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Critical Rationalism is Karl Popper's answer to what he considered the most important problems of epistemology and philosophy of science: the problems of the growth of knowledge, notably by induction, and the demarcation of science. He adopted a fallibilist approach to these problems, especially that of induction, without falling into skepticism. His approach was to put in perspective the distinctive role of deductive logic in the development of knowledge, especially in science, in the context of a less rigorous methodology based on critical thinking. The central technical concept in the application of critical rationalism to science is falsifiabiity. Popper first mentioned the term "critical rationalism" in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945),[1] and also later in Conjectures and Refutations (1963),[2] Unended Quest (1976),[3] and The Myth of the Framework (1994).[4]

Fallibilism, not skepticism

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Popper admitted that the truth of statements cannot be obtained using only logical definitions and deductions, as this leads to an infinite regress.[5] For Popper, this does not prevent statements from being useful for solving problems, because they can be logically analyzed to draw logical consequences, possibly contradictions with observation statements linked to real tests.[5] Popper wrote that the bulk of scientific activities use deductive logic to evaluate theories.[6][7][8]

Popper accepted Hume's argument and the consequences of Duhem's thesis and insisted that there is no logical method for accessing empirical truth, no inductive rule, not even to a small extent. However, he rejected skepticism, the idea that the search for truth is futile. He admitted that, although logic alone says nothing about empirical truth, statements can be related to reality through problem solving, scientific observations and experiments.[9] Popper always insisted on this distinction between the logical aspect and methodological aspect of science.[10][11] In Realism and the Aim of Science, Popper speaks of a "preferred" theory, not of a "true" or a "false" theory, when one theory is chosen over another given experimental results.[9]

Tarski's semantic theory of truth

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Tarski inspired Popper with his semantic theory of truth.

Popper was always aware that empirical truth eludes logic alone, and he was therefore reluctant to refer to the truth of scientific theories. This, he wrote, changed after reading Tarski's semantic theory of truth. He saw this theory as a way of talking about truth as a correspondence with facts. A key aspect of Tarski's theory, which Popper considered important, is the separation between the logical (formal) aspect of language as an object and its semantic interpretation. He saw this as a way of explaining the distinction between the logic of science and its methodology, or rather between logic and the metaphysical component to which methodology refers when it aims, for example, to test theories. The difference is that in Tarski's theory, "facts" are mathematical structures, not an external reality beyond the reach of logic and its language, and which we can only describe artificially in a meta-language as in the argument "Snow is white" (in the object language) is true because snow is white (in the meta-language). This use of Tarski's theory is accepted by some and sharply criticized by others. Popper used it, for example, in Realism and the Aim of Science, to explain the difference between the metaphysical versions of the problem of induction and its logical versions. He wrote that the metaphysical versions of the problem refer to the "meta-theory of physics" and compared this to what Tarski calls the "semantics" in its theory of truth.[12]

The role of methodology

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For Popper, the bulk of activities in science use deductive logic on statements,[6][7][8] but this logical part of science must be integrated within an adequate methodology.[13] The logical part is considered incapable of justifying empirical knowledge on its own. For example, Popper and the members of the Vienna Circle agreed that only statements can be used to justify statements, that is, the use of logic alone in science will not be linked to (empirical, not propositional) evidence.[14][15] Logic uses accepted or provisionally accepted observation statements to determine whether a theory is logically refuted or not, but the "accepted" observation statement could be empirically false and that will not concern the logical part.[11]

Popper wrote that the bulk of scientific activity takes place in the logical part, using deductive logic to check the consistency of a theory, compare theories, check their empirical nature (i.e., falsifiability) and, most importantly, test a theory, which is possible only when it is falsifiable. He emphasized that, even when theories are tested against observations, deductive logic is largely used.[6][8] Despite this intensive use of logic, Popper accepted, as do most philosophers and scientists, that logic alone does not connect by itself with evidence. Popper explained this dilemma by stating the existence of a natural separation (not a disconnection) between the logical and the methodological parts of science.[10][11]

Lakatos described the aspects of scientific methodology leading to the rejection of research programs and their theories

Popper wrote that any criterion, including his famous falsifiability criterion, that applies solely on the logical structure could not alone define science. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, he wrote "it is impossible to decide, by analysing its logical form [as do the falsifiability criterion], whether a system of statements is a conventional system of irrefutable implicit definitions, or whether it is a system which is empirical in my sense; that is, a refutable system."[16][17] Popper insisted that falsifiability is a logical criterion, which must be understood in the context of a proper methodology.[10][11] The methodology can hardly be made precise.[18] It is a set of informal implicit conventions that guide all the decisions that surround the logical work, which experiments to conduct, which apparatus to build, which domain will be financially supported, etc., aspects that were raised by Lakatos in The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.[19]

Popper's philosophy was criticized as if the logical part existed alone. For example, Putnam attributed to Popper "the fantasy of doing science using only deductive logic".[20] Putnam further criticized Popper's description of the logical part of science by referring to methodological problems. For example, he wrote "I claim: in a great many important cases, scientific theories do not imply predictions at all."[21] Because Popper does not believe in inductive logic, Wesley Salmon wrote that, for Popper, "there is no ampliative form of scientific argument, and consequently, science provides no information whatever about the future".[22] Regarding the methodological part, Feyerabend wrote that there is no method in science. He considered and rejected methodological rules, but they were those of a naive falsificationist.[23]

In contrast, Popper emphasized both parts of science and spoke of methodology as a means of correctly using falsifiability and the usual logical work in science to make it useful in a method of conjectures and refutations to be used in usual critical discussions. Falsififiability says hypotheses should be consistent and they should logically lead to predictions, which confrontation with observations should be considered in critical thinking.[7]

Marxism and politic

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Adolf Hitler giving speech on March 15, 1938 in Heldenplatz, three days after the Anschluss.

The failure of democratic parties to prevent fascism from taking over Austrian politics in the 1920s and 1930s traumatised Popper. He suffered from the direct consequences of this failure. Events after the Anschluss (the annexation of Austria by the German Reich in 1938) prompted him to refocus his writings on social and political philosophy. His most important works in the field of social science—The Poverty of Historicism (1944) and The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945)—were inspired by his reflection on the events of his time and represented, in a sense, a reaction to the prevalent totalitarian ideologies that then dominated Central European politics. His books defended democratic liberalism as a social and political philosophy. They also represented extensive critiques of the philosophical presuppositions underpinning all forms of totalitarianism.[24]

Earlier in his life, the death of friends in a demonstration instigated by the communists when he was about seventeen, strongly contributed to Popper's position regarding the search for contradictions or criticisms and the attitude of taking them into account. He blamed Marxism which thesis, Popper recalls, "is that although the revolution may claim some victims, capitalism is claiming more victims than the whole socialist revolution". He asked himself "whether such a calculation could ever be supported by 'science'." He then decided that criticism was important in science.[25] This, Popper wrote, made him "a fallibilist", and impressed on him "the value of intellectual modesty". It made him "most conscious of the differences between dogmatic and critical thinking".[26]

Psychoanalysis

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Sigmund Freud developed the theories of "Psychoanalysis." Popper considered these theories to be unscientific because they were not falsifiable.

Popper saw a contrast between the theories of Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler, which he considered unscientific, and Albert Einstein's theory of relativity which sparked the revolution in physics in the early 20th century. Popper believed that Einstein's theory, as a theory properly grounded in scientific thought and method, was highly "risky", in the sense that it was possible to deduce consequences from it that differed considerably from those of the then-dominant Newtonian physics.[27] One such prediction, that gravity could deflect light, was verified by Eddington's experiments in 1919.[28] When he tackled the problem of demarcation in the philosophy of science, he realized that "what made a theory, or a statement, scientific was its power to rule out, or exclude, the occurrence of some possible events—to prohibit, or forbid, the occurrence of these events."[29] He thought that, in contrast, nothing could, even in principle, falsify psychoanalytic theories. This led him to posit that "only attempted refutations which did not succeed qua refutations should count as 'verifications'."[30]

A little later, Popper realized that theories can be "immunized" against falsification using auxiliary hypotheses. In Logik der Forschung, he introduced the notion of "(degrees of) content". He proposed that only modifications that increase the empirical content of a theory should be considered.[31]

In a series of articles beginning in 1979, Adolf Grünbaum argued, with examples, that Freudian psychoanalytic theories are in fact falsifiable. He criticized Popper's analysis of Freud's psychoanalytic theories and, on this basis, questioned the applicability of the demarcation criterion in general.[32]

Falsifiability, probability statement and metaphysics

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See also: Falsifiability

Popper identified scientific statements with falsifiable statements and distinguished them from metaphysical statements. But, he considered metaphysical statements useful in science. In particular, probabilistic statements are non falsifiable and thus metaphysical in Popper's terminology.[33] There are many other kinds of metaphysical statements that are useful in Popper's view. For examples, "all men are mortal" is metaphysical, because it is not falsifiable, but such statements suggest other hypotheses that are more precise and more useful, for example "all men die before reaching the age of 150."[34] Similarly, probabilistic hypotheses suggest other hypotheses that are falsifiable such as the acceptance criteria for the null hypothesis in a statistical test.[35] As another example: a statistical hypothesis like a Chi-Square test is not a universal statement; it concerns a specific study, but is falsifiable and thus useful in critical discussions. A probability statement like "the probability of both heads and tails are 1/2" is not falsifiable; Popper called this problem of strengthening probability statements to make them falsifiable (i.e. incompatible with some sequences) and thus not metaphysical "the problem of decidability of probability statements." [36]

Critical thinking, not support

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Popper distinguished between trusting a theory because it is true and preferring a theory because it has been more severely tested.[37] Some have argued that, indirectly, Popper was adopting an inductive principle when he proposed to "prefer" a more severely tested theory.[38][39][40] For Popper, the term "induction" refers to a logical method of justification, and he emphasized that this preference does not result from such a logical process whose premises would be the results of rigorous tests. For Popper, results of rigorous tests are rather used in critical discussions. He wrote:[37]

[T]here is no 'absolute reliance'; but since we have to choose, it will be 'rational' to choose the best-tested theory. This will be 'rational' in the most obvious sense of the word known to me: the best-tested theory is the one which, in the light of our critical discussion, appears to be the best so far, and I do not know of anything more 'rational' than a well-conducted critical discussion.

— Karl Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934)

Moreover, critical discussions must consider how much the theory prohibits and thus is unlikely to survive the tests, as well as whether the theory supersedes previous theories by generalizing them as when speaking of all heavenly bodies instead of only planets.[41][42] Popper regularly emphasized that criticism in critical discussions requires the use of background knowledge, but rejected the view there will always be a set of assumptions beyond rational assessment.[43] In particular, Popper brought this point in the context of the empirical basis of science, which he compared to a swamp into which it is always possible to drive pillars deeper if a more solid foundation is needed.[44]

The critical rationalism approach to evaluating scientific theories can be generalized to non-scientific domains.[45] Critical rationalists hold that any claims to knowledge can and should be rationally criticized, and, if they have empirical content, can and should be subjected to tests which may falsify them. They are either falsifiable and thus empirical (in a very broad sense), or not falsifiable and thus non-empirical. The general principle of critical rationalism is the same in both cases: we critically analyze the hypotheses using our "background knowledge".[46] In the case of scientific hypotheses, background knowledge is used while observation statements are discussed or analysed.[46]

Bayésianisme vs conjecture and refutation

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Use of probability in a verificationist approach, "similar in some ways to that of modern pragmatists and positivists", has been traced back to Carneades.[47] In the first half of the 20th century, Reichenbach and Carnap argued that "the only criterion of theory-confirmation ought to be agreement with observed facts; the theory would thus be the 'most probable' one ... within a formal theory of inductive probability."[48] Carnap studies have been related to Bayesianism.[49][50] Theories are assigned a probability, outcomes also have a probability and, given an outcome, Bayes' theorem can be applied to revise the a priori probability of each theory.[51] Bayes' theorem is useful when we have the background knowledge needed to establish the a priori probability of characteristic parameters of the application domain and the probability of the observed data depends on these parameters: the parameters that fit the data and therefore the domain get revised with a higher probability.[52]

Andrew Gelman en 2012
Cosma Shalizi
For Gelman (left) and Shalizi (right), the application of Bayes' theorem uses the hypothetico-deductive approach to revise models.

This view on the growth of knowledge has been criticized. Andrew Gelman and Cosma Shalizi, for example, wrote that the use of Bayes's theorem in practice is closer to the hypothetico-deductive approach, as proposed by Popper and others, than to the approach according to which the revision of probabilities is the sole consequence of the observed data.. In their work, they "examine the actual role played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian confirmation theory.[53]

Critical rationalism is against the use of probability to assess theories. Popper explained that the greater the informative content of a theory the lower will be its probability.[54][55] He wrote that in "many cases, the more improbable (improbable in the sense of the calculus of probability) hypothesis is preferable.[55] He also wrote that "it happen quite often that I cannot prefer the logically 'better' and more improbable hypothesis, because somebody succeeded in refuting it experimentally."[56]

Justified true belief

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Critical rationalism rejects the classical position that knowledge is justified true belief. David Miller noted that, for Popper, knowledge is neither justified nor believed, and that, generally, scientific knowledge is not true (in any logical sense).[57][58] Musgrave wrote that "Popper's theory of science, and his cure for relativism, rest upon his rejection of the traditional theory of knowledge as justified true belief."[59]

Variations

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Mario Bunge's scientific realism draws on Popper's critical rationalism.

William Warren Bartley developed a variation of critical rationalism that he called pancritical rationalism.[60][61][62]

The Argentine-Canadian philosopher of science Mario Bunge criticized Popper's critical rationalism,[63][64] while drawing on it to formulate an account of scientific realism.[65][66][67]

See also

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People

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Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ Popper 2013, pp. 435–437.
  2. ^ Popper 2014, Intro., sec. XV.
  3. ^ Popper 2005, p. 132.
  4. ^ Popper 2014b, p. xii.
  5. ^ a b Popper 2005, ch. 7.
  6. ^ a b c Popper 2002, ch. 1, sec. 3.
  7. ^ a b c Thornton 2018, sec. 4.
  8. ^ a b c Popper 1972, ch. 8, sec. 4.
  9. ^ a b Popper 1983, ch. 1 sec. 2.
  10. ^ a b c Thornton 2018, sec. 3.
  11. ^ a b c d Popper 1983, Intro. 1982.
  12. ^ Popper 1983, ch. 1, sec. VI-5.
  13. ^ Gattei 2009, p. 36.
  14. ^ Popper 2002, sec. 7, 25.
  15. ^ Shearmur & Stokes 2016, ch. 5 sec. 6.5.4.
  16. ^ O'Hear 1982, ch. VI, sec. 2.
  17. ^ Shearmur (2006), p. 275.
  18. ^ Popper 2002, chap. 4, sec. 23.
  19. ^ Lakatos 1999.
  20. ^ Agassi 2008, ch. 10, app. 5.
  21. ^ Putnam 1974, p. 224.
  22. ^ Salmon 1978.
  23. ^ García 2006, ch. 3, sec. 3.3.
  24. ^ Thornton 2015.
  25. ^ Popper 2005, ch. 8.
  26. ^ Popper 2005, chap. 8.
  27. ^ Popper 2005, p. 37, chap. 8.
  28. ^ Shapiro & Shapiro 2010.
  29. ^ Popper 2005, p. 42, chap. 8.
  30. ^ Popper 2005, p. 43, chap. 8.
  31. ^ Popper 2005, pp. 43–45, chap. 8.
  32. ^ Grünbaum 2008.
  33. ^ Shearmur 2006, p. 271.
  34. ^ Popper 1974, sec. 17.
  35. ^ Gillies 1995, sec. 3.
  36. ^ Popper 2002, chap. 8.
  37. ^ a b Garcia 2006, p. 33.
  38. ^ Garcia 2006, sec. 4.5.
  39. ^ Drieschner 2005.
  40. ^ Afisi 2013, sec. 3.1.
  41. ^ Garcia 2006, p. 91.
  42. ^ Popper 2002, sec. 36.
  43. ^ Thornton 2018, sec. 5.
  44. ^ Watkins 2014, sec. 7.4.
  45. ^ Bartley 1982, sec. XXVI.
  46. ^ a b Popper 2014, ch. 10, sec. 4.
  47. ^ Popkin 2015.
  48. ^ McCullin 1976.
  49. ^ Gower 1997, chap. 11.
  50. ^ Kreuzman 2000.
  51. ^ Lin 2024, sec. 1.
  52. ^ van de Schoot et al. 2014.
  53. ^ Gelman & Shalizi 2013.
  54. ^ Corvi 2005, p. 45.
  55. ^ a b Popper 1972, sec. 1.8.
  56. ^ Popper 1971.
  57. ^ Miller 2011.
  58. ^ Miller 1994, sec. 3.1.
  59. ^ Musgrave 1974, p. 562.
  60. ^ Rowbottom & Bueno 2009.
  61. ^ Yoshida 2019.
  62. ^ Bartley III 1999.
  63. ^ Bunge 1983a, pp. 323–376.
  64. ^ Bunge 1983b, pp. 59–113 (70).
  65. ^ Agassi & Bar-Am 2019.
  66. ^ Quintanilla 1982.
  67. ^ Pickel 2004.

References

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Further reading

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Critical rationalism

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Critical Rationalism is a philosophical framework developed by Karl Popper in the mid-20th century, primarily as an epistemological theory that views the growth of human knowledge as an ongoing process of bold conjectures followed by rigorous attempts at refutation, rather than through inductive accumulation of observations or justifications. At its core, it rejects the classical problem of induction—highlighted by David Hume—as a myth, asserting that no amount of confirming evidence can prove a universal theory true, while a single counterexample can falsify it, making falsifiability the key criterion for demarcating scientific theories from pseudoscience. Popper described this approach as fallibilist, emphasizing that all knowledge remains conjectural and tentative, with science progressing through error elimination and critical discussion within an intersubjective community, rather than achieving certainty or absolute foundations.

Key Principles and Epistemological Foundations

Critical Rationalism posits that scientific and rational inquiry operates via a hypothetico-deductive method: theories are proposed as imaginative, often intuitive solutions to problems, then subjected to severe tests designed to expose contradictions or discrepancies with empirical evidence. Popper argued that "the empirical basis of objective science has nothing ‘absolute’ about it," likening science to a structure resting on shifting pillars rather than solid bedrock, underscoring its dynamic and anti-dogmatic nature. Central to this is the idea of verisimilitude (truth-likeness), where surviving falsification tests allows a theory to approximate truth more closely, though never conclusively proving it; for instance, Einstein's relativity gained favor over Newton's mechanics not through verification but by boldly predicting and surviving tests that refuted the older paradigm. The philosophy extends beyond science to all rational thought, promoting criticism as "the lifeblood of all rational thought" and rejecting dogmatic adherence to any idea, including its own principles. Popper's fallibilism draws from influences like Hume's critique of induction and Kant's theory-laden view of perception, maintaining that observations are never neutral but shaped by anticipatory theories, thus eliminating any "pure datum" from which knowledge could be inductively built. In this view, knowledge emerges from creative problem-solving, where even "irrational" or metaphysical conjectures can spark progress, as long as they are open to refutation—avoiding errors entirely would stifle advancement.

Applications to Science and Society

In the philosophy of science, Critical Rationalism revolutionized demarcation by insisting that theories must be testable and refutable: "It must be possible for a scientific system to be refuted by experience." This criterion dismissed irrefutable doctrines like psychoanalysis or historical materialism as non-scientific, while praising empirical sciences for their exposure to criticism. Scientific communities enforce this through a "code of honor," using objective language for intersubjective debate, with progress arising from an "ongoing revolution" of competing theories under severe scrutiny. Beyond epistemology, Popper applied these ideas to social and political theory in works like The Open Society and Its Enemies, advocating for an "open society" modeled on scientific rationalism—one that tolerates diverse ideas, values, and criticisms while closing itself only to intolerance and totalitarianism. Here, societal problem-solving mirrors scientific conjecture and refutation, fostering pluralism and piecemeal engineering over utopian blueprints, as bold but fallible proposals advance through critical trial and error. This holistic framework has influenced fields from methodology in the social sciences to debates on rationality, emphasizing intellectual humility and the perpetual quest for better approximations to truth.

Overview

Definition and Core Principles

Critical rationalism is an epistemological position developed by philosopher Karl Popper that views the growth of knowledge as an evolutionary process driven by bold conjectures followed by rigorous attempts at refutation, rather than through inductive accumulation or positive justification of theories. This approach rejects justificationism—the idea that theories can be rationally supported by evidence to establish their truth or probability—arguing instead that empirical evidence can only serve to falsify hypotheses, never to confirm them definitively. As Popper emphasized, "all our universal laws or theories remain forever guesses, conjectures, and hypotheses," underscoring that science progresses by eliminating errors rather than building secure foundations. At its core, critical rationalism embraces fallibilism, the principle that all human knowledge is tentative and conjectural, inherently open to error and revision, with no claim to absolute certainty or final justification. This fallibilist stance fosters an anti-dogmatic attitude, opposing any immunization of ideas against criticism and promoting an open society of inquiry where theories must withstand severe rational scrutiny to be retained provisionally. Rational criticism plays a central role, functioning as the mechanism for error elimination through intersubjective discussion, empirical testing, and logical analysis, thereby advancing knowledge without relying on authority or tradition. Key concepts in critical rationalism include the provisional nature of all theories, which are held tentatively as the best available explanations until potentially falsified, and a preference for bold conjectures that make risky, testable predictions with high informative content to maximize potential for refutation and progress. It also establishes demarcation between science and non-science through the criterion of falsifiability or testability: a theory qualifies as scientific only if it entails observable consequences that could, in principle, refute it, distinguishing it from unfalsifiable metaphysics or pseudoscience. This emphasis on testability ensures that scientific claims remain critically vulnerable, driving continual improvement through the survival of the fittest ideas.

Historical Development

Critical Rationalism traces its origins to early 20th-century philosophical debates, particularly David Hume's 18th-century problem of induction, which questioned the justification of general laws from specific observations and influenced later critiques of inductivism. In the 1920s and 1930s, Karl Popper engaged with the Vienna Circle's logical positivism through informal attendance at meetings and interactions with figures like Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath, though he rejected their verificationist criteria for scientific demarcation. Popper's early work, shaped by neo-Kantian influences via his associate Julius Kraft and psychologists like Karl Bühler, emphasized methodological criticism over dogmatic verification. A pivotal milestone came with Popper's 1934 publication of Logik der Forschung (translated as The Logic of Scientific Discovery in 1959), which formalized critical rationalism by proposing falsifiability as the criterion for scientific theories, directly responding to the Vienna Circle's inductivist tendencies. Anticipating political turmoil, Popper accepted a lectureship at Canterbury University College in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 1937, emigrating shortly before the Anschluss in 1938, where he remained in exile until 1945, developing his ideas amid World War II isolation. During this period, he composed The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), extending critical rationalism to social and political philosophy by critiquing historicism and advocating open societies based on critical scrutiny. Post-World War II, critical rationalism gained prominence when Popper joined the London School of Economics in 1946, where he taught philosophy of science until 1969, influencing a generation of scholars through seminars and publications. In the 1960s and 1970s, the framework evolved through extensions by Popper's students and associates, notably Imre Lakatos, who developed the "methodology of scientific research programmes" in The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (1978), building on Popperian falsification while incorporating historical progressiveness. Paul Feyerabend, initially a Popperian, diverged in works like Against Method (1975), critiquing strict rationalism and promoting epistemological anarchism, sparking post-Popper debates on the limits of critical methods in science. These developments marked critical rationalism's transition from a primarily epistemological stance to broader methodological and historical analyses.

Philosophical Foundations

Karl Popper's Contributions

Karl Popper, born on July 28, 1902, in Vienna to Jewish parents in an intellectually stimulating household, developed an early interest in philosophy influenced by his father's scholarly pursuits in classics and economics. As a teenager, he briefly embraced Marxism amid post-World War I political turmoil but soon rejected it due to its dogmatic and unfalsifiable nature, an experience that shaped his critiques of historicism and pseudoscience. His exposure to psychoanalysis through work at Alfred Adler's clinic further reinforced this skepticism, as he viewed Freudian and Adlerian theories as irrefutable despite their explanatory claims, contrasting sharply with the testable predictions of Albert Einstein's relativity theory, which profoundly impacted him during university lectures. These encounters, combined with his studies at the University of Vienna where he earned a PhD in 1928, led Popper to prioritize empirical testability over confirmation in knowledge acquisition. Popper's seminal work, Logik der Forschung (1934; translated as The Logic of Scientific Discovery in 1959), marked his foundational contribution to critical rationalism by introducing falsifiability as the criterion for demarcating science from non-science, rejecting the verificationism of logical positivism and the inductivism he associated with David Hume. In this text, he argued that scientific theories advance through bold conjectures subjected to rigorous attempts at refutation, rather than accumulation of confirming instances, emphasizing that "it is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory... but this does not mean that the theory is true." This shift positioned critical rationalism as a fallibilist alternative to positivism, viewing all knowledge as tentative and open to criticism. Later, in Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (1963), Popper expanded this framework, portraying scientific progress as an evolutionary process of problem-solving via trial and error-elimination, and applied it to critique Marxism's historicist predictions as pseudoscientific due to their ad hoc adjustments to evade falsification. Building on these ideas, Popper's Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (1972) theorized an objective realm of knowledge—World 3—comprising cultural products like theories independent of individual minds, which interact with physical and mental worlds to drive intellectual evolution without reliance on subjective justification. His advocacy for piecemeal social engineering, outlined in works like The Poverty of Historicism (1957), stemmed from these epistemological insights, promoting incremental, testable reforms over utopian planning to minimize harm in open societies, as "human misery is the most urgent problem of a rational public policy." This approach critiqued holistic historicism in thinkers like Plato, Hegel, and Marx, favoring methodological individualism and rational criticism to foster democratic institutions. Popper's emigration to New Zealand in 1937 amid rising Nazism and his later career at the London School of Economics from 1946 solidified his influence, though he consistently rejected induction's foundational role in science.

Rejection of Justificationism and Induction

Critical rationalism fundamentally rejects justificationism, the traditional epistemological doctrine that knowledge claims require positive justification through foundational beliefs, empirical observations, or logical deduction to be deemed rational or true. Popper argues that justificationism inevitably leads to an infinite regress, where each justifying reason demands further justification, rendering the process untenable without arbitrary stopping points or circular reasoning. He contends that no theory can be positively justified, only temporarily corroborated through surviving criticism, as all claims remain fallible and open to revision. This critique extends to foundationalism, which Popper sees as dogmatic by privileging certain axioms as immune to scrutiny, thus stifling intellectual progress. Closely tied to this is critical rationalism's dismissal of induction, the method of generalizing universal laws from specific observations, which Popper declares a "myth" following David Hume's demonstration that inductive inferences cannot be logically justified without circularity or assumption of uniformity in nature. Hume's problem remains unsolved, as past observations provide no logical guarantee for future instances, exposing induction as invalid both deductively and inductively. Popper maintains that science does not rely on induction; theories are not derived from data but conjectured boldly and tested for refutation, with no observation able to confirm a universal statement conclusively. In place of justification and induction, critical rationalism proposes a heuristic of critical discussion and error elimination, where rationality consists in subjecting ideas to rigorous scrutiny to detect and discard falsehoods rather than seeking confirmatory evidence. This approach promotes tentative acceptance of theories based on their resistance to falsification, fostering knowledge growth through iterative conjecture and refutation without the pitfalls of positive verification. Falsification thus serves as the logical counterpart to induction, enabling empirical progress without unfounded generalizations.

Epistemological Framework

Falsification as Demarcation Criterion

Critical Rationalism posits falsification as the primary criterion for demarcating scientific theories from non-scientific ones, a concept introduced by Karl Popper in his seminal work The Logic of Scientific Discovery. A theory qualifies as scientific if and only if it is falsifiable, meaning it prohibits certain observable events and can, in principle, be refuted by empirical evidence. This demarcation rejects traditional inductivist approaches, emphasizing that science advances through testable hypotheses rather than confirmatory evidence alone. The logic of falsification rests on an asymmetry between verification and refutation for universal statements, such as scientific laws. No amount of confirmatory instances can logically verify a universal generalization (e.g., "All swans are white"), as it remains compatible with unobserved cases, but a single counterexample (e.g., a black swan) definitively falsifies it. Popper argued that this deductive approach aligns with the structure of scientific prediction, where theories generate specific, risky testable propositions that expose them to potential refutation. Scientific progress thus involves conjecturing bold theories with high empirical content and subjecting them to severe tests, rather than seeking perpetual confirmation. Popper illustrated this criterion with contrasting examples. Albert Einstein's general theory of relativity is scientific because it yields precise, falsifiable predictions, such as the bending of light by gravitational fields during a solar eclipse, which was empirically tested and initially corroborated but could have refuted the theory if discrepant. In contrast, theories like Marxism and psychoanalysis fail the demarcation test due to their unfalsifiability; Marxist predictions of imminent capitalist collapse were preserved through ad hoc modifications and reinterpretations when contradicted, rendering them immune to refutation, while Freudian and Adlerian psychology could accommodate any human behavior as confirmatory, lacking prohibitive power. Despite its theoretical rigor, falsification faces practical limitations, particularly through conventionalist stratagems that scientists may employ to evade refutation. These include auxiliary hypotheses or adjustments to observational protocols that shift blame from the core theory to peripheral assumptions, as seen in historical defenses of geocentric models against heliocentric challenges. Popper acknowledged that ultimate decisions on accepting basic observational statements (e.g., "A white swan was observed here") involve conventional agreement within the scientific community, not absolute justification, which can prolong the life of flawed theories. Nonetheless, he insisted that genuine scientific practice demands minimizing such evasions by prioritizing theories that make novel, improbable predictions. Falsification plays a pivotal role in the progression of scientific knowledge by driving an evolutionary process of trial and error. Theories that survive rigorous attempts at refutation gain temporary corroboration and are preferred if they offer greater explanatory depth and testability than predecessors, fostering incremental advances toward more verisimilar (truthlike) understandings. This mechanism ensures that science eliminates errors through critical scrutiny, promoting objective knowledge growth via successive bold conjectures and refutations, without reliance on inductive justification.

Objective Knowledge and World 3

In Karl Popper's ontology, reality is divided into three interacting worlds to account for the nature of knowledge. World 1 encompasses the physical realm of concrete objects and states, such as rocks, brains, and processes governed by causal laws. World 2 consists of subjective mental states and experiences, including thoughts, perceptions, and individual beliefs. World 3, the focus of Popper's theory of objective knowledge, comprises the autonomous contents of thought—abstract entities like theories, arguments, problems, and cultural products that exist independently of any human mind. This tripartite framework, introduced in works such as Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (1972), rejects reductionist views that collapse knowledge into physical or psychological categories, instead positing World 3 as a distinct, pluralistic domain. World 3 is characterized by its objectivity and logical autonomy, where its entities—such as scientific theories or mathematical proofs—engage in relations of compatibility, contradiction, or implication irrespective of subjective comprehension. Unlike the causal interactions in Worlds 1 and 2, World 3 evolves dialectically through critical examination and error-elimination, embodying an unpredictable growth akin to biological evolution but operating via logical rather than temporal processes. Popper describes these contents as "exosomatic artefacts," external to the mind yet capable of influencing physical actions (via World 2) and material embodiments (in World 1), such as when a theory stored in a book shapes technological developments. This autonomy ensures that World 3 entities possess infinite logical consequences, defying full human understanding while enabling ongoing criticism as the engine of knowledge advancement. Illustrative examples of World 3 include Newton's theory of gravitation, which exists as an objective structure with implications beyond its creator's intent, or Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, an abstract composition instantiated in scores and performances yet logically self-contained. Similarly, a mathematical proof or the U.S. Constitution functions in World 3 as a public artifact, open to logical scrutiny and refinement without dependence on individual minds. These examples highlight how World 3 bridges subjective creativity (World 2) and physical realization (World 1), forming a repository of impersonal knowledge. The implications of World 3 resolve the problem of psychologism by conceiving knowledge not as private mental states but as public, criticizable products that transcend individual subjectivity. This ontology supports critical rationalism's view of knowledge growth as an objective process, where theories in World 3 are tentatively proposed, rigorously tested, and improved through refutation, fostering a non-justificatory epistemology. By treating knowledge as an evolving cultural artifact, Popper's framework underscores its intersubjective accessibility and causal potency in human affairs, without relying on inductive verification or innate ideas.

Methodological Applications

In Scientific Inquiry

Critical rationalism applies to scientific inquiry through a methodology that prioritizes the critical testing and potential refutation of theories over their verification or inductive support. The process begins with the formulation of bold conjectures—hypotheses that are imaginative, highly informative, and risky in their potential for falsification, aiming to solve existing problems and explain phenomena in novel ways. From these conjectures, scientists deduce specific, testable predictions via logical deduction, which are then subjected to severe empirical tests designed explicitly to attempt refutation. If a test fails, the theory is falsified, leading to its elimination or revision; if it survives, the theory gains provisional corroboration, measured by the severity and riskiness of the tests it has withstood, though it remains open to future challenges. This deductive approach, encapsulated in Popper's tetradic schema of problem-solving (problem → tentative theory → error elimination → new problem), underscores that scientific rationality lies in the critical attitude of seeking errors rather than confirming truths. In this framework, scientific progress is understood as a cumulative process of error elimination, where knowledge advances not through the accumulation of confirmatory instances but by the successive replacement of falsified theories with better approximations to truth, characterized by greater verisimilitude (truthlikeness). Theories are evaluated based on their empirical content and explanatory power relative to rivals, with preference given to those that solve more problems and make more precise, improbable predictions. Popper addresses the Duhem-Quine thesis, which posits that no hypothesis can be tested in isolation due to dependence on auxiliary assumptions (such as measurement protocols or background theories), by advocating the introduction of testable auxiliary hypotheses that generate new, falsifiable predictions, while rejecting ad hoc modifications that merely protect a theory without increasing its testability. Basic statements—singular, observational claims like "a black swan was observed here"—serve as the stopping points for testing, accepted conventionally by the scientific community after intersubjective scrutiny, thus enabling decisive refutations without infinite regress. This method ensures objectivity in practice, even as it acknowledges the conventional elements in theory choice. Historical case studies illustrate these principles in action. The phlogiston theory of combustion, which conjectured that a substance called phlogiston was released during burning (explaining why combustibles seemed to lose weight), was refuted when experiments showed that metals gain weight upon calcination, contradicting the theory's predictions and leading to its replacement by the oxygen-based theory of Lavoisier, marking a clear instance of error elimination and theoretical progress. Similarly, quantum mechanics has been corroborated through repeated failed attempts at falsification, such as experiments testing Bell's inequalities derived from quantum predictions, which have withstood severe tests despite anomalies, thereby increasing the theory's verisimilitude without achieving final verification; Popper interpreted quantum probabilities as objective propensities of experimental setups, allowing for falsifiable predictions about outcomes like particle detections. These examples demonstrate how critical rationalism drives scientific inquiry toward increasingly accurate worldviews by weeding out errors via rigorous testing.

In Social and Political Theory

Critical rationalism extends Karl Popper's epistemological principles to social and political domains, emphasizing the importance of criticism, fallibility, and incremental reform over dogmatic ideologies or predictive grand theories. In his seminal work The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), Popper critiques totalitarianism as a form of historicism that seeks to impose unchangeable blueprints on society, drawing on analyses of Plato, Hegel, and Marx to argue that such approaches suppress individual freedom and rational discourse. He contrasts this with the ideal of an "open society," characterized by institutions that allow for ongoing criticism, error correction, and the free exchange of ideas, thereby fostering progress through trial and error rather than enforced conformity. This preference for open, criticizable societies over closed, dogmatic ones underscores critical rationalism's commitment to protecting pluralism and rationality in political life. In social methodology, Popper introduces "situational logic" as a tool for explaining human actions through rational reconstruction, whereby social phenomena are analyzed by identifying the objective situation facing actors, their aims, and the logical consequences of their choices within that context. This approach rejects historicism—the belief in inevitable historical laws or predictable societal trajectories—as scientifically untenable and politically dangerous, since it discourages critical scrutiny and justifies authoritarian interventions. Instead, situational logic promotes a deductivist method akin to economic reasoning, focusing on how individuals respond to perceived problems without assuming omniscience or teleological progress, thus applying falsifiability to social explanations by testing models against historical evidence. Applying these ideas, critical rationalism advocates "piecemeal engineering" as the preferred strategy for social and political reform, involving small-scale, trial-and-error interventions that can be tested, criticized, and adjusted based on outcomes, in contrast to "utopian engineering," which pursues wholesale societal redesign and risks catastrophic failure due to untestable assumptions. Popper illustrates this with policy examples, such as targeted economic interventions to alleviate poverty or unemployment, where reforms are implemented incrementally to allow for empirical feedback and correction, minimizing unintended consequences. This method aligns with the broader critical rationalist ethos by prioritizing solvable problems and institutional openness, ensuring that social change remains adaptable and accountable to rational critique.

Criticisms and Responses

Major Critiques

Critical rationalism, particularly Karl Popper's emphasis on falsification as the cornerstone of scientific progress, has faced significant challenges from fellow philosophers of science. Thomas Kuhn, in his seminal work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, argued that scientific advancement occurs through paradigm shifts rather than the incremental falsification of hypotheses that Popper described. Kuhn contended that during periods of "normal science," scientists operate within a dominant paradigm, resisting falsification by interpreting anomalies in ways that protect the core framework, only yielding to revolutionary changes driven by cumulative anomalies and social factors, not strict rational falsification. This view portrays scientific progress as discontinuous and influenced by non-rational elements like persuasion and community consensus, undermining Popper's vision of a cumulative, rational enterprise. Imre Lakatos extended this line of criticism by developing the methodology of scientific research programmes, which he saw as a more sophisticated alternative to Popper's naive falsificationism. In his 1970 essay "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," Lakatos argued that direct falsification is impractical because hypotheses are typically tested in conjunction with auxiliary assumptions, making it unclear what exactly is falsified. Instead, he proposed evaluating research programmes based on their "hard core" protected by a "protective belt" of auxiliary hypotheses; progressive programmes predict novel facts, while degenerating ones merely accommodate anomalies ad hoc. Lakatos viewed Popper's approach as too simplistic, ignoring how scientists rationally defend promising programmes against immediate refutation to allow for future corroboration. Paul Feyerabend further critiqued critical rationalism by highlighting the theory-ladenness of observations, a point elaborated in his 1975 book Against Method. Feyerabend asserted that all observations are imbued with theoretical presuppositions, rendering Popper's ideal of neutral, falsifying tests illusory and making strict demarcation between science and non-science untenable. This challenges the objectivity central to critical rationalism, suggesting that scientific theories are underdetermined by data, with multiple incompatible theories always compatible with the evidence, thus requiring pluralism and even counter-inductive methods for progress. Additional concerns include critical rationalism's handling of underdetermination and alternatives like Bayesian confirmation. Philosophers such as Adolf Grünbaum have pointed out that falsification does not uniquely identify true theories amid underdetermined evidence, where infinitely many hypotheses could fit non-falsified data, as discussed in his 1963 work Philosophical Problems of Space and Time. Bayesian approaches, as formalized by Rudolf Carnap in the 1950s and later by John Earman in Bayes or Bust? (1992), offer a probabilistic framework for confirmation that accumulates evidence positively, contrasting Popper's negative focus and potentially better accounting for real scientific practice. These critiques collectively question the sufficiency of falsification for demarcating and advancing knowledge.

Defenses and Refinements

Karl Popper responded to Thomas Kuhn's portrayal of scientific revolutions as irrational paradigm shifts by arguing that such revolutions, when properly understood, are rational processes driven by critical scrutiny and falsification rather than incommensurable breaks or social consensus. He contended that Kuhn's "normal science"—periods of puzzle-solving within unchallenged paradigms—represents a dogmatic stagnation that deviates from the ideal of continuous criticism, where theories are subjected to severe tests to eliminate errors and advance toward truth. In this view, scientific progress occurs through bold conjectures and refutations, maintaining rationality even during shifts, as competing theories can be rationally compared via their explanatory power and resistance to falsification. Popper also defended critical rationalism against historicism, the doctrine that history follows predictable laws discoverable through inductive methods, by demonstrating its methodological poverty in The Poverty of Historicism. He argued that historicist predictions fail due to the inherent unpredictability of social change, as they overlook the role of human creativity, unintended consequences, and piecemeal engineering in open societies, rendering large-scale prophecies unscientific and dangerous. This critique emphasized that social sciences should focus on testable, falsifiable hypotheses about situational logic rather than holistic trends, thereby preserving critical rationalism's emphasis on error-elimination over deterministic foresight. Later proponents refined critical rationalism through David Miller's rigorous defense of strict falsification as the engine of knowledge growth. In Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence, Miller argued that all knowledge consists of bold, unjustified conjectures that survive attempts at refutation, rejecting any inductive or justificatory support as logically impossible and unnecessary. He countered charges of skepticism by showing that falsification provides a non-probabilistic basis for preferring theories with higher empirical content and resistance to criticism, while critiquing Bayesian approaches for covertly relying on subjective probabilities that undermine objective error-detection. Joseph Agassi extended critical rationalism into ethics and education, advocating its application to foster open, non-dogmatic inquiry in social domains. In ethics, Agassi applied Popperian principles to critique psychologism and traditional authority, promoting moral progress through the critical testing of ethical hypotheses and the rejection of unfalsifiable dogmas, as explored in essays honoring his work. For education, he championed a pedagogy of constructive skepticism, where learning emphasizes trial-and-error debate over indoctrination, countering psychologistic influences that prioritize conformity and inductive reinforcement. Refinements have integrated critical rationalism with evolutionary epistemology, viewing knowledge growth as a Darwinian process of blind variation (conjectures) and selective retention (via falsification), akin to biological trial-and-error adaptation. Popper himself framed scientific theories as evolving through non-teleological error-elimination, paralleling natural selection where unfit ideas are discarded, thus providing a naturalistic account of epistemic progress without justification. This synthesis underscores the fallibility of knowledge while explaining its reliability as an outcome of critical selection pressures. Some refinements explore hybrids with Bayesian epistemology, acknowledging probabilistic updating as a descriptive tool for belief revision but prioritizing severe criticism and falsification to avoid inductive pitfalls. For instance, mediations via evolutionary accounts like Michael Ruse's suggest incorporating Bayesian convergence on evidence while critiquing its subjectivism, ensuring criticism remains the core mechanism for refining conjectures over mere probability assignments. These approaches maintain critical rationalism's anti-inductivism by subordinating Bayesian methods to rigorous testing, as defended against full Bayesian dominance in philosophical analyses.

Influence and Legacy

Impact on Philosophy of Science

Critical Rationalism, through Karl Popper's emphasis on falsifiability as the demarcation criterion for science, led to a widespread shift in philosophy of science away from verificationism toward testability as the standard for scientific legitimacy. Following the 1959 English translation of Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery (originally published in German in 1934), his ideas gained prominence in Anglophone academia, becoming a staple in textbooks and debates that supplanted inductivist and verificationist approaches dominant in the early 20th century. This adoption is evident in how falsifiability became the benchmark for distinguishing empirical sciences like physics from pseudosciences such as astrology or psychoanalysis, which Popper critiqued for their irrefutability through ad hoc adjustments. By framing science as a process of bold conjectures and attempted refutations rather than cumulative confirmations, Popper's framework influenced methodological discussions, promoting a view of scientific progress as error elimination. Popper's critical rationalism profoundly shaped subsequent philosophers of science, particularly Imre Lakatos and Larry Laudan, who refined his ideas while addressing their limitations in historical practice. Lakatos, a student of Popper, developed the methodology of scientific research programmes in his 1970 essay "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," protecting a theory's "hard core" with auxiliary hypotheses and evaluating progress through novel predictions rather than immediate falsification of isolated hypotheses. Similarly, Laudan in Progress and Its Problems (1977) extended Popper's evolutionary epistemology by prioritizing problem-solving efficiency over strict falsifiability, arguing that theories advance by resolving empirical and conceptual puzzles more effectively than rivals. These developments fueled debates between scientific realism—where Popper positioned falsification as a tool for approximating truth via verisimilitude—and instrumentalism, which views theories merely as predictive instruments; Popper's realist stance critiqued instrumentalist interpretations like the Copenhagen view of quantum mechanics for evading objective testability. In contemporary philosophy of science, critical rationalism informs evidence-based science policy and ongoing critiques in the philosophy of physics. Popper's advocacy for piecemeal social engineering—testing policies incrementally like scientific hypotheses—has influenced approaches to policy-making that demand falsifiable predictions and empirical scrutiny, countering holistic or historicist planning schemes. In physics, his falsifiability criterion remains central to debates over theories like string theory, which critics such as Sabine Hossenfelder and George Ellis argue lacks direct empirical testability due to its reliance on inaccessible extra dimensions and unrefutable mathematical structures, echoing Popper's rejection of non-risky conjectures as non-scientific. Proponents counter that strict falsification is outdated for advanced theories, yet Popper's legacy persists in urging empirical confrontation to maintain science's demarcation from speculation.

Applications in Other Disciplines

Critical rationalism has found significant application in economics, particularly through critiques of inductive methods and the development of theories acknowledging human fallibility. George Soros, a student of Karl Popper, adapted critical rationalism's emphasis on fallibilism—the inherent imperfection of human understanding—into his theory of reflexivity, which posits that participants' biased views influence the situations they describe, creating feedback loops that undermine equilibrium assumptions in economic models. Soros argued that this introduces irreducible uncertainty into social systems, contrasting with neoclassical economics' reliance on rational expectations and perfect knowledge, and enabling explanations of phenomena like financial booms and busts through error-prone conjectures rather than inductive verification. Complementing this, Hans Albert applied critical rationalism to critique econometric induction, rejecting the derivation of general laws from observed data patterns as unfalsifiable and logically invalid, since observations cannot deductively entail untested generalizations. Albert's concept of "model platonism" further targeted the treatment of economic models as abstract, immune-to-refutation ideals detached from empirical reality, advocating instead for testable conjectures via decreasing abstraction and robustness checks to identify critical assumptions. In law and ethics, critical rationalism informs interpretive reasoning by emphasizing conjectural justification subject to ongoing criticism, rather than dogmatic or justificatory foundations. More explicitly, Joseph Agassi extended critical rationalism to the philosophy of education, promoting open critical discussion as the core of learning, where students engage in conjectures and refutations to foster intellectual autonomy and counter psychologistic or dogmatic pedagogies. Agassi's framework views education as an intersubjective process of error elimination, drawing on Popper's trial-and-error epistemology to encourage constructive skepticism in classrooms and broader ethical discourse. Beyond these areas, critical rationalism shapes applications in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning by prioritizing robust testing through falsification over inductive training. In AI development, it critiques data-driven models as mimicking the "bucket theory" of knowledge—passive accumulation rather than active conjecture and criticism—advocating instead for systems that generate and refute hypotheses to achieve universality, as seen in evaluations of narrow AI like AlphaGo, which excel in domains but lack cross-context knowledge creation. This approach emphasizes error-seeking in ML robustness, ensuring models survive severe tests to approximate true explanations without probabilistic justification. In environmental policy, critical rationalism aligns with the precautionary principle by favoring bold, risky predictions of potential harms—such as ecological tipping points—to enable preemptive error avoidance, rather than waiting for inductive confirmation of threats. For instance, Popper's method supports testing hypotheses of irreversible damage through thought experiments and analogies, guiding decisions like containment measures in uncertain scenarios akin to pandemics or climate risks. Contemporary extensions into cognitive science and decision theory further illustrate critical rationalism's versatility, particularly in managing subjectivity through intersubjective critique. In decision-making processes, it provides strategies like two-tier evaluation—separating creative conjecture from rigorous refutation by competent judges—to tame biases in operational research and policy choices, fostering consensus without psychologistic appeals to innate rationality. This echoes cognitive models of fallible reasoning, where knowledge emerges from trial-and-error interactions, as Popper integrated with early psychology to view learning as active problem-solving via criticism. In cognitive science, critical rationalism critiques inductivist assumptions in rational choice theory, promoting a deductivist anthropology that treats human cognition as partially rational yet improvable through communal error elimination, applicable to fields like behavioral economics and AI ethics.

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