Hubbry Logo
Davis–Besse Nuclear Power StationDavis–Besse Nuclear Power StationMain
Open search
Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station
Community hub
Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station
Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station
Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station's cooling tower in July 2015

Key Information

Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station is an 894 megawatt (MW) nuclear power plant, located northeast of Oak Harbor, Ohio, United States. It has a single pressurized water reactor. Davis–Besse is operated by Vistra Corp.

Throughout its operation, Davis–Besse has been the site of several safety incidents that affected the plant's operation. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Davis–Besse has been the source of two of the top five most dangerous nuclear incidents in the United States since 1979.[3] The most severe occurring in March 2002, when maintenance workers discovered corrosion had eaten a football-sized hole into the reactor vessel head.[4][5] The NRC kept Davis–Besse shut down until March 2004, so that FirstEnergy was able to perform all the necessary maintenance for safe operations. The NRC imposed an over $5 million fine, its largest fine ever to a nuclear power plant, against FirstEnergy for the actions that led to the corrosion. The company paid an additional $28 million in fines under a settlement with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).[4]

Davis–Besse was expected to close in 2020 as it is no longer profitable to run when competing against natural gas plants.[6] Plans were updated indicating possible shut down by May 31, 2020.[7] However, Ohio House Bill 6 was signed into law in July 2019 which added a fee to residents' utility bills that funded subsidies of $150 million per year to Davis–Besse and the Perry Nuclear Generating Station to keep both plants operational.[8][9][10] The bill was alleged to be part of the Ohio nuclear bribery scandal revealed by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in July 2020.[11][10]

Location and history

[edit]

The power station is located on the southwest shore of Lake Erie about 10 miles (16 km) north of Oak Harbor, Ohio and is on the north side of Highway 2 just east of Highway 19 on a 954-acre (386 ha) site in the Carroll Township. The plant only utilizes 221 acres (89 ha), with 733 acres (297 ha) devoted to the Ottawa National Wildlife Refuge. The entrance to the Magee Marsh Wildlife Area[12] is approximately 5 miles east of the power station. The official name according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration is the Davis–Besse Nuclear Generating Station. It is the 57th commercial power reactor to commence building in the United States of America (construction began on September 1, 1970) and the 50th to come on-line July 31, 1978.[13] The plant was originally jointly owned by Cleveland Electric Illuminating (CEI) and Toledo Edison (TE) and was named for former TE Chairman John K. Davis and former CEI Chairman Ralph M. Besse.

The reactor head under inspection

Unit One is an 879 MWe pressurized water reactor supplied by Babcock & Wilcox. The reactor was shut down from 2002 until early 2004 for safety repairs and upgrades. In 2012 the reactor supplied 7101.700 GWh of electricity.[14]

In 1973, two more reactors were also ordered from Babcock & Wilcox. However, construction on Units Two and Three never commenced, and these two units were officially canceled in 1981.[15]

Electricity production

[edit]
Generation (MWh) of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station[16]
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual (Total)
2001 659,778 601,935 655,630 634,920 658,726 633,332 648,532 655,159 637,346 624,363 615,007 659,590 7,684,318
2002 664,299 257,171 -4,123 -4,136 -3,264 -3,616 -3,665 -1,052 -2,868 -2,879 -2,910 -2,865 890,092
2003 -3,229 -3,011 -3,515 -3,314 -4,344 -4,228 -7,123 -4,102 -18,422 -5,997 -3,193 -9,682 -70,160
2004 -22,203 -24,463 48,988 616,820 654,538 635,521 656,635 550,253 636,241 662,232 644,274 663,959 5,722,795
2005 333,513 395,132 669,279 640,760 661,392 635,065 647,321 651,779 633,822 591,221 632,360 664,441 7,156,085
2006 663,170 593,863 95,136 20,897 641,900 625,721 662,730 662,215 574,727 672,039 489,047 670,121 6,371,566
2007 668,923 601,820 639,963 643,498 630,043 640,493 661,833 658,993 629,766 663,599 646,539 620,332 7,705,802
2008 -6,155 297,934 662,611 637,980 668,821 631,100 667,935 674,678 654,173 682,609 662,497 589,102 6,823,285
2009 684,652 617,619 680,913 264,381 679,928 652,887 675,845 674,620 654,194 681,912 659,961 682,700 7,609,612
2010 681,476 561,079 -952 -1,365 -754 17,204 669,076 672,403 654,037 679,747 569,433 683,708 5,185,092
2011 530,909 608,350 679,484 649,596 674,584 650,651 669,594 670,660 645,742 -1,655 -1,643 552,625 6,328,897
2012 682,506 640,509 676,545 657,443 111,026 368,266 671,108 674,097 654,386 678,297 621,933 677,776 7,113,892
2013 680,984 615,339 681,159 658,601 676,769 627,419 399,908 672,379 652,538 676,252 658,784 679,696 7,679,828
2014 664,720 -1,310 -1,933 -2,049 488,603 652,873 675,643 674,824 655,160 680,229 660,600 681,809 5,829,169
2015 682,138 615,646 679,650 657,153 592,037 653,796 674,575 675,160 642,915 679,625 658,375 682,821 7,893,891
2016 627,509 544,477 417,821 -752 457,391 646,852 667,664 666,426 370,218 659,647 658,798 678,085 6,394,136
2017 678,210 587,017 675,612 654,031 672,376 609,098 669,451 670,979 650,244 674,261 656,854 677,280 7,875,413
2018 677,499 587,101 110,504 658,777 677,003 652,759 672,925 671,524 651,877 678,299 660,812 681,191 7,380,271
2019 618,699 615,242 680,076 657,639 677,666 653,008 671,001 673,169 572,934 677,455 659,759 680,811 7,837,459
2020 662,767 497,614 80,585 644,305 677,539 650,290 669,007 671,791 653,716 679,261 660,108 681,080 7,228,063
2021 682,989 617,369 679,866 655,488 672,213 650,332 585,691 650,390 651,170 665,185 658,172 610,276 7,779,141
2022 680,675 505,835 64,192 237,329 659,465 651,990 671,667 670,635 652,660 678,774 659,119 359,992 6,492,333
2023 681,308 616,035 682,419 658,746 678,165 652,624 672,339 672,860 653,155 678,292 659,495 680,290 7,985,728
2024 680,082 636,547 73,343 651,301 674,438 649,154 669,754 670,168 650,562 675,560 657,241 679,973 7,368,123
2025 679,610 613,535 676,274 654,182 675,447 648,877 667,431 --

Incident history

[edit]

1977 first stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve

[edit]

On September 24, 1977, the relief valve for the reactor pressurizer failed to close when the reactor, running at only 9% power, shut down because of a disruption in the feedwater system.[17]

This incident later became a precursor to the Three Mile Island accident, in which a pilot-operated relief valve also became stuck open, leaking thousands of gallons of coolant water into the basement of the reactor building.[18]

1985 loss of feedwater event

[edit]

On June 9, 1985, the main feedwater pumps, used to supply water to the reactor steam generators, shut down. A control room operator then attempted to start the auxiliary (emergency) feedwater pumps. These pumps both tripped on overspeed conditions because of operator error. This incident was originally classified an "NRC Unusual Event" (the lowest classification the NRC uses) but it was later determined that it should have been classified a "site area emergency".[19]

1998 tornado

[edit]

On June 24, 1998, the station was struck by an F2 tornado.[20] The plant's switchyard was damaged and access to external power was disabled. The plant's reactor automatically shut down at 8:42 pm and an alert (the next to lowest of four levels of severity) was declared at 9:18 pm. The plant's emergency diesel generators powered critical facility safety systems until external power could be restored.[21][22]

2002 reactor head hole

[edit]
Erosion of the 6-inch-thick (150 mm) carbon steel reactor head, caused by a persistent leak of borated water

In March 2002, plant staff discovered that the borated water that serves as the reactor coolant had leaked from cracked control rod drive mechanisms directly above the reactor and eaten through more than six inches[23] (150 mm) of the carbon steel reactor pressure vessel head over an area roughly the size of a football (see photo). This significant reactor head wastage on the exterior of the reactor vessel head left only 3⁄8 inch (9.5 mm) of stainless steel cladding holding back the high-pressure (~2155 psi, 14.6 MPa) reactor coolant. A breach most likely would have resulted in a massive loss-of-coolant accident[citation needed], in which reactor coolant would have jetted into the reactor's containment building and resulted in emergency safety procedures to protect from core damage or meltdown. Because of the location of the reactor head damage, such a jet of reactor coolant might have damaged adjacent control rod drive mechanisms, hampering or preventing reactor shut-down. As part of the system reviews following the accident, significant safety issues were identified with other critical plant components, including the following:

  1. the containment sump that allows the reactor coolant to be reclaimed and reinjected into the reactor;
  2. the high pressure injection pumps that would reinject such reclaimed reactor coolant;
  3. the emergency diesel generator system;
  4. the containment air coolers that would remove heat from the containment building;
  5. reactor coolant isolation valves; and
  6. the plant's electrical distribution system.[24]

The resulting corrective operational and system reviews and engineering changes took two years. Repairs and upgrades cost $600 million, and the Davis–Besse reactor was restarted in March 2004.[25] To replace the reactor vessel head, FirstEnergy purchased one from the mothballed Midland Nuclear Power Plant in Midland, Michigan.[26]

The NRC determined that this incident was the fifth-most dangerous nuclear incident in the United States since 1979,[3] and imposed its largest fine ever—more than $5 million—against FirstEnergy for the actions that led to the corrosion.[4]

Criminal prosecutions

[edit]

In January 2006, First Energy, the owner of Davis–Besse, acknowledged a series of safety violations by former workers, and entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). The deferred prosecution agreement related to the March 2002 incident. The deferment granted by the NRC were based on letters from Davis–Besse engineers stating that previous inspections were adequate. However, those inspections were not as thorough as the company suggested, as proved by the material deficiency discovered later. In any case, because FirstEnergy cooperated with investigators on the matter, they were able to avoid more serious penalties. The company paid $28 million under a settlement with the Justice Department.[4] $23.7 million of that were fines, with an additional $4.3 million to be contributed to various groups, including the National Park Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Habitat for Humanity, and the University of Toledo as well as to pay some costs related to the federal investigation.[27]

Two former employees and one former contractor were indicted for statements made in multiple documents and one videotape, over several years, for hiding evidence that the reactor pressure vessel was being corroded by boric acid. The maximum penalty for the three was 25 years in prison. The indictment mentions that other employees also provided false information to inspectors, but does not name them.[27][28] In 2007, one of these men was convicted and another acquitted of hiding information from and lying to the NRC. Another jury trial in 2008 convicted the remaining engineer of similar crimes.[29]

2003 slammer worm computer virus

[edit]

In January 2003, the plant's private network became infected with the slammer worm, which resulted in a five-hour loss of safety monitoring at the plant.[30][31]

2008 discovery of tritium leak

[edit]

The NRC and Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (Ohio EPA) were notified of a tritium leak accidentally discovered during an unrelated fire inspection on October 22, 2008. Preliminary indications suggest radioactive water did not infiltrate groundwater outside plant boundaries.[32]

2010 replacement reactor head problems

[edit]

During a scheduled refueling outage in 2010, ultrasonic examinations performed on the control rod drive mechanism nozzles penetrating the reactor vessel closure head identified that two of the nozzles inspected did not meet acceptance criteria. FirstEnergy investigators subsequently found new cracks in 24 of 69 nozzles, including one serious enough to leak boric acid.[33][34] Crack indications required repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. Control rod drive nozzles were repaired using techniques proven at other nuclear facilities. The plant resumed operation in 2010. The existing reactor vessel head was scheduled for replacement in 2011.[35]

2011 shield building cracks

[edit]

An October 2011 shutdown of the plant for maintenance revealed a 30 foot long hairline crack in the concrete shield building around the containment vessel.[36]

2012 reactor coolant pump seal pinhole leak

[edit]

On June 6, 2012, an approximately 0.1 gpm pinhole spray leakage was identified from a weld in a seal of the reactor coolant pump during a routine reactor coolant system walkdown inspection. The plant entered limited operations, and root cause analysis was undertaken.[37]

2015 steam leak shutdown

[edit]

On May 9, 2015, a steam leak in the turbine building caused FirstEnergy operators to declare an 'Unusual Event' and shut the reactor down until repairs could be made.[38] The plant was brought back online and synchronized with the local power grid 3 days later on May 12 after repairs were completed.[39]

Future

[edit]
Further information: Ohio nuclear bribery scandal

The facility's original nuclear operating license was set to expire on April 22, 2017. In August 2006, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) submitted a letter of intent to renew.[40] The submission date for the application was August 10, 2010. On December 8, 2015, the NRC granted a 20-year license extension to expire on April 22, 2037.[41] On March 31, 2018, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company filed for Bankruptcy protection.[42] Around that time, the company indicated it would close the nuclear plant.[43] In 2019, Ohio lawmakers debated a $9/MWh subsidy to keep Davis–Besse open.[44] House Bill 6 was signed into law on July 23, 2019, and FirstEnergy announced it would refuel Davis–Besse and rescind its deactivation notice on July 24, 2019.[8] It was later learned that the bill itself was a part of a public corruption scheme revealed by the Justice Department in July 2020.[45]

The scheme involved FirstEnergy paying approximately $61 million to the Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives, Larry Householder, and Matt Borges, Neil Clark, Juan Cespedes and Jeff Longstreth. For this, they were supposed to help pass the bill subsidizing the nuclear plant and prevent its repeal. Householder was found guilty, removed from the Ohio House and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Clark committed suicide. [46]

Seismic risk

[edit]

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's estimate of the risk each year of an earthquake intense enough to cause core damage to the reactor at Davis–Besse was 1 in 149,254, according to an NRC study published in August 2010.[47][48]

Surrounding population

[edit]

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines two emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants: a plume exposure pathway zone with a radius of 10 miles (16 km), concerned primarily with exposure to, and inhalation of, airborne radioactive contamination, and an ingestion pathway zone of about 50 miles (80 km), concerned primarily with ingestion of food and liquid contaminated by radioactivity.[49]

The 2010 U.S. population within 10 miles (16 km) of Davis–Besse was 18,635, an increase of 14.2 percent in a decade, according to an analysis of U.S. Census data for msnbc.com. The 2010 U.S. population within 50 miles (80 km) was 1,791,856, an increase of 1.4 percent since 2000. Cities within 50 miles (80 km) include Sandusky, Ohio, 22 miles (35 km); Toledo, Ohio 26 miles (42 km); and Detroit, Michigan, 50 miles (80 km) (distance to the city centers).[50]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station is a single-unit located near Oak Harbor in , approximately 21 miles east-southeast of Toledo. Operated by Vistra Operations Company LLC, the facility generates about 894 megawatts of electricity using a raised-loop reactor design with a thermal capacity of 2,817 megawatts. Licensed by the U.S. since April 22, 1977, with operations commencing commercially in 1978 and a license renewal extending service through April 2037, the plant has provided baseload power to the region while employing over 700 personnel. The station's defining event occurred in March 2002, when maintenance inspections uncovered a football-sized cavity in the reactor pressure vessel head caused by boric acid corrosion from leaks through cracks in control rod drive mechanism nozzles, which had penetrated the alloy 600 material but were arrested by the underlying carbon steel liner, averting a pressure boundary breach. This near-miss, which involved no radiological release or public health impact, resulted in a prolonged shutdown for repairs and vessel head replacement, costing hundreds of millions, and prompted the NRC to impose heightened oversight, revise risk-informed inspection guidelines, and drive alloy upgrades across the U.S. fleet to mitigate similar degradation mechanisms. Subsequent head replacements, including in 2011, and ongoing monitoring have ensured continued safe operation, underscoring empirical advancements in materials science and regulatory rigor despite initial lapses in proactive crack detection.

Facility Design and Specifications

Location and Infrastructure

The Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station occupies a 954-acre site in Carroll Township, , along the southwestern shore of , approximately 21 miles east-southeast of Toledo. The facility is positioned adjacent to the mouth of the Toussaint River, facilitating access to lake water for cooling purposes, with geographic coordinates at 41°35′48″N 83°5′11″W. Infrastructure at the site includes a single unit within a structure, a turbine building housing the and generator, and support facilities such as administrative buildings and systems. Cooling is achieved through a once-through system drawing from via an offshore intake crib and conduit, designed for a capacity of 42,000 gallons per minute to minimize thermal discharge velocities. A natural draft supplements heat dissipation, while on-site manages . Electrical output connects to the regional grid through American Transmission Systems Incorporated lines at 345 kV and 138 kV voltages, enabling distribution to northern consumers. The layout emphasizes seismic stability and flood protection, given the lakeshore proximity, with the entire site fenced and monitored for security.

Reactor Technology and Capacity

The Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station houses a single pressurized water reactor (PWR) unit, model DB-1, manufactured by Babcock & Wilcox. This design employs a raised loop configuration, where the steam generators are elevated above the reactor coolant pumps to enhance natural circulation capabilities under low-flow conditions. The reactor core consists of uranium dioxide fuel assemblies arranged in a cylindrical lattice, moderated and cooled by pressurized light water. The unit's licensed thermal power output is 2,817 megawatts thermal (MWt), achieved through power uprates approved by the U.S. (NRC) over its operational history. This thermal capacity corresponds to a gross electrical output of 925 megawatts electric (MWe) and a net electrical output of 894 MWe after accounting for station service loads. The containment structure is a dry, ambient-pressure type, enclosing the reactor vessel, steam generators, and primary coolant systems to mitigate radiological releases in accident scenarios.
ParameterValue
Thermal Power (MWt)2,817
Gross Electrical (MWe)925
Net Electrical (MWe)894
Reactor TypePWR (Raised Loop)
These specifications reflect the plant's design basis for reliable baseload electricity generation, with the Babcock & Wilcox once-through steam generator design contributing to its thermal efficiency profile. The reactor's operational parameters are governed by NRC technical specifications tailored to Babcock & Wilcox plants, ensuring safety margins under varying load conditions.

Construction and Initial Operations

Planning and Build Phase

The Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station was conceived in the late 1960s by the Toledo Edison Company, a subsidiary of Ohio Edison, to address projected increases in electricity demand across northern Ohio amid post-World War II industrialization and population growth. Site selection focused on a 1,000-acre parcel in Ottawa County near Oak Harbor, approximately 21 miles east-southeast of Toledo, chosen for its flat terrain, access to Lake Erie for once-through cooling water intake and discharge, and transmission infrastructure proximity to urban load centers. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), predecessor to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, reviewed environmental and safety aspects, granting initial authorization for site preparation work. Formal construction permit application for Unit 1, a Babcock & Wilcox-designed , was submitted jointly by Toledo Edison and Electric Illuminating Company. The full Construction Permit No. CPPR-80 was issued on March 24, 1971, following AEC evaluation of seismic stability, radiological impacts, and emergency planning. and major site activities commenced on September 1, 1970, under limited work authorization, with Corporation contracted as architect-engineer responsible for design, procurement, and oversight of civil, mechanical, and electrical systems. The build phase involved excavating foundations for the structure, erecting the vessel, and installing steam generators and turbines, amid the era's regulatory shifts toward stricter seismic and safety standards post-1960s earthquake reassessments. Initial plans envisioned two units, with orders placed for additional reactors, but economic pressures including inflation and financing costs led to cancellation of Units 2 and 3 before substantial work began. Total construction duration spanned eight years, with costs escalating to approximately $2.221 billion in 2007-adjusted dollars due to labor, material price hikes, and design modifications for enhanced safety features like improved integrity.

Commissioning and Startup

The Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, received its construction permit from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission on September 1, 1970, initiating the build phase under primary ownership by Toledo Edison Company. Initial fuel loading for the Babcock & Wilcox-designed commenced and was completed on April 27, 1977, marking the transition to pre-operational testing phases. The (NRC) issued the full-power operating license (Docket No. 50-346) in July 1977, enabling progression to criticality and power operations following verification of systems and readiness. Initial criticality, the point at which a self-sustaining was achieved at low power levels, occurred on August 12, 1977. This milestone followed extensive zero-power physics testing to validate core reactivity parameters and worthiness, as required under NRC oversight to ensure compliance with technical specifications. to the followed shortly thereafter on August 28, 1977, allowing initial at ascending power levels up to approximately 100% of the reactor's capacity of 2,772 MWt. Power ascension testing, including turbine-generator performance trials and balance-of-plant integration, proceeded through late 1977 and into 1978, confirming operational stability without reported significant anomalies during this period. Full commercial operation commenced on July 31, 1978, at a net electrical capacity of 894 MWe, delivering baseload power primarily to the Ohio grid via Toledo Edison's transmission network. The startup sequence adhered to standard NRC protocols for pressurized water reactors of the era, emphasizing sequential validation of reactor protection systems, emergency core cooling capabilities, and containment integrity prior to unrestricted operations. No major delays or safety violations were documented in primary regulatory records for the commissioning phase, though the overall project timeline reflected typical construction-era challenges such as supply chain dependencies for specialized components.

Ownership and Management History

Early Ownership under Toledo Edison

The Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station was jointly owned from its inception by the Electric Illuminating Company, holding a 51.4% stake, and the Toledo Edison Company, with a 48.6% share, the latter acting as the initial licensee and operator. The facility, a , was named in honor of John K. Davis, former chairman of Toledo Edison, and Ralph M. Besse, former chairman of Electric Illuminating. This ownership structure facilitated collaborative development amid the expansion of nuclear capacity in the Midwest during the 1970s. Construction began on September 1, 1970, following planning announcements in 1973, with the project aimed at providing baseload power to serve industrial and residential demands in northern . Under Toledo Edison's operational oversight, the station achieved initial criticality and grid connection in 1977, culminating in the issuance of operating license NPF-3 by the U.S. on April 22, 1977. Commercial operations commenced on July 31, 1978, marking the plant's entry into full revenue-generating service at an initial net capacity of approximately 894 megawatts electrical. Toledo Edison managed routine operations, maintenance, and during the initial decades, benefiting from the plant's in its early cycles, though subject to the era's industry-wide challenges such as regulatory and fuel loading protocols. Ownership interests remained undivided as tenants in common, with Toledo Edison retaining decision-making authority aligned with its lead role until corporate restructurings in the late . This period established Davis–Besse as a key asset in Toledo Edison's portfolio, contributing to regional energy reliability without major disruptions reported in foundational records.

Transitions to FirstEnergy and Beyond

In 1997, the merger of Ohio Edison Company, which owned Toledo Edison, with Centerior Energy Corporation, parent of Electric Illuminating Company, formed Corp. on November 7, consolidating ownership of the Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station under the new entity. The plant's operations continued under Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), a responsible for managing 's nuclear fleet, including maintenance, regulatory compliance, and power generation at the 908-megawatt . By the mid-2010s, competitive pressures in deregulated energy markets strained 's nuclear assets, leading to the separation of generation operations into FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. (FES), which assumed ownership of Davis–Besse along with other plants like and Valley. FES filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on March 31, 2018, citing unsustainable economics amid low and subsidy failures, though it secured creditor support to maintain operations without immediate shutdowns. Emerging from on February 27, 2020, FES restructured and rebranded as Energy Harbor Corp., retaining ownership of Davis–Besse with a focus on nuclear generation and retail energy services; the transition preserved jobs and plant viability through debt reduction and equity issuance to creditors. Energy Harbor operated the station amid ongoing challenges, including a 2020 license renewal by the extending operations to 2037. On March 1, 2024, Vistra Corp. completed its $3.43 billion acquisition of Energy Harbor, announced in March 2023, transferring Davis–Besse to Vistra's portfolio and integrating it into the largest U.S. competitive nuclear fleet with over 6,400 megawatts of capacity. This shift positioned the plant under Vistra's management, emphasizing zero-carbon generation amid rising demand for reliable baseload power.

Operational Performance and Contributions

Electricity Generation Records

The Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station, with a net capacity of 894 megawatts, has demonstrated variable performance influenced by maintenance outages, regulatory-mandated inspections, and operational uprates. Annual net generation has ranged from lows around 5.185 million megawatt-hours in periods of extended downtime, such as , to highs exceeding 7.7 million megawatt-hours in years of optimal availability. These outputs reflect capacity factors that have occasionally surpassed 100%, achievable through minor power uprates and efficient fuel utilization beyond nominal ratings during low-demand or testing periods. Notable records include a documented capacity factor of 100.0064% in a specific operating cycle, as reported in plant operating data, highlighting periods of near-continuous full-power generation with minimal forced outages. In 2013, the station achieved approximately 98% capacity factor, outperforming the contemporaneous U.S. nuclear industry average and contributing to elevated annual output. More recently, the three-year average capacity factor for 2022–2024 stood at 91.44%, supporting consistent generation amid ongoing safety enhancements. Lifetime performance, spanning commercial operations since July 31, 1978, has been tempered by incidents like the 2002 reactor vessel head degradation, which extended refueling outages and depressed early capacity factors. Historical data from U.S. sources indicate peak yearly factors reaching 99% in select post-maintenance cycles. Overall, these records underscore the plant's potential for high-reliability baseload power when and regulatory issues are proactively managed, though average factors remain below top-performing U.S. peers due to site-specific challenges.

Reliability Metrics and Efficiency

The of the Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station, calculated as the ratio of actual electrical energy output to the maximum possible output at continuous full-power operation, represents a core metric for assessing operational reliability and efficiency in baseload power generation. High capacity factors indicate minimal unplanned downtime and effective maintenance practices, enabling consistent energy delivery relative to the plant's 894 MW net capacity. In 2013, Davis–Besse attained a of approximately 98%, exceeding the contemporaneous U.S. nuclear fleet average and reflecting robust post-maintenance performance. Recent assessments place it at 91.44% as of 2024 data, aligning with top-quartile industry benchmarks amid ongoing uprates and outage optimizations. Historical capacity factors fluctuated due to extended outages, including those stemming from the 2002 reactor vessel head degradation event, which necessitated prolonged shutdowns for inspections and repairs extending into 2004. Pre-2002 averages hovered in the 70-80% range across cycles, influenced by forced outages and regulatory-mandated improvements, but lifetime figures remain moderated by early operational challenges and the two-year post-2002 hiatus. Post-remediation, annual factors improved markedly, with peaks exceeding 95% in multiple years (e.g., 95%, 91%, 99%, and 97% in sequential cycles documented through the ), attributable to enhanced system health programs and reduced forced outage durations. Under the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), Davis–Besse's performance indicators—encompassing metrics such as unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours, safety system functional failures, and mitigating systems unavailability—have predominantly registered as green (acceptable) in quarterly evaluations since 2010. In 2023 and 2024 assessments, the plant sustained the highest ROP performance category, with zero white or higher findings, signaling effective probabilistic risk-informed mitigations and low event-initiated core damage frequency. Refueling outages exemplify efficiency gains: the 2018 cycle targeted and completed in under 25 days via streamlined planning and enhancements, compared to prior multi-month durations. Forced outage rates, tracked via industry standards like those from the Institute of Operations, approached 0% in select monthly periods (e.g., 1994) and remained below fleet medians post-2000s reforms, minimizing capacity losses from equipment failures.
MetricRecent Value (2023-2024)Historical ContextSource
Annual 91.44%98% (2013 peak); 70-95% variable pre/post-2002
Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours (0 events)Improved from elevated pre-2002 levels
Refueling Outage Duration<25 days (2018)Multi-month historically; reduced via "Drive for 25" initiative
ROP Overall CategoryHighest ()Achieved consistently since reforms

Economic and Environmental Impacts

The Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station sustains substantial economic activity in Ottawa County and throughout by providing reliable baseload and supporting ancillary industries. A 2015 Nuclear Energy Institute analysis estimated that its operations generate $805 million in annual economic output locally and $1.1 billion statewide, encompassing direct , supplier spending, and induced effects from worker expenditures. The plant also contributes $162 million annually in tax revenues to local, state, and federal governments, funding public services such as schools and infrastructure in the region. Direct and indirect employment tied to Davis–Besse bolsters workforce stability in a dependent on production. Combined with the nearby , Ohio's nuclear facilities, including Davis–Besse, supported 4,270 jobs and $510 million in state as of 2017, per a Brattle Group for operations, maintenance, and fuel cycle activities. These figures underscore the station's role in averting economic contraction from potential premature closure, as evidenced by legislative efforts in to extend operations amid competitive pressures from subsidized . Environmentally, Davis–Besse delivers dispatchable, zero-emission electricity that displaces generation, thereby reducing air pollutants and greenhouse gases in Ohio's grid. Unlike coal or natural gas plants, it produces no , nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, or mercury during operation, aligning with empirical assessments of nuclear's low lifecycle emissions profile. U.S. (NRC) evaluations, including a 2010 environmental assessment, have determined that routine operations pose no significant adverse effects on air, water, or biological resources. The station draws cooling water from via once-through systems, with annual radiological and thermal monitoring reports confirming compliance with limits and negligible impacts on aquatic life or . On-site, Davis–Besse stewards the 730-acre Navarre Marsh wetland, which supports migratory birds and local adjacent to the Toussaint River and shoreline. While generating —a compact, contained waste stream—its volume remains far lower than equivalent ash from coal plants, with storage managed under NRC oversight to prevent environmental release.

Safety Incidents and Responses

Pre-2000 Events and Lessons

On September 24, 1977, during low-power testing prior to commercial operation, a pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) on the pressurizer stuck open at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, leading to a loss of reactor coolant and an automatic reactor trip. Operators initially misdiagnosed the event due to inadequate instrumentation indicating the valve's position, resulting in prolonged depressurization and overcooling risks, though no radiological release occurred. This incident, occurring shortly after initial criticality on August 12, 1977, highlighted deficiencies in valve status monitoring and operator training for transient events, prompting industry-wide recommendations for enhanced PORV position indication systems that later influenced responses to the 1979 Three Mile Island accident. On June 9, 1985, while operating at 90% power, Davis-Besse experienced a partial loss of main feedwater followed by a complete loss of all feedwater after a reactor trip triggered by a from a feedwater malfunction. The event stemmed from a combination of equipment failures, including a failed auxiliary feedwater pump start signal and operator errors in aligning systems under stress, leading to a 20-minute period without feedwater before restoration via manual actions. No core damage resulted, but the incident exposed vulnerabilities in feedwater system reliability and emergency procedure clarity, leading the (NRC) to issue Generic Letter 85-15 mandating reviews of feedwater loss scenarios across pressurized water reactors. On June 24, 1998, an F2 directly struck the Davis-Besse site, damaging the switchyard and causing a loss of offsite power while the was at 100% power, necessitating an automatic scram and reliance on emergency diesel generators for 30 hours. The plant's design margins prevented structural failure or loss of critical functions, with diesels starting successfully despite debris impacts, but the event disrupted communications and non-safety systems. This was the first documented direct hit on a U.S. nuclear plant, reinforcing lessons on tornado-resistant switchyard designs and the robustness of emergency power systems under , as detailed in the plant's Licensee Event Report. These pre-2000 events collectively demonstrated the value of redundant features, such as scrams and power, in averting escalation, while revealing recurring themes of human factors in and procedural inadequacies. Post-event analyses by the NRC emphasized proactive incorporation of operating experience into and , contributing to broader industry improvements in transient management and hazard without compromising operational records prior to 2000.

2002 Reactor Vessel Head Degradation

The Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station experienced severe (RPV) head degradation due to -induced corrosion, discovered during a refueling outage in early . The plant, operated by Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), had been shut down on February 16, , for scheduled maintenance and nozzle repairs. While investigating cracks in control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles made of Alloy 182/600, technicians removed accumulated deposits and uncovered a large cavity adjacent to nozzle 3 on March 7–8, . The cavity measured approximately 20–30 square inches in surface area, with a volume of about 2050 cubic centimeters, penetrating nearly through the 6-inch-thick low-alloy steel head, leaving only the 3/8-inch cladding intact at its thinnest point. The degradation stemmed from primary coolant leakage through primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) in the CRDM nozzle penetrations and their J-groove welds, allowing borated water to escape, evaporate, and deposit concentrated on the RPV head. This acidic residue corroded the carbon steel base metal beneath the cladding over an extended period, exacerbated by the head's that trapped moisture and prevented detection. Prior indications included accumulations observed during the 2000 refueling outage and filter cloggings in earlier years, but FENOC's boric acid corrosion control program inadequately addressed these per (NRC) Generic Letter 88-05, leading to underestimation of the issue. In response, FENOC halted repairs on March 6, 2002, and replaced the entire RPV head starting in June 2002 to ensure integrity. The , recognizing the breach of reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity, issued Bulletin 2002-01 on March 13, 2002, mandating licensees to inspect for similar degradation and submit management plans. The incident prompted industry-wide adoption of enhanced visual examinations and contributed to NRC Order EA-03-009 in 2003 for bare-metal visual inspections of penetrations. Davis–Besse remained offline for nearly two years, restarting on February 15, 2004, after satisfying NRC conditions. Regulatory scrutiny revealed lapses in oversight, with a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report criticizing the NRC's risk-informed decision-making for permitting operation despite known nozzle cracks and deposits, as probabilistic risk assessments underestimated core damage frequency increases (e.g., from 4×10⁻⁵ to 5.4×10⁻⁵ per year). FENOC faced the NRC's largest of $33.5 million, including $5.45 million in 2003 and additional restitution, for violations including to maintain design bases and provide complete information. Two FENOC executives were criminally convicted in 2007 for false statements to the NRC regarding the degradation's extent. The event underscored the hazards of complacency toward corrosion, prompting stricter enforcement of operating experience reviews and corrosion monitoring across U.S. nuclear plants.

Post-2002 Operational Challenges

Following the discovery of severe head degradation in March 2002, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station remained shut down for over two years, from February 16, 2002, until its restart on March 15, 2004, after extensive repairs including replacement of the vessel head, steam generators, and other components to address and cracking vulnerabilities. This prolonged outage, the longest in the plant's history at that point, stemmed from boric acid-induced that had penetrated the base material beneath the stainless steel cladding, exposing approximately 6 inches of depth in one location and necessitating heightened NRC oversight. The incident elevated the plant's estimated core damage frequency to 6 in 1,000—a rate 100 times higher than typical U.S. reactor conditions—prompting mandatory assessments and procedural reforms by operator Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC). Operational difficulties persisted after restart, including an immediate shutdown on March 17, 2004—less than 48 hours into power ascension—due to failures in the main feedwater pump and control systems, highlighting incomplete post-outage testing and contributing to ongoing reliability concerns. In 2003, the plant's safety monitoring systems were compromised by the , which infected the safety parameter display system via an unpatched network connection, rendering it inoperable for nearly 21 hours and requiring manual backups; while no direct safety impact occurred, the event exposed cybersecurity gaps in isolated systems. NRC enforcement actions followed, such as a 2005 order citing deliberate violations for operating with known accumulation risks from 2000 to 2002, resulting in a $5.45 million —the largest ever levied by the NRC at the time—and probationary status until 2006. These issues correlated with subpar capacity factors, averaging below the U.S. fleet median in 2003–2005 due to forced outages and inspections. Recurring vessel head challenges reemerged in 2010 during preparations for head replacement sourced from the decommissioned Midland plant, where inspections revealed cracking or flaws in up to 16 drive mechanism nozzles due to , delaying operations and requiring additional repairs before a full outage shutdown in October 2011 for final replacement. Subsequent incidents included a 2012 reactor coolant pump seal leak causing a shutdown and power reduction, and a 2015 steam generator tube leak leading to another outage. More recently, a November 2021 turbine trip exposed five safety violations, including inadequate response procedures and equipment failures, rated as low to moderate safety significance by the NRC. A 2023 special inspection identified very low safety significance findings in structural components but no immediate risks, underscoring persistent maintenance and oversight demands despite capacity factor improvements to near-fleet averages by the late 2010s. Overall, these challenges reflected systemic issues in material degradation management and operational readiness, though mitigated without radiological releases beyond design limits.

Aggregate Safety Performance

The (NRC) evaluates Davis-Besse's aggregate safety performance via the Reactor Oversight Process, encompassing seven performance indicators across categories like initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity, supplemented by annual inspections yielding findings of (very low), (low-to-moderate), (substantial), or (high) safety significance. Plants with all indicators and minimal findings qualify for Category 1, the highest performance tier with baseline oversight. Davis-Besse's record reflects a transition from significant challenges to sustained adequacy: the 2002 reactor vessel head penetration cracking, caused by boric acid-induced corrosion penetrating 6 inches deep without timely detection, prompted a 27-month shutdown, NRC actions, and fleet-wide bulletins mandating bare-metal visual inspections. Post-restart in 2004, corrective measures—including enhanced chemistry controls, remote inspection technologies, and management reforms—yielded consistent green performance indicators through 2025, with no yellow or red findings in recent cycles. Annual NRC assessments confirm this trajectory; for 2020, all indicators and findings remained , denoting very low safety significance. In 2024, the plant passed inspections without moderate-or-higher significance issues, earning Category 1 status and the highest safety performance designation. Second-quarter 2025 indicators similarly registered across mitigating systems and integrity metrics. No off-site releases exceeding regulatory limits have occurred, and unplanned scrams have stayed infrequent, aligning with probabilistic assessments showing core damage frequencies below 10^{-4} per reactor-year post-mitigations. Critiques from bodies like the Government Accountability Office highlight pre-2002 NRC leniency in addressing emerging risks across the industry, potentially understating aggregate vulnerabilities at pressurized water reactors like Davis-Besse. Nonetheless, empirical post-incident data demonstrate effective risk reduction, with safety system reliability and indicators outperforming earlier benchmarks, as verified through augmented inspections and confirmatory action letters. This aggregate profile underscores causal improvements in material degradation prevention and oversight responsiveness, though historical lapses inform ongoing vigilance against complacency in aging .

NRC Inspections and Enforcement

The U.S. (NRC) established heightened regulatory oversight of the Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station following the March 2002 discovery of extensive cracking and penetration in the head penetration nozzles, attributed to boric acid-induced corrosion. Under Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, the NRC chartered a dedicated oversight panel on April 29, 2002, comprising regional and headquarters staff to monitor licensee performance during the extended shutdown, root cause analyses, extent-of-condition evaluations, and repair activities, including replacement of the degraded vessel head. This panel conducted Category 1 meetings to review corrective actions addressing organizational and deficiencies, ensuring compliance before authorizing restart on March 4, 2004, after verification of requirements. A March 13, 2002, Confirmatory Action Letter required the licensee to implement six specific commitments prior to restart, such as comprehensive root cause determination and repair planning, which were fulfilled and closed by March 8, 2004. Concurrently, a Confirmatory Order effective March 8, 2004, mandated annual independent third-party assessments of operations, , corrective actions, and for five years, with mid-cycle reactor vessel head inspections to prevent recurrence. The oversight panel continued post-restart with enhanced inspections until May 2005, when it confirmed sustained safe performance and transitioned to standard oversight processes. Enforcement actions culminated in Enforcement Action EA-05-071, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of issued April 21, 2005, citing nine violations stemming from the vessel head degradation, including failure to limit reactor coolant system leakage per Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.a, willful submission of incomplete or inaccurate information under 10 CFR 50.9, and deficiencies in corrosion control and corrective action programs per 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. These ranged from Severity Level I (e.g., finding for inadequate leakage controls) to Level II problems, resulting in a total of $5.45 million—the largest in NRC history at the time—allocated across violations such as $5 million for the primary leakage failure and $110,000–$120,000 for others. Earlier routine inspections, such as those from September 1998 to May 1999 under EA-99-138, identified two violations related to and procedural adherence. Post-2005, integrated resident inspections have continued quarterly, yielding mostly findings of very low significance; for instance, a 2024 report noted a Non-Cited Violation for Appendix B lapses, assessed per the NRC Policy. In 2021 inspections, five violations were identified concerning emergency diesel generator testing failures, though without escalated . The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process has rated Davis–Besse at the highest performance category (Column 1) in recent years, reflecting resolved issues from prior .

Prosecutions and Compliance Reforms

In response to the 2002 discovery of extensive corrosion damage to the head at Davis-Besse, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Enforcement Action EA-05-071 on April 21, 2005, citing FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) for five willful violations of NRC regulations. These included failures to identify and correct degraded conditions from accumulation, inadequate root cause evaluations that downplayed risks, and deliberate provision of incomplete or misleading information to NRC inspectors regarding deposits and vessel integrity assessments dating back to 2000. The NRC proposed and ultimately imposed civil penalties totaling $5.45 million—the largest such fine against a U.S. nuclear licensee at the time—for these Severity Level I and II violations, which escalated due to the deliberate nature of the misconduct and potential safety implications had the cavity penetrated the vessel wall. Complementing NRC actions, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reached a settlement with FENOC on January 20, 2006, requiring payment of $28 million to resolve civil claims under the Clean Water Act for unauthorized discharges of approximately 100,000 gallons of borated water into Lake Erie during efforts to address the vessel head degradation in 2002. The agreement highlighted FENOC's "misleading conduct" toward regulators, including assurances of vessel safety that omitted critical data on nozzle cracking and corrosion risks, thereby delaying inspections and risking environmental and operational integrity. No criminal indictments of corporate executives followed directly from the safety incident, though the penalties underscored systemic lapses in transparency and risk management at the plant. The NRC also pursued individual accountability, issuing prohibition orders barring several former FENOC employees from NRC-licensed activities for periods of up to five years due to their roles in misrepresenting plant conditions. Affected individuals included Senior Engineer Prasoon Goyal, who contributed to flawed engineering judgments minimizing risks; Steven Moffitt, involved in briefings to NRC staff asserting safe operations despite evidence of degradation; and System Engineer Andrew Siemaszko, who participated in evaluations that withheld key data on vessel head vulnerabilities. These orders, effective immediately upon issuance in 2005–2006, cited deliberate violations of 10 CFR 50.5, prohibiting false statements to the NRC, and aimed to deter similar conduct across the industry. To address root causes, FENOC implemented compliance reforms mandated by NRC Confirmatory Action Letters (CALs) issued in 2002, including comprehensive replacement of the reactor vessel head with a crack-resistant , installation of advanced monitoring systems for control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetrations, and establishment of rigorous control programs with enhanced and precipitation mitigation protocols. These measures, verified through independent audits before the plant's 2004 restart, extended to improved on , mandatory reporting of degraded conditions, and integration of operating experience from similar incidents at other pressurized water reactors. NRC-wide reforms followed, such as revised guidance (e.g., Generic Letter 97-01 updates) requiring bare-metal visual exams of vessel heads every other refueling cycle and accelerated adoption of predictive models for corrosion risks, reducing recurrence potential across the fleet. Separately, FirstEnergy's involvement in the 2019–2020 Ohio House Bill 6 scheme—which funneled over $60 million in payments to secure $1.3 billion in subsidies benefiting Davis-Besse operations—triggered further legal scrutiny. In 2021, the DOJ imposed a $230 million fine via agreement, mandating an independent compliance monitor, restructuring of ethics programs, and severance of ties with implicated lobbyists. A 2024 Ohio settlement added $20 million to avoid state prosecution, enforcing ongoing reforms like a dedicated compliance and revised political engagement policies to prevent influence-peddling affecting plant subsidies. These corporate-level changes indirectly bolstered Davis-Besse oversight by prioritizing regulatory candor, though critics argue they addressed governance more than site-specific safety protocols.

Risk Evaluations and Mitigations

Seismic and Natural Hazard Assessments

The Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station, located in , operates in a region of low seismic activity influenced primarily by distant intraplate sources such as the New Madrid Seismic Zone. The plant's original seismic design basis incorporates a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) derived from a maximum horizontal ground acceleration of 0.15g, with response spectra developed to ensure structures, systems, and components (SSCs) can withstand this level while maintaining safe shutdown capability. Post-Fukushima reevaluations, mandated by NRC's 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter in 2012, included a Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) that generated a Ground Motion Response Spectrum () for the control point at elevation 540 ft, showing horizontal accelerations ranging from 0.0032g at 0.10 Hz to 0.1993g at 100 Hz. A 2017 high-frequency supplement to the screening report, submitted by Nuclear Operating Company, evaluated 80 SSCs for response to elevated high-frequency ground motions exceeding the original SSE (e.g., 0.374g at 2.31 Hz in some bands). Testing per IEEE/ANSI C37-98 and EPRI high-frequency protocols confirmed that most components, including relays and , possessed capacity-to-demand ratios above 1.0 (ranging from 0.17 to 5.27 across evaluations), with adequate margins for seismic qualification; no plant modifications were deemed necessary. These assessments align with broader NRC seismic standards, which prioritize probabilistic methods to quantify exceedance probabilities, though critics note potential underestimation of epistemic uncertainties in low-activity regions. Flood hazard reevaluations, also pursuant to the 2012 NRC directive and NEI 12-07 guidance, identified local intense precipitation (LIP) and probable maximum storm surge (PMSS) from Lake Erie as primary mechanisms. The LIP analysis yielded a maximum flood depth of 0.5 ft lasting 2.5 hours, with inundation above critical door sills in the power block for 33 minutes reaching elevation 585.5 ft. PMSS evaluations produced a stillwater elevation of 585.81 ft plus 0.1 ft wave run-up, with flooding above 585 ft persisting for 2.5 hours. Safety-related and FLEX-basis equipment remained unaffected, but secondary FLEX N+1 and non-safety-related cached items faced potential standing water exposure; mitigations included pre-flood deployment triggers and alternate staging areas. Other mechanisms, such as tsunamis or stream flooding, were screened as bounded by design-basis analyses in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Tornado hazards, prevalent in the Great Lakes region, are addressed through design criteria established by NRC in 1974 via probabilistic risk-informed specifications for wind speeds and missiles. The UFSAR confirms protection of safety-related SSCs against tornado-generated winds and projectiles, with the plant designed to achieve safe shutdown under such conditions. A notable event occurred on June 24, 1998, when an F2 tornado struck the site during 99% power operation, causing a turbine trip and manual scram but no core damage or radiological release, validating the robustness of emergency procedures and structural reinforcements. Reevaluations of high winds and missiles, excluding seismic and flooding, applied NRC screening criteria and determined no beyond-design-basis vulnerabilities requiring upgrades. Overall, these assessments indicate Davis–Besse's configurations provide defense-in-depth against regional natural phenomena, with low historical exceedance rates supporting operational reliability.

Containment and Emergency Preparedness

The containment system at the Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station comprises a steel-lined reinforced concrete containment vessel and an outer reinforced concrete shield building, designed to enclose the reactor coolant system and prevent the release of radioactive fission products during postulated accidents. The primary containment vessel operates at slightly above atmospheric pressure and is engineered to withstand internal pressures up to 58.5 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) following a loss-of-coolant accident, with leak-tightness verified through periodic Type A integrated leak rate tests conducted every 10 years or as required by NRC regulations. The shield building provides secondary containment functions, including shielding against radiation, protection from external missiles such as tornado-generated debris, and filtration of potential airborne releases through its negative pressure boundary during accident conditions. Structural assessments of the shield building have identified age-related degradation, including vertical cracks up to 0.019 inches wide observed in 2011 during preparations for reactor vessel head replacement, which were attributed to drying shrinkage and thermal cycling rather than seismic or load-bearing deficiencies. These findings prompted Nuclear Operating Company to perform finite element analyses confirming the building's ability to maintain seismic margins and integrity, with repairs involving injections and surface sealing completed prior to restart in 2012. In , a 6- to 12-inch air gap was discovered in the shield building wall during coring for license renewal samples, leading to further NRC-reviewed evaluations that affirmed no impact on overall leak-tightness or structural capacity under design-basis events. Emergency preparedness at Davis–Besse aligns with 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E requirements, featuring a comprehensive program that includes classification of emergencies into alert, site area emergency, and general emergency levels based on radiological release potential. The facility defines a 10-mile plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for immediate protective actions such as sheltering or evacuation, and a 50-mile pathway EPZ for measures like food control and distribution, coordinated with and Lucas Counties, the Emergency Management Agency, and federal responders. Notification protocols ensure offsite authorities receive alerts within of emergency declaration, supported by redundant communication systems including the Emergency Notification Network and satellite phones. Recent enhancements include a 2022 revision to the response , reducing on-shift while maintaining response capabilities through augmented offsite teams, approved by the NRC following probabilistic assessments demonstrating equivalent . An NRC on May 16, 2025, rated the program as fully compliant, with effective drills simulating multi-jurisdictional responses and no deficiencies in dose assessment or protective action recommendations. As of October 2025, the plant is transitioning from traditional sirens to the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) for the 10-mile EPZ, enabling cell phone broadcasts and effective November 3, 2025, to improve public notification reliability amid siren maintenance challenges.

Recent Developments and Future Outlook

Post-2020 Status and Ownership Shift

In March 2020, Solutions emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and rebranded as Energy Harbor Corp., retaining ownership and operation of the Davis–Besse Nuclear Power Station, which had avoided a planned permanent shutdown by May 31, 2020, following the enactment of Ohio House Bill 6 in July 2019. This legislation imposed a surcharge on consumers to subsidize nuclear and plants, including Davis–Besse, amid economic pressures from low and competition in deregulated markets. Under Energy Harbor, the plant underwent routine refueling outages and maintained commercial operations, with its operating license renewed by the U.S. (NRC) for an additional 20 years in December 2015, extending authority through April 2037. On March 1, 2024, Vistra Corp., a Texas-based energy company, completed its $3.43 billion acquisition of Energy Harbor, transferring ownership and operational licenses for Davis–Besse, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, and the Beaver Valley Power Station to Vistra Vision—a new subsidiary focused on zero-carbon generation. The deal, announced in February 2023 and approved by the NRC in September 2023 and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in February 2024, positioned Vistra as the operator of the second-largest fleet of competitive nuclear reactors in the United States, with a combined capacity exceeding 6,400 megawatts. This shift integrated Davis–Besse into Vistra's broader portfolio, which includes the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, enhancing economies of scale for maintenance and fuel procurement. As of October 2025, Davis–Besse operates at full capacity under Vistra, having returned to 100% power following a refueling outage in early 2025 and achieving the NRC's highest safety performance category (Column 1) for the assessment period ending December 31, 2024, based on zero violations and strong inspection results. The plant generated approximately 7.5 terawatt-hours annually in recent years, contributing reliable baseload power to the grid. Vistra has emphasized continued investments in reliability and compliance, amid broader industry trends toward extending nuclear plant lifespans beyond initial licenses.

License Extension and Innovations

In December 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the initial license renewal for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, extending its operating license from the original expiration date of April 22, 2017, to April 22, 2037, based on evaluations of aging management programs for structures, systems, and components. The renewal followed submission of the application by Nuclear Operating Company in August 2010 and included assessments confirming no significant environmental impacts beyond those previously analyzed. Subsequent license renewal (SLR) proceedings commenced to extend operations an additional 20 years to 80 years total, addressing extended period of operation effects through enhanced aging management. The NRC conducted post-approval inspections, including Phase 4 verification on July 29, 2025, evaluating of licensee commitments for SLR conditions. As of October 2025, the SLR approval supports continued operation to April 22, 2057, with ongoing oversight focused on time-dependent degradation mechanisms not emphasized in prior renewals. Innovations at Davis-Besse include replacement completed by in the mid-2010s, which enhanced and reduced outage durations by incorporating advanced materials resistant to and cracking. This upgrade, part of broader refit efforts, improved reliability without altering core design parameters. The plant serves as a pilot for nuclear-powered clean , leveraging excess electricity for to generate carbon-free . Selected in 2020 by for a $10 million U.S. Department of Energy-funded initiative, Davis-Besse demonstrates high-temperature steam integrated with operations. The Clean Hydrogen coalition proposed scaling this to produce for industrial use, though federal hydrogen hub funding was not awarded in 2023. Demonstration-scale production is targeted for 2025, emphasizing nuclear's role in dispatchable low-carbon for pathways. Additionally, a $9 million federal research program, secured via congressional appropriations, supports advanced testing at the site, focusing on fuel cycle enhancements and safety innovations.

References

  1. https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactors/davi
  2. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/davis-besse-improv
  3. https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/vessel-head-degradation
  4. https://www.eia.gov/nuclear/state/ohio/
  5. https://repository.library.noaa.gov/view/noaa/42737/noaa_42737_DS1.pdf
  6. https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/davis-besse/davis-besse-enviro.pdf
  7. https://www.firstenergycorp.com/content/dam/corporate/transmission/beaver-davis-besse/beaver-davis-besse-cn.pdf
  8. https://www.power-technology.com/projects/davis-besse-nuclear-power-station-ohio/
  9. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1215/ML12159A228.pdf
  10. https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=676
  11. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1125/ML112590431.pdf
  12. https://decommissioningcollaborative.org/davis-besse/
  13. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0037/ML003753307.pdf
  14. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0211/ML021160197.pdf
  15. https://www.bechtel.com/projects/davis-besse-nuclear-power-station/
  16. https://www.gem.wiki/Davis_Besse_nuclear_power_plant
  17. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1828/ML18283A895.pdf
  18. https://world-nuclear.org/nuclear-reactor-database/details/Davis-Besse-1
  19. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2419/ML24199A132.pdf
  20. https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/reports-and-briefs/economic-benefits-davis-besse-nuclear-201501.pdf
  21. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1930/ML19308C966.pdf
  22. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1931/ML19319C280.pdf
  23. https://www.zippia.com/firstenergy-careers-4537/history/
  24. https://www.ans.org/news/article-11/fes-debuts-new-name-following-bankruptcy/
  25. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/firstenergy-solutions-successfully-completes-financial-restructuring-emerges-as-energy-harbor-301012818.html
  26. https://investors.firstenergycorp.com/investor-materials/news-releases/news-details/2015/FirstEnergys-Davis-Besse-Nuclear-Power-Station-Receives-License-Renewal-from-Nuclear-Regulatory-Commission/default.aspx
  27. https://investor.vistracorp.com/2024-03-01-Vistra-Completes-Energy-Harbor-Acquisition
  28. https://world-nuclear-news.org/articles/vistra-completes-energy-harbor-acquisition
  29. https://www.ans.org/news/2025-05-02/article-6967/us-nuclear-capacity-factors-stability-and-energy-dominance/
  30. https://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7B003ADFCB-C8A0-4285-96E0-747B521E18C2%7D
  31. https://www.ans.org/pubs/magazines/download/article-1200/
  32. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-1029.pdf
  33. https://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%257B003ADFCB-C8A0-4285-96E0-747B521E18C2%257D
  34. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0411/ML041100405.pdf
  35. https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/docket-chart.html?docket=DAVI&quarter=2022Q1
  36. https://www.portclintonnewsherald.com/story/news/local/2025/04/21/davis-besse-passed-inspections-in-2024-facility-was-safe/83163919007/
  37. https://www.portclintonnewsherald.com/story/news/local/2024/08/27/plant-safety-set-for-aug-29/74949748007/
  38. https://www.ans.org/pubs/magazines/download/article-1133/
  39. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2007/ML20077R380.pdf
  40. https://www.nei.org/resources/reports-briefs/economic-impacts-davis-besse-nuclear-power-station
  41. https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/nuclearmatters/pages/211/attachments/original/1494337829/Ohio-Nuclear-Report-Brattle-21April2017_%25281%2529.pdf?1494337829
  42. https://www.ideastream.org/government-politics/2019-07-24/energy-bill-deal-spares-davis-besse-plant-and-local-schools-for-now
  43. https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2024/12/20/is-nuclear-power-green-energy/
  44. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/12/08/2010-30862/firstenergy-nuclear-operating-company-davis-besse-nuclear-power-station-environmental-assessment-and
  45. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2413/ML24136A035.pdf
  46. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1123/ML11235B012.pdf
  47. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ml1122/ML11221A300.pdf
  48. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2023/ML20237D369.pdf
  49. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1403/ML14038A119.pdf
  50. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/bulletins/2002/bl02001
  51. https://www.gao.gov/assets/a242287.html
  52. https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.chas.1c00039
  53. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0406/ML040680717.pdf
  54. https://www.toledoblade.com/frontpage/2004/09/21/2002-Davis-Besse-problem-ranked-among-worst-ever/stories/200409210031
  55. https://www.citizen.org/news/davis-besse-nuclear-plant-shutdown-one-day-after-restart-shows-flaws-in-regulatory-system/
  56. https://www.controleng.com/throwback-attack-the-slammer-worm-hits-davis-besse-nuclear-plant/
  57. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/reactors/ea05071
  58. https://www.ans.org/pubs/magazines/download/article-624/
  59. https://www.toledoblade.com/local/2010/03/15/Davis-Besse-having-problems-with-current-reactor-head.html
  60. https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Davis-Besse-vessel-head-replacement-underway
  61. https://blog.ucs.org/dlochbaum/davis-besses-forgotten-fix/
  62. https://www.rtoinsider.com/29143-nrc-inspectors-find-5-safety-violations-at-davis-besse-nuke/
  63. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2321/ML23214A344.pdf
  64. https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/pi-summary
  65. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-04-415
  66. https://www.thenews-messenger.com/story/news/2021/06/16/news-briefs-nrc-discuss-2020-davis-besse-performance/5293687001/
  67. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/1999/99-014iii
  68. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/reactors/ea03214
  69. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/reactors/ea99138
  70. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2412/ML24122C664.pdf
  71. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2007/05/21/E7-9715/in-the-matter-of-first-energy-nuclear-operating-company-davis-besse-nuclear-power-plant-perry
  72. https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/January/06_enrd_029.html
  73. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2006/01/17/E6-418/prasoon-goyal-order-prohibiting-involvement-in-nrc-licensed-activities-effective-immediately
  74. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2006/01/17/E6-416/steven-moffitt-order-prohibiting-involvement-in-nrc-licensed-activities-effective-immediately
  75. https://www.rtoinsider.com/28274-doj-orders-230-million-fine-for-firstenergy/
  76. https://www.toledoblade.com/local/courts/2024/08/13/firstenergy-to-pay-20-million-to-avoid-prosecution-in-scandal/stories/20240813109
  77. https://www.newsday.com/app/news/nation/bribery-scandal-ohio-republican-firstenergy-utility-householder-k46292
  78. https://www.oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-02/csni-r2019-1.pdf
  79. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1220/ML12200A183.pdf
  80. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1721/ML17214A639.pdf
  81. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/19108/probabilistic-seismic-hazard-analysis
  82. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1634/ML16348A010.pdf
  83. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2110/ML21104A366.pdf
  84. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/86471/34/Tornado%252BDamage%252Band%252BImpacts%252Bon%252BNuclear%252BFacilities%252Bin%252Bthe%252BUnited%252BStates.pdf
  85. https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/factsheets/naturaldisaster&nuclearpower.pdf
  86. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1611/ML16117A042.pdf
  87. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1220/ML12200A212.pdf
  88. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1221/ML12213A351.pdf
  89. https://nuclearstreet.com/nuclear_power_industry_news/b/nuclear_power_news/archive/2014/02/24/nrc-investigating-gap-found-in-davis_2d00_besse-shield-building-wall-022402
  90. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0532/ML053260464.pdf
  91. https://dam.assets.ohio.gov/image/upload/ema.ohio.gov/Documents/Operations/EPI_DavisBesse_OttawaLucas.pdf
  92. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/07/21/2022-15566/energy-harbor-nuclear-corp-and-energy-harbor-nuclear-generation-llc-davis-besse-nuclear-power
  93. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2517/ML25171A041.pdf
  94. https://www.13abc.com/2025/10/08/ottawa-lucas-county-emas-test-new-alert-system-davis-besse-nuclear-power-station/
  95. https://www.cleveland.com/open/2020/02/firstenergy-solutions-emerges-from-bankruptcy-becomes-energy-harbor.html
  96. https://investor.vistracorp.com/2023-09-29-Vistra-Receives-Nuclear-Regulatory-Commission-Approval-to-Own-Operate-Three-Energy-Harbor-Nuclear-Plants
  97. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/ps
  98. https://www.toledoblade.com/business/energy/2025/08/21/davis-besse-is-back-at-full-power/stories/20250821058
  99. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/12/14/2015-31418/license-renewal-for-davis-besse-nuclear-power-station-unit-1
  100. https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/davis-besse
  101. https://www.nei.org/resources/statistics/us-nuclear-license-renewal-filings
  102. https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/subsequent-license-renewal
  103. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2521/ML25218A164.pdf
  104. https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/5-nuclear-energy-stories-watch-2025
  105. https://www.nucnet.org/news/us-initiative-aims-for-productions-with-nuclear-energy-from-davis-besse-9-4-2022
  106. https://www.13abc.com/2023/10/13/davis-besse-hydrogen-hub-project-doesnt-make-cut/
  107. http://kaptur.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/kaptur-9-million-federal-research-initiative-headed-davis-besse-nuclear
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.