Hubbry Logo
Rafic HaririRafic HaririMain
Open search
Rafic Hariri
Community hub
Rafic Hariri
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Rafic Hariri
Rafic Hariri
Rafic Hariri
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Key Information

Rafic Bahaa El Deen al-Hariri[a] (Arabic: رفيق بهاء الدين الحريري, romanized: Rafīq Bahāʾ ad-Dīn al-Ḥarīrī; 1 November 1944 – 14 February 2005) was a Lebanese businessman and politician who served as prime minister of Lebanon from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2000 to 2004.

Hariri headed five cabinets during his tenure. He was widely credited for his role in constructing the Taif Agreement that ended the 15-year Lebanese Civil War. He also played a huge role in reconstructing the Lebanese capital, Beirut. He was the first post-civil war prime minister and the most influential and wealthiest Lebanese politician at the time. During Hariri's first term as prime minister, tensions between Israel and Lebanon increased, as a result of the Qana massacre. In 2000, during his second premiership, his biggest achievement was the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, ending an 18-year old occupation, while his government solidified relations with Ba'athist Syria.

On 14 February 2005, Hariri was assassinated in a suicide truck bomb explosion in Beirut. Four Hezbollah members of Unit 121 were indicted for the assassination and were tried in absentia by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Salim Ayyash, the unit's leader was convicted for his role in the assassination.[1][2] The Tribunal eventually convicted three Hezbollah members before its closure in 2023, but stated that it could find no evidence that the bombing had been directed by the group's senior leadership.[1][2][3] The assassination was a catalyst for dramatic political change in Lebanon. The massive protests of the Cedar Revolution helped achieve the withdrawal of Syrian troops and security forces from Lebanon and a change in government.

At one point, Hariri was one of the world's 100 wealthiest men[4] and the fourth-richest politician.[5]

Early life and education

[edit]

Hariri was born on 1 November 1944 to a modest Sunni Muslim family in the Lebanese port city of Sidon. He had two siblings (brother Shafic and sister Bahia).[6] He attended elementary and secondary school in Sidon,[6] and graduated in business administration from Beirut Arab University.

Business career

[edit]

In 1965, Hariri went to Saudi Arabia to work.[7] There, he taught for a short period of time before moving to the construction industry.[8] In 1978, he gained Saudi Arabian citizenship,[7][9] in addition to his Lebanese citizenship.

In 1969, Hariri established Ciconest, a small subcontracting firm, which soon went out of business. He then went into business with the French construction firm Oger for the construction of a hotel in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, the timely construction of which earned him praise from King Khaled. Hariri took over Oger, forming Saudi Oger, which became the main construction firm used by the Saudi Royal family for all their important developments. As a result, a few years after his first contract with King Khaled, Hariri had become a multi-billionaire.

Having accumulated his wealth, Hariri started a number of philanthropic projects, including the building of educational facilities in Lebanon. His first initiative in Lebanon was the Islamic Association for Culture and Education, which he founded in 1979.[10] The association was later renamed the Hariri Foundation.[10] Hariri became progressively more embroiled in politics. His appeals to the United Nations and services as an emissary to the Saudi Royal family won him international recognition on the political stage for his humanitarian efforts.

In 1982, Hariri donated $12 million to Lebanese victims of the 1978 South Lebanon conflict and helped clean up Beirut's streets with his company's money and contributed to early reconstruction efforts during lulls in the Lebanon war. Said to have heavily financed opposing militias during the war, his former deputy Najah Wakim later accused him of helping to destroy downtown Beirut to rebuild it again and make billions of dollars in the process.[9] After the conflict, he acted as an envoy of the Saudi royal family to Lebanon. He laid the groundwork that led to the 1989 Taif Accord, which Saudi Arabia organised to bring the warring factions together. Taif put an end to the civil war, building goodwill for Hariri politically. While acting as the Saudi envoy to Lebanon, he spent more time in Damascus than in Beirut where he ingratiated himself with the Assad regime; he had a new presidential palace built in Damascus as a gift to the Syrian dictator but Assad didn't use it personally.[9]

Political career

[edit]

Hariri returned to Lebanon in the early 1980s as a wealthy man and began to build a name for himself by making large donations and contributions to various groups in Lebanon. However, he continued to serve as a political advisor to Prince Bandar bin Sultan in 1983.[11] He was implanted as the Saudis' strong man following the collapse of the PLO and the paucity of any viable Sunni leadership in the country as well as a response to the rising power of the Shiite militia Amal. As a former Saudi diplomatic representative, he played a significant role in constructing the 1990 Taif Agreement that ended Lebanon's sixteen-year civil war.[12] In 1992, Hariri became the first post-civil war prime minister of Lebanon under president Elias Hrawi.[13][14] In addition, he was the minister of finance.[15] After the 1996 elections he also took on the role of minister of post and telecommunications.[16] Hariri put the country back on the financial map through the issuing of Eurobonds and won plaudits from the World Bank for his plan to borrow reconstruction money as the country's debt grew to become the largest per capita in the world. Between 1992 and 1996 the public debt grew from $3 billion to $9 billion.[17] His first premiership lasted until 1998, and Hariri was replaced by Salim Hoss as prime minister.[9][13] In fact, as a result of the power struggle between Hariri and newly elected president Émile Lahoud, he left office.[18]

In October 2000, Hariri was again appointed prime minister, replacing Salim Hoss, and formed the cabinet.[9][19] In September 2004, Hariri defended UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for "all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon."[20] On 20 October 2004, his second term ended when he resigned from office.[21] Omar Karami succeeded him as prime minister.[22][23]

First premiership (1992–1998)

[edit]

Economic policies

[edit]
Hariri's former residence in Paris
Beirut Central District, which was developed significantly under Hariri's tenure as Prime Minister.

Hariri implemented an aggressive new economic policy. In 1992, inflation was running at 131% but such was the confidence in Hariri's leadership that within two years it had been reduced to 12%.[24] Perhaps Hariri's most important creation in the beginning of his career was "Horizon 2000", the government's name for its new rejuvenation plan. A large component of "Horizon 2000" was Solidere, the privately owned[25] construction company that was established to reconstruct post-war Lebanon. Solidere was owned by the government and private investors. Solidere was largely focused on redeveloping Beirut's downtown and turning it into a new urban center as quickly as possible as one aspect of the various infrastructure redevelopment plans that would be implemented by "Horizon 2000". Solidere was given powers of compulsory purchase, compensating in Solidere shares rather than cash, and was accused of harassment and underpaying former land owners.[26] Another aspect of the decade-long plan was the privatization of major industries. Numerous contracts were awarded in important industries such as energy, telecommunications, electricity, airports, and roads.

The last and perhaps most significant aspect of "Horizon 2000" was economic stimulus via foreign direct investment. Specifically, Hariri supported foreign firms and individuals taking an interest in Lebanon's developmental potential. Hariri simplified tax codes and provided tax breaks to foreign investors. Due to his previous successes in the private sector and the numerous resulting international connections, Hariri was able to garner a significant amount of low-interest loans from foreign investors. Hariri also pursued aggressive macroeconomic policy such as maintaining strict regulations on bank reserves and inter-bank interest rates to curb inflation and raise the value of the Lebanese pound relative to the dollar.

Hariri's economic policies were a remarkable success during his first year in office. From 1992 to 1993, there was a 6% increase in real national income, the capital base of commercial banks effectively doubled, the budgetary earnings hovered at around a billion dollars, and commercial banks' consolidated balance sheets increased about 25%. By 1998, however, real GDP growth was around 1%, a year later it would be −1%, national debt had skyrocketed 540% from two to eighteen billion dollars.

In 1996, it was estimated that 30% of Lebanon's population were living below the poverty line and that there were 500,000 Syrian laborers working illegally in the country.[27]

Criticism

[edit]

August 11, 1994, the Hariri government issued a ban on organized demonstrations, relying on the Lebanese Army to enforce the decree.[28][29] According to Human Rights Watch, following the demonstration ban, on September 13, 1994, "army troops used force to disperse demonstrations, with disastrous results: seven men and one woman were killed and about forty other peaceful demonstrators injured."[30] On 17 September 1996, Information Minister Farid Makari ordered a ban on the broadcasting of news programs. This was followed eight days later by a government decree ordering the closure of Lebanon's 150 privately owned radio stations and 50 TV stations. Licenses were then issued to Hariri's Future Television, the Christian-owned Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI), Murr Television (MTV) owned by the brother of Interior Minister Michel Murr, and the National Broadcasting Network (NBN), set up by Nabih Berri. The radio stations which were given licenses were Hariri's Orient Radio, Berri's NBN, and the Lebanese Forces’s Voice of Free Lebanon.[31][32] The following year, however, "the cabinet handed out licenses to one television station and eight radio stations, including Hizballah's Al-Manar TV, Voice of Lebanon (formerly owned by the Phalange party), and Voice of the People (Communist Party)." These groups had been previously excluded from licensing in September 1996.[33] According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, the ongoing Syrian occupation and military presence in Lebanon made it difficult for Lebanese media to criticize the Syrian regime, adding that "Syria's continued dominant political and military influence" created an atmosphere of self-censorship.[33]

Second premiership (2000—2004)

[edit]

Hariri and Lebanon's political environment

[edit]
U.S. President George W. Bush and Hariri meeting in the White House
Hariri meeting with Donald Rumsfeld at The Pentagon on April 25, 2001
Hariri with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2001

Amid the political crisis brought on by the extension of President Émile Lahoud's term, Hariri resigned as prime minister, saying: "I have... submitted the resignation of the government, and I have declared that I will not be a candidate to head the (next) government."

During a BBC interview in 2001, Hariri was asked by Tim Sebastian why he refused to hand over members of Hezbollah that were accused by America of being terrorists. He responded that Hezbollah were the ones protecting Lebanon against the Israeli occupation and called for implementation of passed United Nations resolutions against Israel.[34][35]

During the interview, Sebastian also accused Hariri of making the American coalition in the war on terrorism worthless and asked if he was ready for the consequences of his refusal, reminding him that George W. Bush had said: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."[36] Hariri replied that he had hoped there would be no consequences, but would deal with them if they arrive. He also said that he opposed the killing of all humans – Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian or Lebanese – and believed in dialogue as a solution. He further went on to say that Syria would have to stay in Lebanon for protection of Lebanon until they are no longer needed and Lebanon asks them to leave.[34][35]

Opposition to Syrian occupation

[edit]

Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, a recent recruit of the anti-Syrian opposition, emboldened by popular anger and civic action now being called Lebanon's Cedar Revolution, alleged in the wake of the assassination that on 26 August 2004 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad threatened Hariri, saying "[President of Lebanon] Lahoud is me. ... If you and Chirac want me out of Lebanon, I will break Lebanon."[37] He was quoted as saying "When I heard him telling us those words, I knew that it was his condemnation of death." This meeting between Hariri and Assad, which had been on 26 August 2004, lasted for just fifteen minutes.[22][38][39]

Criticism

[edit]
Hariri and Rumsfeld in 2002

Hariri was accused of corruption, which plagued Lebanon during the Syrian occupation. The Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut's Central District (French: Société Libanaise pour le Développement et la Reconstruction du Centre-ville de Beyrouth), more commonly known by the French-derived acronym "Solidere", expropriated most property in the central business district of Beirut, compensating each owner with shares in the company which were worth as little as 15% of the property's value. As the primary shareholder of the company, Hariri and his business associates profited from this project.[28][29] Moreover, it was reported by Middle East International in November 1996 that $26 million had been embezzled from the Lebanese Ministry of Finance while Hariri was in office.[40] Hariri was accused of allowing kickbacks from public spending to enrich government figures. For instance, contracts for the import of petroleum were awarded to the two sons of President Elias Hrawi.[28][29]

Personal life

[edit]

Hariri married twice. He had six children. In 1965, he married an Iraqi woman, Nidal Bustani, who is the mother of his three sons; Bahaa (born 1967), who is a businessman, Saad (born 1970), who succeeded his father as leader of the future movement, and Houssam—who died in a traffic accident in the US in the late 1980s.[41][42] They divorced. He married his second spouse, Nazik Audi, in 1976 and she is the mother of three of Hariri's children: Ayman, Fahd and Hind.[41]

From 1982 until his death, Hariri owned 2–8a Rutland Gate, a large house in London's Knightsbridge district. The house was gifted to the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Sultan bin Abdulaziz, after Hariri's assassination.[43]

Assassination

[edit]
Main article: Assassination of Rafic Hariri
Buildings damaged by the car bomb.

On 14 February 2005, Hariri was killed when explosives equivalent to around 1,800 kilograms (4,000 lb) of TNT concealed inside a parked Mitsubishi van were detonated[44] as his motorcade drove near the St. George Hotel in Beirut.[45] 23 people, including Hariri himself, were killed.[46] Among the dead were several of Hariri's bodyguards and his friend and former Minister of the Economy Bassel Fleihan. Hariri was buried along with his bodyguards, who died in the bombing, in a location near Mohammad Al-Amin Mosque.

A 2006 report by Serge Brammertz indicated that DNA evidence collected from the crime scene suggests that the assassination might be the act of a young male suicide bomber.[47]

In its first two reports in 2014, the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission indicated that the Syrian government may be linked to the assassination.[48][49] Lawyers tasked with prosecuting those responsible for the 2005 bombing said they had received evidence linking Bashar al-Assad's phone to the case.[50] In its tenth report, the UNIIIC concluded[51] "that a network of individuals acted in concert to carry out the assassination of Rafic Hariri."[51]

Although Hezbollah blamed the assassination on Israel,[52] a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation news investigation stated that the special UN investigation team had found evidence for the responsibility of Unit 121 of Hezbollah in the assassination.[53][54][55] A UN-backed tribunal issued four arrest warrants to members of Hezbollah.[56] Later, Hezbollah members Salim Jamil Ayyash, Hassan Habib Merhi, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad Hassan Sabra have been indicted[57] for the assassination and were tried in absentia by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.[58]

Funeral & Memorial Commemoration

[edit]

Hariri was well regarded among international leaders. He was one of French President Jacques Chirac's closest friends.[59] Chirac was one of the first foreign dignitaries to travel to Lebanon, where he personally offered his condolences to Hariri's widow, Nazik Hariri at her home in Beirut.[60] He also attended the funeral, accompanied by his wife, Bernadette Chirac.[61]

Among the foreign dignitaries attending the burial in Beirut were several European and Arab ministers, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, US Assistant Secretary of State William J. Burns, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud bin Faisal Al Saud, and Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa.[62]

Approximately 200,000 people gathered in Martyr's Square to get a glimpse of the coffin draped in Lebanon's red, white, and green flag.[63] Christians, Muslims, and Druze marched together in the procession, which concluded at the Mohammad Al-Amin Mosque, a structure Hariri had built in Beirut Central District.[64] Church bells rang out, blending with the resounding calls to Islamic prayers and the beat of a military band's drums.[64] The attendees turned the funeral of Hariri on February 16, 2005, into a powerful display of public anger against Syria, blamed by opposition leaders for the bomb that killed him, with some witnesses estimating that hundreds of thousands of mourners flooded the nearby streets in one of Lebanon's largest and most diverse gatherings in decades.[62]

A month later, on March 14, 2005, to commemorate the one-month anniversary of his assassination, between 1.2 and 1.5 million people gathered in Martyr's Square for the memorial service, marking the largest public assembly in the country's history to date. [65][66][67][68][69][70] People from all sects and regions of Lebanon, from Wadi Khaled in the north to Ain Ebel in the south, gathered to demand an end to Syria's occupation of Lebanon.[71] About a month later, under increasing international pressure, Syria withdrew after a thirty-year-long occupation.[71]

Aftermath

[edit]
Main article: Cedar Revolution

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was also created at his instigation. Syria was initially accused of the assassination, which led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon following widespread protests.[72]

Hariri memorial shrine

Major General Jamil Al Sayyed, then head of Lebanese General Security, Brigadier General Mustafa Hamdan, Major General Ali Hajj and Brigadier General Raymond Azar were all arrested in August 2005 at the request of German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, who was carrying out the UN investigation about the assassination.[73] Sayyed was one of the persons who decided to assassinate Rafic Hariri according to a leaked draft version of the Mehlis report along with other Syrian high-rank intelligence and security officers and officials, namely Assef Shawkat, Maher Assad, Hassan Khalil and Bahjat Suleyman.[74] However, later reports about the assassination did not repeat the allegations against Jamil Al Sayyed and other three Lebanese generals.[73] Four Lebanese generals were held in Roumieh prison, northeast of Beirut from 2005 to 2009.[73][75] They were released from the prison due to lack of evidence in 2009.[75]

Following Hariri's death, there were several other bombings and assassinations against minor anti-Syrian figures. These included Samir Kassir, George Hawi, Gebran Tueni, Pierre Amine Gemayel, Antoine Ghanem and Walid Eido. Assassination attempts were made on Elias Murr, May Chidiac, and Samir Shehade (who was investigating Hariri's death).[citation needed]

An indictment against alleged Hezbollah members Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad Hassan Sabra was issued and confirmed by the Pre-Trial Judge of the United Nations special tribunal (see Special Tribunal for Lebanon) in 2011.[76] In February 2014, the case against Hassan Habib Merhi was joined with the Ayyash et al. case.[77] Proceedings against the accused Mustafa Badreddine were terminated in July 2016[78] following credible reports of his death.[79] Salim Jamil Ayyash, Hassan Habib Merhi, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad Hassan Sabra[57] currently remain on trial in absentia.[58]

In 2009 the German news magazine Der Spiegel reported that some of the evidence supporting the indictment of Hezbollah involved a number of cellphones purchased in Tripoli shortly before the assassination, and were used by members of Hezbollah solely for the coordination of the assassination, except for a call from one of them to his girlfriend.[80][81] The ties to Hezbollah were exposed by Captain Wissam Eid of the Lebanese Internal Security Force, who was assassinated himself before the conclusion of the investigation,[81] as was Lebanese Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan, one of the leading figures of the Special tribunal.[82]

In August 2010, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah presented intercepted Israeli spy-drone video footage to CNN, which he said implicated Israel because "they were tracking Hariri's whereabouts and the roads that he took every day." When asked what Israel's motive would have been, Nasrallah said, "They just wanted to start an internal strife."[83]

After an altercation between male Tribunal staff and women at a gynecology clinic in October 2010, Hezbollah demanded that the Lebanese government stop all cooperation with the Special Tribunal investigation, claiming the tribunal to be an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty by Western governments.

On 1 November 2010, a report was leaked by Al Akhbar, a local secular, leftist newspaper, stating that Hezbollah drafted plans for a quick takeover of the country in the case an indictment against its members is issued by the UN Special Tribunal.[84] The report states that Hezbollah conducted a simulation of the plan on 28 October, immediately following a speech by its secretary general.[85]

On the other side, it was revealed by leaked US embassy cables that then Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate director Omar Suleiman reported that Syria "desperately" wanted to stop the investigation of the Tribunal.[86]

In 2024, Salim Jamil Ayyash, the assassin of Hariri was reportedly killed by an IDF strike near al-Qusayr in the Homs region.[87]

Legacy

[edit]

On 22 June 2005, Beirut International Airport was renamed Rafic Hariri International Airport.[6] Additionally, Beirut General University hospital was renamed Rafiq Hariri Hospital.[6] Rafic Hariri was succeeded by his son Saad Hariri as leader of the Future Party.

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Sources

[edit]
  • Sallam, Qasim (1980). Al-Baath wal Watan Al-Arabi [Arabic, with French translation] ("The Baath and the Arab Homeland"). Paris: EMA. ISBN 2-86584-003-4
  • Stephan, Joseph S. (2006) Oeuvres et performances du president martyr Rafic Hariri, les performances economico-financieres avant Paris 2 et apres, le philanthrope batisseur
  • Blandford, Nicholas (2006). Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East
  • Vloeberghs, Ward (2015). Architecture, Power and Religion in Lebanon: Rafiq Hariri and the Politics of Sacred Space in Beirut
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Rafic Hariri

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

Rafiq Baha Eddine al-Hariri (1 November 1944 – 14 February 2005) was a Lebanese-Saudi businessman and statesman who served as from October 1992 to November 1998 and from October 2000 to October 2004. Born in to a modest Sunni Muslim family, Hariri built a construction empire in starting in the , founding his company Ciconest in and acquiring Saudi citizenship in 1982 through his close ties to the Saudi royal family.
As , Hariri spearheaded the post-civil reconstruction of , particularly the revitalization of Beirut's central through the company , which transformed war-torn areas into modern commercial hubs, though this effort incurred substantial public debt and drew criticism for favoring elite interests over broader economic equity. His pro-Western orientation and opposition to Syrian dominance in Lebanese affairs increasingly isolated him from Damascus-backed factions, culminating in his assassination via a massive car bomb in on 14 February 2005, an attack that killed 22 others and was widely attributed to Syrian intelligence and allied militias. The killing ignited the , a series of massive protests demanding Syrian troop withdrawal, which had endured since 1976; Syria completed its pullout by April 2005 under international pressure. Hariri's legacy endures through his philanthropic foundations supporting education and his political dynasty, including his son , though his tenure was marred by allegations of and in reconstruction contracts.

Early Life

Upbringing in Lebanon

Rafic Hariri was born on November 1, 1944, in , a southern Lebanese port city, to a modest Sunni Muslim family of limited means. His father operated a small grocery and engaged in citrus farming, typical of the local economy reliant on agriculture and petty trade. Hariri's upbringing occurred amid the economic constraints facing many working-class families in post-mandate , where opportunities were scarce without connections to established networks. He attended elementary and secondary schools in but pursued only limited further formal education, briefly studying commerce in before prioritizing family support over completing studies. These early experiences instilled a self-reliant , with Hariri gaining initial exposure to commerce through local trading and small-scale economic activities in and , honing practical skills in negotiation and resourcefulness independent of elite patronage.

Initial Business Ventures

Hariri began his professional life in Lebanon with modest employment, including labor on fruit farms near , his hometown, during his youth in the 1950s and early 1960s. He later worked as a trainee in a small firm in , gaining initial experience in financial and operations amid the country's pre-civil economic stability. In 1969, at age 25, Hariri founded Ciconest International Co. for Contracting and Trading, a small subcontracting firm based in , marking his first independent business venture. The company secured a contract to construct offices for the in the city, demonstrating early risk-taking in the competitive contracting sector without evident state subsidies or large-scale financing. However, Ciconest faced challenges and ceased operations shortly after, limiting its contribution to long-term but providing foundational lessons in and adaptability.

Business Career

Rise in Saudi Arabia

In 1969, Rafic Hariri relocated to and founded CICONEST, a small subcontracting firm focused on , which initially faced difficulties but capitalized on emerging opportunities in the kingdom's sector. Hariri, lacking significant initial capital as a Lebanese in a field dominated by established players, built his early reputation through reliable delivery on modest contracts, distinguishing himself from competitors reliant on entrenched networks. Hariri developed close personal ties with Saudi royal family members, particularly then-Crown Prince Fahd (later King Fahd), serving as his personal contractor and earning the rare grant of Saudi citizenship in 1978, which facilitated access to high-value projects. These connections, combined with Hariri's emphasis on efficiency in subcontracting, positioned him advantageously during the 1970s , when surging petroleum revenues funded extensive public and private developments. By the mid-1970s, Hariri had amassed substantial through government and private contracts for building offices, hospitals, and other facilities, amassing a fortune estimated in the hundreds of millions by leveraging subcontracts without direct royal favoritism in every deal but through proven execution. His ascent exemplified pragmatic in a competitive expatriate milieu, where success hinged on navigating bureaucratic hurdles and delivering amid rapid rather than solely on .

Oger Group and Major Projects

Rafic Hariri established Ltd. in 1979 by acquiring and partnering with the French construction firm Oger International, initially focusing on large-scale building projects in such as hotels and . The company rapidly expanded its operations across , telecommunications, and media sectors, with Hariri leveraging personal connections to secure government contracts. By the early 2000s, had become one of the kingdom's largest contractors, employing around 50,000 workers, many of whom were Lebanese expatriates recruited through Hariri's networks. Among its major undertakings, contributed to infrastructure developments in , including components of the Jabal Omar expansion project initiated in the mid-2000s to accommodate growing pilgrimage demands with new residential, commercial, and hotel facilities spanning millions of square meters. The firm also bid on and participated in airport upgrades, such as expansions at facilities like Jeddah's , supporting Saudi Arabia's aviation growth. In , Hariri's affiliated Oger Telecom invested in regional networks, including stakes in operators that facilitated Saudi infrastructure rollout, while handled related construction like towers and facilities. These ventures generated substantial revenue, with Saudi Oger reporting approximately $3 billion in annual sales by 2003, underscoring its role as a key economic driver through job creation and project execution that bolstered Saudi GDP via and expatriate labor integration. The company's scale employed thousands of skilled Lebanese workers, channeling remittances back to and enhancing Hariri's influence in both countries.

Accumulation of Wealth and Influence

Hariri founded Ltd. in 1978, leveraging contracts with the Saudi royal family to expand it into a major construction conglomerate executing high-profile projects across the Gulf, which formed the core of his fortune. The company's growth was fueled by personal ties to Saudi leaders, including then-Crown Prince Fahd, for whom Hariri served as a primary contractor, amassing billions through developments without initial reliance on Lebanese markets. By 2004, Forbes valued Hariri's net worth at $4.3 billion, derived principally from his controlling stake in Oger and subsequent diversified holdings, reflecting annual increases from $3.1 billion in 2001. This estimate, corroborated by contemporaneous analyses, underscored his self-made status in before broader investments. His proximity to Saudi royalty extended to informal advisory roles, such as political counsel to Prince Bandar bin Sultan starting in 1983 and mediation in regional disputes, granting him diplomatic leverage as a Saudi representative in amid its without holding Lebanese office. These positions facilitated cross-border influence, including Saudi citizenship awarded for his services to the monarchy. Hariri channeled profits into transnational assets, acquiring stakes in leading French banks and the advertising giant Groupe, which bolstered his media interests and financial diversification linking Gulf wealth to European markets. Such ventures cemented his role as a pivotal economic intermediary between Saudi capital and Levantine networks, enhancing non-political clout through elite Gulf-Levant ties.

Entry into Lebanese Politics

Pre-Premiership Involvement

In 1979, Rafic Hariri founded the Hariri Foundation, a dedicated to human development through , , and in . The foundation initiated large-scale scholarship programs, sponsoring Lebanese students for higher education abroad and domestically, which laid the groundwork for Hariri's influence within the Sunni community by addressing educational gaps exacerbated by the ongoing (1975–1990). These efforts positioned the foundation as a modern alternative to traditional Sunni charitable institutions like the Maqasid society, fostering loyalty among recipients and their families through direct support rather than confessional patronage alone. Amid the civil war's final phases, Hariri extended to immediate , donating $12 million from personal funds in the early 1980s to aid victims of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and organizing cleanup operations in war-torn using company resources. By the late 1980s, as the conflict waned, he intensified these initiatives, funding educational expansions and preliminary reconstruction projects to stabilize communities and rebuild infrastructure in Sunni-majority areas like , his hometown. This period marked Hariri's transition from expatriate businessman to domestic figure, using to cultivate a support base independent of established political families. Hariri's pre-premiership political engagement centered on informal diplomacy, particularly his role in brokering the 1989 Taif Accord, which ended the civil war and reformed Lebanon's confessional power-sharing system by equalizing parliamentary seats between Christians and Muslims while endorsing a transitional Syrian military presence. Leveraging ties from his Saudi advisory positions, he mediated between Lebanese factions and Syrian authorities, advocating for the accord's implementation to restore central authority without immediate confrontation over Syrian influence. These efforts, conducted outside formal office, bridged economic philanthropy with political advocacy, positioning Hariri as a pragmatic Sunni leader committed to national reconciliation amid post-Taif uncertainties.

Appointment as Prime Minister

Following the Lebanese parliamentary elections held between August 23 and October 11, 1992—the first national vote since the outbreak of the civil war in 1975—President Elias Hrawi appointed Rafic Hariri as prime minister on October 31, 1992. Hariri, a billionaire businessman with no prior experience in elected office, was selected for his demonstrated economic acumen, forged through decades in construction and finance, particularly in Saudi Arabia, amid a post-war consensus prioritizing reconstruction over militia influence. This choice reflected Syrian endorsement, as Damascus held de facto veto power over Lebanese executive appointments under the 1989 Taif Accord framework, viewing Hariri's technocratic profile as conducive to stabilizing the war-ravaged economy while maintaining Beirut's alignment with Syrian strategic interests. Hariri swiftly formed a 30-member cabinet on the same day, comprising 20 new appointees—predominantly technocrats and experts in and administration—alongside 10 holdovers including pro-Syrian politicians and former figures to ensure confessional balance across Lebanon's Maronite Christian, Sunni Muslim, Shiite Muslim, and communities. Retaining the finance portfolio for himself, Hariri deliberately sidelined prominent warlords from the era, favoring merit-based selections to signal a break from factional and foster elite consensus on . This composition navigated Lebanon's power-sharing constitution while advancing a mandate centered on economic stabilization and Taif Accord implementation, yielding immediate indicators of recovery such as an appreciation in the Lebanese pound's value against the U.S. dollar.

First Premiership (1992–1998)

Post-Civil War Reconstruction

Upon assuming the premiership in October 1992, Rafic Hariri initiated comprehensive efforts to rebuild Lebanon's war-ravaged infrastructure, prioritizing the restoration of Beirut's central district devastated during the 1975–1990 civil war. In May 1994, he established Solidere, a private joint-stock company tasked with redeveloping the Beirut Central District through privatization, coordinating the demolition of unstable structures, preservation of historic sites, and attraction of foreign investment for commercial and residential projects. This approach mobilized resources estimated at over $2 billion in initial phases, transforming the area from rubble into a modern urban hub with hotels, offices, and souks. Hariri's government pursued major infrastructure initiatives, including the expansion of , modernization of the , and construction of key highways such as the coastal north-south artery. These projects, costing hundreds of millions, were financed via international loans from institutions like the World Bank and aid from Gulf states, particularly , leveraging Hariri's personal networks. By rehabilitating transportation networks essential for trade and , these efforts underpinned Lebanon's recovery, contributing to average annual real GDP growth of around 8% from 1992 to 1997. Institutionally, Hariri enforced the 1991 decree dissolving militias to reestablish the state's monopoly on force, succeeding in disarming most factions like the and by integrating former fighters into security apparatus. However, implementation was selective, with retaining heavy weaponry under Syrian oversight, as Syrian forces maintained influence over disarmament processes per Taif Accord stipulations; UN reports highlighted persistent militia armament beyond state control. This partial enforcement reflected geopolitical constraints but advanced centralized authority in reconstructed areas.

Economic Policies and Horizon 2000 Plan

Hariri's economic policies during his first premiership emphasized macroeconomic stabilization and neoliberal reforms to revive Lebanon's war-ravaged economy. Upon assuming office in 1992, he implemented measures including a currency peg to the U.S. dollar, strict monetary controls via the , and reductions, slashing income and corporate taxes to a flat 10 percent to stimulate and growth. These reforms, coupled with fiscal discipline on expenditures, rapidly curbed , which fell from over 100 percent in 1992 to single-digit levels by 1998, while surged from $1.4 billion to more than $6 billion. Real GDP growth averaged approximately 7-8 percent annually in the initial years, reaching 8 percent in 1994 before moderating to around 4 percent by 1997, driven by reconstruction spending and renewed confidence in . Central to these policies was the Horizon 2000 plan, a comprehensive 13-year reconstruction and development framework launched in 1993 and spanning 1995-2007, projecting total public investments of about $18 billion in , , and services sectors. The plan prioritized rebuilding Beirut's central district, modernizing ports, airports, and , and fostering a service-oriented economy to position as a regional financial hub, with allocations including major projects in and . To attract (FDI), Hariri's government reinforced Lebanon's longstanding banking secrecy laws—dating to 1956 but pivotal in the for safeguarding depositor privacy—alongside liberalization efforts such as easing restrictions on foreign banks and initiating privatization bids for state assets like telecom and , though full implementation faced delays until later laws in the early . Fiscal deficits, averaging 15 percent of GDP in the early , were financed through domestic and international borrowing, including Eurobonds, to inject capital into a post-civil lacking domestic savings and requiring immediate revival to enable recovery. This approach, while accumulating public debt, aligned with the imperative for rapid capital infusion to halt economic contraction and leverage Lebanon's pre-war strengths in finance and trade, yielding short-term gains in stability and growth metrics over ideological alternatives like without . and components aimed to reduce state monopolies and , though progress was incremental amid political constraints.

Relations with Syria and Taif Accord Implementation

Hariri's first premiership emphasized pragmatic collaboration with to advance Taif Accord implementation, prioritizing stability to enable reconstruction amid lingering civil war threats and Israeli border tensions. The of October 1989 had mandated political reforms such as equal Christian-Muslim parliamentary representation, militia disbandment, and phased Syrian troop redeployment once security was assured, but Hariri's government operated under Syrian oversight to enforce these amid factional resistance. This approach aligned with the May 23, 1991, Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, signed by Syrian President and Lebanese President , which established joint higher councils for defense, security, and foreign policy coordination, effectively legitimizing Syria's dominant role in Lebanese affairs. A core element involved integrating non-state militias into the Lebanese state apparatus, as required by , with Syrian forces providing the coercive backing to neutralize holdouts like elements of the . Hariri's cabinet, formed in November 1992, facilitated this by coordinating with Syrian-backed institutions, including extensions of President Hrawi's term in to maintain continuity. In return, hosted approximately 40,000 Syrian troops stationed across key areas, including until partial redeployments in the mid-1990s, trading de facto sovereignty concessions for security assurances against Israeli incursions and internal destabilization. This framework allowed Hariri to secure economic leeway for initiatives like the Horizon 2000 plan, as Syrian presence deterred chaos that could derail investment, though it entrenched Damascus's veto over major decisions. Critics within viewed the arrangement as subordinating Taif's sovereignty goals to short-term expediency, yet Hariri defended it as causal necessity for rebuilding a fractured state.

Resignation and Domestic Opposition

Hariri resigned as on December 4, 1998, after refusing President Émile Lahoud's invitation to form a new government following Lahoud's in November. The dispute centered on cabinet composition, with Lahoud—backed by Syrian authorities—insisting on expanded presidential authority over appointments, particularly in security and military portfolios, which Hariri viewed as an infringement on his control over economic reconstruction priorities. Hariri accused Lahoud of constitutional violations by bypassing consultation on key ministerial selections, leading to a standoff that ended Hariri's first term. This power struggle reflected broader domestic opposition to Hariri's governance, intensified by the August-September parliamentary elections where his bloc lost ground to anti-Hariri candidates. Hezbollah secured a stronger position in Shiite areas, defeating rivals endorsed by Hariri and Amal leader , signaling resistance from Islamist and pro-Syrian factions wary of Hariri's Western-oriented alliances and autonomy from . Pro-Syrian groups, including elements aligned with Hezbollah and Amal, opposed Hariri's neoliberal economic agenda, which emphasized privatization and foreign investment but was criticized for increasing public debt—reaching $10 billion by 1998—and favoring elite business interests over social welfare and state oversight in underserved regions. Lahoud's ascension, supported by Syria to counterbalance Hariri's influence, aligned with these factions' preference for tighter central control. Upon resigning, Hariri stepped back from executive roles, handing power to interim prime minister Salim al-Hoss, while preserving his Beirut parliamentary seat and shifting focus to private sector activities amid ongoing political tensions.

Interregnum Period (1998–2000)

Political Withdrawal and Alliances

After resigning as on 7 November 1998 due to irreconcilable differences with President over cabinet formation and policy control, Rafic Hariri stepped back from executive roles but maintained active political engagement through behind-the-scenes networking. This strategic retreat allowed him to regroup amid Syrian-backed constraints on his influence, focusing on bolstering his parliamentary Hariri Bloc, originally established as a in 1995 to represent Sunni entrepreneurial and mercantile interests. Hariri consolidated alliances among Sunni business elites and community leaders, leveraging his Hariri Foundation's educational and charitable initiatives—established in 1979—to foster loyalty and position himself as a Sunni independent of traditional religious clerics. These efforts laid the groundwork for what would evolve into the Future Movement, emphasizing neoliberal economic visions and cross-sectarian pragmatism to counterbalance Hezbollah's rising Shiite mobilization and Syrian oversight in Lebanese affairs. By 1999, Hariri's bloc controlled key parliamentary seats in and , reflecting sustained mobilization of urban Sunni voters disillusioned with post-Taif stagnation. To mitigate domestic isolation, Hariri pursued Gulf diplomacy, drawing on his Saudi citizenship and personal relationships with Gulf monarchs to secure economic lifelines for . In early 1998, shortly before his resignation, deposited approximately $500 million in the , a move Hariri publicly endorsed as essential for stabilizing the and averting fiscal collapse under the incoming Hoss government. Similar pledges from and the UAE followed in subsequent years, channeled through Hariri's intermediaries, which indirectly enhanced his leverage by associating him with external patronage networks resistant to Damascus's dominance. Hariri increasingly voiced public critiques of the Selim al-Hoss administration (1998–2000), lambasting its fiscal mismanagement, ballooning public debt exceeding $10 billion by 2000, and failure to advance reconstruction beyond Beirut's core. These statements resonated with reform-oriented politicians, forging tentative alliances with leader , whose shared frustrations over Syrian-engineered constitutional extensions and economic inertia. Jumblatt's shift toward opposition rhetoric during this complemented Hariri's subtle anti-authoritarian positioning, enabling joint electoral strategies that culminated in Hariri's parliamentary majority in September 2000, without overt confrontation that might provoke immediate Syrian retaliation.

Growing Tensions with Syrian Influence

Hariri's resignation on December 4, 1998, crystallized frictions with the Syrian-influenced presidency of , whose November 15 election followed parliamentary amendments to constitutional norms allowing the army chief to assume office without prior military resignation—a provision critics viewed as Damascus-engineered to install a loyalist. Hariri, having initially attempted to form a cabinet, rejected Lahoud's terms, which imposed pro-Syrian appointees and sidelined his economic priorities, thereby refusing subordination to what he saw as externally dictated governance. This standoff, amid Syria's de facto control over Lebanese institutions post-Taif Accord, underscored Hariri's resistance to overreach eroding executive balance and . The ensuing premiership of Selim al-Hoss (December 1998–April 2000) amplified economic divergences, as Hoss's austerity-driven policies—emphasizing deficit reduction through spending cuts—contrasted Hariri's growth-oriented model, resulting in stalled investment and reconstruction amid political paralysis. Hariri publicly clashed with Hoss over these approaches, arguing that under Syrian-aligned leadership neglected private-sector revival and international partnerships essential for recovery, with public debt surpassing 150% of GDP by 2000 reflecting the impasse. These critiques implicitly targeted Syrian vetoes on reforms, prefiguring Hariri's later advocacy for Taif's clauses as bulwarks against external economic strangulation. Parallel to domestic critiques, Hariri forged ties with opponents of occupation, particularly Christian figures, to bolster a cross-sectarian front for autonomy. In March 1998, he convened with Maronite Patriarch and bishops at Bkerke, addressing reconciliation and implementation—including phased Syrian withdrawal after stable governance—amid Sfeir's vocal demands for redeployment to affirm Lebanese independence. Such engagements, extending to Druze leader , highlighted Hariri's strategy of leveraging grievances against Damascus's indefinite presence, which by 2000 numbered over 30,000 troops, to pressure for genuine self-rule without overt confrontation.

Second Premiership (2000–2004)

Return to Power and Coalition Dynamics

Hariri's political alliance achieved a decisive victory in Lebanon's parliamentary elections, held in multiple rounds from 27 August to 3 September 2000, capturing all 19 seats in and garnering broad support across the 128-member . This outcome, influenced by sectarian electoral dynamics and Hariri's personal popularity as a Sunni leader and economic reformer, positioned him to reclaim the premiership after a two-year absence. On 26 October 2000, President , a pro-Syrian figure, formally appointed Hariri as , leading to the formation of a 30-member cabinet that balanced Hariri's allies—holding key portfolios like —with representatives from pro-Syrian factions, including allies of Lahoud and Syrian-backed groups, to preserve coalition stability under Damascus's overarching influence. Hariri secured the confidence of 106 parliamentarians for this government, reflecting his parliamentary leverage despite the inclusion of opposing elements. The Hariri-Lahoud cohabitation quickly revealed fault lines, as the president repeatedly exercised constitutional veto powers and blocked ministerial decisions on administrative and economic reforms, forcing Hariri to navigate by compromising on ambitious initiatives to avoid governmental paralysis. Prioritizing short-term stability over escalation, Hariri deferred major confrontations, which sustained the but hampered progress; Lebanon's GDP growth resumed modestly at around 3% in 2000 before tapering to near stagnation by 2003 amid these constraints. Political deadlock manifested in stalled public projects, underscoring the fragile equilibrium between reformist ambitions and entrenched power-sharing demands.

Continued Economic Initiatives

Hariri maintained continuity in reconstruction policies from his first term, overseeing the expansion of Solidere's projects in Beirut's central district, which included the development of commercial, residential, and cultural sites to revive the area's pre-war vibrancy. These efforts contributed to urban renewal amid persistent fiscal constraints, with Solidere attracting private investment for infrastructure like hotels and office spaces. He pursued telecom sector to foster competition and modernize services, proposing of state-owned entities like Ogero, though implementation faced delays due to regulatory and political hurdles. Parallelly, experienced robust growth, with visitor arrivals and revenues surging to record levels by , more than doubling from early 2000 figures and bolstering GDP contributions to around 9 percent. Debt servicing burdens intensified, accounting for 46 percent of expenditures in 2004, reflecting the high cost of financing reconstruction but also highlighting investments' potential economic multipliers as recognized in international assessments. To mitigate liquidity strains, Hariri secured pledges exceeding $4 billion at the 2002 Paris II conference, drawing Arab and international capital to position as a regional financial hub despite volatility.

Escalating Opposition to Syrian Occupation

In September 2004, Hariri publicly defended United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which demanded the withdrawal of all foreign forces from and the disbanding of non-state militias such as . Syrian officials accused him of orchestrating the resolution's passage alongside allies like French President , reflecting Damascus's perception of Hariri as a key proponent of ending its military presence, estimated at around 15,000-20,000 troops in at the time. While the Lebanese government under Hariri's premiership officially critiqued the resolution as external interference, Hariri personally endorsed its sovereignty-enhancing provisions, framing Syrian presence as incompatible with 's independence under the Accord. Hariri's opposition intensified over Syria's push to extend President Émile Lahoud's term by three years, a move requiring a passed by on September 3, 2004, despite Hariri's vocal resistance. He viewed the extension—enabled by Syrian pressure on pro-Damascus legislators—as a direct violation of Lebanon's constitutional order and a prolongation of foreign tutelage. On October 20, 2004, Hariri resigned as along with his cabinet, citing over this "undemocratic" intervention, an act widely interpreted as a bold challenge to Syrian dominance rather than mere political maneuvering. Post-resignation, Hariri escalated his critique through parliamentary speeches and media appearances, decrying Syrian "interference" in Lebanese affairs and advocating for full implementation of Resolution 1559 to restore national control. He cultivated alliances with the and European powers, including meetings with U.S. officials and leveraging ties with Chirac, positioning his stance as a non-sectarian defense of Lebanese against occupation, which garnered support from diverse political factions opposed to . This international backing amplified pressure on , with Hariri emphasizing unity around Lebanon's over confessional divides.

Assassination

The 2005 Beirut Bombing

On February 14, 2005, former Lebanese Rafic Hariri was killed in a bombing in downtown , along the near the St. George Hotel. The attack targeted Hariri's motorcade as it returned from parliament, where he had opposed extensions of Syrian-backed President Emile Lahoud's term. The bomber drove a laden with explosives into the , detonating a charge equivalent to at least 1,200 kilograms of TNT, with estimates ranging up to 3,000 kilograms based on depth and structural damage analysis. This massive above-ground explosion, confirmed by investigators to have originated from a moving vehicle rather than pre-planted roadside bombs, created a several meters deep and shattered windows blocks away. The blast killed 22 people in total, including Hariri, and injured approximately 226 others. The bombing took place shortly before scheduled parliamentary elections, in which Hariri's anti-Syrian was expected to gain influence, heightening the immediate political stakes. No organization claimed responsibility in the immediate aftermath, though the attack followed a pattern of escalating violence against Syrian opponents in .

Immediate Aftermath and Cedar Revolution

The on February 14, 2005, triggered immediate widespread mourning and outrage in , with his son emerging as a central figure in organizing public responses and leading the opposition . Massive protests erupted across the country, drawing hundreds of thousands to the streets of and other cities in what became known as the , a popular uprising demanding an end to Syrian influence. These demonstrations, peaking on with estimates of up to one million participants representing diverse confessional groups, marked a rare moment of cross-sectarian unity against foreign occupation, transcending Sunni, Christian, and divides. International leaders swiftly condemned the killing, with the and attributing responsibility to Syrian orchestration amid preexisting tensions from UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which had called for Syrian troop withdrawal in September 2004. Syria's government denied involvement, labeling the act a "horrendous criminal act," but faced mounting pressure. On February 25, 2005, a UN fact-finding mission led by Peter FitzGerald arrived in to investigate the bombing's circumstances, including the explosive's origin and Syrian intelligence activities, concluding in its March 24 report that bore primary responsibility for the preceding political tensions. Under this domestic and global scrutiny, Syrian President announced on March 5, 2005, the withdrawal of Syrian forces, which had occupied since 1976—a presence spanning 29 years—completing the pullout by April 26. The protests' momentum carried into parliamentary elections held from May 29 to June 19, 2005, where the anti-Syrian opposition alliance, spearheaded by Saad Hariri's bloc, secured a with 72 of 128 seats, defeating pro-Syrian candidates and advancing a platform for and reform. This electoral outcome reflected the revolution's short-term policy shift toward reducing external interference, though confessional unity frayed soon after amid competing factional interests.

Investigations and Syrian Withdrawal

The on February 14, 2005, prompted the Lebanese government to launch an initial domestic investigation, but efforts were rapidly obstructed by the entrenched influence of Syrian-aligned and apparatuses, which controlled key forensic and investigative resources. Lebanese authorities identified explosive residue consistent with military-grade , but chain-of-custody issues and intimidation of witnesses hampered progress from the outset. On April 7, 2005, the unanimously adopted Resolution 1595, establishing the International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) to assist Lebanon's probe into the bombing that killed Hariri and 22 others. The resolution condemned the attack as a terrorist act and demanded cooperation from all states, reflecting suspicions of foreign orchestration given the operation's scale—requiring 2,000-3,000 kg of explosives detonated via a truck bomb traveling at high speed. The UNIIIC, initially headed by Detlev Mehlis, released its first report on October 19, 2005, concluding that the assassination bore hallmarks of a sophisticated network backed by Syrian military intelligence, with evidence implicating high-level Syrian officials such as and Lebanese counterparts in the Syrian security orbit. The report highlighted command-and-control indicators, including telecommunications intercepts and defector testimonies, suggesting the plot could not have proceeded without Syrian approval amid Hariri's vocal opposition to the occupation. These disclosures, endorsed by the Security Council on November 1, 2005, amplified global condemnation of Syria's role. The mounting evidence from UNIIIC findings, combined with mass protests following the , precipitated the of pro-Syrian Lebanese on , 2005, after he failed to quell opposition demands for and Syrian disengagement. Karami's cabinet had been in power since October 2004, following Hariri's own resignation over constitutional manipulations favoring Syrian interests. This political collapse accelerated international isolation of , with the and European states citing the probe's implications in pushing for de-occupation. Under this pressure, announced a troop withdrawal timeline on , 2005, initiating the pullout of its estimated 14,000-16,000 soldiers and personnel stationed in since 1976. The redeployment proceeded in phases, with UN-verified monitoring confirming the exit of military assets; the final convoys crossed the border at Masnaa on , 2005, ending nearly three decades of direct military presence. and open-source verification corroborated the completeness of the withdrawal, though residual Syrian influence via proxies persisted. The UNIIIC's exposure of occupation-linked thus served as a causal catalyst, linking forensic scrutiny to the unraveling of Syrian control.

Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Establishment and Proceedings

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established on 30 May 2007 through United Nations Security Council Resolution 1757, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which incorporated by reference an annexed agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic. This hybrid court, blending international and domestic legal elements with a majority of international judges and prosecutors, held primary jurisdiction over the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing that killed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 21 others, as well as authority to prosecute connected crimes from 1 October 2004 to 12 December 2005. Headquartered in Leidschendam on the outskirts of The Hague, Netherlands, with a field office in Beirut, the STL operated independently to ensure impartiality amid Lebanon's polarized political environment.) Proceedings commenced with an international investigation led by the UN's International Independent Investigation Commission, transitioning to the STL's prosecutorial phase. On 30 June 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed and transmitted sealed indictments and arrest warrants to Lebanese authorities against four Lebanese nationals alleged to be members—Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad Hassan Sabra—for their roles in the , including cell phone procurement, , and false claims of responsibility. The charges relied on telecommunications data analysis tracing activation patterns of blue and red phone networks used in the plot, corroborated by forensic evidence from the and protected witness statements detailing operational logistics. Despite these developments, non-cooperation from in effecting arrests prolonged pre-trial phases, culminating in the trial opening in absentia on 16 April 2014. The STL faced substantial procedural hurdles, including documented witness intimidation that undermined evidence collection and prompted contempt proceedings against individuals and media for disclosing protected identities, as condemned by the tribunal in responses to leaks in 2013. Political pressures, including Lebanese funding shortfalls—obligated at 49% of the budget but often unmet—and reliance on voluntary international contributions led to chronic financial instability, forcing staff reductions and operational pauses. These factors, compounded by evidentiary disputes over data admissibility and defense challenges to investigative methodologies, extended proceedings over a decade, delaying substantive hearings until 2014 while highlighting the tribunal's vulnerability to external interference in a context of sectarian divisions and influence.

Key Indictments and 2020 Verdict

In 2011, the (STL) issued arrest warrants and an indictment against four members—Salim Jamil Ayyash, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, Assad Hassan Sabra, and later Hassan Habib Merhi—for their alleged roles in the conspiracy to assassinate Rafik Hariri, including procuring the explosive-laden truck, conducting surveillance, and disseminating false claims of responsibility. Ayyash was identified as the primary operational leader, coordinating a network of activists who tracked Hariri's movements using activated clusters in the months preceding the February 14, 2005, bombing. On August 18, 2020, after a spanning over four years and relying principally on circumstantial telecommunications data, the STL Trial Chamber convicted Ayyash in absentia of to commit a terrorist act, committing a terrorist act by means of an , the intentional homicide of Hariri and 21 others, and the attempted intentional homicide of 226 attempted victims; he received five concurrent life sentences, enforced symbolically pending arrest. The chamber acquitted Oneissi, Sabra, and Merhi, citing insufficient evidence to prove their direct involvement beyond , despite patterns of communication linking them to Ayyash's network. The judgment emphasized that, while the attack bore hallmarks of Hezbollah operational methods, no credible evidence emerged during proceedings to implicate Hezbollah's senior leadership or the Syrian government in directing or authorizing the , attributing the plot instead to a small, compartmentalized cell motivated by opposition to Hariri's anti-Syrian stance. Ayyash remained a at the time, with the tribunal noting his central role in activating phones but declining to infer broader command structures absent direct proof. Appeals upheld the of Ayyash in its core elements, reinforcing the telecommunications-based findings without altering the absence of for higher-level orchestration.

Tribunal Closure and Unresolved Questions

The ceased operations on 31 December 2023, after completing appeals in the Ayyash et al. case and amid persistent funding shortfalls that could no longer offset through its required contributions. Over its 15-year existence, the tribunal's expenditures surpassed $1 billion, with the bulk financed by voluntary UN member state donations following 's economic collapse and default on annual payments starting around 2020. While the appeals chamber upheld Salim Jamil Ayyash's 2020 conviction in absentia for his operational role in the conspiracy—based on tying him to the activation phones and procurement of the van used in the bombing—the tribunal's three other indicted suspects, all operatives and fugitives, evaded arrest and remained unprosecuted due to Lebanon's inability or unwillingness to execute international warrants. This outcome underscored evidentiary gaps in linking higher-level direction, as the STL's scope was confined to the named indictees without probing broader command structures amid geopolitical sensitivities. Critics, including a former STL judge, highlighted politicization risks, alleging undue influence from sponsoring states and selective focus that spared systemic enablers, though the tribunal's forensic —reconstructing the 2,500 kg TNT-equivalent via metadata and explosive residue analysis—demonstrated procedural rigor and withstood appellate scrutiny. Such assessments, often from legal scholars skeptical of hybrid courts' in polarized contexts, contrast with UN affirmations of the STL's evidentiary standards, revealing tensions between judicial insulation and constraints. In February 2025 reflections marking the 20th of the , analysts described the STL's legacy as partial : a forensic vindication of Hezbollah's tactical involvement but failure to secure custody or deter , exacerbated by the group's historical dominance in Lebanon's apparatus, which impeded domestic even as regional shifts post-Assad weakened its position. These unresolved elements—unapprehended perpetrators and untraced upstream financing—illustrate the tribunal's deterrence limits against non-state actors embedded in state-like power structures, prioritizing symbolic precedent over comprehensive accountability.

Personal Life and Philanthropy

Family and Religious Background

Rafic Hariri was born on November 1, 1944, in , , to a family of modest circumstances headed by his father, Bahaa ed-Din Hariri, a farmer and petty trader, and his mother, Hind. As a member of the Sunni Muslim community, Hariri's early religious upbringing reflected the confessional diversity of , though his family adhered strictly to Sunni traditions. This background informed his lifelong identity as a devout Sunni, which strengthened personal and professional connections in , where he resided from 1966 onward and later acquired citizenship in 1980. Hariri married twice. His first marriage in 1965 was to Nidal el-Boustany, an Iraqi national; the union produced two sons—Bahaa (born 1967) and (born 1970)—before ending in after several years. In 1976, he wed Nazik Audi, of Palestinian descent, who became the mother of his remaining children, including sons (born 1980) and Fahd (born 1982), and daughter Hind (born 1983), bringing the total to seven children. Despite his prominence, Hariri maintained a relatively private family life, prioritizing stability and security for his household amid Lebanon's volatile environment and personal threats. His Sunni faith underpinned alliances in the Gulf but did not preclude advocacy for Lebanon's inter-confessional balance, as evidenced by his efforts to foster unity across sects in personal dealings.

Charitable Foundations and Education Initiatives

Rafic Hariri established the Hariri Foundation in to support Lebanon's human development amid the , with a primary emphasis on to build skilled . The foundation, largely funded from Hariri's personal wealth, sponsored the of nearly 36,000 Lebanese students through scholarships for undergraduate and studies at institutions in and abroad, prioritizing academic merit and financial need to foster talent retention. The foundation constructed and administered five comprehensive schools in , alongside a technical institute, to provide accessible primary and , reinforcing two additional schools facing closure in the by expanding their programs. In higher education, Hariri founded Rafik Hariri (initially Hariri Canadian ) in Mechref in 1999, aiming to deliver affordable, quality degrees in fields like and to empower local youth. Scholarships at the university covered up to 50% of tuition based on academic performance, extending the foundation's merit-driven approach. Post-civil war efforts included over 200 development projects, such as more than 30 centers supporting and community rebuilding to address war-induced and skill gaps. Annual spending exceeded $96 million by 1986-1987, dedicated mainly to scholarships that trained professionals across disciplines, contributing to Lebanon's post-conflict human without reliance on state funds. These initiatives focused on long-term self-sufficiency, funding hospitals and social centers alongside to sustain loyalty through capability enhancement.

Controversies and Criticisms

Corruption and Cronyism Allegations

Hariri's company , established in 1994 to oversee the reconstruction of Beirut's central district, faced accusations of favoritism toward political allies and cronies in property acquisitions and development contracts. Critics alleged that undervalued expropriated properties owned by ordinary residents while granting preferential deals to Hariri's associates, leading to forcible evictions and unequal compensation structures that benefited a narrow elite network. These claims were amplified by opposition figures who pointed to opaque tender processes and the allocation of lucrative subcontracts to firms linked to Hariri's circle, though no independent audits conclusively verified systemic kickbacks during his lifetime. Allegations of personal enrichment arose from state contracts awarded to Hariri's construction firm, Oger, which secured major public works projects in after his return to premiership in 2000. Detractors claimed these deals involved inflated costs and indirect benefits to Hariri's family interests, enabling wealth accumulation beyond his pre-political Saudi earnings, estimated at over $4 billion by the early . However, proponents countered that Oger's profitability stemmed primarily from independent Saudi royal contracts predating Lebanese engagements, with the company's expansion reflecting Hariri's established expertise rather than illicit state favoritism. Hariri faced no formal convictions for prior to his 2005 assassination, amid a Lebanese where elite was commonplace across factions. Post-assassination investigations into financial irregularities were often politicized, targeting Hariri's legacy amid broader sectarian rivalries, but yielded limited verifiable evidence of unique malfeasance beyond prevailing norms of in public procurement. Such probes, including those by parliamentary committees, highlighted procedural lapses but were criticized for lacking judicial rigor and serving factional agendas rather than establishing causal proof of crony-driven enrichment.

Economic Policies: Achievements vs. Unsustainable Debt

Rafic Hariri's economic policies emphasized rapid reconstruction following Lebanon's 1975-1990 , with the Horizon 2000 plan directing investments toward infrastructure revival and establishing as a regional trade and financial center. Initiatives like the project rehabilitated the war-torn , replacing destroyed buildings with modern developments, improving utilities, and fostering that drew foreign capital and boosted . These efforts contributed to Lebanon's GDP increasing from about $1,500 in 1992 to roughly $5,200 by 2004 in current U.S. dollars, alongside taming from 131% in 1992 to single digits by the mid-1990s through stabilized fiscal measures. Financing this expansion relied on extensive borrowing from domestic banks and Arab states, propelling public debt-to-GDP from 46% in to 105% by 1998 and over 170% by 2005, rendering Lebanon's debt burden among the world's highest. Interest servicing absorbed up to 40% of government revenues by the early , crowding out other expenditures amid limited tax base reforms and reliance on indirect taxes. Government allocations for and hovered below 10% of the budget, favoring capital projects over and exacerbating inequalities, as private out-of-pocket spending dominated. While the debt-fueled growth averted prolonged stagnation in a devastated economy—where alternative might have yielded near-zero expansion—the lack of rigorous oversight and diversification amplified risks, embedding structural vulnerabilities that intensified in subsequent decades. Hariri's approach demonstrated that post-conflict recovery necessitated to rebuild , yet unchecked eurobond issuance and crony-linked contracts undermined long-term fiscal without corresponding gains.

Political Ambiguities and Foreign Ties

Hariri initially accommodated Syrian dominance in following the 1989 Ta'if Agreement, which he helped broker in and which formalized Syria's role in overseeing the country's security and political transitions to ensure post-civil war stability. As from 1992 to 1998, he maintained close coordination with , including direct meetings with Syrian leaders and acting as a Saudi envoy to facilitate dialogue during the 1980s Lebanese conflicts. This pragmatic approach reflected Syria's control over Lebanese affairs until the late 1990s, when Hariri began cultivating a broader Sunni political base amid growing Syrian pressure. By his return to power in and into , Hariri's stance shifted toward advocating Lebanese , culminating in opposition to Syria's push to extend President Émile Lahoud's term beyond constitutional limits in a tense December meeting with . This pivot aligned him more closely with U.S. and Saudi interests, as evidenced by his support for 1559 in September , which demanded Syrian troop withdrawal and disarmament of militias—moves backed by Washington and to counter Damascus's influence. Hariri's longstanding Saudi ties, including rare citizenship granted by King Fahd in the and wealth accrued from construction contracts like founded in 1978, fueled perceptions of him as a proxy, yet his mediation in Ta'if demonstrated efforts at pan-Arab consensus-building rather than unilateral allegiance. Critics accused Hariri of sectarian favoritism, particularly Sunni bias given his community's dominance in his , but cabinet compositions under his premierships adhered to Lebanon's confessional quotas, incorporating (e.g., Marwan Hamadeh in economy), Maronite Christians, and Shiite representatives alongside Sunni allies. His diplomacy balanced these ties through regional engagement, such as leveraging Saudi-hosted forums for Lebanese reconciliation and fostering economic links with Gulf states to offset Syrian leverage without alienating partners. This multifaceted approach—initial Syrian pragmatism yielding to Western-Arab alignment—highlighted Hariri's adaptive amid Lebanon's precarious .

Legacy

Role in Lebanese Sovereignty

Rafic Hariri played a pivotal role in negotiating the 1989 Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon's 15-year civil war by reforming the confessional power-sharing system and outlining steps toward greater national sovereignty, including the eventual withdrawal of foreign forces. As a Saudi diplomatic representative, Hariri persuaded reluctant Lebanese deputies to attend the Taif talks, facilitating agreement on a federal compromise that balanced sectarian interests while aiming to reduce militia dominance and warlordism through centralized authority. During his premierships from 1992 to 1998 and 2000 to 2004, Hariri advanced Taif implementation by disarming non-Hezbollah militias and bolstering state institutions, empirically curtailing factional violence that had fragmented sovereignty prior to the accord. Hariri's stance evolved into overt opposition against prolonged Syrian influence, particularly after resigning as in 2004 over the extension of President Emile Lahoud's term, which he viewed as undermining Taif principles and Lebanese independence. While critics argue Hariri initially accommodated Syrian oversight to enable reconstruction, his later of Syrian high-handedness and refusal to endorse constitutional extensions marked a shift toward prioritizing . This opposition positioned him as a symbol of resistance, though some sources contend his power consolidated around personal networks rather than purely institutional reforms. Hariri's assassination on February 14, 2005, catalyzed the , sparking mass protests that pressured to withdraw its troops from by April 26, 2005, after nearly three decades of occupation. The ensuing political vacuum enabled free elections in May 2005 and the formation of the , a pro-sovereignty coalition advocating reduced foreign interference and adherence. Despite debates over whether Hariri's martyrdom alone drove these outcomes or international pressure was decisive, the verifiable sequence—protests following his death leading directly to Syrian exit—underscores his indirect but causal contribution to restoring Lebanese autonomy. Institutional gains under his influence, such as militia disarmament, provided empirical foundations for post-withdrawal stability, countering claims of mere personalization by demonstrating reduced warlordism.

Long-Term Economic Impact

Hariri's economic framework, centered on private sector-led reconstruction and financial liberalization, catalyzed a services-oriented boom that positioned as a regional banking and hub in the decades following the 1975–1990 , during which capital stock was largely destroyed. Services contributed an average of 69% to GDP from 1994 to 2020, rising to 87.2% by the latter period, driven by banking secrecy laws, remittances, and that attracted foreign capital inflows. This model rebuilt Beirut's infrastructure via the Horizon 2000 plan, fostering GDP growth from a of near-zero to annual rates averaging 4–5% in the and early 2000s, outpacing many MENA peers recovering from conflict or stagnation. Post-2005, the framework's emphasis on sustained banking sector resilience, with assets exceeding 360% of GDP by the mid-2010s, enabling deposit growth and liquidity buffers that delayed until external shocks and policy inertia intervened. However, the debt-financed reconstruction—public debt rising from under 20% of GDP in 1990 to over 100% by 2005—exposed vulnerabilities when successor administrations perpetuated borrowing without structural fiscal adjustments, subsidies, or productivity-enhancing reforms, leading to chronic deficits and a surpassing 150% by 2019. Lebanon's March 2020 on a $1.2 billion Eurobond marked the culmination, but causal factors trace primarily to post-Hariri extensions of unchecked spending amid geopolitical instability, rather than the originating model's design alone. Counterfactual assessments grounded in MENA comparatives suggest that absent Hariri-era liberalizations, Lebanon risked prolonged stagnation akin to Syria's pre-2011 trajectory, where state-heavy models yielded sub-2% annual growth and industrial underdevelopment, or Jordan's slower service sector expansion post-regional conflicts. Egypt's parallel burdens stemmed from dissimilar subsidy-driven , underscoring how Lebanon's initial private-led recovery—despite flaws—established a comparative edge in financial intermediation until and external pressures eroded gains. This resilience from war-torn baselines highlights the model's causal role in averting deeper structural decay, though sustainability hinged on unheeded reforms to diversify beyond services and curb patronage-fueled accumulation.

Symbolic Status and Family Succession

Rafic Hariri earned the moniker "Mr. Lebanon" for spearheading the country's postwar reconstruction, symbolizing economic revival and national unity in the eyes of many supporters. Following his on , , Hariri's image transformed into that of a , particularly resonant in Sunni and Christian communities, where he represented resistance to foreign domination and a vision for a sovereign . This martyrdom narrative, forged through public commemorations and media portrayals, elevated him to an enduring icon of Lebanese , though interpretations vary by sect and political affiliation. Hariri's political lineage continued through his son , who assumed leadership of the and served as prime minister from November 2009 to January 2011 and from December 2016 to January 2020. 's tenures extended the family's influence, emphasizing continuity in pro-Western, anti-Syrian policies, but faced dilution amid Hezbollah's expanding military and political dominance, which constrained governmental authority and forced pragmatic accommodations. By 2022, withdrew from electoral politics, signaling challenges to the dynasty's grip, though the family retained symbolic sway in Sunni circles. As of 2025, public perceptions of Hariri's legacy remain polarized: venerated as a hero for catalyzing gains, such as the 2005 Cedar Revolution's push for Syrian withdrawal, yet critiqued by detractors as emblematic of an elitist political class tied to unsustainable patronage networks. Empirical assessments prioritize his tangible contributions to post-civil war recovery and independence assertions over hagiographic portrayals, acknowledging that while the icon endures in loyalist narratives, broader societal fractures—exacerbated by Hezbollah's rise—have tempered the family's succession into a diluted, contested inheritance.

References

  1. https://rhf.org.lb/en/content/rafik-hariri-biography
  2. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/middle-east-programs/rafik-hariri-center-for-the-middle-east/rafik-hariri/
  3. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-feb-15-fg-hariri15-story.html
  4. https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2005-02-14-voa42-67521797/284428.html
  5. https://www.arabnews.com/node/262392
  6. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/diplomacy-and-international-relations/assassination-rafik-hariri-2005
  7. https://fanack.com/lebanon/history-of-lebanon/the-cedar-revolution-how-lebanon-was-further-divided/
  8. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2005/feb/14/guardianobituaries.markoliver
  9. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/2/14/profile-rafiq-al-hariri
  10. https://www.smh.com.au/national/biggest-construction-job-was-on-his-country-20050219-gdkrhm.html
  11. https://www.thetimes.com/comment/register/article/rafik-hariri-rpk20d950mq
  12. https://www.sawanonlinebookstore.com/rafic-hariri/
  13. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13978635
  14. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1262053/lebanon-saudi-arabia-the-story-of-a-family-rupture.html
  15. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/11/27/millionaire-seeks-better-arab-image/2ae28e57-7459-4859-8f0b-8839a9c92da1/
  16. https://www.gsn-online.com/news-centre/article/saudi-oger-built-political-connections
  17. https://hfusa.org/herafiq.htm
  18. https://jordantimes.com/news/business/workers-suffer-saudi-arabia-once-mighty-hariri-firm-falters
  19. https://www.gulfconstructiononline.com/Article/9711/Towering_ambition
  20. https://www.meed.com/sbgoger-vie-for-jeddah/
  21. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/media-telecom/titalia-sells-oger-telecom-stake-for-477-mln-idUSL29642545/
  22. https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/0414/113a.html
  23. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/abandoned-in-saudi-desert-camps-migrant-workers-wont-leave-without-pay-idUSKCN10T1PA/
  24. https://www.forbes.com/maserati/billionaires2004/LIRSKVY.html?pass=
  25. https://www.upi.com/Top_News/2004/03/03/Lebanons-PM-ranked-108th-world-billionaire/34421078331256/?ur3=1
  26. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13602360500063089
  27. https://www.the961.com/facts-about-rafic-hariri/
  28. https://www.arabianbusiness.com/lists/rich-list-290689-htmlitemid290936
  29. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hannes-Baumann-2/publication/303863754_The_%27new_contractor_bourgeoisie%27_in_Lebanese_politics_Hariri_Miqati_and_Faris/links/6274ef41107cae29198dd6a7/The-new-contractor-bourgeoisie-in-Lebanese-politics-Hariri-Miqati-and-Faris.pdf
  30. https://hariri-foundation.org/
  31. https://hfusa.org/?page_id=30
  32. https://shs.cairn.info/leaders-et-partisans-au-liban--9782811105952-page-81?lang=en
  33. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2009/3/1/profile-rafik-hariri
  34. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/08/lebanons-politics
  35. https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Accord24_TheTaifAgreement.pdf
  36. https://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2179_92.htm
  37. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1992/10/31/Hariri-forms-a-new-30-member-cabinet-to-save-Lebanon/5652720507600/
  38. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/politics-and-government/hariri-begins-reconstruction-lebanon
  39. https://2001-2009.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/l/7929.htm
  40. https://timep.org/2020/09/16/demolishing-human-rights-in-the-name-of-reconstruction-lessons-learned-from-beiruts-solidere-for-syria/
  41. https://www.asmeascholars.org/citizen-hariri--lebanon-s-neoliberal-reconstruction
  42. https://pomeps.org/lebanon-and-the-fog-of-reconstruction
  43. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-178609/
  44. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0161893807000567
  45. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/display/book/9781557757845/9781557757845.pdf
  46. https://www.emerics.org:446/issueFileDownload.es?brdctsNo=340208&brdctsFileNo=83731
  47. https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Accord24_ExMilitiaFighters.pdf
  48. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/a-case-in-context-from-the-lebanese-civil-war-to-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon/
  49. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/un-envoy-lebanese-militias-still-armed
  50. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/book/9781557757845/ch002.xml
  51. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4330218
  52. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/unu011/unu011.pdf
  53. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/63577/1/53736983X.pdf
  54. https://mp.luiss.it/archives/titolo/
  55. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/05/the-unraveling-of-lebanons-taif-agreement-limits-of-sect-based-power-sharing?lang=en
  56. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2006-04/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_1510169.php
  57. https://merip.org/2005/09/syria-and-lebanon-a-brotherhood-transformed/
  58. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/middle_east-jan-june05-syria_04-26
  59. https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/freehou/1998/en/94718
  60. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/05/25/voters-boost-opposition-in-lebanon/90d0058d-9f96-4621-acdb-e262ffc84858
  61. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2005/feb/15/guardianobituaries.syria
  62. https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/articles/1308264/fm-a-once-dominant-lebanese-political-force-in-transition
  63. https://www.wrmea.org/1998-march/a-crucial-year-for-democracy-in-lebanon-opens-with-a-warming-of-u.s.-lebanese-relations.html
  64. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/05/lebanon
  65. https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/04/world/opposition-leader-scores-upset-in-lebanon-elections.html
  66. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/04/lebanon
  67. https://www.upi.com/Archives/2000/09/04/Hariri-sweeps-Lebanese-elections/9261968040000/
  68. https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?language=en&id=1120443
  69. https://www.upi.com/Archives/2000/10/26/Lebanons-newly-appointed-PM-forms-30-member-Cabinet/5679972532800/
  70. https://www.encyclopedia.com/international/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/hariri-rafiq-1944-2005
  71. https://merip.org/2006/05/how-un-pressure-on-hizballah-impedes-lebanese-reform/
  72. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=LB
  73. https://wits.worldbank.org/countryprofile/en/country/LBN/startyear/1999/endyear/2003/indicator/NY-GDP-MKTP-KD-ZG
  74. https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2025/02/14/rafic-hariri-lebanon-economy/
  75. https://reason.org/commentary/lebanon-pm-calls-for-electrici/
  76. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rafiq-al-Hariri
  77. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/dmas20041124/dmas2004112404.pdf
  78. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/lebanon-at-the-crossroads-rebuilding-an-arab-democracy/
  79. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/10/24/explaining-unsc-resolution-1701-and-its-relation-to-resolution-1559/
  80. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/04/world/middleeast/lebanon-agrees-to-extend-term-of-leader-imposed-by-syria.html
  81. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syria-and-polarization-lebanese-politics
  82. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/10/20/lebanese-prime-minister-hariri-resigns
  83. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/21/syria.lebanon
  84. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/factbox-the-assassination-of-lebanons-hariri-and-its-aftermath-idUSKCN2500LQ/
  85. https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/15/world/middleeast/beirut-car-bomb-kills-expremier-stability-at-risk.html
  86. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-60691507
  87. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/2/14/former-pm-hariri-dies-in-beirut-blast
  88. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-187181/
  89. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/tooth-tells-a-tale-in-u-n-probe-of-lebanon-killing-idUSN12159633/
  90. https://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/06/17/un.hariri/index.html
  91. https://www.smh.com.au/world/hariri-probe-finds-bomb-was-in-truck-20050618-gdljbt.html
  92. https://press.un.org/en/2006/sc8747.doc.htm
  93. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/lebanons-future-determined-by-two-powerful-explosions-just-fifteen-years-apart/
  94. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/22/worlddispatch.syria
  95. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/saads-sad-goodbye-hariri-leaves-lebanese-politics
  96. https://archive.transatlanticrelations.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/paradigm_chapter8.pdf
  97. https://www.ualm.org.au/ten-years-on-lebanons-cedar-revolution/
  98. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world-condemns-al-hariri-assassination-1.1174157
  99. https://www.rferl.org/a/1057455.html
  100. https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2005/sc8353.html
  101. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/43825.htm
  102. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/factbox-the-assassination-of-lebanons-hariri-and-its-aftermath-idUSKCN25D1LT/
  103. https://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/06/20/lebanon.election/index.html
  104. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/anti-syria-opposition-alliance-declares-victory-in-parliamentary-elections
  105. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2020/07/the-investigation-that-wasnt?lang=en
  106. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/lebanon-sres1595.php
  107. https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/5286/download?inline
  108. https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2005/sc8543.html
  109. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-180707/
  110. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/lebanese-prime-minister-omar-karami-resigns-amid-opposition-unrest
  111. https://news.un.org/en/story/2005/04/133712
  112. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1145217
  113. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2011-06-30/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon
  114. https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/07/383102
  115. https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2288456&language=en
  116. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon-what-does-its-closure-mean-for-lebanon/
  117. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25757367
  118. https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/46228-lebanon-stl-symbolically-sentences-ayyash-to-life-imprisonment.html
  119. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1070482
  120. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55271428
  121. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/world/middleeast/hariri-assassination-trial-hague.html
  122. https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/special_tribunal_lebanon1.html
  123. https://unscol.unmissions.org/un-secretary-generals-spokesperson-closure-special-tribunal-lebanon
  124. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-limits-of-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon-and-what-syrians-can-learn/
  125. http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/26/the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon-after-the-judgment-in-ayyash-et-al-justice-at-last/
  126. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210408-un-backed-court-hezbollah-fugitive-cant-appeal-sentence-in-absentia/
  127. https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2903821/hezbollah-fugitive-cant-appeal-over-hariri-murder-says-un-tribunal
  128. https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/37490-swiss-judge-delivers-harsh-criticism-of-lebanon-tribunal.html
  129. https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_protracted_neglected_and_ineffective_lessons_from_the_lebanon_tr/
  130. https://nowlebanon.com/hariris-assassination-anniversary-with-assad-fallen-and-his-killers-gone-has-justice-finally-been-served/
  131. https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-rafik-hariri-assad-hezbollah-c5bdc3850bf332ddef3c2d4d3e8087f3
  132. https://www.ictj.org/latest-news/lebanon-marks-20th-anniversary-rafik-hariri%25E2%2580%2599s-assassination-amid-political-shifts
  133. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2015/02/ten-years-after-hariris-death-are-lebanons-sunnis-still-leaderless?lang=en
  134. https://www.geni.com/people/Nazik-Hariri/6000000066374235899
  135. https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/articles/1225840/is-hariri-still-steering-the-sunni-ship
  136. https://hariri-foundation.org/story/
  137. https://www.rhu.edu.lb/about-rhu/history
  138. https://www.rhu.edu.lb/admission/financial-aid-and-scholarship-programs
  139. https://www.bibalex.org/he_funding/Donors/Details.aspx?ID=101
  140. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/feb/20/syria.lebanon
  141. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4265565.stm
  142. https://www.academia.edu/16641543/Unjust_Reconstruction_in_Postwar_Lebanon_Why_Solidere_s_Reconstruction_of_Downtown_Beirut_is_Synonymous_to_Victor_s_Reconstruction_
  143. https://www.the-independent.com/news/lebanon-s-vast-web-of-corruption-unravels-1189670.html
  144. https://qifanabki.com/2010/02/12/effective-corrupt-leadership-assessing-rafiq-al-hariris-legacy/
  145. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=LB
  146. https://ccas.georgetown.edu/2013/03/15/how-will-history-remember-rafiq-hariri/
  147. https://equityhealthj.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1475-9276-11-23
  148. https://findevlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/FDL_Lebanon-Policy-Brief_July23.pdf
  149. https://www.dawn.com/news/389444/rafik-hariri-s-legacy-includes-a-huge-debt
  150. https://beirutreport.com/not-your-average-citizen-rafik-hariris-neoliberal-lebanon/
  151. https://english.aawsat.com/features/5052040-rafik-hariri-after-first-meeting-bashar-assad-i-became-more-afraid-syria-not
  152. https://www.newarab.com/opinion/tense-final-meeting-between-rafic-hariri-and-bashar-al-assad
  153. https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/role-usa-current-lebanon-crisis
  154. https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/articles/1320769/rafic-hariri-and-bachir-gemayel-two-visions-for-lebanon-one-national-struggle
  155. https://english.alarabiya.net/perspective/analysis/2015/02/13/Spotlighting-Rafiq-Hariri-s-political-friends-around-the-globe
  156. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2597248
  157. https://newlinesinstitute.org/state-resilience-fragility/lebanon-after-the-assads/
  158. https://english.sawtbeirut.com/opinions/rafik-hariri-architect-of-taef-agreement-and-its-victim/
  159. https://themedialine.org/mideast-daily-news/20-years-after-hariris-assassination-lebanon-faces-a-new-reality/
  160. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/infi.12459
  161. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361311917_Lebanon_economic_and_financial_crises_reasons_for_collapse
  162. https://www.worldfinance.com/strategy/a-resilient-banking-sector-is-allowing-lebanons-economy-to-endure-regional-strife
  163. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/pb_2112_reform_within_lebanon_0.pdf
  164. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/474551606779642981/pdf/Lebanon-Economic-Monitor-The-Deliberate-Depression.pdf
  165. https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-investment-climate-statements/lebanon
  166. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/424551565105634645/pdf/Growth-after-War-in-Syria.pdf
  167. https://www.csis.org/analysis/greater-middle-east-arab-spring-axis-failed-states
  168. https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/0895330042162322
  169. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/03/lebanons-political-economy-from-predatory-to-self-devouring?lang=en
  170. https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/articles/report/The_Political_Economy_of_Lebanon_s_Financial_Crisis/29489987/1/files/56025053.pdf
  171. https://www.bidoun.org/articles/mr-lebanon
  172. https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/ame/11/2/ame110202.xml
  173. https://dokumen.pub/killing-mr-lebanon-the-assassination-of-rafik-hariri-and-its-impact-on-the-middle-east-9780755609642-9781845118549.html
  174. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/lebanon-saad-hariri-decayed-dynasty-career-decline
  175. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/28/hariri-what-happened-in-saudi-stays-in-saudi
  176. https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/24/middleeast/hariri-politics-lebanon-election-intl
  177. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/interview-lebanon-s-future-movement-commemorates-ex-premier-hariri-s-legacy-celebrates-assad-s-fall/3481954
  178. https://www.the961.com/poll-lebanese-political-parties-leaders-results/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.