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September 11 attacks
September 11 attacks
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September 11 attacks
Location
DateSeptember 11, 2001; 24 years ago (2001-09-11)
c. 08:13 a.m.[b] – 10:03 a.m.[c] (EDT)
Target
Attack type
Islamic terrorism, aircraft hijacking, suicide attack, mass murder
Deaths2,996[d]
(2,977 victims and 19 al-Qaeda terrorists)
Injured6,000–25,000+[e]
PerpetratorsAl-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden (see also: responsibility)
No. of participants
19
MotiveSeveral; see Motives for the September 11 attacks and Fatwas of Osama bin Laden
Convicted

The September 11 attacks,[f] also known as 9/11,[g] were four coordinated Islamist terrorist suicide attacks by al-Qaeda against the United States in 2001. Nineteen terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners, two of which were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the third into the Pentagon, which is the headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense, in Arlington County, Virginia. The fourth plane crashed in a rural Pennsylvania field during a passenger revolt, where the Flight 93 National Memorial was established. In response to the attacks, the United States waged the global war on terror over decades, to eliminate hostile groups deemed terrorist organizations, and the governments purported to support them.

Ringleader Mohamed Atta flew American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex at 8:46 a.m. Seventeen minutes later at 9:03 a.m.,[h] United Airlines Flight 175 hit the South Tower. Both collapsed within an hour and forty-two minutes,[i] destroying the remaining five structures in the complex. American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m., causing a partial collapse. The fourth and final flight, United Airlines Flight 93, was believed by investigators to target either the United States Capitol or the White House. Alerted to the previous attacks, the passengers revolted against the hijackers who crashed the aircraft into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 10:03 a.m. The Federal Aviation Administration ordered an indefinite ground stop for all air traffic in U.S. airspace, preventing any further aircraft departures until September 13 and requiring all airborne aircraft to return to their point of origin or divert to Canada. The actions undertaken in Canada to support incoming aircraft and their occupants were collectively titled Operation Yellow Ribbon.

That evening, the Central Intelligence Agency informed President George W. Bush that its Counterterrorism Center had identified the attacks as having been the work of al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden. The United States responded by launching the war on terror and invading Afghanistan to depose the Taliban, which rejected U.S. terms to expel al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and extradite its leaders. NATO's invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—its only usage to date—called upon allies to fight al-Qaeda. As U.S. and allied invasion forces swept through Afghanistan, bin Laden eluded them. He denied any involvement until 2004, when excerpts of a taped statement in which he accepted responsibility for the attacks were released. Al-Qaeda's cited motivations included U.S. support of Israel, the presence of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia and sanctions against Iraq. The nearly decade-long manhunt for bin Laden concluded in May 2011, when he was killed during a U.S. military raid on his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The war in Afghanistan continued for another eight years until the agreement was made in February 2020 for American and NATO troops to withdraw from the country.

The attacks killed 2,977 people, injured thousands more[j] and gave rise to substantial long-term health consequences while also causing at least US$10 billion in infrastructure and property damage. It remains the deadliest terrorist attack in history, as well as the deadliest incident for firefighters and law enforcement personnel in American history, killing 343 and 72 members, respectively. The crashes of Flight 11 and Flight 175 were the deadliest aviation disasters of all time, and the collision of Flight 77 with the Pentagon resulted in the fourth-highest number of ground fatalities in a plane crash in history. The destruction of the World Trade Center and its environs, located in Manhattan's Financial District, seriously harmed the U.S. economy and induced global market shocks. Many other countries strengthened anti-terrorism legislation and expanded their powers of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The total number of deaths caused by the attacks, combined with the death tolls from the conflicts they directly incited, has been estimated by the Costs of War Project to be over 4.5 million.[16]

Cleanup of the World Trade Center site (colloquially "Ground Zero") was completed in May 2002, while the Pentagon was repaired within a year. After delays in the design of a replacement complex, six new buildings were planned to replace the lost towers, along with a museum and memorial dedicated to those who were killed or injured in the attacks. The tallest building, One World Trade Center, began construction in 2006, opening in 2014. Memorials to the attacks include the National September 11 Memorial & Museum in New York City, the Pentagon Memorial in Arlington County, Virginia, and the Flight 93 National Memorial at the Pennsylvania crash site.

Background

[edit]

In 1996, Osama bin Laden of the Islamist militant organization al-Qaeda issued his first fatwā, which declared war against the United States and demanded the expulsion of all American soldiers from the Arabian Peninsula.[17] In a second 1998 fatwā, bin Laden outlined his objections to American foreign policy with respect to Israel, as well as the continued presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War.[18] Bin Laden maintained that Muslims are obliged to attack American targets until the aggressive policies of the U.S. against Muslims were reversed.[18][19]

The Hamburg cell in Germany included Islamists who eventually came to be key operatives in the 9/11 attacks.[20] Mohamed Atta; Marwan al-Shehhi; Ziad Jarrah; Ramzi bin al-Shibh; and Said Bahaji were all members of al-Qaeda's Hamburg cell.[21] Bin Laden asserted that all Muslims must wage a defensive war against the United States and combat American aggression. He further argued that military strikes against American assets would send a message to the American people, attempting to force the U.S. to re-evaluate its support to Israel, and other aggressive policies.[22] In a 1998 interview with American journalist John Miller, bin Laden stated:

We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets in this fatwa. American history does not distinguish between civilians and military, not even women and children. They are the ones who used bombs against Nagasaki. Can these bombs distinguish between infants and military? America does not have a religion that will prevent it from destroying all people. So we tell the Americans as people and we tell the mothers of soldiers and American mothers in general that if they value their lives and the lives of their children, to find a nationalistic government that will look after their interests and not the interests of the Jews. The continuation of tyranny will bring the fight to America, as [the 1993 World Trade Center bomber] Ramzi [Yousef] yourself and others did. This is my message to the American people: to look for a serious government that looks out for their interests and does not attack others, their lands, or their honor. My word to American journalists is not to ask why we did that but to ask what their government has done that forced us to defend ourselves.

— Osama bin Laden, in his interview with John Miller, May 1998, [23]

Osama bin Laden

[edit]
Osama bin Laden, c. 1997 or 1998

Bin Laden orchestrated the September 11 attacks. He initially denied involvement, but later recanted his denial.[24][25][26] Al Jazeera broadcast a statement by him on September 16, 2001: "I stress that I have not carried out this act, which appears to have been carried out by individuals with their own motivation".[27] In November 2001, U.S. forces recovered a videotape in which bin Laden, talking to Khaled al-Harbi, admitted foreknowledge of the attacks.[28] On December 27, a second video of bin Laden was released in which he, stopping short of admitting responsibility for the attacks, said:[29]

It has become clear that the West in general and America in particular have an unspeakable hatred for Islam. ... It is the hatred of crusaders. Terrorism against America deserves to be praised because it was a response to injustice, aimed at forcing America to stop its support for Israel, which kills our people. ... We say that the end of the United States is imminent, whether Bin Laden or his followers are alive or dead, for the awakening of the Muslim ummah [nation] has occurred. ... It is important to hit the economy (of the United States), which is the base of its military power...If the economy is hit they will become reoccupied.

— Osama bin Laden

Shortly before the 2004 U.S. presidential election, bin Laden used a taped statement to publicly acknowledge al-Qaeda's involvement in the attacks.[24] He admitted his direct link to the attacks and said they were carried out because:

The events that affected my soul in a direct way started in 1982 when America permitted the Israelis to invade Lebanon and the American Sixth Fleet helped them in that. This bombardment began and many were killed and injured and others were terrorised and displaced.

I couldn't forget those moving scenes, blood and severed limbs, women and children sprawled everywhere. Houses were destroyed along with their occupants, high rises demolished over their residents, rockets raining down on our home without mercy...As I looked at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered my mind that we should punish the oppressor in kind and that we should destroy towers in America so that they taste some of what we tasted and so that they be deterred from killing our women and children.

And that day, it was confirmed to me that oppression and the intentional killing of innocent women and children is a deliberate American policy. Destruction is freedom and democracy, while resistance is terrorism and intolerance.[30]

Bin Laden personally directed his followers to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.[31][32] Another video obtained by Al Jazeera in September 2006 showed bin Laden with one of the attacks' chief planners, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, as well as hijackers, Hamza al-Ghamdi and Wail al-Shehri, amidst making preparations for the attacks.[33]

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and other al-Qaeda members

[edit]
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed after his 2003 capture in Rawalpindi, Pakistan

Journalist Yosri Fouda of the Arabic television channel Al Jazeera reported that in April 2002, al-Qaeda member Khalid Sheikh Mohammed admitted his involvement in the attacks, along with Ramzi bin al-Shibh.[34][35][36] The 2004 9/11 Commission Report determined that the animosity which Mohammed, the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks, felt towards the United States had stemmed from his "violent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel".[37] Mohammed was also an adviser and financier of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the uncle of Ramzi Yousef, the lead bomber in that attack.[38][39] In late 1994, Mohammed and Yousef moved on to plan a new terrorist attack called the Bojinka plot planned for January 1995. Despite a failure and Yousef's capture by U.S. forces the following month, the Bojinka plot would influence the later 9/11 attacks.[40]

In "Substitution for Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed" from the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, five people are identified as having been completely aware of the operation's details. They are bin Laden, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abu Turab al-Urduni and Mohammed Atef.[41]

Motives

[edit]

Osama bin Laden's declaration of a holy war against the United States, and a 1998 fatwā signed by bin Laden and others that called for the killing of Americans,[18][42] are seen by investigators as evidence of his motivation.[43] In November 2001, bin Laden defended the attacks as retaliatory strikes against American atrocities against Muslims across the world. He also maintained that the attacks were not directed against women and children, asserting that the targets of the strikes were symbols of America's "economic and military power".[44][45]

In bin Laden's November 2002 Letter to the American People, he identified al-Qaeda's motives for the attacks:

After the attacks, bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri released additional recordings, some of which repeated the above reasons. Two relevant publications were bin Laden's 2002 Letter to the American People[56] and a 2004 videotape by bin Laden.[57]

[...] those young men, for whom God has cleared the way, didn't set out to kill children, but rather attacked the biggest centre of military power in the world, the Pentagon, which contains more than 64,000 workers, a military base which has a big concentration of army and intelligence ... As for the World Trade Center, the ones who were attacked and who died in it were part of a financial power. It wasn't a children's school! Neither was it a residence. The consensus is that most of the people who were in the towers were men who backed the biggest financial force in the world, which spreads mischief throughout the world.

— Osama Bin Laden's interview with Tayseer Allouni, October 21, 2001[58]

As an adherent of Islam, bin Laden believed that non-Muslims are forbidden from having a permanent presence in the Arabian Peninsula.[59] In 1996, bin Laden issued a fatwā calling for American troops to leave Saudi Arabia. One analysis of suicide terrorism suggested that without U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, al-Qaeda likely would not have been able to get people to commit to suicide missions.[60] In the 1998 fatwa, al-Qaeda identified the Iraq sanctions as a reason to kill Americans, condemning the "protracted blockade" among other actions that constitute a declaration of war against "Allah, his messenger, and Muslims".[61]

In 2004, bin Laden claimed that the idea of destroying the towers had first occurred to him in 1982 when he witnessed Israel's bombardment of high-rise apartment buildings during the 1982 Lebanon War.[62][63] Some analysts, including political scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, also claimed that U.S. support of Israel was a motive for the attacks.[47][64] In 2004 and 2010, bin Laden again connected the September 11 attacks with U.S. support of Israel, although most of the letters expressed bin Laden's disdain for President Bush and bin Laden's hope to "destroy and bankrupt" the U.S.[65][66]

Other motives have been suggested in addition to those stated by bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Some authors suggested the "humiliation" that resulted from the Islamic world falling behind the Western world—this discrepancy was rendered especially visible by globalization[67][68] and a desire to provoke the U.S. into a broader war against the Islamic world in the hope of motivating more allies to support al-Qaeda. Similarly, others have argued the 9/11 attacks were a strategic move to provoke America into a war that would incite a pan-Islamic revolution.[69][70]

Planning

[edit]
Map of the attacks on the World Trade Center
Diagram of the World Trade Center attacks

Documents seized during the 2011 operation that killed bin Laden included notes handwritten by bin Laden in September 2002 with the heading "The Birth of the Idea of September 11". He describes how he was inspired by the crash of EgyptAir Flight 990 in October 1999, which was deliberately crashed by co-pilot Gameel Al-Batouti, killing over 200 passengers. "This is how the idea of 9/11 was conceived and developed in my head, and that is when we began the planning" bin Laden continued, adding that no one but Mohammed Atef and Abu al-Khair knew about it at the time. The 9/11 Commission Report identified Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the architect of 9/11, but he is not mentioned in bin Laden's notes.[71]

The attacks were conceived by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who first presented it to Osama bin Laden in 1996.[72] At that time, bin Laden and al-Qaeda were in a period of transition, having just relocated back to Afghanistan from Sudan.[73] The 1998 African embassy bombings and bin Laden's February 1998 fatwā marked a turning point of al-Qaeda's terrorist operation,[74] as bin Laden became intent on attacking the United States.

In late 1998 or early 1999, bin Laden approved Mohammed to go forward with organizing the plot.[75] Atef provided operational support, including target selections and helping arrange travel for the hijackers.[73] Bin Laden overruled Mohammed, rejecting potential targets such as the U.S. Bank Tower in Los Angeles for lack of time.[76][77]

Bin Laden provided leadership and financial support and was involved in selecting participants.[78] He initially selected Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, both experienced jihadists who had fought in the Bosnian war. Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar arrived in the United States in mid-January 2000. In early 2000, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar took flying lessons in San Diego, California. Both spoke little English, performed poorly in flying lessons, and eventually served as secondary "muscle" hijackers.[79][80]

In late 1999, a group of men from Hamburg, Germany, arrived in Afghanistan. The group included Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh.[81] Bin Laden selected these men because they were educated, could speak English, and had experience living in the West.[82] New recruits were routinely screened for special skills and al-Qaeda leaders consequently discovered that Hani Hanjour already had a commercial pilot's license.[83]

Hanjour arrived in San Diego on December 8, 2000, joining Hazmi.[84]: 6–7  They soon left for Arizona, where Hanjour took refresher training.[84]: 7  Marwan al-Shehhi arrived at the end of May 2000, while Atta arrived on June 3, 2000, and Jarrah arrived on June 27, 2000.[84]: 6  Bin al-Shibh applied several times for a visa to the United States, but as a Yemeni, he was rejected out of concerns he would overstay his visa.[84]: 4, 14  Bin al-Shibh stayed in Hamburg, providing coordination between Atta and Mohammed.[84]: 16  The three Hamburg cell members all took pilot training in South Florida at Huffman Aviation.[84]: 6 

In the spring of 2001, the secondary hijackers began arriving in the United States.[85] In July 2001, Atta met with bin al-Shibh in Tarragona, Catalonia, Spain, where they coordinated details of the plot, including final target selection. Bin al-Shibh passed along bin Laden's wish for the attacks to be carried out as soon as possible.[86] Some of the hijackers received passports from corrupt Saudi officials who were family members or used fraudulent passports to gain entry.[87]

Prior intelligence

[edit]

In late 1999, al-Qaeda associate Walid bin Attash ("Khallad") contacted al-Mihdhar and told him to meet in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; al-Hazmi and Abu Bara al Yemeni would also be in attendance. The NSA intercepted a telephone call mentioning the meeting, al-Mihdhar, and the name "Nawaf" (al-Hazmi); while the agency feared "Something nefarious might be afoot", it took no further action.

The CIA had already been alerted by Saudi intelligence about al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi being al-Qaeda members. A CIA team broke into al-Mihdhar's Dubai hotel room and discovered that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa. While Alec Station alerted intelligence agencies worldwide, it did not share this information with the FBI. The Malaysian Special Branch observed the January 5, 2000, meeting of the two al-Qaeda members and informed the CIA that al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi, and Khallad were flying to Bangkok, but the CIA never notified other agencies of this, nor did it ask the State Department to put al-Mihdhar on its watchlist. An FBI liaison asked permission to inform the FBI of the meeting but was told: "This is not a matter for the FBI".[88]

By late June, senior counter-terrorism official Richard Clarke and CIA director George Tenet were "convinced that a major series of attacks was about to come", although the CIA believed the attacks would likely occur in Saudi Arabia or Israel.[89] In early July, Clarke put domestic agencies on "full alert", telling them, "Something spectacular is going to happen here, and it's going to happen soon". He asked the FBI and the State Department to alert the embassies and police departments, and the Defense Department to go to "Threat Condition Delta".[90][91] Clarke later wrote:

Somewhere in CIA there was information that two known al Qaeda terrorists had come into the United States. Somewhere in the FBI, there was information that strange things had been going on at flight schools in the United States. [...] They had specific information about individual terrorists from which one could have deduced what was about to happen. None of that information got to me or the White House.[92]

[...] by July [2001], with word spreading of a coming attack, a schism emerged among the senior leadership of al Qaeda. Several senior members reportedly agreed with Mullah Omar. Those who reportedly sided with bin Ladin included Atef, Sulayman Abu Ghayth, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. But those said to have opposed him were weighty figures in the organization-including Abu Hafs the Mauritanian, Sheikh Saeed al Masri, and Sayf al Adl. One senior al Qaeda operative claims to recall Bin Ladin arguing that attacks against the United States needed to be carried out immediately to support insurgency in the Israeli-occupied territories and protest the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.

On July 13, Tom Wilshire, a CIA agent assigned to the FBI's international terrorism division, emailed his superiors at the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) requesting permission to inform the FBI that Hazmi was in the country and that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa. The CIA never responded.[94]

The same day, Margarette Gillespie, an FBI analyst working in the CTC, was told to review material about the Malaysia meeting. She was not told of the participant's presence in the U.S. The CIA gave Gillespie surveillance photos of Mihdhar and Hazmi from the meeting to show to FBI counterterrorism but did not tell her their significance. The Intelink database informed her not to share intelligence material with criminal investigators. When shown the photos, the FBI refused more details on their significance, and they were not given Mihdhar's date of birth or passport number.[95] In late August 2001, Gillespie told the INS, the State Department, the Customs Service, and the FBI to put Hazmi and Mihdhar on their watchlists, but the FBI was prohibited from using criminal agents in searching for the duo, hindering their efforts.[96]

Also in July, a Phoenix-based FBI agent sent a message to FBI headquarters, Alec Station, and FBI agents in New York alerting them to "the possibility of a coordinated effort by Osama bin Laden to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation universities and colleges". The agent, Kenneth Williams, suggested the need to interview flight school managers and identify all Arab students seeking flight training.[97] In July, Jordan alerted the U.S. that al-Qaeda was planning an attack on the U.S.; "months later", Jordan notified the U.S. that the attack's codename was "The Big Wedding" and that it involved airplanes.[98]

On August 6, 2001, the CIA's Presidential Daily Brief, designated "For the President Only", was entitled Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US. The memo noted that FBI information "indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks".[99]

In mid-August, one Minnesota flight school alerted the FBI about Zacarias Moussaoui, who had asked "suspicious questions". The FBI found that Moussaoui was a radical who had traveled to Pakistan, and the INS arrested him for overstaying his French visa. Their request to search his laptop was denied by FBI headquarters due to the lack of probable cause.[100]

The failures in intelligence-sharing were attributed to 1995 Justice Department policies limiting intelligence-sharing, combined with CIA and NSA reluctance to reveal "sensitive sources and methods" such as tapped phones.[101] Testifying before the 9/11 Commission in April 2004, then—Attorney General John Ashcroft recalled that the "single greatest structural cause for the September 11th problem was the wall that segregated or separated criminal investigators and intelligence agents".[102] Clarke also wrote: "[T]here were ... failures to get information to the right place at the right time".[103]

Attacks

[edit]

Early on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, nineteen hijackers took control of four commercial airliners (two Boeing 757s and two Boeing 767s).[104] Large planes with long flights were selected for hijacking because they would have more fuel.[105]

Key information about the four flights
Operator Flight number Aircraft type Time of departure* Time of crash* Departed from En route to Crash site Fatalities
Crew Passengers Ground§ Hijackers Total
American Airlines 11 Boeing 767-223(ER)[k] 7:59 a.m. 8:46 a.m. Logan International Airport Los Angeles International Airport North Tower of the World Trade Center, floors 93 to 99 11 76 2,606 5 2,763
United Airlines 175 Boeing 767–222[l] 8:14 a.m. 9:03 a.m.[h] Logan International Airport Los Angeles International Airport South Tower of the World Trade Center, floors 77 to 85 9 51 5
American Airlines 77 Boeing 757–223[m] 8:20 a.m. 9:37 a.m. Washington Dulles International Airport Los Angeles International Airport West wall of Pentagon 6 53 125 5 189
United Airlines 93 Boeing 757–222[n] 8:42 a.m. 10:03 a.m. Newark International Airport San Francisco International Airport Field in Stonycreek Township near Shanksville 7 33 0 4 44
Totals 33 213 2,731 19 2,996

* Eastern Daylight Time (UTC−04:00)
Excluding hijackers
§ Including emergency workers
Including hijackers

Crashes

[edit]
Security camera footage of American Airlines Flight 77 crashing into the Pentagon (the third attack);[106] the plane collides with the Pentagon approximately 86 seconds after the start of the recording.

At 7:59 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 took off from Logan International Airport in Boston.[107] Fifteen minutes into the flight, five hijackers armed with boxcutters took over the plane, injuring at least three people (and possibly killing one)[108][109][110] before forcing their way into the cockpit. The terrorists also displayed an apparent explosive and sprayed mace into the cabin, to frighten the hostages into submission and further hinder resistance.[111] Back at Logan, United Airlines Flight 175 took off at 8:14 a.m.[112] Hundreds of miles southwest at Dulles International Airport, American Airlines Flight 77 left the runway at 8:20 a.m.[112] Flight 175's journey proceeded normally for 28 minutes until 8:42 am, when a group of five hijacked the plane, murdering both pilots and stabbing several crew members before assuming control of the aircraft. These hijackers also used bomb threats to instill fear into the passengers and crew,[113] also spraying "tear gas, pepper spray or another irritant" in the cabin to force passengers and flight attendants to the rear of the cabin.[114] Concurrently, United Airlines Flight 93 departed from Newark International Airport in New Jersey;[112] originally scheduled to pull away from the gate at 8:00 a.m., the plane was running 42 minutes late.

At 8:46 a.m., Flight 11 was deliberately crashed into the north face of the World Trade Center's North Tower between the 93rd and 99th floors.[115] The initial presumption by many was that it was an accident.[116] At 8:51 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 was also taken over by five hijackers who forcibly entered the cockpit 31 minutes after take-off.[117] Although they were equipped with knives,[118] there were no reports of anyone on board being stabbed, nor did the two people who made phone calls mention the use of mace or a bomb threat. Flight 175 was flown into the South Tower's southern facade (2 WTC) between the 77th and 85th floors[119] at 9:03 a.m.,[h] demonstrating that the first crash was a deliberate act of terrorism.[120][121]

Four men aboard Flight 93 struck suddenly, killing at least one passenger, after having waited 46 minutes—a holdup that proved disastrous for the terrorists when combined with the delayed takeoff.[122] They stormed the cockpit and seized control of the plane at 9:28 a.m., turning the plane eastbound towards Washington, D.C.[123] Much like their counterparts on the first two flights, the fourth team used bomb threats and filled the cabin with mace.[124]

Nine minutes after Flight 93 was hijacked, Flight 77 crashed into the west side of the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m.[125] Because of the two delays,[126] the passengers and crew of Flight 93 had time to learn of the previous attacks through phone calls to the ground, and, as a result, an uprising was hastily organized to take control of the aircraft at 9:57 a.m.[127] Within minutes, passengers had fought their way to the front of the cabin and began breaking down the cockpit door. Fearing their captives would gain the upper hand, the hijackers rolled the plane and pitched it into a nosedive,[128][129] crashing into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, southeast of Pittsburgh, at 10:03:11 a.m. The plane was about twenty minutes away from reaching D.C. at the time of the crash, and its target is believed to have been either the Capitol Building or the White House.[105][127]

Some passengers and crew who called from the aircraft using the cabin air phone service and mobile phones provided details: several hijackers were aboard each plane; they used mace, tear gas, or pepper spray to overcome attendants; and some people aboard had been stabbed.[130] Reports indicated hijackers stabbed and killed pilots, flight attendants, and one or more passengers.[104][131] According to the 9/11 Commission's final report, the hijackers had recently purchased multi-function hand tools and assorted Leatherman-type utility knives with locking blades (which were not forbidden to passengers at the time), but these were not found among the possessions left behind by the hijackers.[132][133] A flight attendant on Flight 11, a passenger on Flight 175, and passengers on Flight 93 said the hijackers had bombs, but one of the passengers said he thought the bombs were fake. The FBI found no traces of explosives at the crash sites, and the 9/11 Commission concluded that the bombs were probably fake.[104] On at least two of the hijacked flights—American 11 and United 93—the terrorists claimed over the PA system that they were taking hostages and were returning to the airport to have a ransom demand met, a clear attempt to prevent passengers from fighting back. Both attempts failed, however, as both hijacker pilots in these instances (Mohamed Atta[134] and Ziad Jarrah,[135] respectively) mistakenly transmitted their messages to ATC instead of the people on the plane as intended, tipping off the flight controllers that the planes had been hijacked.

Image taken from the ISS showing the extent of the smoke plume

Three buildings in the World Trade Center collapsed due to fire-induced structural failure. Although the South Tower was struck around seventeen minutes after the North Tower, the plane's impact zone was far lower, at a much faster speed, and into a corner, with the unevenly-balanced additional structural weight causing it to collapse first at 9:59 a.m.,[136]: 80 [137]: 322  having burned for exactly 56 minutes[o] in the fire caused by the crash of United Airlines Flight 175 and the explosion of its fuel. The North Tower lasted another 29 minutes and 24 seconds before collapsing at 10:28: a.m.,[p] one hour, forty-one minutes, and fifty-three seconds[i] after being struck by American Airlines Flight 11. When the North Tower collapsed, debris fell on the nearby 7 World Trade Center building (7 WTC), damaging the building and starting fires. These fires burned for nearly seven hours, compromising the building's structural integrity, and 7 WTC collapsed at 5:21 p.m.[140][141] The west side of the Pentagon sustained significant damage.

At 9:42 a.m., the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded all civilian aircraft within the continental U.S., and civilian aircraft already in flight were told to land immediately.[142] All international civilian aircraft were either turned back or redirected to airports in Canada or Mexico, and were banned from landing on United States territory for three days.[143] The attacks created widespread confusion among news organizations and air traffic controllers. Among unconfirmed and often contradictory news reports aired throughout the day, one of the most prevalent claimed a car bomb had been detonated at the U.S. State Department's headquarters in Washington, D.C.[144] Another jet (Delta Air Lines Flight 1989) was suspected of having been hijacked, but the aircraft responded to controllers and landed safely in Cleveland, Ohio.[145]

In an April 2002 interview, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who are believed to have organized the attacks, said Flight 93's intended target was the United States Capitol, not the White House.[146] During the planning stage of the attacks, Mohamed Atta (Flight 11's hijacker and pilot) thought the White House might be too tough a target and sought an assessment from Hani Hanjour (who hijacked and piloted Flight 77).[147] Mohammed said al-Qaeda initially planned to target nuclear installations rather than the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, but decided against it, fearing things could "get out of control".[148] Final decisions on targets, according to Mohammed, were left in the hands of the pilots.[147] If any pilot could not reach his intended target, he was to crash the plane.[105]

Casualties

[edit]

The attack on the World Trade Center's North Tower alone[q] made 9/11 the deadliest act of terrorism in history.[150] Taken together, the four crashes killed 2,996 people (including the hijackers) and injured thousands more.[151] The death toll included 265 on the four planes (from which there were no survivors); 2,606 in the World Trade Center and the surrounding area; and 125 at the Pentagon.[152][153] Most who died were civilians, as well as 343 firefighters, 72 law enforcement officers, 55 military personnel, and the 19 terrorists.[154][155] More than 90 countries lost citizens in the attacks.[156]

In New York City, more than 90% of those who died in the towers had been at or above the points of impact. In the North Tower, between 1,344[157] and 1,402 people were at, above or one floor below the point of impact and all died. Hundreds were killed instantly when the plane struck.[158] The estimated 800 people[159] who survived the impact were trapped and died in the fires or from smoke inhalation, fell or jumped from the tower to escape the smoke and flames, or were killed in the building's collapse. The destruction of all three staircases in the North Tower when Flight 11 hit made it impossible for anyone from the impact zone upward to escape. 107 people not trapped by the impact died.[160] When Flight 11 struck between floors 93 and 99, the 92nd floor was rendered inescapable: the crash severed all elevator shafts while falling debris blocked the stairwells, ensuring the deaths of all 69 workers on the floor.

In the South Tower, around 600 people were on or above the 77th floor when Flight 175 struck; few survived. As with the North Tower, hundreds were killed at the moment of impact. Unlike those in the North Tower, the estimated 300 survivors[159] of the crash were not technically trapped, but most were either unaware that a means of escape still existed or were unable to use it. One stairway, Stairwell A, narrowly avoided being destroyed, allowing 14 people located on the floors of impact (including Stanley Praimnath, a man who saw the plane coming at him) and four more from the floors above to escape. New York City 9-1-1 operators who received calls from people inside the tower were not well informed of the situation as it rapidly unfolded and as a result, told callers not to descend the tower on their own.[161] In total, 630 people died in the South Tower, fewer than half the number killed in the North Tower.[160] Of the 100–200 people witnessed jumping or falling to their deaths,[162] only three recorded sightings were from the South Tower.[136]: 86  Casualties in the South Tower were significantly reduced because some occupants decided to leave the building immediately following the first crash, and because Eric Eisenberg, an executive at AON Insurance, decided to evacuate the floors occupied by AON (92 and 98–105) following the impact of Flight 11. The 17-minute gap allowed over 900 of the 1,100 AON employees present to evacuate from above the 77th floor before the South Tower was struck; Eisenberg was among the nearly 200 who did not escape. Similar pre-impact evacuations were carried out by Fiduciary Trust, CSC, and Euro Brokers, all of whom had offices on floors above the point of impact. The failure to order a full evacuation of the South Tower after the first plane crash into the North Tower was described by USA Today as "one of the day's great tragedies".[163]

As exemplified in the photograph The Falling Man, more than 200 people fell to their deaths from the burning towers, most of whom were forced to jump to escape the extreme heat, fire and smoke.[164] Some occupants of each tower above the point of impact made their way toward the roof in the hope of helicopter rescue, but the roof access doors were locked.[165] No plan existed for helicopter rescues, and the combination of roof equipment, thick smoke and intense heat prevented helicopters from approaching.[166]

At the World Trade Center complex, 414 emergency workers died as they tried to rescue people and fight fires, while another law enforcement officer was killed when United 93 crashed. 343 firefighters of the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) died, including a chaplain and two paramedics.[167][168][169] 23 officers of New York City Police Department (NYPD) died.[170] 37 officers of the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) had died.[171] Eight emergency medical technicians and paramedics from private emergency medical services units were killed.[172] Almost all of the emergency personnel who died at the scene were killed as a result of the towers collapsing, with the exception of one who was struck by a civilian falling from the South Tower.[173]

658 employees from Cantor Fitzgerald L.P., an investment bank on the North Tower's 101st–105th floors, died, considerably more than any other employer.[174] 358 employees from Marsh Inc., located immediately below Cantor Fitzgerald on floors 93–100, died,[175][176] and 176 employees from Aon Corporation died.[177] The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) estimated that about 17,400 civilians were in the World Trade Center complex at the time of the attacks.[178]: xxxiii  Turnstile counts from the Port Authority suggest 14,154 people were typically in the Twin Towers by 8:45 a.m.[179] Most people below the impact zone safely evacuated.[180]

In Arlington County, Virginia, 125 Pentagon workers died when Flight 77 crashed into the building's western side. Seventy were civilians and 55 were military personnel, many of whom worked for the United States Army or the United States Navy. 47 civilian employees, six civilian contractors, and 22 soldiers working for the Army died, while six civilian employees, three civilian contractors, and 33 sailors working for the Navy died. Seven Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) civilian employees and one Office of the Secretary of Defense contractor died.[181][182][183] Timothy Maude, a Lieutenant General and Army Deputy Chief of Staff, was the highest-ranking military official killed at the Pentagon.[184]

Weeks after the attack, the death toll was estimated to be over 6,000, more than twice the number of deaths eventually confirmed.[185] The city was only able to identify remains for about 1,600 of the World Trade Center victims. The medical examiner's office collected "about 10,000 unidentified bone and tissue fragments that cannot be matched to the list of the dead".[186] Bone fragments were still being found in 2006 by workers who were preparing to demolish the damaged Deutsche Bank Building.[187]

In 2010, a team of anthropologists and archaeologists searched for human remains and personal items at the Fresh Kills Landfill, where 72 more human remains were recovered, bringing the total found to 1,845. As of 2011, DNA profiling was ongoing in an attempt to identify additional victims.[188][189][190] In 2014, three coffin-size cases carrying 7,930 unidentified remains were transferred to a medical examiner's repository located at the same site as the National September 11 Memorial & Museum.[191] Victims' families are permitted to visit a private "reflection room" which is closed to the public. The choice to place the remains in an underground area attached to a museum has been controversial; families of some victims have attempted to have the remains instead interred in a separate, above-ground monument.[192]

In August 2017, the 1,641st victim was identified as a result of newly available DNA technology,[193] and a 1,642nd during July 2018.[194] Three more victims were identified in October 2019,[195] two in September 2021[196] and an additional two in September 2023.[197] As of 2025, 1,103 victims remain unidentified, amounting to 40% of the deaths in the World Trade Center attacks.[198] On September 25, 2023, the FDNY reported that the department had now lost the same number of members to 9/11-related illnesses as it did on the day of the attacks.[199][200]

Damage

[edit]
The World Trade Center site, called Ground Zero, with an overlay showing the locations of the original buildings

The Twin Towers, Marriott World Trade Center (3 WTC), 7 WTC, and St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church were destroyed.[201] The U.S. Customs House (6 World Trade Center), 4 World Trade Center, 5 World Trade Center, and both pedestrian bridges connecting buildings were severely damaged. All surrounding streets were in ruins.[202] The last fires at the World Trade Center site were extinguished on December 20.[203]

The Deutsche Bank Building was damaged and was later condemned as uninhabitable because of toxic conditions; it was deconstructed starting in 2007.[204][205][206][207] Buildings of the World Financial Center were damaged.[204] The Borough of Manhattan Community College's Fiterman Hall was condemned due to extensive damage, and then reopened in 2012.[208]

Other neighboring buildings (including 90 West Street and the Verizon Building) suffered major damage but have been restored.[209] World Financial Center buildings, One Liberty Plaza, the Millennium Hilton, and 90 Church Street had moderate damage and have been restored.[210] Communications equipment on top of the North Tower was also destroyed, with only WCBS-TV maintaining a backup transmitter on the Empire State Building, but media stations were quickly able to reroute the signals and resume their broadcasts.[201][211]

A September 14 aerial view of the Pentagon during cleanup operations

The PATH train system's World Trade Center station was located under the complex and was demolished when the towers collapsed. The tunnels leading to Exchange Place station in Jersey City were flooded with water.[212] The station was rebuilt as the $4 billion World Trade Center Transportation Hub, which reopened in March 2015.[213][214] The Cortlandt Street station on the New York City Subway's IRT Broadway–Seventh Avenue Line was also in close proximity to the World Trade Center complex, and the entire station, along with the surrounding track, was reduced to rubble.[215] The station was rebuilt and reopened to the public on September 8, 2018.[216]

The Pentagon was extensively damaged, causing one section of the building to collapse.[217] As the Flight 77 approached the Pentagon, its wings knocked down light poles and its right engine hit a power generator before crashing into the western side of the building.[218][219] The plane hit the Pentagon at the first-floor level. The front part of the fuselage disintegrated on impact;[220] debris from the tail section penetrated the furthest into the building, breaking through 310 feet (94 m) of the three outermost of the building's five rings.[220][221]

Rescue efforts

[edit]
Patrol Boat Hocking of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on its way to assist the site on September 11

The New York City Fire Department (FDNY) deployed more than 200 units (approximately half of the department) to the World Trade Center.[222] Their efforts were supplemented by off-duty firefighters and emergency medical technicians.[223][222][224] The New York City Police Department (NYPD) sent its Emergency Service Units and other police personnel and deployed its aviation unit,[225] which determined that helicopter rescues from the towers were not feasible.[226] Numerous police officers of the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) also participated in rescue efforts.[227] Once on the scene, the FDNY, the NYPD, and the PAPD did not coordinate efforts and performed redundant searches for civilians.[223][228]

As conditions deteriorated, the NYPD aviation unit relayed information to police commanders, who issued orders for personnel to evacuate the towers; most NYPD officers were able to evacuate before the buildings collapsed.[228][229] With separate command posts set up and incompatible radio communications between the agencies, warnings were not passed along to FDNY commanders.[230]

After the first tower collapsed, FDNY commanders issued evacuation warnings. Due to malfunctioning radio repeater systems, many firefighters never heard the evacuation orders. 9-1-1 dispatchers also received information from callers that was not passed along to commanders on the scene.[222]

Reactions

[edit]

The 9/11 attacks resulted in immediate responses, including domestic reactions; closings and cancellations; hate crimes; international responses; and military responses. Shortly after the attacks, the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund was created by an Act of Congress.[231][232] The purpose of the fund was to compensate the victims of the attacks and their families with their agreement not to file lawsuits against the airlines involved.[233] Legislation authorizes the fund to disburse a maximum of $7.375 billion, including operational and administrative costs, of U.S. government funds.[234] The fund was set to expire by 2020 but was in 2019 prolonged to allow claims to be filed until October 2090.[235][236]

Immediate response

[edit]
President George W. Bush is briefed in Sarasota, Florida, where he learned of the attacks unfolding while visiting Emma E. Booker Elementary School
Eight hours after the attacks, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declares "The Pentagon is functioning"

At 8:32 a.m., FAA officials were notified Flight 11 had been hijacked and they, in turn, notified the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD scrambled two F-15s from Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts; they were airborne by 8:53 a.m. Because of slow and confused communication from FAA officials, NORAD had nine minutes' notice, and no notice about any of the other flights before they crashed.

After both of the Twin Towers had been hit, more fighters were scrambled from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia at 9:30 a.m.[237] At 10:20 am, Vice President Dick Cheney issued orders to shoot down any commercial aircraft that could be positively identified as being hijacked. These instructions were not relayed in time for the fighters to take action.[237][238][239] Some fighters took to the air without live ammunition, knowing that to prevent the hijackers from striking their intended targets, the pilots might have to intercept and crash their fighters into the hijacked planes, possibly ejecting at the last moment.[240]

For the first time in U.S. history, the emergency preparedness plan Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids (SCATANA) was invoked,[241] stranding tens of thousands of passengers across the world.[242] Ben Sliney, in his first day as the National Operations Manager of the FAA,[243] ordered that American airspace be closed to all international flights, causing about 500 flights to be turned back or redirected to other countries. Canada received 226 of the diverted flights and launched Operation Yellow Ribbon to deal with the large numbers of grounded planes and stranded passengers.[244]

The 9/11 attacks had immediate effects on the American people.[245] Police and rescue workers from around the country traveled to New York City to help recover bodies from the remnants of the Twin Towers.[246] Over 3,000 children lost a parent in the attacks.[247] Blood donations across the U.S. surged in the weeks after 9/11.[248][249]

Domestic reactions

[edit]
President Bush addressing the nation from the White House at 8:30 pm ET
Bush speaking to rescue workers at Ground Zero on September 14 next to firefighter Bob Beckwith
During a speech to a joint session of Congress, President George W. Bush pledges "to defend freedom against terrorism". September 20, 2001 (audio only).

Following the attacks, Bush's approval rating increased to 90%.[250] On September 20, he addressed the nation and a joint session of Congress regarding the events, the rescue and recovery efforts, and his intended response to the attacks. New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani's highly visible role resulted in praise in New York and nationally.[251]

Many relief funds were immediately set up to provide financial assistance to the survivors of the attacks and the victims' families. By the deadline for victims' compensation on September 11, 2003, 2,833 applications had been received from the families of those killed.[252]

Contingency plans for the continuity of government and the evacuation of leaders were implemented soon after the attacks.[242] Congress was not told that the United States had been under a continuity of government status until February 2002.[253]

In the largest restructuring of the U.S. government in contemporary history, the United States enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002, creating the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Congress also passed the USA PATRIOT Act, saying it would help detect and prosecute terrorism and other crimes.[254] Civil liberties groups have criticized the PATRIOT Act, saying it allows law enforcement to invade citizens' privacy and that it eliminates judicial oversight of law enforcement and domestic intelligence.[255][256][257]

To effectively combat future acts of terrorism, the National Security Agency (NSA) was given broad powers. The NSA commenced warrantless surveillance of telecommunications, which was sometimes criticized as permitting the agency "to eavesdrop on telephone and e-mail communications between the United States and people overseas without a warrant".[258] In response to requests by intelligence agencies, the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court permitted an expansion of powers by the U.S. government in seeking, obtaining, and sharing information on U.S. citizens as well as non-Americans around the world.[259]

Hate crimes

[edit]

Six days after the attacks, President Bush made a public appearance at Washington, D.C.'s largest Islamic Center where he acknowledged the "incredibly valuable contribution" of American Muslims and called for them "to be treated with respect".[260] Numerous incidents of harassment and hate crimes against Muslims and South Asians were reported in the days following the attacks.[261][262][263]

Sikhs were also targeted due to their use of turbans, which are stereotypically associated with Muslims. There were reports of attacks on mosques and other religious buildings (including the firebombing of a Hindu temple), and assaults on individuals, including one murder: Balbir Singh Sodhi, a Sikh mistaken for a Muslim, who was fatally shot on September 15, 2001, in Mesa, Arizona.[263] Two dozen members of Osama bin Laden's family were urgently evacuated out of the country on a private charter plane under FBI supervision three days after the attacks.[264]

According to an academic study, people perceived to be Middle Eastern were as likely to be victims of hate crimes as followers of Islam during this time. The study also found a similar increase in hate crimes against people who may have been perceived as Muslims, Arabs, and others thought to be of Middle Eastern origin.[265] A report by the South Asian American advocacy group South Asian Americans Leading Together documented media coverage of 645 bias incidents against Americans of South Asian or Middle Eastern descent between September 11 and 17, 2001. Crimes such as vandalism, arson, assault, shootings, harassment, and threats in numerous places were documented.[266][267] Women wearing hijab were also targeted.[268]

Discrimination and racial profiling

[edit]

A poll of Arab-Americans in May 2002 found that 20% had personally experienced discrimination since September 11. A July 2002 poll of Muslim Americans found that 48% believed their lives had changed for the worse since September 11, and 57% had experienced an act of bias or discrimination.[268] Following the September 11 attacks, many Pakistani Americans identified themselves as Indians to avoid potential discrimination and obtain jobs.[269]

By May 2002, there were 488 complaints of employment discrimination reported to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 301 of those were complaints from people fired from their jobs. Similarly, by June 2002, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) had investigated 111 September 11th-related complaints from airline passengers purporting that their religious or ethnic appearance caused them to be singled out at security screenings, and an additional 31 complaints from people who alleged they were blocked from boarding airplanes on the same grounds.[268]

Muslim American response

[edit]

Muslim organizations in the United States were swift to condemn the attacks and called "upon Muslim Americans to come forward with their skills and resources to help alleviate the sufferings of the affected people and their families".[270] These organizations included the Islamic Society of North America, American Muslim Alliance, American Muslim Council, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Islamic Circle of North America, and the Shari'a Scholars Association of North America. Along with monetary donations, many Islamic organizations launched blood drives and provided medical assistance, food, and shelter for victims.[271][272][273]

Interfaith efforts

[edit]

Curiosity about Islam increased after the attacks. As a result, many mosques and Islamic centers began holding open houses and participating in outreach efforts to educate non-Muslims about the faith. In the first 10 years after the attacks, interfaith community service increased from 8 to 20 percent and the percentage of U.S. congregations involved in interfaith worship doubled from 7 to 14 percent.[274]

International reactions

[edit]
President of Russia Vladimir Putin (right) with his wife (center) at a commemoration service in New York City on November 16

The attacks were denounced by mass media and governments worldwide. Nations offered pro-American support and solidarity.[275] Leaders in most Middle Eastern countries, as well as Libya and Afghanistan, condemned the attacks. Iraq was a notable exception, with an immediate official statement that "the American cowboys are reaping the fruit of their crimes against humanity".[276] The government of Saudi Arabia officially condemned the attacks, but privately many Saudis favored bin Laden's cause.[277][278]

Although Palestinian Authority (PA) president Yasser Arafat also condemned the attacks, there were reports of celebrations of disputed size in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.[279][280] Palestinian leaders discredited news broadcasters that justified the attacks or showed celebrations,[281] and the Authority claimed such celebrations do not represent the Palestinians' sentiment.[282][283] Footage by CNN[vague] and other news outlets were suggested by a report originating at a Brazilian university to be from 1991; this was later proven to be a false accusation.[284][285] As in the United States, the aftermath of the attacks saw tensions increase in other countries between Muslims and non-Muslims.[286]

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 condemned the attacks and expressed readiness to take all necessary steps to respond and combat terrorism in accordance with their Charter.[287] Numerous countries introduced anti-terrorism legislation and froze bank accounts they suspected of al-Qaeda ties.[288][289] Law enforcement and intelligence agencies in a number of countries arrested alleged terrorists.[290][291]

British Prime Minister Tony Blair said Britain stood "shoulder to shoulder" with the United States.[292] In a speech to Congress nine days after the attacks, which Blair attended as a guest, President Bush declared "America has no truer friend than Great Britain".[293] Subsequently, Prime Minister Blair embarked on two months of diplomacy to rally international support for military action; he held 54 meetings with world leaders.[294]

The U.S. set up the Guantanamo Bay detention camp to hold inmates they defined as "illegal enemy combatants". The legitimacy of these detentions has been questioned by the European Union and human rights organizations.[295][296][297]

On September 25, 2001, Iran's president Mohammad Khatami, meeting British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, said: "Iran fully understands the feelings of the Americans about the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11". He said although the American administrations had been at best indifferent about terrorist operations in Iran, the Iranians felt differently and had expressed their sympathetic feelings with bereaved Americans in the tragic incidents in the two cities. He also stated that "Nations should not be punished in place of terrorists".[298]

According to Radio Farda's website, when the news of the attacks was released, some Iranian citizens gathered in front of the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran, which serves as the protecting power of the United States in Iran, to express their sympathy, and some of them lit candles as a symbol of mourning. Radio Farda's website also states that in 2011, on the anniversary of the attacks, the United States Department of State published a post on its blog, in which the Department thanked the Iranian people for their sympathy and stated that it would never forget Iranian people's kindness.[299] After the attacks, both the President[300][301] and the Supreme Leader of Iran condemned the attacks. The BBC and Time magazine published reports on holding candlelit vigils for the victims by Iranian citizens on their websites.[302][303] According to Politico Magazine, following the attacks, Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, "suspended the usual 'Death to America' chants at Friday prayers" temporarily.[304]

Military operations

[edit]

At 2:40 pm on September 11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was issuing orders to his aides to look for evidence of Iraqi involvement. According to notes taken by senior policy official Stephen Cambone, Rumsfeld asked for, "Best info fast. Judge whether they are good enough to hit S.H. at the same time. Not only OBL".[305]

In a meeting at Camp David on September 15 the Bush administration rejected the idea of attacking Iraq in response to the September 11 attacks.[306] Nonetheless, they later invaded the country with allies, citing "Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism".[307] At the time, as many as seven in ten Americans believed the Iraqi president played a role in the 9/11 attacks.[308] Three years later, Bush conceded that he had not.[309]

The NATO council declared that the terrorist attacks on the United States were an attack on all NATO nations that satisfied Article 5 of the NATO charter. This marked the first invocation of Article 5, which had been written during the Cold War with an attack by the Soviet Union in mind.[310] Australian Prime Minister John Howard, who was in Washington, D.C., during the attacks, invoked Article IV of the ANZUS treaty.[311] The Bush administration announced a war on terror, with the stated goals of bringing bin Laden and al-Qaeda to justice and preventing the emergence of other terrorist networks.[312] These goals would be accomplished by imposing economic and military sanctions against states harboring terrorists, and increasing global surveillance and intelligence sharing.[313]

On September 14, 2001, the U.S. Congress passed the Authorization for the use of Military Force Against Terrorists, which grants the President the authority to use all "necessary and appropriate force" against those whom he determined "planned, authorized, committed or aided" the September 11 attacks or who harbored said persons or groups. It is still in effect.[314]

On October 7, 2001, the war in Afghanistan began when U.S. and British forces initiated aerial bombing campaigns targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda camps, then later invaded Afghanistan with ground troops of the Special Forces.[citation needed] This eventually led to the overthrow of the Taliban's rule of Afghanistan with the Fall of Kandahar on December 7, by U.S.-led coalition forces.[315]

Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, who went into hiding in the White Mountains, was targeted by U.S. coalition forces in the Battle of Tora Bora,[316] but he escaped across the Pakistani border and remained out of sight for almost ten years.[316] In an interview with Tayseer Allouni on October 21, 2001, bin Laden stated:

The events proved the extent of terrorism that America exercises in the world. Bush stated that the world has to be divided in two: Bush and his supporters, and any country that doesn't get into the global crusade is with the terrorists. What terrorism is clearer than this? Many governments were forced to support this "new terrorism"... America wouldn't live in security until we live it truly in Palestine. This showed the reality of America, which puts Israel's interest above its own people's interest. America won't get out of this crisis until it gets out of the Arabian Peninsula, and until it stops its support of Israel.[317]

Aftermath

[edit]

Health issues

[edit]
Survivors covered in dust after the collapse of the World Trade towers; a photograph of another dust-covered victim, Marcy Borders, subsequently gained much attention.[318][319]

Hundreds of thousands of tons of toxic debris containing more than 2,500 contaminants and known carcinogens were spread across Lower Manhattan when the towers collapsed.[320][321] Exposure to the toxins in the debris is alleged to have contributed to fatal or debilitating illnesses among people who were at Ground Zero.[322][323] The Bush administration ordered the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to issue reassuring statements regarding air quality in the aftermath of the attacks, citing national security, but the EPA did not determine that air quality had returned to pre–September 11 levels until June 2002.[324]

Health effects extended to residents, students, and office workers of Lower Manhattan and nearby Chinatown.[325] Several deaths have been linked to the toxic dust, and victims' names were included in the World Trade Center memorial.[326] An estimated 18,000 people have developed illnesses as a result of the toxic dust.[327] There is also scientific speculation that exposure to toxic products in the air may have negative effects on fetal development.[328] A study of rescue workers released in April 2010 found that all those studied had impaired lung function.[329]

Years after the attacks, legal disputes over the costs of related illnesses were still in the court system. In 2006, a federal judge rejected New York City's refusal to pay for health costs for rescue workers, allowing for the possibility of suits against the city.[330] Government officials have been faulted for urging the public to return to lower Manhattan in the weeks shortly after the attacks. Christine Todd Whitman, administrator of the EPA in the attacks' aftermath, was heavily criticized by a U.S. District Judge for incorrectly saying that the area was environmentally safe.[331] Mayor Giuliani was criticized for urging financial industry personnel to return quickly to the greater Wall Street area.[332]

The James L. Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act (2010) allocated $4.2 billion to create the World Trade Center Health Program, which provides testing and treatment for people with long-term health problems related to the 9/11 attacks.[333][334] The WTC Health Program replaced preexisting 9/11-related health programs such as the Medical Monitoring and Treatment Program and the WTC Environmental Health Center program.[334]

In 2020, the NYPD confirmed that 247 NYPD police officers had died due to 9/11-related illnesses. In September 2022, the FDNY confirmed that 299 firefighters had died due to 9/11-related illnesses. Both agencies believe that the death toll will rise dramatically in the coming years. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department (PAPD), the law enforcement agency with jurisdiction over the World Trade Center, confirmed that four of its police officers have died of 9/11-related illnesses. The chief of the PAPD at the time, Joseph Morris, made sure that industrial-grade respirators were provided to all PAPD police officers within 48 hours and decided that the same 30 to 40 police officers would be stationed at the World Trade Center pile, drastically lowering the number of total PAPD personnel who would be exposed to the air. The FDNY and NYPD had rotated hundreds, if not thousands, of different personnel from all over New York City to the pile without adequate respirators and breathing equipment that could have prevented future diseases.[335][336][337][338]

Economic

[edit]
U.S. deficit and debt increases in the seven years following the attacks from 2001 to 2008

The attacks had a significant economic impact on the U.S. and world markets.[339] The stock exchanges did not open on September 11 and remained closed until September 17. Reopening, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell 684 points, or 7.1%, to 8921, a record-setting one-day point decline.[340] By the end of the week, the DJIA had fallen 1,369.7 points (14.3%), at the time its largest one-week point drop in history. In 2001 dollars, U.S. stocks lost US$1.4 trillion in valuation for the week.[341]

In New York City, about 430,000 job months and US$2.8 billion in wages were lost in the first three months after the attacks. The economic effects were mainly on the economy's export sectors.[342][343][344] The city's GDP was estimated to have declined by US$27.3 billion for the last three months of 2001 and all of 2002. The U.S. government provided US$11.2 billion in immediate assistance to the Government of New York City in September 2001, and US$10.5 billion in early 2002 for economic development and infrastructure needs.[345]

Also hurt were small businesses in Lower Manhattan near the World Trade Center (18,000 of which were destroyed or displaced), resulting in lost jobs and wages. Assistance was provided by Small Business Administration loans; federal government Community Development Block Grants; and Economic Injury Disaster Loans.[345] Some 31,900,000 square feet (2,960,000 m2) of Lower Manhattan office space was damaged or destroyed.[346] Many wondered whether these jobs would return, and if the damaged tax base would recover.[347] Studies of 9/11's economic effects show the Manhattan office real-estate market and office employment were less affected than first feared, because of the financial services industry's need for face-to-face interaction.[348][349]

North American air space was closed for several days after the attacks and air travel decreased upon its reopening, leading to a nearly 20% cutback in air travel capacity, and exacerbating financial problems in the struggling U.S. airline industry.[350]

The September 11 attacks also led to the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,[351] as well as additional homeland security spending, totaling at least US$5 trillion.[352]

Effects in Afghanistan

[edit]

If Americans are clamouring to bomb Afghanistan back to the Stone Age, they ought to know that this nation does not have so far to go. This is a post-apocalyptic place of felled cities, parched land and downtrodden people.

Barry Bearak, The New York Times, September 13, 2001[353]

Most of the Afghan population was already going hungry at the time of the attacks.[354] In the aftermath of the attacks, tens of thousands of people attempted to flee Afghanistan due to the possibility of military retaliation by the U.S. Pakistan, already home to many Afghan refugees from previous conflicts, closed its border with Afghanistan on September 17, 2001.[355] Thousands of Afghans also fled to the frontier with Tajikistan but were denied entry.[356] The Taliban leaders in Afghanistan pleaded against military action, saying "We appeal to the United States not to put Afghanistan into more misery because our people have suffered so much", referring to two decades of conflict and the humanitarian crisis attached to it.[353]

All United Nations expatriates had left Afghanistan after the attacks and no national or international aid workers were at their post. Workers were instead preparing in bordering countries like Pakistan, China and Uzbekistan to prevent a potential "humanitarian catastrophe", amid a critically low food stock for the Afghan population.[357] The World Food Programme stopped importing wheat to Afghanistan on September 12 due to security risks.[358]

From left to right: U.S. soldiers engaged in the war on terror in Afghanistan in May 2006. • Army Major General Chris Donahue left Afghanistan as the final American soldier on August 30, 2021

Approximately one month after the attacks, the United States led a broad coalition of international forces to overthrow the Taliban regime from Afghanistan for their harboring of al-Qaeda.[355] Though Pakistani authorities were initially reluctant to align themselves with the U.S. against the Taliban, they permitted the coalition access to their military bases, and arrested and handed over to the U.S. over 600 suspected al-Qaeda members.[359][360]

In 2011, the U.S. and NATO under President Obama initiated a drawdown of troops in Afghanistan finalized in 2016. During the presidencies of Donald Trump and Joe Biden in 2020 and 2021, the United States alongside its NATO allies withdrew all troops from Afghanistan, completing the withdrawal of all regular U.S. troops on August 30, 2021.[139][361][362] The withdrawal marked the end of the 2001–2021 war in Afghanistan. Biden said that after nearly 20 years of war, it was clear that the U.S. military could not transform Afghanistan into a modern democracy.[363]

Cultural influence

[edit]

Immediate responses to 9/11 included greater focus on home life and time spent with family, higher church attendance, and increased expressions of patriotism such as the flying of American flags.[364] The radio industry responded by removing certain songs from playlists, and the attacks have subsequently been used as background, narrative, or thematic elements in film, music, literature, and humour. Already-running television shows as well as programs developed after 9/11 have reflected post-9/11 cultural concerns.[365]

9/11 conspiracy theories have become a social phenomenon, despite a lack of support from expert scientists, engineers, and historians.[366] 9/11 has also had a major impact on the religious faith of many individuals; for some it strengthened, to find consolation to cope with the loss of loved ones and overcome their grief; others started to question their faith or lose it entirely because they could not reconcile it with their view of religion.[367][368]

The culture of America, after the attacks, is noted for heightened security and an increased demand thereof, as well as paranoia and anxiety regarding future terrorist attacks against most of the nation. Psychologists have also confirmed that there has been an increased amount of national anxiety in commercial air travel.[369] Anti-Muslim hate crimes rose nearly ten-fold in 2001 and have subsequently remained "roughly five times higher than the pre-9/11 rate".[370]

Government policies towards terrorism

[edit]
Alleged "extraordinary rendition" illegal flights of the CIA, as reported by Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita[371]

As a result of the attacks, many governments across the world passed legislation to combat terrorism.[372] In Germany, where several of the 9/11 terrorists had resided and taken advantage of that country's liberal asylum policies, two major anti-terrorism packages were enacted. The first removed legal loopholes that permitted terrorists to live and raise money in Germany. The second addressed the effectiveness and communication of intelligence and law enforcement.[373] Canada passed the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act, their first anti-terrorism law.[374] The United Kingdom passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.[375][376] New Zealand enacted the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002.[377]

In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to coordinate domestic anti-terrorism efforts. The USA Patriot Act gave the federal government greater powers, including the authority to detain foreign terror suspects for a week without charge; to monitor terror suspects' telephone communications, e-mail, and Internet use; and to prosecute suspected terrorists without time restrictions. The FAA ordered that airplane cockpits be reinforced to prevent terrorists from gaining control of planes and assigned sky marshals to flights.

Further, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act made the federal government, rather than airports, responsible for airport security. The law created the Transportation Security Administration to inspect passengers and luggage, causing long delays and concern over passenger privacy.[378] After suspected abuses of the USA Patriot Act were brought to light in June 2013 with articles about the collection of American call records by the NSA and the PRISM program, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (of Wisconsin), who introduced the Patriot Act in 2001, said that the NSA overstepped its bounds.[379][380]

Criticism of the war on terror has focused on its morality, efficiency, and cost. According to a 2021 report by the Costs of War Project, the several post-9/11 wars participated in by the United States in its war on terror have caused the displacement, conservatively calculated, of 38 million people in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and the Philippines.[381][382][383] They estimated these wars caused the deaths of 897,000 to 929,000 people directly and cost US$8 trillion.[383] In a 2023 report, the Costs of War Project estimated that there have been between 3.6 and 3.7 million indirect deaths in the post-9/11 war zones, with the total death toll being 4.5 to 4.6 million. The report defined post-9/11 war zones as conflicts that included significant United States counter-terrorism operations since 9/11, which in addition to the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, also includes the civil wars in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Somalia.[16] The report derived its estimate of indirect deaths using a calculation from the Geneva Declaration of Secretariat which estimates that for every person directly killed by war, four more die from the indirect consequences of war.[16] The U.S. Constitution and U.S. law prohibits the use of torture, yet such human rights violations occurred during the war on terror under the euphemism "enhanced interrogation".[384][385] In 2005, The Washington Post and Human Rights Watch (HRW) published revelations concerning CIA flights and "black sites", covert prisons operated by the CIA.[386][387] The term "torture by proxy" is used by some critics to describe situations in which the CIA and other U.S. agencies have transferred suspected terrorists to countries known to employ torture.[388][389]

[edit]
President Obama's address to the U.S. after the killing of bin Laden (9:28) Also available: Audio only, full text Wikisource has information on "Remarks by the President on Osama bin Laden"

At 11:35 p.m., President Obama appeared on major television networks:[390] As all 19 hijackers died in the attacks, they were never prosecuted. Osama bin Laden was never formally indicted; he was ultimately killed by U.S. special forces on May 2, 2011, in his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, after a 10-year manhunt.[r][391] The main trial of the attacks against Mohammed and his co-conspirators Walid bin Attash, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ammar al-Baluchi, and Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi remains unresolved. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was arrested on March 1, 2003, in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, by Pakistani security officials working with the CIA. He was then held at multiple CIA secret prisons and Guantanamo Bay detention camp, where he was interrogated and tortured with methods including waterboarding.[392][393] In 2003, al-Hawsawi and Abd al-Aziz Ali were arrested and transferred to U.S. custody. Both would later be accused of providing money and travel assistance to the hijackers.[394] During U.S. hearings at Guantanamo Bay in March 2007, Mohammed again confessed his responsibility for the attacks, stating he "was responsible for the 9/11 operation from A to Z" and that his statement was not made under duress.[36][395] In January 2023, the U.S. government opened up about a potential plea deal,[396] with Biden giving up on the effort in September that year.[397]

To date, only peripheral persons have thus been convicted for charges in connection with the attacks. These include:

In July 2024, The New York Times reported that Mohammed, bin Attash, and al-Hawsawi had agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy in exchange for life sentences, avoiding trial and execution. However, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin revoked a plea agreement with Mohammed days later.[400]

Investigations

[edit]

FBI

[edit]

Immediately after the attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started PENTTBOM, the largest criminal inquiry in U.S. history. At its height, more than half of the FBI's agents worked on the investigation and followed a half-million leads.[401] The FBI concluded that there was "clear and irrefutable" evidence linking al-Qaeda and bin Laden to the attacks.[402]

headshot, expressionless, full face of man
Mohamed Atta was one of the main planners of the attacks and the operational leader, responsible for crashing American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.

The FBI quickly identified the hijackers, including leader Mohamed Atta, when his luggage was discovered at Boston's Logan Airport. Atta had been forced to check two of his three bags due to space limitations on the 19-seat commuter flight he took to Boston. Due to a new policy instituted to prevent flight delays, the luggage failed to make it aboard American Airlines Flight 11 as planned. The luggage contained the hijackers' names, assignments, and al-Qaeda connections. "It had all these Arab-language [sic] papers that amounted to the Rosetta stone of the investigation", said one FBI agent.[403] Within hours of the attacks, the FBI released the names and in many cases the personal details of the suspected pilots and hijackers.[404][405] Abu Jandal, who served as bin Laden's chief bodyguard for years, confirmed the identity of seven hijackers as al-Qaeda members during interrogations with the FBI on September 17. He had been jailed in a Yemeni prison since 2000.[406][407] On September 27, photos of all 19 hijackers were released, along with information about possible nationalities and aliases.[408] Fifteen of the men were from Saudi Arabia, two were from the United Arab Emirates, one was from Egypt, and one was from Lebanon.[409]

By midday, the U.S. National Security Agency and German intelligence agencies had intercepted communications pointing to Osama bin Laden.[410] Two of the hijackers were known to have traveled with a bin Laden associate to Malaysia in 2000[411] and hijacker Mohamed Atta had previously gone to Afghanistan.[412] He and others were part of a terrorist cell in Hamburg, Germany.[413] One of the members of the Hamburg cell in Germany was discovered to have been in communication with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who was identified as a member of al-Qaeda.[414]

Authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom also obtained electronic intercepts, including telephone conversations and electronic bank transfers, which indicated that Mohammed Atef, a bin Laden deputy, was a key figure in the planning of the 9/11 attacks. Intercepts were also obtained of conversations that took place days before September 11 between bin Laden and an associate in Pakistan referring to "an incident that would take place in America on, or around, September 11" and discussing potential repercussions. In another conversation with an associate in Afghanistan, bin Laden discussed the "scale and effects of a forthcoming operation". These conversations did not specifically mention the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, or other specifics.[415]

Origins of the 19 hijackers
Nationality Number
Saudi Arabia
15
United Arab Emirates
2
Egypt
1
Lebanon
1

In their annual violent crime index for the year 2001, the FBI recorded the deaths from the attacks as murder, in separate tables so as not to mix them with other reported crimes for that year.[416] In a disclaimer, the FBI stated that "the number of deaths is so great that combining it with the traditional crime statistics will have an outlier effect that falsely skews all types of measurements in the program's analyses".[417] New York City also did not include the deaths in their annual crime statistics for 2001.[418]

CIA

[edit]

In 2004, John L. Helgerson, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), conducted an internal review of the agency's pre-9/11 performance and was harshly critical of senior CIA officials for not doing everything possible to confront terrorism.[419] According to Philip Giraldi in The American Conservative, Helgerson criticized their failure to stop two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, as they entered the United States and their failure to share information on the two men with the FBI.[420]

In May 2007, senators from both major U.S. political parties (the Republican and Democratic parties) drafted legislation to make the review public. One of the backers, Senator Ron Wyden said, "The American people have a right to know what the Central Intelligence Agency was doing in those critical months before 9/11".[421] The report was released in 2009 by President Barack Obama.[419]

Congressional inquiry

[edit]

In February 2002, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence formed a joint inquiry into the performance of the U.S. Intelligence Community.[422] Their 832-page report released in December 2002[423] detailed failings of the FBI and CIA to use available information, including about terrorists the CIA knew were in the United States, to disrupt the plots.[424] The joint inquiry developed its information about possible involvement of Saudi Arabian government officials from non-classified sources.[425] The Bush administration demanded 28 related pages remain classified.[424] In December 2002, the inquiry's chair Bob Graham revealed in an interview that there was "evidence that there were foreign governments involved in facilitating the activities of at least some of the terrorists in the United States".[426] Victim families were frustrated by the unanswered questions and redacted material from the congressional inquiry and demanded an independent commission.[424] September 11 victim families,[427] members of Congress[428] and the Saudi Arabian government are still seeking the release of the documents.[429][430] In June 2016, CIA chief John Brennan said that he believes 28 redacted pages of a congressional inquiry into 9/11 will soon be made public, and that they will prove that the government of Saudi Arabia had no involvement in the September 11 attacks.[431]

In September 2016, Congress passed the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act that would allow relatives of victims of the September 11 attacks to sue Saudi Arabia for its government's alleged role in the attacks.[432][433][434]

9/11 Commission

[edit]
The cover of the 9/11 Commission Report, a 585-page report released in 2004, on events leading up to the attacks and steps recommended to avoid a future terrorist attack

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, popularly known as the 9/11 Commission, chaired by Thomas Kean,[s] was formed in late 2002 to prepare a thorough account of the circumstances surrounding the attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks.[439] The commission issued the 9/11 Commission Report in July 2004, a 585-page report based on its investigations. The report detailed the events leading up to the attacks, concluding that they were carried out by al-Qaeda.[440] The commission also examined how security and intelligence agencies were inadequately coordinated to prevent the attacks.

According to the report, "We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management".[441] The commission made numerous recommendations on how to prevent future attacks, and in 2011 was dismayed that several of its recommendations had yet to be implemented.[442]

National Institute of Standards and Technology

[edit]
The exterior support columns from the lower level of the South Tower remained standing after the building collapsed

The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology investigated the collapses of the Twin Towers and 7 WTC. The investigations examined why the buildings collapsed and what fire protection measures were in place, and evaluated how fire protection systems might be improved in future construction.[443] The investigation into the collapse of 1 WTC and 2 WTC was concluded in October 2005 and that of 7 WTC was completed in August 2008.[444]

NIST found that the fireproofing on the Twin Towers' steel infrastructures was blown off by the initial impact of the planes and that had this not occurred, the towers likely would have remained standing.[445] A 2007 study of the north tower's collapse published by researchers of Purdue University determined that since the plane's impact had stripped off much of the structure's thermal insulation, the heat from a typical office fire would have softened and weakened the exposed girders and columns enough to initiate the collapse regardless of the number of columns cut or damaged by the impact.[446][447]

The director of the original investigation stated that "the towers did amazingly well. The terrorist aircraft didn't bring the buildings down; it was the fire that followed. It was proven that you could take out two-thirds of the columns in a tower and the building would still stand".[448] The fires weakened the trusses supporting the floors, making the floors sag. The sagging floors pulled on the exterior steel columns causing the exterior columns to bow inward.

With the damage to the core columns, the buckling exterior columns could no longer support the buildings, causing them to collapse. Additionally, the report found the towers' stairwells were not properly reinforced to provide adequate emergency escape for people above the impact zones.[449] NIST concluded that uncontrolled fires in 7 WTC caused floor beams and girders to heat and subsequently "caused a critical support column to fail, initiating a fire-induced progressive collapse that brought the building down".[444]

Alleged Saudi government role

[edit]

In July 2016, the Obama administration released a document compiled by U.S. investigators Dana Lesemann and Michael Jacobson, known as "File 17",[450] which contains a list naming three dozen people, including the suspected Saudi intelligence officers attached to Saudi Arabia's embassy in Washington, D.C.,[451] which connects Saudi Arabia to the hijackers.[452][453]

In September 2016, Congress passed the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act.[454][455] The practical effect of the legislation was to allow the continuation of a longstanding civil lawsuit brought by families of victims of the September 11 attacks against Saudi Arabia for its government's alleged role in the attacks.[456] In March 2018, a U.S. judge formally allowed a suit to move forward against the government of Saudi Arabia brought by 9/11 survivors and victims' families.[454]

In 2022, the families of some 9/11 victims obtained two videos and a notepad seized from Saudi national Omar al-Bayoumi by the British courts. The first video showed him hosting a party in San Diego for Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, the first two hijackers to arrive in the U.S. The other video showed al-Bayoumi greeting the cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who was blamed for radicalizing Americans and later killed in a CIA drone strike. The notepad depicted a hand-drawn airplane and some mathematical equations that, according to a pilot's court statement, might have been used to calculate the rate of descent to get to a target. According to a 2017 FBI memo, from the late 1990s until the 9/11 attack, al-Bayoumi was a paid cooptee of the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency. As of April 2022 he is believed to be living in Saudi Arabia, which has denied any involvement in 9/11.[457]

Rebuilding and memorials

[edit]

Reconstruction

[edit]
The rebuilt World Trade Center, September 2020

On the day of the attacks, New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani stated: "We will rebuild. We're going to come out of this stronger than before, politically stronger, economically stronger. The skyline will be made whole again".[458]

Within hours of the attack, a substantial search and rescue operation was launched. After months of around-the-clock operations, the World Trade Center site was cleared by the end of May 2002.[459] The damaged section of the Pentagon was rebuilt and occupied within a year of the attacks.[460] The temporary World Trade Center PATH station opened in late 2003 and construction of the new 7 World Trade Center was completed in 2006. Work on rebuilding the main World Trade Center site was delayed until late 2006 when leaseholder Larry Silverstein and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey agreed on financing.[461] The construction of One World Trade Center began in April 2006, and reached its full height in May 2013. The spire was installed atop the building at that date, putting One WTC's height at 1,776 feet (541 m) and thus claiming the title of the tallest building in the Western Hemisphere.[462][463] One WTC finished construction and opened on November 3, 2014.[463][464][465]

On the World Trade Center site, three more office towers were to be built one block east of where the original towers stood.[466] 4 WTC, meanwhile, opened in November 2013, making it the second tower on the site to open behind 7 World Trade Center, as well as the first building on the Port Authority property.[467] 3 WTC opened in June 2018, becoming the fourth skyscraper at the site to be completed.[468] In December 2022, the Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church fully reopened for regular services[469] followed by the opening of the Ronald O. Perelman Performing Arts Center in September 2023.[470] With construction beginning in 2008,[471] 2 World Trade Center remains as of 2025 unfinished.[472] Scale models of the building were publicly revealed in September 2024, although Silverstein Properties was still trying to secure funding for the tower at the time.[473][474]

Memorials

[edit]
The National September 11 Memorial and Museum in Lower Manhattan, August 2016

In the days immediately following the attacks, many memorials and vigils were held around the world, and photographs of the dead and missing were posted around Ground Zero. A witness described being unable to "get away from faces of innocent victims who were killed. Their pictures are everywhere, on phone booths, street lights, and walls of subway stations. Everything reminded me of a huge funeral, people were quiet and sad, but also very nice. Before, New York gave me a cold feeling; now people were reaching out to help each other".[475] President Bush proclaimed Friday, September 14, 2001, as Patriot Day.[476]

Tribute in Light, featuring two columns of light representing the Twin Towers, September 2020

One of the first memorials was the Tribute in Light, an installation of 88 searchlights at the footprints of the World Trade Center towers.[477] In New York City, the World Trade Center Site Memorial Competition was held to design an appropriate memorial on the site.[478] The winning design, Reflecting Absence, was selected in August 2006, and consists of a pair of reflecting pools in the footprints of the towers, surrounded by a list of the victims' names in an underground memorial space.[479] The memorial was completed on the 10th anniversary of the attacks in 2011;[480] a museum also opened on site in May 2014.[481]

The Sphere by the German sculptor Fritz Koenig is the world's largest bronze sculpture of modern times, and stood between the Twin Towers on the Austin J. Tobin Plaza from 1971 until the attacks. The sculpture, weighing more than 20 tons, was the only remaining work of art to be recovered largely intact from the ruins of the towers. Since then, the work of art, known in the U.S. as The Sphere, has been transformed into a symbolic monument of 9/11 commemoration. After being dismantled and stored near a hangar at John F. Kennedy International Airport, the sculpture was the subject of the 2001 documentary The Sphere by filmmaker Percy Adlon. In August 2017, the work was installed at Liberty Park, close to the new World Trade Center aerial and the 9/11 Memorial.[482]

The National 9/11 Pentagon Memorial in Arlington County, Virginia, September 2008

In Arlington County, the Pentagon Memorial was completed and opened to the public on the seventh anniversary of the attacks in 2008.[483][484] It consists of a landscaped park with 184 benches facing the Pentagon.[485] When the Pentagon was repaired in 2001–2002, a private chapel and indoor memorial were included at the spot where Flight 77 crashed into the building.[486]

In Shanksville, a concrete-and-glass visitor center was opened in 2015,[487] situated on a hill overlooking the crash site and the white marble Wall of Names.[488] An observation platform at the visitor center and the white marble wall are both aligned beneath the path of Flight 93.[488][489] New York City firefighters donated a cross made of steel from the World Trade Center and mounted on top of a platform shaped like the Pentagon.[490] It was installed outside the firehouse on August 25, 2008.[491] Many other permanent memorials are elsewhere. Scholarships and charities have been established by the victims' families and by many other organizations and private figures.[492]

On every anniversary in New York City, the names of the victims who died there are read out over music. The President of the United States attends a memorial service at the Pentagon,[493] and asks Americans to observe Patriot Day with a moment of silence. Smaller services are held in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, which are usually attended by the First Lady. In 2023, Joe Biden did not attend services in the affected areas, instead marking the day in Anchorage, Alaska, the only U.S. president to do so since the attacks.[494][495][496]

See also

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References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The September 11 attacks were a series of four coordinated Islamist terrorist attacks executed by 19 militants affiliated with the extremist group against targets in the United States on the morning of , 2001. The hijackers, mostly Saudi nationals trained in al-Qaeda camps in , seized control of four commercial airliners shortly after takeoff from airports on the East Coast: and struck the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center in ; impacted in Arlington, ; and crashed into a field near , following a passenger uprising against the hijackers. The operation, masterminded by and approved by al-Qaeda leader , exploited lapses in domestic aviation security and intelligence sharing to maximize destruction. The strikes caused the immediate deaths of 2,977 victims, including office workers, , passengers, and , with thousands more injured amid fires, structural failures, and ; this toll excludes the 19 perpetrators and remains the deadliest incident of in history. Both World Trade Center towers collapsed within two hours of impact due to fire-induced structural weakening, as determined by engineering analyses, while sustained significant damage and Flight 93's crash site yielded fragmented wreckage consistent with high-speed impact. publicly claimed responsibility, with bin Laden issuing a video admission in citing U.S. in the as motivation, though empirical evidence from captured operatives and financial trails solidified attribution despite initial intelligence gaps. Immediate consequences included unprecedented disruption to air travel, financial markets, and urban infrastructure, with New York City's skyline scarred by the loss of the iconic towers and long-term health effects from toxic dust exposure affecting survivors and responders. The attacks precipitated the U.S.-led Global War on Terror, authorizing the invasion of Afghanistan to dismantle al-Qaeda and oust the Taliban regime that harbored them, while domestic reforms like the PATRIOT Act expanded surveillance powers; notably, the 9/11 Commission found no operational collaboration between al-Qaeda and Iraq's Saddam Hussein, undermining later rationales for the 2003 Iraq invasion. Controversies persist over foreknowledge, Saudi governmental involvement—given 15 hijackers' nationalities—and the physics of the tower collapses, which some engineering critiques argue deviated from fire-alone precedents, though official investigations attribute failures to unique impact damages combined with unchecked fires. These events reshaped U.S. security doctrine, prioritizing preemption against non-state actors amid debates on civil liberties erosions and geopolitical overreach.

Islamist Origins of the Threat

Al-Qaeda's Ideology and Global Jihad

Al-Qaeda's ideology is rooted in Salafi-jihadism, a radical interpretation of that combines puritanical Salafism with calls for perpetual armed struggle () to establish a global governed by law. This worldview posits a cosmic conflict between true Muslims and a corrupt tainted by Western influence, with jihadists obligated to wage offensive war against apostate regimes and non-Muslim powers perceived as aggressors against Islam. Al-Qaeda leaders, drawing from thinkers like , framed the as the primary enemy—"the head of the snake"—whose defeat would cascade to topple local tyrants and restore Islamic dominance, evidenced in operational manuals and recruitment materials emphasizing strategic strikes on the far enemy over near ones. Central to this ideology were Osama bin Laden's fatwas, issued as religious edicts binding on followers. In his August 23, 1996, " Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," bin Laden condemned the U.S. military presence in —numbering around 5,000-10,000 troops post-1991 —as a defilement of Islam's holiest sites, and , invoking historical precedents like the Prophet Muhammad's expulsion of polytheists to mandate as a defensive and purifying duty. He cited U.S. bases established after Iraq's invasion of as an ongoing occupation enabling Saudi royal corruption, urging worldwide to kill American forces there regardless of consequences. The ideology escalated in bin Laden's February 23, 1998, , co-signed by allies including , expanding to target all Americans and their allies, civilian and military, "in any country" where feasible. Grievances included U.S. support for Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories—framed as theft of Muslim land—and sanctions on post-Gulf War, which bin Laden claimed caused over 500,000 child deaths by 1998, portraying these as deliberate crusader aggression against the ummah. This ruling rejected distinctions between combatants and non-combatants, interpreting Quranic verses on fighting "those who fight you" as license for indiscriminate retaliation, a departure from classical Islamic just war constraints. Unlike mainstream Islamic scholarship, which limits jihad to defensive contexts and prohibits targeting innocents, al-Qaeda's doctrine radicalized a fringe minority by glorifying martyrdom operations and mass casualty attacks as apex religious acts, disseminated via videos and manifestos that appealed to alienated youth with superficial religious knowledge. This selective radicalism, prioritizing (declaring Muslims apostates for insufficient zeal) and global confrontation over reform, enabled recruitment of operatives willing to execute suicide missions, as seen in training camps emphasizing ideological purity over tactical restraint. While claiming to defend , the ideology's causal engine was supremacist , viewing Western itself as an existential threat warranting .

Prior al-Qaeda Operations

Al-Qaeda's operations prior to September 11, 2001, marked an escalation from support for regional insurgencies to direct, high-impact strikes against U.S. interests, employing truck bombs, coordinated embassy assaults, and boat attacks to target symbols of American economic, diplomatic, and military power. These actions, often planned from bases in and under Osama bin Laden's oversight, demonstrated growing operational sophistication and a focus on inflicting mass casualties on U.S. personnel and allies. for these efforts traced back to bin Laden's financial networks, including donations from wealthy sympathizers and businesses in the Gulf region. The earliest major U.S.-targeted operation linked to networks occurred on February 26, 1993, when and accomplices detonated a 1,200-pound truck bomb in the parking garage beneath the World Trade Center's North Tower in . The explosion killed six people and injured 1,042 others, causing structural damage that required extensive repairs but failed to topple the towers as intended. Perpetrators, including Yousef (nephew of later figure ), were connected to Islamist cells influenced by Sheikh and supported indirectly by bin Laden's emerging organization through training and resources. By 1998, had advanced to synchronized transnational attacks, bombing U.S. embassies in , , and , , on August 7 with truck bombs containing hundreds of pounds of TNT and aluminum powder. These blasts killed 224 people (including 12 Americans) and wounded over 4,500, primarily local staff and passersby, while destroying the embassy buildings and nearby structures. The operations, directed by bin Laden and executed by cells with logistical aid from East African radicals, underscored the group's ability to project power across continents against U.S. foreign policy outposts. The pattern continued with a maritime suicide attack on October 12, 2000, when al-Qaeda operatives piloted an explosive-laden skiff alongside the USS Cole during refueling in Aden Harbor, Yemen, detonating approximately 500 pounds of C-4 plastic explosive and shattering the destroyer's hull. The assault killed 17 U.S. sailors and injured 39 others, crippling the $1 billion vessel and exposing security gaps in port visits. Al-Qaeda publicly claimed responsibility, with planning attributed to bin Laden's core operatives, reflecting refined tactics blending small-boat delivery with high-explosive payloads against naval assets. These incidents revealed al-Qaeda's persistent targeting of U.S. vulnerabilities despite prior captures and indictments of key figures, with each attack building on lessons from the last to amplify lethality and media impact.

Key Figures: Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed


Osama bin Laden transitioned from a wealthy Saudi family member to a mujahideen fighter in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, arriving in Peshawar in the mid-1980s to recruit and fund Arab volunteers against the invaders. He established al-Qaeda in 1988 as a network to sustain jihadist operations post-Soviet withdrawal, emphasizing attacks on perceived enemies of Islam including the United States for its military presence in Saudi Arabia and alliances with Israel. Bin Laden's ideological commitment to global jihad framed the 9/11 attacks as a spectacular operation to provoke American overreaction, drain resources, and rally Muslims, leading him to grant final approval to the plot in mid-1999 after initial reservations about its scale.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a Pakistani engineer radicalized through jihadist networks, proposed the "planes operation"—crashing hijacked airliners into U.S. landmarks—to bin Laden in 1996, evolving concepts from the 1994-1995 he co-planned with nephew , which tested hijackings and bombings but included early ideas of flying planes into CIA headquarters and other targets. As al-Qaeda's chief operational planner, Mohammed refined the 9/11 scheme by selecting targets like the World Trade Center for symbolic economic impact, coordinating logistics, and insisting on suicide missions to maximize casualties, viewing the attacks as retaliation for U.S. foreign policy. Captured on March 1, 2003, in , , he confessed under interrogation to masterminding 9/11 alongside other plots, detailing his direct oversight of hijacker preparations. Other key enablers included , al-Qaeda's military commander and bin Laden deputy, who helped integrate the plot into the group's structure and provided training support until his death in a U.S. on November 16, 2001. , imprisoned since 1997 for the , indirectly influenced via shared Bojinka tactics with Mohammed, though fragmented U.S. intelligence silos pre-9/11 allowed these figures to evade capture despite prior warnings about their networks.

Planning and Intelligence Context

Development of the Plot

first proposed the operational concept of hijacking multiple U.S. commercial airliners and using them as suicide weapons against symbolic targets to in mid-1996, but bin Laden deferred the idea at the time due to resource constraints from other priorities. By spring 1999, following the arrest of Mohammed's nephew in a related plot, Mohammed renewed the pitch during meetings in , emphasizing the psychological impact of crashing planes into high-value sites without need for explosives. Bin Laden approved the scaled-down version targeting East Coast landmarks, designating Mohammed as operational director and allocating up to $500,000 from al-Qaeda's treasury for logistics, travel, and preparations. The selected targets reflected al-Qaeda's strategic focus on economic, military, and political power centers: the World Trade Center towers in New York to symbolize American capitalism, the as the seat of U.S. military might, and the U.S. Capitol (or alternatively the ) for legislative/executive authority. This blueprint evolved through iterative discussions between bin Laden, Mohammed, and al-Qaeda military chief , prioritizing aircraft with sufficient fuel loads for maximum destruction upon impact. Over late 1999 and early 2000, bin Laden and Mohammed vetted and selected 19 operatives, 15 of whom were Saudi nationals vetted for ideological commitment, , and unremarkable travel histories to evade scrutiny; the remainder included Egyptian, Emirati, and Lebanese members integrated via training camps. Operational security emphasized compartmentalization: hijacker teams operated semi-independently, using couriers for instructions, coded verbal signals (e.g., references to "weddings" for attacks), and avoidance of traceable emails or calls, with key directives relayed personally in . Financing drew from bin Laden's personal fortune, private donors sympathetic to , and Islamic charities funneled through front entities, totaling around $400,000–$500,000; transfers relied on informal value networks for untraceable remittances, supplemented by cash couriered from the UAE and wire instructions disguised as routine business. No direct evidence links state actors to the plot's core funding or approval, though individual facilitators with ties to Gulf donors provided indirect support without governmental orchestration.

Hijacker Recruitment, Training, and Entry into the US

The core operational hijackers, including pilots , , and , emerged from the in , where they radicalized amid Islamist influences at the by 1999. , born in in 1968, traveled to in late 1999, training at al-Qaeda camps near under directives from , and along with Shehhi and Jarrah pledged personal loyalty () to , positioning them for the plot due to their adaptation to Western environments. , also from the cell, facilitated coordination but remained abroad as he could not obtain a U.S. visa. Supporting "muscle" hijackers, predominantly Saudi nationals such as and , were selected in spring 1999 through networks and underwent paramilitary training at camps like , focusing on close-quarters combat, explosives, and ideological commitment to martyrdom via suicide operations. oversaw their integration, providing specialized instruction in on blending into Western settings and operational security. This training emphasized hijacking feasibility, drawing from prior experiences, while reinforcing jihadist intent against U.S. targets. Entry into the occurred via temporary visas exploited through incomplete vetting, with 15 of the 19 hijackers obtaining B-1/B-2 tourist/business visas, often in Saudi consulates like . Atta secured his B-1/B-2 visa on May 18, 2000, in and entered at Newark on June 3, 2000, overstaying to pursue without initial authorization. Shehhi entered similarly on May 29, 2000, at Newark after visa issuance on January 18, 2000, in the UAE, later adjusting to M-1 vocational status on August 9, 2001. , pilot for , received an F-1 visa on September 25, 2000, in but violated terms by skipping required classes after entering December 8, 2000, at . Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, early arrivals, entered on January 15, 2000, on B-1/B-2 visas issued April 1999 in , overstaying amid lax entry-exit tracking. Several Saudis used the expedited Visa Express program starting June 2001 for late entries. Flight training commenced post-entry, with Atta and Shehhi starting at in , in July 2000, progressing rapidly to commercial pilot certifications by December 19, 2000, despite Atta's simulator struggles and Shehhi's mid-air errors noted by instructors. Jarrah trained concurrently at the Florida Flight Training Center in Venice, completing multi-engine certification on August 2, 2001. Hanjour, with prior U.S. training in 1996 at Sierra Academy and 1998–1999 at CRM Flight Cockpit Resource Management, refreshed skills in 2001 at and schools, including advanced simulator work. The group resided unassumingly in shared apartments and housing, funding activities through wire transfers while blending as students. Operational discipline under Atta's leadership involved target casing, such as dry runs on cross-country flights in early 2001, and adherence to al-Qaeda guidance favoring concealable blades over firearms for hijackings. Recovered materials, including Atta's instructions and plot-related documents, directed use of box cutters and knives under four inches—permitted pre-9/11 security rules—to enable surprise assaults without triggering metal detectors, underscoring tactical prioritization of stealth over firepower. This approach, rooted in camp training, sustained low profiles until the attacks.

Pre-Attack Warnings and Systemic Failures

On August 6, 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency delivered a President's Daily Brief to President George W. Bush titled "Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US," which reported that Usama Bin Ladin since 1997 had sought to conduct terrorist attacks inside the United States, citing patterns of suspicious activity in New York such as surveillance of federal buildings and aircraft, as well as historical threats of hijackings. The brief, based on over 40 pieces of intelligence from multiple sources including foreign governments, emphasized Bin Ladin's intent but provided no specific timing, targets, or operational details, reflecting a compilation of longstanding concerns rather than an imminent alert. Four days earlier, on July 10, 2001, FBI Special Agent Kenneth Williams from the Phoenix field office issued an electronic communication, known as the Phoenix Memo, warning headquarters of an inordinate number of individuals of "uncertain background" enrolled in U.S. flight schools, particularly Middle Eastern men pursuing training in large aircraft without evident interest in commercial piloting careers, and urged canvassing other schools for similar patterns potentially linked to terrorism. Despite its prescient elements, the memo languished without broad dissemination or action, as FBI headquarters deemed it insufficiently prioritized amid workload constraints and lack of coordination with CIA aviation threat reporting. These isolated signals exemplified deeper inter-agency dysfunctions, including entrenched rivalries between the CIA and FBI that impeded data sharing on operatives. A critical barrier was the "wall" established by 1995 Justice Department guidelines, which strictly segregated foreign collection from domestic criminal investigations to safeguard against improper use of evidence, effectively preventing FBI agents from fully accessing CIA-held information on suspects like the hijackers. The later documented how this policy, intended to protect , fostered a culture of compartmentalization where CIA leads on travel and activities were not promptly relayed to FBI counterterrorism units, despite statutory requirements under the . Visa processing lapses compounded these issues; for instance, the Immigration and Naturalization Service's automated systems failed to flag overstays or coordinate with on high-risk entrants, leaving unresolved leads on thousands of cases including those involving Saudi nationals with jihadist ties. Particular missed opportunities underscored the human and procedural toll of these silos, as seen in the handling of hijackers and . The CIA photographed both attending an operational meeting in , , from January 5-8, 2000, and confirmed Mihdhar's U.S. visa issuance on April 23, 2000, yet delayed placing either on a watchlist until Mihdhar in late August 2001 and Hazmi not at all pre-9/11, allowing them to enter the U.S. multiple times and settle in by September 2000. Even after learning in January 2001 of their links to the via shared intelligence, the CIA withheld full details from the FBI until late August 2001, citing concerns over source protection and jurisdictional boundaries, despite Mihdhar and Hazmi's open associations with local flight instructors and attendance at mosques known to radicals. This non-pursuit persisted amid their visa expirations and suspicious activities, such as Hazmi's multiple address changes and interactions with other plot participants. Broader institutional shortcomings included a failure to fully grasp al Qaeda's adaptive tactics, characterized by the as deficiencies in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management, where analysts did not envision the weaponization of commercial airliners despite precedents like the thwarted 1995 to explode U.S.-bound planes. U.S. agencies underestimated the persistent threat from Islamist extremists inspired by Bin Ladin's global jihad declaration, partly due to resource allocation favoring state actors over non-state networks and a post-Cold War pivot that deprioritized . Critiques in the Commission's findings and subsequent reviews pointed to hesitancy in prioritizing ideological profiling of jihadist indicators—such as repeated attendance by Saudi and Yemeni males at radical training—over generalized threat assessments, influenced by domestic sensitivities around targeting specific ethnic or religious groups despite empirical patterns in al Qaeda recruitment and operations. These factors collectively enabled the plot to advance unchecked, as disconnected warnings failed to trigger proactive measures like enhanced or unified field investigations.

Execution of the Attacks

Hijacking Sequence and Crash Timeline

, a bound from Boston's to , departed at 7:59 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). The aircraft carried 81 passengers, 11 crew members, and five hijackers, including pilot-trained . Hijackers initiated the takeover around 8:14 a.m., using box cutters and mace to stab flight attendants and gain access to the , as reported in calls from attendant to ground personnel describing stabbings and passenger injuries. (ATC) logs captured the hijackers' announcement over the radio: "We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you'll be okay." The was disabled at 8:21 a.m., and the plane deviated sharply southward; it crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. , another on the same Boston-to-Los Angeles route, departed Logan at 8:14 a.m. with 56 passengers, 9 crew, and five hijackers led by . The hijacking occurred between 8:42 a.m. (last routine communication) and 8:46 a.m., with hijackers employing similar tactics of knives and threats of a to control the cabin, per ATC observations of erratic maneuvers and a turned-off . Flight attendants relayed details of the assault via airphone calls, noting slain crew and restricted cockpit access. The aircraft turned sharply toward and struck the South Tower at 9:03 a.m. American Airlines Flight 77, a departing for at 8:20 a.m., carried 58 passengers, 6 crew, and five hijackers including as pilot. Hijackers seized control around 8:51-8:54 a.m., slashing throats of crew members and claiming a , as inferred from flight data recorder (FDR) recovery showing cockpit intrusion and passenger calls reporting violence. The code changed multiple times before going dark, and the plane executed a 330-degree descending spiral; it impacted at 9:37 a.m. United Airlines Flight 93, a delayed from to and airborne at 8:42 a.m., had 37 passengers, 7 crew, and four hijackers with trained as pilot. The hijacking began around 9:28 a.m., with cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data capturing stabbings, mace deployment, and threats of a to subdue passengers. Passengers, informed via airphones of earlier attacks, revolted starting at approximately 9:57 a.m., storming the amid sounds of struggle recorded on the CVR. The plane crashed in a field near , at 10:03 a.m. after hijackers pitched it nose-down.
FlightDeparture Time (EDT)Hijacking OnsetCrash Time (EDT)Key Evidence Sources
AA117:59 a.m.~8:14 a.m.8:46 a.m.ATC logs, Ong calls
UA1758:14 a.m.8:42-8:46 a.m.9:03 a.m.ATC, airphone calls
AA778:20 a.m.~8:51 a.m.9:37 a.m.FDR, passenger calls
UA938:42 a.m.~9:28 a.m.10:03 a.m.CVR, airphone calls

World Trade Center Impacts and Collapses

American Airlines Flight 11 struck the North Tower (WTC 1) between the 93rd and 99th floors at 8:46 a.m. on September 11, 2001, severing multiple core columns and dislodging fireproofing insulation from steel members. United Airlines Flight 175 impacted the South Tower (WTC 2) between the 77th and 85th floors at 9:03 a.m., causing similar structural damage including the failure of perimeter and core columns. Each Boeing 767 carried approximately 10,000 gallons of jet fuel, which ignited upon impact, creating fireballs and spreading fires across multiple floors fueled by office contents. The fires, combined with burning combustibles, generated temperatures reaching up to 1,000°C in localized areas, sufficient to weaken but not melt , which loses about 50% of its strength at 600°C. In both towers, the aircraft impacts stripped fireproofing from trusses and columns, exposing steel to prolonged heating; NIST simulations showed sagging floor trusses pulling inward on perimeter columns, leading to . The South Tower's lower impact zone and off-center hit initiated its collapse first at 9:59 a.m., just 56 minutes after impact, as the upper sections failed progressively downward in a pancake-like sequence. The North Tower followed at 10:28 a.m., after 102 minutes, with its higher impact allowing more time for spread but similar failure mechanics. The towers' innovative tube-frame design—featuring lightweight floor trusses spanning between a central core and exterior columns—facilitated the unprecedented progressive collapses once initial failures occurred, as the dynamic load of falling upper floors overwhelmed lower structures. Seismic records from nearby stations registered signals consistent with progressive gravitational collapse, lacking the high-frequency spikes characteristic of explosive detonations; for comparison, the 1993 WTC truck bomb (0.5 tons of explosives) produced no detectable seismic signal at similar distances. NIST analyses, incorporating eyewitness videos, debris patterns, and computer models, found no corroborating evidence for explosives or alternative demolition hypotheses. Debris from the North Tower's collapse inflicted structural damage to World Trade Center Building 7 (WTC 7), igniting uncontrolled fires on multiple floors that burned for seven hours without firefighting intervention due to disruptions. NIST determined that from these fires caused the failure of a critical interior column (Column 79) on the 13th floor, triggering a of girder walk-offs and , culminating in WTC 7's total failure at 5:20 p.m. The building's long-span design and lack of automatic sprinklers in key areas exacerbated the vulnerability, with no evidence of explosives indicated by audio, video, or seismic data.

Pentagon Strike and Flight 93

American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757-223, departed Washington Dulles International Airport at 8:10 a.m. bound for Los Angeles with 58 passengers, 6 crew members, and 5 hijackers aboard. The hijackers, led by pilot-trained Hani Hanjour, seized control around 8:51 a.m., shortly after the transponder was turned off, turning the aircraft southeast toward Washington, D.C. Hanjour, despite prior flight instructors deeming his skills inadequate for complex maneuvers, manually piloted the plane in a high-speed, low-altitude descent, clipping five light poles along a Virginia highway before impacting the Pentagon's newly renovated west facade at 9:37:45 a.m. at approximately 530 miles per hour. This approach evaded immediate air defenses due to the aircraft's civilian profile, rapid vector change, and the nascent confusion in NORAD response protocols following the earlier World Trade Center strikes. The impact created an initial entry hole roughly 18 feet high and 20 feet wide in the exterior wall, with overall facade damage spanning about 75 feet from the wingspan and debris penetration, leading to a partial roof collapse over 50,000 square feet within 20 minutes from structural fire and impact forces. Recovery efforts identified Boeing 757-specific wreckage, including landing gear, engine components, and fuselage fragments bearing American Airlines markings, scattered inside and outside the building, corroborating the commercial airliner strike against claims of alternative munitions. The FBI confirmed the five hijackers' presence via DNA analysis of remains matched against pre-attack samples and process-of-elimination from victim identifications, alongside radar tracks, flight data recorder (FDR) recovery showing manual throttle advance and dive, and over 100 eyewitness accounts of a large passenger jet. NTSB reconstructions affirmed Hanjour's rudimentary training sufficed for the uncontrolled suicide dive, requiring no advanced aerobatics beyond pointing the nose and accelerating. The strike killed all 64 on the plane and 125 Pentagon personnel. , a 757-222, departed Newark International Airport at 8:42 a.m. (delayed 41 minutes) for with 33 passengers, 7 members, and 4 hijackers, including pilot who had logged over 300 hours of . Hijackers stormed the around 9:28 a.m., and slitting throats to gain access, as captured on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recovered from the crash site. Jarrah broadcast hijacker announcements in , claiming possession, while passengers, learning via airphones of the other attacks, organized a counterassault. , in a call to a operator, rallied others with "Are you guys ready? Okay. ," preceding CVR audio of shouts, crashes against the door, and Jarrah's exclamations of "Is that it? Shall we finish it off?" as the plane pitched and rolled violently. Flight 93 crashed inverted at 10:03 a.m. into a reclaimed strip mine near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after Jarrah, likely aiming for the U.S. Capitol based on al-Qaeda planning documents and flight path toward Washington, lost control amid the revolt. The impact formed a 15-foot-deep crater with debris scattered over 8 miles along the flight path, including engine fragments matching the Boeing 757's Rolls-Royce RB211 turbofans, FDR data logging the final descent from 35,000 feet, and CVR evidence of passenger breaches causing the fatal roll. Hijackers were identified through DNA from remains, corroborated by passenger calls naming them and pre-crash manifests. Jarrah's training enabled basic navigation and control sufficient for the intended ramming, disrupted only by the onboard resistance. All 40 aboard perished, short of the probable Capitol target.

Casualties, Damage, and Immediate Destruction

The September 11 attacks caused 2,977 fatalities among civilians, , and other non-hijacker victims across the four crash sites. Of these, 2,606 occurred at the World Trade Center in —for a total of 2,753 victims from the World Trade Center attacks, including those in the towers, on the ground, and aboard the two planes that struck them—125 at in Arlington, , and 246 on the four hijacked , including passengers and crew; 40 individuals perished in the crash of in . Among , 343 (FDNY) members died while attempting to rescue occupants from the World Trade Center towers, representing the single deadliest incident for any U.S. fire service agency. An additional 72 law enforcement officers from 37 agencies, including 37 Police Department members and 23 New York Police Department officers, were killed in the line of duty, primarily at the World Trade Center. Victims spanned diverse demographics and occupations, with heavy representation from finance and aviation sectors reflecting the targeted sites. At the World Trade Center, occupants included thousands of financial services employees—such as 658 from in the North Tower alone—alongside government workers, visitors, and maintenance staff. The aircraft crashes claimed lives from 15 nations among passengers and crew, underscoring the attacks' transnational reach. Al-Qaeda's operational design, as articulated in post-attack statements by , explicitly sought to maximize civilian deaths through suicide hijackings into densely populated symbols of U.S. economic (World Trade Center), military (), and intended political (Capitol or via Flight 93) power, framing such indiscriminate killing as a religious and strategic imperative to instill widespread fear. Immediate structural destruction was catastrophic: American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 struck the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m., respectively, causing both 110-story skyscrapers to collapse within two hours due to impact damage severing core columns and ensuing fires weakening steel supports across multiple floors. The debris field pulverized surrounding buildings, including full collapses of 7 World Trade Center (later that day) and Marriott World Trade Center Hotel, with damage to 11 other structures rendering the 16-acre site uninhabitable amid millions of tons of twisted steel, concrete, and toxic dust. At the Pentagon, American Airlines Flight 77 impacted the west facade at 9:37 a.m., penetrating three rings and igniting fires that caused a 100-foot-wide section to partially collapse, destroying offices and compromising the building's E Ring. United Airlines Flight 93 crashed at high speed into a reclaimed strip mine, disintegrating the Boeing 757 and scattering wreckage over an eight-mile corridor without impacting its intended Washington, D.C., target. The attacks inflicted initial economic damage estimated at approximately $100 billion, encompassing property destruction, business interruptions, and cleanup costs. The (FAA) imposed a nationwide by 9:45 a.m., halting all 4,500+ commercial and private flights in U.S. airspace—the first such unplanned shutdown in history—and stranding aircraft at airports until limited restarts on 13. The and remained closed for four trading days until 17, disrupting global financial flows and exacerbating losses in aviation and insurance sectors already reeling from aircraft destruction and liability claims.

Immediate Response

First Responder Actions and Heroism

Firefighters from the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) arrived at the World Trade Center shortly after the first plane struck the North Tower at 8:46 a.m. on September 11, 2001, and began ascending stairwells in full protective gear weighing approximately 60 pounds, plus additional equipment, to conduct rescues above the impact zones. This response involved over 400 FDNY units, with members climbing up to 78 floors in some cases despite intense heat, smoke, and structural instability. The department suffered 343 fatalities, representing the single greatest loss of life in its history and underscoring the scale of their commitment amid unprecedented conditions. Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) officers, responsible for the World Trade Center complex, immediately initiated evacuations and assisted trapped individuals, often coordinating with FDNY personnel despite lacking unified command structures. Of the 37 PAPD officers killed, many died while directing civilians downward or searching for victims in upper floors of the towers. Notable individual heroism included that of , a 24-year-old equities trader and trained volunteer in the South Tower, who used a red bandana to cover his face against smoke and led multiple groups—estimated at 12 to 18 people—down Stairwell B from the 78th-floor after the 9:03 a.m. impact, returning several times before perishing in the collapse. Such acts exemplified voluntary without formal responder status, drawing on personal initiative to fill gaps in the chaotic environment. First responders faced severe operational hurdles, including FDNY radio systems that failed to propagate signals effectively inside the towers due to the buildings' structures and the overload from high-rise frequencies, resulting in fragmented communications and delayed awareness of the South Tower's collapse. Inter-agency coordination was limited by incompatible protocols and no established joint command post, yet responders improvised, with many ignoring personal safety to prioritize upward searches. The absence of prior operational doctrines for jet-fuel ignited fires in steel-framed from deliberate plane crashes forced reliance on conventional high-rise response tactics, which could not account for the rapid weakening of core columns and floors. Nevertheless, these efforts enabled a of approximately 99% for the estimated 14,000 to 17,000 occupants below the impact zones, as ' presence facilitated orderly descents and cleared paths amid debris and panic. Their actions demonstrably prevented higher casualties by maintaining access to stairwells and providing directional guidance, mitigating the potential for complete structural failure to trap all below.

Evacuation and Civilian Survival

An estimated 13,000 to 17,000 occupants successfully evacuated the World Trade Center's twin towers prior to their collapses on September 11, 2001, averting far higher casualties through self-directed efforts amid chaos. Evacuation commenced spontaneously after struck the North Tower at 8:46 a.m., with individuals below the impact zones—floors 93 to 99—initiating descent via stairwells despite initial uncertainty about the event's nature. police and building management reinforced this by issuing public address announcements directing evacuation from both towers shortly after the second impact at 9:03 a.m. The towers' structural design facilitated much of the escape, as the impacts severed elevators and damaged upper sections but left at least two of three stairwells intact below the crash zones, enabling passage despite accumulating , falling , and physical obstructions. Survivors navigated narrow 44-inch-wide staircases, often congested by crowds, yet persisted for up to 100 minutes in the South Tower and longer in the North, with many aiding injured or slower colleagues through prosocial actions rather than selfish flight. Data from post-event studies, including interviews with over 1,000 survivors, indicate minimal panic, with orderly queuing and mutual assistance prevailing under extreme stress, contrasting expectations of mass hysteria in such scenarios. These evacuations underscored human agency in , as occupants drew on personal judgment and informal networks for guidance when communications faltered amid the unprecedented attacks. The experience exposed limitations in pre-9/11 high-rise egress designs, such as insufficient stairwell capacity and lack of smoke-proofing, prompting subsequent codes to mandate wider, redundant, and pressurized stair enclosures in to enhance flow during emergencies. Overall, the success rate—near 99% for those below impact floors—reflected effective bottom-up coordination that mitigated the hijackers' intent to maximize deaths.

Federal and Local Government Mobilization

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) faced significant delays in scrambling fighter jets due to pre-9/11 hijacking protocols designed for scenarios involving negotiable demands rather than suicide missions. The FAA notified NORAD of American Airlines Flight 11's hijacking at 8:37 a.m., but fighters from Otis Air National Guard Base did not take off until 8:53 a.m., after the plane had already struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Similar lags occurred for subsequent flights, with no interceptors positioned to engage before impacts, reflecting peacetime constraints that lacked standing authority to shoot down civilian airliners without explicit presidential orders or hijacker communications indicating threats. President , informed of the attacks while at an elementary school in , initially continued a scheduled reading event before departing at approximately 9:54 a.m. following the second tower strike; he was flown to in and then to in for security briefings under protocols. Vice President was evacuated to the beneath the , from where he coordinated defensive measures, including authorizing force against inbound threats, though no such engagements occurred pre-crash due to the rapid timeline and absence of real-time tracking. These actions invoked longstanding continuity plans to ensure executive functionality amid fears of further attacks on . New York City Mayor declared a local shortly after the towers were hit, enabling rapid deployment of city resources for rescue and evacuation amid collapsing infrastructure. The response involved coordinating fire, police, and emergency medical services, though communications failures hampered inter-agency efforts initially. Federally, President Bush authorized the activation of over 8,000 New York Army and Air National Guard personnel by day's end to secure airspace, assist recovery, and maintain order, marking one of the swiftest domestic mobilizations in U.S. history. On September 14, 2001, President Bush visited Ground Zero in , addressing with a bullhorn to affirm national resolve: "I can hear you, the rest of the world hears you, and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon." This symbolic gesture underscored federal commitment to recovery without diminishing the premeditated jihadist strategy that exploited institutional assumptions about hijacking motives. Empirical shortcomings, such as absent shoot-down protocols for non-communicative threats, highlighted vulnerabilities in a defense posture calibrated for Cold War-era contingencies rather than asymmetric .

Official Investigations and Findings

FBI Counterterrorism Investigations

The FBI launched Operation , its largest investigation in history, on September 11, 2001, mobilizing over half of its agents at peak to identify the 19 hijackers and their sponsors. Codenamed for the , , and Twin Towers sites, the probe rapidly confirmed hijacker identities within days by cross-referencing airline passenger manifests with Immigration and Naturalization Service records and CCTV footage from airports, including Dulles International where five hijackers were recorded passing security checkpoints. The FBI publicly released the hijackers' names on September 14, 2001, enabling further tracing of their U.S. movements, such as flight training in and . PENTTBOM led to approximately 1,200 detentions in the initial months, primarily of individuals on violations rather than direct links, as investigators prioritized disrupting potential threats amid scant evidence of broader domestic conspiracies. Of these, 762 non-citizens were held on charges connected to the inquiry through 2002, with joint task forces interviewing thousands and executing hundreds of searches. Prosecutions for 9/11-related were limited, as most detainees lacked provable ties to the plot, shifting focus to and prevention of follow-on attacks. A key pre-attack lead involved , arrested on August 16, 2001, in for immigration violations after enrolling in suspicious without intent to learn basic maneuvers like takeoffs or landings. The Minneapolis FBI field office initiated a full investigation, suspecting Moussaoui's ties to based on his evasive behavior and prior attendance at Afghan training camps; he was later indicted in December 2001 as a conspirator, with evidence linking him to potential roles in the plot, including as a prospective . integrated this case to probe disrupted domestic activities, though headquarters initially resisted FISA warrants, highlighting internal coordination challenges. Financial analysis under traced over $300,000 flowing through the hijackers' U.S. bank accounts, primarily via wire transfers from overseas facilitators in the and , supplemented by cash smuggling and use. These trails exposed al-Qaeda's operational funding mechanisms but revealed no extensive U.S.-based support infrastructure, with hijackers relying on self-financed, low-profile transactions rather than local cells or sympathizers. The investigation's emphasis on these patterns dismantled nascent overseas networks while confirming the plot's execution by a compact, autonomous team within the .

CIA Intelligence Reviews

The CIA's Office of (OIG) conducted a review of agency accountability regarding the September 11 attacks, concluding in that while there were significant lapses in tracking known operatives, no individual CIA officers bore direct responsibility due to systemic issues rather than personal . Specifically, the review highlighted that in 2000, the CIA's Counterterrorist (CTC) identified future hijackers and as participants in an summit in , , yet failed to nominate them for the State Department's watchlist until August 23, 2001, despite internal awareness of their U.S. visa applications and . This delay stemmed from inadequate follow-up on (HUMINT) leads and over-reliance on (SIGINT), with the CTC understaffed and prioritizing dissemination protocols that fragmented information sharing. Post-9/11 internal audits revealed broader deficiencies in HUMINT collection on jihadist networks, including underinvestment in penetrative sources within radical mosques and training camps where operatives like the hijackers were radicalized, as resources were disproportionately allocated to state-based threats such as weapons proliferation rather than decentralized terrorist cells. In response, the CIA expanded the CTC's mandate and staffing, integrating more analysts and case officers focused on tracking, which facilitated operations like the December 2001 , where CIA paramilitary teams supported Afghan allies in encircling Osama bin Laden's forces but ultimately failed to prevent his evasion into via mountain escape routes. Further reforms emphasized enhanced interrogation and rendition programs, exemplified by the March 1, 2003, capture of 9/11 operational planner (KSM) in , , through a joint CIA-ISI raid, after which his interrogations yielded detailed confessions on the plot's architecture, including hijacker selection and aircraft targeting. These efforts, per OIG assessments, addressed pre-attack gaps in plot reconstruction but underscored ongoing critiques of HUMINT prioritization, as the agency's pre-9/11 HUMINT cadre on Sunni extremists numbered fewer than a dozen dedicated officers globally. Overall, the reviews attributed lapses to institutional inertia and resource misallocation, prompting a shift toward proactive CTC-led disruptions of command structures.

9/11 Commission and Congressional Inquiries

The Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of , 2001, conducted jointly by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, culminated in a report released on December 10, 2002. The inquiry examined pre-attack intelligence failures, including inadequate collection on operatives, silos between agencies like the CIA and FBI, and missed opportunities to connect domestic surveillance dots to overseas threats. It highlighted systemic barriers to information sharing but withheld a 28-page annex on potential foreign government connections, which was declassified on July 15, 2016, after review by intelligence agencies. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the (9/11 Commission), an independent bipartisan panel created by congressional signed on November 27, 2002, built upon the Joint Inquiry with a broader mandate to investigate causes, response, and prevention. Its final report, published July 22, 2004, drew from over 1,200 interviews across 10 countries and review of 2.5 million pages of documents, concluding that the attacks succeeded due to U.S. government failures in imagination (underestimating al-Qaeda's ambition for domestic spectaculars), policy (treating terrorism as a secondary priority), capabilities (gaps in and aviation security), and management (rivalries impeding data flow). The report outlined al-Qaeda's operations under Osama bin Laden's direction, motivated by opposition to U.S. through declared , but framed root causes primarily in organizational terms rather than deeper ideological confrontations with radical Islamist networks. Among its 41 recommendations, the commission urged creation of a to oversee and integrate the 15 intelligence agencies, reducing the Director of Central Intelligence's dual hat; establishment of a for joint analysis and operations; mandatory information-sharing protocols across federal, state, and local levels; and overhaul of immigration and visa screening to track terrorist travel patterns. These spurred the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which implemented the DNI position and counterterrorism center, while reinforcing the Department of Homeland Security (created in 2002) with enhanced border and transportation security mandates. Critics, including some former intelligence officials, have faulted the report for timeline inconsistencies, such as discrepancies in FAA notifications to and fighter scramble orders compared to initial agency accounts, which the commission itself acknowledged as creating misleading impressions of responsiveness. Others contend the emphasis on bureaucratic "failures of imagination" omitted rigorous scrutiny of policy reluctance to prioritize countering jihadist as a civilizational , prioritizing structural fixes over of ideological drivers.

NIST Engineering Analyses

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) led a federal investigation authorized under the National Construction Safety Team Act, producing peer-reviewed reports on the structural performance of World Trade Center (WTC) Buildings 1, 2, and 7 during the September 11, 2001 attacks. These analyses integrated impact simulations, fire dynamics modeling, and material testing to determine collapse sequences, emphasizing the combined effects of structural damage from jet impacts and subsequent multi-floor fires fueled by contents and office combustibles. NIST's models demonstrated that the towers' lightweight floor systems, designed for but with limited fireproofing dislodged by impacts, sagged under heat exposure exceeding 1,000°C in localized areas, leading to inward bowing of perimeter columns and initiating progressive global collapse. For WTC 1 and 2, finite element simulations using tools like replicated the aircraft strikes at 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m., respectively, which severed or damaged 35-40% of exterior columns and core columns while dislodging spray-on fireproofing from steel trusses. Fire spread models, validated with large-scale experiments and video evidence, showed unprotected trusses weakening rapidly, with sagging floors pulling core and perimeter columns into failure over 56 minutes for WTC 2 and 102 minutes for WTC 1. These sequences aligned with observed tilt and descent rates, where upper sections descended at near-free-fall acceleration after initial due to dynamic overload on compromised supports. In WTC 7, which collapsed at 5:20 p.m. after seven hours of uncontrolled fires initiated by debris from WTC 1's fall at 10:28 a.m., NIST's thermal-structural analyses ruled out diesel fuel tanks as a primary factor, instead identifying debris-induced structural damage and fire heating on 7-9 and 11-13 as causal. Simulations indicated thermal expansion of a critical east-side (supported by Column 79) at temperatures around 600°C, causing walk-off from its seat and of the column, which triggered failures propagating westward and leading to global instability. This fire-induced mechanism was corroborated by seismic data, video of eastward facade lean, and eyewitness reports of creaking, without reliance on forces. Debris examinations and metallurgical tests found no evidence of or thermitic residues in recovered samples, with failure modes consistent with high-temperature weakening rather than cutting or fracturing from blasts; NIST deemed such testing unnecessary absent prior indicators but affirmed models against alternative hypotheses through lack of seismic or audio signatures. Validation involved cross-checking against 3,000+ photographs, videos, and 1,000+ witness accounts, ensuring empirical fidelity over speculative engineering claims. NIST's findings prompted 31 recommendations, influencing updates to the (e.g., enhanced structural redundancy, improved fireproofing adhesion, and resistance in high-rises), adopted in editions post-2005 for better resilience to impact and loads.

Major Controversies

Intelligence Failures and Political Reluctance to Confront Radical Islam

Prior to the September 11 attacks, systemic barriers between the (CIA) and (FBI) hindered the sharing of critical intelligence on operatives. The CIA tracked hijackers and attending an summit in in January 2000 and knew they had entered the , yet failed to promptly notify the FBI, allowing them to settle in and associate with local extremists undetected. This siloing was exacerbated by legal "walls" under the (FISA), designed to separate criminal investigations from intelligence gathering, which field agents argued paralyzed proactive surveillance of suspected terrorists. The later identified over 70 instances where such disconnects prevented "connecting the dots" on threats, including flight training by hijackers reported to the FBI but not escalated. Under the administration, responses to Islamist terrorism demonstrated restraint influenced by the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, where 18 U.S. soldiers died in a failed operation against warlord , fostering aversion to ground engagements in Muslim-majority regions. Following al-Qaeda's 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in and , which killed 224 people, President Clinton authorized cruise missile strikes on al-Qaeda camps in and a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant but avoided broader military invasion or sustained pursuit of , citing insufficient evidence and risks of escalation. The in October 2000, killing 17 sailors in , similarly elicited no immediate retaliation, with investigations stalled amid concerns over Yemen's cooperation and domestic political calculations during the election season. These measured actions, while avoiding quagmires, signaled to militants that spectacular attacks carried limited costs, emboldening al-Qaeda's operational tempo. The incoming Bush administration in 2001 initially deprioritized terrorism in favor of state-based threats, including ballistic missiles from rogue nations and competition with China. Counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke reported repeated frustrations in principals' meetings, where National Security Advisor emphasized structural reviews over immediate action, despite Clarke's warnings of an imminent plot. The August 6, 2001, titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in " referenced historical surveillance of but prompted no heightened domestic alerts, as focus remained on overseas disruptions rather than homeland vulnerabilities. This strategic orientation reflected a post-Cold War paradigm viewing non-state actors as secondary to peer competitors. FBI whistleblower , chief counsel in the field office, exposed internal resistance to pursuing leads on , arrested August 2001 for suspicious flight training and possession of a knife, whom agents suspected as a potential hijacker. denied search warrants for his laptop, citing thresholds and fears of FISA violations, despite field pleas linking him to al-Qaeda affiliates. Rowley's 2002 congressional testimony detailed a culture of bureaucratic inertia and legal risk aversion, where concerns over outweighed threats, allowing unchecked activities by figures tied to the plot. Broader reluctance to monitor mosques or profile young Arab males at flight schools stemmed from post-1995 sensitivities against "profiling," which officials equated with despite empirical patterns in . These failures traced to a policy aversion to explicitly designating radical as the ideological driver, treating incidents as isolated crimes rather than symptoms of jihadist doctrine advocating violence against the West. Pre-9/11 analyses often diluted causal links to Islamist , prioritizing diplomatic outreach to Muslim states over domestic ideological , amid fears of inflaming communities or appearing intolerant. Post-attacks, President Bush candidly labeled the enemy "Islamic extremists" and "evildoers" rooted in a "fringe form of ," yet subsequent softened, with Secretary in 2009 rephrasing terrorism as "man-caused disasters" to eschew fear-mongering, delaying full acknowledgment of jihadism's doctrinal imperatives. This euphemistic shift, echoed in training materials avoiding "" or "Islamist," perpetuated analytical blind spots by abstracting threats from their motivating .

Evidence of Saudi Regime Support for Hijackers

Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers responsible for the , 2001, attacks were Saudi nationals, a demographic fact that has fueled scrutiny of potential regime ties despite al-Qaeda's ideological opposition to the Saudi . Declassified FBI documents from 2021 detail assistance provided to two Saudi hijackers, and , by , a suspected Saudi intelligence operative based in , who arranged housing and financial support shortly after their arrival in the United States in February 2000. Fahad al-Thumairy, a Saudi and consular official in with ties to extremist networks, was also investigated for facilitating their logistics, including potential contacts for travel and settlement, as outlined in the same FBI memorandum. The declassified "28 pages" from the 2002 Congressional Inquiry into 9/11, released in 2016, highlighted preliminary evidence of Saudi institutional links to the hijackers, including wire transfers and personal connections involving Saudi officials, though the inquiry emphasized these required further investigation without confirming government orchestration. In 2024, unsealed court evidence in ongoing 9/11 victim lawsuits revealed videos recorded by al-Bayoumi in 1999, depicting reconnaissance of , landmarks like the Capitol, alongside sketches of aircraft and extremist materials seized from his residence, bolstering claims of intelligence-gathering aligned with hijacker preparations. An FBI report from 2017 explicitly identified al-Bayoumi as a Saudi agent, corroborating his role beyond mere coincidence in aiding the hijackers' integration. Civil lawsuits by 9/11 families, pursued by firms including Motley Rice and Kreindler & Kreindler under the Anti-Terrorism Act, allege that Saudi officials violated U.S. law by providing material support to the hijackers, citing these declassified materials and al-Bayoumi's actions as evidence of regime complicity. On August 28, 2025, U.S. District Judge George Daniels denied Saudi Arabia's motion to dismiss in one such case, ruling that plaintiffs' claims of knowing assistance met the threshold for trial, rejecting sovereign immunity defenses and allowing discovery to proceed into potential intelligence-directed aid. These suits frame the support as part of broader Saudi funding pipelines for Wahhabi-influenced extremism, which empirically sustained al-Qaeda's operational capacity through mosques, charities, and clerical networks promoting jihadist ideologies akin to those of the hijackers. No declassified evidence has surfaced demonstrating direct orders from Saudi royals or the to facilitate the specific 9/11 plot, with FBI analyses consistently attributing hijacker to individual or mid-level rather than high-level directive. Nonetheless, the pattern of unprosecuted assistance and Saudi Arabia's historical export of —via state-backed institutions that indoctrinated thousands in radical Salafism—provided the ideological and logistical ecosystem enabling such operatives to embed and support affiliates without apparent internal repercussions. This circumstantial web, while not proving orchestration, underscores causal links between regime tolerance of and the attacks' execution, as affirmed in judicial allowances for litigation despite diplomatic pushback.

9/11 Truth Movement Claims and Empirical Debunkings

The , which emerged shortly after the attacks, posits that the events were an "inside job" orchestrated by elements within the U.S. government to justify wars and erode , rather than the work of hijackers. Proponents claim controlled demolitions felled the World Trade Center towers and Building 7, that struck via missile rather than aircraft, and that was shot down by U.S. military jets. These theories often cite perceived anomalies in collapse speeds, debris patterns, and seismic data while dismissing 's repeated claims of responsibility, such as Osama bin Laden's October 2001 video admission and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's 2007 Guantanamo confession detailing his role as mastermind. Claims of a missile strike on the ignore over 100 eyewitness accounts of a large commercial , including markings, approaching at low altitude before impact, as well as recovered debris such as , engine components matching specifications, and the flight data recorder from Flight 77. DNA analysis identified all 64 passengers and crew, plus five hijackers, from remains at the site, consistent with a plane crash rather than an . The damage pattern—a 75-foot-wide hole expanding due to wing fuel ignition and structural penetration—aligns with forensic modeling of a 124-ton at 530 mph, not a smaller , which would produce distinct fragmentation without aircraft-specific wreckage. No remnants were found, and tracks confirmed Flight 77's path from Dulles Airport. Controlled demolition theories for the World Trade Center buildings lack evidence of pre-planted explosives; post-collapse debris analysis by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and independent engineers found no traces of cutter charges, , or detonators, which would have produced audible blasts and seismic spikes beyond those recorded from plane impacts and initial fireballs. Seismic data from Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory registered no demolition-like signatures during collapses, only the impacts and debris falls. NIST's finite element simulations demonstrated that jet fuel-ignited fires, reaching 1,000°C, caused floor trusses to sag and pull perimeter columns inward, initiating progressive pancaking where upper floors' momentum overwhelmed lower supports— a process observed in videos and corroborated by steel samples showing loss of insulation and thermal weakening, not melting. Assertions of "free fall" speeds proving demolition misinterpret timings: the Twin Towers descended at about 60-70% of due to structural resistance, as upper sections pulverized concrete and ejected debris laterally, per NIST models and eyewitness videos showing waves. For WTC 7, which collapsed at 5:20 p.m. after uncontrolled fires burned for seven hours, NIST identified a critical column from , leading to global instability; while 2.25 seconds of the 18-second visible collapse approximated (due to exterior after internal progression), the total descent took 40% longer than pure , inconsistent with simultaneous detonations. Peer-reviewed analyses, including those by the , affirm fire-induced sequential over explosive symmetry. Flight 93 theories alleging a shoot-down cite spread over 8 miles, but cockpit voice recorder transcripts reveal passenger assaults on hijackers commencing at 9:57 a.m., causing erratic maneuvers and a 40-degree nose-down dive into Shanksville at 563 mph, producing the observed high-energy fragmentation pattern without missile shrapnel or intercept evidence. The FBI recovered the flight data recorder, confirming no external ordnance, and phone calls from passengers described revolt, not interception; military jets were scrambled too late from , arriving post-crash. Al-Qaeda's prior patterns of suicide operations and bin Laden's praise for the hijackers' "martyrdom" further undermine alternative attributions, as the movement's focus on anomalies neglects the causal chain of hijacker training, flight manifests, and intercepted communications linking to known operatives.

Policy and Military Aftermath

Launch of Global War on Terror

![President George W. Bush addresses a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001][float-right] On September 14, 2001, the U.S. Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), a joint resolution granting the President authority to employ "all necessary and appropriate force" against nations, organizations, or persons determined to have planned, authorized, committed, or aided the September 11 attacks, or harbored such actors. President George W. Bush signed the AUMF into law on September 18, 2001, providing the legal foundation for military actions targeting al-Qaeda and its enablers without a formal declaration of war. This legislation reflected a consensus that the attacks' scale—nearly 3,000 deaths from coordinated hijackings—demanded a proactive response beyond law enforcement, recognizing terrorism's transnational nature and the role of state tolerance in enabling operations like those of al-Qaeda. In his address to a of on September 20, 2001, Bush formally launched the Global War on Terror, articulating core elements of what became known as the Bush Doctrine: the imperative for preemptive action to deny terrorists safe havens and the framing of the conflict as a binary choice between civilized nations and those who harbor or support global jihadist networks. He emphasized that "our begins with , but it does not end there," committing to a sustained campaign to dismantle not only perpetrators but also their financial, logistical, and territorial supports worldwide, justified by the causal reality that 9/11's success stemmed from years of unchecked training and planning in Afghan sanctuaries under protection. This doctrinal shift prioritized disrupting decentralized terrorist infrastructures over conventional state-on-state warfare, underscoring that passive deterrence had failed against ideologically driven actors willing to sacrifice civilians for asymmetric strikes. The strategy's early focus on network disruption facilitated rapid enhancements in intelligence fusion across U.S. agencies and allies, enabling targeted operations to degrade al-Qaeda's command structure and operational tempo without initial reliance on large-scale occupation. By linking 9/11 directly to state-sponsored impunity—evidenced by al-Qaeda's prior attacks like the embassy bombings from similar bases—policymakers argued for preemption as a necessary evolution from containment, aiming to prevent recurrence through elimination of breeding grounds rather than of symptoms. This approach garnered broad international support initially, with over 100 nations offering assistance, highlighting the attacks' demonstration of jihadist threats' universality beyond U.S. borders.

Afghanistan Invasion and al-Qaeda Disruption

The United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001, with airstrikes targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda positions in Afghanistan, followed by ground operations in coordination with the Northern Alliance opposition forces. This rapid campaign led to the collapse of Taliban control in major cities, including Kabul on November 13, 2001, and Kandahar by early December, routing the regime with minimal U.S. ground troop involvement initially and inflicting heavy casualties on Taliban forces through air power, estimated at thousands killed in the opening months. The operation disrupted al-Qaeda's safe haven, forcing its leadership into hiding and degrading its operational capacity, though tactical decisions such as reliance on local Afghan militias during the Battle of Tora Bora from December 6–17, 2001, enabled Osama bin Laden's escape into Pakistan via unguarded mountain routes. Al-Qaeda's core structure suffered early setbacks, including the death of military chief on November 16, 2001, from a U.S. in , which hampered planning and command functions. Over the subsequent two decades, the invasion prevented from serving as a launchpad for major external terrorist plots against the U.S. homeland comparable to 9/11, with al-Qaeda's central leadership unable to orchestrate large-scale operations from the region due to sustained U.S. and pressure. However, the prolonged occupation evolved into a strategic quagmire, as insurgents regrouped in rural areas and border regions, exploiting governance weaknesses in the U.S.-backed Afghan government to mount a persistent . Post-2014, targeted drone strikes proved effective in eliminating remaining leaders sheltering in , demonstrating the viability of precision operations over broad efforts. Notable successes included strikes against high-value targets, culminating in the 2022 killing of leader in , which underscored the persistence of militant networks despite the 's professed break with al-Qaeda. Yet, these tactical gains contrasted with strategic failure, as the Taliban capitalized on the U.S. withdrawal agreement and accelerated collapse of Afghan forces in August 2021, regaining full control of the country by mid-August and restoring their Islamic Emirate, thereby reviving conditions for potential terrorist resurgence. This outcome highlighted the limits of military intervention in achieving enduring stability without addressing underlying tribal dynamics and ideological commitments. Saddam Hussein's regime provided financial incentives to families of Palestinian suicide bombers targeting Israeli civilians, disbursing $25,000 per family in documented payments during the early , reflecting a pattern of state sponsorship for anti-Western terrorist acts aligned with Islamist extremism. The Iraqi government also harbored , an Iraqi-American fugitive indicted for mixing chemicals in the that killed six and injured over 1,000; Yasin fled to post-attack, lived openly under Saddam's protection, and received monthly payments from Iraqi intelligence until his eventual departure. Claims of direct operational ties to al-Qaeda included reports of 9/11 hijacker meeting Iraqi intelligence officer Ahmed Samirani in on April 9, 2001; Czech intelligence initially corroborated the encounter via surveillance and Atta's passport inconsistencies, though U.S. agencies later deemed evidence insufficient due to disputed travel records. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion of was framed by the Bush administration as a preventive measure in the post-9/11 era, emphasizing Saddam's history of WMD development, defiance of UN resolutions, and potential to arm terrorists amid the demonstrated vulnerability exposed by the attacks; President Bush stated on , 2002, that Iraq's WMD programs posed an imminent risk, citing intelligence on active biological and chemical efforts. No operational collaboration between Iraq and in the 9/11 plot was asserted, but the rationale stressed to eliminate a who rewarded and pursued prohibited weapons, with Vice President Cheney highlighting patterns of al-Qaeda contacts with dating to the . Post-invasion investigations, including the 2004 Duelfer Report by the , confirmed no active WMD stockpiles existed at the time of , attributing destruction of prior arsenals to the 1991 and UN inspections, yet revealing Saddam's intent to reconstitute programs once sanctions eased, supported by dual-use infrastructure and interviews with regime officials who affirmed his strategic value in WMD for deterrence. Debates persist over overstatements, with critics arguing prewar assessments exaggerated threats based on unreliable defectors, while defenders note Saddam's non-cooperation with inspectors and history of concealment validated precautionary action; the deposed Saddam on , , neutralizing a terrorist patron but sparking that empowered regionally, prompting evaluations of net security gains against over 4,000 U.S. deaths and trillions in costs by 2011 withdrawal.

Domestic and Societal Impacts

Surveillance and Counterterrorism Reforms

The USA PATRIOT Act, signed into law on October 26, 2001, significantly broadened federal surveillance capabilities in response to intelligence gaps exposed by the September 11 attacks. Key provisions included Section 206, authorizing roving wiretaps under the (FISA) to track targets across changing devices or locations, and Section 213, enabling "sneak-and-peek" warrants that delayed property owners' notification of searches to prevent alerting suspects. These addressed pre-9/11 constraints, such as device-specific warrants that operatives exploited by discarding phones. Section 215 of the Act further permitted the FBI to obtain business records, including bulk telephony metadata, deemed "relevant" to probes, a term expansively interpreted by the FISA Court to justify NSA's collection of millions of Americans' call records from 2001 onward. Edward Snowden's 2013 disclosures highlighted this program's scope, prompting debates over Fourth Amendment compliance and leading to the of June 2, 2015, which prohibited bulk metadata retention by the government, mandating instead that telecom firms hold data and respond to targeted FISA Court-approved queries using specific identifiers. Complementing these, Section 702 of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act—renewed in 2018 and 2023—authorized warrantless of non-U.S. persons abroad, with incidental U.S. person data minimized, yielding foreign intelligence on terrorist networks. These reforms demonstrably enhanced efficacy, with U.S. crediting expanded tools for disrupting numerous plots that pre-9/11 silos between domestic and foreign likely would have missed. Government assessments, including FBI testimony, link authorities to progress in preempting threats, such as the 2009 arrest of Afghan immigrant for plotting New York subway bombings, aided by intercepted communications under enhanced FISA powers. Officials, including former James , have asserted that post-9/11 programs thwarted over 50 potential attacks worldwide, prioritizing empirical threat disruption over absolute pre-attack barriers that contributed to 9/11 failures. While critics, often from advocates, decry overreach—citing NSA compliance lapses like unauthorized querying revealed in FISA Court rulings—these tools preserved core warrant requirements via judicial oversight, with reforms addressing excesses without dismantling core authorities. No comparable large-scale domestic terrorist success has occurred on U.S. soil since, correlating with the shift toward proactive amid acknowledged early oversight gaps.

Economic Disruptions and Recovery

The September 11 attacks caused immediate disruptions to financial markets, with the and closing until September 17, after which the fell 7.1% on the first trading day and declined approximately 14% from its close by September 21. The attacks reduced U.S. real GDP growth by 0.5 percentage points in 2001, contributing to a temporary slowdown amid an existing mild that had begun in and ended in November of that year, though revised data indicate the events did not independently trigger a . The airline industry faced acute losses, with U.S. carriers reporting over $10 billion in combined net losses for 2001, exacerbated by grounded flights and reduced demand, prompting a $15 billion federal package including loans and grants to prevent widespread bankruptcies. Insurers disbursed nearly $40 billion in payouts for , business interruption, and claims related to the attacks, marking the largest insured catastrophe at the time and testing the private sector's capacity to absorb shocks without systemic collapse. Recovery was swift, driven by interventions that injected liquidity through open market operations and rate cuts to the federal funds target from 3.5% to 3% immediately after the attacks, stabilizing credit markets and enabling a rebound in stock indices by early . This market-led resilience, supported by private capital flows and business adaptations rather than extensive fiscal stimulus, averted deeper contraction, with GDP growth resuming positive territory in Q4 2001 at 1.7%. In the long term, defense spending surged from about 3% of GDP pre-2001 to peaks over 4% during the wars in and , providing a fiscal boost to related industries but incurring opportunity costs estimated in trillions, as funds diverted from potential investments in , , or expansion crowded out private-sector gains. Aviation security enhancements, including TSA operations costing over $5 billion annually by the early (with passenger fees covering only about 40%), imposed ongoing burdens but served as a deterrent by raising the operational costs and risks for potential hijackers. These measures, while extracting resources from airlines and travelers, reflected causal trade-offs where heightened vigilance preserved broader economic confidence in over time.

Health Consequences for Responders and Exposed Populations

An estimated 400,000 individuals, including , cleanup workers, and nearby residents, were exposed to airborne toxins following the collapse of the World Trade Center towers on , 2001. The dust cloud contained pulverized concrete, from building insulation, unburned residues, , and organic compounds from fires and debris combustion, leading to acute and chronic health issues through and contact. Cohort studies of exposed populations have established causal links between these exposures and elevated rates of respiratory diseases, cancers, and disorders, with no identified threshold for safe exposure levels based on dose-response analyses. The World Trade Center Health Program (WTCHP), administered by the CDC, monitors and treats over 80,000 enrollees for more than 70 certified conditions, including various cancers, , and interstitial lung diseases. By September 2025, certified 9/11-linked cancer cases among responders and survivors had surged 143% over five years, reflecting ongoing diagnoses tied to latent effects of the toxic exposures. Total deaths from related illnesses exceed 3,000 as of early 2025, surpassing the 2,753 fatalities on the attack day itself. Among FDNY members, over 400 have died from World Trade Center-related illnesses by mid-2025, exceeding the 343 lost on 9/11. Exposome research published in 2024 integrates chemical, physical, and stressors, demonstrating synergistic effects of , trauma, and hazardous work conditions on responders' health outcomes. These studies link combined exposures to higher incidences of (PTSD), aerodigestive disorders, and lung cancers, with responders in high-contamination zones showing 2-3 times elevated risks compared to less-exposed cohorts. Early intervention through WTCHP monitoring and treatments, such as respiratory therapies and cancer screenings, has mitigated progression in some cases, though long-term morbidity persists due to irreversible tissue damage. Initial EPA assessments in September 2001 minimized airborne hazards outside the immediate Ground Zero site, stating the air was "safe to breathe" despite limited data on fine particulates and fibers, a position later criticized by the EPA for lacking scientific substantiation and potentially influencing public behavior. Former EPA Administrator acknowledged in 2016 that these assurances were erroneous, as subsequent monitoring revealed persistent contaminants correlating with observed health declines. Empirical evidence from longitudinal WTCHP data underscores the absence of negligible exposure risks, prioritizing causal exposure-response models over optimistic early projections.

Long-Term Legacy

Rebuilding Efforts and Memorials

The redevelopment of the 16-acre in proceeded amid significant bureaucratic hurdles from the of New York and , including protracted negotiations over design, security, and funding, which delayed progress compared to faster private-sector initiatives elsewhere on the site. Developer , who held the lease for portions of the site, advocated for expedited construction of office towers to restore economic viability, contrasting with public entity slowdowns that extended timelines for flagship projects. , initially dubbed the Freedom Tower, began construction in April 2006 and reached its structural topping-out on May 10, 2013, at a symbolic height of 1,776 feet, incorporating enhanced resilience features such as a fortified core and blast-resistant glazing to mitigate future threats. The broader site includes a transportation hub, the Oculus, designed to connect PATH trains, subways, and pedestrian pathways across the campus, facilitating renewed transit access. Commemorative efforts emphasized solemn reflection and heroism, with the National September 11 Memorial opening on September 11, 2011, featuring two large reflecting pools occupying the footprints of the original Twin Towers, surrounded by bronze parapets inscribed with the names of 2,983 victims from the World Trade Center, , and hijacked flights (excluding ). The design, titled "Reflecting Absence," uses cascading waterfalls into the pools to evoke absence and perpetual flow, set amid a plaza of swamp white oak trees. At the separate near , the focus highlights the actions of the 40 passengers and crew who thwarted the hijackers, likely preventing an attack on ; the site includes the Tower of Voices, a 93-foot structure with 40 wind chimes symbolizing their resolve. Rebuilding costs exceeded $20 billion in total public and private investment, with over $4 billion from public funds channeled through entities like the , though commercial leasing of new office space—reaching 90% occupancy in by 2021—drove economic revival in by attracting tenants and restoring pre-9/11 vitality. This leasing activity, bolstered by tax incentives and infrastructure improvements, reversed initial post-attack displacements and contributed to job growth and business retention in the district.

Cultural Representations and Public Memory

The film United 93 (2006), directed by , depicted the passengers' and crew's resistance on the hijacked flight that crashed in , consulting with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the and families of victims to reconstruct events based on cockpit recordings, phone calls, and data, though it included dramatized dialogues and sequences not directly verifiable from evidence. This approach contrasted with broader Hollywood tendencies toward sensationalism in 9/11-related productions, where some narratives amplified emotional spectacle or individual heroism at the expense of precise causal details about the attackers' coordinated planning under al-Qaeda's direction. Critics have noted that while factual recreations like United 93 preserved the attacks' stark reality—emphasizing the hijackers' deliberate invocation of religious justifications during the operation—other depictions risked diluting the ideological drivers by framing the event through lenses of universal trauma or unintended geopolitical fallout, potentially understating the premeditated jihadist strategy outlined in Osama bin Laden's fatwas. Public memory of the attacks initially coalesced around national unity, with President George W. Bush's approval rating reaching 90% in late September 2001 amid shared grief and resolve to confront , as evidenced by bipartisan congressional support for the Authorization for Use of Military Force. Over time, this cohesion fractured along partisan lines, particularly as debates over the intensified by 2003, with fatigue from prolonged conflicts eroding consensus on linking Saddam Hussein's regime to al-Qaeda's network despite intelligence assessments of limited operational ties. Empirical polling data, however, reveals persistent American opposition to excusing via socioeconomic "root causes" like , with 73% of respondents in 2011 attributing the attacks to extremist ideology rather than broader Islamic norms, and majorities continuing to prioritize ideological confrontation over narratives advanced in some academic circles. Such views counterbalance media and scholarly tendencies—often influenced by institutional biases toward —that minimized jihadist doctrinal motivations, such as al-Qaeda's explicit calls for global , in favor of emphasizing domestic "Islamophobia" or blowback. Institutions like the maintain public memory through preservation of over 82,000 artifacts, including twisted steel beams from the World Trade Center towers, victims' personal effects recovered from the debris, and hijackers' documents, ensuring an evidence-based recounting of the events without interpretive softening of the attackers' intent. These collections, drawn from ground zero recovery efforts and eyewitness submissions, resist politicized revisions by anchoring remembrance in physical remnants of the 2,977 fatalities and the structural failures caused by the impacts of and at 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m. respectively. Educational programming at such sites focuses on the causal chain from al-Qaeda's training camps to the operational execution, countering efforts in some cultural discourse to reframe the attacks as symptoms of inequality rather than products of Salafi-jihadist ideology, as articulated in Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's confessions of masterminding the plot under bin Laden's approval. This material fidelity sustains awareness of vulnerabilities exploited on September 11, 2001, amid evolving threats from affiliates like , where polls indicate 60-70% of Americans still perceive risks as tied to radical Islamist groups rather than generalized grievances.

Persistent Islamist Threats and Strategic Lessons

Despite efforts to disrupt al-Qaeda's operational networks following the September 11 attacks, Islamist terrorist plots targeting the persisted, underscoring the enduring appeal of jihadist . Between 2001 and 2013 alone, at least 60 such plots were identified by analysts, many inspired by al-Qaeda's calls for global against Western targets. A prominent example occurred on May 1, 2010, when , a Pakistani-born naturalized U.S. citizen, attempted to detonate a in , ; Shahzad had received bomb-making training from Tehrik-i-Taliban in South Waziristan and explicitly cited retaliation for U.S. drone strikes and wars in Muslim lands as motivation, reflecting al-Qaeda's ideological framework. These incidents demonstrated that military strikes, while tactically effective against leadership, failed to eradicate the ideological drivers recruiting self-radicalized individuals or those trained in ungoverned spaces. The U.S. withdrawal from in August 2021 further illustrated the risks of incomplete disruption, as the rapidly overran Afghan forces and reestablished control, creating a sanctuary for affiliates and other jihadist groups. U.S. intelligence assessments prior to the pullout had warned of potential rapid collapse, yet the Agreement's conditions—such as commitments to prevent terrorist safe havens—proved unenforceable without sustained presence, allowing groups like to regroup under protection. This outcome validated critiques that prioritizing withdrawal timelines over sustained deterrence enabled the resurgence of threats originating from the same ideological ecosystem that birthed the 9/11 plot, with leaders hosting figures post-takeover. Strategic lessons from these developments emphasize focusing on ideological confrontation rather than expansive , which diverted resources from core disruption without yielding stable liberal-aligned states. Analyses of two decades in highlight how efforts to impose democratic institutions overlooked tribal and Islamist incompatibilities with Western governance models, leading to dependency on foreign aid and military support that crumbled upon reduction. Effective strategies instead require prioritization of jihadist doctrinal propagation—such as Salafi-jihadist narratives framing liberal orders as existential threats—coupled with robust border security to interdict radicalized entrants, as lax post-9/11 enabled cases like Shahzad's radicalization abroad and return. deterrence, through targeted operations and alliances maintaining pressure on havens, outperforms occupation-style rebuilding, avoiding quagmires while preserving resources for homeland defense. In the 2025 context, ongoing litigation by 9/11 victims' families against reveals persistent alliance tensions, with a federal judge denying Riyadh's motion to dismiss claims of material support to hijackers via officials and charities, potentially tied to Wahhabi ideological exports global networks. Congressional inquiries have linked Saudi-promoted —a puritanical strain emphasizing and —to incubating al-Qaeda's worldview, necessitating diplomatic pressure to curb such without forsaking partnerships against or shared threats. This realism demands vigilance against ideological imports, rejecting in favor of conditional alliances that prioritize causal roots of militancy over geopolitical expediency alone.

References

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