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Metacognition
Metacognition
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Metacognition and self directed learning

Metacognition is an awareness of one's thought processes and an understanding of the patterns behind them. The term comes from the root word meta, meaning "beyond", or "on top of".[1] Metacognition can take many forms, such as reflecting on one's ways of thinking, and knowing when and how oneself and others use particular strategies for problem-solving.[1][2] There are generally two components of metacognition: (1) cognitive conceptions and (2) a cognitive regulation system.[3][4] Research has shown that both components of metacognition play key roles in metaconceptual knowledge and learning.[5][6][4] Metamemory, defined as knowing about memory and mnemonic strategies, is an important aspect of metacognition.[7]

Writings on metacognition date back at least as far as two works by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BC): On the Soul and the Parva Naturalia.[8]

Definitions

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This higher-level cognition was given the label metacognition by American developmental psychologist John H. Flavell (1976).[9]

The term metacognition literally means 'above cognition', and is used to indicate cognition about cognition, or more informally, thinking about thinking. Flavell defined metacognition as knowledge about cognition and control of cognition. For example, a person is engaging in metacognition if they notice that they are having more trouble learning A than B, or if it strikes them that they should double-check C before accepting it as fact. J. H. Flavell (1976, p. 232). Andreas Demetriou's theory (one of the neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive development) used the term hyper-cognition to refer to self-monitoring, self-representation, and self-regulation processes, which are regarded as integral components of the human mind.[10] Moreover, with his colleagues, he showed that these processes participate in general intelligence, together with processing efficiency and reasoning, which have traditionally been considered to compose fluid intelligence.[11][12]

Metacognition also involves thinking about one's own thinking process such as study skills, memory capabilities, and the ability to monitor learning.[citation needed] This concept needs to be explicitly taught along with content instruction.[13] A pithy statement from M.D. Gall et al. is often cited in this respect: "Learning how to learn cannot be left to students. It must be taught."[14]

Metacognition is a general term encompassing the study of memory-monitoring and self-regulation, meta-reasoning, consciousness/awareness and autonoetic consciousness/self-awareness. In practice these capacities are used to regulate one's own cognition, to maximize one's potential to think, learn and to the evaluation of proper ethical/moral rules. It can also lead to a reduction in response time for a given situation as a result of heightened awareness, and potentially reduce the time to complete problems or tasks.

In the context of student metacognition, D. N. Perkins and Gavriel Salomon observe that metacognition concerns students' ability to monitor their progress. During this process, students ask questions like “What am I doing now?”, “Is it getting me anywhere?", and “What else could I be doing instead?”. Perkins and Salomon argue that such metacognitive practices help students to avoid unproductive approaches.[15]

In the domain of experimental psychology, an influential distinction in metacognition (proposed by T. O. Nelson & L. Narens) is between Monitoring—making judgments about the strength of one's memories—and Control—using those judgments to guide behavior (in particular, to guide study choices). Dunlosky, Serra, and Baker (2007) covered this distinction in a review of metamemory research that focused on how findings from this domain can be applied to other areas of applied research.

In the domain of cognitive neuroscience, metacognitive monitoring and control has been viewed as a function of the prefrontal cortex, which receives (monitors) sensory signals from other cortical regions and implements control using feedback loops (see chapters by Schwartz & Bacon and Shimamura, in Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008).[7]

Metacognition is studied in the domain of artificial intelligence and modelling.[16] Therefore, it is the domain of interest of emergent systemics.

Concepts and models

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Metacognition has two interacting phenomena guided by a person's cognitive regulation:[2]

  1. Metacognitive knowledge (also called metacognitive awareness) is what individuals know about themselves and others like beliefs about thinking and such, as cognitive processors.
  2. Metacognitive experiences are those experiences that have something to do with the current, on-going cognitive endeavor.

Metacognition refers to a level of thinking and metacognitive regulation, the regulation of cognition and subsequent learning experiences that help people enhance their learning through a set of activities. It involves active metacognitive control or attention over the process in learning situations. The skills that aid in regulation involve planning the way to approach a learning task, monitoring comprehension, and evaluating progress towards the completion of a task.

Metacognition includes at least three different types of metacognitive awareness when considering metacognitive knowledge:[17]

  1. Declarative knowledge: refers to knowledge about oneself as a learner and about what factors can influence one's performance.[3] Declarative knowledge can also be referred to as "world knowledge".[18]
  2. Procedural knowledge: refers to knowledge about doing things. This type of knowledge is displayed as heuristics and strategies.[3] A high degree of procedural knowledge can allow individuals to perform tasks more automatically. This is achieved through a large variety of strategies that can be accessed more efficiently.[19]
  3. Conditional knowledge: refers to knowing when and why to use declarative and procedural knowledge.[20] It allows students to allocate their resources when using strategies. This in turn allows the strategies to become more effective.[21]

These types of metacognitive knowledge also include:

  • Content knowledge (declarative knowledge), which involves understanding of one's own capabilities, such as a student evaluating their own knowledge of a subject in a class. It is notable that not all metacognition is accurate. Studies have shown that students often mistake lack of effort with understanding in evaluating themselves and their overall knowledge of a concept.[22] Also, greater confidence in having performed well is associated with less accurate metacognitive judgment of the performance.[23]
  • Task knowledge (procedural knowledge), which is how one perceives the difficulty of a task which is the content, length, and the type of assignment. The study mentioned in Content knowledge also deals with a person's ability to evaluate the difficulty of a task related to their overall performance on the task. Again, the accuracy of this knowledge was skewed as students who thought their way was better/easier also seemed to perform worse on evaluations, while students who were rigorously and continually evaluated reported to not be as confident but still did better on initial evaluations.
  • Strategic knowledge (conditional knowledge) is one's own capability for using strategies to learn information. Young children are not particularly good at this; it is not until students are in upper elementary school that they begin to develop an understanding of effective strategies.

In short, strategic knowledge involves knowing what (factual or declarative knowledge), knowing when and why (conditional or contextual knowledge) and knowing how (procedural or methodological knowledge).

Similar to metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive regulation or "regulation of cognition" contains three skills that are essential.[3][24]

  1. Planning: refers to the appropriate selection of strategies and the correct allocation of resources that affect task performance.
  2. Monitoring: refers to one's awareness of comprehension and task performance
  3. Evaluating: refers to appraising the final product of a task and the efficiency at which the task was performed. This can include re-evaluating strategies that were used.

Metacognitive control is an important skill in cognitive regulation, it is about focusing cognitive resources on relevant information.[25] Similarly, maintaining motivation to see a task to completion is also a metacognitive skill that is closely associated with the attentional control. The ability to become aware of distracting stimuli – both internal and external – and sustain effort over time also involves metacognitive or executive functions. Swanson (1990) found that metacognitive knowledge can compensate for IQ and lack of prior knowledge when comparing fifth and sixth grade students' problem solving. Students with a better metacognition were reported to have used fewer strategies, but solved problems more effectively than students with poor metacognition, regardless of IQ or prior knowledge.[26]

A lack of awareness of one's own knowledge, thoughts, feelings, and adaptive strategies leads to inefficient control over them. Hence, metacognition is a necessary life skill that needs nurturing to improve one's quality of life. Maladaptive use of metacognitive skills in response to stress can strengthen negative psychological states and social responses, potentially leading to psychosocial dysfunction. Examples of maladaptive metacognitive skills include worry based on inaccurate cognitive conceptions, rumination, and hypervigilance. Continuous cycles of negative cognitive conceptions and the associated emotional burden often lead to negative coping strategies such as avoidance and suppression. These can foster pervasive learned helplessness and impair the formation of executive functions, negatively affecting an individual's quality of life.[27]

The theory of metacognition plays a critical role in successful learning, and it's important for both students and teachers to demonstrate understanding of it. Students who underwent metacognitive training including pretesting, self evaluation, and creating study plans performed better on exams.[28] They are self-regulated learners who utilize the "right tool for the job" and modify learning strategies and skills based on their awareness of effectiveness. Individuals with a high level of metacognitive knowledge and skill identify blocks to learning as early as possible and change "tools" or strategies to ensure goal attainment. A broader repertoire of "tools" also assists in goal attainment. When "tools" are general, generic, and context independent, they are more likely to be useful in different types of learning needs. In one study examining students who received text messages during college lectures, it was suggested that students with higher metacognitive self-regulation were less likely than other students to have their learning affected by keeping mobile phones switched on in classes.[29]

Finally, there is no distinction between domain-general and domain-specific metacognitive skills. This means that metacognitive skills are domain-general in nature and there are no specific skills for certain subject areas. The metacognitive skills that are used to review an essay are the same as those that are used to verify an answer to a math question.[30]

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A number of theorists have proposed a common mechanism behind theory of mind, the ability to model and understand the mental states of others, and metacognition, which involves a theory of one's own mind's function. Direct evidence for this link is limited.[31]

Several researchers have related mindfulness to metacognition. Mindfulness includes at least two mental processes: a stream of mental events and a higher level awareness of the flow of events.[32] Mindfulness can be distinguished from some metacognition processes in that it is a conscious process.[33]: 137 

Social metacognition

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Although metacognition has thus far been discussed in relation to the self, recent research in the field has suggested that this view is overly restrictive.[34] Instead, it is argued that metacognition research should also include beliefs about others' mental processes, the influence of culture on those beliefs, and on beliefs about ourselves. This "expansionist view" proposes that it is impossible to fully understand metacognition without considering the situational norms and cultural expectations that influence those same conceptions. This combination of social psychology and metacognition is referred to as social metacognition.

Social metacognition can include ideas and perceptions that relate to social cognition. Additionally, social metacognition can include judging the cognition of others, such as judging the perceptions and emotional states of others.[34] This is in part because the process of judging others is similar to judging the self.[34] However, individuals have less information about the people they are judging; therefore, judging others tends to be more inaccurate; an effect called the fundamental attribution error.[34][35] Having similar cognitions can buffer against this inaccuracy and can be helpful for teams or organizations, as well as interpersonal relationships.

Social metacognition and the self concept

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An example of the interaction between social metacognition and self-concept can be found in examining implicit theories about the self. Implicit theories can cover a wide range of constructs about how the self operates, but two are especially relevant here; entity theory and incrementalist theory.[36] Entity theory proposes that an individual's self-attributes and abilities are fixed and stable, while incrementalist theory proposes that these same constructs can be changed through effort and experience. Entity theorists are susceptible to learned helplessness because they may feel that circumstances are outside their control (i.e. there's nothing that could have been done to make things better), thus they may give up easily. Incremental theorists react differently when faced with failure: they desire to master challenges, and therefore adopt a mastery-oriented pattern. They immediately began to consider various ways that they could approach the task differently, and they increase their efforts. Cultural beliefs can act on this as well. For example, a person who has accepted a cultural belief that memory loss is an unavoidable consequence of old age may avoid cognitively demanding tasks as they age, thus accelerating cognitive decline.[37] Similarly, a woman who is aware of the stereotype that purports that women are not good at mathematics may perform worse on tests of mathematical ability or avoid mathematics altogether.[38] These examples demonstrate that the metacognitive beliefs people hold about the self - which may be socially or culturally transmitted - can have important effects on persistence, performance, and motivation.

Attitudes as a function of social metacognition

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The way that individuals think about attitude greatly affects the way that they behave. Metacognitions about attitudes influence how individuals act, and especially how they interact with others.[39]

Some metacognitive characteristics of attitudes include importance, certainty, and perceived knowledge, and they influence behavior in different ways.[39] Attitude importance is the strongest predictor of behavior and can predict information seeking behaviors in individuals. Attitude importance is also more likely to influence behavior than certainty of the attitude.[39] When considering a social behavior like voting a person may hold high importance but low certainty. This means that they will likely vote, even if they are unsure whom to vote for. Meanwhile, a person who is very certain of who they want to vote for, may not actually vote if it is of low importance to them. This also applies to interpersonal relationships. A person might hold a lot of favorable knowledge about their family, but they may not maintain close relations with their family if it is of low importance.

Metacognitive characteristics of attitudes may be key to understanding how attitudes change. Research shows that the frequency of positive or negative thoughts is the biggest factor in attitude change.[40] A person may believe that climate change is occurring but have negative thoughts toward it such as "If I accept the responsibilities of climate change, I must change my lifestyle". These individuals would not likely change their behavior compared to someone that thinks positively about the same issue such as "By using less electricity, I will be helping the planet".

Another way to increase the likelihood of behavior change is by influencing the source of the attitude. An individual's personal thoughts and ideas have a much greater impact on the attitude compared to ideas of others.[40] Therefore, when people view lifestyle changes as coming from themselves, the effects are more powerful than if the changes were coming from a friend or family member. These thoughts can be re-framed in a way that emphasizes personal importance, such as "I want to stop smoking because it is important to me" rather than "quitting smoking is important to my family". More research needs to be conducted on culture differences and importance of group ideology, which may alter these results.

Social metacognition and stereotypes

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People have secondary cognitions about the appropriateness, justifiability, and social judgability of their own stereotypic beliefs.[41] People know that it is typically unacceptable to make stereotypical judgments and make conscious efforts not to do so. Subtle social cues can influence these conscious efforts. For example, when given a false sense of confidence about their ability to judge others, people will return to relying on social stereotypes.[42] Cultural backgrounds influence social metacognitive assumptions, including stereotypes. For example, cultures without the stereotype that memory declines with old age display no age differences in memory performance.[37]

When it comes to making judgments about other people, implicit theories about the stability versus malleability of human characteristics predict differences in social stereotyping as well. Holding an entity theory of traits increases the tendency for people to see similarity among group members and utilize stereotyped judgments. For example, compared to those holding incremental beliefs, people who hold entity beliefs of traits use more stereotypical trait judgments of ethnic and occupational groups as well as form more extreme trait judgments of new groups.[43] When an individual's assumptions about a group combine with their implicit theories, more stereotypical judgments may be formed.[44] Stereotypes that one believes others hold about them are called metastereotypes.

Animal metacognition

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In nonhuman primates

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Chimpanzees

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Beran, Smith, and Perdue (2013) found that chimpanzees showed metacognitive monitoring in the information-seeking task.[45] In their studies, three language-trained chimpanzees were asked to use the keyboard to name the food item in order to get the food. The food in the container was either visible to them or they had to move toward the container to see its contents. Studies shown that chimpanzees more often checked what was in the container first if the food in the container was hidden. But when the food was visible to them, the chimpanzees were more likely to directly approach the keyboard and reported the identity of the food without looking again in the container. Their results suggested that chimpanzees know what they have seen and show effective information-seeking behavior when information is incomplete.

Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

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Morgan et al. (2014) investigated whether rhesus macaques can make both retrospective and prospective metacognitive judgments on the same memory task.[46] Risk choices were introduced to assess the monkey's confidence about their memories. Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were trained in a computerized token economy task first in which they can accumulate tokens to exchange food rewards. Monkeys were presented with multiple images of common objects simultaneously and then a moving border appearing on the screen indicating the target. Immediately following the presentation, the target images and some distractors were shown in the test. During the training phase, monkeys received immediate feedback after they made responses. They can earn two tokens if they make correct choices but lost two tokens if they were wrong.

In Experiment 1, the confidence rating was introduced after they completed their responses in order to test the retrospective metamemory judgments. After each response, a high-risk and a low-risk choice were provided to the monkeys. They could earn one token regardless of their accuracy if they choose the low-risk option. When they chose high-risk, they were rewarded with three tokens if their memory response was correct on that trial but lost three tokens if they made incorrect responses. Morgan and colleagues (2014) found a significant positive correlation between memory accuracy and risk choice in two rhesus monkeys. That is, they were more likely to select the high-risk option if they answered correctly in the working memory task but select the low-risk option if they were failed in the memory task.

Then Morgan et al. (2014) examine monkeys’ prospective metacognitive monitoring skills in Experiment 2. This study employed the same design except that two monkeys were asked to make low-risk or high-risk confidence judgment before they make actual responses to measure their judgments about future events. Similarly, the monkeys were more often to choose high-risk confidence judgment before answering correctly in working memory task and tended to choose the low-risk option before providing an incorrect response. These two studies indicated that rhesus monkeys can accurately monitor their performance and provided evidence of metacognitive abilities in monkeys.

In rats

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In addition to nonhuman primates, other animals are also shown metacognition. Foote and Crystal (2007) provided the first evidence that rats have the knowledge of what they know in a perceptual discrimination task.[47] Rats were required to classify brief noises as short or long. Some noises with intermediate durations were difficult to discriminate as short or long. Rats were provided with an option to decline to take the test on some trials but were forced to make responses on other trials. If they chose to take the test and respond correctly, they would receive a high reward but no reward if their classification of noises was incorrect. But if the rats decline to take the test, they would be guaranteed a smaller reward. The results showed that rats were more likely to decline to take the test when the difficulty of noise discrimination increased, suggesting rats knew they do not have the correct answers and declined to take the test to receive the reward. Another finding is that the performance was better when they had chosen to take the test compared with if the rats were forced to make responses, proving that some uncertain trials were declined to improve the accuracy.

These responses pattern might be attributed to actively monitor their own mental states. Alternatively, external cues such as environmental cue associations could be used to explain their behaviors in the discrimination task. Rats might have learned the association between intermediate stimuli and the decline option over time. Longer response latencies or some features inherent to stimuli can serve as discriminative cues to decline tests. Therefore, Templer, Lee, and Preston (2017) utilized an olfactory-based delayed match to sample (DMTS) memory task to assess whether rats were capable of metacognitive responding adaptively.[48] Rats were exposed to sample odor first and chose to either decline or take the four-choice memory test after a delay. The correct choices of odor were associated with high reward and incorrect choices have no reward. The decline options were accompanied by a small reward.

In experiment 2, some “no-sample” trials were added in the memory test in which no odor was provided before the test. They hypothesized that rats would decline more often when there was no sample odor presented compared with odor presented if rats could internally assess the memory strength. Alternatively, if the decline option was motivated by external environmental cues, the rats would be less likely to decline the test because no available external cues were presented. The results showed that rats were more likely to decline the test in no-sample trials relative to normal sample trials, supporting the notion that rats can track their internal memory strength.

To rule out other potential possibilities, they also manipulated memory strength by providing the sampled odor twice and varying the retention interval between the learning and the test. Templer and colleagues (2017) found rats were less likely to decline the test if they had been exposed to the sample twice, suggesting that their memory strength for these samples was increased. Longer delayed sample test was more often declined than short delayed test because their memory was better after the short delay. Overall, their series of studies demonstrated that rats could distinguish between remembering and forgetting and rule out the possibilities that decline use was modulated by the external cues such as environmental cue associations.

In pigeons

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Research on metacognition of pigeons has shown limited success. Inman and Shettleworth (1999) employed the delayed match to sample (DMTS) procedure to test pigeons’ metacognition.[49] Pigeons were presented with one of three sample shapes (a triangle, a square, or a star) and then they were required to peck the matched sample when three stimuli simultaneously appeared on the screen at the end of the retention interval. A safe key was also presented in some trials next to three sample stimuli which allow them to decline that trial. Pigeons received a high reward for pecking correct stimuli, a middle-level reward for pecking the safe key, and nothing if they pecked the wrong stimuli. Inman and Shettleworth's first experiment found that pigeons’ accuracies were lower and they were more likely to choose the safe key as the retention interval between presentation of stimuli and test increased. However, in Experiment 2, when pigeons were presented with the option to escape or take the test before the test phase, there was no relationship between choosing the safe key and longer retention interval. Adams and Santi (2011) also employed the DMTS procedure in a perceptual discrimination task during which pigeons were trained to discriminate between durations of illumination.[50] Pigeons did not choose the escape option more often as the retention interval increased during initial testing. After extended training, they learned to escape the difficult trials. However, these patterns might be attributed to the possibility that pigeons learned the association between escape responses and longer retention delay.[51]

In addition to DMTS paradigm, Castro and Wasserman (2013) proved that pigeons can exhibit adaptive and efficient information-seeking behavior in the same-different discrimination task.[52] Two arrays of items were presented simultaneously in which the two sets of items were either identical or different from one another. Pigeons were required to distinguish between the two arrays of items in which the level of difficulty was varied. Pigeons were provided with an “Information” button and a “Go” button on some trials that they could increase the number of items in the arrays to make the discrimination easier or they can prompt to make responses by pecking the Go button. Castro and Wasserman found that the more difficult the task, the more often pigeons chose the information button to solve the discrimination task. This behavioral pattern indicated that pigeons could evaluate the difficulty of the task internally and actively search for information when is necessary.

In dogs

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Dogs have shown a certain level of metacognition that they are sensitive to information they have acquired or not. Belger & Bräuer (2018) examined whether dogs could seek additional information when facing uncertain situations.[53] The experimenter put the reward behind one of the two fences in which dogs can see or cannot see where the reward was hidden. After that, dogs were encouraged to find the reward by walking around one fence. The dogs checked more frequently before selecting the fence when they did not see the baiting process compared with when they saw where the reward was hidden. However, contrary to apes,[54] dogs did not show more checking behaviors when the delay between baiting the reward and selecting the fence was longer. Their findings suggested that dogs have some aspect of information-searching behaviors but less flexibly compared to apes.

In dolphins

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Smith et al. (1995) evaluated whether dolphins have the ability of metacognitive monitoring in an auditory threshold paradigm.[55] A bottlenosed dolphin was trained to discriminate between high-frequency tones and low-frequency tones. An escape option was available on some trials associated with a small reward. Their studies showed that dolphins could appropriately use the uncertain response when the trials were difficult to discriminate.

Debate

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There is consensus that nonhuman primates, especially great apes and rhesus monkeys, exhibit metacognitive control and monitoring behaviors.[56] But less convergent evidence was found in other animals such as rats and pigeons.[57] Some researchers criticized these methods and posited that these performances might be accounted for by low-level conditioning mechanisms.[58] Animals learned the association between reward and external stimuli through simple reinforcement models. However, many studies have demonstrated that the reinforcement model alone cannot explain animals’ behavioral patterns. Animals have shown adaptive metacognitive behavior even with the absence of concrete reward.[59][60]

Strategies

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Metacognitive-like processes are especially ubiquitous when it comes to the discussion of self-regulated learning. Self-regulation requires metacognition by looking at one's awareness of their learning and planning further learning methodology.[61] Attentive metacognition is a salient feature of good self-regulated learners, but does not guarantee automatic application.[62] Reinforcing collective discussion of metacognition is a salient feature of self-critical and self-regulating social groups.[62] The activities of strategy selection and application include those concerned with an ongoing attempt to plan, check, monitor, select, revise, evaluate, etc.

Metacognition is 'stable' in that learners' initial decisions derive from the pertinent facts about their cognition through years of learning experience. Simultaneously, it is also 'situated' in the sense that it depends on learners' familiarity with the task, motivation, emotion, and so forth. Individuals need to regulate their thoughts about the strategy they are using and adjust it based on the situation to which the strategy is being applied. At a professional level, this has led to emphasis on the development of reflective practice, particularly in the education and health-care professions.

Recently, the notion has been applied to the study of second language learners in the field of TESOL and applied linguistics in general (e.g., Wenden, 1987; Zhang, 2001, 2010). This new development has been much related to Flavell (1979), where the notion of metacognition is elaborated within a tripartite theoretical framework. Learner metacognition is defined and investigated by examining their person knowledge, task knowledge and strategy knowledge.

Wenden (1991) has proposed and used this framework and Zhang (2001) has adopted this approach and investigated second language learners' metacognition or metacognitive knowledge. In addition to exploring the relationships between learner metacognition and performance, researchers are also interested in the effects of metacognitively-oriented strategic instruction on reading comprehension (e.g., Garner, 1994, in first language contexts, and Chamot, 2005; Zhang, 2010). The efforts are aimed at developing learner autonomy, interdependence and self-regulation.

Metacognition helps people to perform many cognitive tasks more effectively.[1] Strategies for promoting metacognition include self-questioning (e.g. "What do I already know about this topic? How have I solved problems like this before?"), thinking aloud while performing a task, and making graphic representations (e.g. concept maps, flow charts, semantic webs) of one's thoughts and knowledge. Carr, 2002, argues that the physical act of writing plays a large part in the development of metacognitive skills.[63]

Strategy Evaluation matrices (SEM) can help to improve the knowledge of cognition component of metacognition. The SEM works by identifying the declarative (Column 1), procedural (Column 2) and conditional (Column 3 and 4) knowledge about specific strategies. The SEM can help individuals identify the strength and weaknesses about certain strategies as well as introduce them to new strategies that they can add to their repertoire.[64]

A regulation checklist (RC) is a useful strategy for improving the regulation of cognition aspect of one's metacognition. RCs help individuals to implement a sequence of thoughts that allow them to go over their own metacognition.[64] King (1991) found that fifth-grade students who used a regulation checklist outperformed control students when looking at a variety of questions including written problem solving, asking strategic questions, and elaborating information.[65]

Examples of strategies that can be taught to students are word analysis skills, active reading strategies, listening skills, organizational skills and creating mnemonic devices.[66]

Walker and Walker have developed a model of metacognition in school learning termed Steering Cognition, which describes the capacity of the mind to exert conscious control over its reasoning and processing strategies in relation to the external learning task. Studies have shown that pupils with an ability to exert metacognitive regulation over their attentional and reasoning strategies used when engaged in maths, and then shift those strategies when engaged in science or then English literature learning, associate with higher academic outcomes at secondary school.

Metastrategic knowledge

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"Metastrategic knowledge" (MSK) is a sub-component of metacognition that is defined as general knowledge about higher order thinking strategies. MSK had been defined as "general knowledge about the cognitive procedures that are being manipulated". The knowledge involved in MSK consists of "making generalizations and drawing rules regarding a thinking strategy" and of "naming" the thinking strategy.[67]

The important conscious act of a metastrategic strategy is the "conscious" awareness that one is performing a form of higher order thinking. MSK is an awareness of the type of thinking strategies being used in specific instances and it consists of the following abilities: making generalizations and drawing rules regarding a thinking strategy, naming the thinking strategy, explaining when, why and how such a thinking strategy should be used, when it should not be used, what are the disadvantages of not using appropriate strategies, and what task characteristics call for the use of the strategy.[68]

MSK deals with the broader picture of the conceptual problem. It creates rules to describe and understand the physical world around the people who utilize these processes called higher-order thinking. This is the capability of the individual to take apart complex problems in order to understand the components in problem. These are the building blocks to understanding the "big picture" (of the main problem) through reflection and problem solving.[69]

Action

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Both social and cognitive dimensions of sporting expertise can be adequately explained from a metacognitive perspective according to recent research. The potential of metacognitive inferences and domain-general skills including psychological skills training are integral to the genesis of expert performance. Moreover, the contribution of both mental imagery (e.g., mental practice) and attentional strategies (e.g., routines) to our understanding of expertise and metacognition is noteworthy.[70] The potential of metacognition to illuminate our understanding of action was first highlighted by Aidan Moran who discussed the role of meta-attention in 1996.[71] A recent research initiative, a research seminar series called META funded by the BPS, is exploring the role of the related constructs of meta-motivation, meta-emotion, and thinking and action (metacognition).

Mental illness

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In the context of mental health, metacognition can be loosely defined as the process that "reinforces one's subjective sense of being a self and allows for becoming aware that some of one's thoughts and feelings are symptoms of an illness".[72] The interest in metacognition emerged from a concern for an individual's ability to understand their own mental status compared to others as well as the ability to cope with the source of their distress.[73] These insights into an individual's mental health status can have a profound effect on overall prognosis and recovery. Metacognition brings many unique insights into the normal daily functioning of a human being. It also demonstrates that a lack of these insights compromises 'normal' functioning. This leads to less healthy functioning. In the autism spectrum, it is speculated that there is a profound deficit in theory of mind.[74] In people who identify as alcoholics, there is a belief that the need to control cognition is an independent predictor of alcohol use over anxiety. Alcohol may be used as a coping strategy for controlling unwanted thoughts and emotions formed by negative perceptions.[75] This is sometimes referred to as self medication.

Implications

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Adrian Wells' and Gerald Matthews' theory proposes that when faced with an undesired choice, an individual can operate in two distinct modes: "object" and "metacognitive".[76] Object mode interprets perceived stimuli as truth, where metacognitive mode understands thoughts as cues that have to be weighted and evaluated. They are not as easily trusted. There are targeted interventions unique of each patient, that gives rise to the belief that assistance in increasing metacognition in people diagnosed with schizophrenia is possible through tailored psychotherapy. With a customized therapy in place, clients then have the potential to develop greater ability to engage in complex self-reflection.[77] This can ultimately be pivotal in the patient's recovery process. In the obsessive–compulsive spectrum, cognitive formulations have greater attention to intrusive thoughts related to the disorder. "Cognitive self-consciousness" are the tendencies to focus attention on thought. Patients with OCD exemplify varying degrees of these "intrusive thoughts". Patients also with generalized anxiety disorder also show negative thought process in their cognition.[78]

Cognitive-attentional syndrome (CAS) characterizes a metacognitive model of emotion disorder (CAS is consistent with the attention strategy of excessively focusing on the source of a threat).[79][80] This ultimately develops through the client's own beliefs. Metacognitive therapy attempts to correct this change in the CAS. One of the techniques in this model is called attention training (ATT).[81][82] It was designed to diminish the worry and anxiety by a sense of control and cognitive awareness. ATT also trains clients to detect threats and test how controllable reality appears to be.[83]

Following the work of Asher Koriat,[84] who regards confidence as central aspect of metacognition, metacognitive training for psychosis aims at decreasing overconfidence in patients with schizophrenia and raising awareness of cognitive biases. According to a meta-analysis,[85] this type of intervention improves delusions and hallucinations.

Works of art as metacognitive artifacts

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The concept of metacognition has also been applied to reader-response criticism. Narrative works of art, including novels, movies and musical compositions, can be characterized as metacognitive artifacts which are designed by the artist to anticipate and regulate the beliefs and cognitive processes of the recipient,[86] for instance, how and in which order events and their causes and identities are revealed to the reader of a detective story. As Menakhem Perry has pointed out, mere order has profound effects on the aesthetical meaning of a text.[87] Narrative works of art contain a representation of their own ideal reception process. They are something of a tool with which the creators of the work wish to attain certain aesthetical and even moral effects.[88]

Mind wandering

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There is an intimate, dynamic interplay between mind wandering and metacognition. Metacognition serves to correct the wandering mind, suppressing spontaneous thoughts and bringing attention back to more "worthwhile" tasks.[32][89]

Organizational metacognition

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The concept of metacognition has also been applied to collective teams and organizations in general, termed organizational metacognition.

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Metacognition refers to the awareness of one's own and the ability to understand, control, and manipulate one's cognitive processes, encompassing both about and the of cognitive activities. The term was coined by developmental psychologist in 1976 and further elaborated in his seminal 1979 paper, where he described it as a form of cognitive monitoring essential for developmental inquiry. At its core, metacognition comprises two primary components: metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive . Metacognitive knowledge includes of person variables (such as individual strengths and limitations in thinking), task variables (characteristics of the learning task that influence ), and strategy variables (methods to achieve cognitive objectives). Metacognitive , on the other hand, involves active processes like planning an approach to a task, monitoring ongoing comprehension and progress, and evaluating outcomes to adjust strategies as needed. These elements enable individuals to reflect on their mental activities, often summarized as "thinking about thinking." Metacognition is fundamental to effective learning and problem-solving across educational and professional contexts, as it fosters and improves academic performance. Research indicates that learners with strong metacognitive skills are better able to select appropriate strategies, persist through challenges, and transfer knowledge to new situations, making it a key target for instructional interventions in both children and adults. In neuroscientific perspectives, metacognition also links to regions involved in detection and , highlighting its role beyond in broader cognitive and social functions.

Fundamentals

Definitions

Metacognition refers to the processes by which individuals become aware of and gain control over their own activities, often described as "thinking about one's own thinking." This encompasses both of —such as understanding one's capabilities and limitations—and the regulation of , including monitoring progress and adjusting strategies during tasks. The term was introduced by developmental John Flavell in 1976, who framed metacognition as involving interactions among person variables ( about oneself and others as thinkers), task variables (characteristics of the task), and strategy variables (methods for approaching tasks). Metacognitive knowledge is typically categorized into three types: declarative (knowing facts about , such as recognizing that aids ), procedural (knowing how to apply cognitive strategies, like outlining a text to improve comprehension), and conditional (knowing when and why to use particular strategies, such as choosing summarization for complex material over rote repetition). In contrast, metacognitive experiences involve subjective feelings and judgments that arise during cognitive activities, including feelings of knowing (a that one will recognize correct information upon retrieval) and judgments of learning (assessments of how well material has been mastered). These experiences provide online feedback that informs regulatory decisions. Practical examples illustrate these elements: a might monitor their comprehension while reading by pausing to summarize key points in their mind (a metacognitive experience tied to regulation), or adjust study time by allocating more effort to difficult topics based on an assessment of task demands (drawing on conditional ). Metacognition overlaps with , such as and , which support these reflective processes in everyday .

Historical Development

The roots of metacognition trace back to in the 4th century BCE, where thinkers emphasized self-examination and reflection on . promoted the idea of the "," asserting that unreflective existence lacks value and advocating continuous self-questioning to achieve and wisdom. Similarly, explored the nature of (epistēmē), distinguishing practical from theoretical and highlighting the role of self-reflective intellectual processes in understanding one's own mental activities. In the early 20th century, advanced these ideas through during the 1920s to 1950s. Piaget introduced the concept of reflective abstraction, a mechanism by which individuals reflect on their actions and experiences to construct higher-order cognitive structures, laying groundwork for later metacognitive theories by emphasizing the internalization of thought processes. The modern field of metacognition emerged in the 1970s with John Flavell's foundational contributions. In his 1976 paper, Flavell coined the term "metacognition" to describe knowledge about one's own cognitive processes and their regulation during problem-solving, marking a shift toward empirical study in cognitive developmental psychology. He expanded this in a 1979 article, outlining metacognition as involving active monitoring and control of , which spurred widespread research on children's cognitive self-regulation. During the 1980s and 1990s, metacognition integrated more deeply with , particularly through studies on and . Ann L. Brown (1978) investigated how children develop awareness of their memory capabilities, demonstrating age-related improvements in monitoring recall effectiveness and applying strategies adaptively. From the 2000s onward, research shifted toward , employing fMRI to examine mechanisms underlying metacognitive judgments; for instance, Fleming et al. (2010) correlated variations in anterior structure with differences in metacognitive sensitivity across perceptual tasks. This neuroscientific turn has also extended briefly to animal models, revealing comparative insights into metacognitive-like behaviors.

Theoretical Frameworks

Key Concepts and Models

One of the foundational models in metacognition is the framework proposed by Nelson and Narens, which conceptualizes metacognition as involving two interacting levels: the object-level, representing ongoing cognitive processes, and the meta-level, which monitors and regulates those processes. In this model, monitoring flows from the meta-level to the object-level, providing awareness of cognitive states such as confidence in retrieval, while control flows in the opposite direction, adjusting object-level activities based on meta-level evaluations, such as deciding to allocate more study time. This bidirectional interaction enables dynamic regulation, with empirical tests showing its application in judgments like feeling-of-knowing experiences. Flavell's influential 1979 model expands metacognition into a system of four interrelated components that facilitate cognitive monitoring and self-regulation. Metacognitive encompasses awareness of one's cognitive capabilities (person variables), task characteristics (e.g., difficulty), and effective strategies (strategy variables). Metacognitive experiences involve momentary cognitive or affective reactions during tasks, such as surprise or ease, which inform ongoing adjustments. Goals or tasks define the cognitive enterprise, like comprehending a text, while actions include both cognitive strategies (e.g., ) and metacognitive strategies (e.g., checking comprehension). These elements interact recursively, with experiences and influencing and action selection to optimize performance. Building on earlier work, Schraw and Moshman's integrative model organizes metacognition into and components, emphasizing three types of metacognitive : declarative (what one knows about , such as task demands), procedural (how to apply , enabling execution), and conditional (when and why to use , supporting adaptive choice). This framework posits that metacognitive theories—tacit (implicit), informal (explicit but unstructured), or formal (systematic)—guide by integrating to evaluate and direct cognitive processes, with development progressing from basic awareness to sophisticated self-theories. Process-oriented approaches, such as Pintrich's 2000 framework for metacognitive regulation in self-regulated learning, structure metacognition across four sequential phases: forethought (planning and goal activation), monitoring (tracking progress), control (adjusting strategies), and reflection (evaluating outcomes). Within these phases, metacognitive regulation involves assessing comprehension, effort, and task fit to enhance learning efficacy. Empirical support for these models comes from studies on metacognitive accuracy in perceptual tasks, where participants judge their own performance reliability. For instance, demonstrates metacognitive inefficiency, with confidence ratings often underestimating or overestimating actual accuracy due to noise in meta-level representations, as quantified by meta-d' measures showing systematic biases across trials. studies further corroborate prefrontal involvement in monitoring perceptual choices, aligning with model predictions of meta-level control. Metamemory represents a specific of metacognition, focusing on individuals' , monitoring, and control of their own processes. Introduced as part of the broader metacognitive framework, encompasses judgments about capabilities, such as ease-of-learning predictions and assessments. A key example is the feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgment, where individuals assess the likelihood of recognizing an unrecalled item in a future test, which relies on monitoring the strength of traces and influences retrieval strategies. This subprocess highlights metacognition's domain-specific applications, distinguishing it from general cognitive by targeting memory accuracy and regulation. Executive functions share considerable overlap with metacognition in terms of regulatory mechanisms, both involving the orchestration of cognitive resources to achieve goals, but metacognition uniquely emphasizes reflective awareness and subjective evaluation of those processes. , such as inhibition, updating, and task switching, primarily handle automatic control and conflict resolution, often without explicit . In contrast, metacognition adds a layer of conscious monitoring, enabling individuals to appraise their performance and adjust strategies accordingly. evidence points to shared involvement of the (PFC) in both, with regions like the dorsolateral PFC supporting executive control and the rostrolateral PFC facilitating metacognitive judgments of decision confidence. This distinction underscores that while provide the machinery for regulation, metacognition involves meta-level awareness of that machinery's operation. Theory of mind (ToM) differs from metacognition primarily in its focus on interpersonal versus intrapersonal mental state attribution, with ToM enabling inferences about others' beliefs, intentions, and perspectives, whereas metacognition pertains to self-directed awareness of one's own cognitive states. ToM operates in social contexts, supporting empathy and prediction of others' behavior through mentalizing networks involving the temporoparietal junction and medial PFC. Metacognition, by comparison, is intrapersonal, involving self-monitoring of thought processes without necessitating social inference. Although both may recruit overlapping frontal regions for higher-order processing, their functional boundaries remain distinct: ToM is other-oriented and predictive of external actions, while metacognition is self-oriented and evaluative of internal cognition. Self-regulation constitutes a broader construct than metacognition, encompassing the directed of cognitive, motivational, behavioral, and emotional processes to attain personal goals, with metacognition serving as a critical subprocess for monitoring and adjusting those efforts. In models of , metacognition provides the reflective component—such as planning, evaluating progress, and adapting strategies—within a cyclic framework that also includes forethought, performance, and phases influenced by environmental and motivational factors. Self-regulation thus extends beyond metacognitive awareness to include volitional control and sustained effort, integrating metacognition with affective and behavioral elements for comprehensive goal pursuit. Metacomprehension applies metacognitive principles specifically to the monitoring and control of text comprehension, involving predictions and judgments about one's understanding of written material, often revealing systematic inaccuracies in . Studies demonstrate that individuals tend to overestimate their grasp of texts, with relative accuracy—measured as the between predicted and actual comprehension test performance—averaging around 0.27 across multiple experiments, indicating moderate but imperfect . Factors such as absolute levels influence , where higher overall reduces sensitivity to errors without improving resolution of judgments. This domain-specific application underscores metacognition's role in learning from texts, highlighting the need for interventions to enhance monitoring accuracy and subsequent study adjustments.

Components and Processes

Metacognitive Strategies

Metacognitive strategies refer to the deliberate techniques individuals employ to regulate their own cognitive processes, enabling more effective learning and problem-solving. These strategies are typically divided into three primary phases: planning, , which help learners actively manage their approach to tasks. This framework, originally outlined in foundational work on metacognition, emphasizes the orchestration of cognitive efforts to achieve goals. Planning strategies involve setting clear objectives and analyzing tasks prior to engagement, such as breaking down complex problems into manageable steps or selecting suitable methods based on the task's demands. For instance, before preparing for an exam, a might outline key topics, allocate study time, and choose techniques like outlining or diagramming to organize . These preparatory actions enhance efficiency by aligning cognitive resources with anticipated challenges. Monitoring strategies occur during task execution and entail ongoing to track progress and comprehension. Common practices include self-questioning, such as asking "Do I understand this concept?" while reading a text, or pausing to summarize key points mentally. This real-time awareness allows individuals to detect difficulties early and make mid-course adjustments, like re-reading confusing sections or seeking clarification. Evaluation strategies take place after task completion, focusing on reflecting on outcomes to assess and inform future efforts. This might involve reviewing what worked well in a study session, identifying gaps in understanding, and modifying approaches for subsequent tasks, such as switching from rote memorization to relational mapping if retention was poor. Such post-task analysis promotes over time. In educational contexts, metacognitive strategies often integrate with specific techniques to bolster retention and understanding. Mnemonics, for example, aid by creating structured aids like acronyms for lists, while summarization during monitoring helps condense to verify grasp. Elaboration strategies, such as connecting new material to prior through analogies, support by revealing deeper insights into learning successes or failures. These methods are particularly effective when taught explicitly to students. Empirical evidence underscores the benefits of training in metacognitive strategies. A of 74 intervention studies at primary and secondary levels found that programs emphasizing strategy components like , yielded an average of 0.69 on academic performance, with higher impacts when trainings included reflection and were delivered by researchers rather than teachers. This indicates that targeted instruction in these strategies significantly enhances and outcomes across subjects.

Metastrategic Knowledge

Metastrategic knowledge, a key component of metacognitive knowledge, refers to an individual's explicit awareness and understanding of cognitive strategies, including their relative effectiveness and the conditions under which they are most appropriate. This includes conditional knowledge, such as recognizing that outlining is more effective for comprehending complex texts than for simple narratives, enabling learners to tailor approaches to task demands. It is categorized into three main types: , which involves knowing what exist and their general purposes; , which concerns how to execute those ; and conditional knowledge, which addresses when and why a particular should be applied in varying contexts. These types facilitate flexible selection, distinguishing metastrategic knowledge from mere strategy use by emphasizing meta-awareness of strategic options. Developmentally, metastrategic knowledge emerges notably in children around ages 8 to 10, coinciding with advances in and broader metacognitive abilities, as evidenced by longitudinal studies tracking strategy awareness and application in tasks. Prior to this, younger children exhibit limited conditional understanding, but by middle childhood, they demonstrate growing ability to evaluate strategy utility, supporting improved . In applications, metastrategic knowledge contributes to adaptive expertise by enabling individuals to dynamically choose and modify strategies based on situational demands, particularly in complex problem-solving domains like chess, where players assess opponent patterns to select optimal opening or mid-game tactics. This awareness enhances performance across varied challenges, from academic tasks to professional , by promoting strategic flexibility over rote application.

Metacognitive Monitoring and Control

Metacognitive monitoring involves the ongoing assessment of one's cognitive processes and performance during task execution, allowing individuals to evaluate the ease or difficulty of learning and recall in real time. This process operates within a dual-level framework where the meta-level observes the object-level , providing judgments such as ease-of-learning (EOL) ratings, in which learners predict how quickly they will comprehend new material based on initial exposure. For instance, during study sessions, a might rate a vocabulary word as easy to learn if it feels familiar, influencing subsequent study decisions. Metacognitive control refers to the regulatory actions taken in response to these monitoring judgments, adjusting cognitive efforts to optimize . This includes decisions like prolonging study time on items judged as difficult or skipping those perceived as mastered, thereby directing resources efficiently. In Nelson and Narens' influential model, monitoring informs control through a feedback loop, where meta-level evaluations influence object-level actions, such as terminating a search when confidence thresholds are met. Such controls enhance learning outcomes by adapting to perceived progress, distinct from predefined strategies. Despite its utility, metacognitive monitoring often suffers from accuracy limitations, notably overconfidence bias, where individuals overestimate their comprehension or recall abilities. This bias manifests in judgments like EOL or judgments of learning (JOL), leading to understudying and poorer retention. Accuracy is commonly measured using the gamma correlation, a nonparametric index that assesses the correspondence between predicted and actual performance, with values above 0 indicating better-than-chance resolution; however, typical gammas in memory tasks hover around 0.4-0.6, reflecting persistent overconfidence. Nelson's 1984 work established gamma as a robust metric, emphasizing its insensitivity to response biases. Neurologically, metacognitive monitoring and control engage the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), particularly its dorsal region, which detects errors and uncertainties to signal the need for adjustments. The ACC integrates conflict signals from ongoing , facilitating shifts in control, such as increased attention to challenging tasks. studies show ACC activation correlating with metacognitive sensitivity during , underscoring its role in bridging monitoring outputs to control inputs. This neural mechanism supports adaptive behavior by linking performance discrepancies to regulatory responses.

Human Applications

Social Metacognition

Social metacognition encompasses the reflective processes individuals employ to monitor and regulate their own and others' social cognitions in interpersonal settings, such as evaluating the accuracy of impressions formed about others or detecting personal biases in social judgments. This involves metacognitive monitoring to assess the validity of social inferences and control mechanisms to adjust biased thinking, thereby influencing how people form and maintain relationships. For instance, in impression formation, individuals may metacognitively track the influence of initial stereotypes on their evaluations, prompting corrections to achieve more balanced perceptions. A key link exists between social metacognition and , where heightened self-focused attention fosters objective , enabling individuals to critically examine their self-perceptions and their impact on social identity. According to Duval and Wicklund's theory, this objective self-awareness arises when external cues direct attention inward, leading to a discrepancy between actual and ideal self-views that motivates behavioral adjustments in social contexts. Such reflective processes enhance metacognitive understanding of how self-perceptions shape interactions with others, promoting greater alignment between internal states and social roles. In the domain of attitudes, the metacognitive model of attitudes (MCM), developed by Petty, posits that attitudes are not merely evaluative content but also include metacognitive elements like confidence in the attitude's validity, which determine its resistance to persuasion. Under this model, individuals perform validity checks on their attitudes during social influence attempts; low-confidence attitudes are more susceptible to change, while high-confidence ones guide behavior more reliably in interpersonal scenarios. This framework highlights how metacognitive awareness of attitude strength affects social decision-making and conformity. Regarding , Monteith's illustrates how metacognitive monitoring enables the control of stereotypic responses, particularly among those with egalitarian values who experience discomfort from prejudiced thoughts. In her studies, low-prejudice individuals detect discrepancies between their stereotypic intrusions and personal standards, triggering self-regulatory efforts to suppress and redirect thinking, thus reducing bias expression in social interactions. This meta-awareness process underscores social metacognition's role in fostering reduction through ongoing evaluation and correction of biased cognitions.

Metacognition in Mental Health

Metacognitive deficits play a significant role in the of various psychological disorders, particularly , where impairments in and self-reflectivity hinder accurate awareness of one's thoughts and intentions. In , individuals often exhibit reduced metacognitive capacity, leading to difficulties in forming integrated representations of their mental states, which contributes to symptoms like delusions and poor . For instance, impaired source monitoring—distinguishing internally generated thoughts from external stimuli—is a core metacognitive dysfunction that exacerbates psychotic experiences. In depression, metacognitive dysregulations manifest as persistent rumination, characterized by repetitive, uncontrolled focus on negative thoughts, which represents a in metacognitive control to disengage from maladaptive cognitive processes. This rumination is driven by metacognitive beliefs that such thinking is helpful for problem-solving, perpetuating depressive symptoms through extended cycles of distress. supports that positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination predict its maintenance and the severity of depressive episodes. For anxiety disorders, the metacognitive model posits that worry is sustained by positive metacognitive beliefs about the utility of worrying as a coping strategy, alongside negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger of intrusive thoughts, as outlined in Wells' framework. This model, developed by Wells in 1995, with application to GAD outlined in a 1997 paper by Wells and Butler, emphasizes how these beliefs lead to meta-worry—worry about worrying itself—entrenched in generalized anxiety disorder. Metacognitive therapy (MCT), developed by Wells in the 1990s and further detailed in his 2009 book, targets these dysregulations through techniques like detached and attention training, aiming to disrupt maladaptive metacognitive cycles without directly challenging content. MCT promotes flexible thinking styles by fostering awareness of cognitive processes as transient events, reducing reliance on and rumination. Evidence from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) indicates that metacognitive training improves insight, reduces symptom severity, and enhances functioning in disorders like and anxiety, with meta-analyses showing moderate to large effect sizes compared to control conditions. Recent meta-analyses as of continue to support these findings, showing moderate to large effect sizes for metacognitive interventions across psychiatric disorders. For example, MCT has demonstrated sustained reductions in delusions and cognitive biases, underscoring its potential as an adjunctive intervention to boost metacognitive regulation and recovery.

Organizational Metacognition

Organizational metacognition refers to the collective monitoring and regulation of cognitive processes within groups or institutions, extending individual metacognitive abilities to shared knowledge and dynamics. This involves teams developing of their collective thinking patterns, including how is processed, shared, and adapted in professional contexts. Unlike individual metacognition, it emphasizes emergent group-level phenomena where members collectively reflect on and adjust organizational knowledge flows to enhance efficacy. A core aspect of team metacognition is the development of shared mental models, which represent collective understandings of tasks, roles, and processes that facilitate coordinated . These models enable teams to anticipate each other's actions and align efforts, particularly in dynamic environments. For instance, demonstrates that teams with higher congruence in task- and team-based mental models exhibit improved process efficiency and overall . Such shared representations are foundational to metacognitive at the group level, allowing teams to monitor progress and intervene when discrepancies arise. In organizational settings, metacognition supports by promoting reflection on information-sharing practices, such as evaluating the effectiveness of communication channels and adapting strategies to reduce . This reflective approach fosters a of intentional learning, where organizations assess what is accessible, how it is utilized, and barriers to its dissemination. For example, teams engaging in metacognitive building actively share and integrate information, leading to more robust collective insights compared to passive exchange. Empirical evidence highlights the performance advantages of metacognitive teams in complex tasks. Field experiments in collaborative environments show that group metacognition significantly boosts outcomes by enhancing and coordination, outperforming teams reliant on individual-level monitoring alone. Similarly, studies from the 2010s, including simulations of high-stakes operations, indicate that metacognitively aware teams achieve superior results in multifaceted scenarios due to better and error detection.

Metacognition in Animals

Evidence in Nonhuman

Studies on nonhuman primates have provided compelling behavioral evidence for metacognitive abilities, particularly in monitoring and in perceptual and numerical tasks. In chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), research has demonstrated uncertainty monitoring during judgments using token-based choice paradigms. For instance, when faced with ambiguous numerical comparisons between sets of food items or tokens, chimpanzees adjusted their decisions based on prior reward experiences, opting for safer choices when uncertain about the larger , which suggests an ability to assess the reliability of their own judgments. Similar evidence emerges from perceptual metacognition tasks in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). In signal detection paradigms, macaques were trained to report whether they remembered a previously viewed stimulus, with the option to "" of difficult trials by selecting an escape response. Hampton's 2001 study showed that macaques selectively opted out on trials where memory was weak, leading to higher accuracy on committed responses compared to chance levels, indicating confidence-based monitoring of their perceptual states. Neuroscientific investigations further support these behavioral findings by revealing parallels in brain activity between primates and humans during metacognitive processes. (fMRI) studies in monkeys have identified activation in the frontopolar during tasks requiring metacognitive evaluation of non-experienced or uncertain events, such as judgments about or perceptual decisions. This region, homologous to human prefrontal areas involved in , showed selective impairment in metacognitive accuracy when temporarily silenced, underscoring its causal role in integrating subjective with task performance.

Evidence in Other Species

Studies on metacognition in non-primate species have revealed behaviors suggestive of uncertainty monitoring and information-seeking, extending beyond to , birds, and marine mammals. In rats, evidence comes from tasks where animals of or seek to resolve . For instance, in a duration-discrimination task, rats were trained to classify short or long durations of a stimulus for , but on some trials, they could press a "decline" to escape difficult discriminations near the boundary between short and long. Rats selectively declined trials with intermediate durations, indicating sensitivity to their own uncertainty about the correct response, which increased as task difficulty rose. This behavior was not explained by simple perceptual cues, supporting an interpretation of metacognitive-like monitoring in . Although early studies used perceptual tasks, later work explored information-seeking in spatial contexts like the radial arm maze, where rats pressed a to reveal cues about reward locations in uncertain arms, avoiding exploration without information. This proactive seeking of cues before choosing arms demonstrated that rats adjust based on perceived gaps, akin to metacognitive . Such findings highlight simpler, adaptive manifestations of metacognition in compared to more complex analogs. In birds, pigeons have shown metacognition-like responses in memory tasks using delay-of-choice procedures. In a delayed matching-to-sample , pigeons viewed a sample stimulus and, after a retention interval, chose between matching the sample or opting for an "uncertain" response that postponed the , effectively extending the delay to boost . Pigeons more frequently selected the delay option on trials with longer retention intervals or when was weaker, leading to higher accuracy on subsequent choices. This strategic adjustment suggests pigeons monitor their memory strength and control task engagement accordingly. Dogs exhibit uncertainty signals in social contexts, such as vocalizations and gaze alternation toward humans during ambiguous situations. In uncertainty monitoring tasks, dogs faced choices between two identical objects hiding food, but when uncertain, they looked toward their owner more often and produced whines or barks, behaviors that increased with task difficulty. These communicative acts imply dogs recognize their lack of information and seek human assistance to resolve it, paralleling metacognitive help-seeking in humans. Although not always replicated in non-social paradigms, this sensitivity to personal uncertainty underscores metacognition's role in canine social cognition. Marine mammals like demonstrate metacognitive in perceptual . In an auditory pitch- task, a classified tones as high or low for reinforcement, with an "escape" option to avoid trials. The dolphin used the escape response more on near-threshold trials where was , reducing errors and maintaining high overall performance. This pattern, robust across sessions, indicated the dolphin monitored its perceptual and regulated participation, providing early evidence of metacognition in cetaceans. Similar escape behaviors appeared in visual tasks, reinforcing the dolphin's to signal .

Debates on Animal Metacognition

One central debate in animal metacognition concerns the behavioral interpretation problem, where observed uncertainty-monitoring behaviors in animals may be attributable to low-level perceptual or associative cues rather than genuine meta-. Skeptics argue that performances in tasks like perceptual can be explained by simple or stimulus-response associations, without invoking higher-order cognitive monitoring. For instance, Carruthers (2008) contends that apparent metacognitive judgments in monkeys and other species can be parsimoniously accounted for by first-order theories of under , such as signal detection processes that do not require self-reflective . This emphasizes the risk of anthropomorphic overinterpretation, urging researchers to rule out such alternatives through controlled experiments that isolate meta-level processes. Evolutionary arguments further complicate the debate, positing a gradual emergence of metacognitive abilities across species, with more robust evidence in due to their complex social and ecological demands. Proponents suggest that metacognition likely evolved to enhance adaptive in uncertain environments, but its presence varies phylogenetically, appearing strongest in great apes and old-world monkeys where cognitive demands for tool use and social navigation are high. Metcalfe (2009) proposes that metacognition represents a relatively recent evolutionary , primarily in humans and select , enabling escape from stimulus-bound behavior through prospective monitoring of cognitive states. However, this view is contested by evidence of similar behaviors in birds and , raising questions about whether these reflect homologous metacognitive mechanisms or convergent low-level adaptations. Methodological issues underscore the challenges in distinguishing true metacognition from behavioral mimics, particularly the reliance on non-verbal paradigms designed for animals. Tasks such as uncertainty monitoring, where subjects can opt out of difficult trials to seek more information or avoid penalties, have become standard for probing metacognitive control without linguistic demands. Smith et al. (2003) introduced this approach in studies with rhesus monkeys and a dolphin, demonstrating adaptive uncertainty responses that suggest internal monitoring, yet critics highlight potential confounds like external reward cues influencing choices. Ongoing refinements, including transfer tests and computational modeling, aim to validate these paradigms by ensuring behaviors persist across contexts without low-level explanations. The current consensus reflects partial acceptance of animal metacognition, acknowledging compelling in while recognizing interpretive ambiguities in other species, with active research employing comparative cognition methods to resolve debates. Reviews from the indicate growing agreement that great apes and some macaques exhibit metacognitive monitoring and control, as seen in consistent performances across diverse tasks, though full phenomenal remains unproven. Beran et al. (2019) highlight a of progress, noting that while low-level accounts persist, accumulating data from information-seeking paradigms support higher-order interpretations in nonhumans. Recent syntheses, such as Basile and Hampton (2024), affirm this tempered view, emphasizing the need for interdisciplinary approaches to bridge gaps between behavioral data and cognitive theory. A 2025 study further supports metacognitive abilities in chimpanzees by demonstrating their capacity to rationally revise beliefs in response to new under .

Emerging Topics

Mind Wandering and Metacognition

Mind wandering is characterized as a shift in away from a primary task toward internal, task-unrelated thoughts, often occurring spontaneously and without immediate awareness. This phenomenon involves metacognitive processes, particularly meta-awareness, which refers to the ability to notice and monitor these attentional lapses as they occur. Without meta-awareness, mind wandering can persist undetected, while its emergence enables metacognitive signals that prompt reflection on one's cognitive state. Detection of mind wandering relies on methods that capture these episodes in real time, distinguishing between unaware and aware instances to highlight metacognitive involvement. Probe-caught techniques interrupt participants during tasks with questions about their current thoughts, estimating mind wandering rates retrospectively based on responses, though they may underestimate unaware episodes. In contrast, experience sampling methods, such as those used in studies, provide online assessments by prompting participants to report thought content at random intervals, revealing associations between and activity; for instance, a seminal fMRI study using experience sampling found increased activation during reported episodes. These approaches underscore how metacognition facilitates the identification of distraction, with self-caught reports—where individuals voluntarily signal awareness of —offering direct insight into meta-awareness levels. Regulation of mind wandering involves metacognitive control mechanisms that detect deviations and redirect attention, often through interplay between neural networks. The , active during internally directed thought, supports the generation of spontaneous ideas but can lead to prolonged distraction if unchecked. Metacognitive strategies, such as intentional refocusing, engage executive control networks to suppress default mode activity and restore task focus, with evidence suggesting that higher meta-awareness enhances this regulatory capacity. These processes draw on broader metacognitive monitoring, allowing individuals to evaluate and adjust their attentional allocation dynamically. The implications of mind wandering for metacognition reveal both adaptive and maladaptive dimensions, modulated by context and individual traits. Adaptively, meta-aware mind wandering can foster by enabling unconstrained associations and problem-solving insights, as seen in studies linking spontaneous thought to enhanced idea generation, including recent 2025 research showing mind wandering during creative incubation predicts increases in . Maladaptively, it impairs performance on error-prone tasks requiring sustained , increasing lapse rates and cognitive costs when meta-awareness is low. Individual differences in meta-awareness significantly influence these outcomes; for example, people with higher trait or report greater detection and control of mind wandering, reducing its disruptive effects while preserving creative benefits. Recent 2025 neuroimaging work further highlights neural dynamics in the default and control networks guiding transitions in spontaneous and future thinking related to mind wandering.

Metacognitive Artifacts in Works of Art

Metacognitive artifacts in works of art refer to creative expressions that externalize and stimulate reflection on one's own cognitive processes, such as memory retrieval, perceptual interpretation, and interpretive biases, thereby serving as scaffolding for metacognitive awareness. These artifacts encourage audiences to monitor and evaluate their thinking during engagement, bridging artistic experience with self-regulated cognition. Research in art appreciation highlights how such works facilitate metacognitive monitoring by prompting viewers to visualize and deepen their thought processes, transforming passive consumption into active self-examination. In literature, Marcel Proust's (1913–1927) exemplifies metacognitive scaffolding through its exploration of , where sensory triggers evoke past experiences without deliberate effort, inviting readers to reflect on the and reliability of their own mechanisms. The narrative's focus on the narrator's sudden recollections, such as the famous madeleine episode, illustrates how can prompt metacognitive evaluation of memory's non-conscious pathways, enhancing awareness of how emotions and sensations influence recall. This process aligns with psychological accounts of involuntary retrieval as a metacognitive phenomenon that bypasses intentional search, fostering deeper self-insight into cognitive biases in remembering. Visual arts provide another avenue for metacognitive engagement, particularly through perceptual challenges that reveal the constructed nature of cognition. M.C. Escher's impossible figures, like those in Belvedere (1958), depict spatially incoherent structures that defy three-dimensional logic, compelling observers to monitor and question their perceptual judgments as the brain alternates between conflicting interpretations. These works induce metacognitive reflection on how visual cues are processed and integrated, highlighting errors in spatial reasoning and the subjective nature of sight. Studies on such illusions demonstrate their utility in exploring cognitive and metacognitive processes, as interactive simulations of Escher-like worlds reveal how violations of real-world constraints prompt of perceptual limitations. In modern media, interactive installations extend this scaffolding by involving participants directly in explorations of perception and adaptation through human-computer interactions. For instance, contemporary digital art pieces that respond to viewer input, such as holographic installations probing techno-perceptions, engage users in real-time feedback on their actions, facilitating reflection on adaptations to novel stimuli in dynamic environments. These 21st-century examples, often found in new media exhibitions, make perceptual processes tangible through interaction, with recent 2025 research highlighting AI-based painting tools' role in enhancing children's creative thinking and metacognitive skills.

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