Hubbry Logo
Yucca FlatYucca FlatMain
Open search
Yucca Flat
Community hub
Yucca Flat
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Yucca Flat
Yucca Flat
Yucca Flat
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
Yucca Flat occupies most of the central east portion of the Nevada Test Site[1]
Yucca Flat has hundreds of subsidence craters from underground nuclear weapons tests. Asian Lake is visible on the right.

Yucca Flat is a closed desert drainage basin, one of four major nuclear test regions within the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and is divided into nine test sections: Areas 1 through 4 and 6 through 10. Yucca Flat is located at the eastern edge of NTS, about ten miles (16 km) north of Frenchman Flat, and 65 miles (105 km) from Las Vegas, Nevada.[2] Yucca Flat was the site for 739 nuclear tests – nearly four of every five tests carried out at the NTS.[3]

Yucca Flat has been called "the most irradiated, nuclear-blasted spot on the face of the earth".[2] In March 2009, TIME identified the 1970 Yucca Flat Baneberry Test, where 86 workers were exposed to radiation, as one of the world's worst nuclear disasters.[4]

Geology

[edit]
Subsidence craters at Yucca Flat

The open, sandy geology of Yucca Flat in the Tonopah Basin made for straightforward visual documentation of atmospheric nuclear tests. When testing went underground, deep layers of sedimentary soil from the erosion of the surrounding mountains allowed for relatively easy drilling of test holes.[5]

Hundreds of subsidence craters dot the desert floor. A crater could develop when an underground nuclear explosion vaporized surrounding bedrock and sediment. The vapor cooled to liquid lava and pooled at the bottom of the cavity created by the explosion. Cracked rock and sediment layers above the explosion often settled into the cavity to form a crater.

At the south end of Yucca Flat is Yucca Lake, also called Yucca Dry Lake. The dry, alkaline lake bed holds a restricted runway (Yucca Airstrip) which was built by the Army Corps of Engineers before nuclear testing began in the area. To the west of the dry lake bed is News Nob, a rocky outcropping from which journalists and VIPs were able to watch atmospheric nuclear tests at Yucca Flat.[5]

Nearby

[edit]

West of the dry lake bed, cresting the top of Yucca Pass, is Control Point, or CP-1, the 31,600 sq ft (2,940 m2) complex of buildings that contains testing and monitoring equipment for nuclear tests, and a cafeteria that seats 32. CP-1 overlooks Yucca and Frenchman Flats. Today, Control Point is the center for support of all activity at the NTS.[5]

A subsidence crater in nearby Area 5 is used to store containers of contaminated scrap metal and debris; its radioactivity is periodically measured.

Nuclear testing

[edit]

Yucca Flat saw 739 nuclear tests, including 827 separate detonations. The higher number of detonations is from single tests that included multiple nuclear explosions occurring within a 0.1-second time window and inside a 1.2 mi (2 km) diameter circle. Sixty-two such tests took place at NTS.[3]

No test at Yucca Flat ever exceeded 500 kilotons of expected yield. Tests of larger explosions were carried out at Rainier Mesa and Pahute Mesa, as their geology allowed deeper test shafts.

First tests

[edit]
Drill rigs operated around the clock to prepare shafts deep enough for nuclear testing

The first test explosion at Yucca Flat came after five atmospheric tests at nearby Area 5 as part of Operation Ranger. On October 22, 1951, the "Able" test of Operation Buster was detonated at the top of a tower in Area 7, resulting in a nuclear yield less than an equivalent kilogram of TNT; the shot was a fizzle. It was the world's first failure of a nuclear device. Over the next two weeks, four successful tests were conducted by bomber aircraft that dropped nuclear weapons over Area 7.

The first underground test at NTS was the "Uncle" shot of Operation Jangle. Uncle detonated on November 29, 1951, within a shaft sunk into Area 10.

Operation Plumbbob

[edit]

In Area 9, the 74-kiloton "Hood" test on July 5, 1957, part of Operation Plumbbob, was the largest atmospheric test ever conducted within the continental United States;[6] nearly five times as large in yield as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. A balloon carried Hood up to 1,510 ft (460 m) above the ground where it was detonated. Over 2,000 troops took part in the test in order to train them in conducting operations on the nuclear battlefield. The test released 11 megacuries (410 PBq) of iodine-131 (131I) into the air.[7] With a relatively brief half-life of eight days, 131I is useful as a determinant in tracking specific nuclear contamination events. Iodine-131 comprises about 2% of radioactive materials in a cloud of dust stemming from a nuclear test, and causes thyroid problems if ingested.[7]

The "John" shot of Plumbbob, on July 19, 1957, was the first test firing of the nuclear-tipped AIR-2 Genie air-to-air rocket designed to destroy incoming enemy bombers with a nuclear explosion. The two-kiloton warhead exploded approximately three miles (4.8 km) above five volunteers and a photographer who stood unprotected at "ground zero" in Area 10 to demonstrate the purported safety of battlefield nuclear weapons to personnel on the ground.[8] The test also demonstrated the ability of a fighter aircraft to deliver a nuclear-tipped rocket and avoid being destroyed in the process. A Northrop F-89J fired the rocket.

Project Plowshare

[edit]
Area 10's Sedan crater is the largest at the Nevada Test Site

A dramatically different test shot was the "Sedan" test of Operation Storax on July 6, 1962, a 104 kiloton shot for Project Plowshare which sought to discover whether nuclear weapons could be used for peaceful means in creating lakes, bays or canals. The explosion displaced twelve million tons of earth, creating a crater 1,280 ft (390 m) wide and 320 ft (98 m) deep in Area 10. For an underground shot, a relatively large amount of energy was vented to the atmosphere, estimated to be 2.5 kilotons (7.4 bars of pressure).[9] Two radioactive dust clouds rose up from the explosion and traveled across the United States, one at 10,000 ft (3,000 m) and the other at 16,000 ft (4,900 m). Both dropped radioactive particles across the USA before crossing into the sky above the Atlantic Ocean. Among many other radioisotopes, the clouds carried 880 kCi (33 PBq) of 131I.

Sedan Crater was added to the National Register of Historic Places in 1994.[10]

Baneberry

[edit]
Baneberry's accidental radioactive plume rises from a shock fissure. It was carried in three different directions by the wind

Area 8 hosted the "Baneberry" shot of Operation Emery on December 18, 1970. The Baneberry 10-kiloton test detonated 900 ft (270 m) below the surface but its energy cracked the soil in unexpected ways, causing a fissure near ground zero and the failure of the shaft and cap.[11] A plume of fire and dust was released 3.5 minutes after initiation,[12] raining fallout on workers in different locations within NTS. The radioactive plume released 6.7 megacuries (250 PBq) of radioactive material, including 80 kCi (3.0 PBq) of iodine-131.[7][13] After dropping a portion of its material locally, the plume's lighter particles were carried to three altitudes and conveyed by winter storms and the jet stream to be deposited heavily as radionuclide-laden snow in Lassen and Sierra counties in northeast California, and to lesser degrees in southern Idaho, northern Nevada and some eastern sections of Oregon and Washington states.[14] The three diverging jet stream layers conducted radionuclides across the US to Canada, the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean.

Some 86 workers at the site were exposed to radioactivity, but according to the Department of Energy none received a dose exceeding site guidelines and, similarly, radiation drifting offsite was not considered to pose a hazard by the DOE.[15] In March 2009, TIME magazine identified the Baneberry Test as one of the world's worst nuclear disasters.[4]

Two US Federal court cases resulted from the Baneberry event. Two NTS workers who were exposed to high levels of radiation from Baneberry died in 1974, both from acute myeloid leukemia. The district court found that although the Government had acted negligently, the radiation from the Baneberry test did not cause the leukemia cases. The district decision was upheld on appeal in 1996.[16][17]

Huron King

[edit]
The Huron King test chamber was used to simulate the vacuum of space

As part of Operation Tinderbox, on June 24, 1980, a small satellite prototype (DSCS III) was subjected to radioactivity from the "Huron King" shot in a vertical line-of-sight (VLOS) test undertaken in Area 3. This was a program to improve the database on nuclear hardening design techniques for defense satellites. The VLOS test configuration involved placing a nuclear device (less than 20 kilotons) at the bottom of a shaft. A communications satellite or other experiment was placed in a partially evacuated test chamber simulating a space environment. The test chamber was parked at ground level at the top of the shaft. At zero time, the radiation from the device shot up the vertical pipe to the surface test chamber. Mechanical closures then intercepted and sealed the pipe, preventing the explosive shock wave from damaging the targets. The test chamber was immediately disconnected by remote control from the pipe and quickly winched to safety before the ground could subside to form a crater. The Huron King test cost US$10.3 million in 1980 (equivalent to $39.3 million today).[18]

Last test

[edit]

The final test at Yucca Flat (also the last test at the entire Nevada Test Site) was Operation Julin's "Divider" on September 23, 1992, just prior to the moratorium temporarily ending all nuclear testing. Divider was a safety experiment test shot that was detonated at the bottom of a shaft sunk into Area 3.

Abandoned tests

[edit]
IceCap test tower

Three tests planned for 1993 have been abandoned in place, two in Yucca Flat. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had been strongly supported by the UN General Assembly in 1991, and negotiations began in earnest in 1993. The United States, on October 3, 1992, suspended all nuclear weapons testing programs in anticipation of eventual ratification of the treaty. The partially assembled cabling, towers and equipment for shot "Icecap" in Area 1 and shot "Gabbs" in Area 2 lie amid weeds and blowing dust, waiting for a possible resumption of nuclear testing. Shot "Greenwater" awaits its fate in Area 19 at Pahute Mesa. "Icecap" was to be a joint US-UK test event.[19]

Radioactivity

[edit]

UGTA

[edit]

The United States Department of Energy produced a report in April, 1997, on a subproject of the Nevada Environmental Restoration Project. The larger project involves environmental restoration and mitigation activities in the NTS, Tonopah Test Range, Nellis Air Force Range, and eight further sites in five other states. The Underground Test Area (UGTA) subproject focuses on defining the boundaries of areas containing unsafe water contaminated with radionuclides from underground nuclear tests. The ongoing subproject is tasked with predicting the future extent of contaminated water due to natural flow and it is expected to quantify safe limits for human health. Yucca Flat was identified as a Corrective Action Unit (CAU).[20][21] Because of the great expense and virtual impossibility of cleaning up the Nevada Test Site, it has been characterized as a "national sacrifice zone."[22]

USGS

[edit]

In 2003, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) collected and processed magnetotellurics (MT) and audio-magnetotelluric (AMT) data at the Nevada Test Site from 51 data stations placed in and near Yucca Flat to get a more accurate idea of the pre-Tertiary geology found in the Yucca Flat Corrective Action Unit (CAU). The intent was to discover the character, thickness, and lateral extent of pre-Tertiary rock formations that affect the flow of underground water. In particular, a major goal was to define the upper clastic confining unit (UCCU) in the Yucca Flat area.[23][24]

First responder training

[edit]
First responder trainees treat a simulated radiation victim in Area 1

The radioactivity present on the ground in Area 1 provides a radiologically contaminated environment for the training of first responders.[25] Trainees are exposed to methods of radiation detection and its health hazards. Further training takes place in other areas of NTS.[26]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Yucca Flat

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

Yucca Flat is a dry lake basin and closed topographic depression spanning approximately 10 by 20 miles within the Nevada National Security Site in Nye County, Nevada, about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. It functioned as the principal location for U.S. nuclear weapons testing on continental soil, accommodating 659 underground nuclear detonations between 1951 and 1992, along with numerous atmospheric tests prior to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. These activities, conducted to develop and refine the nation's nuclear arsenal amid Cold War tensions, resulted in over 700 total explosions in the basin, producing distinctive subsidence craters that render the area one of the most pockmarked terrains globally. The basin's alluvial and relative isolation facilitated safe containment of underground blasts, with most devices emplaced in vertical shafts penetrating saturated volcanic tuffs and older rocks. Notable operations included the 104-kiloton Sedan test in 1962, part of the Plowshare Program for peaceful nuclear excavation, which excavated a 320-foot-deep measuring 1,280 feet across—the largest human-made from a single explosion. Yucca Flat's testing legacy underpinned advancements in warhead design, yield prediction, and , while post-testing remediation efforts addressed contamination, achieving closure for the Yucca Flat corrective action unit by 2020. Today, the site supports non-proliferation training, , and serves as a testament to the empirical validation of principles through iterative experimentation.

Geography and Geology

Location and Topography

Yucca Flat constitutes a topographic and situated in the northeastern sector of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, , . Centered at coordinates 37.0534°N, 116.0540°W, it forms part of the Basin and Range physiographic province, approximately 105 km northwest of . The basin spans roughly 200 square miles (518 km²), encompassing nuclear test areas 1 through 4, 6, and 7 of the former . Its valley floor, filled with alluvium, exhibits low relief with an average elevation of 4,062 feet (1,238 m). A seasonally dry playa occupies the southern end, while surrounding low-elevation mountain ranges, composed primarily of Tertiary volcanic rocks, bound the flat to the north, east, and west. These topographic features—a broad, arid expanse with closed drainage—facilitated its selection for nuclear testing due to the unobstructed visibility and containment potential of surface effects.

Geological Composition and Features

Yucca Flat constitutes a structural and topographic basin within the , featuring low-relief terrain with a central playa at its southern extremity. The basin fill primarily comprises alluvial deposits, which overlie a thick sequence of Tertiary volcanic rocks and are underlain by sedimentary formations. These alluvial sediments exhibit hydraulic heterogeneity, subdivided into an older, volcanic-rich basal tuffaceous and a younger overlying mixed alluvium derived from diverse surrounding sources. The volcanic foundation consists mainly of Miocene-age tuffs and flows associated with the Timber Mountain caldera complex, forming part of the regional volcanic that includes units from the Paintbrush and Timber Mountain groups. These volcanics, reaching thicknesses up to several kilometers, exhibit varying degrees of welding and alteration, influencing subsurface hydrology and structural integrity. Beneath the volcanics lie Paleozoic carbonate rocks, such as limestones and , interspersed with older clastic sediments, resting on a pre-Tertiary crystalline of granitic composition. Structurally, Yucca Flat formed through Miocene-to-Quaternary , involving block faulting and basin subsidence that displaced geologic units along normal faults bounding the basin margins. This faulting, accompanied by tilting of volcanic layers, created a configuration with displacements exceeding hundreds of meters in places. The basin's evolution reflects post-middle downwarping, accommodating sediment accumulation while preserving stratigraphic relations discernible from data across the region.

Nuclear Weapons Testing History

Establishment and Atmospheric Era (1951-1963)

The (NTS), encompassing Yucca Flat, was designated by President on December 18, 1950, for continental nuclear testing following initial . Initial detonations commenced on January 27, 1951, with Operation Ranger's Able shot at , south of Yucca Flat, using a 1-kiloton device air-dropped from a B-50 bomber. Yucca Flat, a 28-by-16-mile intermontane basin filled with over Tertiary volcanic tuffs, was selected for expansion due to its isolation, providing greater standoff distances for instrumentation and troop maneuvers compared to 's closer proximity to populated areas. Yucca Flat's first nuclear tests occurred during from October 22 to November 29, 1951, shifting some activities northward for enhanced safety after fallout concerns from earlier shots. Key atmospheric events included Shot Charlie, a 14-kiloton airdrop on October 30 over Area 9, and Shot Dog, a 21-kiloton airdrop on November 1 over Area 7 at 1,417 feet altitude, both evaluating weapons effects on ground forces from Camp Desert Rock. These tests, involving over 7,000 troops, yielded data on blast overpressure, , and cratering, with yields from 0.2 to 31 kilotons across the series' eight detonations, six atmospheric. From 1952 to 1963, Yucca Flat hosted dozens of atmospheric tests across operations like Tumbler–Snapper (eight airdrops and towers, yields up to 31 kilotons), Upshot–Knothole (11 shots, including the 61-kiloton Grable artillery-fired device), and (14 shots, advancing thermonuclear designs with yields to 43 kilotons), primarily via airdrops over Areas 1–10 to simulate tactical delivery. These detonations, totaling part of NTS's 100 atmospheric tests with combined yields exceeding 500 megatons equivalent, prioritized yield calibration, fission-fusion staging, and survivability assessments amid escalating imperatives. Fallout from unsterilized shots dispersed radionuclides like and cesium-137, prompting health monitoring by the Atomic Energy Commission, though containment failures highlighted risks over and . The era concluded with the Limited Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963, prohibiting atmospheric, underwater, and space tests, transitioning Yucca Flat to underground operations while underscoring its role in stockpiling over 200 designs through empirical validation rather than simulation alone.

Underground Testing Period (1963-1992)

Following the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963, which barred nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, underwater, and , the shifted all nuclear testing at the to underground configurations, with Yucca Flat serving as the primary location for such activities until the 1992 testing moratorium. This transition aimed to contain radioactive fallout while continuing weapons development, effects evaluation, and . Over the period from 1963 to 1992, Yucca Flat hosted the majority of the 's approximately 800 underground tests, with shaft emplacements accounting for over 90 percent of all underground detonations nationwide. Underground tests in Yucca Flat predominantly utilized vertical shaft drilling, involving boreholes 3 to 12 feet in diameter and depths ranging from 600 to 2,200 feet, into which nuclear devices were lowered and detonated. Containment was achieved by backfilling or "stemming" the shaft above the device with layered materials such as sand, gravel, and epoxy plugs to trap radionuclides within the resulting molten rock cavity formed by the explosion. Tunnel tests, conducted in horizontal drifts for specific weapon effects assessments, were less common but complemented shaft testing in areas like Rainier Mesa adjacent to Yucca Flat. Yields varied from sub-kiloton to hundreds of kilotons, with early post-treaty events like Bilby on September 13, 1963 (249 kilotons), demonstrating containment in volcanic tuff while producing a subsidence crater 1,800 feet wide and 80 feet deep. Between 1951 and 1992, Yucca Flat accommodated 658 underground nuclear tests encompassing 747 individual detonations, the vast majority occurring after 1963 as atmospheric testing ceased. These efforts supported iterative improvements in nuclear designs, safety features, and performance under diverse geological conditions, including alluvial fill and fractured . operations alone spanned 1.5 million feet of (equivalent to 280 miles) from 1961 to 1992, often requiring up to 60 days per 1,000-foot section due to challenging porous terrain. Successful containment minimized surface release in most cases, though craters—resulting from cavity roof collapse—became characteristic surface features, their sizes determined by yield, depth, and . The final underground test at the site, Divider on , 1992 (yield under 20 kilotons), marked the end of this era amid international pressure for a comprehensive test ban.

Peaceful Nuclear Applications

Yucca Flat hosted experiments under , a U.S. Atomic Energy Commission initiative launched in 1957 to explore non-military applications of nuclear explosions, such as large-scale excavation for projects including canals, harbors, and . These efforts aimed to leverage the immense energy release from nuclear detonations to move vast quantities of more efficiently than conventional methods. The most prominent test in Yucca Flat was the Sedan detonation on July 6, 1962, conducted in Area 10 as part of . This shallow underground explosion involved a 104-kiloton thermonuclear device buried 194 meters deep, designed to simulate excavation potential by creating a large . The blast displaced approximately 12 million tons of earth, forming a crater initially 390 meters in and 100 meters deep, demonstrating the capability to excavate volumes equivalent to millions of cubic yards in seconds. Proponents envisioned applications like deepening ports or constructing a sea-level across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec as alternatives to the . Despite technical success in earth-moving, the Sedan test released significant radioactive fallout, contributing about 7% to the total radionuclides from all U.S. nuclear tests due to the shallow and vaporization of surface materials. This unexpected dispersion, lofted 3.7 kilometers high and carried by winds, underscored challenges in containing radioactivity for civilian uses, leading to heightened scrutiny and eventual constraints under the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. Plowshare's excavation experiments at the , including those in Yucca Flat, ultimately highlighted practical limitations, with no large-scale peaceful applications realized due to environmental, political, and economic factors.

Notable Tests and Incidents

Operation Plumbbob

was a series of 29 nuclear tests conducted by the at the from May 28 to October 7, 1957, including 24 detonations with nuclear yields and five safety experiments designed to assess accidental detonation risks. The operation aimed to refine designs, evaluate military effects on equipment and personnel, and verify safety mechanisms to prevent nuclear yield from high-explosive failures in weapons. Multiple tests occurred in Yucca Flat, the primary basin for tower, , and shaft detonations during this era, contributing to its role as the epicenter of over 700 subsequent underground tests. Yields ranged from sub-kiloton levels in safety shots to a maximum of 74 kilotons in the Hood test, with atmospheric releases generating localized fallout monitored by the Atomic Energy Commission. The tests encompassed diverse configurations: tower shots for ground-burst simulations, balloon-suspended devices for air-burst effects, and underground shafts for containment trials, alongside the first evaluations of "one-point safety" where devices were subjected to single high-explosive lens detonations without . In Yucca Flat's Areas 7, 9, and 10, at least 15 detonations took place, including full-scale proofs of boosted fission and thermonuclear primaries, with data used to enhance reliability for intercontinental ballistic missiles. participation involved over 14,000 Department of Defense personnel, including troop maneuvers to study blast and radiation impacts, such as 2,100 positioned 5,500 yards from the Hood shot for simulated exposure. experiments, like the Pascal series, tested arming and firing systems under mishandling scenarios, confirming no unintended yields despite some high-explosive anomalies. Notable Yucca Flat tests included Hood on July 5, 1957—a 74-kiloton tower detonation in Area 9, the highest-yield atmospheric event at the site, which propelled a plate to estimated during analysis. Smoky, detonated August 31 in Area 8 at 44 kilotons via , exposed 1,150 troops to fallout for studies, yielding on personnel vulnerability but prompting later reassessments due to elevated cancer risks among participants. Incidents during safety shots, such as the accidental drop of the Pascal-B device on July 26, highlighted handling risks but resulted in no nuclear release, reinforcing procedural safeguards. Overall, Plumbbob advanced U.S. nuclear capabilities amid pressures, though retrospective analyses from reports note incomplete initial containment and monitoring of radionuclides in Yucca Flat's alluvial basins.
Test NameDateYield (kt)Type/LocationNotes
HoodJuly 5, 195774Tower, Yucca Flat Area 9Largest atmospheric yield at NTS; military effects testing.
SmokyAugust 31, 195744Balloon, Yucca Flat Area 8Troop exposure; significant fallout.
GalileoSeptember 2, 195711Tower, Yucca FlatWeapon proof test.

Baneberry and Vented Events

The Baneberry test, conducted on December 18, 1970, as part of , involved detonating a 10-kiloton nuclear device at a depth of approximately 900 feet (274 meters) beneath Yucca Flat in the . The device, designed by scientists at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, was intended as a fully contained underground explosion to assess weapon performance without atmospheric release. However, shortly after detonation at 7:30 a.m., unexpected venting occurred through a natural fissure near ground zero, propelling a radioactive plume upward to heights of about 10,500 feet (3.2 kilometers). The venting released an estimated 6.7 million curies of radioactive material, primarily noble gases and particulates including tritium, iodine-131, and cesium-137, which formed a plume that drifted eastward across Utah and beyond. Approximately 86 onsite workers were directly exposed to fallout, with some receiving doses exceeding 100 rem, prompting immediate evacuation and monitoring efforts. Investigations attributed the breach to unanticipated high water saturation in the tuff surrounding the emplacement hole, which generated steam and pressured gases that exploited pre-existing fractures rather than a design flaw in containment predictions. In the aftermath, two workers developed acute leukemia and died within four years, with exposures linked to the incident by medical evaluations, though broader population health impacts remain debated due to challenges in isolating Baneberry-specific doses from cumulative testing fallout. The event, the largest unintended release at the Nevada Test Site, halted underground testing for six months and prompted the Atomic Energy Commission to mandate a 99% containment assurance probability for future tests, significantly tightening safety protocols. Beyond Baneberry, Yucca Flat hosted several other vented underground events during the 1963–1992 period, where containment failures released radionuclides via stemples, cracks, or barometric pumping, though none matched Baneberry's scale. Examples include minor releases from tests like Dalhart () and others documented in Department of Energy records, totaling about 100 announced venting incidents across the site, with offsite detectability rare due to monitoring and wind patterns. These events underscored geological uncertainties in the volcanic aquifers of Yucca Flat, influencing subsequent emplacement depth requirements and mapping to mitigate risks. Overall, while underground testing reduced atmospheric fallout compared to earlier eras, venting incidents highlighted persistent challenges in achieving perfect containment in fractured media.

Other Significant Detonations

The Uncle detonation, conducted on November 29, 1951, as part of Operation Buster–Jangle, marked the first underground nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site in Yucca Flat's Area 10, with a yield of 1.2 kilotons aimed at evaluating cratering effects for weapons applications. This shaft emplacement experiment produced a crater approximately 100 feet deep and 300 feet wide, providing early data on subsurface blast dynamics despite ejecting significant radioactive debris. High-yield underground tests later exemplified advancements in thermonuclear device and performance. The Handley shot, detonated on March 26, 1970, during , achieved a yield exceeding 1 megaton, contributing to validation of designs under deep burial conditions exceeding 2,000 feet. Similarly, Benham on December 19, 1968, under (also referenced in Grenadier series documentation), registered 1.15 megatons, one of the largest fully contained explosions in Yucca Flat, with seismic signals detected regionally but no venting reported. Other notable detonations included Greeley on December 20, 1966, as part of , yielding 870 kilotons and testing scalability in tuffaceous rocks, and Bilby on September 13, 1963, during , at 249 kilotons—the first underground test whose ground motion was perceptible in , approximately 65 miles away. These events, conducted at depths typically between 500 and 2,500 feet, advanced understanding of cavity formation, materials, and radiological containment, though some produced minor subsidence craters observable via post-test surveys. The Huron King test on June 24, 1980, under , involved a device of less than 20 kilotons in a vertical line-of-sight configuration to assess effects on communications, utilizing specialized in Yucca Flat.

Radiological Assessments and Containment

Radionuclide Distribution from Tests

![Operation Emery Baneberry vent][float-right] The underground nuclear tests in Yucca Flat, numbering 659 events with 747 detonations between 1957 and 1992, introduced a substantial portion of the Nevada National Security Site's (NNSS) underground radionuclide inventory into the local subsurface, accounting for approximately 39% of the total. These radionuclides, including fission products such as cesium-137 and strontium-90, activation products like tritium and carbon-14, and actinides including plutonium-239 and americium-241, were predominantly retained near the detonation cavities within melt glass, rubble chimneys, and surrounding fractured tuff and volcanic rocks. Refractory elements exhibited limited mobility, binding tightly to the glassy matrix, while volatile species such as noble gases and tritium demonstrated greater potential for migration through fractures and the gas-phase transport in the unsaturated zone. Although designed for containment, select tests experienced venting or seepage, releasing radionuclides to the surface and atmosphere. The Baneberry test on December 18, 1970, a 10-kiloton device detonated 900 feet underground, exemplifies this; hydrofracturing created a surface that vented a radioactive plume, dispersing particulates and gases across regional downwind areas. Such events, while comprising a minority of tests, contributed to localized surface in subsidence craters and immediate vicinities, with radionuclides depositing nearby and finer aerosols traveling farther via atmospheric dispersion. Empirical investigations post-testing revealed that radionuclide distributions followed predictable patterns: isotopes concentrated proximal to cavities, soluble ones advancing meters to tens of meters along fractures, but overall migration constrained by the closed-basin of Yucca Flat. In the groundwater regime, transport occurs slowly through the alluvial, tuffaceous, and underlying aquifers, with models indicating velocities on the order of millimeters per year due to matrix , onto mineral surfaces, and . Field-scale studies, including sampling from sites like those drilled after refractory tests, confirm confinement primarily to fault zones and test-derived fractures, with no evidence of widespread plume migration beyond Yucca Flat boundaries within observational timescales. , being more mobile, has been detected at greater distances in monitoring wells, yet concentrations diminish rapidly through dilution and decay (12.3 years), precluding significant off-site impacts. Comprehensive inventories and flow simulations underscore that the site's geological barriers—low permeability tuffs and hydraulic gradients directing flow inward—effectively limit long-term distribution, aligning with post-closure surveillance data showing radionuclides decaying without breaching containment envelopes.

Underground Testing Area Project (UGTA)

The Underground Testing Area (UGTA) Project, administered by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management through the National Security Site (NNSS), assesses contamination resulting from 828 underground nuclear tests conducted at the site between and 1992. The project aims to define the nature and extent of migration in aquifers, predict long-term transport using numerical models, and determine boundaries where contamination may exceed (SDWA) maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) in human-accessible environments. Closure strategies emphasize institutional controls and monitoring rather than remediation, as active cleanup of deep subsurface contamination is deemed technically infeasible and economically prohibitive. In Yucca Flat, designated as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97 (Yucca Flat/Climax Mine), 659 underground nuclear tests encompassing 747 detonations occurred, representing approximately 39% of the NNSS's total underground test inventory. UGTA activities there followed a phased approach under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO): a Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) in 1999 guided data collection from 2000 to 2008, including well drilling, sampling over 100 monitoring points, and geophysical surveys to characterize hydrogeology and contaminant distribution. Subsequent modeling from 2008 to 2013 integrated saturated and unsaturated zone flow, lower carbonate aquifer dynamics, and uncertainty analyses to forecast radionuclide transport over 1,000 years. Peer-reviewed models for CAU 97 concluded that no exceedances of SDWA MCLs were predicted in accessible environments, such as downgradient used for municipal supply, due to limited migration pathways, , and dilution in the regional carbonate . This supported the closure decision for Yucca Flat, implementing long-term monitoring and land-use restrictions without engineered barriers. The closure report documented compliance with FFACO requirements, affirming that risks to human health and the environment remain below regulatory thresholds based on empirical data and validated simulations. Ongoing surveillance includes annual hydrophysical evaluations of key wells to verify model assumptions and detect any anomalous contaminant plumes.

USGS Groundwater and Fault Studies

The (USGS) has performed detailed investigations into and fault characteristics in Yucca Flat to evaluate subsurface pathways for potential transport from 659 underground nuclear tests conducted between 1951 and 1992. These studies integrate hydrogeological data, testing, and geophysical surveys to model predevelopment flow systems and post-testing alterations. Groundwater studies by the USGS analyzed nearly 4,000 water-level measurements from 216 wells in Yucca Flat spanning 1951 to 2003, identifying trends influenced by nuclear detonations and water withdrawals. Anthropogenic fluctuations, primarily from testing, caused temporary water-level changes in multiple wells, while regional flow directs contaminants from volcanic tuff aquifers toward underlying carbonate rock systems. A 2019 multiple-well aquifer test at well ER-6-1-2 estimated groundwater flow rates past testing areas at approximately 0.5 to 1.5 meters per year, indicating slow migration through low-permeability tuffs. Additional aquifer tests, such as the ER-4-1 m1 pumping trial, quantified transmissivity and storage coefficients in the tuff sequence, supporting numerical models of contaminant plumes. Fault studies focused on geophysical characterization to delineate structural controls on permeability and potential leakage paths. High-resolution seismic reflection and surveys mapped fault , splays, and zone widths in volcanic rocks, revealing variations tied to protolith welding and alteration degrees. Gravity inversion analyses identified high-angle basement faults offsetting surfaces beneath Yucca Flat, with structures like the Carpetbag and Yucca faults influencing deep resistivity patterns. These faults, often exhibiting enhanced fracturing post-testing, were assessed for hydraulic connectivity, though empirical data show limited enhancement due to sealing by mineralization and properties. Deep resistivity profiling confirmed major lineaments such as the CP Thrust fault, aiding in three-dimensional hydrogeologic frameworks for .

Environmental Remediation and Monitoring

Subsidence Craters and Site Management

Subsidence craters in Yucca Flat result from the collapse of overlying rock and soil into cavities formed by underground nuclear explosions, typically occurring days to years after detonation as the vaporized material condenses and structural support fails. These features dot the landscape from tests conducted between 1961 and 1992, with Yucca Flat hosting the majority of the Nevada National Security Site's (NNSS) approximately 800 underground detonations, leading to hundreds of craters that render it one of Earth's most pockmarked terrains. Crater dimensions vary based on yield, depth, and geology; for instance, the Bilby test (November 28, 1963, yield 40 kilotons at 2,400 feet depth) produced a crater 1,800 feet wide and 80 feet deep. Site management prioritizes physical safety and radiological containment, with craters presenting hazards such as steep walls prone to erosion and falls, alongside minimal surface residual radioactivity that diminishes over time due to weathering. The NNSS restricts public access via fencing, signage, and patrols, designating craters within controlled areas to prevent unauthorized entry; potential crater sites without visible collapse are roped off and posted. In Area 3, seven subsidence craters serve as disposal units for bulk low-level radioactive waste from testing operations, capped to limit infiltration and monitored for stability. Remediation of craters focuses on preventing further environmental release rather than infilling, as structural alterations could exacerbate pathways; efforts include and integration into broader site surveillance under Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order protocols. Unstable craters constrain nearby activities, informing that favors non-intrusive stewardship over development. Annual environmental reports confirm low airborne emissions from crater resuspension, affirming the efficacy of strategies.

Long-Term Health and Ecological Evaluations

Long-term health evaluations of nuclear testing at Yucca Flat have primarily examined exposures from the site's 739 underground detonations between 1951 and 1992, with atmospheric tests contributing to offsite fallout patterns. reconstructions estimate that downwind populations, including Native American communities in , , and surrounding areas, received cumulative effective doses ranging from 10 to 100 millisieverts from and other radionuclides during the 1951–1962 atmospheric testing era, correlating with elevated risks of up to 5–10% in high-exposure cohorts based on NCI-CMS models. incidence studies in downwinder groups show standardized incidence ratios 1.5–2.0 times background levels, though attribution remains confounded by lifestyle factors and small sample sizes in peer-reviewed analyses. Onsite worker cohorts, tracked via the Former Nuclear Weapons Workers program, exhibit no statistically significant excess mortality from radiation-linked cancers beyond age-adjusted baselines, per DOE longitudinal data through 2020, with average career doses under 50 millisieverts for most personnel. For underground testing specific to Yucca Flat, containment failures like the 1970 Baneberry event released approximately 6.6 megacuries of radionuclides, but subsequent modeling confirms plume migration remains localized within aquifers at depths exceeding 500 meters, with no detectable migration to accessible as of 2023 monitoring. Empirical sampling from over 200 wells in the Yucca Flat/ corrective action unit detects and /240 at levels below EPA standards (e.g., <20,000 pCi/L), indicating negligible human health risks from hydrologic transport. Ecological assessments under the NNSS Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program track biota, , and across Yucca Flat's 1,000+ square kilometers, revealing craters as stable habitats with enhanced cover (up to 30% higher in 20-year-old craters due to water retention) compared to undisturbed flats. Long-term surveys of the (Gopherus agassizii), a , report population densities of 0.5–2.0 individuals per in monitored plots, with no radiological exceeding 1% of dose limits in tissue analyses from 2010–2023. inventories in cores decline exponentially (half-lives of cesium-137 at 30 years), with surface gamma exposures averaging 0.1–0.5 microsieverts per hour, supporting resilient creosote bush () and rodent communities without evident in genetic assays. Ongoing USGS fault and studies confirm minimal fracturing-induced contaminant release, preserving ecosystems.

Recent Closure and Ongoing Surveillance (Post-1992)

Following the U.S. moratorium on underground nuclear testing in September 1992, Yucca Flat transitioned to environmental characterization, remediation planning, and corrective action closure under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), administered by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, and other agencies. Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97, encompassing Yucca Flat and , focused on assessing migration in from historic tests, with investigations involving hydraulic modeling, tracer studies, and well sampling to evaluate flow paths and contaminant plumes. In November 2020, DOE's Environmental Management Nevada program achieved closure of CAU 97 after determining that radionuclides remained contained within the alluvial and aquifers beneath Yucca Flat, with no evidence of off-site migration or to accessible environments; this milestone advanced the site's overall to 75% completion. Closure decisions relied on over two decades of data from the Underground Testing Area (UGTA) project, including numerical simulations predicting plume stabilization due to the site's hydrogeologic barriers, such as low-permeability layers. Post-closure surveillance for CAU 97 continues annually through a network of 10 groundwater monitoring wells, sampling for tritium, americium-241, plutonium isotopes, and other radionuclides, with results consistently showing concentrations below DOE action levels and drinking water standards. The 2024 monitoring confirmed no significant changes from prior years, attributing stability to natural attenuation processes and the absence of active recharge pathways; surveillance also includes seismic and barometric pressure data to detect potential venting or subsidence impacts on containment. These activities integrate with broader Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) environmental reporting, ensuring long-term verification of isolation for the 739 underground tests conducted in Yucca Flat from 1951 to 1992.

Legacy, Controversies, and Strategic Value

Contributions to National Security and Science

Yucca Flat hosted the majority of the 928 nuclear tests conducted at the from 1951 to 1992, with over 650 underground detonations providing critical empirical data for verifying U.S. designs and ensuring arsenal reliability. These tests encompassed design validation for fission and thermonuclear devices, proof-testing of deployed weapons, and safety evaluations to prevent accidental detonations, directly supporting deterrence by confirming the performance of warheads under varied conditions. The resulting yield measurements, diagnostic , and effects data enabled iterative improvements in weapon efficiency and robustness, maintaining a credible second-strike capability without reliance on unproven simulations at the time. In terms, Yucca Flat's tests facilitated weapons effects experiments, including assessments of generation, blast propagation, and radiation penetration, which informed defensive strategies against adversary nuclear threats and hardened military infrastructure designs. Post-1992, archived test data from these detonations underpins the Stockpile Stewardship Program, where hydrodynamic experiments at facilities like the Big Explosives Experimental Facility in Yucca Flat validate computational models for certifying the aging U.S. stockpile without live explosive testing. This approach has sustained confidence in warhead longevity and performance, averting the need for resumed full-yield tests despite material degradation challenges. Scientifically, the tests yielded foundational insights into high-energy physics, revealing behaviors of materials under extreme pressures and temperatures exceeding millions of degrees , which advanced fusion reaction understanding and equation-of-state modeling for dense plasmas. Geophysical data from seismic waves and cavity collapse informed fault mechanics and transport in fractured rock, enhancing predictive capabilities for and environmental containment. These observations, coupled with radiochemical analyses of post-shot debris, refined knowledge of fission product yields and interactions, contributing to nonproliferation monitoring techniques like distinguishing nuclear test signatures from natural . Overall, Yucca Flat's empirical legacy supports ongoing simulations that ensure strategic stability while minimizing proliferation risks.

Public Health Claims and Empirical Evidence

Public health claims surrounding Yucca Flat center on potential radiation-induced illnesses from the 739 nuclear tests conducted there from 1951 to 1992, with atmospheric detonations (81 tests) dispersing fallout containing isotopes like (I-131), cesium-137, and eastward toward populated areas in , , and . Downwinder advocacy groups and affected communities assert elevated rates of , , , and other malignancies attributable to inhalation, ingestion via contaminated milk and produce, and external exposure, citing personal testimonies and compensation under the (RECA), which presumes causation for specified cancers in designated counties. Empirical studies provide evidence of associations but highlight challenges in establishing direct causation due to low doses, confounding lifestyle factors, and reliance on retrospective modeling. A 1983 cohort analysis of 4,125 Mormon families in southwestern Utah, downwind from Yucca Flat tests, documented 288 cancers versus 179 expected (1967–1975), including leukemia excesses (19 observed vs. ~7 expected early post-exposure, with 5-fold increase in children), thyroid cancer (14 vs. 1.7), and breast cancer (27 vs. 14), correlated with estimated fallout deposition and higher in acutely exposed subgroups. Case-control research similarly linked Utah leukemia incidence, particularly in those under 20 at exposure, to fallout metrics from Nevada tests. The National Cancer Institute's (NCI) dose reconstruction estimated average cumulative thyroid doses of 0.02 Gy for adults and 0.1 Gy for children under 20 from I-131 in NTS fallout (1951–1962), projecting 11,300–212,000 excess U.S. thyroid cases (central: 49,000), though primarily papillary subtype with low fatality; however, most exposures were low-level, where epidemiological evidence is sparse and extrapolated from higher-dose scenarios like Chernobyl. For underground tests (658 at Yucca Flat), which comprised the majority after the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, containment minimized public fallout, with rare venting incidents like Baneberry (1970) releasing ~6.5 MCi but largely onsite. Department of Energy dose reconstructions via the Off-Site Review Project quantified off-site exposures as low (e.g., <1–2 mSv/year in peak fallout years for high-risk areas), below natural background in many locales, with no broad observed in vital statistics. Recent monitoring () of air, plants, and public zones near the site detected only natural radionuclides (e.g., from / decay), concluding no measurable radiological health impacts from residual NNSS activities. While associations persist in select cohorts, overall cancer trends align more closely with national baselines than predicted excesses, underscoring uncertainties in low-dose risk models versus direct observation.

Debates on Resumption and Policy Implications

The has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing since its last underground test on , 1992, at the Site, including Yucca Flat, while preserving the technical capability to resume within months if directed by the president. Annual assessments by the directors of the national laboratories and U.S. Strategic Command commanders have consistently concluded that resumption is not required for stockpile certification under the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which relies on advanced simulations, subcritical experiments, and non-explosive diagnostics to verify warhead reliability. Proponents of resumption, including analysts at conservative think tanks, argue that prolonged reliance on modeling without full-yield data risks undetected degradation in an aging arsenal, particularly as adversaries like , , and conduct tests or develop novel designs that challenge U.S. deterrence; for instance, 's alleged 2020 Novaya Zemlya test and 's estimated 1980s-1990s tests highlight asymmetries in empirical validation. These advocates emphasize first-principles needs for causal verification of physics in high-energy regimes, where computational approximations may overlook nonlinear effects, and recommend readiness at sites like Yucca Flat, where over 700 underground tests provide proven geological containment. Opponents, drawing from arms control organizations and Democratic administrations, counter that the stewardship program's empirical successes—evidenced by zero predicted failures over three decades—render explosive testing superfluous and provocative, potentially spurring a cascade of global tests by non-signatories to the , which the U.S. signed in 1996 but has not ratified. state resolutions in 2025 explicitly urged upholding the moratorium, citing localized risks of seismic activity or releases at Yucca Flat's subsidence craters, though federal monitoring data indicate containment efficacy exceeding 99% for past events with no off-site exceedances. Critics like those at the warn that resumption would erode U.S. moral authority on nonproliferation, incentivizing allies such as or to pursue independent capabilities and complicating sanctions against proliferators, based on game-theoretic models of norm erosion rather than direct empirical precedents. Policy implications hinge on balancing deterrence credibility against escalation risks; resumption could enable tailored warhead modifications for hypersonic threats or low-yield options, bolstering extended deterrence commitments to and allies amid peer competition, but it risks fracturing bilateral arms control frameworks like , expiring in 2026 without extension. Congressional reports stress that any decision requires of technical necessity to mitigate diplomatic backlash, with economic costs estimated at $500 million to $1 billion per test series at Yucca Flat, including infrastructure reactivation. From a causal realist perspective, empirical track records favor stewardship's predictive accuracy, yet strategic from unverified adversary advances underscores debates over whether simulated stewardship suffices indefinitely or if targeted resumption preserves qualitative superiority without quantitative arms racing.

References

  1. https://eros.usgs.gov/earthshots/yucca-flat-nevada-usa
  2. https://www.usgs.gov/publications/detailed-geophysical-fault-characterization-yucca-flat-nevada-test-site-nevada
  3. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/671858-KSWy8u/webviewable/671858.pdf
  4. https://www.usgs.gov/centers/eros/cold-war-craters
  5. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/DOENV_715_Rev1.pdf
  6. https://www.energy.gov/em/articles/em-nevada-reaches-75-completion-groundwater-mission
  7. https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2008/1346/
  8. https://www.topozone.com/nevada/nye-nv/flat/yucca-flat-2/
  9. https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/Publications/Bkground/BP83-05.pdf
  10. https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1307/of2010-1307.pdf
  11. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0037073886900709
  12. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/2016NNSSER_AttA_Final.pdf
  13. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0222/ML022200138.pdf
  14. https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Geological-framework-model-GFM-of-the-Yucca-Flat-basin-The-main-geological-layers_fig1_348614309
  15. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1061
  16. https://pubs.geoscienceworld.org/gsa/books/edited-volume/118/chapter/3788659/Geologie-Structure-of-Yucca-Flat-Area-Nevada
  17. https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Geologic-map-of-Yucca-Flat-showing-drill-hole-locations-cross-section-lines-and_fig2_236447212
  18. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/DOE_MA0518-1.pdf
  19. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/DOENTSAtmospheric.pdf
  20. https://www.dtra.mil/Portals/125/Documents/NTPR/newDocs/6-BUSTER-JANGLE-2021.pdf
  21. https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/pdfs/tbd/nts2-r1-p1.pdf
  22. https://nuclearmuseum.pastperfectonline.com/Archive/F8618835-910C-4556-B53F-839629329110
  23. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/DOENV_1068-1.pdf
  24. https://www.brookings.edu/nuclear-testing-at-the-nevada-test-site/
  25. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/non-power-nuclear-applications/industry/peaceful-nuclear-explosions
  26. https://st.llnl.gov/news/look-back/sedan-event-project-plowshare
  27. https://eros.usgs.gov/earthshots/sedan-crater
  28. https://www.dtra.mil/Portals/125/Documents/NTPR/newDocs/14-PLUMBBOB%20-%202021.pdf
  29. https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/operation-plumbbob-1957/
  30. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/DOE_NV-209_Rev16.pdf
  31. https://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/Plumbob.html
  32. https://www.dtra.mil/Portals/125/Documents/NTPR/newDocs/ANTHReport/1957_DNA_6005F.pdf
  33. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5115961/
  34. https://www.stephensstephens.com/2017/01/the-baneberry-incident-nevada-test-site/
  35. http://www.onv-dev.duffion.com/articles/underground-nuclear-testing-nevada-test-site
  36. https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/do-underground-nuclear-tests-have-fallout
  37. https://www.warhistoryonline.com/cold-war/baneberry-test-operation-emery.html
  38. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/4679984
  39. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214790X18303289
  40. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-03/environmental-impacts-of-underground-nuclear-weapons-testing/
  41. https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=9100CWKR.TXT
  42. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/756465
  43. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/DOENV_1089.pdf
  44. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/2019_GWOH_Posters.pdf
  45. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1242909
  46. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/358836
  47. https://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2019/5038/sir20195038.pdf
  48. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0314/ML031410498.pdf
  49. https://www.energy.gov/em/nevada-national-security-sites-nnss
  50. https://nevada.usgs.gov/doe_nv/emoa.html
  51. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/12/f19/5%20Bob%20Andrews.pdf
  52. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1784927
  53. https://www.energy.gov/em/articles/em-nevada-reaches-significant-milestone-groundwater-testing
  54. http://epubs.nsla.nv.gov/statepubs/epubs/31428003072572.pdf
  55. https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/sir20125196
  56. https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/sir20055175
  57. https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/pp1771
  58. https://nevada.usgs.gov/aquifertests/studies/tests.html?test_pg=ER-4-1m1
  59. https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/ofr99383
  60. https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/ofr20061261
  61. https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/ofr20071293
  62. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/NNSS-BILB-U-0049-Rev01.pdf
  63. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0331/ML033170382.pdf
  64. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1962813
  65. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1055472
  66. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/Nevada-National-Security-Site-Environmental-Report-2023-Summary-Final.pdf
  67. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10795343/
  68. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00295450.2021.1918985
  69. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1559288
  70. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/EMAC-2023-DOE_NV_03624-2024.pdf
  71. https://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2012/5196/
  72. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/Nevada-National-Security-Site-2024-Final-Summary.pdf
  73. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/Nevada-National-Security-Site-2024-Final.pdf
  74. https://cemp.dri.edu/nnsser/nnsser_2001.pdf
  75. https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/location/nevada-test-site/
  76. https://nnss.gov/mission/stockpile-stewardship-program/big-explosives-experimental-facility-beef/
  77. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/NNSS-BEEF-U-0003.pdf
  78. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2020/06/nuclear-testing-not-needed-now.html
  79. https://www.downwinders.info/2024/10/04/the-connection-between-the-nevada-test-site-and-cancer-from-radiation-exposure/
  80. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R43956/R43956.11.pdf
  81. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/6690781/
  82. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/20790388_Leukemia_in_Utah_and_Radioactive_Fallout_From_the_Nevada_Test_Site_A_Case-Control_Study
  83. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK100833/
  84. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Nevada-National-Security-Site-Environmental-Report-2021-Summary-Final.pdf
  85. https://oriseapps.orau.gov/cedr/pdf/hist-docs/8150.pdf
  86. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39222011/
  87. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11662
  88. https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter14.html
  89. https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/america-must-prepare-test-nuclear-weapons
  90. https://globalsecurityreview.com/it-is-time-to-test-again/
  91. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-07/focus/looming-threat-renewed-us-nuclear-testing
  92. https://trivalleycares.org/2025/confronting-the-call-to-resume-nuclear-testing
  93. https://www.stimson.org/2025/the-chapter-on-us-nuclear-testing-must-be-closed/
  94. https://fas.org/publication/certification-necessity-nuclear-explosive-testing/
  95. https://news.usni.org/2025/08/21/report-to-congress-on-u-s-nuclear-weapons-tests
  96. https://www.sciencenews.org/article/nuclear-weapons-tests-comeback-threats
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.