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Al-Manar (Arabic: المنار, romanized: al-Manār, lit. ''The Lighthouse'') is a Lebanese satellite television station owned and operated by the Islamist political party and paramilitary group Hezbollah,[5][6] broadcasting from Beirut, Lebanon.[7] The channel was launched on 4 June 1991 as a terrestrial channel and in 2000 as a satellite channel. It is a member of the Arab States Broadcasting Union. The station reaches around 50 million people.[8]

The station is considered one of Hezbollah's most important global propaganda tools, with the Danish Institute for International Studies describing it as "the very centrepiece of the entire [Hezbollah] media apparatus".[9]

It is banned in the United States, France, Spain, and Germany, and has run into some service and license problems outside Lebanon,[10] making it unavailable in the Netherlands,[11][12] Canada, and Australia.[13][14]

According to the RAND Corporation in 2017, "Al-Manar has an annual budget of roughly $15 million, much of it supplied by wealthy expatriate Lebanese donors and various Iranian community organizations, and income from the sale of its shows."[15]

History

[edit]
See also: South Lebanon conflict (1985–2000)

Al-Manar first began terrestrial broadcasting from Beirut, Lebanon on 4 June 1991.[16] The station was located in Haret Hreik in the southern suburbs of Beirut, close to Hezbollah's headquarters.[9][17] Originally, the station had only a few employees, who had studied media in London during the mid-1980s. But almost a year later, Al-Manar was employing over 150 people.[18]

Initially, Al Manar would broadcast five hours per day. Shortly before the 1992 election, it began broadcasting regular news bulletins in order to help Hezbollah attain more votes and spread its message to more people. In 1993, the station expanded its broadcasting to seven hours a day and extended its signal to the southern part of the Bekaa Valley. Ahead of the 1996 Lebanese parliamentary elections, additional antennas were erected in Northern Lebanon and throughout the Mount Lebanon range, so that the station could be viewed not only in Lebanon, but also in western Syria and northern Israel.[19] Broadcasting was extended to 20 hours in 1998 but reduced to 18 hours in 2000 and 24 in 2001.[20]

In 1996, the Lebanese government granted broadcasting licenses to five television stations, not including Al-Manar. Approximately 50 stations were forced to close at the time. Several stations appealed the government's decision, but only four of them were finally granted licenses, one of which was Al-Manar. On 18 September, the Lebanese Cabinet decided to grant Al-Manar a license after having been requested to do so by then Syrian president Hafez al-Assad. Al-Manar received the license in July 1997.[21]

It started in this period to embed journalists with Hezbollah fighters, showing video of Israeli casualties, and including Hebrew so Israeli viewers could follow, with the aim of sowing fear among Israeli viewers.[22][23][1][20]

The station's website was launched in 1999, at first hosting some recordings of Hassan Nasrallah speeches to a background of religious and nationalist music.[24]

On 24/25 June 1999 the IAF launched two massive air raids across Lebanon. One of the targets was the al-Manar radio station's offices in a four storey building in Baalbek which was completely demolished. The attacks also hit Beirut's power stations and bridges on the roads to the south. An estimated $52 million damage was caused. Eleven Lebanese were killed as well as two Israelis in Kiryat Shmona.[25]

Satellite broadcasting

[edit]

During the 1990s, the popularity of satellite broadcasting greatly increased in the Arab world and in Lebanon. The first Lebanese station to use this technology was Future Television, launching Future International SAT in 1994, while LBCI and the Lebanese government followed by launching LBCSAT and Tele Liban Satellite respectively. In order to compete with these emerging stations, and in order to find an international audience, Al-Manar announced its intention to launch a satellite channel on 9 March 2000. Muhammad Ra'd, a Hezbollah member of parliament and al-Manar's largest shareholder, submitted the request to the minister of transmission, which was approved in April 2000. Although the launch of the satellite station was originally planned for July, the date was moved up in order to coincide with the end of the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon on 25 May. This success led other television stations to follow in launching satellite stations, including Murr TV in November 2000, but it was shut down for "violating an election law prohibiting propaganda" – a fate which al-Manar did not meet, although its programming was also considered propaganda by many analysts.[who?][citation needed] ArabSat, a leading communications satellite operator in the Middle East, headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, was at first wary about collaborating with al-Manar, because of the station's Shi'a agenda[citation needed] – the two companies agreed, however, that the programming would be adapted to the pan-Arab audience, leading to a slight difference between the local broadcast and the one via satellite. At first, only three hours of satellite programming were broadcast per day, but by December 2000, the station was broadcasting around the clock.[26]

The timing of the satellite launch - covering the Israeli withdrawal and also the start of the Second Intifada - boosted its audience in the Arab world.[27]

Al-Manar was soon carried by many satellite providers. However, starting with the removal of the station from TARBS World TV in Australia in 2003, many satellite television providers stopped featuring it. Until then the station was featured by the following providers at one time or another:

According to the BBC on 26 July 2006, Al-Manar had three satellite signals:[29]

  • ArabSat 2B at 30.5 degrees east
  • Badr 3 at 26 degrees east
  • NileSat 102 at 7 degrees west

By 2004, Al Manar was estimated to hold 10-15 million viewers daily worldwide.[30][9]

2000s: Israeli attacks and global growth

[edit]

The station's website team expanded in 2004, from four members to thirteen.[24]

During the 2006 Lebanon War, the channel was continuously struck by missiles during Israeli air raids. The Israeli Air Force attacks on 13 July 2006 led to injury of three employees.[31][32] The attack on Al-Manar's facilities shortly followed another strike against the Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut earlier that morning. Despite the attack, the station remained on air, broadcasting from undisclosed locations.[33] The IDF bombed Al-Manar's Beirut complex again on 16 July causing fire in the complex and surrounding buildings. The station's signal disappeared briefly several times, then continued normal programming.[34]

Human Rights Watch said the bombing of media outlets violates international law when they are not being used for military purposes ("it is unlawful to attack facilities that merely shape civilian opinion; neither directly contributes to military operations").[35] The incident was condemned by the International Federation of Journalists.[36] The Israel Association of Journalists withdrew from the federation in response, claiming that Al-Manar employees "are not journalists, they are terrorists".[37][38] The New York based Committee to Protect Journalists, also expressed alarm over the incident as "it (Al-Manar) does not appear based on a monitoring of its broadcasts today to be serving any discernible military function, according to CPJ's analysis."[39]

The Israeli bombing increased the station's popularity:

With other channels turning to Al Manar for the latest line from Hizbullah, it could set the regional news agenda and bring viewers to its extensive coverage of the war. Indeed, purely by staying on air, Al Manar could claim a success. According to Israel's Market Research, the channel's popularity rankings in the Middle East leapt from 83rd to the 10th slot between July 15 and 28. This meant a substantial increase to the estimated 10 million people that tune in daily to its terrestrial and satellite channels in normal times.[33]

In 2006, it began to broadcast online to complement its terrestrial and satellite output. By 2008, its website was hosting 100 new items a day, and reaching over 26,000 daily viewers, and as many as 55,000 according to its management.[24] By the end of the 2000s, as well as TV broadcasts in Arabic, Hebrew, French and English, the station's website was available in Spanish as well.[9]

As a result of removal from some satellite services in the 2000s, it signed new deals with smaller satellite providers, e.g. in April 2008 with Indosat, the operator of the Palapa C2 satellite owned by Telkom Indonesia, in which the Indonesian government is the majority shareholder.[24][40] By 2009, al-Manar was watched by some 18 million people globally.[41] By 2010, its annual budget was $10 million.[20]

2013 Bahrain crisis

[edit]

Iranian-backed Shia groups were involved in demonstrations starting in mid-2011 (as part of the "Arab Spring") against Bahrain's ruling Sunni oligarchy, and al-Manar backed these demonstrations and condemned the government repression of them. In late December 2013, the Lebanese Communication Group that includes Al-Manar apologised for its partisan coverage of the events at a meeting of the Arab States Broadcasting Union. In response, Hezbollah forced the Director General of the station, Abdallah Qasir or Kassir (a former MP of Hezbollah’s Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc), to resign. He went to Iran.[42][43][44]

2020s

[edit]
See also: Middle Eastern crisis (2023–present) and Attacks on journalists during the Israel–Hezbollah conflict (2023–present)

According to Orayb Aref Najjar, after the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, leader of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on January 3, 2020, "Al-Manar went on a daily attack on U.S. policy on Iran and the region, promising revenge."[22]

Al-Manar translates its content into Spanish for circulation in Latin America.[45]

On 25 October 2023, as the 2023 Gaza war spread to southern Lebanon, Al-Manar reported that its camera operator, Wissam Qassim, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on Hasbaiyya, southern Lebanon, alongside two employees of allied website Al Mayadeen, while they slept in chalets used by journalists.[46][47][48] The station's studios in Dahiyeh, southern Beirut, were hit in Israeli airstrikes in early October 2024.[49]

Content

[edit]

Al-Manar's programming is diverse, including music shows, children's programmes and news. The Washington Post, said in 2004 that "It heavily covers events involving the Palestinians, and it shows militants setting off explosives and shooting at Israelis and American troops, often to musical accompaniment." Citing the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Post said it often features Islamic sacred texts and images of martyrdom.[50] According to the Washington Institute's 2004 analysis, it consists of 25% music videos and fillers, 25% series and dramas, 25% talk shows, and finally 25% news and family shows.[51] A 2007 analysis described 65% of its content as entertainment and 35% as political.[33]

Programs

[edit]

The news programming includes much footage from the international press. Additionally, as of early 2004, the station subscribed to wire services including Reuters, Associated Press (AP), Agence France Presse, and Deutsche Presse Agentur. As of 2004, the station airs eight news bulletins a day in Arabic in addition to one in English and one in French.[52] AP severed ties with the station shortly after this.[28]

Al-Manar primarily uses Iranian and Syrian government news agencies for news and documentaries.[22] It has had a formal co-operation agreement with IRNA since 2012.[53] On its websites it also republishes material verbatim from Russia's state broadcaster RT.[54] It extensively screens Iranian films (which it sees as "culturally in harmony with Arab values and Al Manar’s mostly Shiite audience") and television series including soap operas, dubbed into (and later more often subtitled in) Modern Standard Arabic, as well as Syrian series.[22][3]

Several talk shows are regularly aired on al-Manar. According to Avi Jorisch of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the best known of these is Beit al-ankabut (The Spider's House); its title alludes to a metaphor, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah often employs to describe Israel. It is dedicated to uncovering the "weakness of the Zionist entity", i.e. Israel, and attempts to convince the Arab world that Israel could easily be destroyed, for example, by an increase in the Arab population.[55][40] Further talk shows include Hadith al-sa'a (Talk of the Hour), Matha ba'ad (What's Next?), Ma'al Hadath (With The Event), Bayna Kawsayn (Between The Brackets), Milafat (Files), Al-din wa al-hayat (Religion and Life), and Nun wa al-qalam (The 'Nun' and the Pen). Guests include well-known journalists, analysts, writers, Lebanese politicians, spokespersons of terrorist groups, and Islamic scholars, who then discuss current religious, political, and cultural, regional and global topics.[56]

Al-Manar often airs music videos and fillers in between full-length programs and during commercial breaks. Much of the music praises Hezbollah and its martyrs or the Palestinian intifada.[9] According to Jorisch, the music videos are generally dedicated to the following seven purposes: the promotion of the Hezbollah, highlighting the importance of armed resistance against Israel, the glorification of martyrdom, spreading of anti-Americanism, denunciation of Israel and Zionism as the embodiments of terrorism, the appeals for the destruction of Israel, and the depiction of the future of Arab youths.[57] The videos are on average three minutes long. The videos are usually professionally produced by the station itself and each usually takes about three to four days to make.[57] The filler material usually consists of appeals to donate money to the Hezbollah, lists of demonstrations taking place worldwide, and slogans in English, Hebrew, or Arabic.[58]

The station also offers sports broadcasting such as the programs Goal and Tis'in daqiqa (Ninety Minutes), family programming such as Al-mustakshifoun al-judud (The New Explorers), Al-Muslimoun fi al-Sin (Muslims in China), and Ayday al-khayr (Hands of Benevolence), game shows including Al-mushahid shahid (The Viewer Is the Witness), where contestants attempt to guess the names of Israeli political and military figures, and Al-muhima (The Mission) - a game show in the style of Who Wants to Be a Millionaire but with questions on Arab and Islamic history and the victor winning a virtual trip to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem,[22][1][9] and even a children's program called Al-manr al-saghir (The Little Manar), which is in the style of the US show Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood, targeting three- to seven-year-olds.[58]

During Ramadan, al-Manar features special programs, many of which are self-produced. In 2001, Izz al-Din al-Qassam: Qisat al-jihad wa al-muqawama (Izz al-Din al-Qassam: A Story of Jihad and Resistance), a four-part drama based on the life of Izz al-Din al-Qassam, an early-twentieth-century Arab, after whom the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades are named. The 2002 program Faris bi la jawad (A Knight without a Horse orThe Horseless Rider), which was produced by an Egyptian, was based on The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, an old Russian antisemitic text claiming a conspiracy of Jews control the world.[59][60][61] The 29-part series Ash-Shatat (The Diaspora), which was aired in 2003, was also based on The Protocols;[59] Commissioned by Al-Manar and produced in Syria,[62] its screening on the channel led to the banning of al-Manar in France.[63]

The station archives the complete speeches of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and those of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei.[22][33] It also promotes Hezbollah social services, for example showcasing public health initiatives.[9]

Stance

[edit]

According to The SAGE Encyclopedia of Journalism, "Al-Manar does not claim neutrality but bills itself as partisan to the cause of its constituents, initially, the disadvantaged and poor Shi’ia of [Lebanon's] South and the Beka’a valley; later expanded to include the Arab and Islamic worlds." Its adopted slogan is “The channel for Arabs and Muslims”.[22] In 2001, the station's chair, Nayyef Krayyem, said "Al Manar is an important weapon for us. It's a political weapon, social weapon, and cultural weapon."[20]

According to Jorisch, the station manager Mohammad Afif Ahmad (later Hezbollah's head of media[64][65]), said in the 1990s that Al Manar belongs to Hezbollah culturally and politically.[66] As of 2022, its former CEO, Abdallah Kassir, is now a member of Hezbollah's governing council.[4]

According to Jorisch, writing in National Review in 2004, Al-Manar's programming adopts a strongly anti-Israel and anti-US point of view. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah often "calls for 'Death to America'" on the channel and the Statue of Liberty is depicted "as a ghoul, her gown dripping blood, a knife instead of a torch in her raised hand."[67][68] According to Orayb Aref Najjar, this stance is reflected in the language used, for instance calling the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) the "Israeli Occupation Forces" (IOF).

Its Hot Topics section lists “The Israeli Enemy” as a search category. Al-Manar calls fighters Israel killed martyrs. Hezbollah fighters often leave archived video wills that explain why they chose martyrdom. The station also archives short video clips of family members or friends of martyrs praising their sacrifice and explaining why it benefits the country. The station glorified its martyrs on Martyr Day on November 11, 2019, with a speech by Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, and in song and resistance videos. [22]

According to German public television ARD in 2023, al-Manar broadcasts calls for the destruction of Israel, such as statements from Hamas. Hashem Safieddine, chairman of the Hezbollah Executive Council, used the channel to warn US President Joe Biden, Israel's Prime Minister President Netanyahu and the "evil Europeans" about his organization.[8] Jeffrey Goldberg wrote in 2002 that the channel "broadcasts anti-American programming, but its main purpose is to encourage Palestinians to become suicide bombers",[30] and ARD said in 2023 that some of its content glorifies suicide bombers,[8] and this was also noted in some early reports about the channel; however, a 2006 analysis by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies said that it was no longer screening this type of content.[69]

Al-Manar was once[when?] described[by whom?] as one of the channels, among other complex reasons, of the spread of Shiism in Syria in the years before 2009.[70] In a 2011 poll, 52% percent of Shia Lebanese identified Al Manar TV as their first choice for news, compared with only 4% of Sunnis and Druze and 1% of Christians.[71]

The station is also closely aligned to Iran. In 2015, Asharq Al-Awsat reported that Nasser Akhdar, a senior manager at al-Manar, was part of a Houthi delegation in peace talks relating to the Yemeni civil war.[72] A 2021 report by the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), a conservative thinktank at Reichman University, noted that Farahat, now al-Manar CEO and a Hezbollah member is on the board of Tehran-based Islamic Radio and Television Union (IRTVU), described as a soft power operation for the Iranian state.[73]

Journalistic standards and restrictions

[edit]

Interviewed by Jeffrey Goldberg in 2002, Al Manar's news director, Hassan Fadlallah, said that Al Manar does not aim to be neutral in its broadcasting, "Neutrality like that of Al Jazeera is out of the question for us," Fadlallah said. "We cover only the victim, not the aggressor. CNN is the Zionist news network, Al Jazeera is neutral, and Al Manar takes the side of the Palestinians...He said Al Manar's opposition to neutrality means that, unlike Al Jazeera, his station would never feature interviews or comments by Israeli officials. "We're not looking to interview Sharon," Fadlallah said. "We want to get close to him in order to kill him."[30]

The Israeli government and its supporters have consequently lobbied Western governments to ban it, with Anti-Defamation League, CAMERA, the American Jewish Congress, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, American Israel Public Affairs Committee and the Middle East Media Research Institute all campaigning against it and taking credit for some successes in its deplatforming.[74][28] Their campaigning led to corporations such as Pepsi removing their ads from the station in the mid-2000s, costing it an estimated $2 million in revenue.[28]

Allegations of antisemitism and conspiracy theories

[edit]

9/11 Conspiracy theories

[edit]
See also: 9/11 conspiracy theories

Al-Manar was one of the originators of the myth that Israelis stayed home from the World Trade Center on September 11 2001 due to foreknowledge of the attacks, publishing the story on 17 September.[75][76][77]

Allegations of antisemitic programming

[edit]

In the past, Al-Manar TV has aired material deemed antisemitic by Reporters Without Borders as well as Jewish groups, including content based on "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion".[74][78][28][1] For example, on 23 November 2004 it transmitted a news programme in which someone presented as an expert on Zionism Al-Manar warned of ng of "Zionist attempts" to transmit AIDS to Arab countries; in 2004 it screened a multi-episode Syrian series that included the blood libel and drew on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. As a result, Jewish groups have campaigned about the station.[74][78][79]

In 2004, the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions juives de France (Crif) complained to France's Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel (Higher Audio Visual Council, CSA) that scenes in the Syrian-made series, Al-Shatat (The Diaspora), which purported to depict the history of the Zionist movement, portrayed the killing of a Christian child by Jews to use the victim's blood.[78] On 13 December 2004, the French Conseil d'État, the highest administrative court in France, ordered the French-based Eutelsat Satellite organisation (owner of Hot Bird 4, which had transmitted the station) to shut down Al-Manar broadcasts.[80][81][82] Initially, Al-Manar defended Ash-Shatat as "purely factual",[2] and said that the French response was political and not legal, influenced by Israel and Jewish lobbies.[83] Later, however, "Al-Manar’s management apologized for airing the series, dropped it, and explained that the station had purchased it without first viewing the entire series, according to Franklin Lamb [in CounterPunch]."[74][78]

In 2002, Jeffrey Goldberg interviewed members of the station's staff and reported some of their comments about Jews. He quoted the news director, Hassan Fadlallah, as saying “Many Europeans believe that the Holocaust was a myth invented so that the Jews could get compensation. Everyone knows how the Jews punish people who seek the truth about the Holocaust.” He quoted the director of English-language news, Ibrahim Mussawi, calling Jews “a lesion on the forehead of history.”[30]

Covid conspiracies

[edit]

According to The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, al-Manar "condemned the United States for ‘using’ COVID-19 to ‘undermine’ its adversaries".[84][better source needed]

Restrictions

[edit]

Restrictions in the US

[edit]

Al-Manar was designated as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity", and banned by the United States on 17 December 2004.[85][86] A US government spokesman said the decision was taken because of "its incitement of terrorist activity", and that anybody linked to Al-Manar would be refused a visa to enter the US or if present in the US would be subject to expulsion procedures. Al-Manar was also removed from the satellite provider in the US, Intelsat, and Globecast, the TV service that hosted its US programming.[87][50] Lebanon's ambassador to the United States, Farid Abboud, protested: "If you want simply to demonize or eliminate one side, you're not going to advance the issue. If you are going to focus on one side simply because of the political message, it's unacceptable and it's a grave breach of the freedom of speech.".[86] Reporters without Borders opposed the designation, saying "Some of the anti-Semitic statements broadcast on Al-Manar are inexcusable but putting this TV station in the same category as terrorist groups worries us and does not strike us as the best solution".[87][88] The decision was also opposed by the International Federation of Journalists, who called it political censorship,[77] and by French academic and Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson.[89]

In 2006, the US terrorist designation was extended to all Lebanon Media Group outlets, and its financial assets were frozen by the US Treasury.[33] The Treasury said al-Manar had provided support to Palestinian groups defined as terrorist by the US government, including by transfer of tens of millions of dollars to a charity linked to Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[90][28]

In May 2023, the US government sanctioned and took down a number of Hezbollah-related web domains, including that of Al-Manar TV, after Hezbollah was listed as a terrorist organization by the United States. Al Manar’s Lebanese domain (.lb) remained accessible.[91]

Broadcasting restrictions

[edit]

In October 2003, the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) launched an investigation into it, leading to Al-Manar's suspension from the Television and Radio Broadcasting Services PTY (TARBS).[92][93] The investigation related to accusations that it "broadcast programs that are likely to incite or perpetuate hatred against or gratuitously vilify any person or group on the basis of their ethnicity, nationality, race or religion" and suspicions it might be in breach of Australian Federal anti-terrorism law. TARBS stopped broadcasting al-Manar on 5 November 2003, and went into receivership.[94][95] In August 2009, Al-Manar received approval for broadcast by the Australian Communications and Media Authority.[96][better source needed]

In November 2004, after the controversy in France about Al-Manar's broadcast of Ash-Shatat, the Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel (CSA) entered into an agreement with the Lebanese Communication Group under which the channel would not air material that would not "respect the political, cultural and religious sensitivities of Europeans" and "not to broadcast programmes likely to cause problems with public order". Within days, the CSA deemed Al-Manar not to have met this, citing an interviewee accusing Israel of spreading AIDS in the Arab world in November 2004, and a clip “inciting violence” against Israel, leading to the removal of the channel from both Eustat and Arabsat.[24][50][97] French officials also cited other broadcasts saying Jews "seek children's blood to bake into Passover matzoh."[50][98] Other broadcasts cited by the CSA as racist incitement were "Flambeau sur la route de Jérusalem" and "Le Prince du paradis".[99]

After the U.S. Department of State placed Al-Manar on the Terrorist Exclusion List in December 2004, transmissions to North America via Intelsat's satellites were blocked.[86][100] Javed Iqbal, a resident of New York City, was the first person to charged under this law. He was charged by federal prosecutors with providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization by broadcasting Al Manar to American customers via his company HDTV, in exchange for thousands of dollars payment. In a 2008 plea bargain, he agreed to serve a prison term of up to 6+1⁄2 years. Saleh Elahwal, who also operated HDTV, was also charged and went on trial 5 January 2009.[101][102] Donna Lieberman, executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, says it's constitutional for the government to outlaw businesses with direct operational ties to terrorist organizations, and media outlets that directly incite and direct violent action, but in this case, the government is trying to stop the spread of ideas.[103] Mark Dubowitz, who founded the Coalition Against Terrorist Media in part to stop Al-Manar, said Al-Manar was "shouting fire in a crowded theater", although Lieberman disagreed with that metaphor.[103]

The lack of transmission from Intelsat had the effect of making Al-Manar unavailable in Canada[when?].[104][better source needed]

In 2005, the Dutch Media Authority "discovered that a satellite owned by New Skies Satellites was carrying Al-Manar and has ordered the company to stop doing so, because the channel did not have the required Dutch licence."[105][106][11][12] Spanish authorities banned the retransmission of Al-Manar by Hispasat on 30 June 2005 (which effectively prevents its reception not only in the Iberian peninsula but also in South America).[107][33] In August 2006, France Telecom's satellite provider Globecast removed the station from its Asiasat offer of channels.[33]

It was banned in Germany in 2008.[108][109]

In 2013, Bahrain blocked its website.[110]

In 2015, Arabsat, a satellite operator majority-owned by Saudi Arabia, removed the station from its platform after Nasrallah blamed the Saudi government for a fatal stampede, at the hajj pilgrimage that year.[110]

Internet and social media

[edit]

The channel provides a live feed of its programming on the Internet through its website. This effectively circumvents the bans as Al-Manar is still available in all the areas it does not broadcast to via satellite.[citation needed]

Twitter removed its account in November 2019.[111]

On 22 June 2021, the official Al-Manar website domain as well as dozens of other Arab news network domains related to Iran, Lebanon and Syria were shut down by the government of the United States for spreading disinformation. It was also banned by multiple social media platforms including YouTube, Twitter, Instagram and Reddit.[112]

Broadcasting via illegal IPTV services and streaming devices

[edit]

According to a 2008 report by the security company NAGRA and the Digital Citizens Alliance, following an investigation into illegal IPTV services and illicit streaming devices, it indicated that 50% of these services include Al-Manar, making it available in countries where the channel has been banned due to links with Hezbollah.[113]

On October 26, 2020, the Digital Citizens Alliance released a video warning of terrorist content that could include several of these illegal services, including Al-Manar.[114]

Google and Apple applications

[edit]

On 25 July 2012, Al Manar launched an application through Apple's iTunes app store and Google Play. However, the application was removed from iTunes after four days and Google Play after six.[115][116] Maha Abouelenein, Head of Communications for the Mena at Google, subsequently stated that "We remove applications that violate our policies, such as apps that are illegal or that promote hate speech" although she added that "We don't comment on individual applications – however, you can check out our policies for more."[117]

According to MEMRI, Al Manar TV subsequently blamed "Israeli incitement against Al Manar TV" as the reason Al-Manar mobile apps were removed by Apple and Google. An Al-Manar TV reporter stated that: "Al Manar TV is once again targeted by America and Israel. The removal of the channel's mobile apps from the Google and Apple stores is a new attempt to curb Al-Manar's message of resistance.[118] According to MEMRI, Al Manar TV Director-General Abdallah Qasir stated that the removal of the apps "indicates that Al Manar TV has the ability to cause great harm to Israel, and that Israel is extremely annoyed by Al Manar becoming so widespread and by its great credibility. Israel cannot even bear to see the Al-Manar icon on smartphones." Abd Al-Hadi Mahfouz, president of the Lebanese National Media Council, also supported Al-Manar, arguing that: "This move contradicts all laws pertaining to radio and television, to the exercising of media liberties, and to the right of citizens, Western and Arab alike, to information." Rabi' Al-Ba'lbaki, the head of the Lebanese IT Association reportedly called for a boycott of Apple and Google if they do not restore service for Al-Manar's applications.[118]

According to the Anti-Defamation League, in a statement issued on 16 August 2012, Al Manar says it is "back on Ipad and Iphone applications via alternative ways, following the campaign carried out by the Jewish Anti-Defamation League to deactivate Al-Manar applications on smart phones at Google Play and apple store". To avoid distributor policies and control, the new applications were downloadable directly from Al-Manar's website, which was hosted by a British server.[119][120]

In March 2014, Al Manar relaunched their application in Apple's iTunes store under the name "LCG."[121] It launched a new iPhone app in 2016, called "Trust News".[122]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
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Al-Manar

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Al-Manar (: المنار, meaning "") is a channel based in , , owned and operated by the Shia Islamist militant organization and political party , which it describes as the "Station of the Resistance." The channel commenced terrestrial broadcasting on 4 June 1991, initially for five hours daily, before expanding to satellite transmission in 2000 and 24-hour operations. As Hezbollah's primary media arm, Al-Manar disseminates the group's political, religious, and military messaging, including coverage of conflicts involving and promotion of anti-Western narratives aligned with Iran's regional influence. It has produced programming such as dramas glorifying "resistance" operations and documentaries framing Hezbollah's actions as defensive . The channel has faced international bans due to content accused of inciting violence, , and support for ; the designated it a entity in 2004, while ordered its removal from broadcasts that year following programs alleging Jewish orchestration of AIDS epidemics. Similar restrictions occurred in other European countries and via providers like Nilesat in 2021 for violating broadcast agreements with inflammatory material. Despite these measures, Al-Manar continues operations via its and alternative distributions, maintaining influence among Shia communities in and the .

History

Establishment and Early Operations (1991–1999)

Al-Manar Television was established by in 1991 as a terrestrial broadcasting station headquartered in , , with its first transmission occurring on June 4 of that year. The channel, whose name translates to "the beacon," served as 's primary media outlet to disseminate its Islamist ideology and promote armed resistance against the , which had persisted since 1982. Initial broadcasts were limited to approximately five hours per day, focusing on local audiences in Shiite-dominated areas amid the ongoing context. Early operations relied on rudimentary , including mobile units equipped with microwave dishes to enable live coverage from conflict zones, allowing cameramen—often wearing flak jackets—to accompany fighters during attacks on Israeli positions. This approach facilitated the rapid airing of battlefield footage, such as ambushes resulting in Israeli casualties, aimed at demoralizing Israeli public opinion and bolstering 's image as an effective resistance force. By 1994, regular scheduled programming had commenced, expanding content to include religious recitations from the , children's educational shows, serialized programs glorifying martyrdom and , and edited Western films stripped of content deemed incompatible with Shiite Islamist values. maintained direct control over all aspects, with staff often coordinating closely with its military wing to prioritize supporting operations against and, to a lesser extent, internal Lebanese political rivals. Throughout the 1990s, Al-Manar operated without formal licensing until applying in 1996 and receiving approval in 1997 as one of four new stations permitted by the , after which it registered as the Lebanese Media Group Company. Broadcast hours increased to 18 per day by 1997, extending reach across via improved terrestrial signals, though coverage remained vulnerable to disruptions from Israeli airstrikes targeting infrastructure. Funding derived primarily from 's networks, including Iranian support and donations from Lebanese expatriates, enabling modest expansion despite the channel's role in what Israeli and Western sources described as against occupation forces. By 1999, as Israeli withdrawal loomed, Al-Manar had solidified its position as 's unfiltered voice for resistance narratives, though it had not yet transitioned to satellite transmission.

Expansion Amid Conflicts (2000–2009)

In May 2000, Al-Manar initiated satellite broadcasting, transitioning from terrestrial signals to 24-hour transmission via Arabsat and Nilesat, thereby extending its reach across the , , and parts of . This expansion coincided with the Second Palestinian Intifada and Israel's withdrawal from in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425, events that Al-Manar framed as triumphs of Hezbollah's resistance, broadcasting footage of operations against Israeli forces to bolster its narrative of Islamist defiance. The channel's enhanced visibility amplified Hezbollah's messaging amid regional tensions, including anti-Israel programming that included dramatized series promoting conspiracy theories about Jewish influence. Despite this growth, Al-Manar encountered international restrictions beginning in 2004, when the designated it a terrorist entity under the for serving as Hezbollah's propaganda arm, prohibiting material support and leading to bans by providers like . followed by suspending its broadcasts for inciting , citing content such as antisemitic broadcasts, though Al-Manar circumvented some blocks through alternative satellites. These measures reflected Western assessments of the channel's role in recruiting and radicalizing viewers via programs glorifying suicide bombings and series like The Diaspora. Nevertheless, viewership surged in Arab audiences, with Al-Manar leveraging conflicts to position itself as an uncensored voice against perceived Israeli aggression. The , triggered by 's cross-border raid on July 12 that captured two Israeli soldiers, marked a peak in Al-Manar's operational expansion and resilience. Throughout the 34-day conflict, the channel provided near-continuous coverage, airing raw footage of rocket launches, ambushes on Israeli troops, and civilian impacts to shape domestic and regional perceptions of steadfastness, often under the slogan of "Divine Victory." Israeli airstrikes targeted Al-Manar's headquarters and transmission facilities multiple times, including a July 27 hit that briefly disrupted signals for two minutes before backup systems restored operations. By war's end on August 14, Al-Manar had documented over 1,000 hours of material, enhancing 's capabilities and contributing to its post-conflict political gains in . In March 2006, the U.S. Treasury further designated Al-Manar a Specifically Designated Global Terrorist entity, freezing assets linked to its funding from and , yet the channel persisted by adapting frequencies and relying on ground supporter networks. This period underscored Al-Manar's strategic embedding within 's structure, where conflicts catalyzed audience loyalty and infrastructural redundancies, enabling sustained propagation of ideological content despite adversarial pressures.

Regional Challenges and Adaptations (2010–2019)

During the Arab Spring upheavals starting in late 2010, Al-Manar confronted ideological and audience-retention challenges as endorsed the Syrian government's suppression of protests, diverging from widespread Sunni Arab sympathy for the revolts. The channel's programming reframed events through a sectarian lens, portraying uprisings in and as legitimate while depicting Syria's as conspiracies orchestrated by Salafists, , and the to dismantle the Iran-Syria- "axis of resistance." This stance, articulated in daily news bulletins and talk shows, aimed to consolidate Shia loyalty in amid regional polarization, but it alienated broader Arab viewers, contributing to a decline in Al-Manar's across the Sunni world. Hezbollah's deepening military commitment to from , escalating to open intervention by , intensified operational strains on Al-Manar, including resource diversion for war coverage and backlash from Lebanese factions opposed to the cross-border fight. The network broadcast extensive footage of Hezbollah operations, such as the 2013 Qusayr offensive, emphasizing tactical victories and narratives tying Syrian rebels to affiliates and Israeli intelligence to justify the group's involvement, which by 2015 had resulted in over 1,000 Hezbollah fatalities. Domestically, this coverage faced criticism for glorifying combat at the expense of Lebanon's economic woes, exacerbated by the war's spillover, including refugee influxes and border skirmishes; Al-Manar responded by producing serialized documentaries and religious programs linking Syrian defense to eschatological Shia themes of resistance against tyranny. Regional hostilities peaked with the rise of by 2014, prompting Al-Manar to adapt its content toward broader anti-jihadist framing while maintaining anti-Western undertones, as seen in reports from Syrian battlefields that highlighted Hezbollah-Iranian coordination against forces. Sanctions and broadcast restrictions compounded these pressures: the U.S. maintained Al-Manar's terrorist designation from , enforcing financial blocks, while Arab states like and the UAE escalated jamming of its Nilesat signal in 2013–2017, citing incitement against Gulf monarchies. In adaptation, Al-Manar pivoted to digital resilience, enhancing its multilingual website (english.almanar.com.lb) for live streams and archives by mid-decade, and leveraging platforms like for clipped segments to evade satellite curbs, thereby sustaining reach to expatriate and covert audiences despite intermittent takedowns. This shift mitigated some viewership losses, with online metrics indicating sustained engagement in Shia communities across and during Yemen's 2015 coverage.

Coverage of Recent Conflicts (2020–present)

Al-Manar provided extensive coverage of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on , framing it as the "epic Operation Al-Aqsa Flood" and emphasizing its strategic successes against Israeli targets. The channel reported daily updates on resistance operations in Gaza, highlighting Palestinian militant achievements while portraying 's retaliatory airstrikes and ground incursions as a "genocidal war" that had incurred over $46 billion in costs for by May 2025, with daily expenditures exceeding $81 million. Correspondents embedded with Gaza-based groups delivered on-the-ground reports, such as intensified civilian strikes by on October 12, 2023, attributed to military failures in securing objectives. From October 8, 2023, Al-Manar shifted focus to Hezbollah's cross-border operations in solidarity with , documenting over 1,000 attacks by February 11, 2024, including missile strikes on Israeli positions like the Al-Manara site. Coverage emphasized Hezbollah's intelligence capabilities and inflicted casualties, such as reports of 23 Israeli officers and soldiers injured in clashes on October 20, 2025, alongside 70 rockets launched. The channel rebutted Israeli claims of degrading Hezbollah's capabilities through videos of ongoing strikes, while noting Israeli media acknowledgments of Hezbollah's recovery and injuries to 22-24 soldiers in 24-hour periods during October 2025. In September 2024, following the Israeli assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, Al-Manar chronicled the ensuing escalation, including Israel's ground incursion into southern Lebanon, under a "2024 War Log" series that detailed daily resistance confrontations and Israeli setbacks from day one. On October 25, 2024, an Israeli airstrike targeted a press vehicle in southern Lebanon, killing one Al-Manar journalist among three media workers from Hezbollah-affiliated outlets, an incident Al-Manar attributed to deliberate targeting of reporters covering the conflict. Throughout 2020–2022, coverage of lower-intensity clashes, such as sporadic Hezbollah-Israel exchanges and Syrian operations against remnants of ISIS, maintained a narrative of defensive resistance, though with less volume compared to the 2023–present Gaza-Lebanon fronts.

Organizational Affiliation and Funding

Ties to Hezbollah

Al-Manar was founded in 1991 by as its primary media outlet, serving as the group's official to propagate its ideological and political messages. The channel, which self-identifies as the "Station of the Resistance," operates under direct organizational control, aligning its programming with 's strategic communications, including coverage of military operations and anti-Israel rhetoric. This affiliation is evidenced by shared leadership and content oversight, where 's political and military figures frequently appear on air to deliver statements and directives. The government has formally recognized these ties, designating Al-Manar in 2006 as a entity due to its ownership and control by , which is classified as a foreign terrorist organization. This designation underscores Al-Manar's role in facilitating Hezbollah's , including broadcasting footage of attacks and recruitment materials that support the group's paramilitary activities. Hezbollah's integration of Al-Manar into its operations extends to using the channel for real-time coordination during conflicts, such as the , where it aired unfiltered reports from the front lines to bolster morale and narrative control. Operational interdependence is further demonstrated by Al-Manar's reliance on Hezbollah's for and distribution, with the channel's studios and transmission facilities protected as strategic assets by the group's forces. Despite occasional Lebanese regulatory pressures, Hezbollah's political influence ensures Al-Manar's continuity, reflecting the media arm's embedded status within the organization's hierarchical structure rather than as an independent entity. This symbiotic relationship positions Al-Manar not merely as a broadcaster but as an extension of Hezbollah's command apparatus for ideological mobilization and global outreach.

Sources of Funding and Resources

Al-Manar receives its primary funding through subsidies provided by , the Lebanese Shiite militant organization with which it is directly affiliated. , in turn, obtains substantial financial support from , estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually, a portion of which sustains the group's media operations including Al-Manar. Although Al-Manar officials have denied direct Iranian funding, analysts describe such support as an open secret channeled via 's budget. Supplementary revenue streams include donations solicited from overseas Shiite communities and advertising broadcasts that promote Hezbollah activities. The channel's website and programming have historically featured appeals for contributions to support "resistance" efforts, facilitating fundraising on behalf of . International donations, particularly from Lebanese expatriates sympathetic to Hezbollah's ideology, contribute to operational resources alongside these subsidies. No publicly available detailed financial disclosures exist, reflecting the opaque nature of funding tied to designated terrorist entities.

Broadcasting Infrastructure

Terrestrial and Satellite Transmission

Al-Manar initiated terrestrial broadcasting in on June 3, 1991, operating initially from with a limited schedule before expanding to 24-hour coverage. The channel received formal licensing under Lebanese Decree No. 13476 on November 5, 1998, enabling regulated over-the-air transmission primarily within borders via analog and later digital signals. This terrestrial footprint relies on ground-based transmitters, serving local audiences in urban centers like and , where maintains strong influence, though signal disruptions have occurred during conflicts, such as Israeli airstrikes targeting infrastructure. Satellite transmission commenced in 2000, extending Al-Man's reach beyond to the , , and parts of and through free-to-air beams on multiple orbiting platforms. As of 2025, the channel broadcasts on satellites including Express AM6 at 53.0°E (frequency 12631 V, 8PSK), Express AM8 at 14.0°W (frequency 10974 H, DVB-S), and others like Arabsat and Nilesat variants, with a key beam on Nilesat 102 at 7.0°W using 12130 V ( 27500, FEC 5/6). These configurations allow reception via C- and Ku-band dishes, though coverage varies by beam footprint—strongest in the , with spillover into . Political pressures have intermittently disrupted satellite access, including removals from Arabsat in 2016 amid Saudi-led initiatives labeling it pro-Iranian , prompting shifts to alternative providers like Russian Express satellites. Despite U.S. designation of Al-Manar as a terrorist entity in 2006 and bans in countries like and , the channel persists via non-compliant satellites, evading full blackouts through changes and operator tolerance in regions outside Western regulatory enforcement. In , where satellite TV penetration exceeds 83% of households, Al-Manar supplements terrestrial signals, ensuring redundancy during outages.

Digital and Online Platforms

Al-Manar provides online access to its content through dedicated websites in and English, serving as extensions of its television broadcasts. The Arabic-language site at almanar.com.lb includes sections for , enabling real-time viewing of news bulletins, speeches, and programs via a dedicated broadcast page. The English site at english.almanar.com.lb aggregates translated news reports, video segments, and archival material from the channel, facilitating broader accessibility for non-Arabic speakers. These platforms emphasize timely updates on regional conflicts, activities, and ideological content, mirroring the station's on-air focus. On , Al-Manar maintains an official X (formerly ) account @ManarTV, established in November 2011, which disseminates headlines, live event notifications, and alerts regarding counterfeit profiles purporting to represent the channel. Efforts to expand reach via platforms like and encounter challenges due to policies targeting Hezbollah-affiliated media, resulting in account suspensions or restrictions in multiple jurisdictions. Despite such hurdles, Al-Manar's digital outlets contribute to its information dissemination strategy, allowing circumvention of terrestrial and satellite bans through direct web streaming and reposts on alternative networks.

Programming and Content Formats

News and Political Commentary

Al-Manar's news programming features regular bulletins aired hourly, delivering updates on Lebanese domestic affairs, regional conflicts, and international developments, often prioritizing events aligned with Hezbollah's strategic interests such as operations against Israeli forces or support for Palestinian groups. These bulletins, typically lasting about an hour, emphasize live reporting from conflict zones in and Gaza, portraying Hezbollah's military actions as defensive resistance while depicting adversaries like as aggressors initiating unprovoked attacks. For instance, coverage of the 2023–2025 Israel-Hezbollah escalations included frequent on-site dispatches highlighting alleged Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, with reports citing specific incidents like strikes on civilian areas on dates such as October 25, 2024. Political commentary on the channel manifests through dedicated talk shows and interview formats, where officials and sympathetic analysts dissect current events through an ideological lens of and Shia solidarity. Programs such as Panorama Today host discussions on Lebanese parliamentary dynamics, featuring guests like Hezbollah-aligned MPs critiquing government policies as concessions to Western pressures, as seen in a February 2022 episode addressing national dialogue preparations. Comprehensive interviews, often broadcast in slots like 8:30 PM local time, provide platforms for figures such as Secretary General Sheikh to elaborate on strategic responses to regional threats, including binary framings of alliances as either "oppressors" or "oppressed" in contexts like the Syrian conflict or Iran-backed axes. These segments integrate archival footage of past victories, such as the , to reinforce narratives of resilience against perceived existential enemies. The commentary style prioritizes interpretive analysis over neutral reporting, with panels rarely including dissenting voices from Sunni, Christian, or pro-Western Lebanese factions, resulting in a homogenized perspective that attributes causal agency in conflicts primarily to external interventions by the and . During heightened tensions, such as post-October 7, 2023, Gaza events, Al-Manar shifted to extended live talk shows from opposition strongholds, sustaining viewer engagement through repetitive reinforcement of themes like unified "resistance" fronts. This format, while informative on Hezbollah's operational updates—detailing rocket launches or truce violations with timestamps—has been characterized by observers as serving propagandistic ends rather than journalistic balance, given the channel's direct operational ties to the group's .

Religious and Ideological Programming

Al-Manar's religious programming emphasizes Shia Islamic teachings aligned with Hezbollah's doctrine, including daily recitations of the , broadcasts of the call to prayer, and discussions of law. Sermons by Hezbollah-affiliated clerics, such as Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, feature prominently, framing Islamic resistance as a religious imperative against perceived enemies like . During holy periods like and , the channel intensifies coverage with speeches from Hezbollah leader and commemorations of Shia martyrdom, reinforcing themes of sacrifice and divine justice. Ideological content integrates religious motifs with Hezbollah's political narrative of resistance to Western imperialism and , often portraying armed struggle as a fulfillment of Islamic duty. Programs like Al-Muhimma (The Mission), a testing contestants' knowledge of resistance history and entry into , blend with indoctrination to cultivate anti-Israel sentiment among viewers. Similarly, the series Al-Shatat (The Diaspora), aired during , depicts in a manner that reinterprets as a conspiratorial to , drawing international criticism for promoting antisemitic tropes. Other shows, such as Ila al-Qalb (To the Heart), address personal and family issues through a religious lens, advocating Shia values like and without overt militancy, reflecting a post-2000 shift toward broader Lebanese appeal while maintaining ideological undertones. Glorification of fighters as martyrs appears in segments reciting Koranic verses over images of deceased combatants, linking personal devotion to the group's efforts. This programming, which constituted a dominant portion in the channel's early years (1991–2000), serves to mobilize Shia audiences toward 's vision of an Islamic resistance state, though later diversification reduced explicit religious airtime to about 1.5 hours daily.

Cultural and Educational Shows

Al-Manar broadcasts cultural and educational programs that constitute a notable segment of its schedule, often blending with content promoting social values aligned with Hezbollah's . According to an of its programming grid, approximately 35% of Al-Manar's shows fall into the category of , distinct from news or overtly political content. These programs target Lebanese and regional audiences, including youth and families, and include series, , and youth-oriented formats that emphasize local cultural themes alongside implicit support for resistance narratives. Children's programming forms a key component, featuring and interactive segments designed to engage young viewers while instilling moral and societal lessons. For instance, shows incorporate games and stories that highlight perseverance and , sometimes framed through anti-Israeli motifs, as part of an effort to cultivate early ideological awareness. Such content has been critiqued for mixing innocent with militant undertones, yet it remains a staple to appeal to family demographics in . A prominent example is Habbat Misk (" Seed"), a home-produced satirical series starring Wisam Sabbagh as Abu Shafiq, which addresses everyday social, educational, and cultural challenges in Lebanese society. Airing regularly, the program uses humor to critique domestic issues like family dynamics and education access, while subtly reinforcing Hezbollah's emphasis on and resistance to external influences. This format exemplifies Al-Manar's approach to cultural programming, where entertainment serves didactic purposes without direct religious preaching.

Editorial Stance and Ideology

Resistance Against Perceived Imperialism

Al-Manar Television positions itself as the "Channel of Resistance," framing Hezbollah's armed and ideological efforts as essential countermeasures to perceived American and Israeli , which it depicts as coordinated efforts to dominate the through military occupation, economic control, and cultural subversion. The channel's programming consistently portrays , including support for , as an extension of historical , aimed at weakening Muslim societies and imposing secular, capitalist values that erode Islamic identity. This narrative aligns with Hezbollah's broader , emphasizing unity among regional actors in an "Axis of Resistance" to counter and what it terms Zionist . In news and commentary segments, Al-Manar broadcasts live coverage of operations against Israeli targets, presenting them as legitimate defense against imperialist aggression; during the , which lasted from July 12 to August 14, the channel aired footage of guerrilla attacks and Israeli casualties, claiming this contributed to Israel's eventual withdrawal by undermining the perception of its military invincibility. Speeches by Secretary-General , a staple of the channel's political programming, routinely denounce and Israeli actions as manifestations of , calling for sustained resistance to prevent regional subjugation. The station also features eulogies for fighters and Lebanese civilians killed in conflicts with , glorifying their deaths as martyrdom in the fight against foreign domination. Cultural and dramatic programming reinforces this resistance theme; for example, the series Al-Shatat, aired during Ramadan, portrays the Zionist movement and Israel's founding in 1948 as a European conspiracy engineered to fragment Muslim lands under the guise of imperialism. Anti-US rhetoric includes montages of American-supplied weapons causing civilian deaths, with commentators in 2006 labeling then-President George W. Bush the "master of state terrorism" for backing Israel's campaign. Al-Manar extends this framing to global events, such as coverage of alliances between figures like Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in June 2021, presented as joint opposition to Western imperialism. Through such content, the channel seeks to mobilize viewers by linking local Lebanese struggles to a worldwide anti-imperialist cause, while critiquing Western media as tools of propaganda that obscure these dynamics.

Positions on Key Geopolitical Issues

Al-Manar portrays as an illegitimate Zionist entity and occupier of Palestinian and Lebanese territories, consistently depicting its military actions as aggression against defenseless populations. The channel endorses armed "resistance" by Palestinian groups such as and Islamic Jihad, framing suicide bombings, rocket attacks, and other violent operations as legitimate responses to occupation rather than . For instance, during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), Al-Manar broadcast programming that glorified Palestinian militants and criticized international media for bias toward . Regarding United States foreign policy, Al-Manar presents the U.S. as the primary enabler of Israeli actions and a driver of regional , often attributing Israeli operations to American . Coverage of U.S. interventions, such as the 2003 invasion, emphasizes themes of occupation and cultural domination, aligning with Hezbollah's rhetoric against the "Great Satan." The channel has aired content accusing U.S. policy of fueling sectarian strife in and to weaken Shia-majority resistance. Al-Manar strongly supports the "Axis of Resistance," a including , under , , , and Yemen's Houthis, viewing it as a bulwark against and Western dominance. Programming praises backing for proxy groups and government efforts to combat Sunni extremists during the (2011–present), portraying Assad's survival as essential to countering U.S.-backed insurgencies. In 2025 broadcasts, Al-Manar highlighted the axis's role in pressuring toward ceasefires in Gaza, crediting coordinated actions by its members. The channel frames 's regional strategy, including arms supplies to allies, as vital support for Palestinian liberation, without acknowledging internal Lebanese criticisms of over-reliance on .

Controversies

Allegations of Antisemitism and Propaganda

Al-Manar has been repeatedly accused of broadcasting antisemitic content, including programs that invoke classic tropes of Jewish conspiracies and . In October 2003, the channel aired the 29-episode Syrian-produced series Ash-Shatat (The Diaspora), which portrayed Jews as orchestrating massacres and pursuing global control, drawing directly from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a fabricated antisemitic text alleging a Jewish plot for . The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor described the series as promoting antisemitic stereotypes, contributing to heightened tensions during the channel's international scrutiny. Further allegations center on specific broadcasts blending anti-Zionism with broader anti-Jewish rhetoric. A November 2004 program claimed that Jews deliberately spread AIDS to non-Jews through prostitutes as part of a genocidal plot, prompting complaints from Jewish organizations and leading to France's Council of State ordering the channel's removal from satellite transmission on December 14, 2004, on grounds of incitement to hatred and threats to public order. Al-Manar has also featured Holocaust deniers, including an interview with French revisionist Robert Faurisson and tributes to Roger Garaudy, whose denialist works were honored in channel events. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's speeches denying the Holocaust, aired on Al-Manar, have been cited by monitors as exemplifying the channel's role in disseminating such views. As Hezbollah's official media outlet, Al-Manar functions as a propaganda arm, critics contend, prioritizing ideological messaging over objective reporting by framing conflicts in absolutist terms that demonize , the West, and perceived Jewish influence. Content often glorifies Hezbollah's "resistance" operations, portrays adversaries as existential threats controlled by Zionist cabals, and promotes narratives of divine victory against "infidels," as seen in post-2006 programming that embedded antisemitic undertones in victory celebrations. These practices led the U.S. to designate Al-Manar a terrorist entity on December 21, 2004, citing its support for violence alongside antisemitic incitement. Al-Manar rejects these charges as politically motivated smears by pro- lobbies, asserting its content targets and rather than inherently, though independent analyses note frequent conflation of the two in its output.

Dissemination of Conspiracy Theories

Al-Manar has regularly disseminated conspiracy theories through dedicated programs, documentaries, and news segments, often framing historical and contemporary events as plots orchestrated by , Zionists, or Western powers to dominate or destabilize the region. These narratives frequently incorporate antisemitic tropes, such as alleged Jewish control over global media and , and portray the and as colluding in false-flag operations to advance imperial agendas. Broadcasts emphasize fabricated evidence and historical revisionism to lend credibility to unsubstantiated claims, aligning with Hezbollah's ideological opposition to perceived adversaries. A prominent example is the channel's promotion of Holocaust denial. In 2001, Al-Manar aired the documentary The Tale of the Holocaust, which asserted that Nazi genocide accounts were exaggerated or invented by Zionists to garner sympathy and legitimize Israel's establishment, dismissing gas chambers and mass extermination as propaganda. The program featured interviews and purported archival "evidence" to support these assertions, contributing to broader efforts in Arab media to undermine established historical facts about the Shoah. Similarly, in late 2003, Al-Manar broadcast the 29-episode Syrian series Al-Shatat (The Diaspora), which depicted Jews as conspirators responsible for medieval massacres like those during the Crusades and alleged a millennia-long plot for world domination, echoing motifs from the forged Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The series prompted international condemnation and bans in countries like France, where it was deemed incitement to hatred. Regarding the September 11, 2001, attacks, Al-Manar propagated theories implicating Zionist or elements. On the first anniversary, September 11, 2002, the program In the Path of the Truth suggested Israeli intelligence orchestrated or facilitated the strikes to draw the U.S. into Middle Eastern conflicts beneficial to , including unsubstantiated claims that thousands of were forewarned and absent from the World Trade Center. Such broadcasts echoed and amplified rumors circulating in some Arab outlets, attributing the attacks to a Mossad-CIA plot rather than al-Qaeda. During the from 2011 onward, Al-Manar and Hezbollah-affiliated outlets like Al-Ahed advanced conspiracies portraying the conflict as a U.S.-Israeli scheme to dismantle the "resistance axis." Coverage of the August 2013 claimed rebels, backed by and , staged it as a to provoke Western intervention against , denying regime responsibility despite UN investigations attributing it to Syrian forces. Similar narratives surrounded the , alleging White Helmets—portrayed as Western puppets—fabricated evidence of use. Additional claims included supplying with nuclear weapons for operations in 2015 and joint Saudi-Israeli funding of invasions like 's 1982 Lebanon incursion, often citing unverified sources like to assert a grand plot against Arab sovereignty. These theories served to justify Hezbollah's intervention in while deflecting blame from allied regimes.

Accusations of Inciting Violence

Al-Manar has been accused by multiple governments and watchdog organizations of broadcasting content that incites violence, particularly through of suicide bombings, calls for against and the , and framing resistance as obligatory martyrdom. These accusations center on programs, speeches, and music videos that explicitly endorse or celebrate acts of as legitimate responses to perceived aggression. For instance, leader Hassan 's speeches aired on the channel, such as one on March 20, 2002, labeled the U.S. as the "main source of " and concluded with chants of "," urging resistance. Similarly, on May 23, 2002, Nasrallah praised suicide bombings as the "strongest weapon" in the fight against , portraying them as heroic martyrdom operations. Programming like the The Spider’s House, ongoing since 2003, has advocated low-intensity warfare, demographic subversion of , and suicide bombings against U.S. forces in , presenting violence as a . The weekly series Terrorists documented alleged Israeli atrocities with graphic footage while glorifying Hezbollah's countermeasures, contributing to a that justifies retaliatory terror. Music videos known as anashid comprised about 25% of airtime, fostering enthusiasm for suicide missions; one example promoted the operations of , replayed before her March 29, 2002, bombing in a supermarket that killed two and wounded 28. Filler slogans between segments, such as "In your death, you are victorious," echoed Imam Ali to encourage in attacks. These elements led to formal actions, including the U.S. State Department's December 16, , designation of Al-Manar as a terrorist organization, stating it was "not a question of ; it's a question of inciting to ." France's broadcasting authority ordered its removal from airwaves on December 13, , under laws prohibiting incitement to hatred or based on or , following broadcasts deemed to promote anti-Jewish and anti-Western aggression. Critics, including the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), have highlighted Al-Manar's role in disseminating such content to Arab audiences, though defends it as legitimate resistance journalism rather than incitement.

International Restrictions

Bans and Blocks in Western Nations

France's ordered the immediate cessation of Al-Manar's satellite broadcasts to on December 13, 2004, ruling that the channel violated French laws against to and violence due to content including antisemitic programs accusing of ritual murders and spreading diseases like AIDS. The decision targeted transmissions via , a Paris-based operator, with a 48-hour compliance deadline and potential fines for non-adherence, following complaints from Jewish groups and prior warnings from France's broadcasting authority. The designated Al-Manar a entity on March 23, 2006, under the Department's authority, citing its role as a propaganda arm of , which facilitates the group's terrorist activities through media dissemination. This designation prohibits U.S. persons from conducting any transactions with Al-Manar and blocks its assets, building on earlier restrictions tied to Hezbollah's status as a foreign terrorist organization. Germany's regulators directed service providers to block access to Al-Manar's websites on December 19, 2024, as part of measures against content linked to , designated a terrorist group by the EU's member states including . Al-Manar has also been banned or restricted in other Western nations, including , , , and the , often on grounds of promoting , , and , with prohibitions dating back to around 2003 in some cases. These actions reflect broader efforts to curb the channel's dissemination of Hezbollah-aligned material deemed incompatible with and regulations.

Limitations in Arab and Muslim-Majority Countries

In and Muslim-majority countries, particularly Sunni-dominated states opposed to Hezbollah's Shia-led influence and Iranian alliances, Al-Manar encounters substantial broadcasting limitations, often enforced via satellite providers and internet blocks rather than outright national bans. These restrictions stem from geopolitical rivalries, with providers like Arabsat (Saudi-headquartered) and Nilesat (Egyptian) repeatedly suspending transmissions, citing contract violations or political directives. Such actions disrupt Al-Manar's regional reach, as satellite TV remains the primary medium in the , affecting audiences in countries including , , the UAE, and . Arabsat terminated Al-Manar's broadcasts on December 5, 2015, without prior notice, prompting condemnation from but no immediate reversal despite a subsequent Lebanese in 2016 mandating resumption. This move aligned with Saudi-led efforts to curb pro- media amid escalating Saudi-Iran tensions. Similarly, Nilesat halted transmissions multiple times, including on April 6, 2016—disrupting service across and the region—September 15, 2018, and June 14, 2021, each time invoking breaches of broadcasting terms related to content deemed inflammatory or sectarian. These interruptions force Al-Manar to seek alternative frequencies, often at higher costs or with reduced coverage. Beyond satellite curbs, Gulf states impose digital barriers: , the UAE, and block Al-Manar's website, alongside 's official sites, as part of broader internet censorship targeting Iran-backed entities. Oman and the UAE extend similar blocks to related platforms. In and , while no comprehensive terrestrial bans are documented, reliance on Nilesat and regional alignments limits accessibility, reflecting Sunni-majority governments' aversion to Al-Manar's advocacy for "resistance" narratives that challenge their policies on , , and . These measures, while not universal across all Muslim-majority nations (e.g., and permit broadcasts), underscore a pattern of containment driven by sectarian and strategic concerns rather than uniform ideological rejection. Al-Manar has circumvented bans by negotiating with alternative providers and leveraging platforms for dissemination. After Arabsat abruptly terminated its transmission on December 10, 2015, under pressure from , Al-Manar quickly shifted to other regional to maintain coverage across the . In April 2016, following a similar halt by a European operator, the channel resumed within days through deals with alternative providers such as Nilesat or Turksat, demonstrating its adaptability in sourcing new orbital slots despite geopolitical pressures. , Al-Manar relies on websites offering live streams, on-demand videos, and archived content, often mirrored across multiple domains to evade blocks. Legal authorities have countered these tactics through domain seizures, ISP mandates, and regulatory enforcement. In May 2023, the U.S. Justice Department seized 13 domains operated by affiliates, including those used for propaganda and fundraising that facilitated Al-Manar's online reach, under authorities prohibiting support for designated terrorist entities. European responses include Germany's order on December 19, 2024, requiring service providers to block access to Al-Manar's websites, encompassing live streams and textual content, as part of broader efforts to curb . In , the Superior Audiovisual Council (CSA) initially approved then revoked Al-Manar's license in December 2004, a decision upheld by courts citing repeated violations of laws through antisemitic programming. These measures reflect coordinated international efforts, though challenges persist due to Al-Manar's decentralized distribution. U.S. designations of Al-Manar as a entity since 2006 have enabled financial and technical restrictions, yet the channel's terrestrial and web-based operations in evade . Analysts note that while disruptions temporarily reduce viewership—estimated at 10-15 million regionally— proxies and VPNs allow dedicated audiences to access content, prompting calls for enhanced cyber regulations.

Societal Impact and Reception

Influence on Lebanese Shia Community

Al-Manar, launched by in 1991, functions as a central media outlet for the Lebanese Shia , particularly in strongholds such as Beirut's southern suburbs (Dahiya), the Bekaa Valley, and . Its programming blends news, religious sermons, and cultural content that aligns with 's , emphasizing themes of resistance (muqawama) against , Shia Islamic values, and solidarity with Iran-backed axes. By framing regional events—such as conflicts in or Gaza—through a lens that portrays as the of Shia empowerment, the channel reinforces communal narratives of victimhood and defiance, contributing to political mobilization during elections and crises. Viewership data underscores its dominance among Shia audiences. A 2011 Zogby International poll found that 52% of Lebanese Shia selected Al-Manar as their preferred source, far outpacing other channels among this demographic, reflecting its role in countering perceived biases in Sunni- or Christian-affiliated Lebanese media. By the early , the station had achieved third-place popularity in overall Lebanese viewership, with higher penetration in Shia areas where it serves as a community voice, disseminating Hezbollah's messages on , wartime resilience, and . This exposure has empirically bolstered support for Hezbollah's policies, as evidenced by sustained electoral backing in Shia-majority districts despite Lebanon's economic downturns. The channel's influence extends to cultural and religious spheres, where series during and religious programming promote an "" of resistance, linking personal Shia identity to Hezbollah's militant posture. For instance, content glorifying past operations like the war with Israel fosters intergenerational loyalty, with surveys indicating alignment between Al-Manar's portrayals and Shia views on as a protector. However, this sway is not absolute; dissenting Shia voices, including followers of the late Grand Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah who critiqued Hezbollah's Iran-centric alignment, often reject Al-Manar's hardline rhetoric, highlighting fractures within the community over issues like Syrian intervention. Independent analyses note that while Al-Manar effectively shapes core supporters' opinions, broader Shia reception varies, with some opting for diverse outlets amid Lebanon's confessional media landscape.

Broader Regional and Global Reach

Al-Manar extends its influence across the through satellite transmissions that cover much of the , particularly resonating with Shiite populations in allied states such as , , and , where it amplifies Hezbollah's narrative of resistance against and Western powers. Following the initiation of satellite broadcasting on May 25, 2000, coinciding with Israel's withdrawal from , the channel's audience expanded significantly, positioning it as a key outlet for pro-Hezbollah viewpoints in regional conflicts. In and , for instance, it garners support among Shiite militias aligned with the Iran-backed axis, disseminating content that frames Hezbollah's actions as pan-Islamic solidarity against perceived aggression. Despite periodic disruptions, such as Nilesat's suspension of broadcasts in April 2016, Al-Manar maintains coverage via alternative satellites like those operating at frequencies such as 4080 MHz horizontal polarization, enabling access in and the Gulf states. During the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the channel surged into the top 10 ratings for Arab youth news viewership, underscoring its competitive edge in shaping across Sunni-majority areas skeptical of official . Globally, Al-Manar's reach relies increasingly on digital platforms, including its multilingual websites, to target Muslim diaspora communities in , , and , bypassing terrestrial bans imposed by providers like . This online dissemination sustains propaganda efforts among expatriate Lebanese and sympathetic audiences, with content translated into English and other languages to promote Hezbollah's ideological framing of geopolitical events. Independent assessments note its role in fostering transnational narratives of and , though empirical viewership data remains opaque due to the channel's non-commercial nature and reliance on unverified self-reports estimating tens of millions of periodic viewers.

Assessments by Independent Analysts

Independent analysts, including media scholars and researchers, have consistently described Al-Manar as Hezbollah's central instrument, designed to propagate the group's Islamist , anti-Western narratives, and justification of violence against . A 2004 study by Avi Jorisch, an adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, detailed how the channel operates 24 hours a day to disseminate content glorifying martyrdom operations, such as suicide bombings, and portraying Hezbollah fighters as heroic defenders of . Jorisch highlighted specific programs like "The Spider Web," a series alleging global Jewish conspiracies controlling media, , and , which recycles classic antisemitic tropes akin to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Quantitative media analyses reinforce these observations, examining Al-Manar's rhetorical strategies in . A 2025 scholarly review by Kota Suechika analyzed Al-Manar's coverage during Lebanese elections, finding it employs framing techniques that emphasize sectarian solidarity, resistance narratives, and vilification of opponents as collaborators with or the West, thereby sustaining Hezbollah's influence within Lebanon's consociational . This approach, per Suechika, prioritizes ideological over objective reporting, with content algorithms favoring emotive appeals to Shia viewers. Broader assessments from security-focused think tanks underscore Al-Manar's role in and . The Washington Institute's monitoring, corroborated by archival broadcasts, notes the channel's satellite reach extending to over 10 million households across the and by the early 2000s, enabling it to shape perceptions of conflicts like the 2006 Israel- war through unverified claims of Israeli atrocities and Hezbollah victories. Analysts such as Matthew Levitt have linked this to fundraising efforts, where on-air appeals solicit donations framed as contributions, though empirical viewership data from regional surveys indicate limited appeal beyond core supporters, as noted in a 2008 report citing low popularity even among some Shiite intellectuals. Critiques of source monitoring, including by Jorisch, emphasize reliance on untranslated content to counter claims of exaggeration, privileging primary footage over secondary interpretations; however, left-leaning academic outlets have occasionally downplayed the channel's , attributing it to contextual resistance rather than inherent bias, a view contested by empirical content audits showing persistent and motifs in programming as late as 2010. Multiple analysts, drawing from broadcast transcripts, conclude Al-Manar functions less as and more as a tool for causal narrative control, fostering causal attributions of regional woes to Zionist or imperial plots without evidentiary support.

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