Hubbry Logo
SWIFTSWIFTMain
Open search
SWIFT
Community hub
SWIFT
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Contribute something
SWIFT
SWIFT
SWIFT
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Key Information

Part of a series on financial services
Banking
Types of banks
Lists of banks
Accounts · Cards
Accounts
Transaction (checking / current)
Cards
Funds transfer
Terms
Related topics

The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), legally S.W.I.F.T. SC, is a cooperative established in 1973 in Belgium (French: Société Coopérative) and owned by the banks and other member firms that use its service. SWIFT provides the main messaging network through which international payments are initiated.[2] It also sells software and services to financial institutions, mostly for use on its proprietary "SWIFTNet", and assigns ISO 9362 Business Identifier Codes (BICs), popularly known as "SWIFT codes".

As of 2018, around half of all high-value cross-border payments worldwide used the SWIFT network,[3] and in 2015, SWIFT linked more than 11,000 financial institutions in over 200 countries and territories, who were exchanging an average of over 32 million messages per day (compared to an average of 2.4 million daily messages in 1995).[4]

SWIFT is headquartered in La Hulpe near Brussels. It hosts an annual conference, called Sibos, specifically aimed at the financial services industry.

History

[edit]

Before SWIFT's establishment, international financial transactions were communicated over Telex, a public system involving manual writing and reading of messages.[5] SWIFT was set up out of fear of what might happen if a single private and fully American entity controlled global financial flows – which before was First National City Bank (FNCB) of New York – later Citibank. In response to FNCB's protocol, FNCB's competitors in the US and Europe pushed an alternative "messaging system that could replace the public providers and speed up the payment process".[6]

SWIFT was founded in Brussels on 3 May 1973. Individuals who played a key role in its creation included bankers Jan Kraa (at AMRO Bank) and François Dentz (at the Banque de l'Union Parisienne) as well as Carl Reuterskiöld and Bessel Kok, who became respectively its first two chairmen and chief executives.[2]: 14-16  It was initially supported by 239 banks in 15 countries. It soon started to establish common standards for financial transactions and a shared data processing system and worldwide communications network designed by Logica and developed by the Burroughs Corporation.[7] Fundamental operating procedures and rules for liability were established in 1975, and the first message was ceremonially sent by Prince Albert of Belgium on 9 May 1977.[2]: 19 

SWIFT's first non-European operations centre was inaugurated by Governor John N. Dalton of Virginia in 1979.[8] In 1989 SWIFT completed a monumental new head office building in La Hulpe, designed by Ricardo Bofill Taller de Arquitectura.[9]

Ownership and governance

[edit]

SWIFT's shareholding structure is adjusted every three years in proportion to volumes of activity incurred by the members, ensuring that the most active members get the most voice irrespective of geography; additional rules are aimed at ensuring some geographical diversity within the board of directors. The 25 directors are elected by the shareholders, on three-year terms with the renewal of one-third of the board every year; all directors are member representatives.[2]: 30-31 

As of May 2024, the members directly represented on the board of directors were JPMorgan Chase (chair), Lloyds Bank (deputy chair), Bank of China, BNP Paribas, BPCE, Citi, Clearstream, Commerzbank, Commonwealth Bank, Deutsche Bank, Euroclear, FirstRand, HSBC, ING, Intesa Sanpaolo, KBC, MUFG, NatWest, Nordea, Royal Bank of Canada, Santander, SEB, UBS (2 representatives following the acquisition of Credit Suisse), as well as the Association of Banks in Singapore.[10]

Operations

[edit]
SWIFT logo before 2023

SWIFT acts as a carrier of the "messages containing the payment instructions between financial institutions involved in a transaction".[2]: 35 [11] However, the organisation does not manage accounts on behalf of individuals or financial institutions, and it does not hold funds from third parties.[2]: 1-2  It also does not perform clearing or settlement functions.[2]: 1-2, 35 [11] After payment has been initiated, it must be settled through a payment system, such as T2 in Europe.[2]: 36  In the context of cross-border transactions, this step often takes place through correspondent banking accounts that financial institutions have with each other.[2]: 35 

SWIFT means several things in the financial world:

  1. a secure network for transmitting messages between financial institutions;
  2. a set of syntax standards for financial messages (for transmission over SWIFTNet or any other network)
  3. a set of connection software and services allowing financial institutions to transmit messages over SWIFT network.

Under 3 above, SWIFT provides turn-key solutions for members, consisting of linkage clients to facilitate connectivity to the SWIFT network and CBTs or "computer-based terminals" which members use to manage the delivery and receipt of their messages. Some of the more well-known interfaces and CBTs provided to their members are:

  • SWIFTNet Link (SNL) software which is installed on the SWIFT customer's site and opens a connection to SWIFTNet. Other applications can only communicate with SWIFTNet through the SNL.
  • Alliance Gateway (SAG) software with interfaces (e.g., RAHA = Remote Access Host Adapter), allowing other software products to use the SNL to connect to SWIFTNet
  • Alliance WebStation (SAB) desktop interface for SWIFT Alliance Gateway with several usage options:
    1. administrative access to the SAG
    2. direct connection SWIFTNet by the SAG, to administrate SWIFT Certificates
    3. so-called Browse connection to SWIFTNet (also by SAG) to use additional services, for example, the Eurosystem's T2
  • Alliance Access (SAA) and Alliance Messaging Hub (AMH) are the main messaging software applications by SWIFT, which allow message creation for FIN messages, routing and monitoring for FIN and MX messages. The main interfaces are FTA (files transfer automated, not FTP) and MQSA, a WebSphere MQ interface.
  • The Alliance Workstation (SAW) is the desktop software for administration, monitoring and FIN message creation. Since Alliance Access is not yet capable of creating MX messages, Alliance Messenger (SAM) has to be used for this purpose.
  • Alliance Web Platform (SWP) as new thin-client desktop interface provided as an alternative to the existing Alliance WebStation, Alliance Workstation (soon)[when?] and Alliance Messenger.
  • Alliance Integrator is built on Oracle's Java Caps which enables customer's back-office applications to connect to Alliance Access or Alliance Entry.
  • Alliance Lite2 is a secure and reliable, cloud-based way to connect to the SWIFT network which is a light version of Alliance Access specifically targeting customers with low volume of traffic.

Services

[edit]

There are four key areas that SWIFT services fall under in the financial marketplace: securities, treasury & derivatives, trade services, and payments & cash management.

SWIFT Ref, the global payment reference data utility, is SWIFT's unique reference data service. SWIFT Ref sources data directly from data originators, including central banks, code issuers and banks making it easy for issuers and originators to maintain data regularly and thoroughly. SWIFTRef constantly validates and cross-checks data across the different data sets.[13]

Operations centres

[edit]

The SWIFT secure messaging network is run from three data centres, located in the United States, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. These centres share information in near real-time. In case of a failure in one of the data centres, another is able to handle the traffic of the complete network. SWIFT uses submarine communications cables to transmit its data.[14]

Shortly after opening its third data centre in Switzerland in 2009,[15] SWIFT introduced a new distributed architecture with two messaging zones, European and Trans-Atlantic, so data from European SWIFT members no longer mirrored the US data centre.[16] European zone messages are stored in the Netherlands and in part of the Swiss operating centre; Trans-Atlantic zone messages are stored in the United States and in another part of the Swiss operating centre that is segregated from the European zone messages. Countries outside of Europe were by default allocated to the Trans-Atlantic zone but could choose to have their messages stored in the European zone.

Data centres
SN SWIFT data centres Type
1 Zoeterwoude, Netherlands OPC (Operating Centre)
2 Culpeper, Virginia, United States OPC (Operating Centre)
3 Diessenhofen, Switzerland[17] OPC (Operating Centre)
4 Hong Kong Command and control

SWIFTNet network

[edit]

SWIFT moved to its current IP network infrastructure, known as SWIFTNet, from 2001 to 2005,[18] providing a total replacement of the previous X.25 infrastructure. The process involved the development of new protocols that facilitate efficient messaging, using existing and new message standards. The adopted technology chosen to develop the protocols was XML, which now provides a wrapper around all messages legacy or contemporary. The communication protocols can be broken down into:

SWIFT provides a centralized store-and-forward mechanism, with some transaction management. For bank A to send a message to bank B with a copy or authorization involving institution C, it formats the message according to standards and securely sends it to SWIFT. SWIFT guarantees its secure and reliable delivery to B after the appropriate action by C. SWIFT guarantees are based primarily on high redundancy of hardware, software, and people.

During 2007 and 2008, the entire SWIFT network migrated its infrastructure to a new protocol called SWIFTNet Phase 2. The main difference between Phase 2 and the former arrangement is that Phase 2 requires banks connecting to the network to use a Relationship Management Application (RMA) instead of the former bilateral key exchange (BKE) system. According to SWIFT's public information database on the subject, RMA software should eventually prove more secure and easier to keep up-to-date; however, converting to the RMA system meant that thousands of banks around the world had to update their international payment systems to comply with the new standards.[citation needed] RMA completely replaced BKE on 1 January 2009.

Standards

[edit]

SWIFT has become the industry standard for syntax in financial messages. Messages formatted to SWIFT standards can be read and processed by many well-known financial processing systems, whether or not the message travelled over the SWIFT network. SWIFT cooperates with international organizations to define standards for message format and content. SWIFT is also a registration authority (RA) for the following ISO standards:[19]

  • ISO 9362: 1994 Banking – Banking telecommunication messages – Bank identifier codes
  • ISO 10383: 2003 Securities and related financial instruments – Codes for exchanges and market identification (MIC)
  • ISO 13616: 2003 IBAN Registry
  • ISO 15022: 1999 Securities – Scheme for messages (Data Field Dictionary) (replaces ISO 7775)
  • ISO 20022-1: 2004 and ISO 20022-2:2007 Financial services – Universal Financial Industry message scheme

In RFC 3615 urn:swift: was defined as Uniform Resource Names (URNs) for SWIFT FIN.[20]

Supervision

[edit]

SWIFT is not a payment system and thus neither regulated nor supervised as such, but is nevertheless deemed to be systemically important and thus under the "oversight" of public authorities. In 1998, the so-called Group of Ten central banks (those of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for the US and the European Central Bank) started acting as joint overseers, with the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) in a lead role. The oversight focuses primarily on systemic risk, confidentiality, infrastructure security, and business continuity.[2]: 43  It is formalized in bilateral documents between the NBB and SWIFT on the one hand, and between the NBB and each of the other G10 central banks on the other hand.[21] In 2018, the International Monetary Fund has recommended that "the National Bank of Belgium should consider enhancing oversight with additional regulatory and supervisory powers."[22]

In 2012, this framework was complemented by a "SWIFT Oversight Forum" including additional central banks. As of 2024, in addition to the G10 central banks, the SWIFT Oversight Forum included the national central banks of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, and Turkey. According to SWIFT, the Oversight Forum "provides a forum for the G-10 central banks to share information on SWIFT oversight activities with a wider group of central banks."[23]

Alternatives

[edit]
See also: BRICS, Dedollarisation, Economic sanctions, and Trade war


  • Current: Purported alternatives to the SWIFT system include:[24]
  1. BRICS Pay: by BRICS member nations
  2. CIPS: sponsored by China, for RMB-related deals. 1467 financial institutions in 111 countries and regions have connected to the system. The actual business covers more than 4,200 banking institutions in 182 countries and regions around the world.[25][26][27]
  3. SFMS: sponsored by India
  4. SPFS: developed by the Russian Federation[28]
  5. Pix (payment system): developed by Brazil.
  • Former
  1. INSTEX: sponsored by the European Union, limited to non-USD transactions for trade with Iran, largely unused and ineffective.[29][30] Liquidated in March 2023.

Leadership

[edit]

Chair

[edit]
  • Johannes Kraa (AMRO Bank, Dutch), 1973–1974
  • François Dentz (Crédit du Nord, French), 1974–1976
  • Helmer Hasselblad (Swedish), 1976–1984
  • W. Robert Moore (Chemical Bank, American), 1984–1989
  • Richard Fröhlich (Austrian), 1989–1992
  • Eric C. Chilton (Barclays, British), 1992–1996
  • Jean-Marie Weydert (Société Générale, French), 1996–2000
  • Jaap Kamp (ABN AMRO, Dutch), 2000–2006
  • Yawar Shah (JPMorgan then Citi, American), 2006–2022[2]: 16 
  • Mark Buitenhek (ING, Dutch), acting 2022–2023
  • Graeme Munro (JPMorgan, British), since 2023[31]

Chief executive officer

[edit]
  • Carl Reuterskiöld, 1973–1983
  • Bessel Kok, 1983–1991
  • Jacques Cerveau (interim CEO), 1991
  • Leonard (Lennie) Schrank, 1992–2007
  • Lazaro Campos, 2007–2012
  • Gottfried Leibbrandt, 2012–2019[2]: 17 
  • Javier Pérez-Tasso, since 2019[32]

Controversy

[edit]

Inefficiency

[edit]

SWIFT has been criticised for inefficiency. In 2018, the London-based Financial Times noted that transfers frequently "pass through multiple banks before reaching their final destination, making them time-consuming, costly and lacking transparency on how much money will arrive at the other end".[3] SWIFT has since introduced an improved service called "Global Payments Innovation" (GPI), claiming it was adopted by 165 banks and was completing half its payments within 30 minutes.[3] The new standard which included SWIFT Go was supposed to be utilised in receiving and transferring low-value international payments. One of the significant changes was the transaction amount, which would not differ from start to end. However, as of 2023, uptake was mixed. For instance, Alisherov Eraj, Alif Bank Treasury Department SWIFT Transfers & Banking Relationship Expert in the Republic of Tajikistan, describes that the leading cause for the late SWIFT Go adoption in Tajikistan was the Core Banking System itself. To connect to SWIFT Go, he adds, banking system interfaces needed to be upgraded and integrated with their software to be fully compatible; this hindered many banks from adopting the technology earlier.

US government surveillance

[edit]

A series of articles published on 23 June 2006 in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the Los Angeles Times revealed a program, named the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, which the US Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other United States governmental agencies initiated after the 11 September attacks to gain access to the SWIFT transaction database.[33]

After the publication of these articles, SWIFT quickly came under pressure for compromising the data privacy of its customers by allowing governments to gain access to sensitive personal information. In September 2006, the Belgian government declared that these SWIFT dealings with American governmental authorities were a breach of Belgian and European privacy laws.[34]

In response, and to satisfy members' concerns about privacy, SWIFT began a process of improving its architecture by implementing a distributed architecture with a two-zone model for storing messages (see § Operations centres).

Concurrently, the European Union negotiated an agreement with the United States government to permit the transfer of intra-EU SWIFT transaction information to the United States under certain circumstances. Because of concerns about its potential contents, the European Parliament adopted a position statement in September 2009, demanding to see the full text of the agreement and asking that it be fully compliant with EU privacy legislation, with oversight mechanisms emplaced to ensure that all data requests were handled appropriately.[35] An interim agreement was signed without European Parliamentary approval by the European Council on 30 November 2009,[36] the day before the Lisbon Treaty—which would have prohibited such an agreement from being signed under the terms of the codecision procedure—formally came into effect. While the interim agreement was scheduled to come into effect on 1 January 2010, the text of the agreement was classified as "EU Restricted" until translations could be provided in all EU languages and published on 25 January 2010.

On 11 February 2010, the European Parliament decided to reject the interim agreement between the EU and the US by 378 to 196 votes.[37][38] One week earlier, the parliament's civil liberties committee had already rejected the deal, citing legal reservations.[39]

In March 2011, it was reported that two mechanisms of data protection had failed: EUROPOL released a report complaining that requests for information from the US had been too vague (making it impossible to make judgments on validity)[40] and that the guaranteed right for European citizens to know whether their information had been accessed by US authorities had not been put into practice.[40]

Der Spiegel reported in September 2013 that the National Security Agency (NSA) widely monitors banking transactions via SWIFT, as well as credit card transactions.[41] The NSA intercepted and retained data from the SWIFT network used by thousands of banks to securely send transaction information. SWIFT was named as a "target", according to documents leaked by Edward Snowden. The documents revealed that the NSA spied on SWIFT using a variety of methods, including reading "SWIFT printer traffic from numerous banks".[41] In April 2017, a group known as the Shadow Brokers released files allegedly from the NSA which indicate that the agency monitored financial transactions made through SWIFT.[42][43]

SWIFT and sanctions

[edit]

Iran

[edit]

In January 2012, the advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) implemented a campaign calling on SWIFT to end all relations with Iran's banking system, including the Central Bank of Iran. UANI asserted that Iran's membership in SWIFT violated US and EU financial sanctions against Iran as well as SWIFT's own corporate rules.[44]

Consequently, in February 2012, the US Senate Banking Committee unanimously approved sanctions against SWIFT aimed at pressuring it to terminate its ties with blacklisted Iranian banks. Expelling Iranian banks from SWIFT would potentially deny Iran access to billions of dollars in revenue using SWIFT but not from using IVTS. Mark Wallace, president of UANI, praised the Senate Banking Committee.[45]

Initially SWIFT denied that it was acting illegally,[45] but later[when?] said that "it is working with U.S. and European governments to address their concerns that its financial services are being used by Iran to avoid sanctions and conduct illicit business".[46] Targeted banks would be—amongst others—Saderat Bank of Iran, Bank Mellat, Post Bank of Iran and Sepah Bank.[47] On 17 March 2012, following an agreement two days earlier between all 27 member states of the Council of the European Union and the council's subsequent ruling, SWIFT disconnected all Iranian banks that had been identified as institutions in breach of current EU sanctions from its international network and warned that even more Iranian financial institutions could be disconnected from the network.

In February 2016, most Iranian banks reconnected to the network following the lift of sanctions due to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[48]

In November 2024, Iran implemented a paradigm shift approach to shift the focus from the SWIFT payment system by initiating the concept of bringing ACUMER. ACUMER was coined by Iran as a retaliation to the international sanctions imposed by the United States which has ever since limited Iran's competitive edge in the context of international trade.[49] Iran had long conceived an idea of bringing a viable alternative option to SWIFT in order to actively engage in smooth economic activities and international trade.[50]

Israel

[edit]

In 2014, SWIFT rejected calls from pro-Palestinian activists to revoke Israeli banks' access to its network owing to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory.[51]

Russia and Belarus

[edit]
See also: SWIFT ban against Russian banks

Similarly, in August 2014 the UK planned to press the EU to block Russian use of SWIFT as a sanction due to Russian military intervention in Ukraine.[52] However, SWIFT refused to do so.[53] SPFS, a Russian alternative to SWIFT, was developed by the Central Bank of Russia as a backup measure.[54]

During the prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States developed preliminary possible sanctions against Russia, but excluded banning Russia from SWIFT.[55] Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the foreign ministers of the Baltic states Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia called for Russia to be cut off from SWIFT. However, other EU member states were reluctant, both because European lenders held most of the nearly $30 billion in foreign banks' exposure to Russia and because Russia had developed the SPFS alternative.[56] The European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States finally agreed to remove a few Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; the governments of France, Germany, Italy and Japan individually released statements alongside the EU.[57][11]

On 20 March 2023, Russia was banned from SWIFT.[58][59]

The European Union issued the first set of sanctions against Belarus; the first was introduced on 27 February 2022, which banned certain categories of Belarusian items in the EU, including timber, steel, mineral fuels and tobacco.[60] After the Lithuanian prime minister proposed disconnecting Belarus from SWIFT,[61] the European Union, which does not recognise Lukashenko as the legitimate President of Belarus, started to plan an extension of the sanctions already issued against Russian entities and top officials to its ally.[62]

Security

[edit]
See also: Bangladesh Bank robbery

In 2016 an $81 million theft from the Bangladesh central bank via its account at the New York Federal Reserve Bank was traced to hacker penetration of SWIFT's Alliance Access software, according to a New York Times report. It was not the first such attempt, the society acknowledged, and the security of the transfer system was undergoing new examination accordingly.[63] Soon after the reports of the theft from the Bangladesh central bank, a second, apparently related, attack was reported to have occurred at a commercial bank in Vietnam.[64][65]

Both attacks involved malware written both to issue unauthorized SWIFT messages and to conceal that the messages had been sent. After the malware sent the SWIFT messages that stole the funds, it deleted the database record of the transfers and then took further steps to prevent confirmation messages from revealing the theft. In the Bangladeshi case, the confirmation messages would have appeared on a paper report; the malware altered the paper reports when they were sent to the printer. In the second case, the bank used a PDF report; the malware altered the PDF viewer to hide the transfers.[64]

In May 2016, Banco del Austro (BDA) in Ecuador sued Wells Fargo after Wells Fargo honoured $12 million in fund transfer requests that had been placed by thieves.[65] In this case, the thieves sent SWIFT messages that resembled recently cancelled transfer requests from BDA, with slightly altered amounts; the reports do not detail how the thieves gained access to send the SWIFT messages. BDA asserts that Wells Fargo should have detected the suspicious SWIFT messages, which were placed outside of normal BDA working hours and were of an unusual size. Wells Fargo claims that BDA is responsible for the loss, as the thieves gained access to the legitimate SWIFT credentials of a BDA employee and sent fully authenticated SWIFT messages.[65]

In the first half of 2016, an anonymous Ukrainian bank and others—even "dozens" that are not being made public—were variously reported to have been "compromised" through the SWIFT network and to have lost money.[66]

In March 2022, Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported about the increased security precautions by the State Police of Thurgau at the SWIFT data centre in Diessenhofen. After most of the Russian banks had been excluded from the private payment system, the risk of sabotage was considered higher. Inhabitants of the town described the large complex as a "fortress" or "prison" where frequent security checks of the fenced property are conducted.[67]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

SWIFT

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is a member-owned headquartered in , founded in 1973 to provide a secure, standardized messaging network for over 11,000 financial institutions across more than 200 countries to exchange instructions for cross-border payments, securities transactions, and other financial operations. Unlike actual fund transfer systems, SWIFT facilitates communication of transaction details via proprietary formats like MT messages and emerging standards, processing billions of messages annually to underpin the efficiency of global finance. Established by 239 banks from 15 countries as a replacement for outdated systems, SWIFT's governance by an international board including oversight from central banks such as the and U.S. emphasizes operational neutrality under Belgian law, though its cooperative structure ties decisions to member interests dominated by Western institutions. Key achievements include developing interoperable standards that reduce errors and costs in international transfers, pioneering initiatives like SWIFT gpi for real-time tracking, and adapting to digital threats through robust cybersecurity protocols, thereby maintaining its status as the dominant infrastructure for non-domestic financial communications. Despite claims of political impartiality, SWIFT has faced controversies over its role in enforcing , such as disconnecting Iranian banks in and select Russian entities in 2022 at the behest of authorities, actions that critics argue weaponize against non-Western actors and expose vulnerabilities in global payment reliance on a single, geopolitically influenced provider. These exclusions have prompted alternatives like Russia's and China's CIPS, highlighting causal tensions between SWIFT's technical utility and its alignment with sanctioning powers, potentially fragmenting the international financial architecture.

History

Founding and Initial Setup (1973)

The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) originated from efforts in the late 1960s by the Société Financière Européenne (SFE), a of six major European banks seeking to address the inefficiencies of telex-based international payment messaging, which suffered from high error rates, lack of standardization, and security vulnerabilities. Feasibility studies commissioned in 1971 from in the and the Stanford Research Institute in the United States confirmed the viability of a cooperative network for secure, standardized interbank communications, involving input from 68 banks across 11 countries in and . On May 3, 1973, SWIFT was formally established as a not-for-profit society under Belgian law, with headquarters in selected for its political neutrality and favorable legal framework for international organizations. The founding membership comprised 239 banks from 15 countries, including major institutions such as , , Chase Manhattan Bank from the , , Lloyds, and from the , and Bank of India from India, reflecting a collaborative effort among leading international financial entities to create a shared global messaging utility. The initial setup focused on developing a dedicated telecommunications network for financial messages, distinct from public systems like telex, to ensure reliability, reduce costs, and minimize risks in cross-border transactions. Membership required an entrance fee—set at $3,200 for commitments before September 30, 1972, and $5,000 thereafter—to fund preliminary infrastructure planning, with the organization structured as a user-owned entity governed by its shareholders to prioritize operational efficiency over profit. This foundational cooperative model aimed to standardize message formats and protocols, laying the groundwork for what would become a cornerstone of international banking communications, though full operational launch occurred later in 1977.

Growth and International Expansion (1970s–1990s)

SWIFT commenced operations on January 10, 1977, initially connecting 518 financial institutions across 22 countries, a near doubling from the 239 founding banks in 15 countries established in 1973. The network rapidly scaled message traffic, reaching over 120,000 messages per day by February 1979 and accumulating 10 million messages within the first year of operation. This growth reflected SWIFT's replacement of inefficient systems with standardized, secure electronic messaging, primarily for cross-border payments, fostering broader adoption among international banks initially concentrated in and . In the 1980s, SWIFT pursued geographic and functional expansion, initiating live operations in and in the early part of the decade to penetrate Asian markets. Central banks first connected in 1983, extending the network's utility beyond commercial banks. By 1987, membership categories broadened to include broker-dealers, exchanges, and clearing institutions, alongside entry into securities messaging and launch of value-added services, amid internal debates over diluting bank-centric governance. Late in the decade, the community exceeded 2,800 institutions transmitting nearly 300 million messages annually, underscoring SWIFT's consolidation as a global standard despite challenges in standardizing formats like ISO 7775 for securities. The marked accelerated innovation and membership diversification, with participant numbers reaching 3,500 by 1992 following inclusion of fund managers after prolonged discussions. Mid-decade advancements included the rollout of Interbank File Transfer for , enhancing efficiency for high-volume users. By the late , the FIN messaging service achieved 99.98% availability, supporting preparations for the introduction and Y2K compliance, while message volumes continued surging to underpin trillions in daily transaction values across an expanding footprint in over 100 countries. This era solidified SWIFT's cooperative model, balancing bank ownership with inclusive growth to meet rising demands from global financial integration.

Digital Transformation and Key Milestones (2000s–2025)

In the early 2000s, SWIFT transitioned from its legacy X.25-based network to SWIFTNet, an IP-based platform designed for enhanced security, reliability, and scalability in financial messaging, with phased rollouts beginning around 2001 and full migration completed by 2005. This upgrade supported new services like InterAct for interactive applications and FileAct for large file transfers, marking a shift toward modern digital infrastructure amid growing transaction volumes exceeding 1 billion messages annually by the mid-2000s. The 2010s saw further advancements in payment efficiency, including the 2017 launch of SWIFT gpi (global payments innovation), which introduced end-to-end tracking, faster processing, and transparency standards for cross-border payments, achieving nearly 50% of gpi transactions credited within 5 minutes by 2021. In parallel, SWIFT initiated preparations for , a richer data standard, with voluntary adoption for certain messages starting in the late 2010s and a formal cross-border payments migration roadmap announced, featuring coexistence of MT and ISO 20022 formats from November 2022 until mandatory adoption by November 2025. The Customer Security Programme, rolled out in 2016, imposed mandatory controls to combat cyber threats, reflecting heightened focus on digital resilience after incidents like the 2016 Bangladesh Bank heist. Geopolitical pressures accelerated operational adaptations in 2022, when SWIFT, complying with EU Council decisions, disconnected seven major Russian banks (including VTB and ) and later three Belarusian entities from its network amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict, disrupting their international capabilities while minimizing broader spillover through targeted implementation. Concurrently, initiatives like Swift Go, launched in July 2021, targeted low-value retail payments with guaranteed speed and cost transparency, onboarding over 120 institutions by late 2021. By the mid-2020s, SWIFT emphasized interoperability with emerging technologies, conducting CBDC connector trials from 2022 onward to link digital currencies across networks, with phase two in 2024 involving 38 institutions testing use cases like settlement and atomic transactions. Live trials of digital asset and tokenized deposit transactions over the SWIFT network commenced in 2025 across , , and , aiming to bridge fragmented "digital islands" without requiring wholesale system overhauls. SwiftNet Instant, introduced around 2017-2018, further enabled 24/7 real-time messaging for schemes like Europe's RT1. These efforts, alongside ISO 20022's full enforcement in November 2025, position SWIFT to handle projected growth to over 15 billion annual messages while integrating AI for fraud detection and .

Ownership and Governance

Membership and Ownership Structure

SWIFT operates as a society under Belgian , legally structured as S.W.I.F.T. SC, with vested exclusively in its shareholders, who are primarily banks, securities broker-dealers, and regulated institutions involved in financial messaging. These shareholders collectively hold all issued shares, with the total number varying monthly based on admissions and adjustments, and each share valued at €9,365 as of June 12, 2025. Share allocation is determined by each institution's financial contribution to the network's services, reflecting proportional usage and ensuring alignment with operational activity; this structure is readjusted periodically through a formal re-allocation process outlined in the SWIFT By-laws. Shares are not freely transferable and are tied to active participation, with shareholders obligated to support and utilize SWIFT's messaging services. Shareholders, numbering around 3,500 organizations that represent broader user participation, elect a Board of Directors comprising 25 members to oversee governance and management, thereby embedding ownership influence in strategic decisions. Eligibility for shareholding requires approval by the Board, demonstration of involvement in financial message transmission, financial stability, and often a recommendation from an existing SCORE-participating financial institution in a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member country. Beyond direct shareholders, SWIFT's user base includes tiered categories with varying access and implications:
  • Shareholders: Full rights to send and receive all message types as supervised financial institutions, with equity .
  • Non-shareholding Members: Institutions meeting shareholder criteria but without shares; granted similar messaging access without stake.
  • Sub-Members: Entities more than 50% directly or 100% indirectly owned by a shareholder, under full control, allowing extended network access via parent .
  • Other Participants: Includes supervised financial institutions (full access), non-supervised entities (restricted from certain peer-to-peer payments), and closed user groups such as corporates or participants, limited to predefined message types administered by group overseers.
This hierarchical model ensures that ownership remains concentrated among core financial institutions while enabling wider ecosystem participation, with all users subject to onboarding fees, annual charges scaled by category and volume, and compliance with SWIFT's Corporate Rules and By-laws.

Governance Bodies and Decision-Making

SWIFT operates as a society incorporated under Belgian law, with ownership and control vested in its shareholders, primarily financial institutions that utilize its messaging services. The primary governance bodies include the General Meeting of Shareholders, the , and specialized board committees, which collectively oversee strategic direction, , and operational integrity. Decision-making emphasizes member-driven input, with authority delegated from shareholders to the Board and, in turn, to executive management for day-to-day operations. The General Meeting of Shareholders convenes annually on the second Thursday of June in , , serving as the ultimate decision-making forum for electing the and approving key resolutions. Shareholders, whose holdings are proportional to their usage of SWIFT's services and valued at EUR 9,365 per share as of June 12, 2025, propose candidates through National Member Groups (NMGs), regional bodies comprising shareholders that reflect national interests and facilitate coordinated input. Voting rights align with share ownership, enabling influence over governance matters such as board composition and share reallocations, which occur every three years to match evolving service contributions. The , comprising 25 independent members, holds the broadest powers under the by-laws, setting general , , and exercising supervision over the . Directors are elected by shareholders at the General Meeting for renewable three-year terms, with allocation reflecting message volume: up to two directors each from the top six nations by shares (maximum 12), one each from the next 10 nations (maximum 10), and up to three jointly from remaining nations. The Board meets at least four times annually, elects its Chair and Deputy Chair yearly from among its members, and delegates operational management to the CEO while retaining oversight. Directors receive no beyond of expenses, underscoring the cooperative's member-focused . Supporting the Board are five standing committees, each with a minimum of seven members and meeting at least four times per year, advising on specialized areas to inform board-level decisions. The Audit and Finance Committee oversees financial reporting, internal audits, and compliance; the Risk Committee addresses strategic and operational risks; the Human Resources Committee aligns HR policies with organizational values; the provides guidance on and ; and the manages board composition, nominations, and frameworks. These bodies ensure decisions integrate diverse expertise, with the Board retaining final authority on strategic matters to maintain neutrality and global alignment.

Operations

Core Messaging Services

SWIFT's core messaging services revolve around the platform, a store-and-forward network that enables over 11,000 financial institutions worldwide to securely transmit standardized financial messages for transactions such as payments, securities settlements, and . Launched in , FIN processes billions of messages annually, with daily volumes exceeding 42 million as of late 2024, facilitating the exchange of instructions rather than the direct transfer of funds. These messages adhere to predefined formats categorized by purpose, ensuring and reducing errors in global financial communications. The FIN service supports eight primary message categories under the legacy MT (Message Type) format, each designated by a three-digit code beginning with the category number (e.g., MT1xx for category 1). Category 1 covers customer payments and cheques, including formats like MT103 for single customer credit transfers. Category 2 handles financial institution transfers, such as MT202 for general financial institution transfers used in interbank settlements. Category 3 addresses foreign exchange, money markets, and derivatives, with messages like MT300 for foreign exchange confirmation. Category 4 pertains to collections and cash letters, while category 5 focuses on securities markets, including MT513 for client purchase or sale instructions. Category 6 deals with precious metals transactions, category 7 with documentary credits and guarantees (e.g., MT700 for issue of a documentary credit), and category 8 with travellers' cheques. Category 9 encompasses cash management and customer status reporting. Additionally, MT n98 series allow proprietary messages defined by users, and MT n99 series support free-format communications. Complementing FIN, SWIFT provides InterAct for real-time, interactive messaging suitable for confirmations and inquiries, and FileAct for bulk file transfers of non-standardized data, such as reports or large datasets, which bypasses the store-and-forward model for direct peer-to-peer exchange. These services collectively underpin SWIFT's role in global finance, with FIN remaining the foundational network despite an ongoing migration to the richer ISO 20022 standard (MX messages), mandated for high-value payments by November 2025 to enhance data granularity and automation. Security protocols, including end-to-end encryption and mandatory customer security controls, are integral to all core services to mitigate risks like cyber threats.

Network Infrastructure and Data Centers

SWIFT's global messaging network relies on a distributed comprising multiple operating centres (OPCs) that process, store, and route financial messages among over 11,000 member institutions worldwide. This setup ensures resilience against disruptions by replicating data across geographically dispersed facilities, with messages encrypted end-to-end using protocols such as SWIFTNet Link and monitored for security compliance. The avoids a , distributing workloads to maintain 99.999% availability for critical operations. The primary OPCs are located in , ; , ; and , , selected for their strategic positioning to minimize latency and comply with international requirements. These centres house redundant servers, high-capacity storage systems, and advanced capable of handling billions of messages annually, with Culpeper's facility spanning a 30-acre for enhanced . Physical protections include fortified perimeters, biometric access controls, and, in some cases, local coordination during geopolitical tensions. Data processing at these centres involves validation, , and temporary storage of messages in compliance with retention policies, typically limited to 30 days unless required for legal or purposes. SWIFT employs tiered , including backup power systems and mechanisms, to support peak volumes exceeding 40 million messages per day as of 2023. Ongoing modernization efforts integrate -compatible elements for while preserving on-premises core infrastructure to meet stringent regulatory standards like those from the and overseers.

Global Connectivity and Transaction Volumes

SWIFT connects over 11,500 financial institutions across more than 220 countries and territories, enabling standardized messaging for cross-border payments, securities, and other financial transactions. Although SWIFT messaging itself occurs near-instantaneously, end-to-end cross-border wire transfers involve intermediary correspondent banks, regulatory compliance checks, and settlement processes, typically taking 2-5 business days; for instance, transfers from a bank in China to a US account most commonly require 3-5 business days, excluding weekends and holidays, though they may complete in 1-3 days absent delays or extend to 5-7 days or longer in complex cases. This extensive network includes banks, broker-dealers, investment managers, and other entities that rely on SWIFT's infrastructure for secure, reliable communication. Membership requires adherence to SWIFT's operational and security standards, with direct participants maintaining BIC (Bank Identifier Code) directories for routing messages. The network's scale supports an average of over 53 million messages daily, facilitating the exchange of instructions for trillions in value annually, though SWIFT itself processes only the messaging layer, not the settlement of funds. In , messaging traffic experienced the highest growth in 15 years, driven by rising cross-border payment demands and adoption of standards, which enhance data richness in messages. Prior year data from 2023 recorded approximately 44 million messages per day, totaling over 11 billion annually, with payments and securities comprising the majority of volume (44.8% and 50.3%, respectively). Growth rates have consistently exceeded 6% year-over-year, reflecting SWIFT's centrality to global finance despite emerging alternatives.

Technical Standards

Messaging Formats and Protocols

SWIFT's core messaging relies on standardized formats for secure, structured exchange of financial instructions among over 11,000 member institutions worldwide. The primary legacy format is Standards MT, a fixed-field, structure developed by SWIFT and maintained under annual releases to accommodate evolving financial practices. Each MT message comprises five blocks: the Basic Header Block (BH) identifying the message's logical and physical , the Application Header Block (AH) specifying delivery instructions and message type, the optional User Header Block (UH) for user-defined , the Text Block containing the core transaction details in tagged fields, and the Trailer Block (TR) for and validation. MT messages are classified into nine categories based on function: Category 1 for customer payments and cheques (e.g., MT103 for single customer credit transfers), Category 2 for financial institution transfers (e.g., MT202 for general financial institution transfers), Category 3 for foreign exchange and currency options, Category 4 for collections and cash letters, Category 5 for securities markets, Category 6 for precious metals, Category 7 for documentary credits and guarantees, Category 8 for travellers cheques, and Category 9 for cash management and customer status (e.g., for customer statement messages). These categories ensure standardized handling, with over 200 specific message types defined; for instance, the November 2022 Standards MT release outlines rules for validation, field usage, and syntax to minimize errors in high-volume processing. Complementing MT, SWIFT has adopted the standard for MX messages since 2004, employing XML-based syntax to enable richer, extensible data structures that support detailed semantics like purpose codes and information, enhancing and regulatory reporting. messages follow a hierarchical model with predefined reusable components, allowing for greater flexibility than MT's rigid tags while maintaining during transitions. The cross-border payments and reporting segment initiated MT-to-MX migration in 2023 via SWIFT's coexistence period, set to conclude by November 2025, after which MT formats for categories like 1 and 2 will be phased out in favor of MX equivalents such as pacs.008 for credit transfers. SWIFT facilitates conversion through tools like FINplus, which translates MT to and flags converted messages for recipient awareness. Transmission protocols operate over SWIFTNet, a secure IP-based network replacing earlier X.25 infrastructure, utilizing the FIN service for store-and-forward messaging with via (PKI) and digital signatures to ensure authenticity and . supports both MT (via legacy protocol) and (via FINplus enhancements for XML handling), with messages routed through four regional data centers for resilience and low-latency delivery, processing over 44 million messages daily as of 2023. Additional protocols like Swift.gpi enhance tracking and compliance for MT and payments, embedding unique end-to-end transaction identifiers compliant with principles.

Security and Compliance Frameworks

The SWIFT Customer Security Programme (CSP), initiated in 2016 following high-profile cyber incidents such as the heist, mandates cybersecurity measures for all network participants to mitigate risks in financial messaging. At its core is the Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF), which specifies 25 mandatory controls and 7 advisory controls in its 2024 version, organized under three objectives: securing the local SWIFT environment, preventing customer fraud, and promoting operational awareness. These controls address vulnerabilities like access management, , and incident response, requiring annual self-attestation of compliance by all users. High-risk users or those flagged by SWIFT may undergo mandatory independent assessments by certified providers to verify adherence. Complementing security, SWIFT's compliance frameworks emphasize tools and standards enabling anti-money laundering (AML), sanctions screening, and know-your-customer (KYC) processes within the network. Compliance Analytics provides aggregated data on SWIFT message traffic to support regulatory reporting and threat detection, aligning with global standards like FATF recommendations and directives on transparency. Messaging protocols incorporate structured fields for party identification and transaction details, facilitating automated screening against sanctions lists such as those from OFAC or the , though ultimate compliance responsibility lies with individual institutions. SWIFT itself adheres to Belgian cooperative law and data protection regulations, including GDPR, while maintaining neutrality in geopolitical sanctions by excluding entities only upon directive from its oversight board of central banks.

Oversight and Regulation

Central Bank Supervision

SWIFT is subject to cooperative oversight by the central banks of the Group of Ten (G10) countries, with the (NBB) serving as the lead overseer responsible for coordinating activities. The G10 participants include the , , , Banque de France, , , , , United States , and . This arrangement recognizes SWIFT's systemic importance to global financial stability, as disruptions could propagate risks across interconnected payment systems. The primary objectives of this oversight are to monitor and promote the , operational reliability, business continuity, and overall resilience of SWIFT's infrastructure, without imposing formal . Oversight activities involve assessing SWIFT's controls and processes against international standards, conducting reviews, and recommending enhancements through rather than enforceable mandates. The NBB, leveraging SWIFT's Belgian incorporation, facilitates joint evaluations and ensures compliance with these standards in cooperation with other G10 members. Key bodies supporting this framework include the SWIFT Oversight Group (OG), which handles core monitoring and decision-making, and specialized working groups such as the Oversight Evaluation Group (EG) for assessments and the Security Oversight Forum (SOF) for resilience issues. The SWIFT Oversight Forum extends information-sharing to a broader set of central banks beyond the G10, including participants, to address evolving global risks. Formalized in arrangements dating back to at least 2005, this oversight has adapted to threats like cyber risks, with the G10 central banks maintaining a unified approach to insist on necessary improvements. SWIFT operates as a society incorporated under since its establishment on May 25, 1973, subjecting it to Belgian corporate statutes and EU-wide legal frameworks governing financial providers. As a non-profit entity headquartered in , , it maintains neutrality in message transmission but bears obligations to ensure platform integrity, including adherence to EU directives on resilience under the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), effective January 17, 2025. This legal status limits SWIFT's liability for the content of transmitted financial messages, placing primary responsibility for transaction legality on participating institutions, while requiring SWIFT to implement robust access controls and audit mechanisms. In terms of sanctions compliance, SWIFT adheres strictly to EU sanctions regimes transposed into Belgian , disconnecting access for designated entities upon directives from competent authorities, as affirmed by the Belgian government. For example, following the EU Council's decision on February 25, 2022, SWIFT suspended messaging services to selected Russian banks in March 2022 to enforce sanctions related to the conflict, demonstrating its obligation to prioritize binding EU legal requirements over operational neutrality. Responsibility for verifying individual transaction compliance with sanctions, anti-money laundering (AML), and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) rules remains with users, though SWIFT cooperates with regulators by providing aggregated data insights to combat illicit flows without compromising message confidentiality. Data protection forms a core compliance pillar, with SWIFT processing personal data embedded in financial messages in full alignment with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), effective May 25, 2018. Its Personal Data Protection Policy, updated as of March 17, 2022, designates SWIFT as a data controller for operational purposes, mandating measures like data minimization, , and breach notifications within 72 hours to supervisory authorities such as the Belgian Data Protection Authority. Joint controllership agreements with users further delineate responsibilities, ensuring cross-border data transfers comply with adequacy decisions or standard contractual clauses, amid past scrutiny from data protection authorities in 2014 that found no major violations. Oversight by the G10 central banks, formalized since 2009 and coordinated by the , imposes additional legal duties on SWIFT to uphold systemic stability, including annual assessments of security, operational reliability, and cyber resilience under the High Value Payment System oversight framework. This cooperative regime, extended to the , requires SWIFT to implement the Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF), comprising 27 mandatory controls across access, messaging, and system operations to mitigate risks like the 2016 Bangladesh Bank cyber heist. Non-compliance could trigger enhanced monitoring or remedial actions, reinforcing causal links between SWIFT's infrastructure safeguards and global without direct enforcement powers beyond and information sharing.

Alternatives and Competitors

Government-Sponsored Systems

Russia's System for Transfer of Financial Messages (), established by the in 2014, serves as a domestic and limited international alternative to SWIFT, primarily developed in response to Western threats of financial isolation following the annexation of . The system enables secure transmission of financial messages, including payment instructions, among Russian banks and select foreign participants, with initial focus on intra-Russian transactions before expanding to allies like . By March 2022, amid broader sanctions excluding major Russian banks from SWIFT, the Central Bank reported 399 users connecting to , facilitating circumvention of international restrictions through parallel messaging channels. However, its global adoption remains constrained, with usage predominantly within and sanctioned entities, prompting U.S. warnings in 2024 about secondary sanctions risks for foreign institutions interfacing with . China's (CIPS), launched in October 2015 under the oversight of the , provides clearing and settlement services for renminbi-denominated cross-border transactions, aiming to bolster RMB internationalization and reduce reliance on dollar-dominated networks like SWIFT. As of May 2025, CIPS connects 1,683 participants, including 124 direct and 1,138 indirect in alone, spanning 189 countries and regions, though the majority are indirect users linking through domestic gateways. In the first half of 2025, it processed approximately 4.03 million transactions, while full-year 2024 volumes reached CNY 175.49 trillion across 8.2 million transactions, reflecting 42.6% year-on-year growth in value and 24% in transaction count. Unlike SWIFT's messaging focus, CIPS emphasizes settlement, often integrating SWIFT-compatible syntax for , but its scale—handling a fraction of SWIFT's daily volumes—limits it to niche RMB trade corridors, particularly along routes. Other government-initiated systems, such as those explored within frameworks, have advanced discussions on unified alternatives but lack operational maturity as of 2025, with and CIPS functioning as foundational models for de-dollarization efforts rather than comprehensive SWIFT replacements. These platforms underscore geopolitical motivations to insulate national financial systems from sanctions, yet their efficacy is tempered by challenges, limited participant bases, and dependence on state-backed currencies with narrower global acceptance.

Private and Decentralized Alternatives

RippleNet, developed by the private company Ripple Labs and launched in 2012, serves as a prominent blockchain-based alternative to SWIFT for cross-border payments. It employs the XRP Ledger and XRP cryptocurrency to provide on-demand liquidity, enabling transactions to settle in 3-5 seconds at costs averaging fractions of a cent per transfer, compared to SWIFT's typical 1-5 day delays and fees of $25-50. By 2025, RippleNet connects over 100 countries and has processed billions in volume, though it remains niche relative to SWIFT's daily handling of 44 million messages and $5 trillion in value. Critics note that while Ripple emphasizes efficiency and transparency via distributed ledger technology, its semi-centralized structure—controlled by Ripple Labs—raises questions about true decentralization and regulatory risks, as evidenced by ongoing U.S. SEC litigation resolved in Ripple's partial favor in 2023. Fully decentralized alternatives rely on permissionless public blockchains, bypassing central coordinators like SWIFT's model. Stellar, a of Ripple's early protocol launched in 2014 by the nonprofit Stellar Development Foundation, uses its native XLM token for rapid, low-cost remittances, achieving consensus via the Stellar Consensus Protocol for settlements in 3-5 seconds across a network of validators without a single controlling entity. Similarly, platforms like Lightspark leverage Bitcoin's —a layer-2 scaling solution—for real-time cross-border micropayments, processing transactions off-chain for near-instant finality and fees under $0.01, with adoption growing among institutions seeking censorship-resistant rails by 2025. These systems prioritize causal efficiency through cryptographic verification and settlement, but face hurdles; for instance, public blockchains handle far lower volumes than SWIFT's infrastructure, with Bitcoin's base layer limited to ~7 absent layer-2 enhancements. Academic proposals further explore architectures as SWIFT substitutes, such as permissioned or hybrid ledgers for secure remittances, claiming up to 90% cost reductions and enhanced via zero-knowledge proofs, though empirical pilots remain small-scale and unproven at global volumes. Adoption barriers include interoperability challenges, as SWIFT integrates standards while blockchains vary in compliance, and volatility in native tokens like XRP or XLM undermines reliability for high-value transfers. Despite these, decentralized networks have facilitated over $1 trillion in cumulative cross-border value by mid-2025, signaling gradual erosion of SWIFT's monopoly in select corridors.

Leadership

Board Chair and Key Directors

The SWIFT Board of Directors is composed of 25 members elected by shareholders to oversee the organization's governance, ensuring representation proportional to SWIFT messaging usage across global financial institutions for neutrality and international balance. Graeme Munro has served as Chair since his election on March 30, 2023, bringing over 30 years of experience in , operations, and in banking; he holds the position of Managing Director and Chief Controls Manager at Corporate & Investment Bank in New York, . Key directors include executives from prominent institutions worldwide, reflecting SWIFT's cooperative structure among over 11,000 member financial organizations. Notable members encompass:
DirectorAffiliation and Role
Artie AmbroseManaging Director, Global Head of Treasury and Trade Solutions Operations, Citi, New York, NY, USA
Mark GemDeputy Chair of the Executive Board, Clearstream, Luxembourg
Ole MatthiessenGlobal Head of Cash Management & Head of Corporate Bank APAC MEA, Deutsche Bank
Noritoshi MurakamiManaging Director, Head of Transaction Banking Division, MUFG, Japan
Yvonne YiuRegional Co-Head of Global Payments Solutions, Asia Pacific, HSBC, Hong Kong SAR
Ethan TeasExecutive General Manager Payments, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Australia
Jason StorsleySenior Vice President – Savings and Investments, Royal Bank of Canada, Canada
This composition, current as of the latest official disclosure, emphasizes expertise in payments, compliance, and transaction banking from regions including , , , and others. Full board details, including additional directors such as those from , ING, and , are maintained on SWIFT's governance page to support strategic oversight of standards, , and in cross-border messaging.

Chief Executive Officer and Executive Team

Javier Pérez-Tasso has served as of SWIFT since July 1, 2019, overseeing the cooperative's global operations, strategy implementation, and innovation in financial messaging standards. Prior to his appointment, Pérez-Tasso joined SWIFT in 1995 and held the role of Chief Executive for the and region from September 2015, where he expanded regional adoption of SWIFT's services amid growing cross-border payment demands. The executive team operates as SWIFT's Executive Committee, chaired by the CEO and responsible for delegating and managing day-to-day functions across , , , and compliance. Key members include:
PositionName
Chief Corporate OfficerRosemary Stone
Cheri McGuire
Thierry Chilosi
Max Mamondez
Chief Risk and Control OfficerCate Kemp
Chief Operations OfficerJerome Piens
Thomas Delaet
and Nathan Van de Velde
Wendy Zidan
Thomas Delaet was appointed Chief Product Officer on September 4, 2025, bringing prior experience from to drive product strategy enhancements. The Chief Auditor, Peter De Koninck, supports the committee independently on internal audits. This structure ensures alignment with SWIFT's shareholder-owned governance model, emphasizing operational resilience and standards evolution.

Economic and Geopolitical Role

Facilitation of International Trade and Payments

SWIFT provides a global messaging network that enables financial institutions to transmit standardized instructions for cross-border payments, serving as the foundational infrastructure for settling transactions without directly holding or transferring funds. These messages, formatted according to protocols like MT series or the emerging standard, instruct banks or clearing systems to debit and accounts, thereby facilitating the payment legs of letters of credit, open account trade, and supplier remittances. By standardizing communication via Bank Identifier Codes (BICs) and structured data fields, SWIFT minimizes discrepancies in transaction details, such as amounts, currencies, and beneficiary information, which reduces processing errors and disputes in global commerce. The system's scale underscores its centrality to : it links over 11,500 institutions in more than 220 countries and territories, supporting payments of varying sizes from high-value commercial transfers to retail flows. In 2024, SWIFT reported 99.999% availability for its core FIN messaging service, ensuring reliable transmission amid daily volumes exceeding 40 million messages, which underpin payments estimated at trillions of dollars annually. Innovations like SWIFT gpi, adopted by thousands of banks, have accelerated processing, with 90% of cross-border payments reaching the destination bank within one hour and 75% credited within 10 minutes, aligning with targets for faster, more transparent trade settlements. For specifically, SWIFT integrates with instruments by enabling secure confirmation of payment instructions, which helps mitigate risks like non-payment in export-import cycles. Messages such as MT700 for letters of credit issuance or MT202 for interbank transfers allow seamless coordination between buyers' and sellers' banks across jurisdictions, supporting the flow of goods valued at approximately $28 trillion in global merchandise trade each year. Recent enhancements, including with systems and richer data for compliance screening, further streamline end-to-end visibility, reducing delays in financing while adhering to anti-money laundering requirements.

Effectiveness in Enforcing Sanctions

SWIFT's exclusion of designated financial institutions has been employed as a tool for enforcing , primarily at the behest of Western governments, by disrupting cross-border messaging for payments and securities transactions. In practice, this involves disconnecting specific banks from the network, which hampers their ability to conduct routine international transfers, though SWIFT itself lacks direct enforcement authority and operates under legal obligations from jurisdictions like the and , where it is headquartered. The system's effectiveness stems from its near-universal adoption—over 11,000 institutions in more than 200 countries—but is constrained by incomplete coverage, as not all global transactions rely on SWIFT, and alternatives can emerge. The 2012 disconnection of EU-sanctioned Iranian banks exemplified early effectiveness, leading to a contraction in Iran's GDP by over 5% that year and a sharp devaluation of the rial, alongside a roughly 50% drop in revenues due to severed financial channels for . This isolation pressured Iran's economy significantly, contributing to broader sanction-induced stagnation, with output growth rates falling from a potential 4-5% to around 3% annually over subsequent decades. Reconnection in 2016 followed the implementation of the , underscoring how SWIFT exclusions can serve as reversible leverage in negotiations, though long-term evasion via trades and regional networks mitigated some isolation. In response to Russia's February 2022 invasion of , SWIFT disconnected seven major Russian banks by late February, expanding to over a dozen by mid-year, including entities handling about 70% of Russia's external payments, while sparing some like to facilitate energy transactions. This contributed to initial disruptions in imports and a decline in oil and gas revenues following the December 2022 price cap, with Russia's facing risks and reduced access to Western capital. However, Russia's GDP grew by 3.6% in 2023 and an estimated 3.2% in 2024, buoyed by wartime spending, military exports, and fiscal stimulus, indicating limited crippling effect despite the measures. Effectiveness is further limited by workarounds, such as Russia's expansion of its domestic messaging system for intra-Russian and select Eurasian transactions, integration with China's CIPS, and rerouting of through intermediaries like , , and the UAE using non-SWIFT channels or local currencies. Sanctions evasion via third-country banks and shadow fleets for oil transport has sustained revenues, with Russia's current account surplus reaching $70 billion in 2023. The global nature of finance also risks spillover, as precise targeting proves challenging, prompting geopolitical pushback including accelerated de-dollarization efforts and development of parallel payment infrastructures that erode SWIFT's monopoly over time. Overall, while SWIFT exclusions deliver targeted shocks—more potently against smaller economies like Iran's—they have proven insufficient alone to collapse larger, adaptive ones like Russia's, necessitating complementary measures such as asset freezes and bans for broader impact.

Controversies

Allegations of Inefficiency and High Costs

Critics, particularly from the sector, have alleged that SWIFT's legacy infrastructure leads to operational inefficiencies, including delayed processing times that can span 1–5 business days for cross-border payments due to reliance on banks and manual interventions. This structure necessitates multiple intermediaries, each adding verification steps and potential errors, contrasting with real-time systems that settle in seconds. Allegations of high costs center on per-transaction fees, often ranging from $10 to $50, driven by intermediary bank charges, foreign exchange markups, and SWIFT's own messaging tariffs, which are levied per message based on type, length, and traffic volume. For high-volume users, these accumulate significantly; for instance, a 2024 analysis estimated average SWIFT remittance corridor costs at 7.1%, far exceeding alternatives like blockchain networks at under 1%. Proponents of decentralized alternatives, such as Ripple, attribute these expenses to SWIFT's non-native settlement capabilities, requiring separate clearing and liquidity arrangements that inflate total outlays by 30–50% in some corridors. Such criticisms have intensified with the rise of competitors, where transaction fees can drop to fractions of a cent, prompting claims that SWIFT's model prioritizes incumbency over despite handling over 44 million daily messages in 2023. However, defenders note that SWIFT's costs reflect embedded , compliance, and global , with fees partially offset for large institutions via volume discounts—though independent audits suggest persistent premiums of 2–4 times over digital ledgers. These allegations, often voiced by entities with vested interests in disruptive technologies, underscore broader debates on modernizing legacy financial rails amid escalating global trade volumes exceeding $28 trillion annually.

Surveillance and Data Privacy Concerns

The Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), established by the U.S. Department of the Treasury following the September 11, 2001 attacks, enables access to financial transaction records transmitted via SWIFT to track terrorist financing. Under this program, the U.S. issues administrative subpoenas to SWIFT for bulk data on international wire transfers, primarily targeting non-U.S. originated messages involving European counterparties after 2001. An EU-U.S. agreement, first negotiated in 2009 and renewed periodically, imposes safeguards such as data minimization, EU oversight by Europol, and judicial redress limited to U.S. courts, but critics argue these fail to adequately protect non-U.S. persons' privacy due to the program's scale—processing billions of messages annually without individualized suspicion. Revelations from 2013, stemming from Edward Snowden's leaks, exposed (NSA) efforts to circumvent TFTP restrictions by directly tapping SWIFT's European data hubs, accessing up to 90% of global SWIFT traffic including intra-EU and non-U.S. messages beyond agreement terms. This included alleged collaboration with Belgium's intelligence services to exploit SWIFT's infrastructure in Osij, , raising concerns of indiscriminate violating EU data protection laws like the e-Privacy Directive. The European Parliament responded with a non-binding resolution on October 23, 2013, urging suspension of the TFTP agreement until NSA overreach was addressed, citing undermined trust and insufficient transparency in U.S. assurances. Privacy advocates, including , have highlighted risks of , where counter-terrorism data is repurposed for broader intelligence or economic espionage, with limited effective redress for affected individuals outside U.S. jurisdiction. In Canada, a 2007 investigation by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner found SWIFT's disclosures of Canadian-originated data to the U.S. Treasury breached domestic privacy principles by lacking consent and necessity assessments, though no enforcement followed due to SWIFT's cooperative structure. SWIFT maintains compliance with GDPR and appoints a , but its role as a neutral messaging provider exposes centralized transaction metadata— including sender, recipient, amounts, and accounts—to potential state compulsion without for content. These issues underscore tensions between financial transparency for sanctions enforcement and the privacy of billions in annual cross-border payments, prompting calls for decentralized alternatives to mitigate single-point surveillance risks.

Implementation of Sanctions and Geopolitical Backlash

SWIFT's implementation of financial sanctions involves disconnecting designated institutions from its messaging network in compliance with applicable laws, primarily regulations given its Belgian headquarters and cooperative structure under Belgian law. The process requires explicit instructions from EU authorities, after which SWIFT notifies affected parties and executes the cutoff, disrupting cross-border payment communications without halting domestic operations. This mechanism has been invoked sparingly, reflecting SWIFT's stated neutrality in geopolitical matters, but it enforces multilateral decisions coordinated with U.S. and other allies. The first major application occurred in 2012 against , when EU Regulation 267/2012 directed SWIFT to sever ties with the and approximately 30 other sanctioned entities effective March 31, 2012, in response to Iran's nuclear program. Iranian banks were reconnected on January 31, 2016, following the , though U.S. reimposition of sanctions in 2018 prompted partial disconnections again. In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU Council Regulations on March 2 and March 9, 2022, mandated the exclusion of seven major Russian banks (including VTB, Bank Otkritie, and Novikombank) from SWIFT effective March 12, 2022, with additional banks added in June 2022. This action, supported by G7 coordination, aimed to isolate Russia's financial system from global trade, freezing over $300 billion in Central Bank of Russia assets abroad and complicating energy exports. While effective in raising transaction costs—estimated at 30-50% higher for Russia via alternatives—the exclusions spared some banks to preserve energy payment channels. These disconnections have provoked significant geopolitical backlash, framed by affected nations as the "weaponization" of financial infrastructure to enforce Western foreign policy. Russia accelerated its , launched in 2014, which by 2025 connects over 500 domestic institutions and links with counterparts in 20 countries, including partial integration with 's (CIPS, established 2015). , wary of similar vulnerabilities, has expanded CIPS to over 1,500 participants globally by 2025, emphasizing renminbi-denominated settlements to mitigate dollar dependence. BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, plus recent expansions) have intensified efforts for SWIFT alternatives, including proposals for a unified "BRICS Pay" platform discussed at 2024 and 2025 summits, aiming to facilitate trade in local currencies and bypass U.S.-influenced systems. These initiatives, while advancing de-dollarization— intra-trade in local currencies rose to 65% by 2024—face technical hurdles like and limited scale, with SWIFT still handling over 44 million daily messages in 2023 versus CIPS's 300,000. Critics from sanctioned states argue such moves promote multipolarity, though adoption remains constrained by SWIFT's entrenched efficiency and network effects.

Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Breaches

SWIFT's cybersecurity architecture depends on secure endpoints at member financial institutions, where vulnerabilities often arise from inadequate internal controls, such as unpatched software, weak , and insufficient monitoring of messaging systems like Alliance Access. These endpoint weaknesses allow attackers to inject fraudulent payment instructions without compromising the central SWIFT network, which authenticates messages but does not verify their legitimacy. A coordinated series of cyberattacks exploiting these vulnerabilities occurred between 2015 and 2016, attributed to North Korea's Lazarus Group (also known as APT38). In January 2015, hackers stole approximately $9 million from Ecuador's Banco del Austro by sending fraudulent SWIFT messages after breaching the bank's systems. The most prominent incident was the February 2016 Bangladesh Bank heist, where intruders used malware to access the bank's SWIFT terminal, issuing 35 fraudulent transfer requests totaling $951 million from its New York Federal Reserve account; $81 million was successfully transferred to accounts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka before detection, with the remainder blocked due to typographical errors and weekend timing. The attack involved deleting transaction logs and printer outputs to evade detection, highlighting lapses in real-time monitoring and segregation of duties at the victim institution. U.S. authorities, including the Treasury Department and FBI, linked the 2015–2016 campaign to operatives, who employed custom for reconnaissance, credential theft, and message manipulation across multiple targets, including unsuccessful attempts on banks in and other Asian countries. Subsequent incidents included the 2018 Cosmos Bank attack in , where hackers compromised servers to execute SWIFT transfers of about $1.7 million to a Hong Kong bank, alongside $11 million in ATM withdrawals using cloned cards, resulting in total losses of $13.5 million. In response, SWIFT launched the Customer Security Programme (CSP) in 2017, mandating 8 core principles and 31 controls focused on securing local environments, preventing fraud, and maintaining operational resilience, with annual independent attestations required from members. This framework has correlated with fewer successful large-scale breaches, though surveys indicate persistent increases in attack attempts—two-thirds of banks reported more SWIFT-related cyber fraud efforts since 2016—driven by state-sponsored actors targeting high-value endpoints.

References

  1. https://www.swift.com/about-us
  2. https://www.swift.com/about-us/who-we-are/our-story
  3. https://www.swift.com/our-solutions/global-financial-messaging
  4. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr1047.pdf
  5. https://www.swift.com/about-us/organisation-governance
  6. https://www.swift.com/about-us/legal/compliance-0/swift-and-sanctions
  7. https://www.csis.org/analysis/sanctions-swift-and-chinas-cross-border-interbank-payments-system
  8. https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46490/1/Origins%20and%20Development%20of.pdf
  9. https://bankofindia.co.in/about-us
  10. https://docs.axway.com/bundle/Gateway_6173_UsersGuide_allOS_en_HTML5/page/Content/connectors/swiftnet/swiftnet_about.htm
  11. https://thefinancialtechnologyreport.com/swifts-evolution-in-cross-border-payments-embracing-innovation-and-collaboration/
  12. https://www.swift.com/news-events/news/iso-20022-payments-data-revolution
  13. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1484
  14. https://www.dlapiper.com/en-us/insights/publications/global-sanctions-alert/2022/explaining-swift-and-recent-actions
  15. https://www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/swift-delivers-major-milestones-strategy-instant-and-frictionless-transactions-and-sets-stage-global-adoption-2022
  16. https://www.ledgerinsights.com/38-institutions-join-swift-cbdc-connector-second-trials/
  17. https://www.swift.com/news-events/news/live-trials-digital-asset-transactions-swift-start-2025
  18. https://www.prnewswire.com/in/news-releases/swiftnet-instant-to-provide-access-to-eba-clearings-rt1-system-650382813.html
  19. https://www.swift.com/standards/iso-20022
  20. https://www.swift.com/about-us/legal/corporate-matters/swift-user-categories
  21. https://www.swift.com/about-us/legal/swift-shareholding
  22. https://verify-swift.com/about-us/legal/swift-shareholding.html
  23. https://stripe.com/resources/more/what-is-swift
  24. https://www.swift.com/swift-resource/7776/download
  25. https://www.swift.com/about-us/organisation-governance/swift-governance
  26. https://www.swift.com/myswift/ordering/order-products-services/fin
  27. https://www.paystand.com/blog/what-is-a-swift-code
  28. https://www.swift.com/standards/standards-releases
  29. https://www.swift.com/swift-resource/7786/download
  30. https://www.swift.com/myswift/developer-resource-centre/design-messaging-services
  31. https://www.swift.com/standards/iso-20022/iso-20022-faqs/implementation
  32. https://www.swift.com/about-us/discover-swift/information-security/2024-isae-3000-type-2-reports
  33. https://www.swift.com/about-us/legal/compliance/data-protection-policies/frequently-asked-questions
  34. https://www.swift.com/about-us/swift-and-data
  35. https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/local-police-brought-in-to-protect-swiss-swift-data-center-after-russia-is-booted-from-financial-messaging-system/
  36. https://baxtel.com/data-center/swift-culpeper-va
  37. https://cloud.google.com/security/swift
  38. https://wise.com/us/blog/how-long-does-swift-take
  39. https://stripe.com/resources/more/how-long-do-international-payments-take-what-to-know-about-international-wire-transfers
  40. https://www.swift.com/about-us/who-we-are
  41. https://www.swift.com/news-events/news/ceos-annual-letter-shareholders
  42. https://www.swift.com/about-us/swift-traffic-highlights
  43. https://www2.swift.com/knowledgecentre/rest/v1/publications/usgi_20220722/2.0/usgi_20220722.pdf?logDownload=true
  44. https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E74659_01/html/MS/MS13_SWIFT_Messages.htm
  45. https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19509-01/820-7113/6nid5dl2r/
  46. https://www.swift.com/standards
  47. http://www.iso20022.org/iso-20022-message-definitions
  48. https://www.citibank.com/tts/sa/iso-20022-migration/assets/docs/ISO-20022-FAQs.pdf
  49. https://www.swift.com/standards/iso-20022/iso-20022-faqs/mt-iso-20022-conversion
  50. https://www.swift.com/standards/iso-20022/iso-20022-financial-institutions-focus-payments-instructions
  51. https://www.swift.com/myswift/customer-security-programme-csp
  52. https://www.ecsfin.com/swift-csp-2024-overview-of-the-updates-for-this-year/
  53. https://www.swift.com/myswift/customer-security-programme-csp/security-controls
  54. https://www.swift.com/myswift/customer-security-programme-csp/independent-assessment
  55. https://www.swift.com/risk-and-compliance
  56. https://www.swift.com/products/compliance-analytics
  57. https://www.swift.com/risk-and-compliance/anti-money-laundering
  58. https://www.swift.com/about-us/legal/compliance
  59. https://www.nbb.be/en/financial-oversight/oversight/other-infrastructures-and-service-providers
  60. https://www.bundesbank.de/en/tasks/payment-systems/oversight/swift-626536
  61. https://financialforum.be/en/bfw-digitaal/the-international-cooperative-oversight-of-swift
  62. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/financial-stability-publications/fsr/focus/2005/pdf/ecb~d573ca68c6.fsrbox200512_18.pdf
  63. https://www.bancaditalia.it/compiti/sispaga-mercati/infrastrutture-tecniche/swift/FSR_2005_EN_oversight_of_SWIFT.pdf
  64. https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/over_pssystems.htm
  65. https://www.nbb.be/doc/ts/publications/fmi-and-paymentservices/2024/fmi-2024_swift.pdf
  66. https://www.swift.com/about-us/organisation-governance/swift-oversight
  67. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025AB0001
  68. https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/making-sense-of-sanctions-versus-swift-delisting/
  69. https://www.swift.com/swift-resource/21476/download
  70. https://www2.swift.com/knowledgecentre/rest/v1/publications/s_pers_data_prt_pol/5.0/s_pers_data_prt_pol.pdf?logDownload=true
  71. https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/data-privacy/data-protection-enforcement-in-belgium/
  72. https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933656/download?inline
  73. https://jamestown.org/program/russia-builds-alternative-to-swift-as-part-of-digital-sovereignty-push/
  74. https://www.intfiba.com/services/currency-transfers/alternatives-to-swift/
  75. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/central-bank-russia-launches-swift-154004953.html
  76. https://amlwatcher.com/news/treasury-sanctions-gazprombank-and-limiting-russias-use-of-the-international-financial-system/
  77. https://www.swift.com/swift-resource/44986/download
  78. https://www.cips.com.cn/cipsenmobile/7242/7256/34009/index.html
  79. https://www.fxcintel.com/research/analysis/cips-growth-may-2025
  80. https://www.facebook.com/AmbHuangXilian/posts/china-is-making-cross-border-payments-faster-easier-and-more-connectedthe-rmb-cr/1101848538805912/
  81. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cross-border-interbank-payment-system-cips-strategic-pillar-quan-du-ntnhe
  82. https://digitaloneagency.com.au/brics-and-the-rise-of-an-independent-payment-system-are-the-global-rails-changing-tracks/
  83. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/brics-payment-system/
  84. https://www.businessinsider.com/dedollarization-countries-national-tech-payments-systems-russia-china-india-swift-2024-8
  85. https://101blockchains.com/ripple-vs-swift/
  86. https://www.ccn.com/education/crypto/ripple-xrp-odl-tokenization-real-world-utility-explained/
  87. https://www.risein.com/blog/swift-vs-xrp-which-is-the-future-of-international-payments
  88. https://www.ccn.com/news/technology/ripple-stellar-replace-swift-building-blockchain/
  89. https://www.lightspark.com/news/payments/swift-alternatives-2025
  90. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/383466755_Blockchain-Based_System_for_Secure_and_Efficient_Cross-Border_Remittances_A_Potential_Alternative_to_SWIFT
  91. https://b2binpay.com/en/news/blockchain-vs-swift
  92. https://www.papayaglobal.com/blog/8-alternatives-to-swift-for-cross-border-payments/
  93. https://www.swift.com/about-us/organisation-governance/swift-board-directors
  94. https://www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/swift-board-names-new-chair-and-deputy-chair-completing-leadership-transition
  95. https://www.swift.com/about-us/organisation-governance/swift-management
  96. https://www.financemagnates.com/executives/moves/swift-names-javier-perez-tasso-as-new-ceo/
  97. https://financialit.net/news/people-moves/swift-appoints-javier-perez-tasso-ceo
  98. https://www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/swift-strengthens-global-product-leadership-executive-hire
  99. https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/050515/how-swift-system-works.asp
  100. https://www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/swift-cross-border-payment-processing-speed-stretches-further-ahead-g20-target
  101. https://www.swift.com/products/swift-gpi
  102. https://www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/swift-connects-instant-payment-systems-bring-round-clock-processing-across-borders
  103. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2023.2228679
  104. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2021/06/how-disastrous-would-disconnection-from-swift-be-for-russia?lang=en
  105. https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/econpol-forum-2023-3-laudati-sanctions-may.pdf
  106. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/timeline-sanctions-against-russia/
  107. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608
  108. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/three-years-war-ukraine-are-sanctions-against-russia-making-difference
  109. https://www.csis.org/analysis/down-not-out-russian-economy-under-western-sanctions
  110. https://www.economicsobservatory.com/sanctions-effectiveness-what-lessons-three-years-into-the-war-on-ukraine
  111. https://www.investopedia.com/swift-and-sanctions-how-banking-system-impacts-international-relations-5220404
  112. https://atlasinstitute.org/weaponized-finance-sanctions-swift-and-the-future-of-global-political-risk/
  113. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/policy-briefs/strengthening-financial-frontline-russian-trade-sanctions
  114. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/396419944_SWIFT_vs_RippleNet_Evaluating_Transaction_Speed_Cost_and_Transparency
  115. https://www.transfi.com/blog/swift-vs-ripple
  116. https://coinlaw.io/xrp-vs-swift-statistics/
  117. https://bvnk.com/blog/swift-alternatives
  118. https://www.ainvest.com/news/xrp-potential-replace-swift-sparks-debate-driven-efficiency-cost-savings-2504/
  119. http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:1964132
  120. https://payquicker.com/swift-alternatives/
  121. https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/swift-tests-blockchain-ledger-30-banks-what-it-means-xrp
  122. https://www.cobase.com/insight-hub/is-swift-still-relevant
  123. https://www.endl.io/articles/stablecoin-settlement-vs-swift-rtgs
  124. https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/DynamicImages/Generic/e426b076-928d-4a79-ac0c-9ed9efe9e4cf/TFTP%2520Chairman%2520Statement%252011_19_20.pdf
  125. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2013-0449_EN.html
  126. http://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/1534/demanding-accountability-nsas-breach-swift-financial-agreement
  127. https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/meps-call-for-suspension-of-euus-swift-agreement-following-new-nsa-revelations
  128. https://www.justsecurity.org/5463/eu-parliamentary-committees-preliminary-report-nsa-surveillance/
  129. https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2007/swift_rep_070402/
  130. https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2007/04/privacy-commissioner-concludes-investigation-swift.html
  131. https://www.insideprivacy.com/financial-institutions/swift-messaging-raises-unique-financial-privacy-concerns/
  132. https://www.cyberghostvpn.com/privacyhub/cia-data-mining/
  133. https://www.swift.com/insights/press-releases/swift-instructed-to-disconnect-sanctioned-iranian-banks-following-eu-council-decision
  134. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/world/middleeast/crucial-communication-network-expelling-iranian-banks.html
  135. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/iranian-banks-reconnected-to-swift-network-after-four-year-hiatus-idUSKCN0VQ1FB/
  136. https://www.banque-france.fr/en/publications-and-statistics/publications/sanctions-against-russia-role-swift
  137. https://www.bankinfobook.com/russias-spfs-to-end-of-swifts-dominance/
  138. https://www.fxstreet.com/analysis/a-brics-alternative-to-the-swift-payment-system-could-accelerate-de-dollarization-202404071751
  139. https://www.opportimes.com/en/brics-challenge-swift-and-dollar-with-spfs-and-cips/
  140. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2199853124002348
  141. https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/report-swift-hacked-by-bangladesh-bank-attackers-a-9061
  142. https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/attacking-the-swift-banking-system/
  143. https://www.bakerdatacounsel.com/blogs/90-million-cyber-thefts-from-swift-network-raise-security-and-legal-issues/
  144. https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-57520169
  145. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/03/magazine/money-issue-bangladesh-billion-dollar-bank-heist.html
  146. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774
  147. https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/prison-time-for-11-involved-in-indias-cosmos-bank-heist-a-21854
  148. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/cosmos-bank-loses-135-million-in-cyber-attack-idUSKBN1KZ1J8/
  149. https://www.swift.com/swift-resource/197901/download?token=xj2pW6vY
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
Contribute something
User Avatar
No comments yet.