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Cypriot National Guard
Greek: Εθνική Φρουρά
Emblem of the National Guard of Cyprus
Flag of the National Guard General Staff
MottoΑμύνεσθαι περί πάτρης (lit. 'Defend the Homeland')
Founded15 June 1964
Service branches
HeadquartersNicosia, Cyprus
WebsiteOfficial website
Leadership
Minister of DefenceVasilis Palmas
Chief of the Cypriot National GuardLieutenant General Emmanouel Theodorou
Personnel
Military age18 years old
Conscription14 months
Active personnel12,000[1]
Reserve personnel60,000[1]
Expenditure
Budget€553 Million
Percent of GDPIncrease2.0%
Industry
Foreign suppliers
Related articles
RanksCyprus military ranks

The National Guard of Cyprus (Greek: Εθνική Φρουρά, romanized: Ethniki Froura), also known as the Greek Cypriot National Guard or simply the National Guard, is the military force of the Republic of Cyprus. It consists of air, land, sea and special forces elements, and is highly integrated with its first and second line reserves, as well as supporting civilian agencies and paramilitary forces.[2]

The mission of the National Guard is to take all necessary measures for the defense of the Republic of Cyprus for the purpose of dealing with a threatened invasion or any action directed against the independence or territorial integrity of the Republic or threatening to secure the life or property of citizens of the Republic.[3] The main threat to Cyprus comes from the presence of 40,000 Turkish troops stationed in northern Cyprus.[4]

Greece currently maintains a garrison of 950 men in the Republic of Cyprus under the designation Hellenic Force in Cyprus (ELDYK), but this is not officially part of the Cyprus military and mostly takes orders from Greece's Hellenic Army General Staff.[5]

History

[edit]

The National Guard was established in 1964 as a force composed predominantly of ethnic Greeks, following the Cyprus crisis of 1963–1964 and the breakdown of social and political relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the island of Cyprus.[6] As outlined by the tripartite Treaty of Alliance (1960)[7] and defined by the early Constitution of 1960–1963, Cyprus was entitled to an army of 2,000 men, to be made up of 60% Greek and 40% Turkish personnel.[8] The Cyprus army was a short-lived volunteer force from 1960-4.[8] The first elected President of the Republic of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios III, proposed thirteen constitutional amendments to the 1960 constitution, which would have adjusted the distribution of manpower and voting power for all civil and military services.[9] This adjustment was aimed at giving greater representation and influence to the Greek Cypriot majority, which at the time formed around 82% of the island's indigenous population.

Military service

[edit]

Military service in the Republic of Cyprus is mandatory for males. Today, the obligatory service period is 14 months.[10][11] Currently, only Greek Cypriots serve in the military. Legally, the Greek Cypriot community comprises the ethnic Greek population as well as Cypriots belonging to three Christian minorities—the Armenians, and Catholics of the Latin and Maronite Churches. Since 2008, service is mandatory for all members of the Greek Cypriot community and not only for ethnic Greek Cypriots. The current supreme commander is a Greek military commander, as have been all of his predecessors.[10]

Cyprus participates in the establishment of the permanent structured cooperation. Introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, PESCO is the most important initiative in promoting the establishment of a European defence policy.

The Cyprus National Guard has since 2016 aimed to move towards semi-professionalization, in the scope of this change, the military serviced time was reduced from 24 months to 14 months, whilst about 3,000 professional soldiers were hired.[12][13] Even though long wished for by the public, these changes have been said to be no more than a political expediency.[14][15] The way in which the semi-professionalization has been conducted has been illustrated as unprofessional and undermining the ability of the force, by academic researchers.[16][17] Europe's defence is present in Cyprus through Permanent Structured Cooperation. The government had argued for it to increase deterrence against any intervention on the island.[18] Cyprus has made available the military base in Paphos and the naval base in Zygi, along with other facilities. These have been upgraded and equipped with electronic surveillance systems.[19]

The force has in recent years experienced exponential draft dodging (in Greek: φυγοστρατία). Many policies have been designed, yet the issue has not been effectively managed.[20]

Components

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Organisation of active forces

[edit]

The National Guard is an interdisciplinary force. It consists of the Army, Navy and Air Force as mentioned above. The General Staff of the National Guard is the supreme hierarchical step and includes the Chief, the Staff, the Arms / Body Divisions and Organizations and its Organizational Units.

Over- simplified Organisational Structure of Cyprus National Guard.

The force heavily relies on the Reserves (Εφεδρεία), making up the biggest percentage of Human Resources in the case of full mobilisation of the National Guard.[21]

Army- It consists of a number of Brigade Formations and Regular Regimental Groups:

  • 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Ιη Μ/Κ Ταξιαρχια ΠΖ)
  • 2nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IIη M/K Ταξιαρχία ΠΖ)
  • 3rd Support Brigade (IIIη Ταξιαρχία ΥΠ)
  • 4th Infantry Brigade (IVη Ταξιαρχία ΠΖ)
  • 6th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (VIη M/K Ταξιαρχία ΠΖ)
  • 7th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (VIIη M/K Ταξιαρχία ΠΖ)
  • 20th Armored Brigade (XXη ΤΘ Ταξιαρχία)
  • Hellenic Force of Cyprus (ELDYK- ΕΛΔΥΚ) - Mechanized Group (battalion plus) Formation
  • 2nd Infantry Regiment (2ο Τ.Σ Σύνταγμα ΠΖ)
  • 8th Infantry Regiment (8ο Τ.Σ Σύνταγμα ΠΖ)
  • Military Police (Στρατονομία)
  • Special Forces Command - 1 Regiment (Διοίκηση Kαταδρομών)
  • Artillery Command (Διοίκηση Πυροβολικού)
  • Engineers Command (Διοίκηση Μηχανικού)
  • Military Music Department of the National Guard
  • Signal Command (Διοίκηση Επικοινωνιών Πληροφορικής)
  • Medical Bureau (Διεύθυνση Υγειονομικού)
  • Home Guard Bureau (Διεύθυνση Εθνοφυλακής)

Navy- It consists of:

Air Force- It consists of:

  • Air Command (Διοίκηση Αεροπορίας)
  • Units (including Attack Helicopters - Aircraft, Air Force Patrols, Air Control System, and Operational Support Degrees).

[22]

Operational history

[edit]
Soldiers of the National Guard armed with Sten submachine guns and Lee-Enfield bolt action rifles marching in 1967.

Early operational history (1963–1974)

[edit]

The Cypriot National Guard, in its existent form, was initially mobilised circa mid-1963 as a Greek Cypriot infantry force with some small elements dedicated to artillery, anti-armour and light armour forces. This force inherited some mixed equipment from its pre-civil war organisation, including 54 British-made 25-pounder gun-howitzers, 40 Marmon-Herrington Armoured Car (Mk. IVF),[23] 4 Shorland light armoured cars, 2 Daimler Dingo light armoured cars, 5 C-17 light armoured trucks and a variety of machine guns, mortars and a few anti-tank weapons (namely M20 Super Bazookas and a small number of PIAT weapons). The Greek Cypriots also possessed some Bofors 40mm anti-aircraft guns,[24] along with a variety of Bedford trucks and old US made jeeps.

The Cyprus Naval Command became active circa 1963, following the outbreak of civil conflict between extremists within the Greek and Turkish ethnic communities of the island. At the outset of operational status, the Cyprus Naval Command was manned by Greek Navy officers and junior officers, whilst the sailors were primarily Greek Cypriot conscripts of educated backgrounds. The first equipment made available to the Cyprus Naval Command was a set of three ex-German WW2-era R-boats (two of the R-151 class called P-01 Arion and P-02 Phaethon, and one of the R-218 class under the name Dedalos). All three vessels were in service by August 1964, having been purchased from a shipyard in Piraeus, Greece by a private sponsor named A. Leventis. The three vessels were in poor condition due to their age, and had to be refurbished in Greece before delivery to Cyprus.[25]

On 6 August 1964, the Cypriot National Guard was mobilised to intervene in the ongoing inter-ethnic confrontation at Kokkina, a Turkish-Cypriot controlled fortified enclave on the south-western edge of Morphou Bay in the north-west of the island with its commander, being General George Grivas.[26]

Kokkina was regarded by Grivas as a major coastal beachhead for Turkey to land weapons in Cyprus, with the aim of arming the Turkish Cypriots. For this reason, he persuaded the military government in Athens to authorise an all-out assault on Kokkina, with the aim of eliminating the beachhead, and preventing more weapons being delivered to Turkish Cypriot militia groups.[26]

The military confrontation at Kokkina in August 1964 between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces saw the Greek-Cypriot force mobilised for the first time to attempt to eliminate a fortified coastal enclave in the Tylliria region of the island, in an effort to stop Turkish vessels putting ashore there to offload food, weapons and ammunition for the Turkish Cypriot militia units active in that region.[27] As a necessity of mounting such an assault, Grivas required a naval presence off the coast of Kokkina, in order to bombard the enclave from the sea, and to prevent any other shipping from interfering. Consequently, the Phaethon and the Arion were utilised in the assault and commenced their assault with broadsides of 40mm and 20mm gunfire into the enclave on 6 August. This action was coordinated with battery fire from six land-based 25-pounder guns and around a dozen mortars used by ground forces[28] to besiege the enclave from the south and south-west. The siege continued until 8 August during which the Turkish Government opted to intervene with air strikes, as it became clear to all parties that Kokkina's defences were likely to collapse, regardless of a UN presence in the area.[29] The Turkish Air Force dispatched a number of formations of F-100 Super Sabres to commence air strikes against the Cypriot ground and naval forces, in broad daylight and flying at low level.

The first formation of F-100 Super Sabres spotted the Phaethon near to a small fisheries harbour west of Kokkina. The Phaethon commenced evasive manoeuvres and put up 20mm cannon fire, but was struck in the engines by strafing rockets, napalm and going into flames, killing seven of her crew.[30] One of the four survivors then piloted the ship with a single functioning engine to run aground next to the harbour, so that the crew could be recovered by local fishermen.[31]

Minutes after the attack on the Phaethon, a second formation of F-100s spotted the Cypriot gunboat Arion further up the coast towards Kokkina. The Arion was strafed with guns and rockets, causing superficial damage. As the Arion successfully made her escape using evasive manoeuvres, an F-100C Super Sabre, piloted by Cpt. Cengiz Topel of 112 Filo was shot down by a Cypriot 40mm anti-aircraft gun emplacement on the shoreline.[32]

The loss of the Phaethon was a severe shock to the National Guard leadership, and was compounded by further casualties and material losses at Kato Pyrgos,[33] a nearby Greek Cypriot village which was bombarded on 8 and 9 August in an effort to dislodge National Guardsmen using its hilltops for directing artillery fire with radios. The Cypriot National Guard solidified a perimeter of containment around Kokkina, leaving the Turkish Cypriot village isolated from the rest of the island, and buffered only a narrow UN demilitarized zone after successfully achieving its objectives.[34]

Aware of the glaring deficiency of their military capabilities, the leadership of the Cypriot National Guard under General Georgios Grivas was able to compel the civilian Government of Cyprus, under Archbishop Makarios to seek out foreign assistance for a massive armament campaign. Since Cyprus could not afford major weapons purchases under her own depleted national budget, Makarios was forced to dispatch an envoy on 1 October 1964 to the Soviet Union to request military assistance. This move resulted in rapid Soviet assistance, widely regarded by Western countries as a step towards a Cold War alliance between Cyprus and Russia.[35]

As soon as 23–24 December 1964, a Soviet Navy freighter arrived at Limassol Port[36] carrying the first batch of arms intended to re-equip the National Guard. These supplies included 4 unidentified armoured vehicles, and 130 ZIL heavy trucks, along with sufficient number of crates to fill 36 Bedford trucks. After this initial delivery, arms transfers made by the Soviet Navy to Cyprus accelerated, with freighters travelling via Alexandria in Egypt to Limassol under cover of night. These deliveries included a full package of Soviet-made radars and radio systems to complement the structural and strategic requirements of a reinforced National Guard. In addition, a consignment of 32 Soviet-made T-34/85 medium tanks (from Yugoslav surplus) were delivered along with 40 BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers,[37] as well as a batch of 30 M1944 100-mm field guns,[38] 40 modern 3M6 Shmel anti-tank missile firing units, a batch of ZPU-1 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns and a consignment of around 4500 Czech surplus vz. 58 assault rifles, as well as machine guns and mortars.

After 1965, and until 1974, the civilian Government of Archbishop Makarios became increasingly alienated by the relationship between the National Guard leadership and the ruling military Government of Greece. Few funds were made available to secure other armaments of technical support, and the National Guard was forced to develop alternative means to armament and self-sustainment. A Technical Corps was established to produce and retrofit a series of improvised armoured vehicles from unneeded ATS-712 Soviet tractors, resulting in 10 locally produced "TS" armoured personnel carriers.[39] A lack of spare parts meant that by the time of the 1974 military coup against Archbishop Makarios, the National Guard was experiencing severe technical difficulties with its T-34 tanks. The problem for the National Guard was further compounded by the refusal of Makarios' loyalist paramilitary force to hand over some 4500 Czech automatic rifles and a variety of other weapons which had been kept at a warehouse near Nicosia Airport, and which were handed over to the UN in January 1972.[40]

Coup and invasion in 1974

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Main article: Military operations during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus

On 15 July 1974, the Cypriot National Guard, under its own leadership and in conjunction with the EOKA-B ultra-nationalist organisation, overthrew the civilian Government of Archbishop Makarios in Nicosia[41] and attempted to assassinate him by using tanks and infantry to storm the Presidential Palace.[42] Makarios escaped, but the confrontation in Nicosia resulted in multiple casualties as the National Guard units engaged in a gunfight with Makarios' loyalist forces. Since Kyrenia in the north of the island was not expected to present much armed resistance to the coup, many forces which were stationed there to fend off a threatened Turkish invasion were sent to Nicosia on 15 and 16 July to enforce the coup in the Capital. Kyrenia was thus, poorly defended when the Turkish invasion began on 20 July.[42]

Makarios escaped an initial attempt to capture him at the Archbishopric in Nicosia, and fled to Paphos. The naval patrol vessel Leventis (No.15) was quickly dispatched to Paphos to begin shelling a radio station there which was being operated by pro-Makarios elements.

On 20 July 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus in a surprise-attack, without issuing a declaration of war. A naval force of Turkish vessels was detected by coastal radar at Apostolos Andreas approaching the coast, and a second force of naval vessels was sighted off the coast of Kyrenia during the early hours. The Cyprus National Guard Naval Command quickly ordered its two motor torpedo boats, T-1 (under the command of Lieutenant Junior Grade Nicolaos Verikios) and T-3 (under the command of Lieutenant Elefterios Tsomakis), both based at Kyrenia, to attack the Turkish flotilla directly. Both vessels were promptly sunk by combined air and sea attack. The rest of the Cyprus Navy vessels were scuttled by their own crews at Naval Base Chrysulis in Boghazi on 14 August 1974. After the conflict, two boats were re-floated by Turkish troops and transferred to Golcuk Naval Museum, Turkey (on display with incorrect pennant numbers 11 and 12).

Turkey commenced an air and sea invasion of northern Cyprus, under the codename "Attila-1" which had the anticipated aim of seizing Kyrenia as a beachhead with amphibious forces, whilst simultaneously establishing a beachhead from Kyrenia to the northern suburbs of Nicosia (the site of two Turkish fortified enclaves that could be used as strongholds to seize northern Nicosia) using parachute forces. The attack was heavily supported by a daylight air campaign, allowing Cypriot A/A flak to be suppressed to the extent that Turkish transport planes could drop parachute forces north of Nicosia in broad daylight from 20 July to 23 July. In disarray, the Greek Cypriot military leadership enacted the "Aphrodite-2" defence plan to coordinate a containment and resistance to the invasion forces. This plan, however, proved to be ineffective in either containing or repelling the Turkish forces already ashore. At the same time, the Greek Cypriot EOKA-B forces, subordinate to their own de facto leadership, enacted their own interpretation of the existing Aphrodite defence plan (sometimes referred to historically as Aphrodite-3 or Hephaestus) and attacked multiple Turkish Cypriot enclaves simultaneously, causing heavy Turkish Cypriot non-combatant casualties and rounding up an estimated 20,000 Turkish Cypriot POWs who were interred at Limassol until later that year.[43] Cypriot National Guard forces, supported by a smaller number of Greek troops, were able to prevent the loss of Nicosia (Including the International Airport which initially was successfully defended by elements of the Cyprus National Guard, later to be joined by ELDYK) and the Kato Pyrgos corridor during the second Turkish offensive, and stopped the offensive aimed at Larnaka, but were unable to support Famagusta due to lack of sufficient weaponry.[44][45]

As a result of the operations during the summer of 1974, the Cyprus National Guard had gained important operational experience and despite the loss of territory, surprised NATO with its tenacious defense without air power, naval power, a severe lack of armour, and being outnumbered some 4-1.

Post-war (1974–2004)

[edit]

Immediately following the 1974 conflict, the Cypriot National Guard experienced a major depletion of its military capability due to lack of equipment and ammunition, compounded by the wartime economic collapse of the country. A small armored unit of 11 surviving T-34/85 tanks continued to operate in service until circa 1985, albeit in poor mechanical condition with lack of spare parts. Small numbers of other armored vehicles (including re-engined Marmon Herrington Mk-IV F armored cars)[46] and artillery guns from the pre-war period also continued in service until the economic revival of the Cyprus Republic in the mid-1980s.

In 1978, Egyptian commando forces raided Larnaca International Airport in an effort to seize a hijacked Greek Cypriot airliner. Greek Cypriot commando forces (LOK) resisted the Egyptian forces, resulting in a sustained gun battle with the death of 15 Egyptian commandos and 3 Egyptian Air Force aircrew and an additional 15 Egyptian commandos hospitalised, an Egyptian C130 destroyed and Egyptian Jeeps destroyed.[47] Cairo had severed diplomatic relations with Nicosia for a number of years but eventually they were restored. Today, Egypt and Cyprus share a very close strategic relationship.[48]

In the early 1980s, Cyprus sought new suppliers of arms in order to circumvent US and European embargoes, combined with an apparent unwillingness by the Soviet Union to supply further aid. From Brazil, a large consignment of new light armored vehicles was ordered in 1982, 15 EE-3 Jararaca armored reconnaissance vehicles (delivered 1984–1985), and 126 EE-9 Cascavel armored fighting vehicles (delivered 1984–1988).

Faced with an urgent need for infantry-portable air-defense equipment, the Cypriot Government was able to procure 20 firing units of Strela-2/SA-7B Grail anti-aircraft missiles along with 324 live rounds from neighboring Syria in 1984.

Major arms orders were also placed with France, one of the few European powers still willing to support weapon deliveries to Cyprus. In 1984, Cyprus purchased from France a total of 27 VAB-VCI infantry fighting vehicles with 20mm cannon (delivered 1985–1988) along with 100 VAB-VTT armored personnel carriers (delivered 1985–1988).

In 1987, the first batch of new French tanks were purchased to replace the T-34s that had been removed from service - a total of 15 AMX-30B2 main battle tanks and 1 AMX-30D recovery vehicle, all delivered the following year. Also in 1987, Cyprus purchased from France a unit of 6 SA-342L Gazelle scout anti-tank helicopters and 18 VAB-VCAC guided-missile tank-destroyers, along with 1200 HOT-2 anti-tank missiles (interchangeable for both airborne and ground launcher platforms), all delivered in 1988. A further 2 VAB-VTT armored personnel carriers were ordered as options in 1987 (delivered in 1988) along with 250 MILAN-2 anti-tank missile rounds and an unknown number of firing units (possibly 45).[49]

In June 1987, the Cyprus National Guard Air Command purchased a batch of six Aerospatiale SA-342L Gazelle scout anti-tank helicopters with 1200 Euromissile HOT-2 wire-guided anti-tank missiles (the interchangeable live rounds to be shared with the Army for use on their VAB-VCAC tank destroyers). The six aircraft were delivered from January 1988 onward, and were issued the serial numbers 351, 352, 353, 354, 355 and 356,[50][51] drawn from Aerospatiale 21XX and 22XX series construction numbers.[52] Of these aircraft, five examples (excluding 351) have been noted in regular use with the Cyprus National Guard airborne forces, suggesting number 351 had been withdrawn for use as spare parts, or as a technical training air frame, prior to 2004.[52] The Gazelles were delivered in a three-tone desert camouflage consisting of light sand, dark sand and drab-olive tones - this camouflage has been retained to the present day. All aircraft utilize a low-visibility Cyprus flag fin-flash and a low-visibility Hellenic Air Force styled roundel marking at the midsection of the tail boom. The designation SA-342L is inscribed above the fin flash, along with the three-digit serial number.

In 1989, the Cyprus Government ordered a batch of 35 AMX-30B2 main battle tanks and 1 AMX-30D armored recovery vehicle as part of a $115 million US dollar purchase from France. The deal included 12 GIAT Mk F-3 self-propelled 155mm howitzers and 12 AMX-VCI armored personnel carriers. All of the equipment ordered from France in this year was delivered from 1990–1991.[53]

In 1990, Greece supplied Cyprus with 81 ELVO Leonidas-2 (4K-7FA) armored personnel carriers, which were fielded to provide the Greek ELDYK Army Regiment in Cyprus with a Mechanized Infantry vehicle force. These were followed in 1996–1998 by a batch of 52 French-made AMX-30B main battle tanks supplied from Hellenic Army surplus, along with a further 65 new Leonidas-2 armored personnel carriers delivered in 1996–1997.[49]

AW-139 helicopter of the National Guard in a Search & Rescue exercise.

In 2001–2002, Cyprus discreetly acquired 12 new-build examples (serial numbers 811–822 inclusively)[54] of the Mil Mi-35P Hind-F attack helicopter type from the Russian Federation, following a lengthy tender process which included reported competition from the Mil Mi-28 Havoc,[55] and Denel Rooivalk.[56] The helicopters were first made public at a surprise three-ship flypast of the funeral of Lt General Evangelos Florakis on 12 July 2002[57] (himself killed in the crash of Cypriot Air Command Bell-206L Long Ranger "112"[58] on 10 July 2002 whilst observing a command and control exercise at night). The Mi-35s were initially supplied in an unusual matte-black (and presumably infra-red absorbent) camouflage[59] suitable for night operations, but lacked the optional FLIR turret and identification friend-or-foe systems made available for the more advanced Russian Mi-24PN. Aside from their monotone camouflage, the aircraft carried a small, high-contrast Cyprus Republic tail fin flag, and a high visibility Hellenic Air Force styled blue-on-white roundel on the tail at the midpoint. Bright red danger markings were applied to the rotor tips and to the end of the tail boom.[60]

The Cypriot Mi-35 helicopters were initially equipped for the deployment of fixed-mount 30mm heavy cannon, and a capacity for 80mm (3.1 inch) S-8 rockets in AP and HE-FRAG configurations, as well as for anti-tank missiles in the 9K114 and 9M120 versions.

European Union membership (2004-2020)

[edit]
See also: Cyprus in the European Union
Cyprus National Guard soldiers during the October 1st parade in 2004.

On 10 September 2005, National Guard Pilatus PC-9M turboprop aircraft "902" crashed into a church bell tower while performing an unauthorized flight maneuver near Kollossi in Limassol Cyprus, having deviated 80 km from the planned flight path. The aircraft was destroyed, and its two pilots killed.[61]

On 5 July 2006, a National Guard Mi-35P Hind attack helicopter (serial number 822)[62] crashed[63] near the Paphos-Limassol motorway shortly after departing from Andreas Papandreou Air Base in Paphos. The aircraft was written off and both crew members (a Russian instructor and Cypriot student) killed.

The SA-342L Gazelle anti-tank helicopter force remains in service to present day, although example 356 is no longer thought to be operational. The four remaining Gazelle anti-tank helicopters are thought to have undergone an overhaul, reportedly completed in August 2014 at Valence-Chabeuil airport by Aerotec Group.[64][65] The four Gazelle helicopters were assigned to 450ME / 1st Platoon, which has been implemented at Andreas Papandreou Air Base (in Paphos district) following the closure of Lakatamia air base (in Nicosia district) in April 2013.[66] Their prior host unit, 449MAE Helicopter Squadron, was disbanded with the closure of Lakatamia AFB.

In February 2017, the Cyprus Navy was given an offshore patrol vessel by the Sultanate of Oman.[67] The Al Mabrukah training and patrol vessel displaced 930 tons and was 62 metres long, making it far larger than any vessel previously operated by the Cyprus Navy.[68] The vessel was refitted and modernised for the donation process and came equipped with a large helicopter pad and expanded accommodation facilities, making it suitable for use as a support ship under its new designation, A620 Alasia.[69] However the low speed of the ship, combined with its age, highlighted mechanical difficulties with the ship's propulsion, and following its use in the TELES-2017 naval exercise in May 2017, the ship was laid up at Larnaca Port, requiring repair.[70]

Cyprus Navy P-4 "Skinhead" class Motor Torpedo Boat

On 28 November 2017 the Cypriot Defence Ministry announced the planned acquisition of eight helicopters:[71] four SA-342L Gazelle scout anti-tank helicopters to be acquired from France with night and all-weather capability, and four attack helicopters to be selected by tender.[71] The four existing Gazelle helicopters in the Air Force would be upgraded, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were also being sought as part of a combined Unmanned Air System package.[71][72]

In 2018, the Cyprus Navy received a Sa’ar 62. It was purchased by the Republic of Cyprus through a transnational agreement with Israel and was built by the Israeli shipyards in Haifa. The new vessel has a displacement of 430 tons, an overall length of 62 meters, a maximum speed of 32 knots, and carries up to 30 crewmembers plus a Special Forces unit. Installed on the vessel are multiple systems including 2 Rafael Typhoon Weapon Stations with a single 23mm gun each, radar, two TOPLITE electro-optical payloads, SATCOM, navigation systems, command and control systems, and more. Among others, the vessel is armed with two 12.7mm heavy machine guns but also it is Fitted for But Not With (FFBNW) a Rafael MLS-NLOS system. In late 2018, an option was exercised to purchase a second vessel of the type.[citation needed]

In late 2018, the Cyprus Government purchased 24 Nora B-52 self-propelled 155mm heavy field howitzers from Serbia, along with 8 BOV M16 Miloš MRAPs / Light Armoured Vehicles and an unspecified number of options to purchase additional systems for both types.[73] The acquisition of Nora B-52 was widely reported to be part of a phased refurbishment of the Artillery Command, transitioning to a greater number of self-propelled guns and launcher systems, integrated and better networked for a more sophisticated warfighting capability.[74]

2020–present

[edit]
Greek and Cypriot Greek SEALs during an exersice.

In early 2020, Cyprus signed contracts worth more than 240 million Euros to purchase French Mistral MANPADS, Exocet ASMs and a short-medium range SAM system, later identified is the Israeli Barak MX.[75][76]

In 2023, the Turkish Armed Forces attempted to create a new road that would have connected occupied Arsos straight to Pyla, bypassing the SBAs, when UN forces tried stopping them, the Turkish personnel attacked and wounded 3 UN soldiers and as such the Cypriot National Guard was placed on alert and the change of the Chief of the National Guard was delayed due to the military being placed on alert.[77][78][79]

As part of the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine initiative, Greek and Cypriot Greek explosive ordnance disposal experts assisted Ukrainian troops in handling various related scenarios.[80][81]

The Cypriot National Guard has also been involved in the Cyprus governments "Amalthea" initiative which has been sending aid to people in Gaza.[82]

Special forces

[edit]

Army

[edit]
See also: Special Forces Command (Cyprus)
Special Forces unit flash that is emblazoned with ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ ΚΑΤΑΔΡΟΜΩΝ (Raider Forces).

The Cyprus armed forces operate a pool of three Army Special Forces Groups (plus one auxiliary) known colloquially as LOK (Greek: ΛΟΚ - Λόχοι Ορεινών Καταδρομών, Lochoi Oreinōn Katadromōn). All LOK Groups are part of the Army Special Forces Command DKD (Greek: ΔΚΔ - Διοίκησης Καταδρομών - Diikisis Katadromon), and a soldier belonging to the Brigade is called a Raider (Greek: Kαταδρομέας, Kαταδρομείς - Katadromeas, Katadromeis). Cyprus Special Forces training is based closely on their Greek Counterparts. The formation is more commonly referred to as the Raider Forces (Greek: Δυνάμεις Kαταδρομών, translit. Dynameis Katadromon).

Roles include airborne operations, unconventional warfare, reconnaissance, and guerrilla warfare.

All members of the Brigade wear the unit insignia depicting a winged sword, representative of the "deadly, silent and swift" nature of special forces operations. A scroll runs across the sword and wings with the motto "Who Dares Wins" (Greek: Ο Τολμων Νικα - O Tolmon Nika), a tribute to the Free Greek Special Forces that served with the 1st Special Air Service (1 SAS) Brigade during World War II. The unit flash is emblazoned with Δυνάμεις Καταδρομών (Raider Forces). While on operation, low-visibility patches are worn.

All Raiders wear the green beret with the Greek national emblem on the left.[83]

[edit]
See also: Underwater Demolition Team (Cyprus)

The Navy has a Special Forces Group known as Omada Ypovrixion Katastrofon (Greek: Ομάδα Υποβρυχίων Καταστροφών). Similar to United States Navy SEALs. Roles include amongst others Amphibious Assault, Special Reconnaissance of coastal targets and combating events of terrorism/ incursion occurring in the EEZ of Cyprus.

Military equipment inventory

[edit]
Main article: List of equipment of the Cypriot National Guard
[edit]
  • National Guard soldier with the G3A3 rifle (Cypriot National Guard Camouflage).
    National Guard soldier with the G3A3 rifle (Cypriot National Guard Camouflage).
  • LOK officers marching at Republic Fest Military Parade in Italy, 2007.
    LOK officers marching at Republic Fest Military Parade in Italy, 2007.
  • LOK raiders at a welcoming ceremony of Dmitry Medvedev.
    LOK raiders at a welcoming ceremony of Dmitry Medvedev.
  • Bell-206L3 of Cypriot Air Force
    Bell-206L3 of Cypriot Air Force
  • Cypriot T-80U Main Battle Tank οn the 1st of October Parade.
    Cypriot T-80U Main Battle Tank οn the 1st of October Parade.
  • Flag Carriers of the Cypriot National Guard marching in formation during the Independence day parade.
    Flag Carriers of the Cypriot National Guard marching in formation during the Independence day parade.
  • Cypriot VAB in a parade, this variant equipped with HOT-2 missiles (4)
    Cypriot VAB in a parade, this variant equipped with HOT-2 missiles (4)
  • An Aérospatiale Gazelle flying above the crowd.
    An Aérospatiale Gazelle flying above the crowd.
  • Soldiers of the Cypriot Special Forces and US Navy SEALs after a military exercise.
    Soldiers of the Cypriot Special Forces and US Navy SEALs after a military exercise.

See also

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References

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Cypriot National Guard

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The Cypriot National Guard (Greek: Εθνική Φρουρά) is the land-based armed force of the , responsible for the defense of Greek Cypriot territories against the of the northern third of the island since 1974. Established in June 1964 through parliamentary legislation following the disintegration of the bicommunal Army due to intercommunal clashes, it introduced mandatory for male Greek Cypriot citizens to bolster amid rising tensions with . Organized under the with a structure including an army headquarters, divisional commands, and brigades manned by professionals and conscripts serving 14 months, the Guard adheres to a of territorial defense and deterrence, reinforced by a 1993 joint defense with that integrates Cypriot forces into Hellenic operational planning. Its equipment features armored vehicles such as tanks, artillery systems, and anti-tank capabilities, sourced primarily from , , and other partners, enabling sustained resistance in asymmetric scenarios. A defining episode occurred in July 1974, when elements of the , aligned with the Greek , executed a against President Archbishop to pursue unification with , providing Turkey the for its invasion that overran despite fierce but ultimately unsuccessful Guard resistance, resulting in heavy losses and the island's division. Today, the Guard contributes to UN missions and frameworks like PESCO, while maintaining vigilance along the Green Line ceasefire, underscoring its evolution from post-independence improvisation to a professional deterrent force amid persistent geopolitical strains.

History

Establishment and Intercommunal Violence (1964–1967)

The Cypriot National Guard was established in June 1964 by the Greek Cypriot-led government under President Archbishop Makarios III, introducing compulsory military service for ethnic Greek Cypriot males amid escalating intercommunal tensions following the 1963 constitutional crisis and subsequent violence that isolated Turkish Cypriot communities in enclaves. This force consolidated existing Greek Cypriot militias, such as those from the EOKA organization, into a centralized conscript army answerable to the state, primarily to counter perceived threats from Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries and potential Turkish intervention, though underlying motivations included preparations under the Akritas Plan for eventual enosis (union with Greece), which Turkish Cypriots viewed as existential due to demographic imbalances and historical precedents of ethnic strife. Greek General Georgios Grivas, former EOKA leader, arrived in Cyprus in June 1964 at Makarios's invitation to assume command, bringing Greek Army officers and emphasizing training aligned with Hellenic military doctrines to professionalize the Guard against enclave-based attacks and blockade tactics employed by Turkish Cypriots. Initial equipment consisted of surplus World War II-era , supplemented by donations and sales from , including pieces and ammunition, while limited acquisitions from provided additional rifles and mortars; by late 1964, the Guard had mobilized for its first major action in the enclave on , where it clashed with Turkish Cypriot fighters and Turkish-supplied reinforcements, resulting in aerial bombings by Turkish aircraft and over 100 combined casualties, prompting mediation under UNFICYP to enforce ceasefires. The Guard's operations often blurred defensive and offensive lines, as seen in responses to Turkish Cypriot roadblocks and raids that exacerbated economic isolation of Greek Cypriot areas, but empirical records from UN observers indicate Guard units frequently initiated advances to relieve besieged positions or expand control, reflecting causal dynamics where Greek Cypriot numerical superiority (with forces growing to several thousand active personnel by mid-decade) clashed with Turkish Cypriot guerrilla tactics rooted in fears of annihilation. Intercommunal violence intensified through 1967, culminating in the Kophinou incident on November 15, when Guard forces under Grivas's direction launched a large-scale on Turkish Cypriot positions in Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros villages, overrunning defenses and killing at least 24 while suffering lighter losses, an action UN reports described as disproportionate to prior skirmishes and triggering Turkish threats of invasion. This escalation, amid broader Guard sieges of enclaves that restricted supplies and movement, led to international pressure; recalled its contingent of over 600 officers from the Guard in December 1967 to avert war, highlighting vulnerabilities in the force's reliance on external support and the Akritas-inspired strategy's role in provoking Ankara's guarantees under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. By year's end, the Guard numbered approximately 10,000-12,000 personnel, trained in conventional but strained by internal frictions between Makarios's moderation and Grivas's advocacy, setting precedents for ethnic partitioning amid unresolved constitutional grievances.

Buildup to the 1974 Crisis

In the aftermath of the 1963-1967 intercommunal violence, the Cypriot National Guard expanded rapidly to counter Turkish Cypriot activities and deter potential mainland Turkish intervention, increasing from an initial strength of approximately 2,000 personnel—envisioned under the 1960 constitution as a joint force with a 60:40 Greek-Turkish ratio—to around 12,000 active troops by 1974, bolstered by a theoretical reserve of 35,000. This growth incorporated veterans of the insurgency (1955-1959), many of whom retained arms and integrated into Guard units or the Greek Cypriot police, providing irregular combat expertise amid the enosis-taksim impasse. Equipment acquisitions focused on armored and capabilities, including 32 Soviet /85 tanks imported via Yugoslav intermediaries in 1964 and assigned to the 23rd , alongside 20 100mm field guns and British WWII-era 25-pounder for enhanced firepower against perceived armored threats. Defensive preparations intensified after 1967, with bunker networks constructed around likely invasion beaches and the force reorganized into tactical commands (Eastern, Western, , ) to facilitate rapid mobilization and sector-specific deterrence. Command increasingly reflected Greek junta oversight, as Athens dispatched hundreds of officers—building on the 950-strong (ELDYK) treaty contingent—to dominate leadership, including battalions (31st, 32nd, 33rd). This integration, while strengthening operational cohesion for enosis-oriented defenses, drew criticism for eroding Cypriot autonomy; President Makarios highlighted risks of external manipulation suppressing pro-independence voices, whereas junta-aligned elements justified it as essential against Turkish partitionist aims, fostering internal divisions that prioritized Greek Cypriot consolidation over balanced sovereignty. The November 1967 crisis exemplified escalating Guard involvement, with units clashing against Turkish Cypriot fighters at Agios Theodoros and Kophinou on , directed by police and Guard elements in operations that prompted Turkish threats of and international mediation to avert war. Into the early , amid stalled negotiations, the Guard enforced control over contested areas through patrols and containment of enclaves, framed as preemptive deterrence but contributing to heightened communal isolation and sporadic skirmishes that underscored the force's role in perpetuating deadlock.

Post-1974 Reorganization

Following the cessation of hostilities in August 1974, which left Turkish forces in control of approximately one-third of Cyprus's territory, the Cypriot National Guard consolidated its surviving elements—reduced by heavy attrition—into a defensive configuration centered on the government-held southern regions. This reorganization prioritized static fortifications along the Phase Line Attila, later formalized as the Green Line under supervision, with the establishment of Eastern, Western, and defensive sectors to manage the 180-kilometer boundary. Manpower shortages from the conflict, including around 1,574 killed, prompted the integration of displaced Greek Cypriot refugees into reserve formations, bolstering overall readiness while emphasizing infantry-heavy holdings over mobile offensives. Key adaptations addressed empirical shortcomings exposed during the , such as fragmented command structures, inadequate inter-unit coordination, and the misallocation of assets—like battalions and the 23rd Tank Battalion—to support the preceding coup rather than coastal defenses. Tactical reforms included the creation of mobile reserve groups during operational pauses and the dispersal of armored units, such as /85 tanks, to mitigate risks of mass destruction by Turkish air superiority, alongside efforts to curb desertions through morale enhancements. These measures reflected a doctrinal pivot to deterrence via observation posts, improved surveillance, and layered defenses, acknowledging the Guard's inability to dislodge established Turkish lodgments despite localized successes, such as ambushes that destroyed multiple enemy vehicles. Greek Cypriot narratives credit the Guard's restructured defenses with preventing total island conquest, portraying a resilient stand against overwhelming odds, whereas Turkish viewpoints depict their 1974 operation as a warranted intervention to safeguard amid the coup's chaos. Causally, however, the National Guard's execution of the coup—directed by the Greek junta and aimed at (union with Greece)—diverted critical resources and sowed internal disloyalty among Greek-officered units, directly precipitating the Turkish response under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, though Ankara's refusal to withdraw after the Cypriot government's restoration breached the treaty's restorative mandate. This dual failure of provocation and overreach underscored the need for depoliticized, Cyprus-centric command reforms to prioritize over irredentist ambitions.

Organizational Structure

Command and Leadership

The command of the Cypriot operates under the of the Republic of , with the Chief of the National Guard—a —serving as the highest-ranking officer responsible for operational and administrative oversight. The Chief is appointed by the and advises the government on defense policy, while the structure includes a deputy chief and specialized staff branches for personnel, logistics, and operations. This framework emphasizes centralized authority to ensure rapid decision-making in a defensively oriented force facing persistent threats from Turkish forces in . Lieutenant General Emmanuel Theodorou assumed the role of Chief on October 9, 2025, following a cabinet decision, succeeding Lieutenant General Georgios Tsitsikostas; he pledged to prioritize and enhance combat readiness during his swearing-in. His predecessor had overseen modernization efforts amid EU-aligned reforms, but the appointment reflects ongoing efforts to balance experienced leadership with national priorities. The deputy chief, Lieutenant General Neophytos Pachoulides, supports the Chief in day-to-day command. Historically, the National Guard's officer corps relied heavily on seconded Greek Army personnel, with estimates of up to 1,800 Greek officers and NCOs in senior roles as late as , fostering deep doctrinal alignment with the . Post-1974 Turkish invasion, pursued indigenization to assert operational , reducing foreign officer dependency while retaining Greek training influences; today, the professional officer cadre numbers approximately 1,000–1,200, primarily Cypriot nationals trained in Hellenic institutions or programs. This evolution has shifted focus toward , including participation in PESCO initiatives, though core tactics remain Greek-derived for territorial defense. Despite these ties, criticisms have emerged regarding politicization, notably a 2024 public among top officers that reportedly undermined and chain-of-command integrity. Such incidents highlight vulnerabilities in a force characterized by ethnic Greek Cypriot homogeneity, which aids internal cohesion but risks insular decision-making; nonetheless, the Guard has sustained operational unity through rigorous professionalization, enabling effective deterrence without external command dilution.

Conscription and Manpower

Mandatory in the Cypriot National Guard is required for all male citizens of the aged 18 to 50, with the standard term of enlistment lasting 14 months. This system sustains a force comprising approximately 12,000 to 15,000 active personnel, supplemented by 60,000 to 75,000 reservists, the vast majority of whom are ethnic . The structure relies on this pool to maintain defensive readiness against the Turkish , which controls about 37 percent of the island's territory since , necessitating a citizen-based to deter without a large . As of October 2025, the faces an acute and retention , with Defence Minister Vasilis Palmas warning that persistent shortfalls threaten future defense capabilities unless addressed through long-term reforms. Contributing factors include economic pressures, such as career delays for conscripts that exacerbate brain drain by postponing higher education and opportunities, alongside demographic challenges from Cyprus's declining birth rates, which shrink the eligible cohort. Efforts to mitigate shortages, including restored pre-2013 financial allowances and incentives for specialized roles, have yielded limited success, while voluntary enlistment for women, introduced in 2025, has failed to significantly bolster numbers due to low uptake. Conscientious objectors are granted exemptions from active combat duty on religious or ethical grounds but must perform of comparable length, though critics argue the process falls short of international standards and obligations can still apply, balancing individual rights against imperatives in a divided state. This system, while cost-effective for a small sustaining territorial defense amid ongoing occupation, engenders challenges from mandatory participation and proposals to reduce service length remain debated, weighing efficiency gains against potential readiness erosion.

Components and Force Composition

The Cypriot National Guard maintains a unified structure integrating land, naval, and air elements under a single command, with land forces constituting the predominant component due to Cyprus's and the post-1974 territorial constraints that confine operations primarily to the government-controlled southern areas. This composition prioritizes defensive capabilities over offensive projection, reflecting the need for against a numerically superior adversary, the , which maintains over 30,000 troops in . Land forces form the core of the , encompassing brigades, armored units, and formations organized into divisions and reserve battalions for territorial defense and rapid mobilization. Active personnel in these ground units number approximately 12,000, supplemented by extensive reserves that can expand the force significantly during contingencies. The naval command operates as a coastal defense element, focusing on maritime surveillance and patrol without submarines or major warships, with around 500 personnel manning and support vessels to secure waters and deter incursions. The air command provides limited organic support, emphasizing rotary-wing assets for transport, , and search-and-rescue, alongside unmanned aerial vehicles for , with roughly 1,200 personnel; it lacks fixed-wing , relying instead on ground-based air defenses. Special forces units, including and raider formations, are integrated primarily within the land forces structure to enhance and capabilities, rather than operating as a standalone . This overall force composition—totaling about 15,000 active personnel across components—differs markedly from the of Greece, which emphasize expeditionary and larger-scale joint operations; the National Guard's smaller, land-centric model is tailored for prolonged island denial, leveraging terrain familiarity and conscript reserves to impose costs on potential invaders without matching conventional parity.

Operational History

Early Engagements and Conflicts (1963–1974)

The Cypriot National Guard was formally established on June 4, 1964, through legislation introducing obligatory military service for Greek Cypriot males, in direct response to the intercommunal violence that erupted on December 21, 1963, known as Bloody Christmas, when clashes between Greek Cypriot police and Turkish Cypriot civilians in escalated into widespread fighting across the island. Initially drawing from irregular militias and volunteers, the Guard rapidly organized into structured units under Greek Cypriot leadership, with early operations focused on securing Greek Cypriot-majority areas amid Turkish Cypriot withdrawals into enclaves. This formation marked a shift from defenses to a force capable of coordinated engagements, though it faced logistical constraints including limited heavy weaponry. In August 1964, the mobilized approximately 1,500 personnel to intervene in the Tylliria region, particularly around , where Turkish Cypriot fighters had received arms shipments via sea, prompting Guard forces to deploy —including six 25-pounder guns and mortars—along with fire to suppress positions and prevent further incursions. The operation succeeded in isolating Turkish Cypriot strongholds but elicited bombing runs on August 6–7, killing at least 34 , mostly civilians, and wounding over 100, while Guard casualties numbered around 12. Interactions with the newly deployed United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in March 1964, were tense, as Guard units occasionally restricted UN observers' access to firing positions, complicating efforts to enforce ceasefires. By November 1967, the Guard had evolved toward battalion-level operations, exemplified in the Kophinou incident, where a Guard battalion under General advanced into Turkish Cypriot areas near following ambushes on Greek Cypriot police, leading to heavy clashes on that overran several positions and resulted in at least 20–25 Turkish Cypriot deaths alongside Guard losses. This engagement, part of broader friction including Guard encroachments on enclaves, heightened crisis risks and prompted UNFICYP-mediated disengagements, though the force continued to deny UN patrols full movement in contested zones. Greek military assistance, including seconded officers for command roles and programs, enabled this progression from guerrilla-style actions to standoff capabilities with support, sustaining Guard control over approximately 97% of the island's territory by 1967. These engagements, totaling over 500 deaths across intercommunal clashes from 1963 to 1967, secured demographic majorities for in key regions but drew Turkish Cypriot accusations of aggressive tactics that entrenched ethnic divisions and fueled demands for partition. While the Guard's operations prevented immediate Turkish intervention beyond airstrikes, they underscored vulnerabilities in readiness, reliant on Greek amid UNFICYP's buffering , which prioritized de-escalation over enforcement against either side.

1974 Coup d'État, Turkish Invasion, and Defensive Operations

On July 15, 1974, elements of the Cypriot National Guard, directed by Greek military officers embedded within its ranks and supported by the organization, executed a against President Archbishop , storming the presidential palace and overthrowing the government to install , a proponent of (union with ). The operation, orchestrated by the Greek in , aimed to eliminate Makarios's resistance to enosis and align Cyprus with Greece, but it destabilized the island's bi-communal constitutional order established by the 1960 Zurich and Agreements, which guaranteed Cypriot independence with , , and the as protectors. Turkish Cypriots viewed the coup as an existential threat, citing prior Greek Cypriot violence against their enclaves, while Greek Cypriots later framed the National Guard's actions as an internal political shift rather than a for foreign intervention. Turkey, invoking its rights under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to restore constitutional order, launched Operation Attila on July 20, 1974, with airborne and amphibious landings near , deploying approximately 6,000 troops initially against the 's estimated 12,000-15,000 personnel, who were hampered by recent coup-related disarray, obsolete equipment, and lack of reinforcement from . The first phase (July 20-22) saw Turkish forces secure a and advance southward toward , prompting counterattacks, including efforts to relieve and block advances along the Kyrenia-Nicosia road; however, these were undermined by poor coordination, fifth-column sabotage from coup sympathizers, and Turkish air superiority, which neutralized Cypriot air assets early. A brokered by the UN on July 22 halted immediate gains, with controlling about 3% of the island, but Greek Cypriot sources maintain the landings constituted an illegal invasion violating , whereas Turkish accounts describe it as proportionate enforcement against threats to . National Guard defensive operations focused on holding key positions, such as , where units repelled initial Turkish paratrooper assaults on July 20-21 but ultimately abandoned it after heavy Turkish bombing rendered runways unusable and isolated defenders. Other engagements included skirmishes around Turkish Cypriot strongholds like Louroujina and fierce resistance in suburbs, where armor and infantry inflicted casualties but suffered from ammunition shortages and command fragmentation following Sampson's ouster on July 23. The force's effectiveness was compromised by the Greek junta's refusal to commit reinforcements—fearing wider war with ally —and internal betrayals, leaving isolated battalions to face numerically superior Turkish advances supported by 40,000 troops by phase's end. After failed Geneva Conference talks in late July-early August, Turkey resumed operations on August 14 (Attila II), overwhelming National Guard lines through superior artillery and armor, capturing Famagusta and Morphou by August 16-18, and advancing to a line dividing the island. Greek Cypriot casualties totaled approximately 1,500-3,000 military dead, with overall losses (including civilians) estimated at 3,000-5,000, reflecting defensive collapses due to matériel deficits and strategic isolation; Turkish losses were around 500-1,000. The operations displaced over 200,000 Greek Cypriots from the north, creating a de facto partition that persists, with causal analysis indicating the coup's provocation enabled initial intervention but Turkey's expansion beyond enclave protection—occupying 37% of territory—exceeded treaty proportionality, prioritizing geopolitical gains over restoration.

Buffer Zone Maintenance and Incidents (1974–2004)

Following the 1974 ceasefire, the Cypriot National Guard (CNG) shifted to static defense along the southern boundary of the United Nations buffer zone, or Green Line, which spans approximately 180 kilometers and separates Greek Cypriot-controlled areas from those occupied by Turkish forces. The CNG established bunkers, observation posts, and fortified positions to monitor Turkish military movements and enforce the military status quo, as defined by UNFICYP patrols that prevent crossings and maintain the ceasefire. This defensive posture emphasized deterrence amid a significant disparity in force sizes, with Turkish troops numbering around 30,000-40,000 compared to the CNG's reduced strength after territorial losses. Throughout the period, CNG-UNFICYP interactions focused on , with the Guard cooperating in via ground patrols and limited aerial monitoring while restricting unauthorized civilian access to the line. Sporadic violations occurred, including occasional small-arms fire exchanges and encroachments on the zone, though large-scale clashes were avoided due to mutual restraint and UN intervention. The CNG's role in preventing further Turkish advances contributed to the line's stability, averting additional territorial concessions despite criticisms of its defensive limitations and reliance on UNFICYP for enforcement. Notable incidents underscored persistent tensions, such as the August 1996 events near Deryneia, where Greek Cypriot demonstrators breached CNG lines into the , prompting Turkish forces to fire indiscriminately, killing Solomos Solomou and wounding others, including UNFICYP personnel. Earlier skirmishes in the late and involved isolated shootings across the line, often triggered by probes or accidental contacts, but these remained contained without escalating to broader conflict. By the early 2000s, amid preparations for the , both sides engaged in minor position adjustments, including CNG construction of firing posts, which UNFICYP monitored to preserve the despite ongoing violations. The Guard's maintenance efforts thus sustained a fragile deterrence, prioritizing over reclamation amid stalled negotiations.

EU Integration and Modern Operations (2004–Present)

Cyprus's accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004 marked a pivotal shift for the National Guard, facilitating deeper integration into Western security frameworks and enabling expanded military cooperation with EU member states and partners. This period saw the Guard participate in joint exercises emphasizing interoperability, such as bilateral training with Israeli special forces in 2017 and trilateral air-naval drills with Greece, the United States, and Israel in the eastern Mediterranean in March 2023. The Guard's operational focus post-2004 has centered on deterrence and low-intensity contingencies amid ongoing tensions with , including readiness for provocations in the (EEZ) and areas like Varosha. While no large-scale conflicts have occurred, the force has maintained defensive postures during EEZ disputes, where Turkish naval actions have challenged Cypriot maritime rights since the mid-2000s hydrocarbon explorations. Tensions peaked with Turkey's partial reopening of the fenced-off Varosha district in October 2020, prompting Cypriot authorities to heighten military vigilance along the to prevent escalations. Modernization efforts have aligned the Guard toward NATO-compatible standards, supported by partnerships like the U.S. with the . In July 2025, Cypriot non-commissioned officers underwent training in leadership, crisis management, and military decision-making at the Artillery Command in Mosfiloti, enhancing capabilities for hybrid threats. These adaptations reflect a strategic pivot from legacy Soviet-era systems to Western interoperability, including adoption of NATO-standard 5.56x45mm ammunition and preparations for potential future alignment through U.S. assistance. The Guard has also contributed to regional stability through anti-terrorism readiness and maritime patrols addressing irregular migration flows, though primary counterterrorism incidents remain rare. Participation in defense initiatives, such as the (PESCO), further underscores this era's emphasis on collective security without direct combat engagements.

Special Forces and Elite Units

Land-Based Special Operations

The land-based special operations of the Cypriot National Guard are primarily conducted by the Raider Forces (Δυνάμεις Καταδρομών), operating under the Special Forces Command (ΔΚΔ). Established in 1964, these units focus on unorthodox warfare, including reconnaissance, sabotage, direct action, and counter-insurgency operations. Training emphasizes mountain and asymmetric tactics, initially developed in the Troodos Mountains and modeled after Greek special forces methodologies. Comprising squadrons such as the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd Raiding Squadrons, these ground units integrate with regular forces for specialized missions like anti-tank engagements and infiltration behind enemy lines. Capabilities include small-team raids for disruption and gathering, with personnel undergoing rigorous selection to ensure proficiency in and survival in hostile environments. In asymmetric scenarios, they have demonstrated effectiveness in delaying superior numerically forces through . During the 1974 Turkish invasion, Raider Forces executed infiltrations and sustained defensive raids, engaging Turkish advances from the night of onward despite initial disorganization from the preceding coup. These operations involved against landing zones and counter-attacks to disrupt enemy logistics, contributing to localized delays in Turkish momentum amid overall defensive challenges. Post-1974, units have maintained roles in reconnaissance and low-intensity counter-insurgency, though their small scale—limited by the National Guard's overall manpower constraints—has drawn critiques for insufficient depth in sustained large-scale asymmetric campaigns. The Underwater Demolition Team (MYK), a specialized unit within the Cypriot National Guard's Naval Command, focuses on maritime special operations including underwater demolition, coastal raids, and vessel boarding. Established in 1964 shortly after the Guard's formation, the MYK conducts missions critical for defending Cyprus's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and supporting search and rescue (SAR) efforts in contested waters. The unit regularly trains with allied forces, such as U.S. Navy SEALs and Greek Underwater Demolition Command (DYK), enhancing interoperability through exercises involving immediate action drills and joint maritime interdiction. These capabilities provide deterrence against regional threats, particularly Turkish incursions, though their effectiveness remains constrained by the Guard's overall naval limitations and reliance on international partnerships. Air special capabilities in the Cypriot National Guard emphasize helicopter-based support for special operations, including troop insertion, extraction, and armed reconnaissance, integrated with SAR missions. Prior to 2023, Mi-35P attack helicopters fulfilled roles in close air support and special forces deployment, but the fleet was transferred to Serbia, prompting a shift to multi-role platforms. In March 2025, the Guard received the first two of six Airbus H145M helicopters, configured for armed operations with night vision, missiles, and modular weapons systems suitable for special operations insertion. These helicopters, unveiled publicly in May and June 2025, enhance deterrence through rapid response capabilities but face inherent vulnerabilities to superior air forces, lacking fixed-wing fighters for protection. The AW139 helicopters further bolster SAR and medevac roles in maritime environments, supporting naval special units during EEZ patrols.

Military Equipment and Capabilities

The Cypriot National Guard's military capabilities are limited, comprising approximately 12,000–15,000 active personnel with no fixed-wing fighter aircraft. The inventory features around 100–150 main battle tanks and 300–400 armored vehicles, emphasizing defensive systems including ground-based air defenses such as Tor-M1, Buk, and the recently integrated Barak MX, alongside rotary-wing assets and naval vessels acquired through partnerships with Israel and other nations.

Land Forces Inventory

The land forces of the Cypriot National Guard maintain an inventory oriented toward defensive operations, featuring a mix of Soviet/Russian-origin armored vehicles, Western APCs, and legacy artillery systems, with limited quantities reflecting Cyprus's strategic emphasis on terrain denial rather than offensive projection. Total main battle tanks number approximately 134, comprising 82 T-80U variants acquired from Russia between 1996 and 2011, equipped with 125mm smoothbore guns and capable of firing anti-tank guided missiles, alongside 52 French AMX-30B2 tanks upgraded for improved fire control. These assets, while aging, provide credible deterrence in Cyprus's mountainous and urbanized defensive landscape, where mobility and hull-down positions amplify their effectiveness against numerically superior forces, though maintenance challenges arise from reliance on imported parts amid historical arms restrictions. Armored personnel carriers form the backbone of mobility, with 197 Greek-produced Leonidas-2 vehicles in service, based on the Austrian chassis and armed with 20mm autocannons or machine guns for . Additional wheeled APCs include French VAB variants, totaling around 147 units, some configured for anti-tank roles with HOT missiles. These tracked and wheeled platforms enable rapid deployment across Cyprus's varied topography but suffer from obsolescence, with upgrade proposals focusing on enhanced protection and electronics to sustain operational readiness, contributing to a total of approximately 300–400 armored vehicles. Artillery holdings emphasize multiple rocket launchers for area saturation, including a small number of Soviet 122mm systems mounted on trucks for high-volume fire support, and Yugoslav 128mm launchers, both legacy platforms with limited precision but suited to suppressive barrages in static defense scenarios. Towed and self-propelled guns, such as 105mm and 155mm howitzers, supplement these, though exact counts remain classified; overall, maintenance relies on Greek technical assistance due to the equipment's origins. Defensive capabilities are further enhanced by ground-based air defense systems, including Russian Tor-M1 and Buk surface-to-air missiles, complemented by the Israeli Barak MX system integrated in 2024–2025 for protection against aerial threats. Infantry small arms center on the German-origin HK G3 7.62×51mm as the standard issue, valued for its reliability and in close-quarters engagements typical of Cypriot operations. Supporting weapons include machine guns and anti-tank missiles, with some units receiving Israeli-sourced optics and upgrades for improved accuracy, though widespread adoption remains constrained by budget and logistics. This equipment mix underscores a force optimized for conscript-based defense, where numerical simplicity aids training but exposes vulnerabilities to modern precision threats without ongoing sustainment. The Cypriot National Guard Naval Command maintains a modest fleet oriented toward coastal , , and support for amphibious operations, lacking frigates, corvettes, or submarines. Its primary surface assets include fast boats such as the Shaldag-class vessel Odysseas (PV-22), acquired from in 1998 and equipped with a 20 mm Oerlikon gun and twin 12.7 mm machine guns for interception and security roles, with additional offshore patrol vessels sourced through partnerships including with Israel. Additional holdings comprise smaller craft and rigid-hulled inflatable boats for insertion, with recent infrastructure upgrades at the Mari naval base enhancing operational sustainment as of 2025. The Air Command operates exclusively rotary-wing and unmanned assets, with no fixed-wing combat aircraft following the near-total destruction of 's air capabilities during the 1974 Turkish invasion, which prioritized ground defense thereafter. Its helicopter inventory totals around 20 aircraft, including Mi-24V Hind attack helicopters for anti-armor support, JetRanger for utility and training, for , and newly delivered H145M multirole helicopters—four of which were unveiled in May 2025 for armed transport, reconnaissance, and light attack with options for 70 mm rockets or machine-gun pods. Unmanned aerial vehicles consist of four IAI Searcher II systems for surveillance, emphasizing persistent monitoring over strike roles. These naval and air elements underscore a defensive posture focused on territorial surveillance and rapid response within Cyprus's , constrained by historical losses and arms embargoes until recent U.S. policy shifts in 2025.

Modernization Efforts and Reforms

Shifts and Upgrades

Following Cyprus's accession to the in May 2004, the Cypriot National Guard initiated a strategic pivot in its , moving away from reliance on Russian-supplied armaments toward diversified sourcing from Western and non-aligned partners such as , the , and mechanisms. This realignment was propelled by imperatives for with EU defense initiatives, the obsolescence and sanction-induced vulnerabilities of legacy equipment, and the persistent Turkish military threat necessitating robust, sanction-resistant supply chains. Key milestones in this transition included the 2018 bilateral agreement with for an offshore patrol vessel, which represented Cyprus's inaugural major naval acquisition from a non-traditional supplier and underscored deepening defense ties amid shared regional concerns. Subsequent Israeli collaborations focused on air defense enhancements, including systems designed to counter aerial incursions, further exemplifying the doctrinal emphasis on asymmetric capabilities over sheer volume. The U.S. revocation of its 1987 in early 2025 unlocked access to and Excess Defense Articles programs, enabling the National Guard to pursue NATO-standardized upgrades while phasing out Russian systems hampered by spare parts shortages. Complementing these bilateral deals, integrated into the European Union's SAFE programme, allocating €1.2 billion toward modernizing communications infrastructure and radar networks, with priorities on digitalization, artificial intelligence-enabled functions, and multi-threat detection capabilities. This EU-backed effort facilitated procurement of Western-compatible electronics, reducing exposure to unilateral supplier disruptions. While yielding gains in operational synergy and technological edge—particularly against a numerically superior adversary—the shift entailed elevated costs relative to prior low-price Eastern contracts and fostered dependencies on nascent alliances, potentially complicating sustainment in prolonged isolation scenarios. Nonetheless, such diversification pragmatically circumvents geopolitical leverage points, like Russian inconsistencies in delivery amid broader sanctions, thereby bolstering long-term defensive autonomy.

Recent Developments (2020–2025)

In October 2025, Emmanuel Theodorou assumed the role of Chief of the , succeeding Georgios Tsitsikostas after a two-year term, with his appointment approved by the and effective from October 9. Theodorou, born in 1967 and previously serving in Greek military roles, was sworn in amid presidential emphasis on continuous upgrades to enhance Cyprus's defense posture. On October 1, 2025, during the Independence Day parade in , the publicly unveiled the Serbian-made Tamnava multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) for the first time, featuring three units equipped with reusable pods for 122 mm unguided rockets, with modular compatibility for 267 mm munitions. This acquisition marks a modernization step away from legacy Soviet-era systems toward - and EU-compatible platforms, reflecting broader procurement diversification. The has intensified partnerships with the U.S., including training collaborations with the National Guard; in August 2025, Cypriot non-commissioned officers received instruction in leadership, military decision-making, crisis management, and cybersecurity best practices, building on the formalized initiated in 2023. Concurrently, dispatched a defense delegation to the U.S. in October 2025 to pursue acquisitions of transport aircraft, helicopters, and armored vehicles, prioritizing helicopters—potentially surplus U.S. models—for search-and-rescue (SAR) operations, , and missions. Infrastructure enhancements include upgrades to the Air Base in , coordinated with U.S. and partners since early 2025, aimed at expanding capacity for aircraft operations and humanitarian staging in the , with costs estimated at €10-15 million and completion targeted within 18 months. These efforts underscore a modernization momentum, though a recruitment crisis persists, prompting a new direct-entry program for cyber specialists announced on October 20, 2025, to address enlistment shortfalls amid budget constraints tied to the 's program allocations.

Controversies and Criticisms

Internal Leadership and Disciplinary Issues

In July 2024, a public feud emerged at the highest levels of the Cypriot National Guard when retired Deputy Chief Loukas Hadjimichael published an open farewell letter accusing senior officials of fostering divisions, treating Cypriot officers and personnel derogatorily, and undermining through partisan behaviors. Hadjimichael, who had served in key command roles, highlighted instances of favoritism and internal conflicts that he claimed eroded cohesion and professionalism, prompting concerns over the Guard's ability to maintain unified command structures amid ongoing threats. This episode exemplified persistent challenges in balancing apolitical leadership with expectations of ethnic solidarity rooted in Hellenic military traditions, where critics argue that from external Greek elements can prioritize ideological loyalty over merit-based discipline. The Guard's internal dynamics have been shaped by historical precedents, particularly the 1974 coup d'état against President , which was directed by Greece's and executed by Greek officers embedded within the Guard's command. These officers, numbering around 650 and holding key positions, leveraged their authority to stage the overthrow in pursuit of (union with ), an action that not only fractured internal trust but also precipitated the Turkish invasion and partition of the island. Post-1974 reforms sought to insulate the Guard from such foreign political interference by emphasizing Cypriot-led professionalism, yet lingering junta-era influences have fueled debates over whether ethnic ties to enhance deterrence or introduce vulnerabilities through divided allegiances. Disciplinary cohesion remains tested by these tensions, as evidenced by ongoing personnel challenges including career stagnation and shortfalls that exacerbate issues among conscripts and officers. Proponents of stricter apolitical standards contend that prioritizing verifiable Cypriot-centric command reduces risks of external manipulation, while defenders of traditional ethnic linkages assert they bolster resolve against perceived existential threats from . Such viewpoints underscore the Guard's evolution toward greater internal autonomy, though unresolved leadership frictions continue to hinder unified discipline.

Effectiveness, Preparedness, and Strategic Challenges

The Cypriot National Guard maintains a defensive posture characterized by continuous states of alert and regular exercises, such as the multinational "Argonaut 2024" operation, which enhanced coordination among participating forces. However, 2025 assessments indicate a and retention that jeopardizes long-term viability, with Defence Minister Vasilis Palmas warning parliament of stagnation in officer and fixed-term contract soldiers facing limited promotion prospects, exacerbating staffing shortfalls. Efforts to introduce voluntary female service have yielded zero applicants as of October 2025, underscoring broader disinterest amid declining birth rates and economic pressures from mandatory 14-month for males. Strategic challenges are compounded by numerical and technological disparities against Turkish forces, which number approximately 40,000-50,000 troops in with plans to expand to 100,000, dwarfing the National Guard's 9,500 active personnel and 48,000 reserves. The absence of an operational —following the destruction of capabilities in and reliance on limited helicopters—leaves vulnerabilities in air defense, despite recent acquisitions like the Israeli Barak MX system and Russian-origin Tor M-1 units. A 2022 strategic study highlighted ongoing erosion from obsolete equipment, high maintenance costs, and U.S./EU pressures to divest Russian systems comprising over 60% of heavy weaponry, rendering the force less capable than in when it possessed nascent air elements before rapid defeat. Geographic division along the Green Line under UNFICYP oversight further hampers unified command and maneuverability, while stalled demilitarization negotiations perpetuate reliance on static defenses. Defensive reserves provide a partial counterbalance, enabling a manpower pool of over 57,000 including Greek contingent forces, trained for island-specific terrain like urban and coastal fortifications, which has arguably deterred Turkish escalation since 1974 by raising invasion costs. Yet, optimism regarding mechanisms like PESCO for deterrence appears overstated, as Turkish threats persist over Cypriot procurements, including air defenses, without evident restraint from . The Turkish occupation sustains a baseline vigilance through alert escalations like "Tharros 2" in 2025, but diverts economic resources—78% of the €350 million annual budget to salaries—straining a small GDP and incentivizing evasion over professionalization.

Political and Ethnic Influences

The Cypriot National Guard was established in June 1964 through Law 20, amid the intercommunal violence of the 1963–1964 Cyprus crisis, during which withdrew from shared government institutions and formed separate enclaves and self-defense forces, rendering joint military structures untenable. This led to the Guard's composition being limited to , a ethnic exclusivity rooted in the collapse of bi-communal governance rather than explicit constitutional prohibition, though Turkish Cypriot non-participation has been cited as fueling partitionist narratives and accusations of against the 's minority. The absence of Turkish Cypriot conscripts or officers persists to the present, with no recorded instances of service, as the Turkish Cypriot community maintains its own security apparatus under the , a entity unrecognized internationally except by . The Guard's operations and ethos reflect deep Hellenic influences, including mandatory use of the Greek language, adoption of symbols and insignias evoking ancient Greek heritage (such as evzones-style uniforms in parades), and training regimens modeled on those of the , with Greek officers historically seconded to for instruction. These elements serve to reinforce Greek Cypriot identity, bolstering unit cohesion and morale in a context of perceived existential threats from , though they also embed the pre-1974 legacy—the irredentist aspiration for union with —into institutional culture. A notable controversy arose from the Guard's role in the July 15, 1974, , executed in coordination with paramilitaries who advocated ; post-coup, elements were integrated into Guard ranks under the Sampson regime, prioritizing ethnic Greek unification over constitutional stability and directly contributing to the subsequent Turkish military intervention. Greek Cypriot right-wing and nationalist viewpoints portray the Guard's ethnic and Hellenic orientation as a pragmatic defense of against taksim (Turkish Cypriot demands for partition or on separatist terms), emphasizing self-preservation after 1963 attacks on Greek enclaves and the 1974 invasion. Conversely, left-leaning factions, including elements within AKEL, have critiqued the mono-ethnic structure for entrenching divisions and proposed symbolic inclusivity measures to support bi-zonal, bi-communal settlement talks, arguing it hinders reconciliation by naturalizing exclusion as inherent rather than contingent on historical conflict. Empirically, this identity framework enhances internal loyalty but causally impedes trust-building, as the Guard's reification of Greek exclusivity—through rituals like enosis-era marching songs—reinforces mutual suspicions, perpetuating the island's partition despite UN-mediated efforts since 1974.

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