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R-36 (missile)
R-36 (missile)
R-36 (missile)
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The R-36 (Russian: Р-36) is a family of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and space launch vehicles (Tsyklon) designed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The original R-36 was deployed under the GRAU index 8K67 and was given the NATO reporting name SS-9 Scarp. It was able to carry three warheads and was the first Soviet MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) missile.[4] The later version, the R-36M, also known as RS20, was produced under the GRAU designations 15A14 and 15A18 and was given the NATO reporting name SS-18 Satan. This missile was viewed by certain United States analysts as giving the Soviet Union first strike advantage over the U.S., particularly because of its rapid silo-reload ability, very heavy throw weight and extremely large number of re-entry vehicles. Some versions of the R-36M were deployed with 10 warheads and up to 40 penetration aids and the missile's high throw-weight made it theoretically capable of carrying more warheads or penetration aids. Contemporary U.S. missiles, such as the Minuteman III, carried up to three warheads at most.

Key Information

The R-36 became the base for the Tsyklon launch vehicles family. As of early 2021, Cyclone-4M, the last Tsyklon variant in development, is planned for launch in 2023 from Canso, Nova Scotia.[5]

Some R-36 missiles have been converted into Dnepr medium-lift launch vehicles, capable of putting up to 4,500 kg into orbit.

History

[edit]
Rocket nozzles of an R-36

Development of the R-36 was begun by OKB-586 (Yuzhnoye) in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine (at the time part of the Soviet Union) in 1962, and built upon the work of the R-16 program. The Chief Designer was Mikhail Yangel. Initial development was of light, heavy, and orbital versions, with flight testing from 1962 through 1966, at which time initial operational capability was achieved. News of the development of the orbital version caused alarm in the West with the possibility that the Soviets would be able to launch a large number of nuclear weapons into orbit where there was no capability to intercept them. Weapons could potentially be left orbiting for an indefinite period. The prospect of orbital nuclear weapons led both sides to agree to a treaty banning the basing of weapons of mass destruction in space.

In 1970, development of a fourth version, capable of delivering multiple warheads, was begun, which was test flown the next year.

Further improvement of the R-36 led to the design of the R-36M, which provided a theoretical first-strike capability—the ability to destroy the United States' LGM-30 Minuteman ICBM silos and launch control centers before they could retaliate. However, neither the Soviet Union nor the Russian Federation have ever publicly delineated the missile's particular role in their arsenal. The initial design of the R-36M called for a single massive 12 Mt warhead to be delivered over a range of 10,600 km. The missile was first tested in 1973 but this test ended in failure. After several delays the R-36M was deployed in December 1975. This design was delivered with a single 18–20 Mt warhead and a range of just over 11,000 km. This new version was given a new codename by NATO: SS-18 Satan.

The R-36M has gone through six separate variants, with the first being phased out by 1984. The final variant designated R-36M-2 "Voevoda" (NATO codename SS-18 mod 6) was deployed in August 1988. This missile could deliver the same 18–20 Mt warhead 16,000 km. Prior variants mainly introduced MIRV (Multiple independent reentry vehicles) warheads. These missiles surpassed their western counterpart, the US LGM-118 Peacekeeper in terms of megatons delivered, range, and survivability, but were inferior in terms of accuracy (CEP).

The control system for this rocket was designed at NPO "Electropribor"[6] (Kharkiv, Ukraine).

Deployment

[edit]
Dnepr inside silo

At full deployment, before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 308 R-36M launch silos were operational. After the breakup of the USSR, 204 of these were located on the territory of the Russian Federation and 104 on the territory of newly independent Kazakhstan. In the next few years Russia reduced the number of R-36M launch silos to 154 to conform with the START I treaty. Part of the missiles in Kazakhstan (54 of them) were under the 57th Rocket Division at Zhangiz-Tobe (Solnechnyy), Semipalatinsk Oblast.[7] The other R-36 establishment in Kazakhstan was the 38th Rocket Division at Derzhavinsk, Turgay Oblast.[8] The dismantling of 104 launchers located in Kazakhstan was completed in September 1996.

The START II treaty was to eliminate all R-36M missiles but it did not enter into force and the missiles remained on duty. Russia has steadily decreased the number of operational R-36Ms and as of March 2013, only 55 (all of the 10 MIRV R-36M2 version) remain.

US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates that as of June 2017 about 50 R-36M2 launchers were operationally deployed.[9]

About 40 missiles will have their service lives extended so that they remain in service until about 2020. With the retirement of the 20 megaton R-36M2 warheads, the highest yield weapon in service with any nation is the estimated 5 Mt Chinese Dong Feng 5 (DF-5) ICBM (CSS-4) warhead and the Russian UR-100N 5 Mt rocket.

Elimination / Retirement

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Senator Richard Lugar inspects an R-36M ICBM being readied for decommission under the Nunn-Lugar Program

In the last decade[dubious – discuss] Russian armed forces have been steadily reducing the number of R-36M missiles in service, withdrawing those that age past their designed operational lifetime. As of January 2020, the Strategic Missile Troops had 46 R-36M2s (or RS-20Vs) in active service.[10]

In March 2006 Russia made an agreement with Ukraine that will regulate cooperation between the two countries on maintaining the R-36M2 missiles. It was reported that the cooperation with Ukraine will allow Russia to extend the service life of the R-36M2 missiles by at least ten to 28 years.[11][needs update]

According to Interfax report, two R-36M2 missiles are planned to be dismantled by November 30, 2020. The process is to be carried out in accordance with the New START procedures.[12][needs update]

As of 2018 Russia unveiled the intended replacement for the R-36M series, a new heavy ICBM the RS-28 Sarmat,[13] which became operational in September 2023.[14]

Design

[edit]

Multiple warheads

[edit]
Decommissioned R36M missile at the Strategic Missile Forces Museum
R36M missile

Missiles of the R-36M family have never been deployed with more than ten warheads, but given their large throw-weight (8.8 tonnes as specified in START), they have the capacity to carry considerably more detonation power. Among the projects that the Soviet Union considered in the mid-1970s was that of a 15A17 missile—a follow-on to the R-36MUTTKh (15A18).[15] The missile would have had an even greater throw-weight—9.5 tonnes—and would be able to carry a very large number of warheads. Five different versions of the missile were considered. Three of these versions would carry regular warheads — 38 × 250 kt yield, 24 × 500 kt yield, or 15–17 × 1 Mt yield. Two modifications were supposed to carry guided warheads ("upravlyaemaya golovnaya chast") — 28 × 250 kt or 19 × 500 kt.[15] However, none of these upgraded models were ever developed. The SALT II Treaty, signed in 1979, prohibited increasing the number of warheads ICBMs could carry. Equally, from a strategic point of view, concentrating so many warheads on silo-based missiles was not seen as desirable, since it would have made a large proportion of the USSR's warheads vulnerable to a counterforce strike.

The operational deployment of the R-36M consisted of the R-36MUTTKh, which carried ten 500 kt warheads, and its follow-on, the R-36M2 (15A18M), which carried ten 800 kt warheads (single-warhead versions with either 8.3 Mt or 20 Mt warhead also existed at some point). To partially circumvent the treaty, the missile was equipped with 40 decoys to utilize the capacity left unused due to the 10-warhead limitation.[16] These decoys would appear as warheads to any defensive system, making each missile as hard to intercept as 50 single warheads, rendering potential anti-ballistic defense ineffective.

Silo hardness

[edit]

A US military estimate circa 1994 said "SS-18 silos have since been assessed to be much harder than 7,000 psi (48 MPa)".[17]

Variants

[edit]

R-36 (SS-9)

[edit]

R-36

[edit]

The R-36 is a two-stage rocket powered by a liquid bipropellant, with UDMH as fuel and nitrogen tetroxide as an oxidizer. It carries one of two types of re-entry vehicles (RVs) developed especially for this missile:[citation needed]

  • Single nuclear warhead of 20 megatons TNT (NATO codename SS-9 Mod 1).[18]
  • Single nuclear warhead of 8.3 megatons TNT (NATO codename SS-9 Mod 2).[18]

The first launch of an R-36 took place on September 28, 1963, and ended ignominiously when the missile lost thrust one second after liftoff and fell back onto the pad, causing a fire.[19] This debacle led to program director V.P. Petrov being fired and replaced by V.N. Soloviev.[citation needed] LC-67/1 was repaired and the next test took place successfully on December 3. Subsequent testing went better, however, LC-80/1 had to be rebuilt following another launch accident on January 13, 1965. Two months later, an R-36 caught fire during propellant loading on LC-67/1 and exploded, putting the pad out of commission for nine months.[20] During test launch #17 (October 10, 1964), the warhead was retrieved with a parachute. Flight tests of the rocket were completed by May 20, 1968, and on November 19 of the same year it entered service.[20] The first (and only) regiment with 18 launchers was deployed on August 25, 1969.[citation needed] A total of 139 8K67s flew between 1963 and 1975 with 16 failures.[citation needed]

The Tsyklon series of civilian space launchers from Ukraine is based on the R-36orb (8К69) or R-36-O (capital O for Orbital) design.[21] The R-36-O launched many orbital satellites (like Kosmos 160, SATCAT 2806, on 17 May 1967) in the 1960s and 1970s as part of the FOBS weapons program.

R-36M (SS-18 Mod 1)

[edit]

Variant of the R-36M carrying a single large reentry vehicle, with a warhead yield of 18-25 Mt, a distance of about 11,000 kilometres (6,000 nmi). In January 1971, cold-launch tests began during which the mortar launch was perfected. The actual flight tests for the missile began on 21 February 1973, though some sources suggest that testing began in October 1972. The testing phase of the R-36M with various different types of warheads was finished in October 1975 and on 30 December 1975 deployment began (though some Western sources suggest that an initial operational capability was reached in early 1975). A total of 56 were deployed by 1977, though all were replaced by R-36MUTTKh missiles by 1984. These high-yield weapons were assessed in the West as possibly developed to attack American Minuteman ICBM launch control centers.[citation needed]

R-36M (SS-18 Mod 2)

[edit]

Variant of the R-36M with a post-boost vehicle and up to eight reentry vehicles, each with a warhead yield estimated at between 0.5 and 1.5 Mt, with a range capability of about 10,200 kilometres (5,500 nmi). The MIRVs were placed in pairs, and a post boost vehicle with a command structure and a propulsion system were contained in the nose cone of the R-36M. The flight tests of this variant began in September 1973 (though some Western sources suggest that the initial flight test occurred in August 1973), with IOC in 1975. Approximately 132 were deployed by 1978, but the post-boost vehicle design was seriously flawed, and all missiles were replaced by R-36MUTTKh by 1983.[citation needed]

R-36MUTTKh (SS-18 Mod 3)

[edit]

Variant of the R-36MUTTKh with a single large reentry vehicle that was an improved version of the R-36M. On 16 August 1976, a few months after the R-36M entered service, the development of an improved modification of the R-36M (15A14) was approved. This missile subsequently received the designation R-36MUTTKh (15A18) and was developed by KB Yuzhnoye (OKB-586) through December 1976. The R-36MUTTKh was capable of carrying two different nose cones. On 29 November 1979, deployment of the improved R-36M with a single reentry vehicle carrying an 18–25 Mt warhead began. This variant is no longer in service.[22]

R-36MUTTKh (SS-18 Mod 4)

[edit]

Variant of the R-36MUTTKh with multiple warheads. It was probably designed to attack and destroy ICBMs and other hardened targets in the US. Its increasing accuracy made it possible to reduce the yield of the warheads and allowed an increase in the number of warheads from 8 to 10. According to some Western estimates, evidence suggested that it may be capable of carrying as many as 14 RVs (this may reflect observation of the deployment of countermeasures intended to overcome a ballistic missile defense, or to confuse American attack characterization systems). The flight-design tests of the R-36MUTTKh began on 31 October 1977 and in November 1979 the flight tests of the MIRVed missile were completed. The first three regiments were put on alert on 18 September 1979. During 1980 a total of 120 missiles were deployed, replacing the last remaining R-36 missiles. In 1982–1983 the remaining R-36M missiles were also replaced with the new R-36MUTTKh and the total number of deployed missiles reached the maximum 308 ceiling established in the SALT-1 treaty. The R-36MUTTKh force had the estimated capability to destroy 65 to 80 percent of US ICBM silos using two nuclear warheads against each. Even after this type of attack, it was estimated that more than 1000 R-36MUTTKh warheads would be available for further strikes against targets in the US. After 2009, the R-36MUTTKh were all eliminated in favor of the newer R-36M2.[citation needed]

R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 5)

[edit]

This newer, more accurate version placed in converted silos allowed the R-36M family to remain the bulwark of the SRF's hard-target-kill capability. The R-36M2 carries 10 MIRVs, each having a nearly twice the yield of the R-36MUTTKh warheads according to Western estimates (approximately 750 kt to 1 Mt), though Russian sources suggest a yield of 550–750 kt each. The increase in the R-36M2's warhead yield, along with improved accuracy, would, under the START treaty, help allow the Russians to maintain their hard-target-kill wartime requirements even with the 50 percent cut in heavy ICBMs the START agreement required. The technical proposals to build a modernized heavy ICBM were made in June 1979. The missile subsequently received the designation R-36M2 Voevoda and the industrial index number 15A18M. The design of the R-36M2 was completed in June 1982. The R-36M2 had a series of new engineering features. The engine of the second stage is completely built into the fuel tank (earlier this was only used on SLBMs) and the design of the transport-launching canister was altered. Unlike the R-36M, the 10 warheads on the post-boost vehicle are located on a special frame in two circles. The flight tests of the R-36M2 equipped with 10 MIRVs began in March 1986 and were completed in March 1988. The first regiment with these missiles was put on alert on 30 July 1988 and was deployed on 11 August 1988. This is the only variant still operational.[23]

One of the missile's most important features is its storage/basing in a container, inserted in the silo. The container doubles as a mortar barrel – it has a "piston" at its bottom, beneath the missile. The drum-like "piston" is filled with a slow-burning, gas pressure-generating charge that pushes, mortar-like, the missile from the container. Only when several meters above the silo with the now empty container the "piston" is pushed sideways by a small rocket motor to avoid being accelerated towards the silo by the ignition of the missile's main engine. Thus the silo is a) spared the burning-out by the main engine flames, and so b) the empty container could be quickly removed and a new container with missile could be inserted by a ready transporter/erector into the intact silo, allowing for a second salvo before the adversary's warheads arrive. This feature was a deep concern for the US side during the SALT/START negotiations, as it gave Soviet Union the possibility to strike US targets again after the first missile exchange was concluded.[citation needed]

R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 6)

[edit]

The flight tests of the R-36M2 missile carrying a single warhead with a yield of 20 Mt were completed in September 1989 and deployment began in August 1991. Ten missiles were deployed. One intended use of these large warheads was high altitude detonation to incapacitate electronics and communications through a very large electromagnetic pulse, however, the most likely use would be against missile launch control centers as the stated purpose for which the R-36MUTTKh warheads were designed. These missiles were all decommissioned by late 2009.[citation needed]

Derivatives

[edit]

A proposal has been advanced to modify Voyevoda R-36M2 Satan heavy ICBMs to destroy incoming asteroids of up to 100 m, similar to the Chelyabinsk asteroid.[24]

Deployed variants of the R-36M missile[25][26][18]
System: R-36M R-36M R-36MUTTKh R-36MUTTKh R-36M2 R-36M2
Treaty-designation: RS-20A RS-20A1 RS-20A2 RS-20B RS-20B RS-20V
GRAU-designation: 15A14 15A14 15A14 15A18 15A18 15A18M
NATO-designation: SS-18 Satan Mod 1 SS-18 Satan Mod 2 SS-18 Satan Mod 3 SS-18 Satan Mod 4 SS-18 Satan Mod 5 SS-18 Satan Mod 6
Deployment: 1974–1983 1976–1980 1976–1986 1979–2005 1988–Present 1991–2009
Maximum deployed number: 148 10 30 278 104 58
Length: 32600 mm 32600 mm 32600 mm 36300 mm 36300 mm 34300 mm
Diameter: 3000 mm 3000 mm 3000 mm 3000 mm 3000 mm 3000 mm
Launch weight: 209,600 kg 209,600 kg 210,000 kg 211,100 kg 211,100 kg 211,100 kg
Number of warheads: 1 8 1 10 10 1
Warhead yield: 20 Mt 0.5-1.3 Mt 25 Mt 0.55 Mt 1 Mt 20 Mt
Range: 11,200 km 10,200 km 16,000 km 16,000 km 11,000 km 16,000 km
CEP: 1000 m 1000 m 1000 m 920 m 500 m 500 m

Operators

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 Russia

The Strategic Missile Troops are the only operator of the R-36. As of January 2020, 46 silo-based missiles are deployed at:[10]

Former operators

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 Soviet Union

See also

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

R-36 (missile)

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from Grokipedia
The R-36 (8K67; NATO: SS-9 Scarp) was a super-heavy, two-stage, liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) developed by the Soviet Union as a key component of its strategic nuclear deterrent during the Cold War. Authorized for development on April 16, 1962, by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (OKB-586), it featured a length of approximately 32.2 meters, a diameter of 3 meters, and a launch weight exceeding 180 metric tons, enabling it to deliver payloads of up to 8,000 kg over ranges of 11,000 to 16,000 kilometers. Deployed in hardened silos starting in 1966, the missile entered service with the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and reached a peak inventory of around 308 units by the mid-1970s, underscoring its role in countering U.S. Minuteman deployments through superior throw-weight and potential for single or multiple nuclear warheads with yields up to 25 megatons. The R-36 represented a leap in Soviet ICBM technology as the second-generation heavy missile, incorporating storable hypergolic propellants for rapid launch readiness and anti-ballistic missile countermeasures, though its variants included both single-warhead and early MIRV configurations tested but limited by treaty constraints. Its development prioritized overwhelming payload capacity over accuracy, with a circular error probable (CEP) of several kilometers, reflecting a doctrine of assured destruction rather than precision counterforce strikes. By the late 1970s, the R-36 was phased out in favor of the enhanced R-36M (SS-18 Satan), which retained the core design but improved MIRV capabilities and silo survivability, with some R-36 components repurposed for space launchers like the Dnepr rocket. The missile's immense scale and destructive potential earned it a fearsome reputation, influencing arms control negotiations such as SALT II, where limits on heavy ICBMs addressed its destabilizing throw-weight advantages.

Development and History

Origins and Initial Design

The R-36 intercontinental ballistic missile originated from a Soviet Ministry of Defense decree issued on April 16, 1962, initiating development of a new heavy-class ICBM to enhance strategic nuclear capabilities amid escalating Cold War tensions. Designed by Mikhail Yangel's Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (OKB-586) in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, the project leveraged prior experience with the R-16 missile, incorporating a similar first-stage engine configuration adapted for greater payload capacity. The initial concept emphasized a silo-launched, two-stage liquid-propellant system capable of delivering a massive single warhead, estimated at up to 20 megatons, to penetrate hardened U.S. targets and counter emerging American ICBM defenses. Early design priorities focused on achieving range exceeding 10,000 kilometers while maximizing throw-weight, with the missile's expanded to 3 meters to accommodate larger fuel tanks and a more powerful RD-251 engine cluster in the first stage. This represented a shift from lighter Soviet ICBMs like the R-16, aiming to match or surpass U.S. Titan II capabilities in destructive potential. Development incorporated countermeasures such as the '' penetration aid system, first tested in a July 1965 launch, to evade anticipated intercepts. Flight-design testing commenced on September 28, 1963, from the Tyuratam launch site, validating core aerodynamic and propulsion parameters despite initial propulsion reliability concerns inherited from R-16 programs. By 1966, the R-36 ( designation SS-9 Mod 1 Scarp) achieved initial operational readiness in hardened silos, marking the Soviet Union's first deployment of a super-heavy ICBM optimized for single-warhead strikes. Subsequent modifications would introduce (MIRV) configurations, but the foundational design prioritized overwhelming firepower over precision.

Testing Phase and Early Challenges

The of the R-36 (8K67) commenced on 28 September 1963 at the Tyuratam () launch site, marking the initial attempt from a purpose-built 41.5 meters deep. The inaugural launch failed immediately, achieving zero apogee, as did subsequent early attempts on 13 December 1963 and 25 January 1964. Initial tests revealed significant reliability issues, with seven failures recorded in the first ten launches, reflecting challenges in stabilizing the missile's liquid-fueled stages using and nitrogen tetroxide propellants. A critical incident occurred on 5 March 1965, when a second-stage propellant leak triggered a fire inside the , highlighting vulnerabilities in containment and silo pressurization during cold-launch sequences. The overall test program extended through 29 March 1966 for primary flight trials, involving dozens of launches that achieved an in-flight failure rate slightly above 15 percent—higher than the preceding SS-7 Saddler program's benchmark and necessitating prolonged validation of silo-hardened deployment. Early guidance relied on a hybrid inertial system augmented by radio commands to compensate for inertial inaccuracies, but this supplemental method was discontinued by late 1965 owing to its susceptibility to jamming and limited precision over ranges. These setbacks delayed operational readiness, as engineers addressed structural stresses on the missile's isolated design and integrated penetration aids against emerging threats, ultimately requiring over 130 trial launches across variants to refine performance before deployment authorization in 1967.

Deployment during the

The R-36 (8K67, NATO: SS-9 Scarp) achieved initial operational capability in late 1966, with the first placed on alert on 5 November 1966 at the Uzhur missile field in . Formally accepted into service on 21 July 1967, the missile was deployed exclusively in hardened underground to enhance against preemptive strikes. Deployment expanded rapidly during the late 1960s as part of the Soviet ' buildup to counter U.S. Minuteman and Titan II ICBMs, with constructed at multiple sites including Dombarovsky in , Kartaly in , Aleysk in , Derzhavinsk (Imeni Gastello) in , and Zhangiz-Tobe in . By 1970, the Soviet Union had deployed a peak of approximately 260 R-36 missiles across these bases, supported by the construction of 308 silos between 1965 and 1973. Early deployments focused on Mod 1 and Mod 2 variants, each carrying a single reentry vehicle with a yield of up to 25 megatons, emphasizing high throw-weight for assured destruction capabilities. The Mod 4 variant, introduced operationally on 26 October 1970, featured three multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) for improved targeting flexibility, though it lacked full independent targeting. A Mod 3 fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) variant was also tested and deployed in limited numbers for global reach without overflight warnings, aligning with Soviet efforts to circumvent U.S. early warning systems. Throughout the , the R-36 formed a cornerstone of Soviet land-based strategic deterrence, with around 300 missiles operational in s by the mid-decade, capable of delivering massive payloads against U.S. and . Regiments typically consisted of 10-16 s each, distributed to disperse risk and complicate enemy countermeasures. Deployment peaked amid U.S.-Soviet tensions, including responses to American MIRV developments, but began phasing out by 1975 as the more advanced R-36M (SS-18) entered service, with full retirement of SS-9s completed by 1978-1979. This transition reflected Soviet prioritization of MIRV technology and hardening improvements for second-strike reliability.

Technical Design

Propulsion and Structural Features

The R-36 (8K67), designated SS-9 Scarp by , featured a two-stage liquid-propellant system utilizing storable hypergolic propellants: nitrogen tetroxide (N₂O₄) as the oxidizer and (UDMH) as the fuel. This combination allowed for indefinite storage and rapid ignition without pre-launch fueling, enhancing operational readiness in silo-based deployments. The first stage propulsion comprised the RD-251 engine, developed by OKB-456 under V.P. Glushko, consisting of three open-cycle main engines each with two combustion chambers, supplemented by a four-chambered steering engine for attitude control. The second stage employed the RD-252 two-chamber main engine, highly unified with first-stage components for production efficiency, paired with RD-69M four-chamber vernier engines. These engines delivered a total boost thrust enabling intercontinental range, with the first stage alone providing approximately 940 kN of cruise thrust. Structurally, the R-36 adopted a tandem two-stage design with a first-stage of 3.0 meters, mass of 118.9 metric tons, and dry of 6.4 metric tons, optimizing for maximum payload capacity among early heavy ICBMs. The cylindrical body integrated reinforced fuel tanks, intertank skirts, and shrouds to withstand launch stresses and confinement, prioritizing throw-weight over maneuverability. -hardened for direct ignition launch, the missile's robust aluminum-lithium construction supported its role as a high-yield strategic deterrent, though early models lacked the containerized storage of later variants.

Warhead and MIRV Systems

The R-36 missile family utilized a range of nuclear configurations, prioritizing high-yield single warheads in early variants for targeting, with later models incorporating multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to enhance capabilities against hardened targets. Initial deployments of the R-36 (8K67, SS-9 Scarp) featured single warheads: Mod 1 with an estimated yield of 10 megatons (Mt), Mod 2 with 18-25 Mt, and Mod 3 introducing a MIRV option with three warheads each yielding approximately 5 Mt, supported by decoys for . These designs emphasized massive explosive power over multiplicity, with weights reaching up to 5,727-6,565 kg for heavy variants, enabling ranges exceeding 10,000 km. Subsequent R-36M (SS-18) variants expanded MIRV integration via the 15F143U post-boost vehicle, which included dedicated propulsion and command systems to dispense multiple reentry vehicles (RVs). Early R-36M models (Mods 1-3) retained single-warhead options, such as a heavy monobloc of 20 Mt (15F141) or light monobloc of 8 Mt (15B86), both silo-deployable with yields optimized for city-level destruction. Mod 4 (R-36UTTh) introduced at least 10 MIRVs, each with yields around 0.5-1 Mt, designed for precision strikes on ICBM silos and command centers, achieving circular error probable (CEP) accuracies of 0.65 km. The R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 5-6) refined MIRV deployment to 10 s per missile, with individual yields increased to approximately 0.75-1 Mt—nearly double those of Mod 4—for improved hard-target kill probability, while maintaining a total throw-weight of about 8.8 tons. This configuration included penetration aids like decoys and , dispensed from the nose cone's MIRV platform, which used paired arrangement and independent targeting logic to counter defenses. Across variants, reliability was enhanced through liquid-propellant upper stages enabling precise RV separation, though operational yields were often limited by constraints post-START I, capping MIRV counts at 10 per missile.

Silo Hardening and Launch Mechanisms

The silos for the initial R-36 (SS-9 Scarp) were engineered to withstand overpressures of 500 psi from a 1-megaton nuclear detonation, providing significant protection against blast effects. These structures measured 41.5 meters in depth and 8.3 meters in diameter, with an interior bore of 4.64 meters, and were hardened to resist up to 20 atmospheres of overpressure. For the R-36M (SS-18 Satan) variants, deployment occurred in modified OS-67 silos originally designed for the earlier R-36, which were heavily reinforced for enhanced survivability. These silos had dimensions of 39 meters in depth and 5.9 meters in diameter, with the missile housed in a transport-launch canister (ampoule) suspended within the silo to facilitate rapid response and reduce vulnerability. Approximately 20 new super-hardened silos were constructed specifically for certain R-36M deployments, offering superior resistance to nuclear and conventional threats compared to standard ICBM silos of the era. The R-36M utilized a cold launch mechanism to minimize silo damage during liftoff. In this system, the missile was ejected from its canister in the silo by high-pressure gas generated from pyrotechnic charges or dedicated gas generators, reaching an altitude of several tens of meters before the first-stage liquid-fueled engines ignited in the atmosphere. This "soft launch" approach avoided direct exposure of the silo interior to the corrosive and erosive effects of hot exhaust plumes, enabling silo reusability after launch and improving overall system reliability under combat conditions. Later modifications, such as those in the R-36M2 (SS-18 Mod 5/6), incorporated further enhancements to silo and missile protection against nuclear effects, including improved shielding and potentially active defense elements like the Mozyr system for intercepting incoming warheads.

Variants and Modifications

R-36 (SS-9 Mods)

The R-36, designated 8K67 by the GRAU index and known to NATO as the SS-9 Scarp, represented the Soviet Union's initial heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) series, featuring storable liquid propellants and silo-based deployment. Developed by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau under a decree dated May 12, 1962, the missile underwent flight testing from 1963 to 1970, culminating in initial operational capability for Mods 1 and 2 in 1966 and Mod 4 in 1970. A total of 146 launches were conducted across all modifications, with the first regiment achieving operational status on November 5, 1966, at the Uzhur site. The system emphasized massive throw-weight, enabling high-yield warheads or early multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) configurations, and was deployed in hardened silos withstand 500 psi overpressure, with a reaction time of 3-5 minutes. The SS-9 series included four primary modifications, differing in reentry vehicle configurations, , and ranges to fulfill diverse strategic roles. Mod 1 featured a single reentry vehicle (RV) with a yield estimated at 5 megatons (MT) by Russian sources or 12-18 MT by Western assessments, achieving a range of 10,200 km with a 5,825 kg ; the measured 32.2 meters in length and weighed 183.9 metric tons at launch. Mod 2, a heavier single- variant (8K67 heavy), carried a 20 MT (or 18-25 MT per Western estimates) but sacrificed range to 10,200 km for the increased of up to 5,825 kg, with similar dimensions to Mod 1 but potentially adjusted for optimization. Mod 3 introduced a (FOBS) capability, combining the SS-9's first and second stages with an upper stage for depressed-trajectory or orbital delivery, yielding 5 MT (Russian) or 1-3 MT (Western) over a 40,000 km range, though with a lighter 1,700 kg payload and extended of 32.6-34.5 meters. This variant, sometimes designated 8K69, allowed circumvention of early warning systems by approaching from unexpected trajectories but was limited in deployment due to considerations and technical complexities. Mod 4 (8K67P) marked the SS-9's progression toward multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), equipping three MRVs each with 2-3.5 MT yields, a total payload of 6 metric tons, and a range of 10,200-12,000 km, retaining the 32.2-meter and 183.9-ton launch weight of earlier mods.
VariantWarhead ConfigurationYield (MT)Range (km) (kg) (m)Launch Weight (t)
Mod 1Single RV5 (Rus)/12-18 (West)10,2005,82532.2183.9
Mod 2Single RV (heavy)10-20 (Rus)/18-25 (West)10,200-15,2003,950-5,82531.7-32.2179-183.9
Mod 3FOBS single5 (Rus)/1-3 (West)40,0001,70032.6-34.5180
Mod 43 MRV2-3.5 each10,200-12,0006,00032.2183.9
Deployment peaked at 268 silos across sites including Uzhur, Dombarovskiy, and Aleysk, with each complex typically comprising 6-10 dispersed hardened launchers of the 15P714 type. The SS-9 Mods were phased out by 1978, superseded by the improved R-36M (SS-18) series, which offered enhanced accuracy, cold-launch mechanisms, and greater MIRV capacity while utilizing modified SS-9 silos. Inertial guidance systems provided a circular error probable (CEP) of 900-1,970 meters per Russian data or 0.4-0.5 nautical miles per Western estimates, powered by UDMH and nitrogen tetroxide propellants in a two-stage configuration.

R-36M (SS-18 Mods 1-4)

![R-36M SS-18 'Satan'][float-right] The R-36M, designated SS-18 Mods 1-4 by , represented the initial production series of the Soviet Union's heaviest (ICBM), developed to enhance strategic deterrence through superior throw-weight and targeting flexibility compared to its predecessor, the R-36 (SS-9). Approved for development on September 2, 1969, by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, these variants featured a two-stage liquid-propellant design with a length of approximately 36.6 meters, a of 3.0 meters, and a launch weight of around 191,000 kg, enabling silo-based deployment in hardened launchers. for Mod 1 commenced in February 1973, with the testing phase for various configurations concluding in October 1975, leading to initial operational capability (IOC) declarations starting in December 1975. SS-18 Mod 1 (R-36M, 15A14) was configured with a single high-yield of 18-25 megatons (Mt), a of 7.2 tons, and a range of 11,200 km, optimized for strikes against large area targets such as command centers. Mod 2 introduced multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) with up to eight s each yielding 0.5-1.5 Mt, though its post-boost vehicle design exhibited flaws that prompted early phase-out by 1983; its range varied from 9,250-10,200 km with a similar 7.2-8.8 ton . These early MIRV attempts achieved a (CEP) of about 1,000 meters, reflecting the technological challenges of the era. Subsequent improvements yielded Mod 3, an enhanced single-warhead variant with a 24-25 Mt yield and extended range of 16,000 km, entering service in November 1979 after testing from October 1977, primarily to address accuracy and reliability gaps in prior models. Mod 4 (R-36MUTTH) marked a significant advancement with 10 MIRVs each at 0.55 Mt, an 8.8-ton , range of 11,500-16,000 km, and improved CEP of 920 meters, enabling hard-target potential against U.S. Minuteman silos—estimated to neutralize 65-80% in a salvo. Deployment peaked at 308 Mod 4 missiles by 1982-1983, with all Mods 1-4 utilizing converted SS-9 silos and cold-launch mechanisms for . By the mid-1980s, Mods 1-3 were largely retired in favor of Mod 4 and later iterations, amid U.S. concerns over a "window of vulnerability" for American ICBMs that influenced debates on systems like the MX Peacekeeper.
VariantIOC DateWarheadsYield (Mt)Range (km)Payload (t)CEP (m)
Mod 1Dec 1975118-2511,2007.2~1,000
Mod 219758 MIRV0.5-1.59,250-10,2007.2-8.8~1,000
Mod 3Nov 1979124-2516,0007.2-8.8~1,000
Mod 4Dec 197910 MIRV0.5511,500-16,0008.8920

R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mods 5-6)

The R-36M2 Voevoda, NATO-designated SS-18 Mods 5 and 6, is an upgraded variant of the R-36M , designed as a response to anticipated U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. Development began in the late 1970s, with the tactical-technical specification issued in July 1979 for a fourth-generation to replace earlier R-36M models and overcome prospective U.S. defenses. The missile's design was finalized in June 1982, incorporating innovations such as a second-stage liquid-propellant with multiple fixed nozzles for improved thrust vector control and a solid-propellant third stage for post-boost maneuvers. concluded successfully, leading to the first regiment achieving alert status on July 30, 1988, and full deployment on August 11, 1988. Key enhancements over prior R-36M variants included superior accuracy with a (CEP) of 0.5-1 km, penetration aids to evade missile defenses, and warheads engineered for high resistance to nuclear effects and individual targeting capabilities. The Mod 5 configuration was optimized for a single of 20 megatons yield, achieving a maximum range of 16,000 km, while the Mod 6 supported multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) with up to 10 warheads of 750 kilotons each, reducing range to 11,000 km under MIRV load. Overall encompass a launch weight of 211.1 metric tons, length of 34.3 meters, and first-stage thrust of 7,257 kN from a liquid-fueled engine. These features enabled a throw-weight of approximately 8.8 tons, prioritizing overwhelming delivery. The Voevoda retained silo-based deployment in hardened launchers, with the 15P018M system emphasizing survivability through rapid fueling and launch readiness. By 1998, 58 R-36M2 missiles were operational within Russia's , forming a core of the silo-based leg of the . Mod 6 remained the primary operational configuration into the , underscoring its role in maintaining capabilities amid constraints.

Strategic Role and Capabilities

Deterrence Doctrine and Throw-Weight Advantages

The R-36 missile series formed a cornerstone of Soviet nuclear deterrence strategy during the , emphasizing a survivable second-strike capability to enforce (MAD). By deploying heavy silo-based ICBMs capable of delivering overwhelming retaliatory strikes, the aimed to deter aggression through the credible threat of devastating attacks on population centers and infrastructure, compensating for perceived vulnerabilities in conventional forces. This approach prioritized quantitative superiority in megatonnage and warhead numbers over precision, with the R-36's design enabling rapid reload and high readiness to ensure a portion of the arsenal survived a U.S. first strike. A key element of this was the R-36's exceptional throw-weight, which ranged from approximately 5,800 kg in early R-36M variants to 8,800 kg in the R-36M2 (SS-18 Mods 5-6), far exceeding contemporary U.S. ICBMs such as the Minuteman III's 1,150 kg . This capacity permitted flexible configurations, including up to 10 MIRVs with yields of 500-750 kt each or a single massive exceeding 20 Mt, allowing the to either saturate defenses with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids or concentrate destructive power on hardened targets. The throw-weight advantage enhanced deterrence by complicating enemy countermeasures; the payload's size supported extensive decoy deployment and countermeasures, increasing the probability of successful penetration against emerging defenses like the U.S. Safeguard system, which was limited to sparse coverage. In doctrinal terms, this translated to a "minimum acceptable damage" threshold for retaliation, where even a fraction of surviving R-36s could inflict unacceptable losses, reinforcing Soviet negotiating leverage in talks such as SALT II, where the missile's capabilities were factored into limits on MIRVed heavy ICBMs. Analysts noted that the SS-18's payload superiority positioned it as the most destructive single ICBM, amplifying psychological deterrence through sheer destructive potential.

Comparative Analysis with Western ICBMs

The R-36 missile family, particularly the R-36M2 Voevoda variant, exhibits substantial differences from Western ICBMs like the U.S. LGM-30G Minuteman III and the retired LGM-118A Peacekeeper, primarily in capacity and design priorities. Soviet engineers emphasized maximizing throw-weight to enable heavy loads or extensive penetration aids, aligning with a deterrence strategy focused on assured destruction of targets through overkill. In contrast, U.S. systems favored solid-propellant designs for faster launch readiness and enhanced accuracy suited to missions against hardened , though at the cost of reduced mass. Key specifications highlight these disparities. The R-36M2 achieves a throw-weight of 8,800 kg, supporting up to 10 MIRVs with individual yields of 550 kt, and a maximum range of 16,000 km under light payload configurations. The Minuteman III, by comparison, has a throw-weight of 1,150 kg, originally accommodating three MIRVs of 300-340 kt each (de-MIRVed to single warheads post-START treaties), with a range of 13,000 km. offered closer parity with 3,950 kg throw-weight and 10 MIRVs of 300 kt each, but its range dropped to 9,600 km under full load, and it was decommissioned in 2005 due to treaty limits and maintenance costs.
MissileThrow-Weight (kg)Max MIRVs (Yield per Warhead)Range (km, max payload)CEP (m)Propulsion
R-36M28,80010 (550 kt)11,000-16,000260
Minuteman III1,1503 (300-340 kt)13,000110-220Solid
Peacekeeper3,95010 (300 kt)9,600100Solid
This table underscores the R-36M2's payload dominance—roughly double the Peacekeeper's and over seven times the Minuteman III's—facilitating greater destructive potential per missile, though its liquid fueling demands extended preparation times compared to solid-fuel Western counterparts. Accuracy metrics further differentiate the systems: U.S. ICBMs achieved (CEP) values under 200 m through inertial guidance upgrades, enabling precise strikes on reinforced targets, while the R-36M2's 260 m CEP prioritized volume over precision, relying on MIRV multiplicity and decoys to saturate defenses. Silo survivability presents mixed trade-offs. The R-36's cold-launch mechanism—ejecting the missile via gas pressure before ignition—permits firing amid silo overpressure from nearby detonations, enhancing launch-under-attack viability despite its larger 211-ton gross mass requiring fortified third-generation s. Western solid-fuel missiles like the Minuteman III offer inherent readiness without pre-launch fueling but face vulnerabilities to prompt attack due to fixed locations, mitigated by dispersion and rapid retargeting. Overall, the R-36's capabilities reflect a doctrinal focus on raw megatonnage for retaliatory strikes, contrasting U.S. emphasis on technological precision and reliability, though both served paradigms during the .

Counterforce and Countervalue Potential

The R-36M series, particularly later modifications like the SS-18 Mod 4 and Mod 6, demonstrated substantial potential through its combination of high throw-weight—approximately 8,800 kg—and improved accuracy, with a (CEP) of around 500 meters for MIRVed configurations. This enabled the missile to deploy up to 10 independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), each with yields of 500-750 kilotons, sufficient to neutralize hardened targets such as U.S. Minuteman ICBM silos. Assessments from the era indicated that a full salvo of SS-18 Mod 4 missiles could destroy 65 to 80 percent of deployed U.S. silo-based ICBMs in a first strike, factoring in the missile's payload capacity for penetration aids and decoys to overwhelm defenses. The liquid-fueled, silo-launched further supported rapid targeting of military assets, aligning with Soviet emphases on preemptive or retaliatory strikes against enemy nuclear forces, though operational accuracy was constrained by inertial guidance limitations compared to later solid-fuel systems. In roles, the R-36M's versatility extended to massive single-warhead options, with yields up to 20-25 megatons, optimized for inflicting catastrophic damage on urban-industrial centers and population hubs to ensure . The high throw-weight allowed for either MIRV dispersal across multiple cities or a unitary high-yield device, amplifying deterrence by threatening rather than isolated nodes. Soviet strategic doctrine, as reflected in deployments, prioritized such heavy ICBMs for retaliatory strikes post-exchange, preserving for urban targets after absorbing an initial attack, though the missile's dual-use design blurred lines between force-on-force and city-busting missions. This capability persisted into the post-Cold War period for remaining operational units, underscoring the R-36M's role in maintaining a spectrum of nuclear options despite aging guidance systems. Overall, the R-36 family's edge derived from quantitative superiority in warheads and yield over contemporary Western ICBMs like the Minuteman III, enabling theoretical decapitation, while its potency rested on unmatched single-shot destructive power, though real-world efficacy depended on survivability of against counter-counterforce threats. Later variants incorporated enhancements for both modes, including up to 40 penetration aids per , but treaty-limited deployments curtailed full exploitation of this potential.

Operational Deployment

Deployment Timeline and Sites

The initial variant of the R-36, designated 8K67 and known to NATO as SS-9 Scarp, entered deployment with the Soviet in , with the first regiment achieving operational status on November 5, 1966. Deployment proceeded rapidly, reaching approximately 170 missiles by the end of 1969, primarily in -based configurations across several sites that would later host upgraded variants. Subsequent development led to the R-36M family, beginning with the 15A14 variant (SS-18 Mod 1 and 2), whose first regiment became operational on December 25, 1974, at the Dombarovskiy site. Initial operational capability for the R-36M was achieved in January 1975, with full integration into service by December 1975. Deployment expanded through the late and , incorporating variants such as Mod 3 and 4 by 1979-1980, and peaking at 308 by 1982-1983, many replacing earlier R-36 installations. The R-36M2 (Mod 5 and 6, Voevoda) entered service in 1988 and 1991, respectively, further enhancing capabilities until the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991. Deployment sites for the R-36M were concentrated in the Soviet Union, with silos distributed across and :
SiteLocation/RegionNumber of SilosNotes
Aleysk, 30
Derzhavinsk52Dismantled post-1991
Dombarovskiy-3, 64First R-36M regiment site
Kartaly-6, 46
Uzhur-4, 64
Zhangiz-TobeSemipalatinsk, 52Dismantled by 1996
Following the USSR's , the 104 Kazakhstani silos were eliminated by September 1996 in compliance with agreements, leaving 204 in .

Current Operators and Inventory (as of 2025)

The R-36 missile series, particularly the R-36M2 Voevoda (NATO: SS-18 Mod 6 Satan), is operated solely by the Russian (RVSN) as part of Russia's land-based (ICBM) component. No other nations maintain operational R-36 systems, following the dismantlement of former Soviet stockpiles in and pursuant to the START treaties and subsequent bilateral agreements. As of May 2025, deploys 34 silo-launched R-36M2 missiles, each configured for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) with up to 10 warheads of 500–800 kilotons yield, yielding a total of approximately 340 strategic warheads from this type. These represent a diminishing fraction of 's overall ICBM inventory, which totals around 330 missiles capable of delivering over 1,200 warheads, amid ongoing modernization efforts prioritizing solid-fuel systems like the RS-24 Yars and the delayed RS-28 Sarmat replacement. The R-36M2's liquid-fueled design and heavy throw-weight continue to underpin 's silo-based deterrence posture, though service life extensions are required due to the variant's deployment since 1988.

Retirement, Treaties, and Phasing Out

START Treaty Compliance and Dismantlement

The R-36M series, designated SS-18 by , was classified as a heavy (ICBM) under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (), signed on July 31, 1991, and entered into force on December 5, 1994. START I imposed aggregate limits of 1,600 deployed strategic delivery vehicles and 6,000 accountable warheads across ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers, with specific sub-limits on heavy ICBMs like the SS-18, which were capped at 154 launchers due to their (MIRV) capacity of up to 10 warheads each. Russia's deployed SS-18 force, which peaked at 308 missiles in 1982, had already declined to 204 by late 1991; by the treaty's first data exchange on July 1, 1995, this number further reduced to 176 deployed missiles, achieved through retirements of earlier Mod 1-4 variants, while retaining Mod 5 and 6 (R-36M2 Voevoda). Dismantlement under followed treaty-mandated procedures, including on-site inspections by U.S. and Russian teams to verify the removal of missiles from , followed by the destruction of launchers via high-explosive to render them inoperable, typically involving the collapse of silo lids and internal structures. eliminated excess SS-18 missiles and at bases such as those in the 13th Missile Division near and the 60th near Tatishchevo, with over 100 silos destroyed by the late 1990s to meet launcher limits; liquid-fueled components were drained, stages separated, and sections rendered unusable under verification protocols. START II, signed on January 3, 1993, but never ratified by due to linkages with U.S. ballistic missile defense plans, explicitly required the elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs, including the entire SS-18 inventory, through missile destruction (e.g., via explosive disassembly or launch) and conversions or eliminations, aiming to phase out heavy ICBMs entirely by 2003. Although non-binding after Russia's 2000 withdrawal from ratification, the provisions influenced voluntary reductions, with Russia retiring additional SS-18s beyond requirements, reducing operational numbers to around 58 Mod 5/6 missiles by the early 2000s. Under the Treaty, signed on April 8, 2010, and extended through February 4, 2026, the SS-18 remained accountable as a heavy MIRVed ICBM, subject to limits of 700 deployed launchers, 1,550 deployed warheads, and 800 total deployed and non-deployed launchers across systems. complied with these caps until suspending inspections in August 2022 amid geopolitical tensions, declaring approximately 46-58 SS-18s operational as of 2021 data exchanges, necessitating ongoing retirements of aging units—many exceeding 30 years of service—to avoid exceeding warhead attributions. Dismantlement continued selectively, with missiles decommissioned at facilities like , where stages were demilitarized for scrap or conversion, though delays in the replacement have prolonged SS-18 reliance, with roughly 40 remaining deployed as of mid-2024.

Partial Retirements and Legacy Systems

The earlier variants of the R-36 ICBM family, including Mods 1 through 4 (R-36 and initial R-36M configurations), were progressively retired starting in the 1990s under obligations such as the Treaty, which entered force in 1994 and mandated significant reductions in deployed strategic launchers and warheads. By the early 2000s, these liquid-fueled, silo-based systems—characterized by single-warhead or early MIRV payloads—had been largely dismantled or converted, with over 200 launchers eliminated to comply with treaty limits capping deployed ICBMs at 1,200-1,600 for the Soviet successor states. This phase-out reflected both treaty-driven downsizing and the obsolescence of their propulsion and accuracy relative to newer models, though some silos were repurposed for the R-36M2 upgrades. In contrast, the R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mods 5 and 6), deployed from 1988 onward, has experienced only partial retirements, retaining operational status as a into 2025 despite nearing the end of its projected 25-30 year . Approximately 34 to 46 R-36M2 missiles remain deployed in hardened , primarily at sites like Dombarovsky and Uzhur, configured for up to 10 MIRV warheads each and serving as a high-throw-weight backbone of Russia's strategic deterrent amid delays in the successor . Russian officials extended their lifespan beyond initial projections, announcing in 2010 that the fleet would remain active until at least 2026 to bridge modernization gaps, a decision reinforced by Sarmat test failures in 2024 that postponed full operational capability. These legacy systems continue to underpin Russia's silo-based ICBM inventory, which totals around 330 launchers as of 2025, providing potential through their massive capacity—up to 8-10 megatons equivalent—while facing maintenance challenges from aging liquid-propellant components. Phasing out is underway incrementally, with individual missiles deactivated and prepared for Sarmat integration, but full hinges on the new system's reliability, as the R-36M2's robustness has been prioritized over complete replacement amid geopolitical tensions and the suspension of inspections in 2023.

Derivatives and Non-Military Applications

Conversion to Space Launch Vehicles

Decommissioned R-36M intercontinental ballistic missiles, particularly the R-36MUTTH variant, were converted into the Dnepr space launch vehicle as part of post-Cold War arms reduction efforts, allowing the repurposing of silo-based hardware for commercial orbital missions under international treaties like START I. The conversion process entailed removing nuclear warheads and reentry vehicles, integrating a composite payload fairing, modifying the inertial guidance system for precise orbital insertion rather than target impact, and adapting upper stage engines for satellite deployment sequences. Operated from converted ICBM silos, the Dnepr preserved the original three-stage architecture with nitrogen tetroxide and propellants, achieving a liftoff mass of 211 metric tons, a length of 34 meters, and capacity of up to 4,500 kg to a 200 km . Launches occurred vertically from underground silos at Cosmodrome's Site 109 in , with secondary operations from Dombarovsky (Yasny) in starting in , enabling rapid integration and cost-effective access to polar or sun-synchronous orbits. The program was managed by ISC Kosmotras, a trinational entity formed in 1997 involving , , and , which facilitated 22 successful missions from 1999 to 2015, primarily for foreign clients deploying and small constellations at costs around $10,000 per kg. Initial demonstration on April 21, 1999, orbited the UoSAT-12 from , validating the conversion's reliability derived from the ICBM's established flight heritage. Subsequent conversions supported diverse payloads, including the 32-satellite cluster launch on November 21, 2013, featuring DubaiSat-2 and STSat-3, and the final mission on March 25, 2015, deploying South Korea's KompSat-3A from Yasny. The initiative extended the operational life of approximately 148 available R-36M missiles slated for dismantlement by under treaty obligations, transforming potential scrap into a niche launch service until geopolitical strains and missile stock depletion halted activities post-2015.

Dnepr Rocket Family Utilization

The Dnepr rocket family consisted of converted R-36M2 (SS-18) intercontinental ballistic missiles repurposed for commercial space launches by the International Space Company Kosmotras, a joint venture involving Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Operations began with the inaugural flight on April 21, 1999, from silo launcher 109 at Baikonur Cosmodrome, successfully deploying the British UoSat-12 microsatellite into low Earth orbit. This conversion program leveraged surplus ICBMs decommissioned under arms control agreements, enabling cost-effective rideshare missions for small to medium payloads up to 3,600 kg to sun-synchronous orbits. From 1999 to 2015, the Dnepr executed 22 launches, with 21 successes for a 95.5% reliability rate, marred only by a July 26, 2006, failure at Yasny Cosmodrome due to a second-stage malfunction. Launches alternated between silo 109 and Yasny (formerly Dombarovsky) sites, utilizing the system's cold-launch technique where gas generators ejected the vehicle from the silo before main engine ignition. The family specialized in cluster deployments, accommodating multiple microsatellites and CubeSats via dispensers like UniSat, which facilitated over 150 from more than 20 countries, including , technology demonstrators, and scientific missions. Notable missions included the June 19, 2014, record-setting launch of 37 satellites representing 17 nations, primarily smallsats on UniSat-6, from Yasny, surpassing prior multi-payload records and demonstrating the vehicle's capacity for high-volume rideshares. Another highlight was the November 21, 2013, deployment of 32 satellites, including amateur radio CubeSats like FUNcube-1, from the same site. These operations provided affordable access to , with Kosmotras marketing the Dnepr for its proven ICBM heritage—over 150 prior R-36 tests—and rapid silo reload capabilities, though geopolitical strains post-2014 limited further utilization. The program's termination followed the final launch on March 25, 2015, carrying South Korea's KompSat-3A reconnaissance satellite to a 528 km from Yasny, as donor missile stocks expired and international cooperation faltered amid Ukraine-Russia tensions. Despite its brevity, the Dnepr family contributed significantly to the of converted strategic assets, enabling diverse payloads without dedicated investments and underscoring the dual-use potential of technology.

Controversies and Assessments

Reliability and Test Failures

The initial of the R-36M Mod 1 in 1972 ended in failure, with the missile exploding shortly after launch and destroying the test . Subsequent tests addressed these issues, achieving success by 21 February 1973, which paved the way for deployment in December 1975 after the testing phase concluded in October 1975. Early development challenges, including a flawed post-boost vehicle design in Mod 2, necessitated its replacement by Mod 4 by 1983. The R-36M UTTKh (Mod 4) underwent 19 test flights from October 1977 to November 1979, of which two failed on 30 June 1978 and 29 September 1978. Similarly, the Mod 5 variant experienced two failures during its flight test program from March 1986 to March 1988. These incidents were part of iterative improvements, as the missile's liquid-fueled design required refinements for silo-based ejection and multi-stage ignition reliability. Despite early setbacks, the R-36M series demonstrated high overall reliability, with a 97% success rate across more than 160 launches, including tests, operational checks, and conversions to the Dnepr space launcher. This exceeded the Soviet ICBM average of 92%, reflecting effective maturation post-development. For the UTTKh variant specifically, 62 operational missions from 1980 to 1998 yielded 56 successes and 6 failures.

Strategic Perceptions and NATO Designations

The R-36 family received distinct reporting names reflecting its evolutionary variants. The initial R-36 (8K67), deployed in 1966, was designated SS-9 Scarp, characterized by its single-warhead configuration and capability for fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS). Subsequent improvements led to the R-36M series starting in the early 1970s, which classified as SS-18 due to its enhanced throw-weight exceeding 8 tons and ability to carry up to 10 MIRVs or a single massive warhead. Western strategic perceptions framed the SS-18 as a formidable weapon, capable of targeting hardened U.S. silos with high accuracy and overwhelming payload, prompting development of responses like the MX Peacekeeper ICBM to restore parity. U.S. negotiations, including and II, prioritized limiting or eliminating SS-18 deployments, viewing its silo-based, liquid-fueled design as destabilizing for crisis stability owing to potential preemptive strike advantages despite its vulnerability to detection and targeting. Soviet doctrine emphasized the missile's role in assured retaliation, leveraging its range over 11,000 km and penetration aids to ensure second-strike credibility against defenses. The "" moniker encapsulated NATO assessments of the missile's apocalyptic potential, with its variants able to deliver yields totaling up to 25 megatons, far surpassing contemporary U.S. systems and symbolizing the asymmetry in throw-weight that fueled escalation dynamics. Post-, Russian maintainers have sustained limited SS-18 inventories for deterrence continuity, though aging infrastructure raises reliability concerns not always reflected in public Western threat inflation. Independent analyses from organizations like the highlight that while the SS-18's capabilities warranted vigilance, its operational constraints—such as lengthy fueling times—mitigated some first-strike fears compared to solid-fuel alternatives.

Criticisms of Escalatory Impact versus Deterrent Value

The R-36 series, particularly the R-36M variants designated SS-18 by , has been defended by Soviet and strategists as a of nuclear deterrence through its massive throw-weight—up to 8.8 metric tons—and capacity for 10 MIRVs with yields exceeding 500 kilotons each, enabling retaliation capable of devastating an adversary's population centers and military infrastructure even after absorbing a first strike. This aligns with principles, where the missile's silo-based survivability and rapid launch readiness (under 30 minutes for liquid-fueled models) ensured a credible second-strike posture that deterred large-scale aggression during the . military analyses have emphasized its psychological and material dominance, portraying it as a "guarantor of " by imposing unacceptable costs on potential attackers, with operational deployments peaking at around 308 missiles by the mid-1980s. Critics, primarily from U.S. strategic assessments, have argued that the R-36's scale and accuracy upgrades—such as inertial guidance systems achieving under 500 meters in later models—conferred a potential that undermined strategic stability by threatening U.S. Minuteman ICBM silos and launch control centers, thereby incentivizing preemptive actions in crises. This perception fueled U.S. insistence in the Treaty (signed 1993) to phase out all heavy ICBMs like the SS-18, viewing them as destabilizing due to their ability to target hardened fixed sites with high-yield warheads optimized for bunker-busting, which could erode an opponent's retaliatory forces before full response. Declassified U.S. reports from the 1970s highlighted how the SS-18's deployment shifted the balance toward Soviet first-strike advantages, escalating dynamics and prompting U.S. countermeasures like missile. From a causal standpoint, while the R-36's deterrent value rested on overwhelming second-strike capacity, its MIRV architecture amplified escalation risks by complicating damage-limiting strategies; a single missile could neutralize multiple , fostering "use-it-or-lose-it" pressures in ambiguous warning scenarios and reducing the threshold for nuclear employment amid conventional conflicts. Independent analyses, such as those from the , note that Soviet upgrades to SS-18 accuracy (post-1975 tests) blurred the line between (cities) and (military) targeting, eroding crisis stability without proportionally enhancing pure deterrence against irrational or limited attacks. Russian responses have dismissed these as Western projections of offensive intent, asserting the system's hardening and capabilities prioritized survival over aggression, though empirical test data showing occasional failures (e.g., launch anomalies) raised doubts about reliability under duress, potentially heightening miscalculation risks. Overall, the debate underscores a tension: the R-36 bolstered raw deterrent parity but at the of perceived instability, as evidenced by its role in prolonging superpower asymmetries until treaty-mandated reductions began in the .

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  19. https://weaponsparade.com/r-36m2-rs-20v-ss-18-mod-5-6-satan-gallery/
  20. http://www.astronautix.com/r/r-36m215a18m.html
  21. https://www.russianspaceweb.com/r36m2.html
  22. https://en.missilery.info/missile/15a18m
  23. https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/doctrine/arbatov.htm
  24. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1704&context=parameters
  25. https://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Mx.html
  26. https://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Mmiii.html
  27. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/minuteman-iii/
  28. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/lgm-118-peacekeeper-mx/
  29. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/r-36m-program.htm
  30. https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/russia/ss-18-satan/
  31. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-05/russian-nuclear-weapons-2025/
  32. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-russia
  33. https://www.acq.osd.mil/asda/ssipm/sdc/tc/start2/START2execsum.html
  34. https://media.nti.org/pdfs/ukraine_missile_dismantlement.pdf
  35. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2024/09/russias-sarmat-icbm-woes/
  36. https://www.military.com/history/worlds-most-powerful-nuclear-missile-russian-icbm-nicknamed-satan.html
  37. https://fas.org/publication/russianmodernization/
  38. https://www.militarypowerrankings.com/military-power/russia
  39. https://russianforces.org/blog/2010/12/rocket_forces_will_keep_r-36m2.shtml
  40. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-03/russian-nuclear-weapons-2024/
  41. https://en.topwar.ru/264817-rossijskij-jadernyj-arsenal-v-2025-godu.html
  42. https://www.russianspaceweb.com/dnepr.html
  43. http://www.astronautix.com/d/dnepr.html
  44. https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/russia/dnepr.htm
  45. https://www.forecastinternational.com/archive/disp_pdf.cfm?DACH_RECNO=1287
  46. https://nextspaceflight.com/rockets/192/
  47. https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2029&context=smallsat
  48. https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/dnepr-rocket-launches-37-satellites/
  49. https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2014/06/russian-dnepr-rocket-record-launch-37-satellites/
  50. https://www.russianspaceweb.com/r36muttkh.html
  51. https://russianforces.org/blog/2005/06/reliability_of_the_ss18_missil.shtml
  52. https://russianforces.org/blog/2008/07/the_window_of_vulnerability_th.shtml
  53. https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2016-04-05/russia-relies-satan-keep-new-start-data-exchange-numbers-up
  54. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/780310
  55. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/TripolarInstability_Nov2023.pdf
  56. https://globalsecurityreview.com/mutually-assured-destruction/
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