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Fifth Fleet
The U.S. Fifth Fleet's emblem
Active
  • 26 April 1944 – January 1947
  • 1 July 1995 – present
Country United States
Branch United States Navy
Part of
Garrison/HQNaval Support Activity Bahrain, Bahrain
Engagements
Battle honoursPacific Theatre of World War II
Commanders
Current
commander		VADM Curt Renshaw
Command Master ChiefCMDCM Jason M. Dunn
Notable
commanders		ADM Raymond A. Spruance, USN

The Fifth Fleet is a numbered fleet of the United States Navy. Its area of responsibility encompasses approximately 2.5 million square miles, and includes the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean. It shares a commander and headquarters with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) in Bahrain. Fifth Fleet/NAVCENT is a component command of, and reports to, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

Established during World War II in 1944, the Fifth Fleet conducted extensive operations that led to the defeat of Japanese forces in the Central Pacific, including battles for the Mariana Islands campaign, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. In 1947, two years after the Allied victory, it was stood down. After remaining inactive for 48 years, the Fifth Fleet was reactivated in 1995. It contributed significant forces in the Global War on Terrorism and continues to project US naval power in the Middle East.

World War II

[edit]

The Fifth Fleet was initially established during World War II on 26 April 1944 from the Central Pacific Force under the command of Admiral Raymond Spruance. Central Pacific Force was itself part of Pacific Ocean Areas. The ships of the Fifth Fleet also formed the basis of the Third Fleet, which was the designation of the "Big Blue Fleet" when under the command of Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.[N 1] Spruance and Halsey would alternate command of the fleet for major operations, allowing the other admiral and his staff time to prepare for the subsequent one. A secondary benefit was confusing the Japanese into thinking that they were actually two separate fleets as the fleet designation flipped back and forth. Under Admiral Spruance, the Fifth Fleet was, by June 1944, the largest combat fleet in the world, with 535 warships.[2]

While operating under Spruance's command as the Fifth Fleet, the fleet took part in the Mariana Islands campaign of June–August 1944, the Iwo Jima campaign of February–March 1945, and the Okinawa campaign of April–June 1945. During the course of these operations, it conducted Operation Hailstone (a major raid against the Japanese naval base at Truk) in February 1944, defeated the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, and blunted the Japanese Operation Ten-Go – sinking the Japanese battleship Yamato in the process – in April 1945.

The British Pacific Fleet operated as part of the Fifth Fleet from March to May 1945 under the designation Task Force 57.[3] Halsey then relieved Spruance of command and the British ships, like the rest of the Fifth Fleet, were resubordinated to the Third Fleet.

The Fifth Fleet's next major combat operation would have been Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu in the Japanese Home Islands, scheduled to begin on 1 November 1945.[citation needed] The Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki made this operation unnecessary, and the Fifth Fleet did not return to combat again during the war.

The commanders of Fifth Fleet during this era were Admirals Spruance (26 April 1944 – 8 November 1945), John Henry Towers (8 November 1945 – 18 January 1946), Frederick C. Sherman (18 January 1946 – 3 September 1946), and Alfred E. Montgomery (5 September 1946 – 1 January 1947).[4] The Fifth Fleet was deactivated in January 1947. The position of Commander, Fifth Fleet, became Commander, First Task Fleet. Montgomery became Commander, First Task Fleet, upon the deactivation of the Fifth Fleet.

In the Middle East after 1995

[edit]

Prior to the first Gulf War in 1990–1991, U.S. naval operations in the Arabian Gulf region were directed by the Commander, Middle Eastern Force (COMMIDEASTFOR). Since this organization was considered insufficient to manage large-scale combat operations during the Gulf War, the Seventh Fleet — primarily responsible for the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean and normally based in Japan – was given the temporary task of managing the force during the period. However, no numbered fleet existed permanently within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. In 1995, John Scott Redd proposed and founded the only new U.S. Navy Fleet in half a century, serving as the first Commander, Fifth Fleet (COMFIFTHFLT) since World War II.[5][6] After a 48-year hiatus, the Fifth Fleet was reactivated, replacing COMMIDEASTFOR, and it now directs operations in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Arabian Sea. Its headquarters are at NSA Bahrain located in Manama, Bahrain.

U.S. Navy, Royal Navy, and Royal Australian Navy destroyers and frigates on joint operations in the Persian Gulf.

For the early years of its existence, its forces normally consisted of an Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), surface combatants, submarines, maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, and logistics ships. After the September 11 terrorist attack and the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the naval strategy of the U.S. changed. Consequently, the policy of always maintaining a certain number of ships in various parts of the world also changed.

However, its usual configuration now includes a Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Amphibious Ready Group or Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), and other ships and aircraft with almost 15,000 people serving afloat and 1,000 support personnel ashore.[7]

Carrier Strike Group Three formed the core of the naval power during the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. Commander, Carrier Group Three, Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor, arrived in the Arabian Sea on 12 September 2001 and was subsequently designated Commander Task Force 50 (CTF 50), commanding multiple carrier strike groups and coalition forces. The Task Force conducted strikes against Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Task Force 50 comprised over 59 ships from six nations including six aircraft carriers, stretching over 800 nautical miles.[8]

Naval operations in the Middle East were the subject of DOD Exercise Millennium Challenge 2002, during which unanticipated maneuvers by opposing forces director Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper USMC (retd.) led to heavy losses to the 'imaginary' exercise U.S. fleet.[9]

In August 2002, Marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable (MEU) (SOC)) carried out a long-range deployment exercise from the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1) into Djibouti. During the deployment the MEU also participated in Operation Sea Eagle in the Gulf of Aden and Operation Infinite Anvil in the Horn of Africa.[10]

Fifth Fleet forces peaked in early 2003, when five USN aircraft carriers (CV and CVNs), six amphibious assault ships (LHAs and LHDs) and their embarked Marine Corps air ground combat elements, their escorting and supply vessels, and over 30 Royal Navy vessels were under its command.

In the Persian Gulf, United States Coast Guard surface ships attached to the Fifth Fleet were under Commander, Destroyer Squadron 50 (CDS-50) commanded by Captain John W. Peterson of the Navy.[11] Coast Guard cutters Boutwell, Walnut, and the four patrol boats were part of this group. The shore detachments, MCSD and Patrol Forces Southwest Asia also operated under the command of CDS-50. For actual operations, the Coast Guard forces were part of two different task forces. The surface units were part of Task Force 55 (CTF-55). Command of CTF-55 actually shifted during OIF. Initially, Rear Admiral Barry M. Costello, Commander of the Constellation Battle Group, commanded CTF-55. The surface forces were designated Task Group 55.1 (TG-55.1) with Commander Destroyer Squadron 50 (CDS-50) as the task group commander. In mid-April, the Constellation Battle Group left the NAG and the Destroyer Squadron 50 staff commanded TF-55 for the remainder of OIF major combat operations. In the aftermath of the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, the very large force of ships was quickly drawn down.

On 6 May 2005, a party of Marines reportedly landed in Somaliland, the autonomous and self-declared state in northern Somalia. The landings were purportedly conducted to carry out searches, as well as to question locals regarding the whereabouts of terrorist suspects. Three ships, including a helicopter carrier, were reported in a nearby anchorage, likely a MEU/ARG. United States military officials denied the allegations and said operations were not being conducted in Somaliland.[12]

On 3 January 2012, following the end of the ten-day Velayat 90 naval maneuvers by the Iranian Navy in the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranian Army chief of staff, General Ataollah Salehi, was quoted by the state news agency IRNA as warning the United States to not deploy John C. Stennis back to the Persian Gulf.[13][14] On 4 January 2011, Fars News Agency reported that a bill was being prepared for the Iranian Parliament to bar foreign naval vessels from entering the Arabian Gulf unless they receive permission from the Iranian navy, with Iranian lawmaker Nader Qazipour noting: "If the military vessels and warships of any country want to pass via the Strait of Hormuz without coordination and permission of Iran's navy forces, they should be stopped by the Iranian armed forces."[15] Also, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi reiterated that "transnational forces" have no place in the Arabian Gulf region.[15] On 6 January 2012, armed Iranian speedboats reportedly harassed two U.S. naval vessels, the amphibious transport dock New Orleans and the Coast Guard cutter Adak, as they transited the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf.[16]

On 9 January 2012, Carrier Strike Group One, led by the carrier Carl Vinson, joined Carrier Strike Group Three in the North Arabian Sea, with Carrier Strike Group Nine, led by the carrier Abraham Lincoln, en route to the Arabian Sea amid rising tension between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran over U.S. naval access to the Strait of Hormuz.[17] On 19 January 2012, Carrier Strike Group Nine entered the Fifth Fleet's area of responsibility (AOR) and relieved Carrier Strike Group Three.[18] That same day during an interview on the Charlie Rose program, Mohammad Khazaee, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, stated that Iran would consider closing the Strait of Hormuz if Iran's security was endangered.[19]

For December 2012 and January 2013, Carrier Strike Group Three was the only carrier strike group operating with the U.S. Fifth Fleet until relieved by the Carrier Strike Group Ten. This is because of the temporary two-month rotation of the Carrier Strike Group Eight back to the United States in order to resurface the flight deck of that group's flagship, the carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower.[20] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Carrier Air Wing Seven, and the guided-missile cruiser Hue City returned to base on 19 December 2012, and the guided missile destroyers Jason Dunham, Farragut, and Winston S. Churchill were scheduled to return to base in March 2013.[21]

In September 2016, Commander Amphibious Task Group, Commodore Andrew Burns, set off from the UK with Ocean, along with helicopters from 845 Naval Air Squadron, No. 662 Squadron AAC and No. 27 Squadron RAF, Bulwark, and element of 3 Commando Brigade HQ Royal Marines, RFA Mounts Bay and MV Eddystone Point under his flag. This deployment was known as the Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime) 2016. The Amphibious Task Group was planned to sail to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, where Burns was to assume command of the United States Fifth Fleet Task Force 50 until March 2017.[22][23]

On 1 December 2018, Commander, Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral Scott A. Stearney was found dead in his residence in Bahrain. No foul play was suspected. Deputy commander Rear Admiral Paul J. Schlise assumed command in his place.[24][25] Vice Admiral Jim Malloy flew to Bahrain to provide support.[26][27] Malloy was formally nominated to succeed Stearney on 4 December[27][28][29] and quickly confirmed by voice vote of the full United States Senate on 6 December.[28][30][31] Vice Adm. Malloy assumed command on 7 December.[32]

Composition

[edit]
The Fifth Fleet's area of responsibility, 2009.

Coalition Forces Maritime Component Command

[edit]

Together with Naval Forces Central Command, Fifth Fleet oversees four naval task forces monitoring maritime activity:

  • Combined Task Force 150 that patrols from Hormuz, halfway across the Arabia Sea, South as far as the Seychelles, through the Gulf of Aden, up through the strait between Djibouti and Yemen known as the Bab Al Mandeb and into the Red Sea and, finally, around the Horn of Africa;
  • Combined Task Force 152 patrols the Persian Gulf from the northern end where area of responsibility of CTF 158 ends and down to the Strait of Hormuz between Oman and Iran where the area of responsibility for CTF 150 begins;
  • Combined Task Force 151 patrols mostly the same area as CTF 150 but is primarily focused on deterring and disrupting Somali piracy attack on commercial shipping and leisure craft;
  • CTF 52 (as above) patrols the same area as CTF 152 but is focused on countermining/demining activity.[41]

Commanders

[edit]

The United States Navy, Naval Historical Center advises that;

"..This position was originally titled Commander, Central Pacific Force. On 26 April 1944 it was renamed Commander, Fifth Fleet. It then became Commander, First Task Fleet on 1 January 1947."[42]

List of commanders

[edit]

Original fleet (1944–1947)

[edit]
No. Commander Term Ref
Portrait Name Took office Left office Term length
1
Raymond A. Spruance
Admiral
Raymond A. Spruance
(1886–1969)		26 April 1944[43]8 November 19451 year, 196 days[44]
2
John Henry Towers
Admiral
John Henry Towers
(1885–1955)		8 November 194518 January 194671 days[44]
3
Frederick C. Sherman
Vice Admiral
Frederick C. Sherman
(1888–1957)		18 January 19463 September 1946228 days[44]
4
Alfred E. Montgomery
Vice Admiral
Alfred E. Montgomery
(1891–1961)		5 September 19461 January 1947[45]118 days[44]

Current fleet (1995–present)

[edit]
No. Commander Term Ref
Portrait Name Took office Left office Term length
1
John Scott Redd
Vice Admiral
John Scott Redd
(born 1944)		1 July 1995[46]June 1996~336 days[47]
2
Thomas B. Fargo
Vice Admiral
Thomas B. Fargo
(born 1948)		June 199627 July 1998~2 years, 56 days[48]
3
Charles W. Moore Jr.
Vice Admiral
Charles W. Moore Jr.
(born 1946)		27 July 199811 February 20023 years, 199 days[49]
4
Timothy J. Keating
Vice Admiral
Timothy J. Keating
(born 1948)		11 February 20027 October 20031 year, 238 days[50]
5
David C. Nichols
Vice Admiral
David C. Nichols
(born 1950)		7 October 20033 November 20052 years, 27 days[50]
6
Patrick M. Walsh
Vice Admiral
Patrick M. Walsh
(born 1955)		3 November 200527 February 20071 year, 116 days[50]
7
Kevin J. Cosgriff
Vice Admiral
Kevin J. Cosgriff		27 February 20075 July 20081 year, 129 days[51]
8
William E. Gortney
Vice Admiral
William E. Gortney
(born 1955)		5 July 20085 July 20102 years, 0 days[52]
9
Mark I. Fox
Vice Admiral
Mark I. Fox
(born 1956)		5 July 201024 May 20121 year, 324 days[53]
10
John W. Miller
Vice Admiral
John W. Miller		24 May 20123 September 20153 years, 102 days[54]
11
Kevin M. Donegan
Vice Admiral
Kevin M. Donegan
(born 1958)		3 September 201519 September 20172 years, 16 days[55]
12
John C. Aquilino
Vice Admiral
John C. Aquilino
(born 1962)		19 September 20176 May 2018229 days[56]
13
Scott Stearney
Vice Admiral
Scott Stearney
(1960–2018)		6 May 20181 December 2018209 days[57]
-
Paul J. Schlise
Rear Admiral (lower half)
Paul J. Schlise
Acting		1 December 20187 December 20186 days-
14
James J. Malloy
Vice Admiral
James J. Malloy
(born 1963)		7 December 201819 August 2020255 days[58]
15
Samuel Paparo
Vice Admiral
Samuel Paparo
(born 1964)		19 August 20205 May 20211 year, 259 days[59]
16
Charles B. Cooper II
Vice Admiral
Charles B. Cooper II
(born 1967)		5 May 20211 February 20242 years, 272 days[60]
17
George M. Wikoff
Vice Admiral
George M. Wikoff
(born 1968)		1 February 20245 October 20251 year, 246 days-
18
Curt A. Renshaw
Vice Admiral
Curt A. Renshaw
(born 1968)		5 October 2025Incumbent50 days-

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

United States Fifth Fleet

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The United States Fifth Fleet is the U.S. Navy's numbered fleet tasked with operations, theater security cooperation, and partner across approximately 2.5 million square miles of strategic waterways, encompassing the Arabian Gulf, , , , and portions of the . Headquartered at , it commands rotationally deployed naval forces, including carrier strike groups, surface action groups, submarines, and expeditionary units, to deter aggression, ensure , and counter threats from state and non-state actors in a vital to global flows and trade routes. Originally established on April 26, 1944, during under Admiral to conduct central Pacific campaigns against Japanese forces, the Fifth Fleet achieved decisive victories in battles such as Midway and the invasion before being deactivated in 1945. Deactivated post-war amid naval restructuring, it was reactivated on July 1, 1995, as the first new U.S. fleet in 50 years, specifically to oversee operations in the volatile region following Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, reflecting the Navy's recognition of enduring Middle Eastern maritime challenges independent of broader Central Command structures. Under Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), who concurrently serves as Fifth Fleet commander, the fleet integrates eight specialized task forces covering , air and , mine countermeasures, expeditionary operations, , submarines, and unmanned systems to execute missions like manned-unmanned teaming for enhanced domain awareness and responses to illicit maritime activities. Notable operations include enforcing sanctions, conducting transits amid territorial disputes, and leading multinational coalitions such as Combined Maritime Forces to combat and , thereby safeguarding approximately 20 percent of global oil consumption transiting the area.

History

World War II Establishment and Operations

![Raymond A. Spruance](./assets/Ray_Spruance_(cropped\ ) The United States Fifth Fleet was established on March 15, 1943, as part of the U.S. Navy's reorganization into a system of numbered fleets to streamline command structures during . This even-numbered fleet was designated for Pacific operations, specifically targeting Japanese forces in the Central Pacific theater. assumed command, overseeing amphibious assaults and carrier strikes aimed at island-hopping toward . The fleet's initial major operation was Operation Galvanic, the invasion of the Gilbert Islands on November 20, 1943, targeting Tarawa Atoll and Makin Atoll. At Tarawa, the 2nd Marine Division faced approximately 4,700 Japanese defenders entrenched in fortified positions, resulting in over 1,000 U.S. fatalities due to challenges including a shallow reef hindering landing craft and underestimation of enemy defenses. Makin saw the 27th Infantry Division secure the island with fewer casualties, capturing it by November 23. These actions provided airfields for further advances and marked the Fifth Fleet's role in testing amphibious tactics. Subsequent operations included the campaign under , commencing January 31, 1944, with assaults on Kwajalein and atolls. U.S. forces, supported by carrier-based air strikes from Task Force 58, overwhelmed Japanese garrisons, capturing Kwajalein after intense fighting that killed nearly all 8,100 defenders while U.S. losses totaled around 350 dead. Eniwetok Atoll followed in February, securing additional bases for B-29 bomber operations. These victories extended U.S. control over key , disrupting Japanese supply lines. In June 1944, the Fifth Fleet executed Operation Forager, the campaign, invading Saipan on June 15 with over 70,000 troops against 30,000 Japanese defenders. Preceding the landings, 58 engaged in the on June 19-20, destroying over 600 Japanese aircraft in what became known as the "Marianas ," with U.S. losses minimal at 29 planes. Saipan, Tinian, and fell by August, enabling long-range bombing of , though Saipan alone cost 3,426 U.S. lives amid fierce banzai charges and civilian suicides. Command then shifted to the Third Fleet under Admiral William Halsey for preparations. The Fifth Fleet reactivated under Spruance in late 1944 for the final phases, supporting the invasion on February 19, 1945, where assaulted amid heavy attacks, securing the island by March 26 at a cost of nearly 7,000 U.S. dead against 21,000 Japanese. Its culminating operation was Okinawa, beginning April 1, 1945, involving over 180,000 U.S. troops against 116,000 Japanese, enduring prolonged cave warfare and over 1,900 strikes that sank 36 ships and damaged 368 others. Okinawa fell on June 22, providing a staging base for planned invasions, but with 12,500 U.S. fatalities, highlighting the campaign's attrition. The fleet's operations demonstrated the efficacy of in the island-hopping strategy, contributing decisively to Japan's defeat.

Post-War Deactivation and Strategic Dormancy

Following the conclusion of , the United States Fifth Fleet, which had operated primarily in the Central Pacific under commanders such as and Marc A. Mitscher, underwent disestablishment as part of the U.S. Navy's extensive postwar force reductions. These reductions, driven by budgetary constraints and the demobilization of wartime expansions, saw the Navy shrink from over 6,700 ships in 1945 to fewer than 700 active vessels by 1949, with numbered fleets consolidated or eliminated to align with peacetime priorities. The Fifth Fleet specifically ceased operations in January 1947, with Alfred E. Montgomery having briefly assumed command in September 1946 before its formal disestablishment. This deactivation initiated a nearly 48-year period of strategic dormancy for the Fifth Fleet designation, during which no active bore the name, reflecting a U.S. naval posture reoriented toward contingencies in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Western Pacific via the reactivated Second, Sixth, and Seventh Fleets. Assets and personnel from the Fifth Fleet were redistributed to the Pacific Fleet's task organizations, emphasizing carrier-based deterrence against Soviet naval threats rather than residual Pacific island-hopping remnants. While the saw a modest U.S. presence through the Middle East Force—established in 1949 with small detachments for oil route protection amid emerging Arab-Israeli tensions—no equivalent to the Fifth Fleet's scale materialized, as regional commitments remained secondary to European theater reinforcements under . The dormancy underscored a deliberate U.S. of selective , preserving the numbered fleet concept for potential rapid reconstitution amid fiscal austerity that limited standing forces to essentials, with the Navy's active-duty personnel dropping from 3.4 million in 1945 to about 330,000 by 1950. This interlude allowed doctrinal evolution toward nuclear deterrence and forward-deployed carrier groups, but left Middle Eastern waters without a dedicated fleet until geopolitical shifts in the prompted revival, highlighting the designation's latent utility for expeditionary responses.

Reactivation Amid Persian Gulf Tensions

The U.S. Fifth Fleet was reactivated on July 1, 1995, after a 48-year hiatus, as the first new numbered fleet established by the U.S. Navy in half a century, in direct response to escalating tensions in the region following the 1991 . Iraq's persistent defiance of sanctions, including repeated violations of southern no-fly zones established under and provocative military maneuvers such as the October 1994 buildup of forces along the Kuwaiti border—prompting Operation Vigilant Warrior—underscored the need for a dedicated naval command to enforce and protect vital oil shipping lanes through the . Iran's expanding naval capabilities, including acquisitions of Kilo-class submarines and anti-ship cruise missiles, further heightened threats to and regional stability, where approximately 60% of global oil reserves were at stake. The reactivation was approved by Secretary of Defense on May 4, 1995, to provide an intermediate operational echelon between U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and forward-deployed forces, enhancing responsiveness to crises amid ongoing sanctions enforcement that had already involved over 11,000 maritime boardings since 1990. Headquartered initially aboard the command ship USS La Salle in , the reactivated Fifth Fleet was dual-hatted under the NAVCENT commander, with Douglas Katz assuming leadership to oversee operations across the , , , and parts of the . This structure replaced arrangements like the longstanding Middle East Force, formalizing a persistent U.S. naval presence that had grown since the 1980s Iran-Iraq Tanker War and intensified post-Desert Storm to counter Iraqi aggression and Iranian adventurism. The fleet's immediate priorities included supporting joint exercises, maritime interdiction to curb Iraqi oil smuggling, and rapid crisis response, such as potential evacuations or strikes, thereby signaling unwavering U.S. commitment to deterring WMD proliferation and ensuring in an area critical to global energy supplies.

Post-1995 Operations in the Middle East

The United States Fifth Fleet was reactivated on July 1, 1995, in as the naval component of , assuming responsibility for afloat forces operating in the , , , and parts of the , covering approximately 2.5 million square miles. This reactivation addressed escalating regional threats, including Iraqi non-compliance with resolutions and Iranian naval provocations, by replacing the smaller Commander, Forces. Initial operations focused on enforcing the southern over under , which involved naval aviation support from carriers like and USS Tarawa, contributing to strikes on Iraqi air defenses as late as January 1993 and continuing through the 1990s with interdictions querying over 29,000 vessels by 2000. ![U.S., Australian, and British warships in December 2002][float-right] Following the , 2001, attacks, the Fifth Fleet mobilized for , launching initial strikes against and targets in on October 7, 2001, from carrier strike groups positioned in the North Arabian Sea. This effort deployed up to six carrier battle groups and four amphibious ready groups, totaling around 73,000 personnel, enabling the rapid capture of in mid-November 2001 and by December 7, 2001, through sustained naval air campaigns and support. A notable precursor incident was the October 12, 2000, bombing of USS Cole in Harbor, , which killed 17 sailors and underscored vulnerabilities in the fleet's area of responsibility. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, initiated March 19, 2003, the Fifth Fleet provided critical enablers for the invasion of Iraq, deploying five carrier battle groups, 115 ships, and conducting 65% of coalition air sorties alongside over 1,000 Tomahawk missile launches. Naval forces secured Iraq's offshore oil terminals by March 21, 2003, preventing sabotage, and supported the collapse of Baghdad's defenses by April 9, 2003, with major combat operations concluding May 1, 2003. Post-invasion, the fleet facilitated Iraqi oil exports of 370 million barrels from July 2003 to April 2004 while training approximately 600 Iraqi sailors to build coastal defense capabilities. From April 2005, the Fifth Fleet led Maritime Security Operations to deter terrorism, piracy, and smuggling, boarding over 12,700 vessels and protecting key chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. Under Combined Maritime Forces, it established Combined Task Force 151 in January 2009 to counter Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden, conducting patrols that suppressed attacks through multinational escorts and interdictions. In Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State, starting in 2014, naval assets delivered precision strikes from the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, advising Iraqi forces and disrupting ISIS logistics until territorial defeat in designated areas. Amid heightened Iranian aggression, the Fifth Fleet responded to attacks on commercial tankers in the on June 13, 2019, providing assistance and releasing evidence attributing responsibility to Iranian forces, including video of removal by Iranian vessels. In July 2023, U.S. elements under Fifth Fleet command intervened to prevent Iranian seizures of two commercial tankers, firing warning shots and positioning forces to deter further escalation. These actions underscored the fleet's ongoing role in safeguarding approximately one-fifth of global oil transiting the region against state-sponsored disruptions.

Contemporary Engagements and Adaptations

The United States Fifth Fleet has been actively engaged in defending international maritime commerce in the and since October 2023, when Iran-backed Houthi militants in began launching drone, missile, and small boat attacks on merchant vessels in solidarity with following the group's assault on . These operations intensified in 2024, prompting the Fifth Fleet to lead defensive intercepts, with U.S. destroyers downing over 100 Houthi projectiles by mid-2024 and contributing to efforts that preserved safe transits for participating ships despite Houthi campaigns deterring broader commercial traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In December 2023, the Fifth Fleet spearheaded , a multinational under to protect shipping lanes, which by February 2025 transitioned leadership to U.S. 50 for sustained defensive presence amid ongoing threats. Countering Iranian influence has remained a core engagement, with the Fifth Fleet increasing patrols in the in 2023 to deter Tehran's seizures of commercial tankers and other vessels, including the apprehension of over 3,000 additional personnel deployed to bolster deterrence against such incidents that threatened 20% of global oil transits. Recent deployments, such as the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in the region amid Israel-Iran tensions in 2024, have emphasized deterrence against Iranian aggression and protection of shipping lanes, with no U.S. carrier strike groups or submarines conducting cruise missile strikes directly on Iranian territory. U.S. naval forces under Fifth Fleet intercepted multiple Iranian arms shipments destined for Houthi proxies, such as a January 2024 seizure of over 2,000 assault rifles from a in the , highlighting 's direct material support for regional disruptions. By early 2025, amid escalated Houthi attacks, the fleet supported sustained combat operations, including strikes on Houthi launch sites, as part of broader U.S. efforts to hold accountable for proxy threats extending beyond the . Adaptations to these asymmetric threats have included the integration of unmanned systems for enhanced , with Fifth Fleet forces conducting operations in October 2023 that paired uncrewed surface and aerial platforms with manned assets to monitor and respond to illicit activities across 2.5 million square miles of responsibility. Drawing from real-world Houthi engagements, the U.S. adjusted configurations and weapon employment tactics based on sailor feedback by October 2024, improving interception efficacy against low-cost drone swarms while managing stockpiles depleted by 30 years' worth of expenditures in 15 months of operations. These evolutions reflect a shift toward distributed lethality and , though Operation Prosperity Guardian's limited participation from major European powers underscored challenges in burden-sharing against persistent Iranian-enabled disruptions.

Mission and Strategic Role

Area of Responsibility and Core Objectives

The for the United States Fifth Fleet, serving as the maritime component of U.S. Central Command, spans approximately 2.5 million square miles of vital waterways in the and surrounding regions. This includes the , , , , and portions of the extending along the east coast of . These waters host essential global trade routes, with the fleet maintaining presence to safeguard passage through strategic chokepoints like the and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Core objectives focus on achieving maritime superiority to deter and defeat , defend allied homelands, and preserve of maneuver across the region. The fleet conducts operations, which encompass patrols to counter threats such as , , and that disrupt commercial shipping. Complementary efforts involve theater security cooperation to build with regional partners through joint exercises and capacity enhancement, thereby strengthening collective deterrence against state and non-state actors. These objectives align with broader U.S. Central Command priorities, emphasizing proactive force posture to ensure stability amid persistent tensions, including Iranian naval provocations and Houthi disruptions in the as of 2023-2025. Operations prioritize empirical threat assessment over declarative diplomacy, with deployed assets like carrier strike groups enabling rapid response to kinetic incidents while minimizing escalation risks through demonstrated capability.

Energy Security and Freedom of Navigation Priorities

The U.S. Fifth Fleet prioritizes the protection of energy transit routes in its , encompassing the , , , and , where disruptions could cascade into global economic instability. The , a 21-mile-wide chokepoint at the gulf's mouth, handled an average of 20.9 million barrels per day of crude oil and condensate in 2023, representing roughly 21% of global petroleum liquids consumption. This volume underscores the fleet's deterrence posture against Iranian threats, including vessel seizures and mine-laying, which have escalated since the 2019 tanker incidents and persisted into 2023 with multiple commercial ship interdictions. Freedom of navigation operations form a core component of these priorities, enabling the secure passage of over 80% of the region's oil exports that rely on unimpeded sea lanes. The fleet maintains persistent patrols and has surged forces, such as deploying over 3,000 additional personnel in August 2023, to counter asymmetric threats from Iranian fast-attack boats and proxies. In the , where Houthi missile and drone attacks since October 2023 have targeted shipping, the Fifth Fleet leads efforts under the Combined Maritime Forces framework, including launched on December 18, 2023, to defend commercial vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. These priorities integrate multinational coalitions and advanced technologies to enhance and response capabilities. Exercises like International Maritime Exercise (IMX) 2019 demonstrated resolve in preserving navigation rights and commerce flow amid regional volatility. The fleet employs unmanned surface vessels, underwater vehicles, and aerial drones alongside manned assets to monitor threats across 2.5 million square miles, deterring disruptions that could spike energy prices and strain allied economies. This approach reflects causal linkages between regional stability, secure energy flows, and broader U.S. national interests in preventing coercive control over vital trade arteries.

Deterrence Against Regional Adversaries

The U.S. Fifth Fleet maintains a persistent naval presence in the , , and to deter Iranian aggression, including threats to maritime traffic through the , where has seized commercial vessels and conducted harassing maneuvers against U.S. and allied ships. In response to Iranian seizures of tankers in 2023, the fleet increased patrols with surface combatants and , signaling readiness to counter further disruptions and thereby discouraging escalation. This posture leverages carrier strike groups, regularly deployed to the Middle East to deter Iranian aggression and protect shipping—such as the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group amid Israel-Iran tensions in 2024—and submarines (such as Virginia- and Ohio-class) equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of precision strikes if ordered, though no carrier strike groups or submarines have conducted cruise missile strikes directly on Iran, along with destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense capabilities to neutralize Iran's asymmetric threats, such as fast-attack boats and anti-ship missiles, fostering stability by raising the costs of Iranian adventurism. Against Iran-backed Houthi forces in , the Fifth Fleet's deterrence emphasizes defensive operations to safeguard international shipping lanes in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and , where Houthi drone and missile attacks have targeted over 100 merchant vessels since late 2023. Through multinational efforts like , launched in December 2023, U.S. warships have intercepted incoming threats and conducted precision strikes on Houthi radar and launch sites, degrading their capabilities while demonstrating resolve to protect global commerce, as part of broader U.S. military actions focused on Iranian-backed proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Iranian technical support and weaponry enable these attacks, prompting the fleet to integrate intelligence sharing with allies to preempt strikes and deter proxy escalation. Integration of unmanned systems, such as Task Force 59's saildrones and underwater vehicles, enhances domain awareness and acts as a force multiplier for deterrence by enabling persistent of adversarial movements without risking manned assets. Exercises involving live-fire tests from unmanned platforms in 2023 underscore the fleet's adaptation to hybrid threats, projecting technological superiority to dissuade and its proxies from testing U.S. red lines. Overall, this forward-deployed strategy prevents regional dominance by any single actor, preserving access to critical routes amid ongoing tensions.

Organization and Composition

Headquarters and Command Structure

The headquarters of the United States Fifth Fleet is located at in , , hosting approximately 8,000 U.S. personnel and their families while supporting operations across the Arabian Gulf, , , and parts of the . This forward-deployed base facilitates rapid response to maritime security threats in the region, including counter-piracy, , and deterrence missions. The Fifth Fleet's command structure is integrated with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), sharing the same who holds dual responsibilities as , U.S. Fifth Fleet (COMFIFTHFLT) and , NAVCENT. This unified oversees naval operations, theater security cooperation, and within CENTCOM's area of responsibility, encompassing about 2.5 million square miles of strategic waterways vital for global energy transit. The directs afloat and ashore forces, including carrier strike groups, amphibious units, and expeditionary forces, while coordinating with Combined Maritime Forces for multinational task forces focused on counter-terrorism and illicit . As a component command of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the Fifth Fleet/NAVCENT reports operationally to the CENTCOM commander, ensuring alignment with broader joint and interagency objectives in the and Southwest Asia. Administratively, it falls under the U.S. Navy's chain of command through the , but its primary focus remains expeditionary operations rather than fixed peacetime basing. This structure allows flexible deployment of numbered fleet assets from U.S. bases, emphasizing surge capacity over permanent regional garrisons. The naval force assets of the United States Fifth Fleet consist primarily of rotational deployments of carrier strike groups and other units from U.S. Navy fleets to the region for deterrence, maritime security, strike, and support operations across approximately 2.5 million square miles of the Arabian Gulf, , , and parts of the . These assets encompass aircraft carriers, surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, mine countermeasures vessels, logistics ships, , and emerging unmanned systems, with no permanently assigned hulls but rather transient task-organized groups averaging 20-40 major combatants during peak deployments. Task Force 50 (TF 50) directs strike forces, commanded by a carrier strike group commander, and typically includes one Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier—such as USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) or USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) during recent rotations—supported by Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers for air defense and command, Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers for multi-mission warfare, and Los Angeles-, Virginia-, or Ohio-class submarines equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles for undersea strike, intelligence, and potential precision strikes. Carrier air wings embarked on these platforms feature approximately 60-70 aircraft, including F/A-18E/F Super Hornets for strike and interception, EA-18G Growlers for electronic warfare, E-2D Hawkeyes for airborne early warning, and MH-60R/S Seahawks for anti-submarine and surface warfare. Surface warfare assets operate under Task Force 55 (TF 55), led by 50 (DESRON 50), which coordinates Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, littoral combat ships, and coastal patrol units, including up to 10 Cyclone-class patrol craft for fast-attack and interdiction in littoral environments, augmented by U.S. cutters as needed for support. Amphibious and expeditionary forces in 51 (TF 51) and 54 (TF 54) feature Wasp- or America-class amphibious assault ships, -class amphibious transport docks, and Harpers Ferry-class dock landing ships, embarked with Marine Expeditionary Units for and crisis response. Specialized assets include mine countermeasures ships and unmanned underwater vehicles in 52 (TF 52) for clearing naval mines in contested waters; logistics and replenishment ships from the in 53 (TF 53), such as Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo/ammunition ships and -class fleet oilers, to sustain extended deployments—as of February 17, 2026, no US Navy fleet replenishment oilers (T-AO class) were explicitly reported operating in the U.S. Fifth Fleet area, but USNS Carl Brashear (T-AKE-7), a Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo/ammunition ship, was operating in the Arabian Sea replenishing the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group; and land-based like P-8A Poseidons in 57 (TF 57) for surveillance and over vast areas. 59 (TF 59) integrates unmanned surface vessels, unmanned underwater vehicles, and for enhanced domain awareness and , reflecting adaptations to hybrid threats since its establishment in 2021. Expeditionary warfare under 56 (TF 56) incorporates forces, riverine squadrons, and security detachments for ashore support.

Coalition and Allied Integration

The U.S. Fifth Fleet facilitates and allied integration through the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a multinational naval partnership headquartered alongside Fifth Fleet at , encompassing approximately 3.2 million square miles of operational area. The CMF commander position is held concurrently by the Fifth Fleet commander, enabling unified direction of U.S. and partner nation assets for operations. As of 2025, CMF includes 47 participating nations, which contribute ships, personnel, and leadership rotations to shared missions focused on counter-narcotics, counter-smuggling, suppression, and regional maritime cooperation. CMF operates five principal task forces, each led by rotating national commands to distribute operational burdens and build interoperability. Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 conducts maritime security patrols in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea against non-state threats, with participants including Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and others. CTF 151 targets counter-piracy off Somalia and in the Indian Ocean, with leadership from nations such as Bahrain, Brazil, Denmark, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, the Philippines, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. CTF 152 focuses on Gulf maritime security, exemplified by Qatar's assumption of command on September 16, 2025. Additional task forces enhance specialized integration: CTF 153 addresses security threats, while CTF 154, established in May 2023, coordinates multinational maritime training across the to expand partner participation and capabilities. These efforts include practical exercises like multinational vessel boarding integrations, such as the December 2022 event involving regional partners for enhanced counter-smuggling tactics. Fifth Fleet further strengthens alliances via large-scale drills, including the International Maritime Exercise (IMX), the region's premier multinational event, which in its ninth iteration in February 2025 integrated over 80 U.S. Reserve personnel with allies for anti-terrorism, mine countermeasures, and infrastructure protection training. This framework promotes deterrence and collective defense without relying on permanent foreign bases, prioritizing voluntary contributions from partners like states and allies.

Leadership

Commanders During World War II

The United States Fifth Fleet during was commanded by , who assumed command of the Central Pacific Force—which was redesignated as the Fifth Fleet—on 5 August 1943. This force was formally established as the Fifth Fleet on 29 April 1944 to provide an administrative designation for operations in the Central Pacific, alternating with William Halsey's Third Fleet to maintain continuity in numbering and . Spruance, promoted to admiral during his tenure, directed the fleet's carrier-centric operations from , emphasizing methodical planning and precise execution over aggressive pursuit. Under Spruance's command, the Fifth Fleet executed pivotal amphibious assaults and carrier strikes, including the campaign (November 1943), the invasion with the (January-February 1944), the Marianas operation featuring the (June 1944), the landing (February-March 1945), and the Okinawa campaign (April-June 1945). 58, the fast carrier striking force under Vice Admiral , formed the core of these efforts, comprising up to 15 aircraft carriers, 7 battleships, and numerous cruisers and destroyers at peak strength during Okinawa. Spruance's leadership prioritized securing air superiority and supporting Marine landings while minimizing unnecessary risks, contributing to the isolation of Japanese forces without decisive surface engagements after Midway. Spruance remained in command through Japan's surrender on 2 September 1945, after which John H. Towers relieved him on 8 November 1945, marking the transition to postwar operations. No other officers served as overall commander of the Fifth Fleet during active combat phases of the war, reflecting the fleet's role as a specialized extension of Spruance's strategic oversight within Chester Nimitz's Pacific Fleet structure.

Commanders Since Reactivation

The U.S. Fifth Fleet was reactivated on July 1, 1995, with Vice Admiral John Scott Redd as its inaugural commander following the 48-year hiatus after World War II. Successive commanders, all holding the rank of vice admiral unless otherwise noted, have overseen operations in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and adjacent waters, often dual-hatted as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT).
No.NameTerm
1John Scott ReddJuly 1, 1995 – June 1996
2July 1996 – July 1998
3Charles W. Moore Jr.July 27, 1998 – February 2002
4February 11, 2002 – October 7, 2003
5David C. NicholsOctober 7, 2003 – November 3, 2005
6November 3, 2005 – February 27, 2007
7Kevin J. CosgriffFebruary 27, 2007 – July 5, 2008
8July 5, 2008 – July 5, 2010
9Mark I. FoxJuly 5, 2010 – May 24, 2012
10John W. MillerMay 24, 2012 – September 3, 2015
11Kevin M. DoneganSeptember 3, 2015 – September 20, 2017
12September 19, 2017 – May 6, 2018
13Scott StearneyMay 6, 2018 – December 1, 2018 (died in office)
–Paul J. Schlise (acting)December 1, 2018 – December 7, 2018
14James J. MalloyDecember 7, 2018 – August 19, 2020
15August 19, 2020 – May 5, 2021
16Charles B. Cooper IIMay 5, 2021 – February 1, 2024
17George WikoffFebruary 1, 2024 – October 6, 2025
18Curt RenshawOctober 6, 2025 – present

Achievements and Challenges

Key Operational Successes

The United States Fifth Fleet, during , achieved pivotal victories in the Central Pacific under Admiral Raymond A. Spruance's command of Task Force 58, the largest carrier task force ever assembled, comprising up to 15 aircraft carriers, 7 battleships, and numerous support vessels. This force executed amphibious assaults and carrier strikes that captured the Gilbert and in late 1943, decisively defeating Japanese naval air power in the on June 19-20, 1944—known as the "Marianas Turkey Shoot"—where U.S. aircraft sank three Japanese carriers and destroyed over 600 enemy planes with minimal losses. Subsequent operations supported the invasions of (February 1945) and Okinawa (April-June 1945), neutralizing Japanese air and threats through sustained carrier-based attacks, contributing directly to Japan's naval defeat and the war's end in the Pacific. Following its 1995 reactivation as the naval component of U.S. Central Command, the Fifth Fleet supported Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 by providing critical maritime fires, including Tomahawk missile strikes from submarines and surface ships that degraded Iraqi command-and-control and air defenses, alongside carrier air wings launching over 5,500 sorties and expending more than 77,500 pounds of ordnance from platforms like USS Theodore Roosevelt. In Operation Enduring Freedom, the fleet enforced maritime interdiction and secured sea lanes for coalition logistics, enabling sustained ground operations in Afghanistan. These efforts demonstrated the fleet's role in power projection, with naval aviation accounting for a significant portion of initial precision strikes that facilitated rapid regime collapse in Iraq. ![U.S., Australian, and British warships in December 2002.jpg][float-right] In counter-piracy operations within its area of responsibility, including the , the Fifth Fleet, through established in 2009, significantly reduced Somali piracy incidents from a peak of 236 attacks in to near zero by 2012 via multinational patrols, boarding operations, and deterrence that disrupted pirate logistics and motherships, protecting over 20% of global trade transiting the region. Combined Maritime Forces under Fifth Fleet oversight also conducted counter-terrorism and narcotics interdictions, seizing tons of illegal drugs and preventing attacks on shipping. More recently, in launched December 2023 to counter Houthi attacks in the , Fifth Fleet forces intercepted over 100 drones, missiles, and unmanned surface vessels, achieving a near-perfect defense record against inbound threats—including the first combat employment of certain variants—while maintaining for commercial shipping despite sustained Iranian-backed aggression. This tactical success preserved key trade routes carrying 15% of global commerce, with U.S. Navy destroyers expending millions in interceptors but preventing major disruptions until strategic escalation. Complementing this, Operation Unified Takedown (2022-2025) disrupted Iranian smuggling networks supporting proxies, earning the fleet the for enhanced maritime security and partner capacity-building.

Criticisms, Controversies, and Lessons Learned

The on October 12, 2000, in Harbor, , highlighted significant shortcomings in Fifth Fleet protocols, as a boat attack by killed 17 sailors and wounded 39 others despite prior intelligence warnings of threats to U.S. naval assets in the region. A subsequent Manual (JAGMAN) investigation by the Fifth Fleet criticized Commander, Task Force 50 (CTF 50) for inadequate oversight of the ship's measures, including tolerance of relaxed port visit security standards and failure to enforce comprehensive risk assessments for high-threat environments. These lapses underscored broader operational complacency in the fleet's approach to asymmetric threats during the post-Cold War era, where conventional naval superiority did not adequately counter tactics. In January 2016, two U.S. Navy riverine command boats from Coastal Riverine Squadron 1 strayed into Iranian near Farsi Island, leading to the brief detention of 10 sailors by the (IRGCN); the incident drew scrutiny over navigational errors, potential lapses in electronic warfare systems, and that limited immediate defensive responses. Pentagon reviews attributed the entry to a combination of GPS malfunctions and in plotting courses, revealing vulnerabilities in small-boat operations within contested littorals central to Fifth Fleet responsibilities. Critics within military circles pointed to insufficient training for persistent low-level harassment by Iranian forces, which exploit proximity in the to test U.S. resolve without escalating to open conflict. Ongoing Houthi attacks on shipping since late 2023, supported by Iranian-supplied drones and missiles, have exposed the Fifth Fleet's challenges in countering cost-effective , with over 280 projectiles fired at vessels and more than 680 at ships by October 2025, disrupting global trade lanes despite multinational efforts like . U.S. Central Command reports indicate that while intercepts have succeeded in many cases, the high operational tempo— including sustained combat from assets like the —has strained munitions stocks and revealed gaps in layered defenses against swarming tactics. Fleet commanders have noted the Houthis' effective campaigns amplifying perceived risks, deterring commercial traffic even without direct hits. Minesweeping operations in the have faced criticism for inefficiencies against Iranian mine threats, with U.S. Navy Avenger-class ships repeatedly clearing debris like dishwashers and car parts mistaken for ordnance, indicating potential shortfalls in sensor discrimination and for cluttered environments as of 2012 exercises. This persists amid Iran's stockpile of hundreds of mines deployable via small boats or submarines, posing a disproportionate to high-value Fifth Fleet units transiting chokepoints. Lessons learned from these events emphasize enhancing through rigorous oversight and risk mitigation, as post-Cole reforms mandated stricter port denial protocols and integrated threat assessments, though implementation varied. Against asymmetric threats, analyses advocate distributed lethality and investment in affordable countermeasures like directed-energy weapons over sole reliance on expensive interceptors, recognizing that adversaries like and the Houthis exploit economic disparities in . The basing arrangement, scrutinized during protests amid concerns, has prompted reviews of host-nation stability but affirmed its strategic value for rapid response, with no major relocations enacted. Overall, these experiences reinforce the need for adaptive training to address hybrid threats, balancing deterrence with resilience in a prone to proxy escalations.

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