposes, underpinning caravan and maritime networks documented in UNESCO-recognized sites like the . By the 19th and early 20th centuries, however, the economy had contracted from its imperial peaks under the , which once controlled East African clove plantations and slave trade routes until the 1861 partition with diminished revenues. Ports like and facilitated intra-Gulf and exchanges of commodities such as textiles, spices, and pearls, but overall activity remained small-scale and localized, with souqs serving as hubs for barter and limited monetary transactions using foreign currencies like the or . In the decades leading to 1970, prevailed amid political isolation under Sultan , with no formal banking system, minimal infrastructure, and pervasive poverty driving labor emigration; thousands of Omanis departed annually for employment in neighboring oil-producing states such as and the (later UAE), exacerbating domestic underdevelopment and highlighting the subsistence economy's inability to support . This era lacked centralized monetary oversight, relying on informal credit and tribal networks, while fiscal resources derived scant customs duties and agricultural levies insufficient for modernization. The absence of diversified revenue streams underscored vulnerabilities to climatic variability and regional competition, setting the stage for transformative shifts post-1967 oil exports.

Oil Discovery and Rapid Expansion (1967–1990s)

Oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Oman at the Yibal field in 1962, following decades of exploration efforts that began with the initial concession granted in 1925. Further significant finds occurred at the Fahud field in 1964, leading to the commencement of commercial production by (PDO) in August 1967, with the first exports marking the onset of revenue generation from hydrocarbons. Prior to this, Oman's relied predominantly on , , and limited , with oil comprising 31 percent of real GDP and 95 percent of export receipts by 1967, though production volumes remained modest at initial stages. Under Sultan , revenues were minimally reinvested, resulting in a stagnant isolated from modernization, which constrained broader development despite the nascent oil sector. The accession of Sultan Qaboos bin Said in July 1970, following a palace coup, fundamentally altered this trajectory by redirecting oil proceeds toward infrastructure and public welfare projects, reversing his predecessor's isolationist policies. Qaboos prioritized investments in roads, ports, electricity, water desalination, education, and healthcare, leveraging rising oil prices and output to fund the first Five-Year Development Plan (1976–1980), which emphasized capital-intensive growth to build foundational institutions. This approach enabled rapid socioeconomic transformation, with oil production surging from approximately 332,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1970 to 366,000 bpd by 1976, peaking near 400,000 bpd in 1979 amid global oil booms. Into the and , production fluctuations occurred due to field maturity and price cycles, dipping to around 285,000 bpd in the late 1980s before recovering to 708,000 bpd by 1991, driven by enhanced recovery techniques and new fields. These revenues, which constituted the bulk of government income, financed extensive state-led expansion, including industrialization initiatives and urban development, though the economy's heavy reliance—often exceeding 40 percent of GDP by the late —highlighted vulnerabilities to volatility without substantial diversification at the time. Qaboos's strategy emphasized prudent fiscal allocation for long-term , contrasting with less structured spending in peer oil economies, fostering growth from near-subsistence levels to middle-income status by the decade's end.

Diversification Attempts under Sultan Qaboos (2000–2019)

During the reign of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Oman's diversification strategy was anchored in the Vision 2020 framework, initiated in 1995 to lessen reliance on hydrocarbons by fostering non-oil sectors such as manufacturing, logistics, and tourism, with the aim of doubling per capita income through accelerated private sector-led growth by 2020. Implementation intensified in the 2000s via five-year development plans emphasizing infrastructure development and foreign investment incentives, including the establishment of free zones and special economic zones to attract industrial projects. These efforts sought to capitalize on Oman's strategic location for trade and transshipment, though progress was hampered by fluctuating oil prices and structural challenges like limited skilled labor. Key infrastructure projects underscored these attempts, notably the development of , formalized in 2002 through a with the and Royal Decree 80/2002, which transformed the site into a hub for , including aluminum smelting and petrochemicals, drawing investments exceeding OMR 1 billion by the mid-2010s. Similarly, the at was established in 2011 under Royal Decree 119/2011, spanning 2,000 square kilometers to promote , , and fisheries, with port operations commencing in 2012 to position as a gateway between and . Tourism initiatives also advanced, with visitor numbers and spending rising steadily; inbound tourism expenditure reached $3.08 billion in 2019, up from lower bases in the early 2000s, supported by marketing campaigns and heritage site developments like Souq renovations. Despite these measures, diversification outcomes fell short of Vision 2020 targets, as non-oil GDP growth averaged modest rates—contracting 1.5% in 2019 amid global slowdowns—while hydrocarbons retained a dominant role, comprising around 26% of GDP by 2020 but over 50% of exports throughout the period. Non-oil sectors expanded their GDP contribution from approximately 55% in the early to over 70% by late , driven by and services, yet vulnerability to oil revenue shocks persisted due to incomplete dynamism and reforms. IMF analysis highlights that real non-hydrocarbon growth slowed post-, averaging below overall GDP expansion, underscoring causal links between oil dependency and limited diversification efficacy.

Reforms under Sultan Haitham bin Tariq (2020–Present)

Upon ascending to the throne on January 11, 2020, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq prioritized economic restructuring to address fiscal vulnerabilities exposed by low oil prices and the , launching Oman Vision 2040 as a long-term framework for diversification, private sector-led growth, and reduced hydrocarbon dependence. The vision, approved in December 2020, emphasizes fiscal sustainability, human capital development, and innovation, with targets to increase non-oil GDP contribution to 87% by 2040 through investments in , , , and renewables. Early actions included a government reshuffle in August 2020 to streamline ministries, merging economic oversight under new entities like the Ministry of Economy to enhance policy coordination. Fiscal reforms under the Medium-Term Financial Framework (Tawazon program, 2020–2024) focused on deficit reduction, achieving a halving of the fiscal gap through expenditure rationalization, cuts on and , and mobilization via a 5% VAT hike to 15% in phases starting April 2021. Public debt was managed through international issuances totaling over $7 billion by 2023, while initiatives targeted state-owned enterprises in , ports, and aviation, with the overseeing asset sales to attract private capital. These measures supported non-oil growth to 68% of total revenues by 2023, though challenges persisted from global volatility. To bolster (FDI), reforms eliminated minimum capital requirements for most sectors, permitted 100% foreign ownership in commercial firms, and expanded free zones, resulting in FDI inflows rising 21.6% year-on-year in 2023 and 17.4% in early 2024. Institutional enhancements included programs integrated into Vision 2040, such as platforms to streamline registration, reducing setup time to under a week by 2024. Despite progress, implementation faces hurdles like bureaucratic inertia and at around 15% in 2024, prompting ongoing tweaks to Omanisation quotas in private sector hiring. Overall, these reforms have driven non-oil GDP growth averaging 3.5% annually from 2021–2024, signaling a shift toward resilience amid oil price fluctuations.

Macroeconomic Performance

GDP Composition and Growth Rates

Oman's GDP composition remains heavily influenced by hydrocarbons, with the oil and gas sector accounting for approximately 25-30% of total GDP in recent years, down from peaks exceeding 40% during high oil price periods due to production cuts under OPEC+ agreements and global energy transitions. In 2023, the mining and quarrying sector (predominantly hydrocarbons) contributed around 24.8% to GDP at constant prices, while non-hydrocarbon activities, including manufacturing (about 9%), construction (7%), and wholesale/retail trade (15%), comprised the balance, with services overall forming over 50% of the economy. This structure reflects Oman's resource endowment but underscores vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations, as evidenced by the hydrocarbon sector's contraction of 10.5% in 2023 amid lower Brent crude averages and voluntary output reductions. Real GDP growth has exhibited volatility tied to oil dynamics and external shocks, with non-oil sectors providing relative stability through diversification initiatives. The economy contracted sharply by 3.4% in 2020 due to the and a collapse in oil demand, followed by a rebound of 5.1% in 2021 driven by eased lockdowns and higher energy prices. Growth moderated to 3.3% in 2022 amid sustained + quotas, slowed further to 1.2% in 2023 as hydrocarbon output fell, and accelerated to an estimated 1.9-2.0% for 2024, supported by 4.1% expansion in non-oil GDP from , , and . Projections from the IMF indicate average annual growth of around 2.5% through 2028, contingent on fiscal reforms and under Oman Vision 2040 to elevate non-oil contributions.
YearReal GDP Growth Rate (%)Key Drivers
2020-3.4Oil price crash and restrictions
20215.1Post-pandemic recovery and oil price surge
20223.3OPEC+ production limits offsetting non-oil gains
20231.2 decline amid lower output and prices
2024 (est.)2.0Non-oil sector expansion at 4.1%
Oman's fiscal position deteriorated in the due to volatile prices and expansionary spending, resulting in annual deficits averaging around 7-10% of GDP between 2015 and 2019, exacerbated by subsidies and public sector wage growth that outpaced non- revenues. The intensified this, with the fiscal deficit reaching approximately 11% of GDP in 2020 amid low prices and emergency expenditures. Public debt surged accordingly, climbing from about 35% of GDP in 2014 to a peak of nearly 68% by late 2020, financed largely through domestic and international bonds to cover shortfalls and sustain social programs. High oil prices post-2021 enabled a reversal, with fiscal surpluses emerging as revenues rebounded while expenditure discipline was imposed under Oman Vision 2040, which prioritizes fiscal consolidation through subsidy rationalization, tax reforms, and non-oil revenue diversification. In 2023, the government recorded a surplus of 2.2% of GDP, equivalent to RO 931 million, supported by oil export gains and initial non-oil growth. This continued into with a projected surplus of 6.2% of GDP, driven by sustained revenues and restrained capital spending. By the end of , public debt had fallen to RO 14.4 billion, or 34% of GDP, down from 67.9% earlier in the decade, reflecting debt repayments and surplus channeling into liability reduction. Into 2025, the trend of debt reduction persisted, with public debt at RO 14.3 billion by Q1 and RO 14.1 billion by Q2, maintaining a around 34-35% amid ongoing fiscal . The assesses this trajectory as sustainable, with debt projected to stabilize below 40% of GDP through Vision 2040 reforms, though vulnerability to oil price shocks remains due to hydrocarbons comprising over 70% of export earnings.
YearFiscal Balance (% of GDP)Public Debt (% of GDP)
2020-11.0~68
2023+2.237.5
2024+6.234-35
Fiscal balances are expected to average a 2.3% surplus through 2025, contingent on moderate prices and continued implementation of structural measures like expansion and public-private partnerships to bolster non-oil fiscal resilience. Despite progress, analysts note that without accelerated diversification, cyclical dependence could reverse gains during future downturns, underscoring the need for prudent borrowing limits and asset accumulation in sovereign wealth mechanisms.

Inflation, Monetary Policy, and Exchange Rate Stability

The has maintained a fixed peg to the since January 1986 at a rate of 1 OMR = 2.6008 USD, providing long-term stability amid Oman's hydrocarbon-dependent economy. This peg, managed by the (CBO), limits monetary autonomy but anchors expectations by importing U.S. monetary policy credibility and mitigating imported volatility from global commodity prices. The arrangement has endured without , supported by substantial equivalent to over 10 months of imports as of 2023, though it exposes Oman to U.S. cycles. Oman's monetary policy framework prioritizes through reserve requirements, management, and alignment with U.S. actions, given the peg's constraints. The CBO monitors indicators such as GDP growth and employment while employing tools like operations and repo agreements to influence domestic , though transmission to lending and deposit rates remains subdued compared to flexible regimes. In response to global tightening post-2022, the CBO raised policy rates in tandem with the Fed, reaching 5.50% by mid-2023, which helped curb inflationary pressures without disrupting credit growth. Fiscal consolidation under Oman Vision 2040 complements this by reducing public spending volatility, enhancing overall macroeconomic resilience. Inflation in Oman has remained among the lowest globally, averaging below 2% annually from 2010 to 2019, with deflation of -0.91% in 2020 amid the downturn and oil price collapse. Rates rose to 2.51% in 2022 due to disruptions and energy price surges but declined to 0.95% in 2023, aided by the fixed and subsidy adjustments on and . Preliminary data for 2024 indicate stabilization around 1.0-1.5%, with September 2025 recording 1.10% year-over-year, driven by moderated food and transport costs. The projects consumer price inflation at 0.9% for 2025, reflecting prudent monetary-fiscal coordination and non-oil sector expansion, though risks persist from geopolitical tensions affecting energy imports.

Primary Economic Sectors

Hydrocarbons: Oil and Natural Gas Dominance

Oman's hydrocarbon sector, centered on and , forms the cornerstone of its economy, with petroleum liquids production beginning after the discovery of commercial quantities in 1964 at the Yibal field, followed by initial exports in 1967. Proven crude reserves stood at 4.8 billion barrels as of 2024, supporting annual production of 363.3 million barrels, equivalent to approximately 995,000 barrels per day, with exports reaching 308.4 million barrels in the same year. Historical output peaked at 972,000 barrels per day in 2000 before declining due to maturing fields and subsequent enhanced recovery efforts, though production has stabilized around 1 million barrels per day in recent years amid voluntary output cuts aligned with global supply management. The sector's operations are managed primarily through concessions held by (PDO) and international partners, with state-owned OQ entities overseeing upstream activities post-2019 restructuring. Oil dominates export earnings, accounting for 57.6% of total merchandise exports in 2023, while hydrocarbons collectively underpin a significant portion of revenues, estimated at over 50% in budget projections assuming oil prices around $55 per barrel. This reliance has driven economic expansion, with hydrocarbon sector growth contributing to a 4.3% overall GDP increase in 2022, though vulnerability to price fluctuations—evident in production dips from + aligned cuts—highlights the sector's outsized influence on fiscal stability. complements oil, with of 658.5 billion cubic meters recorded in 2024, and marketed production reaching about 40 billion cubic meters in 2023. The (LNG) subsector exemplifies gas's export-oriented dominance, with achieving a record 11.98 million tonnes produced in and exports totaling 12 million tonnes, primarily to Asian markets under long-term contracts. Facilities at Qalhat and Sur, operational since the late and early , have elevated to a mid-tier global LNG supplier, with first-half exports hitting 6.1 million tonnes, up 11% year-over-year. Gas also fuels domestic power generation and industry, reducing oil's internal consumption and bolstering overall hydrocarbon value, though the sector's combined weight—historically over 70% of exports—constrains diversification despite policy pushes like Vision 2040.

Non-Hydrocarbon Contributions: Manufacturing, Logistics, and Agriculture

Oman's sector has become a cornerstone of non-hydrocarbon economic diversification, recording GDP contributions of approximately 9% and achieving 8.3% annual growth in 2024. from manufacturing reached 4,149 million Omani rials (OMR) in 2024, an increase from 3,819.8 million OMR in 2023, driven by expansions in metals, cement, and plastics. Industrial clusters in , including the Oman Aluminium Rolling Company established in 2011 for flat-rolled aluminum products and Sohar Cement Factory in Phase 7 of the Sohar Industrial Estate, anchor development. These activities, supported by Oman Vision 2040, helped manufacturing offset declines in hydrocarbons and contribute to overall GDP growth of 1.7% in 2024. The sector positions Oman as an emerging regional hub, with contributions of 7% to GDP in 2023 targeted to surpass 10% by 2040 through port and free-zone investments. exemplified this momentum, handling 152% more cargo in 2024 while receiving over 1,000 vessels, bolstered by the at for logistics and industry. Vessel traffic and cargo volumes at major ports including , , and rose significantly in the first half of 2025, reflecting infrastructure enhancements aligned with diversification goals. Non-oil exports, facilitated by these logistics advancements, grew 11.3% to over 3.89 billion OMR by July 2025. Agriculture remains a modest yet stable non-hydrocarbon contributor, accounting for 2.6% of GDP in 2024 and rising to 1,070.3 million OMR in value added from 996.8 million OMR in 2023. Key outputs include dates, limes, bananas, and alfalfa, with date fruit value-addition initiatives emphasizing productivity enhancements such as nut-infused products yielding up to 540% ratios in select varieties. The sector supported GDP expansion in the second quarter of 2024 amid broader non-oil growth of 4.2% in the first half of the year.

Emerging Sectors: Tourism, Fisheries, and Renewables

Oman's tourism sector has expanded as part of economic diversification efforts under Oman Vision 2040, which identifies tourism as a key pillar for non-oil growth. In 2024, the sector attracted approximately 3.8 to 3.9 million international visitors, following a peak of 4 million in 2023, with domestic tourism reaching 13.6 million visitors, a 5.1% increase from 12.9 million in 2023. Revenues from tourism reached $5.5 billion in 2024, contributing OMR 2.12 billion to the economy, while total sector spending rose to OMR 1.02 billion from OMR 960 million in 2018, and its GDP contribution increased to OMR 2.7 billion from OMR 2.3 billion over the same period. Government initiatives, including infrastructure development and marketing campaigns, have targeted ecotourism and cultural sites like Muttrah Souq to sustain this momentum amid fluctuating global travel patterns. The fisheries sector supports Oman's diversification by leveraging its 3,165-kilometer coastline and , positioning it as another Vision 2040 pillar with projected contributions of $5.2 billion to GDP by 2040. Fish production totaled 410,000 metric tons from January to July 2024, a 13% rise from 364,000 metric tons in the same period of 2023, driven by artisanal and activities. Exports reached approximately 325,000 tonnes valued at OMR 190 million in recent years, with new markets like opening in 2024 to boost demand for Omani . The sector's GDP from and grew to OMR 1,070.3 million in 2024 from OMR 996.8 million in 2023, reflecting investments in , sustainability, and infrastructure to reduce reliance on hydrocarbons. Renewable energy emerges as a critical non-oil sector under Vision 2040, aiming for 3,631 MW of solar and capacity by 2030 from a base of 163 MW in 2025, with renewables comprising up to 21% of the power mix in early 2025. Key projects include the 50 MW Dhofar Wind Power Plant, generating 42.04 GWh in Q1 2025, and planned solar independent power producers totaling 4,500 MW with $2.8 billion investment. Agreements signed in December 2024 for 300 MW of renewables by and OQAE, set for production in late 2026, alongside upcoming Ibri 3 (500 MW solar) and Dhofar 2 (120 MW ), underscore commitments to utility-scale solar and amid abundant and coastal resources. These developments, supported by battery storage investments like a $488.6 million project, aim to enhance and export potential while addressing challenges inherent to solar and variability.

Government Policies and Structural Reforms

Omanisation: Localization of Workforce and Training

Omanisation is the Omani government's strategic policy to localize the workforce by prioritizing the hiring and training of Omani nationals, particularly in the , to reduce dependency on labor and address . The policy mandates sector-specific quotas, annual localization plans from companies, and restrictions on employment in designated roles, such as systems analysts, engineers, and managers, as expanded in September 2024. Foreign-owned companies must employ at least one Omani national within one year of operation, with incentives like wage support for exceeding targets. The oversees implementation through employment targets integrated with programs, aiming to align educational outcomes with market needs via initiatives like on-the-job apprenticeships and qualification courses. In 2025, the ministry set a goal of 45,000 jobs for , including 11,000 opportunities, with 17,228 placed in or programs by the first half of the year, achieving 38% of the annual target. Sectoral progress includes 21% localization in transport and logistics during the first quarter of 2025. Despite these efforts, the Omanisation rate remained at 16% in 2023, with 274,894 employed out of a 1.74 million , reflecting persistent skills gaps that necessitate targeted to enable effective replacement. Historical data shows rates fluctuating between 13% and 17% from 2007 to 2018, underscoring challenges in sustaining growth amid a rising of 1.81 million as of May 2025. Programs emphasize practical skills development, such as IT apprenticeships and wage-subsidized placements, to bridge mismatches and support Vision 2040's diversification goals.

Oman Vision 2040: Strategic Diversification Framework

Oman Vision 2040, launched on October 1, 2020, by Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, provides a long-term blueprint for the Sultanate's development, succeeding the earlier Vision 2020 initiative and emphasizing economic resilience through diversification beyond hydrocarbons. The framework recognizes the causal vulnerabilities of oil price fluctuations, which have comprised up to 70% of government revenues in recent decades, and prioritizes causal levers such as sectoral expansion, empowerment, and to foster self-sustaining growth. At its core, the strategy targets elevating non-oil sectors' GDP contribution to over 90% by 2040, with oil's share projected to decline to approximately 8-9%, through integrated value chains in , , , and renewables. Key enablers include enhancing competitiveness via regulatory streamlining, attracting targeting 10% of GDP inflows, and developing specialized economic zones to integrate upstream and downstream activities. Tourism, for example, aims for 11 million annual visitors by 2040, capitalizing on cultural and eco-tourism assets, while and fisheries receive incentives for export-oriented production. The vision's seven pillars—encompassing a diversified , empowered society, sustainable environment, and high-quality services—guide implementation via national programs, public-private partnerships, and fiscal consolidation measures like subsidy rationalization to redirect resources toward productive investments. Non-oil targets include raising it to 18% of GDP by 2040 from a 2017 baseline of 9.5%, supported by reforms and . Early implementation has yielded measurable gains, with non-oil sectors such as , , and registering accelerated growth rates post-2020, contributing to overall GDP expansion and improved global rankings in and ease of doing . The fourth periodic report, scheduled for release on October 27, 2025, underscores advancements in economic transformation metrics, though empirical data indicate ongoing hurdles in workforce localization—aiming for 40% Omani in private sectors by 2040—and scaling amid global energy transitions.

Privatization, Subsidy Reforms, and Fiscal Consolidation

Oman's privatization initiatives, integral to Oman Vision 2040 launched in 2020, seek to reduce state dominance in the economy by transferring ownership of select state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to private investors, thereby enhancing efficiency and attracting foreign direct investment. The program targets sectors such as energy, transportation, and utilities, with the sovereign wealth fund overseeing asset sales to align with diversification goals. Notable examples include the 2020 divestment of a 49 percent stake in the Oman Electricity Transmission Company to China's State Grid Corporation, marking a key step in utility sector liberalization. Further efforts involve partial privatization of Oman Air through joint ventures and exploration of listings for oil and gas entities like OQ Exploration and Production, though full implementation has proceeded cautiously amid concerns over SOE governance and market readiness. Subsidy reforms have focused on rationalizing universal support for , , and to curb fiscal leakages and promote resource conservation, with adjustments beginning in the mid-2010s and accelerating under Vision 2040. In December 2020, the government announced a phased elimination of and subsidies over five years starting January 2021, introducing tiered tariffs based on consumption slabs to protect low-income households while incentivizing efficiency. subsidies persist via the National Subsidy System for eligible Omani nationals, compensating for market price fluctuations, though prior reforms like 2016 price hikes demonstrated productivity gains in affected businesses by aligning costs with global benchmarks. These measures aim to reallocate savings toward and , reducing the burden from approximately 5 percent of GDP pre-reform to more sustainable levels. Fiscal consolidation efforts, formalized through the Medium-Term Fiscal Balance Plan (MTFP) for 2020-2024, emphasize expenditure restraint, revenue diversification via non-oil sources, and management to achieve balance amid volatility. Supported by higher hydrocarbon prices since 2022 and subsidy cuts, these policies have restored fiscal surpluses by 2024, with public stabilized below 40 percent of GDP through issuances and expenditure controls on civil ministries. The has commended Oman's steadfast reforms for fostering economic expansion with low inflation, while the World Bank highlights the program's role in sustainable trajectories via enhanced non-hydrocarbon revenues and growth. Despite progress, challenges persist in institutional capacity to sustain reforms without eroding credit metrics during downturns.

Labor Market and Human Capital

Employment Structure and Unemployment Dynamics

Oman's employment structure is characterized by a significant divide between public and private sectors, with nationals (Omanis) comprising the majority of public sector workers while expatriates dominate the private sector. In 2023, approximately 56% of Omani nationals were employed in the public sector, reflecting a strong preference for government jobs due to higher wages, job security, and benefits compared to private sector roles. The private sector, which accounts for the bulk of economic activity outside hydrocarbons, relied heavily on expatriate labor, with 1.45 million expatriates employed in 2023, up from 1.36 million in 2022. This expatriate dependency stems from historical reliance on low-cost foreign workers in construction, manufacturing, and services, where Omanis often face wage gaps and skill mismatches that deter participation. Sectoral distribution shows industry, including and gas, employing about 40% of the workforce in recent estimates, followed by services at 54%, and at roughly 6%. Hydrocarbon-related industries and absorb a large share of expatriates, while services encompass retail, , and with mixed nationalities. Public sector employment, which grew modestly amid fiscal reforms, remains a key absorber of Omani labor, but private sector Omanisation quotas have increased national participation to around 20-25% in targeted fields by , driven by policies mandating Omani hires in professional roles. These quotas, enforced since the and intensified under Vision 2040, aim to localize jobs but have raised labor costs and prompted some firms to automate or relocate. Unemployment dynamics reveal a low overall rate of 3.2% in 2024, masking structural vulnerabilities among nationals. The figure benefits from inflows during economic upturns, but Omani hovers higher due to saturation and reluctance, with projections requiring 220,000 new jobs for nationals by 2032 to accommodate labor force growth. , particularly acute for ages 15-24, stood at 13.9% in 2024, down from 14.1% in 2023 but persistently elevated due to skills gaps, over-reliance on academic credentials mismatched with market needs, and cultural preferences for white-collar roles. Female youth face even steeper barriers, with rates exceeding male counterparts amid limited vocational training and social norms. Policy responses under Oman Vision 2040 emphasize job creation through diversification, with initiatives like the National Employment Program targeting 45,000 annual Omani placements via training and incentives. However, progress is uneven: oil price volatility disrupts private hiring, while subsidy cuts and fiscal consolidation since 2016 have curbed public sector expansion, exacerbating youth idleness and prompting emigration or informal work. Empirical evidence from IMF analyses indicates that without accelerated private sector absorption—via wage subsidies and skills alignment—unemployment could rise amid demographic pressures from a young population, where 15-29-year-olds comprise over 30% of citizens. These dynamics underscore a transition from rentier-state employment patterns toward sustainable, productivity-driven growth, though expatriate substitution remains challenging given productivity differentials.
IndicatorValue (2024)TrendSource
Overall Unemployment Rate3.2%Stable/Declining
Youth Unemployment Rate (15-24)13.9%Declining
Private Sector Expatriate Employment~1.45 million (2023)Increasing
Required New Jobs for Nationals by 2032220,000Projected Need

Skills Development and Youth Integration Challenges

Oman's youth unemployment rate, encompassing individuals aged 15-24, stood at 13.9% in 2024, reflecting a modest decline from 14.1% in 2023 but remaining elevated compared to the overall national unemployment rate of approximately 3%. This disparity underscores structural barriers to youth integration, including a mismatch between educational outputs and private-sector demands, where workers fill roughly 70% of roles in key non-oil sectors like and services. often prioritize stable public-sector employment, which constitutes about 50% of Omani jobs but offers limited openings amid fiscal constraints, exacerbating reluctance to enter competitive private markets requiring hands-on skills. A primary challenge lies in skills misalignment, with Omani graduates frequently lacking practical competencies such as technical proficiency, problem-solving, and digital literacy essential for industries driving Oman Vision 2040's diversification goals, including logistics, manufacturing, and renewables. Studies indicate that vocational college students, despite targeted training, exhibit gaps in employability skills, with employers reporting shortages in areas like engineering applications and soft skills, partly due to curricula emphasizing theoretical knowledge over industry-specific apprenticeships. This disconnect is compounded by labor market segmentation, where low mobility between public and private sectors—fueled by wage disparities and expatriate preferences for cost-effective hiring—hinders youth progression into skilled roles. Integration efforts under Oman Vision 2040 prioritize development through expanded vocational programs and public-private partnerships, yet implementation faces hurdles like inadequate trainer quality and limited private-sector absorption capacity. For instance, while initiatives like the Eidaad internship aim to bridge academic and workforce gaps, participant feedback highlights persistent deficiencies in real-world application, contributing to a not in employment, education, or training () rate that pressures social stability amid a demographic bulge representing over 25% of the . Addressing these requires causal reforms, such as incentivizing private-sector Omanisation via targeted subsidies for and enforcing skill-aligned hiring quotas, as unchecked expatriate reliance perpetuates a cycle of underutilized national talent.

Expatriate Labor Dependency and Policy Responses

Oman's workforce remains predominantly composed of expatriate labor, with foreign workers numbering approximately 1.81 million as of May 2025, primarily from , filling roles in , services, and low-skilled sectors due to access to low-cost labor and limited national participation in these areas. This dependency has persisted despite post-pandemic recovery, where expatriate employment growth outpaced that of nationals by more than twofold, exacerbating labor characterized by wage disparities—Omanis earning significantly more than expatriates in the —and restricted mobility between public and private jobs. By late 2024, expatriates constituted a substantial share of the total labor force, with their numbers having tripled between 2007 and 2017 and surpassing pre-COVID levels by January 2023, underscoring structural reliance that hinders sustainable national employment. In response, the government has intensified Omanization policies since the , mandating quotas for Omani hiring in specific sectors and professions to localize jobs and reduce expatriate dominance, with measurable reductions in shares in both public and private sectors achieved between 1995 and 1998, though progress has been uneven. These efforts include outright bans on expatriate recruitment for over 200 professions as of January 2025, aimed at prioritizing qualified and building self-sufficiency in targeted roles. Aligned with Oman Vision 2040's emphasis on workforce development and economic diversification, policies project the need for 220,000 additional private-sector jobs for nationals by 2032, supported by training initiatives to address skills gaps. Recent reforms, effective as of October 2025, revise the work permit system by offering a 30% fee discount to employers meeting prescribed Omanization rates while doubling charges for non-compliant firms, incentivizing localization amid mixed policy outcomes that have yet to fully curb dependency. Such measures reflect causal pressures from demographic growth and fiscal constraints, prioritizing empirical job creation for nationals over unrestricted foreign inflows, though challenges persist in private-sector attractiveness due to lower wages and working conditions compared to the .

Trade, Investment, and International Relations

Major Trade Partners and Export Composition

Oman's major export destinations are dominated by Asian economies, with China as the primary partner, accounting for approximately $30.2 billion in exports in 2023, primarily crude petroleum. Other key partners include India ($4.5 billion), Saudi Arabia ($3.64 billion), the United Arab Emirates ($3.49 billion), and South Africa ($2.57 billion), reflecting regional hydrocarbon demand and re-export dynamics within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These five destinations represented over 70% of Oman's total merchandise exports, valued at $62.7 billion in 2023. The United Arab Emirates holds a notable position in both exports (11% share) and imports (27% share), underscoring bilateral GCC trade ties. Export composition remains heavily reliant on hydrocarbons, which comprised 57.6% oil and 11.6% (LNG) in 2023, with crude ($29.3 billion), refined ($10.3 billion), and gas ($6.53 billion) as top products. Non-oil exports, including semi-finished iron ($3.27 billion), aluminum, and chemicals, totaled RO7.442 billion ($19.3 billion) in 2023 but declined 16.3% to RO6.232 billion ($16.2 billion) in 2024 amid global commodity fluctuations and subdued demand. Mineral products dominated the non-oil category in 2024, highlighting limited diversification progress despite policy efforts.
Top Export Partners (2023)Value (USD Billion)Approximate Share of Total Exports
30.248%
4.57%
3.646%
3.496%
2.574%
Oman's import partners mirror export patterns but emphasize machinery and consumer goods sourcing, with the leading at around 27-29% of total imports ($36.3 billion in 2023), followed by (12%), (8.5%), and (7.5%). This structure contributed to a trade surplus of RO7.517 billion ($19.5 billion) in 2024, driven by elevated oil prices despite rising imports and non-oil export contraction.

Foreign Direct Investment Inflows and Regulatory Environment

Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Oman have grown significantly in recent years, supporting the country's diversification away from oil dependency under Oman Vision 2040. In 2023, net FDI inflows reached $4.74 billion, reflecting a 13.4% increase from 2022, driven by investments in , , , and sectors. This uptick aligns with global trends in the Gulf region but is bolstered by Oman's strategic location and infrastructure developments, such as port expansions at and . Major sources include , which contributed approximately OMR 905 million ($2.35 billion) in 2022–2023 across energy and infrastructure projects; the and , focusing on regional integration initiatives; and , with firms like ACME Group investing in . Other notable investors encompass the United Kingdom's in oil and gas exploration and Saudi-based in renewables. Oman's regulatory framework for FDI is primarily governed by Royal Decree 50/2019, the Foreign Capital Investment Law, which allows 100% in most sectors, excluding restricted areas like commercial agency representation and certain security-related activities. The law streamlines investor registration through the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Investment Promotion (MOCIIP), requiring approval within 10 days for most applications, and provides legal protections against expropriation with guarantees of fair compensation. Amendments and supplementary royal decrees, such as those in 2020–2021, have expanded eligible sectors and reduced bureaucratic hurdles, contributing to Oman's improvement in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business rankings prior to the index's discontinuation. To attract FDI, Oman offers targeted incentives, including up to 30-year tax holidays and customs duty exemptions in special economic zones (SEZs) and free zones like SEZ and Free Zone, established under Royal Decree 19/2020 and updated by a new SEZ law in April 2025. These zones permit full repatriation of profits and capital, zero tax, and relaxed labor regulations to facilitate hiring. Additional measures include reduced government fees for foreign investors in priority sectors like and digital services, as outlined in MOCIIP's investment promotion strategy. Despite these reforms, challenges persist, including occasional delays in through Omani courts or , though the country's low perception—ranked 67th globally by in 2023—enhances investor confidence compared to regional peers. Overall, the environment favors long-term projects aligned with national priorities, with FDI stock as a of GDP rising to around 25% by 2023.

Regional Agreements and Geopolitical Economic Ties

Oman is a founding member of the (GCC), established in 1981 to promote economic, security, and political coordination among , , , , , and the . The GCC's Unified Economic Agreement, originally signed in 1981 and revised in 2001, aims to create a , harmonize economic policies, and facilitate free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor among members. Oman fully participates in the GCC Customs Union, implemented in 2003, which imposes a common external tariff of 5% on most imports and eliminates internal duties, though intra-GCC trade remains limited at approximately 10% of total trade due to overlapping export profiles dominated by hydrocarbons. The GCC Common Market, launched in 2008, grants national treatment to citizens and firms across borders, enabling Omani businesses to access larger regional markets for diversification efforts. Bilateral agreements within the GCC framework strengthen Oman's economic ties. In February 2025, Oman and signed three pacts covering trade facilitation, legal services, and manufacturing to enhance private-sector collaboration and , which supports Oman's non-oil export growth. Similarly, Oman and the UAE formalized $35.12 billion in agreements and memorandums of understanding in April 2024, focusing on investment in , , and to leverage shared borders and ports like and . Qatar-Oman trade exceeded QAR 6.3 billion (approximately $1.73 billion) in 2024, reflecting a 17% year-on-year increase driven by liquefied natural gas swaps and joint ventures in . In August 2025, Oman and further agreed to a joint investment framework targeting diversified sectors, aiming to boost non-oil GDP contributions amid Vision 2040 goals. Geopolitically, Oman's economic ties reflect a policy of neutrality, balancing GCC alliances with pragmatic engagement with Iran despite sectarian differences. Oman maintains a unique bilateral relationship with Iran, including a 25-year agreement signed in 2013 for Iran to supply up to 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to Oman via pipeline, valued at billions in energy security benefits and fostering joint ventures in fisheries and electricity interconnectors. This arrangement, operationalized post-2016 sanctions relief, positions Oman as a conduit for Iranian exports through ports like Sohar, enhancing revenue from transit fees and diversification. Oman mediated the 2023 restoration of Saudi-Iran diplomatic ties, brokered with Chinese involvement, which indirectly stabilized regional energy markets and opened avenues for trilateral economic cooperation. While deepening GCC integration with Sunni neighbors like Saudi Arabia and the UAE—through shared infrastructure projects and defense pacts—Oman's Iran ties mitigate risks from Strait of Hormuz disruptions, where 20% of global oil transits, underscoring causal linkages between diplomacy and economic resilience.

Challenges, Criticisms, and Risks

Persistent Oil Dependency and Price Volatility

Oman's economy exhibits a longstanding reliance on crude and products, which accounted for approximately 35% of GDP in 2023 while dominating export revenues at over 62% of the total, including crude ($29.3 billion) and refined ($10.3 billion) as leading categories. finances remain particularly vulnerable, with hydrocarbons funding the majority of budgetary needs despite recent reforms and non- growth; the fiscal breakeven stood at around $65 per barrel in 2024, underscoring the threshold below which deficits widen absent compensatory measures. Global oil price swings exacerbate this dependency through direct transmission to fiscal outcomes and real GDP, as empirical analyses confirm a strong positive between Brent crude prices and Omani growth rates over 1970–2022, with shocks amplifying volatility in public spending and economic activity. The 2014–2016 price collapse, which saw Brent fall over 70% from mid-2014 peaks, triggered Oman's first fiscal deficits in decades, contracting non-oil GDP and prompting borrowing; similarly, the 2020 COVID-induced plunge to negative territory contributed to a 3.5% overall GDP drop amid production cuts and revenue shortfalls. Highs, such as those in 2022 following Russia's invasion of , temporarily boosted revenues but highlighted procyclical fiscal patterns, where spending surges during booms strain adjustment during busts. Efforts under Oman Vision 2040 to mitigate dependency via non-oil sector expansion—targeting reduced hydrocarbon reliance through , , and —have yielded modest gains, with non-oil GDP comprising 37% of nominal totals in 2023 and non-oil exports rising 11.3% year-on-year by mid-2024. Yet progress remains incremental, as oil production quotas under + and persistent global demand keep hydrocarbons central; IMF assessments note improved fiscal buffers via debt issuance and asset drawdowns, but warn that sustained prices below breakeven levels—projected at $65–70 per barrel into 2025—could erode reserves and necessitate further , given limited non-oil revenue elasticity. This structural exposure, compounded by Oman's modest reserves relative to peers, perpetuates boom-bust cycles, hindering long-term stability absent accelerated diversification.

Governance Issues: Resource Curse and Rentier State Dynamics

Oman's economy exemplifies characteristics, where hydrocarbon rents—primarily from and gas exports—form the backbone of state revenues, historically accounting for over 70% of export earnings and a significant portion of income as of the early . This reliance on external rents, rather than diversified taxation, diminishes the need for rulers to cultivate broad citizen , enabling a governance model centered on distribution through subsidies, public employment, and welfare provisions. Empirical analyses confirm that such structures in Gulf states like Oman perpetuate autocratic stability by substituting fiscal rents for productive domestic taxation, thereby weakening incentives for institutional reforms that prioritize efficiency over loyalty. Rent-seeking behaviors manifest prominently in labor markets, with Omani nationals disproportionately favoring positions, which employ around 44% of the national workforce despite comprising only a fraction of total jobs; surveys indicate 87% of job-seekers prefer roles for their superior wages, benefits, and security, often secured through connections () rather than merit. This distortion crowds out dynamism, as state largesse sustains unproductive employment and fiscal burdens, with public wages consuming a substantial share amid price volatility—evident in deficits exceeding 10% of GDP during low-price periods like 2014–2016 and 2020. Governance challenges compound these dynamics, including persistent in public procurement, where cases rose from 112 accusations in 2016 to 200 in 2018, reflecting rentier incentives for over transparent allocation. The hypothesis applies to through mechanisms like , where oil windfalls appreciate the real , undermining non-hydrocarbon sectors such as and , which have stagnated relative to resource extraction. Time-series studies from 1990 to 2021, employing ARDL models, detect negative growth correlations with resource intensity, attributing slower diversification to shortcomings that prioritize short-term rent allocation over long-term investment in or institutions; financial development partially offsets this but fails to fully counteract volatility-induced policy inconsistency. In MENA oil exporters including , these symptoms interconnect with authoritarian , where resource abundance correlates with lower institutional quality scores, as rents enable rulers to co-opt potential challengers via handouts rather than fostering competitive markets or . Efforts under Vision 2040 to introduce value-added taxes and curb subsidies signal awareness of these pitfalls, yet entrenched rentier logics—evident in subdued private investment amid state dominance—pose causal barriers to escaping the curse without deeper political accountability.

Social Welfare Burdens: Subsidies and Demographic Pressures

Oman's government allocates substantial resources to subsidies on essential goods and services, including energy, water, electricity, and food, which have historically comprised a significant portion of public expenditure amid hydrocarbon revenue fluctuations. In the 2024 state budget, contributions and other expenses—encompassing subsidies—totaled RO 2.177 billion, an increase from RO 1.830 billion in 2023, reflecting persistent fiscal commitments despite reform efforts. Fuel subsidies alone are projected to account for approximately 0.7% of GDP in 2024, while electricity subsidies were reduced by 5% compared to the prior year as part of cost-containment measures. These subsidies, rooted in maintaining social stability in a rentier economy, often lead to inefficiencies such as overconsumption of subsidized utilities and implicit cross-subsidization burdens on state-owned enterprises, complicating fiscal sustainability. Reform initiatives under Oman Vision 2040 have targeted subsidy rationalization to alleviate budgetary strains, with reductions in fuel subsidies yielding savings of RO 479 million and electricity subsidies RO 386 million in recent fiscal adjustments. The introduction of a new law in 2024 has shifted toward more targeted welfare, allocating RO 289 million for in early 2025 alongside RO 339 million for electricity and RO 44 million for oil products, aiming to replace blanket subsidies with means-tested support. For 2025, total contributions including subsidies are budgeted at RO 2.345 billion, signaling continued but moderated emphasis on these expenditures amid broader fiscal consolidation. Such measures address the dynamics where subsidies perpetuate dependency on state handouts, deterring efficiency and exposing the economy to oil price volatility. Demographic pressures compound these subsidy burdens, as Oman grapples with a pronounced youth bulge and rapid , projecting an increase of 625,665 people in 2025 to reach 8.14 million by early 2026. Approximately 31.2% of the is under 15 years old in 2025, with the cohort (under 29) historically comprising over 64% of , sustaining high dependency ratios and demands for public , healthcare, and job creation. This demographic profile, expected to persist for at least two decades, intensifies fiscal needs for social welfare, as young exhibit a strong preference for secure employment, straining government hiring capacities amid limited non-oil job growth. Social spending, exceeding 40% on and over 20% on healthcare, alongside new protections equivalent to 1.8% of nonhydrocarbon GDP, underscores the interplay between and welfare obligations. The convergence of subsidy commitments and demographic expansion poses risks to long-term fiscal health, as noted by international assessments highlighting medium-term pressures from labor market entry and entrenched welfare expectations. Without accelerated diversification and labor market reforms to harness the potential , these factors could exacerbate public debt trajectories and hinder development, perpetuating a cycle of state-led resource distribution over market-driven growth. IMF analyses emphasize the need for sustained streamlining and public caps to mitigate these intertwined burdens, ensuring in a transitioning economy.

Future Prospects and Projections

Short-Term Growth Forecasts (2025–2030)

The (IMF) projects Oman's real GDP growth at 2.9% for 2025, reflecting an uptick from 1.7% in 2024, primarily driven by the anticipated easing of + oil production cuts and sustained expansion in non-oil sectors such as and . Omani officials forecast a higher rate of 3.4% for the same year, citing robust hydrocarbon output recovery alongside structural reforms under Vision 2040. The World Bank anticipates an average of 3.0% growth over 2025–2026, underpinned by increasing oil production and diversification efforts, though regional projections for states suggest variability tied to global energy demand. For 2026, IMF estimates indicate acceleration to 3.7%, supported by further non-oil momentum and fiscal prudence that has reduced public debt to around 35% of GDP. Projections beyond 2026 remain less granular, with medium-term outlooks from the IMF and private analyses pointing to sustained annual growth of 3–4% through 2030, contingent on consistent implementation of diversification initiatives like industrial zoning and foreign investment incentives. Non-oil GDP, which comprised over 70% of activity in recent years, is expected to outpace overall growth, driven by sectors including and projects, though empirical data from prior periods underscores the challenge of decoupling from oil amid volatile prices averaging $70–80 per barrel. Uncertainties persist, including geopolitical tensions in the and potential global recessions that could suppress oil demand, as highlighted in IMF assessments; nonetheless, Oman's fiscal buffers, including a 3.3% surplus in , provide resilience against downside risks. Credible forecasts from multilateral institutions like the IMF, which incorporate econometric models and on-ground consultations, outweigh more optimistic domestic projections that may embed policy assumptions not yet fully realized, emphasizing the causal link between hydrocarbon dynamics and short-term trajectories.

Long-Term Sustainability under Vision 2040

Oman Vision 2040, launched in 2021, establishes a framework for long-term economic sustainability by prioritizing diversification away from hydrocarbons, which accounted for approximately 30% of GDP in 2023 despite comprising over 70% of export revenues. The strategy targets an average annual GDP growth rate of 5% through non-oil sector expansion, aiming to elevate real GDP per capita by 90% by 2040 via investments in , , , and . This approach seeks to build resilience against oil price volatility, which has historically driven fiscal swings, by fostering private sector-led growth and reducing public expenditure dependency on resource rents. Key to sustainability is the emphasis on fiscal prudence, with goals to achieve a 3% fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio while curtailing subsidies and enhancing revenue from non-oil sources such as value-added taxes and fees. Progress includes non-oil GDP growth of 4.2% in the first half of 2024, driven by , , and , supported by regulatory reforms like streamlined investment laws and special economic zones. The has noted these efforts as contributing to a 6.9% fiscal surplus in 2023, attributing it to disciplined spending and hydrocarbon windfalls, though sustaining this requires accelerating private investment to offset declining oil output projected post-2030. Environmental sustainability integrates targets, including 30% of power from solar and by 2030, to mitigate carbon dependency and align with global transitions, while preserving natural resources through regulated and management. development underpins these goals, with programs to upskill the workforce for high-value sectors, addressing at around 15% in 2023 and demographic pressures from a growing population. Overall, Vision 2040's multi-pillar structure—encompassing economic, social, and environmental dimensions—positions for a post-oil era, though empirical success hinges on consistent implementation amid geopolitical risks and global energy shifts.

Potential Risks from Global Energy Transitions

Oman's economy remains vulnerable to disruptions from the global shift toward sources and , given that hydrocarbons account for approximately 35% of GDP and a substantial share of government revenues and exports as of 2024. This dependency amplifies risks from declining long-term demand, as international commitments to net-zero emissions by 2050—such as those under the —drive policies favoring electric vehicles, , and intermittent renewables, potentially stranding Omani assets if extraction costs exceed future market prices. The International Energy Agency's Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) projects global demand growth slowing to around 700,000 barrels per day annually through 2026, with a plateau near 105 million barrels per day by 2030, but its Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) anticipates an earlier peak and decline, heightening fiscal pressures for exporters like . Finite reserves exacerbate these challenges, with Oman holding just 0.32% of global proven oil reserves, sufficient for roughly 20-25 years at current production rates of about 1 million barrels per day, assuming no major discoveries. Accelerated transitions could precipitate sustained low prices—below Oman's fiscal of around $80-90 per barrel—leading to budget deficits, as evidenced by historical volatility where oil price drops have forced cuts and borrowing. While Vision 2040 targets reducing oil's GDP share to 16% by 2030 and 8.4% by 2040 through non-oil growth in , , and , progress remains partial, with non-oil sectors expanding 4.2% in the first half of 2024 but still comprising under 70% of GDP. Geopolitical factors compound these risks, including competition from lower-cost producers like and potential trade barriers from carbon border adjustments in the and elsewhere, which could diminish Oman's market access for carbon-intensive exports. Oman's own net-zero 2050 roadmap emphasizes and carbon capture, yet implementation lags behind diversification needs, leaving the exposed if global demand peaks before 2030 as some IEA variants suggest, rather than extending as in baseline forecasts. Fiscal buffers, including sovereign wealth funds, provide short-term mitigation, but sustained transition pressures could undermine Vision 2040's sustainability without faster non-hydrocarbon revenue streams.

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