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Alexander Litvinenko
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Alexander Valterovich Litvinenko[a] (30 August 1962[2][3] – 23 November 2006) was a British-naturalised Russian defector and former officer of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) who specialised in tackling organised crime.[1][4] A prominent critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin, he advised British intelligence and coined the term "mafia state".[5]

Key Information

In November 1998, Litvinenko and several other FSB officers publicly accused their superiors of ordering the assassination of the Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky. Litvinenko was arrested the following March on charges of exceeding the authority of his position. He was acquitted in November 1999 but re-arrested before the charges were again dismissed in 2000. He fled with his family to London and was granted asylum in the United Kingdom, where he worked as a journalist, writer and consultant for the British intelligence services.

During his time in London, Litvinenko wrote two books, Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within and Lubyanka Criminal Group, in which he accused the Russian secret services of staging the Russian apartment bombings in 1999 and other acts of terrorism in an effort to bring Vladimir Putin to power. He also accused Putin of ordering the assassination of the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya in 2006.

On 1 November 2006, Litvinenko suddenly fell ill and was hospitalised after poisoning with polonium-210; he died from the poisoning on 23 November.[6] The events leading up to this are well documented, despite spawning numerous theories relating to his poisoning and death. A British murder investigation identified Andrey Lugovoy, a former member of Russia's Federal Protective Service (FSO), as the main suspect. Dmitry Kovtun was later named as a second suspect.[7] The United Kingdom demanded that Lugovoy be extradited; Russia denied the extradition as the Russian constitution prohibits the extradition of Russian citizens, leading to a straining of relations between Russia and the United Kingdom.[8]

After Litvinenko's death, his wife Marina, aided by biologist Alexander Goldfarb, pursued a vigorous campaign through the Litvinenko Justice Foundation. In October 2011, she won the right for an inquest into her husband's death to be conducted by a coroner in London; the inquest was repeatedly set back by issues relating to examinable evidence.[9] A public inquiry began on 27 January 2015,[10] and concluded in January 2016 that Litvinenko's murder was carried out by the two suspects and that they were "probably" acting under the direction of the FSB and with the approval of Putin and then FSB director Nikolai Patrushev.[11][12] In the 2021 case Carter v Russia, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Russia was responsible for his death and ordered the country to pay €100,000 in damages.[13][14][15][16][17]

Early life and career

[edit]

Alexander Litvinenko was born in the Russian city of Voronezh in 1962.[18] After he graduated from a Nalchik secondary school in 1980, he was drafted into the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a Private. After a year of service, he matriculated in the Kirov Higher Command School in Vladikavkaz. In 1981, Litvinenko married Nataliya, an accountant, with whom he had a son, Alexander, and a daughter, Sonia. This marriage ended in divorce in 1994 and in the same year Litvinenko married Marina, a ballroom dancer and fitness instructor, with whom he had a son, Anatoly.[19]

After graduation in 1985, Litvinenko became a platoon commander in the Dzerzhinsky Division of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs. He was assigned to the 4th Company of 4th Regiment, where among his duties was the protection of valuable cargo while in transit.[2][20][21] In 1986, he became an informant when he was recruited by the MVD's KGB counterintelligence section and in 1988, he was officially transferred to the Third Chief Directorate of the KGB, Military Counter Intelligence.[20] Later that year, after studying for a year at the Novosibirsk Military Counter Intelligence School, he became an operational officer and served in KGB military counterintelligence until 1991.[20][22]

Career in Russian security services

[edit]

In 1991, Litvinenko was promoted to the Central Staff of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, specialising in counter-terrorist activities and infiltration of organised crime. He was awarded the title of "MUR veteran" for operations conducted with the Moscow criminal investigation department, the MUR.[23] Litvinenko also saw active military service in many of the so-called "hot spots" of the former USSR and Russia.[24] During the First Chechen War, Litvinenko planted several FSB agents in Chechnya. Although he was often called a "Russian spy" by western press, throughout his career he was not an 'intelligence agent' and did not deal with secrets beyond information on operations against organised criminal groups.[20][25]

Litvinenko met Boris Berezovsky in 1994 when he took part in investigations into an assassination attempt on the oligarch. He later was responsible for the oligarch's security.[20] Litvinenko's employment under Berezovsky and other security services created a conflict of interest, but such practice is usually tolerated by the Russian state.[20]

In 1997, Litvinenko was promoted to the FSB Directorate of Analysis and Suppression of Criminal Groups, with the title of senior operational officer and deputy head of the Seventh Section.[26][27]

Conflict with FSB leadership

[edit]

During his work in the FSB, Litvinenko discovered numerous connections between top leadership of Russian law enforcement agencies and Russian mafia groups, such as the Solntsevo gang. He wrote a memorandum about this issue for Boris Yeltsin. Berezovsky arranged a meeting for him with FSB director Mikhail Barsukov and deputy director of Internal affairs Ovchinnikov to discuss the corruption problems;[28] however, this had no effect. Litvinenko gradually realized that the entire system was corrupt from the top to the bottom. He explained: "If your partner [cheated] you, or a creditor did not pay, or a supplier did not deliver‍— where did you turn to complain? [...] When force became a commodity, there was always demand for it. "Roofs" (krysha) appeared‍— people who sheltered and protected your business. First it was provided by the mob, then by police, and soon even our own guys realized what was what, and then the rivalry began among gangsters, cops, and the Agency for market share. As the police and the FSB became more competitive, they squeezed the gangs out of the market. However, in many cases competition gave way to cooperation, and the services became gangsters themselves."[28]

On 25 July 1998, Berezovsky introduced Litvinenko to Vladimir Putin. He said: "Go see Putin. Make yourself known. See what a great guy we have installed, with your help."[29] On the same day, Putin replaced Nikolay Kovalyov as the Director of the Federal Security Service, with help from Berezovsky.[29] Litvinenko reported to Putin on corruption in the FSB, but Putin was unimpressed.[29] Litvinenko said to his wife after the meeting: "I could see in his eyes that he hated me."[29] Litvinenko said that he was doing an investigation of Uzbek drug barons who received protection from the FSB, and Putin tried to stall the investigation to save his reputation.[30]

On 13 November 1998, Berezovsky wrote an open letter to Putin in Kommersant. He accused four senior officers of the Directorate of Analysis and Suppression of Criminal Groups of ordering his assassination: Major-General Yevgeny Khokholkov, N. Stepanov, A. Kamyshnikov, and N. Yenin.[31]

Four days later, on 17 November, Litvinenko and four other officers appeared together in a press conference at the Russian news agency Interfax. All officers worked for both FSB in the Directorate of Analysis and Suppression of Criminal Groups.[20] They repeated the allegation made by Berezovsky.[20][32] The officers also said they were ordered to kill Mikhail Trepashkin who was also present at the press conference, and to kidnap a brother of the businessman Umar Dzhabrailov.[32] In 2007, Sergey Dorenko provided the Associated Press and The Wall Street Journal with a complete copy of an interview he conducted in April 1998 for ORT, a television station, with Litvinenko and his fellow employees. The interview, of which only excerpts were broadcast in 1998, shows the FSB officers, who were disguised in masks or dark glasses, claim that their bosses had ordered them to kill, kidnap or frame prominent Russian politicians and businesspeople.

After holding the press conference, Litvinenko was dismissed from the FSB.[citation needed] Later, in an interview with Yelena Tregubova, Putin said that he personally ordered the dismissal of Litvinenko, stating, "I fired Litvinenko and disbanded his unit ...because FSB officers should not stage press conferences. This is not their job. And they should not make internal scandals public."[33] Litvinenko also believed that Putin was behind his arrest. He said, "Putin had the power to decide whether to pass my file to the prosecutors or not. He always hated me. And there was a bonus for him: by throwing me to the wolves he distanced himself from Boris [Berezovsky] in the eyes of FSB's generals."[34]

Flight from Russia and asylum in the United Kingdom

[edit]

In October 2000, in violation of an order not to leave Moscow, Litvinenko and his family travelled to Turkey, possibly via Ukraine.[35] While in Turkey, Litvinenko applied for asylum at the United States Embassy in Ankara, but his application was denied.[35] With the help of Alexander Goldfarb, Litvinenko bought air tickets for the Istanbul–London–Moscow flight,[36] and asked for political asylum at Heathrow Airport during the transit stop on 1 November 2000.[37] Political asylum was granted on 14 May 2001,[38] not because of his knowledge on intelligence matters, according to Litvinenko, but rather on humanitarian grounds.[20] While in London he became a journalist for Chechenpress and an author. He also joined Berezovsky in campaigning against Putin's government.[39] In October 2006, he became a naturalised British citizen with residence in Whitehaven.[40]

In 2002, Litvinenko was convicted in absentia in Russia and given a three-and-a-half-year jail sentence for charges of corruption.[41][42] According to Litvinenko's widow, Marina Litvinenko, her husband cooperated with the British security services, working as a consultant and helping the agencies to combat Russian organised crime in Europe.[5] During the public inquiry started in January 2015, it was confirmed that Litvinenko was recruited by MI6 to provide "useful information about senior Kremlin figures and their links with Russian organised crime", primarily related to Russian mafia activities in Spain.[43]

Shortly before his death, Litvinenko tipped off Spanish authorities on several organised crime bosses with links to Spain. During a meeting in May 2006, he allegedly provided security officials with information on the locations, roles, and activities of several "Russian" mafia figures with ties to Spain, including Zahkar Kalashov, Vitaly Izguilov and Tariel Oniani.[44]

Litvinenko allegedly converted to Islam in Britain and was rumoured to have told his father he had converted to Islam on his death bed. Litvinenko said his father commented about it: "It doesn't matter. At least you're not a communist."[45] Akhmed Zakayev, who was present during the conversation, later arranged for an Imam to recite appropriate Koranic verses in the hospital room at Litvinenkos request the day before his death.[46] Litvinenko also wished to be buried in Chechnya, since he was ashamed of Russia's actions there.[47]

This account has been strongly denied by close family and friends.[48] Visitors to Litvinenko's death bed included Boris Berezovsky and Litvinenko's father, Walter, who flew in from Moscow.

Mikhail Trepashkin said that in 2002 he had warned Litvinenko that an FSB unit was assigned to assassinate him.[49] In spite of this, Litvinenko often travelled overseas with no security arrangements, and freely mingled with the Russian community in the United Kingdom, and often received journalists at his home.[20]

Allegations

[edit]

Litvinenko published a number of allegations about the Russian government, most of which are related to conducting or sponsoring domestic and foreign terrorism.

Support of terrorism worldwide by the KGB and FSB

[edit]

Litvinenko stated that "all the bloodiest terrorists of the world" were connected to FSB-KGB, including Carlos "The Jackal" Ramírez, Yasser Arafat, Saddam Hussein, Abdullah Öcalan, Wadie Haddad of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, George Hawi who led the Communist Party of Lebanon, Ezekias Papaioannou from Cyprus, Sean Garland from Ireland, and many others. He said that all of them were trained, funded, and provided with weapons, explosives and counterfeit documents to carry out terrorist attacks worldwide and that each act of terrorism made by these people was carried out according to the task and under the rigid control of the KGB of the USSR.[50] Litvinenko said that "the center of global terrorism is not in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan or the Chechen Republic. The terrorism infection creeps away worldwide from the cabinets of the Lubyanka Square and the Kremlin".[51][52]

When asked in an interview who he thought the originator of the 2005 bombings in London was, Litvinenko responded saying,[50] "You know, I have spoken about it earlier and I shall say now, that I know only one organization, which has made terrorism the main tool of solving of political problems. It is the Russian special services."[53]

Litvinenko also commented on a new law that "Russia has the right to carry out preemptive strikes on militant bases abroad" and explained that these "preemptive strikes may involve anything except nuclear weapons." Litvinenko said, "You know who they mean when they say 'terrorist bases abroad'? They mean us, Zakayev and Boris and me."[33] He also said that "It was considered in our service that poison is an easier weapon than a pistol." He referred to a secret laboratory in Moscow that still continues development of deadly poisons, according to him.[54]

Armenian parliament shooting

[edit]
Main article: 1999 Armenian parliament shooting

Litvinenko accused the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General-Staff of the Russian armed forces of having organised the 1999 Armenian parliament shooting that killed the Prime Minister of Armenia, Vazgen Sargsyan, and seven members of parliament, ostensibly to derail the peace process which would have resolved the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but he offered no evidence to support the accusation.[20][55][56] The Russian embassy in Armenia denied any such involvement, and described Litvinenko's accusation as an attempt to harm relations between Armenia and Russia by people against the democratic reforms in Russia.[57]

Russian apartment bombings

[edit]
Main article: Russian apartment bombings

Litvinenko wrote two books, Lubyanka Criminal Group and Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within (in co-authorship with historian Yuri Felshtinsky), where he accused the Russian secret services of staging the Russian apartment bombings and other terrorism acts in an effort to bring Vladimir Putin to power.[58]

Moscow theatre hostage crisis

[edit]
Main article: Moscow theater hostage crisis

In a 2003 interview with the Australian SBS TV network, and aired on Dateline, Litvinenko claimed that two of the Chechen terrorists involved in the 2002 Moscow theatre siege – whom he named "Abdul the Bloody" and "Abu Bakar" – were working for the FSB, and that the agency manipulated the rebels into staging the attack.[59] Litvinenko said, "[W]hen they tried to find [Abdul the Bloody and Abu Bakar] among the dead terrorists, they weren't there. The FSB got its agents out. So the FSB agents among Chechens organized the whole thing on FSB orders, and those agents were released." This echoed similar claims made by Mikhail Trepashkin.[60] The leading role of an FSB agent, Khanpasha Terkibaev ("Abu Bakar"), was also described by Anna Politkovskaya, Ivan Rybkin and Alexander Khinshtein.[61][62][63][64] In the beginning of April 2003, Litvinenko gave "the Terkibaev file" to Sergei Yushenkov when he visited London, who in turn passed it to Anna Politkovskaya.[33] A few days later Yushenkov was assassinated. Terkibaev was later killed in Chechnya. According to Ivan Rybkin, a speaker of the Russian State Duma, "The authorities failed to keep [the FSB agent] Terkibaev out of public view, and that is why he was killed. I know how angry people were, because they knew Terkibaev had authorization from presidential administration."[65]

Beslan school siege

[edit]
Main article: Beslan school siege

In September 2004, Alexander Litvinenko suggested that the Russian secret services must have been aware of the plot beforehand and probably had organised the attack themselves in order to toughen laws on terrorism and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies. His conclusion was based on the fact that several Beslan hostage takers had been released from FSB custody just before the attack in Beslan. He said that they would have been freed only if they were of use to the FSB, and that even in the case that they were freed without being turned into FSB assets, they would be under strict surveillance that would not have allowed them to carry out the Beslan attack unnoticed.[66]

Ella Kesayeva, co-chair of the group Voice of Beslan, supported Litvinenko's argument in a November 2008 article in Novaya Gazeta, noting the large number of hostage takers who were in government custody not long before attacking the school, and coming to the same conclusion.[67]

Alleged Russia–al-Qaeda connection

[edit]

In a July 2005 interview with the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita, Litvinenko alleged that Ayman al-Zawahiri, a prominent leader of al-Qaeda, was trained for half a year by the FSB in Dagestan in 1997.[50][68][69][70] Litvinenko said that after this training, al-Zawahiri "was transferred to Afghanistan, where he had never been before and where, following the recommendation of his Lubyanka chiefs, he at once ... penetrated the milieu of Osama bin Laden and soon became his assistant in Al Qaeda."[71][70] Konstantin Preobrazhenskiy, a former KGB officer and writer, supported this claim and said that Litvinenko "was responsible for securing the secrecy of Al-Zawahiri's arrival in Russia; he was trained by FSB instructors in Dagestan, Northern Caucasus, in 1996–1997."[72] He said: "At that time, Litvinenko was the Head of the Subdivision for Internationally Wanted Terrorists of the First Department of the Operative-Inquiry Directorate of the FSB Anti-Terrorist Department. He was ordered to undertake the delicate mission of securing Al-Zawahiri from unintentional disclosure by the Russian police. Though Al-Zawahiri had been brought to Russia by the FSB using a false passport, it was still possible for the police to learn about his arrival and report to Moscow for verification. Such a process could disclose Al-Zawahiri as an FSB collaborator. In order to prevent this, Litvinenko visited a group of highly placed police officers to notify them in advance."[73] According to Sergei Ignatchenko, an FSB spokesman, al-Zawahiri was arrested by Russian authorities in Dagestan in December 1996 and released in May 1997.[74][75]

Assassination of Anna Politkovskaya

[edit]
Main article: Anna Politkovskaya assassination

Two weeks before his poisoning, Alexander Litvinenko accused Vladimir Putin of ordering the assassination of the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya and stated that a former presidential candidate, Irina Hakamada, warned Politkovskaya about threats to her life coming from the Russian president. Litvinenko advised Politkovskaya to escape from Russia immediately. Hakamada denied her involvement in passing any specific threats, and said that she warned Politkovskaya only in general terms more than a year earlier.[76] It remains unclear if Litvinenko referred to an earlier statement made by Boris Berezovsky, who claimed that Boris Nemtsov, a former Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, received word from Hakamada that Putin threatened her and like-minded colleagues in person. According to Berezovsky, Putin stated that Hakamada and her colleagues "will take in the head immediately, literally, not figuratively" if they "open the mouth" about the Russian apartment bombings.[77]

Allegations concerning Romano Prodi

[edit]
Main article: Mitrokhin Commission

According to Litvinenko, the FSB deputy chief General Anatoly Trofimov said to him: "Don't go to Italy, there are many KGB agents among the politicians. Romano Prodi is our man there."[78][79] Prodi was the Italian centre-left leader, and a former Prime Minister of Italy and former president of the European Commission. The conversation with Trofimov took place in 2000, after the Prodi–KGB scandal broke out in October 1999 due to information about Prodi provided by Vasili Mitrokhin.[80]

In April 2006, a British member of the European Parliament for London, Gerard Batten of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), demanded an inquiry into the allegations.[78][79] On 26 April 2006, Batten repeated his call for a parliamentary inquiry, revealing that "former senior members of the KGB are willing to testify in such an investigation, under the right conditions." He added: "It is not acceptable that this situation is unresolved, given the importance of Russia's relations with the European Union."[81] On 22 January 2007, the BBC and ITV News released documents and video footage from February 2006, in which Litvinenko repeated his statements about Prodi.[82][83]

Prodi denied the allegations. Litvinenko said that "Trofimov did not exactly say that Prodi was a KGB agent, because the KGB avoids using that word."[84] The Mitrokhin Commission, which was established in 2002 and closed in 2006 with a majority and a minority report, without reaching shared conclusions, and without any concrete evidence given to support the original allegations of KGB ties to Italian politicians contained in the Mitrokhin Archive. Led by the centre-right coalition majority, it was criticized as politically motivated, as it was focused mainly on allegations against opposition figures.[85] In November 2006, the new Italian Parliament with a centre-left coalition majority instituted a commission to investigate the Mitrokhin Commission for allegations that it was manipulated for political purposes.[86] In December 2006, colonel ex-KGB agent Oleg Gordievsky, whom Mario Scaramella claimed as his source, confirmed the accusations made against Scaramella regarding the production of false material relating to Prodi and other Italian politicians,[87] and underlined their lack of reliability.[88]

Connections between FSB and mafia

[edit]

In his book Gang from Lubyanka, Litvinenko alleged that Vladimir Putin during his time at the FSB was personally involved in protecting the drug trafficking from Afghanistan organised by Abdul Rashid Dostum.[89] In December 2003, Russian authorities confiscated over 4,000 copies of the book.[90] Shortly before his death, Alexander Litvinenko alleged that Vladimir Putin had cultivated a "good relationship" with Semion Mogilevich (head of the Russia mafia) since 1993 or 1994.[91]

Alleged FSB employees of Deripaska

[edit]

One or two years before his death, Alexander Litvinenko alleged that Oleg Deripaska employed numerous senior FSB officials including FSB General Osadchy (Russian: ФСБ Генерал Осадчий, Александр Ильич), who was the assistant to the director of FSB; URPO FSB General Yevgeny KoKolkov, also tranliterated as Evgeny Khokholkov (Russian: УРПО ФСБ Генерал Хохольков, Евгений Григорьевич), who headed URPO, was from the Uzbek KGB and is central to Litvinenko's "Uzbek File";[b] FSB General Vladimir Vasilevich Lutsenko (Russian: Луценко, Владимир Васильевич; born 1948), ex-FSB top officer who headed the private security firm "STEALTH", also transliterated as "STELS" or "STELLS", (Russian: ЧОП «Стелс»);[96][97][c] General Pronin (Russian: Пронин, Владимир Васильевич), General Anatoly Oleynikov (Russian: Олейников, Анатолий Аввакумович; 5 September 1940, Mikhailovo-Aleksandrovka village, Chertkovsky District, Rostov Oblast, USSR - 5 February 2009, Moscow), who was the first deputy minister of security of Russia from 24 January 1992 - 6 June 1992; Viktor Barannikova (Russian: Баранников, Виктор Павлович; 20 October 1940, Fedosyevka, Pozharsky District, Primorsky Krai, USSR - 21 July 1995, Moscow), who was the first deputy minister of security of Russia from 24 January 1992 to 27 July 1993.[98][99][100][101][102]

Alleged paedophilia of Vladimir Putin

[edit]

In a July 2006 article published on Zakayev's Chechenpress website, Litvinenko claimed that Putin is a paedophile and that the KGB knew about it since Putin's graduation from the Red Banner Institute. Litvinenko asserted that the FSB had possessed video footage which documented sex between Putin and minor boys and that Putin destroyed it while FSB director.[103] Litvinenko also claimed that Anatoly Trofimov and Artyom Borovik knew of the alleged paedophilia.[104] An article in the New York Times described the allegation as "without evidence".[105]

Litvinenko made the allegation after Putin kissed a boy on his stomach while stopping to chat with some tourists during a walk in the Kremlin grounds on 28 June 2006. The incident was recalled in a webcast organised by the BBC and Yandex, in which over 11,000 people asked Putin to explain the act, to which he responded, "He seemed very independent and serious... I wanted to cuddle him like a kitten and it came out in this gesture. He seemed so nice. ... There is nothing behind it."[106]

Vladimir Bukovsky, a close friend of Litvinenko, said he was angry when he published the article, as he had strongly urged him against it. Bukovsky noted that despite his ferocious hostility toward the Kremlin, Litvinenko still had the mind-set of a security officer and "could not understand the difference between truth and operational information."[105]

Prophet Muhammad "cartoons" controversy

[edit]

According to Litvinenko, the 2005 controversy over the publication in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten of editorial cartoons depicting the Islamic prophet Muhammad was orchestrated by the FSB to punish Denmark for its refusal to extradite Chechen separatists.[107]

Poisoning and death

[edit]
Main article: Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko
A bald Litvinenko at University College Hospital

On 1 November 2006, Litvinenko suddenly fell ill. On 3 November, he was admitted to Barnet General Hospital in London.[108] He was then moved to University College Hospital for intensive care. His illness was later attributed to poisoning with radionuclide polonium-210 after the Health Protection Agency found significant amounts of the rare and highly toxic element in his body.[109]

Litvinenko met with two former agents early on the day he fell ill – Dmitry Kovtun and Andrey Lugovoy, in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel where high polonium contamination was found.[110][109] Though both denied any wrongdoing, a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable revealed that Kovtun had left polonium traces in the house and car he had used in Hamburg.[citation needed] Before his meeting with Kovtun and Lugovoy, Litvinenko had lunch at Itsu, a sushi restaurant on Piccadilly in London with Italian acquaintance Mario Scaramella.[111][112] Scaramella claimed to have information on the assassination of Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist who had been shot dead in the elevator of her Moscow apartment building three weeks prior.[113]

On his deathbed, Litvinenko claimed that Putin had directly ordered his assassination.[110] After his death, Marina Litvinenko, his widow, accused Moscow of orchestrating the murder. Though she believes the order did not come from Putin himself, she does believe it was done at the behest of the authorities, and announced that she would refuse to provide evidence to any Russian investigation out of fear that it would be misused or misrepresented.[114] In a court hearing in London in 2015, a Scotland Yard lawyer concluded that "the evidence suggests that the only credible explanation is in one way or another the Russian state is involved in Litvinenko's murder".[115]

Death and final statement

[edit]

Before his death, Litvinenko said: "You may succeed in silencing one man but the howl of protest from around the world, Mr. Putin, will reverberate in your ears for the rest of your life."[116] On 22 November 2006, Litvinenko's medical team at University College Hospital reported Litvinenko had suffered a "major setback" due to either heart failure or an overnight heart attack. He died on 23 November. The following day, Putin publicly stated: "Mr Litvinenko is, unfortunately, not Lazarus".[116]

Scotland Yard stated that inquiries into the circumstances of how Litvinenko became ill would continue.[117]

On 24 November 2006, a statement was released posthumously, in which Litvinenko named Putin as the man behind his poisoning.[118] Litvinenko's friend Alex Goldfarb, who was also the chairman of Boris Berezovsky's Civil Liberties Fund, claimed Litvinenko had dictated it to him three days earlier. Andrei Nekrasov said his friend Litvinenko and Litvinenko's lawyer had composed the statement in Russian on 21 November and translated it to English.[119]

Litvinenko's grave at Highgate Cemetery in 2007

Goldfarb later stated that Litvinenko, on his deathbed, had instructed him to write a note "in good English" in which Putin was to be accused of his poisoning. Goldfarb also stated that he read the note to Litvinenko in English and Russian and Litvinenko agreed "with every word of it" and signed it.[118]

Litvinenko's grave in 2017

His autopsy took place on 1 December at the Royal London Hospital's institute of pathology. It was attended by Dr Benjamin Swift and Dr Nathaniel Cary, as well as a third chosen by the family.[120] Litvinenko was buried at Highgate Cemetery (West side) in north London on 7 December.[121] The police treated his death as a murder, although the London coroner's inquest was yet to be completed.[122][123]

In an interview with the BBC broadcast on 16 December 2006, Yuri Shvets said that Litvinenko had created a 'due diligence' report investigating the activities of an unnamed senior Kremlin official on behalf of a British company looking to invest "dozens of millions of dollars" in a project in Russia, and that the dossier contained damaging information about the senior Kremlin official. He said he was interviewed about his allegations by Scotland Yard detectives investigating Litvinenko's murder.[124] British media reported that the poisoning and consequent death of Litvinenko was not widely covered in the Russian news media.[125]

Funeral

[edit]

On 7 December 2006, Litvinenko was buried within a lead-lined casket at Highgate Cemetery with Christian, Jewish and Muslim rites, including a Christian and Muslim prayer being said by an imam and Orthodox priest in line with Litvinenko's wishes of a non-denominational service at the grave.[48][126] The funeral ceremony was followed by a private memorial at which the ensemble Tonus Peregrinus sang sacred music by Russian composers Igor Stravinsky, Sergei Rachmaninov, Victor Kalinnikov, and three works by British composer Antony Pitts.[127][128][129]

Investigations into death

[edit]
Main article: Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko § Investigation

UK criminal investigation

[edit]

On 20 January 2007, British police announced that they had "identified the man they believe poisoned Alexander Litvinenko. The suspected killer was captured on cameras at Heathrow as he flew into Britain to carry out the murder."[130] The man in question was introduced to Litvinenko as "Vladislav".[131]

As of 26 January 2007, British officials said police had solved the murder of Litvinenko. They discovered "a 'hot' teapot at London's Millennium Hotel with an off-the-charts reading for polonium-210, the radioactive material used in the killing." In addition, a senior official said investigators had concluded the murder of Litvinenko was "a 'state-sponsored' assassination orchestrated by Russian security services." The police want to charge former Russian spy Andrei Lugovoy, who met Litvinenko on 1 November 2006, the day officials believe the lethal dose of polonium-210 was administered.[132]

On the same day, The Guardian reported that the British government was preparing an extradition request asking that Andrei Lugovoy be returned to the UK to stand trial for Litvinenko's murder.[133] On 22 May 2007, the Crown Prosecution Service called for the extradition of Russian citizen Andrei Lugovoy to the UK on charges of murder.[134] Lugovoy dismissed the claims against him as "politically motivated" and said he did not kill Litvinenko.[135]

A British police investigation resulted in several suspects for the murder, but in May 2007, the British Director of Public Prosecutions, Ken Macdonald, announced that his government would seek to extradite Andrei Lugovoy, the chief suspect in the case, from Russia.[136] On 28 May 2007, the British Foreign Office officially submitted a request to the Government of Russia for the extradition of Lugovoy to face criminal charges in the UK.[137]

On 2 October 2011, The Sunday Times published an article wherein the chief prosecutor who investigated the murder of Litvinenko, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, publicly spoke of his suspicion that the murder was a "state directed execution" carried out by Russia. Until that time, British public officials had stopped short of directly accusing Russia of involvement in the poisoning. "It had all the hallmarks of a state directed execution, committed on the streets of London by a foreign government," Macdonald added.[138]

In January 2015, it was reported in the British media that the National Security Agency had intercepted communications between Russian government agents in Moscow and those who carried out what was called a "state execution" in London: the recorded conversations allegedly proved that the Russian government was involved in Litvinenko's murder, and suggested that the motive was Litvinenko's revelations about Vladimir Putin's links with the criminal underworld.[139] On 21 January 2016, the Home Office published The Litvinenko Inquiry: Report into Litvinenko's death.[140]

Russian criminal investigation

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Many publications in Russian media suggested that the death of Alexander Litvinenko was connected to Boris Berezovsky.[141][142] Former FSB chief Nikolay Kovalyov, for whom Litvinenko worked, said that the incident "looks like the hand of Boris Berezovsky. I am sure that no kind of intelligence services participated."[143] This involvement of Berezovsky was alleged by numerous Russian television shows. Kremlin supporters saw it as a conspiracy to smear the Russian government's reputation by engineering a spectacular murder of a Russian dissident abroad.[144]

After Litvinenko's death, traces of polonium-210 were found in an office belonging to Berezovsky.[145] This was unsurprising: Litvinenko had visited Berezovsky's office as well as many other places in the hours after his poisoning.[146] The British Health Protection Agency made extensive efforts to ensure that locations Litvinenko visited and anyone who had contact with Litvinenko after his poisoning were not at risk.[147]

Russian authorities claimed they were unable to question Berezovsky. The Russian Foreign Ministry complained that Britain was obstructing its attempt to send prosecutors to London to interview more than 100 people, including Berezovsky.[148] The Times reported "Mr Darling made it clear that the British Government was willing to grant permission for the Russian team to visit."[148]

On 5 July 2007, the British ambassador to Russia, Anne Pringle, claimed that London had submitted sufficient evidence to extradite Lugovoy to Britain.[149]

Judicial inquiries

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Logo of the inquiry

Inquest in London

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On 13 October 2011, Dr. Andrew Reid, the Coroner of St. Pancras, announced that he would hold an inquest into Litvinenko's death, which would include the examination of all existing theories of the murder, including possible complicity of the Russian government.[150] The inquest, held by Sir Robert Owen, a High Court judge acting as the coroner, originally scheduled to start on 1 May 2013, was subject to a series of pre-hearings: firstly, the coroner agreed that a group representing Russian state prosecutors could be accepted as a party to the inquest process; secondly, the British Government submitted a Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificate. Under Public Interest Immunity (PII) claims, the information at the disposal of the British government relating to Russian state involvement, as well as how much British intelligence services could have done to prevent the death, would be excluded from the inquest.[151]

On 12 July 2013, Sir Robert, who had previously agreed to exclude certain material from the inquest on the grounds its disclosure could be damaging to national security, announced that the British Government refused the request he had made earlier in June to replace the inquest with a public inquiry, which would have powers to consider secret evidence.[9][152] After the hearing, Alex Goldfarb said: "There's some sort of collusion behind the scenes with Her Majesty's government and the Kremlin to obstruct justice"; Elena Tsirlina, Mrs Litvinenko's solicitor, concurred with him.[9][152]

On 22 July 2014, the British Home Secretary Theresa May, who had previously ruled out an inquiry on the grounds it might damage the country's relations with Moscow,[10] announced a public inquiry into Litvinenko's death. The inquiry was chaired by Sir Robert Owen who was the Coroner in the inquest into Litvinenko's death; its remit stipulated that "the inquiry will not address the question of whether the UK authorities could or should have taken steps which would have prevented the death".[153][154] The inquiry started on 27 January 2015.[10] New evidence emerged at first hearings held at the end of January 2015.[43] The last day of hearings was on 31 July 2015.[155]

The report stated that the FSB operation to kill Litvinenko was probably approved by Nikolai Patrushev (left) and Vladimir Putin

The inquiry report was released on 21 January 2016. The report found that Litvinenko was killed by two Russian agents, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitry Kovtun and that there was a "strong probability" they were acting on behalf of the Russian FSB secret service.[156] Paragraph 10.6 of the report stated: "The FSB operation to kill Mr Litvinenko was probably approved by Mr Patrushev and also by President Putin."[157]

The report outlined five possible motives for the murder: a belief Litvinenko had betrayed the FSB through public disclosures about its work; a belief that he was working for British intelligence; because he was a prominent associate of leading opponents of Mr Putin and his regime, including Mr Boris Berezovsky and Akhmed Zakayev; because his claims about the FSB were "areas of particular sensitivity to the Putin administration", including a plot to murder dissident Boris Berezovsky; and because there was "undoubtedly a personal dimension to the antagonism" between Litvinenko and Putin, culminating in his allegation that Putin was a paedophile.[116]

On the release of the report, British Prime Minister David Cameron condemned Putin for presiding over "state sponsored murder". British Labour MP Ian Austin said: "Putin is an unreconstructed KGB thug and gangster who murders his opponents in Russia and, as we know, on the streets of London – and nothing announced today is going to make the blindest bit of difference." The Kremlin dismissed the Inquiry as "a joke" and "whitewash".[116]

The same day, British Home Secretary Theresa May announced that assets belonging to both Lugovoi and Kovtun would be immediately frozen and that the Metropolitan Police were seeking their extradition.[158] The Russian Ambassador was also summoned by the British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond and demands were made that Russia cooperate with the investigation into Mr Litvinenko's murder with Foreign Office minister David Liddington asserting that Russia had demonstrated "a flagrant disregard for UK law, international law and standards of conduct, and the safety of UK citizens"[159][160][161] However, the government's response to the inquiry's results has been described by The Economist as consisting of "tough talk and little action".[162][163]

Carter v Russia

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In May 2007 Marina Litvinenko (also known as Maria Anna Carter)[164] registered a complaint against the Russian Federation in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, accusing the Russian state of violating her husband's right to life, and failing to conduct a full investigation.[165] On 21 September 2021, a chamber of the court found Russia responsible for Litvinenko's death and ordered the country to pay 100,000 euros in damages.[13] Russia can still appeal the decision to the Grand Chamber. The ECHR also found beyond reasonable doubt that Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitry Kovtun killed Litvinenko. Commenting on the case, law professor Marko Milanovic thought it was unlikely that Russian government would pay the damages.[166]

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See also

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Notes

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References

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His books

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Books and films about Litvinenko

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Alexander Litvinenko

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Alexander Valterovich Litvinenko (4 December 1962 – 23 November 2006) was a lieutenant colonel in Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), formerly the , who investigated and before publicly denouncing the agency's leadership for issuing illegal orders and engaging in corruption, which prompted his dismissal, arrest, and defection to the in 2000. In , where he received asylum in 2001 and British citizenship shortly before his death, Litvinenko collaborated with Western intelligence services, worked in private security, and authored books including Blowing Up Russia, in which he accused the FSB of staging the 1999 apartment bombings—a series of explosions killing over 300 civilians—to manufacture public support for the Second Chechen War and propel to power. Litvinenko's criticisms extended to alleging Putin and the FSB's involvement in other crimes, such as the murder of journalist ; these claims made him a high-profile until his by on 1 November 2006, administered during a meeting with suspected FSB operatives Andrei Lugovoy and , an act a 2016 British determined was a state-sponsored operation likely approved by Putin himself.

Early Life and Military Service

Childhood and Education in the Soviet Union

Alexander Litvinenko was born on 4 December 1962 in , Russian SFSR, , to parents whose marriage dissolved shortly after his birth, resulting in a turbulent early childhood that included time spent with his grandparents. His family background featured a tradition of , exemplified by his grandfather's career in the armed forces, which later influenced Litvinenko's own trajectory. Litvinenko completed his secondary education in 1980 amid the structured environment of the Soviet educational system, which emphasized discipline and preparation for state service. Following graduation, he applied for admission to a civilian but was unsuccessful, prompting him to pursue enrollment in a college as an alternative path aligned with familial expectations and available opportunities in the USSR. This decision marked the transition from civilian schooling to specialized training, though it remained rooted in the formative experiences of his youth under Soviet governance.

Initial Military Career

Litvinenko enlisted in a military unit of the Soviet Union's Ministry of Internal Affairs immediately after , around 1980. His initial service focused on domestic security operations within the , which handled tasks such as guarding key installations and suppressing internal unrest. During this period, Litvinenko underwent rigorous training and advanced through the officer ranks, developing expertise in operational tactics and applicable to high-threat environments. By the mid-1980s, he had gained practical experience in countering organized criminal elements and maintaining order in urban settings, including postings that involved coordination with local . These early military assignments honed his skills in infiltration and rapid response, laying the groundwork for his subsequent into services without direct involvement in foreign operations at this stage.

Service in Security Agencies

Entry into KGB and Early Operations

Alexander Litvinenko was recruited into the in 1988, following three years as an in the Soviet Interior Ministry from 1985 to 1988. This transition marked his entry into the Soviet state's primary security apparatus amid the economic liberalization of , which had begun fostering black-market activities and proto-mafia structures. Upon joining, Litvinenko underwent specialized training at a counter-intelligence school in , completing the program by 1991. The emphasized operational skills for domestic threats, including techniques and infiltration methods tailored to the 's mandate against and economic . In 1991, as the USSR neared collapse, Litvinenko was posted to headquarters in within the bureau's unit, where his initial duties focused on countering rings and emerging criminal syndicates exploiting shortages and . These operations involved routine of suspect enterprises, informant recruitment from black-market networks, and coordinated arrests to disrupt theft of state property and speculative trading, reflecting the 's shift toward internal economic threats in the late Soviet era. Specific cases during this pre-dissolution phase included targeting groups engaged in commodity hoarding and illicit currency exchanges, though detailed records of Litvinenko's personal involvement remain classified.

Transition to FSB and Anti-Organized Crime Work

In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the , Litvinenko transitioned from counterintelligence roles in the to specialized units addressing the surge in amid economic turmoil and . In , he was assigned to the KGB's Economic Security and Organised Crime Unit, where he focused on countering infiltration into state institutions and emerging black-market activities. This placement aligned with the post-Soviet security apparatus's shift toward domestic threats, as criminal networks exploited the power vacuum left by the USSR's dissolution. As the fragmented, Litvinenko's unit evolved through interim agencies—the Ministry of Security (MB) in 1991 and the (FSK) in 1993—before integrating into the newly formed (FSB) on December 3, 1995. Within the FSB's Department for Combating , he continued operations against economic sabotage, smuggling rings, and mafia syndicates operating in , often involving protection rackets and illicit trade in commodities like fuel and arms. By 1997, he had advanced to senior operational officer, overseeing field investigations into these networks' ties to corrupt business elites and regional power brokers. Litvinenko's efforts targeted the penetration of into Russia's nascent capitalist structures, including probes into oligarch-linked that undermined state revenues during the chaotic Yeltsin era. Public records indicate his unit's involvement in dismantling select criminal operations, though detailed outcomes are limited due to classification and the era's institutional opacity; for instance, FSB reports from the period highlight broader successes in curbing violence in urban centers, with Litvinenko contributing to undercover penetrations of groups exerting influence over privatized enterprises.

Conflicts Within the FSB

Criticism of Leadership and Corruption Allegations

In November 1998, Alexander Litvinenko, then a in the FSB's Department for the Struggle against , publicly accused his superiors of systemic and abuse of power during a press conference attended by four fellow officers. Litvinenko specifically claimed that FSB leadership had ordered him in 1997 to assassinate Boris Berezovsky, a influential oligarch and media tycoon seen as a political rival by elements within the security services under President . He alleged this directive came from high-ranking officials, including figures tied to extortion rackets targeting business figures, and that refusing the order led to threats against his life from colleagues. These assertions portrayed the FSB as infiltrated by criminal networks, where state resources were allegedly diverted for personal gain and elimination of competitors in the chaotic post-Soviet economic landscape. Litvinenko's dissent emerged from investigations into , where he reportedly uncovered patterns of FSB officers protecting or participating in activities, including protection rackets and contract killings. He had previously met , appointed FSB director on July 17, 1998, to brief him on these internal corrupt practices but later expressed skepticism that Putin, whom he viewed as emblematic of the agency's flaws, would address them effectively. Litvinenko framed the corruption as structural, rooted in the FSB's inheritance from KGB-era impunity, enabling leaders to order extrajudicial actions against rivals without accountability during Yeltsin's tenure, marked by weak institutional oversight. The FSB dismissed Litvinenko's accusations as unfounded and self-serving, attributing them to personal grudges rather than evidence of institutional rot, amid a Yeltsin-era media environment that amplified such whistleblower claims but often lacked independent verification due to restricted access to classified operations. Russian outlets covered the event sensationally, reflecting broader public unease with security service overreach in the 1990s, though official responses emphasized loyalty oaths and denied any sanctioned assassinations. Litvinenko's public stance highlighted fractures within the agency, where mid-level officers like him clashed with leadership over ethical boundaries in anti-crime work, predating his later, more expansive critiques.

Arrests, Trials, and Internal Purges

In December 1998, following a where Litvinenko accused senior FSB officials of corruption and illegal orders, he was dismissed from the agency by its director, . On March 25, 1999, Litvinenko was arrested on charges of exceeding his official authority and abuse of office, related to his earlier operations against figures. He was detained for eight months in Moscow's , an FSB facility known for holding political detainees. Litvinenko's trial in November 1999 resulted in on the initial charges, but he was immediately rearrested on additional accusations, including of explosives and assaulting a during an . These proceedings extended into 2000, coinciding with Putin's ascension to the presidency after Boris Yeltsin's on December 31, 1999. Released on later that year, Litvinenko faced ongoing legal pressure, culminating in an in absentia conviction for abuse of office in 2002, which carried a potential three-and-a-half-year sentence. These events occurred amid broader FSB internal consolidations under Putin's leadership, which targeted officers viewed as disloyal or aligned with Yeltsin-era oligarchs and critics, such as Litvinenko's associate Boris Berezovsky. Putin's prior role as FSB director facilitated the agency's shift toward stricter discipline, with Litvinenko's repeated arrests serving as a public example of repercussions for internal dissent and alleged corruption exposures. The charges, while formally tied to operational misconduct, aligned with efforts to neutralize potential threats during the power transition, though Litvinenko maintained they were fabricated to silence his criticisms of agency leadership.

Defection and Exile in the United Kingdom

Escape from Russia in 2000

In late September 2000, Alexander Litvinenko departed for in , ostensibly to visit relatives, but instead crossed the border into Georgia amid escalating threats from the (FSB). He faced multiple death threats, including one from an FSB colonel who explicitly warned of killing both Litvinenko and his six-year-old son, , as retribution for his prior public criticisms of agency corruption and leadership. These risks were compounded by ongoing legal persecution, including a pending closed trial in on charges of abuse of office, during which authorities had confiscated his passport and ordered him not to leave the area, heightening the danger of interception or arrest during transit. By late October 2000, Litvinenko reached , Georgia, before proceeding to and then , , where he reunited with his wife, Marina, and son, Anatoly. The escape was facilitated by Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky, who provided funding for flights, accommodations, and logistics, including a private jet for intermediaries. Associates and Alex Goldfarb offered direct operational support, with Goldfarb coordinating the final leg from ; Berezovsky had contacted Goldfarb in October to arrange assistance after Litvinenko reached out for help evading Russian pursuit. On 31 October 2000, Litvinenko, his family, and Goldfarb purchased tickets for a flight from Istanbul to Tbilisi with a connecting stop at London's Heathrow Airport, exploiting a transit visa that permitted entry into the UK without formal stay authorization. They arrived at Heathrow on 1 November 2000 and immediately claimed political asylum, citing persecution by Russian state security organs; this maneuver evaded potential extradition risks but exposed them to immediate vulnerability in an unfamiliar city, as Russian intelligence networks could still monitor high-profile defectors. The flight's mechanics underscored the precariousness of the defection, with Litvinenko later convicted in absentia in Russia for related charges, intensifying the threat of extraterritorial reprisal.

Grant of Asylum and Adaptation to Life in Exile

Litvinenko fled and arrived in the in November 2000, seeking political asylum due to persecution fears following his criticisms of the FSB. The UK granted him asylum in spring 2001, allowing him and his family to settle legally in . His wife, , and son, , relocated to join him shortly thereafter, adopting new identities for security reasons amid ongoing threats from Russian authorities. Financially, Litvinenko relied on support from fellow Russian exile Boris Berezovsky, a wealthy oligarch who provided accommodation, including an initial flat in followed by a house at 140 Osier Crescent in , along with funding for living expenses and Anatoly's schooling. This patronage enabled a modest but stable existence, though the family maintained a low public profile in the early years, focusing on personal resettlement rather than immediate activism. By mid-2006, Litvinenko had submitted applications for British citizenship for himself and his family during the summer, reflecting his intent to integrate fully into society; the applications were approved on October 13, 2006. precautions remained central to their adaptation, including restricted movements and vigilance against , as Litvinenko navigated his status while prioritizing family safety in an unfamiliar environment.

Writings, Allegations, and Collaborations in Exile

Key Publications and Books

Litvinenko's primary written outputs during his exile consisted of two books co-authored or authored solely by him, both published in 2002 amid his efforts to expose perceived systemic issues within Russia's security services. These works, initially released in Russian through independent publishers outside the country, were subsequently translated into English and distributed by Western presses, functioning as key mediums for articulating his insider perspectives derived from his FSB tenure. "Lubyanka Criminal Group" (original Russian title: Lubyanskaya Prestupnaya Gruppirovka), published by Grani in 2002, presented Litvinenko's analysis of the purported evolution of the FSB from a state security entity into a structure intertwined with elements. The book drew on his experiences in counter-organized crime operations to argue for institutional at Lubyanka , positioning itself as testimony from a former officer. It was self-published in limited runs initially and later reissued, reflecting Litvinenko's reliance on networks for dissemination due to domestic prohibitions. Co-authored with historian , "Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within" (original Russian: FSB vzryvaet Rossiyu) appeared the same year via Liberty Publishing House, with English editions following from Encounter Books in 2007 and subsequent reprints. This volume expanded on Litvinenko's claims regarding internal FSB dynamics and operations, incorporating archival research by Felshtinsky to frame events through Litvinenko's accounts. Banned in shortly after release, it gained traction among dissident circles and Western audiences, contributing to Litvinenko's profile as a whistleblower through print channels unavailable to him domestically. Beyond these, Litvinenko contributed to minor publications such as "Genscherismus: Ein Leitfaden für angehende EU-Diktatoren" (2005), a polemical tract critiquing European political figures, but it remained peripheral to his core security-focused oeuvre. His books collectively amplified his narratives via international sales and translations, though exact circulation figures are undocumented; they preceded his frequent interviews, serving as foundational texts for later media engagements.

Associations with Western Intelligence and Media

Following his defection to the in 2000, Alexander Litvinenko established formal ties with British intelligence services, serving as a paid to from 2003 onward, specializing in Russian organized crime and connections in . He received a monthly retainer of £2,000 from , as confirmed by his widow Marina Litvinenko during the 2015 into his death, and maintained a dedicated contact, handler "Martin," for tasking and communication, often via a line or bank transfers. These arrangements positioned Litvinenko as an informant bridging British and allied agencies, including assistance to Spanish intelligence on Russian criminal networks operating in , though Marina Litvinenko emphasized he functioned as a rather than a full operational agent. Litvinenko's activities were substantially supported by Boris Berezovsky, a Russian oligarch and exiled critic of the Putin government, who funded his initial escape from via in 2000 and provided ongoing financial assistance, including housing in and monthly "research grants" amounting to thousands of pounds. This patronage enabled Litvinenko's research, writing, and public engagements, amplifying his role as a vocal , though Berezovsky's motivations stemmed from his own conflicts with Russian authorities, including asset seizures and political . In parallel, Litvinenko cultivated relationships with Western journalists and media outlets, contributing insights on Russian security services and to facilitate coverage of his analyses. These interactions, often coordinated through his contacts or Berezovsky's network, shaped his public profile as a defector whistleblower, with outlets like the and Guardian featuring his commentary on FSB operations, though such collaborations drew accusations from Russian officials of Litvinenko acting as a propagandist for foreign interests.

Major Claims Against Russian State Actors

Litvinenko alleged in his 2002 book Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within, co-authored with , that the FSB under Director orchestrated the September 1999 apartment bombings in , , and , which killed over 300 civilians, as a false-flag operation to justify the Second Chechen War and propel to power as and then president. He claimed FSB agents planted the explosives and simulated additional attacks to manufacture public support for renewed military action against , drawing on his purported access to internal FSB documents and witness testimonies from the agency's anti-organized crime unit. Litvinenko further asserted that the FSB maintained deep ties to Russian syndicates, including protection rackets for mafia bosses, and accused the agency of shielding figures like , a fugitive financier linked to global fraud and extortion networks, as a long-standing asset whose operations, including alleged contacts with , were controlled by FSB handlers. He stated that during his time in the FSB's Department 7 combating , he uncovered evidence of state complicity in mafia activities, such as and , which were used to fund covert operations and enrich agency leadership. On international connections, Litvinenko claimed in articles and interviews that the FSB collaborated with operatives, alleging that was recruited or controlled by Russian intelligence during a 1997 visit to and that FSB agents trained jihadists in for attacks, including potential involvement in the , 2001, hijackings. He also accused the FSB of forging links with Western political figures, asserting that former Italian Prime Minister had been a KGB asset codenamed "Mario" since the 1970s, facilitating influence operations in . Litvinenko leveled personal accusations against Putin, whom he knew from their time together in the FSB and St. Petersburg security circles, claiming in publications like Gang from Lubyanka that Putin as FSB director actively protected drug trafficking networks tied to and that he bore ultimate responsibility for the apartment bombings as part of a broader strategy to restore authoritarian -style control. He further alleged unverified personal misconduct by Putin, including , referencing anonymous accounts of abuse involving a young boy during Putin's tenure in , though these stemmed from unconfirmed rumors circulated in émigré circles rather than direct evidence.

Claims of FSB Involvement in Domestic Terrorism

Litvinenko alleged that the Federal Security Service (FSB) orchestrated the September 1999 Russian apartment bombings as a false-flag operation to manufacture public outrage against Chechen separatists, thereby justifying the launch of the Second Chechen War and facilitating Vladimir Putin's rise to power. In the book Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within, co-authored with Yuri Felshtinsky and published in 2002, he detailed how FSB operatives allegedly planted the explosives in residential buildings in Buynaksk on September 4 (64 deaths), Moscow on September 9 and 13 (243 deaths combined), and Volgodonsk on September 16 (19 deaths), resulting in a total of at least 293 fatalities and widespread national panic. Litvinenko cited the Ryazan incident on September 22, 1999—where locals discovered and reported suspicious hexogen-filled bags in an apartment basement, later claimed by FSB officials as a "training exercise"—as direct evidence of FSB involvement, arguing it exposed the pattern of staged attacks before official attribution to Chechens. Regarding the October 2002 (), Litvinenko claimed FSB complicity or deliberate mishandling, asserting that the agency's use of an unidentified toxic gas to subdue approximately 40-50 Chechen militants holding over 850 hostages led to the deaths of 130 civilians, many due to the gas rather than gunfire, as part of a broader strategy to test chemical weapons under operational cover. He argued this reflected FSB prioritization of eliminating threats over hostage safety, echoing patterns of provocation in prior incidents. Litvinenko further contended that the FSB either knew in advance of or directly ordered the September 2004 , where over 1,100 hostages, including more than 300 children, were held by 30-35 militants from September 1 to 3, culminating in 334 deaths amid chaotic rescue efforts involving indiscriminate heavy weaponry. He suggested the operation served FSB interests by justifying intensified powers and suppressing dissent, pointing to foreknowledge indicators ignored by authorities and disproportionate force that exacerbated casualties.

Allegations of International Connections and Organized Crime

Litvinenko alleged that the FSB maintained operational control over international terrorist networks, including al-Qaeda, as part of a broader strategy inherited from KGB practices to foster global instability. In a 2005 interview with the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita, he claimed that Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's deputy leader at the time, had been recruited as an FSB agent during a 1997 visit to Russia and received specialized training there, asserting that al-Qaeda's activities were indirectly supervised by Russian intelligence to advance geopolitical aims. He further contended in various statements that FSB agents had trained al-Qaeda operatives in Dagestan during the late 1990s, linking these efforts to Russia's tolerance or orchestration of events like the September 11, 2001, attacks to justify domestic crackdowns. On , Litvinenko asserted that the FSB systematically protected and collaborated with syndicates, extending their influence transnationally through state-backed networks. He specifically identified , a fugitive Ukrainian-born crime boss labeled by the FBI as a key figure in global , as a long-standing FSB asset whose operations—including arms trafficking and —were coordinated with Russian intelligence. Litvinenko claimed these ties enabled mafia penetration into European markets, citing his consultations with Spanish authorities on Russian criminal groups operating in , such as those linked to and rings. In a pre-recorded videotape released posthumously, he detailed how FSB leadership shielded mafia figures to consolidate economic power, arguing this fusion created a hybrid state-criminal apparatus with international reach. These allegations portrayed the FSB as a successor to KGB-era tactics, allegedly sponsoring proxy terrorism and criminal enterprises worldwide to undermine Western interests and extract resources. Litvinenko maintained that such connections, including purported FSB oversight of Mogilevich's interactions with for illicit dealings, exemplified Russia's use of non-state actors as deniable tools for . His claims, drawn from his FSB experience in counter-organized crime units, were presented in interviews, writings, and testimony to foreign investigators, though they relied heavily on insider assertions without independently corroborated documentation.

Personal Accusations Against Vladimir Putin

Litvinenko publicly portrayed Vladimir Putin as deeply involved in corruption and organized crime, stemming from his experiences as an FSB officer. In the late 1990s, Litvinenko reportedly informed Putin, then FSB director, of extensive corruption within the agency and its ties to the Russian mafia, but later concluded that Putin himself was complicit in protecting these networks to maintain power. He described Putin's Russia as a "mafia state" where high-level officials, including Putin, enabled criminal syndicates to flourish in exchange for loyalty and financial benefits, drawing from his investigations into FSB-mafia collaborations during the 1990s. In a July 2006 article published under a , Litvinenko leveled a highly personal charge against Putin, alleging based on footage of Putin kissing a young boy on the stomach during a March 2006 preschool event in Krasnoe Selo. Litvinenko interpreted the act as sexually motivated, citing it as evidence of Putin's deviant behavior and linking it to broader claims of moral corruption in the Kremlin leadership. Following the October 7, 2006, assassination of journalist , Litvinenko quickly accused Putin of directly ordering the killing, claiming it was retaliation for her reporting on Chechen atrocities and abuses. He asserted that Politkovskaya's murder served to intimidate critics and consolidate Putin's control, positioning it as part of a pattern of targeted eliminations against personal adversaries. This accusation intensified their longstanding feud, with Litvinenko framing Putin as orchestrating violence against those exposing his regime's underbelly.

Skepticism and Counterarguments to Litvinenko's Claims

Evidence Gaps and Alternative Explanations

Litvinenko's allegations of FSB-orchestrated operations, particularly regarding the September 1999 apartment bombings in , , and that killed over 300 people, primarily rested on testimonies from purported FSB insiders interviewed for his book Blowing Up Russia, but these accounts lacked corroborating documentation or independently verifiable evidence, rendering them hearsay-dependent. Forensic analysis of the bombings identified hexogen () as the explosive, consistent with materials used in prior Chechen-linked attacks, with no direct trace to FSB stockpiles or operations despite claims of state involvement. Official Russian investigations, including criminal probes concluded in the early 2000s, attributed the attacks to Islamist militants affiliated with Chechen separatists, resulting in convictions such as those of Krymshamkhalov and Dekkushev, who received life sentences in 2004 for transporting explosives used in the blasts, and similar verdicts for the and incidents tied to Wahhabi networks under field commanders like . Confessions from arrested suspects, including details of explosive procurement from smuggling routes, further supported terrorist attribution over internal provocation, with no empirical reversal of these findings in subsequent independent scrutiny. Alternative causal explanations emphasize a pattern of Chechen predating 1999, including truck bombings and raids that escalated post-First Chechen War, making external attribution more parsimonious than a vast FSB requiring undetected planting of devices, fabricated evidence, and coerced confessions across multiple sites. Litvinenko's narrative overlooks such precedents, with evidentiary voids amplified by the absence of defectors producing physical proof or surviving whistleblowers facing prosecution for . Litvinenko's exile activities and claims coincided with financial reliance on Boris Berezovsky, a self-exiled oligarch who funded his family's escape from in 2000, provided housing, and supported his anti-Kremlin work, including payments tied to reports on Putin regime corruption. Berezovsky's motives stemmed from asset seizures and political after opposing Putin's consolidation of power, incentivizing amplified accusations to bolster narratives discrediting the Russian leadership and securing Western asylum or influence. This dependency raises questions of selective , where genuine insider knowledge may have been conflated with sponsor-driven hyperbole, contrasting pure incentives with sustained revenue from sensational publications and collaborations.

Russian Government Responses and Denials

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) categorically denied Litvinenko's central allegation that it had staged the 1999 apartment bombings in , , and , which killed 293 civilians, as a false-flag operation to bolster Vladimir Putin's rise to power and justify the Second Chechen War. Instead, FSB investigators attributed the explosions to Chechen militants, citing forensic evidence of hexogen explosives consistent with prior attacks by Islamist groups and subsequent convictions of suspects like , who admitted renting storage units used to assemble the bombs. An FSB spokesman dismissed Litvinenko's purported evidence—such as claims of FSB agents planting bombs in a building—as fabrications unworthy of consideration, emphasizing that independent probes, including by the Russian Prosecutor General's Office, found no state involvement. Russian authorities portrayed Litvinenko as an unreliable defector motivated by personal grudges and financial incentives from anti-Kremlin oligarchs, particularly Boris Berezovsky, who funded his exile and co-authored publications like Blowing Up Russia. Prior to his flight in 2000, Litvinenko had been arrested in March 1998 and charged with abuse of office and exceeding authority during counter-terrorism operations, charges from which he was briefly acquitted in November 1999 before re-arrestment; these were cited as evidence of his own misconduct within the FSB. Post-defection, Russia issued an international warrant for him on additional counts including theft and assault, framing his allegations as self-serving lies disseminated for Western remuneration amid the economic turmoil of the 1990s Yeltsin era. State-controlled media reinforced this narrative by depicting Litvinenko as a "jackal-traitor" who betrayed his oath during Russia's post-Soviet instability, when and plagued security services, and who aligned with foreign interests to undermine national stability. Officials, including figures close to the , argued his claims lacked empirical backing, such as verifiable documents or witnesses, and served only to echo unsubstantiated theories propagated by émigré critics. This portrayal extended to his personal accusations against Putin, dismissed as venomous slander from a disgruntled ex-officer whose career ended amid internal FSB disputes over anti-corruption probes he initiated but failed to substantiate.

Assessments of Motives and Reliability

Litvinenko's close association with Boris Berezovsky, the exiled Russian oligarch who funded his relocation to the in 2000 and provided ongoing financial support including housing, has prompted scrutiny of potential biases in his public allegations against the Russian state. This dependency arose from Litvinenko's earlier FSB investigation into assassination attempts on Berezovsky in the , fostering a patron-client dynamic where Berezovsky's anti-Putin stance—rooted in his loss of influence after Putin's 2000 ascension—may have shaped Litvinenko's narrative framing. Russian officials and analysts have cited this tie as evidence of motivated exaggeration, arguing Litvinenko's claims served Berezovsky's political agenda amid the oligarch's legal battles and exile status. Litvinenko's documented role as a paid MI6 consultant, earning roughly £2,000 per month starting around 2003, further complicates assessments of his independence, as it positioned him within British intelligence networks pursuing intelligence on Russian activities. While such affiliations do not inherently invalidate testimony, they introduce incentives for alignment with host-government priorities, particularly given 's interest in countering perceived Russian threats; Litvinenko provided expert briefings on figures, potentially amplifying unverified details to sustain operational value. Suspects in his poisoning, like , have countered that these connections reflected Litvinenko's recruitment into anti-Russian operations, casting doubt on the neutrality of his disclosures. Certain claims exemplify inconsistencies undermining Litvinenko's reliability, such as his allegation that , Italy's former prime minister and president, operated as a KGB agent under the codename Botarin—a assertion relayed without documentary proof and promptly refuted by Prodi. Originating from Litvinenko's discussions with defectors like , the claim relied on anecdotal sourcing and lacked empirical corroboration, even as it surfaced amid broader Italian investigations into leftist networks; its speculative nature parallels other unproven assertions, suggesting a propensity for conspiratorial interpretation over verifiable evidence. In contrast to these lapses, Litvinenko's pre-defection career in the FSB's units demonstrated tangible successes, including investigations into infiltration and high-profile arrests that earned him internal commendations. This operational record—focused on disrupting criminal syndicates rather than state-level conspiracies—highlights a shift post-2000 toward broader, harder-to-substantiate accusations, possibly amplified by grievances and sources. Analysts weighing his testimony emphasize the need for cross-verification, noting that while some exposures aligned with independent reports, reliance on Litvinenko alone for pivotal claims risks conflating personal vendettas with causal fact.

The Polonium-210 Poisoning

Events Leading to Exposure on November 1, 2006

On November 1, 2006, Alexander Litvinenko conducted meetings in as part of his consultancy activities. In the early afternoon, he met Italian academic at the Itsu sushi bar near . handed Litvinenko documents related to the October 7 assassination of Russian journalist and discussed intelligence indicating assassination threats against both men due to their inquiries into networks. Litvinenko then proceeded to the Pine Bar at the Millennium Hotel in , arriving around 3:00 PM to meet Andrei Lugovoi and , both former /FSB officers whom he had known from . Lugovoi had requested the rendezvous to discuss potential business collaboration and Litvinenko's personal security arrangements. The group conversed for about 90 minutes, during which Litvinenko consumed poured from a on their table. Subsequent radiation testing confirmed polonium-210 contamination in the Pine Bar's teapot and on associated surfaces, marking the location—and the tea—as the vector for Litvinenko's exposure to the isotope. Traces of the same substance were detected in samples from Lugovoi and Kovtun's hotel rooms and along their travel paths in and prior to November 1, consistent with handling of the material en route to the meeting.

Symptoms, Treatment, and Death on November 23, 2006

Litvinenko first exhibited symptoms of poisoning on the evening of November 1, 2006, including severe vomiting and diarrhea, which led to and acute abdominal pain.00144-6/abstract) These initial manifestations mimicked , prompting initial treatment with antibiotics upon his admission to Barnet General Hospital on November 3. As his condition failed to improve, complicating factors such as detection of Clostridium difficile toxin in his stools emerged, but persistent and escalating organ stress indicated deeper systemic damage from the alpha-particle emissions of , which preferentially targeted rapidly dividing cells in the and bone marrow.00144-6/abstract) On November 17, Litvinenko was transferred to the at in , where his count had plummeted catastrophically, signaling profound and increased susceptibility to infections. Medical staff administered supportive therapies, including fluids, blood products, and antibiotics to combat secondary infections, while initially trialing for potential heavy metal , though this proved ineffective against polonium's internalized radiation effects. Diagnostic efforts ruled out common toxins like , with urine analysis eventually revealing alpha radiation; the isotope was identified as by the just hours before his death on November 23. Litvinenko succumbed to multiple organ failure, culminating in , as the cumulative dose—estimated in the lethal range—irreversibly damaged vital systems including the heart, liver, and kidneys. The post-mortem examination, deemed the most hazardous in British history due to persistent contamination risks, required pathologists to wear anti- suits and respirators to mitigate exposure during the procedure.

Final Statement and Immediate Aftermath

On November 21, 2006, two days before his death, Alexander Litvinenko dictated a statement from his bed at in , accusing Russian President of ordering his poisoning with polonium-210. In the document, released publicly on November 24 by his friend Alex Goldfarb outside the hospital, Litvinenko claimed the radioactive isotope originated from Russia's nuclear reactors and was deployed under Putin's direct authorization, framing the act as an assault not only on him but on Britain and the . He addressed Putin personally, stating: "You may succeed in silencing one man, but the howl of protest from around the world will reverberate in your ears for the rest of your life. May God amend your crimes." The statement's release immediately following Litvinenko's death on November 23 triggered intense global media attention, with outlets portraying the incident as state-sponsored assassination and amplifying Litvinenko's charges against the Kremlin. Litvinenko's wife, Marina, who had been at his bedside, endorsed the accusations in initial public comments, asserting that Putin held ultimate responsibility for her husband's murder and vowing to pursue justice. She described Litvinenko's final days as marked by severe pain and limited speech, yet he reiterated his love for her and resolve against the Russian leadership before succumbing to multiple organ failure from acute radiation syndrome. Litvinenko's funeral took place on December 7, 2006, at in , conducted according to Muslim rites after his shortly before death. Approximately 50 mourners attended, including his wife , 12-year-old son , parents Valter and Nina, first wife Natalia, and Russian exiles such as billionaire Boris Berezovsky and Chechen leader . The ceremony, described as solemn amid ongoing police inquiries, featured a green coffin draped in the and prayers led by an , reflecting Litvinenko's alliances with anti-Kremlin figures.

Investigations and Judicial Proceedings

United Kingdom Criminal Inquiry and Inquest Findings

An into Alexander Litvinenko's death was opened by coroner Dr. Andrew Reid on 27 November 2006, shortly after his passing, but faced repeated delays due to concerns and insufficient disclosure of sensitive material from and Russian authorities. In , the coroner postponed proceedings further, citing implications, and by 2013, challenges over secrecy and evidence access led to additional postponements until October of that year. The initially rejected calls for a in July 2013, but following pressure, Home Secretary announced its establishment in July 2014 to address broader state involvement questions beyond the coroner's remit. The , chaired by retired judge Sir , commenced hearings in January 2015 and incorporated both functions and expanded investigations, including closed sessions for intelligence evidence. Russian non-cooperation exacerbated delays, as authorities refused to extradite suspects and —whom the charged with murder in May 2007—or facilitate their testimony, citing constitutional prohibitions. The inquiry examined forensic traces of , revealing contamination patterns linking Lugovoy and Kovtun's travels from to , including on , hotel rooms, and the Millennium Hotel's Pine Bar where Litvinenko met them on 1 November 2006. The inquiry's report, published on 21 January 2016, determined that Litvinenko's death resulted from deliberate poisoning, with Lugovoy and Kovtun administering the lethal dose, likely via contaminated tea during their 1 November meeting. Both men, former FSB officers, lacked personal motives and possessed neither the means nor authority to obtain weapon-grade without state backing, leading Owen to conclude they acted as agents of the Russian state in an FSB-directed operation. The report assessed a strong probability that the was approved by FSB Director and President , given the operation's scale, secrecy requirements, and alignment with state interests in silencing Litvinenko's criticisms of Russian leadership.

Russian Investigation Outcomes

Russian authorities initiated their own criminal investigation into Litvinenko's death shortly after it occurred, classifying it as a case under Article 105 of the Russian Criminal Code for premeditated homicide. The probe identified Andrei Lugovoi and as key suspects, with Lugovoi formally charged with the on May 22, 2007. However, following Lugovoi's election to the in December 2007, he acquired , which halted any domestic prosecution and effectively stalled the case against him. Moscow consistently rejected claims of state involvement or that the polonium-210 originated from Russian facilities, with Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika dismissing such assertions as "nonsense" and state nuclear corporation denying any link to the isotope used. Instead, officials and the suspects promoted alternative explanations, including —speculating that Litvinenko may have ingested the poison himself to discredit the Russian government—or accidental exposure during handling of radioactive material from his alleged past activities. Other theories pointed to personal enemies from Litvinenko's time in Russian security services or rival factions in , rather than orchestrated . Russia refused Britain's extradition requests for Lugovoi and Kovtun, citing constitutional prohibitions against extraditing its citizens, and made no serious effort to advance the case domestically beyond initial charges. In Russia, Lugovoi was portrayed as a patriot; he hosted a television program and received the Order of Honor from President in March 2015, signaling official endorsement despite foreign accusations. These outcomes contrasted sharply with Western findings by emphasizing individual culpability or self-inflicted harm over systemic orchestration.

European Court of Human Rights Ruling in 2021

In its judgment of 21 September 2021 in Carter v. (Application no. 20914/07), the held that violated the procedural limb of Article 2 of the —the —by failing to carry out an effective investigation into Alexander Litvinenko's 2006 poisoning and death. The Court found 's probe inadequate, as it dismissed evidence implicating state agents, refused to extradite prime suspects Andrei Lugovoy and , and prioritized a narrative of suicide or accident unsupported by forensic data. This procedural breach stemmed from the authorities' deliberate non-cooperation with investigators and their exclusion of lines of pointing to (FSB) involvement. The Court inferred from a "strong case" that Lugovoy and Kovtun, identified as FSB operatives, acted on direct orders from senior agency figures, with possible approval at the level of then-President . This attribution relied not on novel empirical evidence but on patterns in prior inquiries: the rarity and state-monopolized production of in , the suspects' FSB ties and access to the isotope, their trail of contamination across , and the operational sophistication mirroring FSB "wet affairs" tactics. The Court deferred to the UK Litvinenko Inquiry's 2016 findings of "compelling" proof of FSB orchestration, deeming them credible absent rebuttal, while rejecting 's parallel investigation as a sham that shielded perpetrators. No violation of the substantive under Article 2 was established, as Litvinenko's killing occurred in the , beyond Russia's under Article 1 of the Convention; the clarified that mere attribution of responsibility does not confer such without effective control over the victim or territory. , delivered by a Third Section Chamber with six votes to one (Russian Judge Dedov dissenting on evidentiary grounds), ordered Russia to pay applicant Marina Litvinenko €100,000 in non-pecuniary damages for her moral suffering and €22,500 in costs and expenses.

Broader Implications and Legacy

Effects on Russo-British Relations

The in November 2006 prompted an immediate escalation in diplomatic tensions between the and , culminating in reciprocal expulsions of personnel. Following 's refusal to extradite suspect Andrei Lugovoy—formally requested by the Foreign Office on May 28, 2007—British Foreign Secretary announced on July 16, 2007, the expulsion of four Russian diplomats, identified by the as intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover. retaliated on July 20, 2007, by expelling four British diplomats, marking the first such tit-for-tat action since the era. These measures were part of broader efforts to reduce the Russian diplomatic footprint in from approximately 200 staff to around 50, though rejected the proposal, further complicating embassy operations. In addition to expulsions, the imposed restrictions on visas for Russian officials and suspended ongoing talks on intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism cooperation, actions that Russia criticized as undermining joint efforts against . These steps reflected Britain's attribution of the to Russian state involvement, though denied responsibility and framed the measures as politically motivated interference. While not amounting to formal sanctions, the diplomatic row disrupted bilateral dialogues that had previously facilitated limited collaboration on transnational threats. By the late , the Litvinenko had contributed to a profound chill in Russo-British relations, positioning them at their lowest ebb since the well before the 2014 crisis. Economic and energy ties persisted amid mutual dependencies, but political trust eroded, with persistent disputes and unresolved accountability fostering mutual suspicion in intelligence and diplomatic spheres. This pre-existing strain limited high-level engagements and set a for confrontations, underscoring a shift from post-Cold War to managed antagonism.

Influence on Narratives of Russian State Actions

The Litvinenko poisoning intensified Western portrayals of the Putin regime as an authoritarian entity employing state resources for targeted killings abroad, framing as defiant of international legal and ethical boundaries. The 2016 UK inquiry's assessment that Putin likely authorized the operation, based on indicating polonium-210's origin in a Russian reactor and the involvement of FSB-linked operatives, reinforced narratives of exceptionalist and disregard for extraterritorial norms. This contributed to broader perceptions of systemic threats from , evidenced by subsequent diplomatic strains, though critics noted the inquiry's reliance on classified evidence without adversarial testing raised questions of procedural bias. Russian state responses countered these accounts by rejecting the inquiry as a politicized fabrication, with officials like Kremlin spokesman decrying its opacity and linking it to anti-Russian agendas amid strained bilateral ties. Domestic narratives emphasized Litvinenko's status as a defector entangled in criminal networks, portraying accusations as Western interference to undermine Putin's stabilization efforts post-1990s chaos, while highlighting Britain's failure to extradite or prosecute without Russian cooperation. Persistent denials, including dismissal of the 2021 ruling holding Russia accountable, sustained arguments prioritizing internal sovereignty and skepticism toward foreign judicial overreach. Litvinenko's death cemented his role in the archetype of the defector as a high-risk , underscoring vulnerabilities for those exposing state operations: individuals with insider knowledge of tactics inherently invite retaliation to deter emulation and neutralize perceived threats. This pattern, absent formal convictions— as suspects Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitry Kovtun evaded and faced no international trial—highlights empirical gaps in attributing solely to state directives, despite probabilistic evidence from forensic trails and access to radiological materials. Such limits temper narratives, as unproven allegations risk amplifying unverified claims amid institutional biases in both Western reporting and Russian counter-propaganda.

Portrayals in Media, Books, and Films

Litvinenko's life and death have been depicted in several books authored or co-authored by associates, often framing him as a whistleblower against Russian state corruption. In "Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within," co-written with and published in 2002, Litvinenko alleged that Russia's FSB orchestrated the 1999 apartment bombings to justify the Second Chechen War and bolster Vladimir Putin's rise, portraying the agency as a criminal entity rather than a security service. "Death of a Dissident: The Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and the Return of the ," published in 2007 by Alex Goldfarb with contributions from Litvinenko's widow Marina, details the poisoning as a targeted ordered by the , emphasizing Litvinenko's and criticisms of Putin. Luke Harding's "A Very Expensive Poison: The Assassination of Alexander Litvinenko and Putin's War with the West," released in , reconstructs the events through , depicting Litvinenko as a victim in a broader pattern of Russian extraterritorial operations. Documentaries have frequently examined the poisoning's mechanics and implications, drawing on public records and witness accounts. "Poisoned by Polonium: The Litvinenko File," a 2007 Channel 4 production later available on Netflix, traces Litvinenko's exile from Russia in 2000 to his hospitalization on November 1, 2006, and death three weeks later, highlighting the rarity of polonium-210 and traces found across Europe. Netflix's "How to Poison a Spy," released in 2020, incorporates newly declassified footage and interviews with Litvinenko's associates to explore the operation's execution, including contamination at sites like London's Millennium Hotel. "Litvinenko: The Mayfair Poisoning," a 2022 BBC documentary accompanying an ITV drama, focuses on the forensic and diplomatic responses, featuring Scotland Yard investigators who tracked polonium trails to Moscow flights. "Hunting the KGB Killers," produced by True Vision in 2023, provides access to British police details on suspects Andrei Lugovoy and Dmitry Kovtun, portraying the case as a deliberate state hit. Fictionalized portrayals in television series emphasize Litvinenko's personal struggles and confrontation with Russian authorities. The 2022 ITV miniseries "Litvinenko," starring in the title role, dramatizes his 1998 denouncing FSB orders to assassinate oligarch Boris Berezovsky, his 2000 asylum in the UK, and the 2006 poisoning at a Mayfair bar, culminating in his bedside accusation against Putin. Marina Litvinenko praised Tennant's performance for capturing her husband's determination amid suffering. Russian has offered contrasting depictions, often dismissing Litvinenko as a funded by Western interests. In 2007 coverage during the poisoning inquiry, outlets like portrayed him as driven by financial motives and personal grudges, a lonely estranged from his homeland rather than a principled defector. Such narratives align with official denials of involvement, attributing his death to self-inflicted or third-party causes, though lacking forensic substantiation. Western media, by contrast, predominantly casts Litvinenko as a exposing authoritarian tactics, a view reinforced in outlets like amid strained UK-Russia ties post-2006.

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  141. https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2022/dec/09/litvinenko-to-dance-monsters-the-seven-best-shows-to-stream-this-week
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