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A mental state, or a mental property, is a state of mind of a person. Mental states comprise a diverse class, including perception, pain/pleasure experience, belief, desire, intention, emotion, and memory. There is controversy concerning the exact definition of the term. According to epistemic approaches, the essential mark of mental states is that their subject has privileged epistemic access while others can only infer their existence from outward signs. Consciousness-based approaches hold that all mental states are either conscious themselves or stand in the right relation to conscious states. Intentionality-based approaches, on the other hand, see the power of minds to refer to objects and represent the world as the mark of the mental. According to functionalist approaches, mental states are defined in terms of their role in the causal network independent of their intrinsic properties. Some philosophers deny all the aforementioned approaches by holding that the term "mental" refers to a cluster of loosely related ideas without an underlying unifying feature shared by all. Various overlapping classifications of mental states have been proposed. Important distinctions group mental phenomena together according to whether they are sensory, propositional, intentional, conscious or occurrent. Sensory states involve sense impressions like visual perceptions or bodily pains. Propositional attitudes, like beliefs and desires, are relations a subject has to a proposition. The characteristic of intentional states is that they refer to or are about objects or states of affairs. Conscious states are part of the phenomenal experience while occurrent states are causally efficacious within the owner's mind, with or without consciousness. An influential classification of mental states is due to Franz Brentano, who argues that there are only three basic kinds: presentations, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate.

Mental states are usually contrasted with physical or material aspects. For (non-eliminative) physicalists, they are a kind of high-level property that can be understood in terms of fine-grained neural activity. Property dualists, on the other hand, claim that no such reductive explanation is possible. Eliminativists may reject the existence of mental properties, or at least of those corresponding to folk psychological categories such as thought and memory. Mental states play an important role in various fields, including philosophy of mind, epistemology and cognitive science. In psychology, the term is used not just to refer to the individual mental states listed above but also to a more global assessment of a person's mental health.[1]

Definition

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Various competing theories have been proposed about what the essential features of all mental states are, sometimes referred to as the search for the "mark of the mental".[2][3][4] These theories can roughly be divided into epistemic approaches, consciousness-based approaches, intentionality-based approaches and functionalism. These approaches disagree not just on how mentality is to be defined but also on which states count as mental.[5][3][4] Mental states encompass a diverse group of aspects of an entity, like this entity's beliefs, desires, intentions, or pain experiences. The different approaches often result in a satisfactory characterization of only some of them. This has prompted some philosophers to doubt that there is a unifying mark of the mental and instead see the term "mental" as referring to a cluster of loosely related ideas.[4][3][6] Mental states are usually contrasted with physical or material aspects. This contrast is commonly based on the idea that certain features of mental phenomena are not present in the material universe as described by the natural sciences and may even be incompatible with it.[3][4]

Epistemic and consciousness-based approaches

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Epistemic approaches emphasize that the subject has privileged access to all or at least some of their mental states.[4][7][8] It is sometimes claimed that this access is direct, private and infallible. Direct access refers to non-inferential knowledge. When someone is in pain, for example, they know directly that they are in pain, they do not need to infer it from other indicators like a body part being swollen or their tendency to scream when it is touched.[4] But we arguably also have non-inferential knowledge of external objects, like trees or cats, through perception, which is why this criterion by itself is not sufficient. Another epistemic privilege often mentioned is that mental states are private in contrast to public external facts.[4][8] For example, the fallen tree lying on a person's leg is directly open to perception by the bystanders while the victim's pain is private: only they know it directly while the bystanders have to infer it from their screams. It was traditionally often claimed that we have infallible knowledge of our own mental states, i.e. that we cannot be wrong about them when we have them.[4] So when someone has an itching sensation, for example, they cannot be wrong about having this sensation. They can only be wrong about the non-mental causes, e.g. whether it is the consequence of bug bites or of a fungal infection. But various counterexamples have been presented to claims of infallibility, which is why this criterion is usually not accepted in contemporary philosophy. One problem for all epistemic approaches to the mark of the mental is that they focus mainly on conscious states but exclude unconscious states. A repressed desire, for example, is a mental state to which the subject lacks the forms of privileged epistemic access mentioned.[4][6]

One way to respond to this worry is to ascribe a privileged status to conscious mental states. On such a consciousness-based approach, conscious mental states are non-derivative constituents of the mind while unconscious states somehow depend on their conscious counterparts for their existence.[3][8][9] An influential example of this position is due to John Searle, who holds that unconscious mental states have to be accessible to consciousness to count as "mental" at all.[10] They can be understood as dispositions to bring about conscious states.[11] This position denies that the so-called "deep unconscious", i.e. mental contents inaccessible to consciousness, exists.[12] Another problem for consciousness-based approaches, besides the issue of accounting for the unconscious mind, is to elucidate the nature of consciousness itself. Consciousness-based approaches are usually interested in phenomenal consciousness, i.e. in qualitative experience, rather than access consciousness, which refers to information being available for reasoning and guiding behavior.[3][13][14] Conscious mental states are normally characterized as qualitative and subjective, i.e. that there is something it is like for a subject to be in these states. Opponents of consciousness-based approaches often point out that despite these attempts, it is still very unclear what the term "phenomenal consciousness" is supposed to mean.[3] This is important because not much would be gained theoretically by defining one ill-understood term in terms of another. Another objection to this type of approach is to deny that the conscious mind has a privileged status in relation to the unconscious mind, for example, by insisting that the deep unconscious exists.[9][12]

Intentionality-based approaches

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Intentionality-based approaches see intentionality as the mark of the mental.[4][3][7] The originator of this approach is Franz Brentano, who defined intentionality as the characteristic of mental states to refer to or be about objects.[15][16] One central idea for this approach is that minds represent the world around them, which is not the case for regular physical objects.[7][17] So a person who believes that there is ice cream in the fridge represents the world as being a certain way. The ice cream can be represented but it does not itself represent the world. This is why a mind is ascribed to the person but not to the ice cream, according to the intentional approach.[4] One advantage of it in comparison to the epistemic approach is that it has no problems to account for unconscious mental states: they can be intentional just like conscious mental states and thereby qualify as constituents of the mind.[18] But a problem for this approach is that there are also some non-mental entities that have intentionality, like maps or linguistic expressions.[4][19] One response to this problem is to hold that the intentionality of non-mental entities is somehow derivative in relation to the intentionality of mental entities. For example, a map of Addis Ababa may be said to represent Addis Ababa not intrinsically but only extrinsically because people interpret it as a representation.[18][20] Another difficulty is that not all mental states seem to be intentional. So while beliefs and desires are forms of representation, this seems not to be the case for pains and itches, which may indicate a problem without representing it.[16][19] But some theorists have argued that even these apparent counterexamples should be considered intentional when properly understood.[21][22]

Behaviorism and functionalism

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Behaviorist definitions characterize mental states as dispositions to engage in certain publicly observable behavior as a reaction to particular external stimuli.[23][24] On this view, to ascribe a belief to someone is to describe the tendency of this person to behave in certain ways. Such an ascription does not involve any claims about the internal states of this person, it only talks about behavioral tendencies.[24] A strong motivation for such a position comes from empiricist considerations stressing the importance of observation and the lack thereof in the case of private internal mental states. This is sometimes combined with the thesis that we could not even learn how to use mental terms without reference to the behavior associated with them.[24] One problem for behaviorism is that the same entity often behaves differently despite being in the same situation as before. This suggests that explanation needs to make reference to the internal states of the entity that mediate the link between stimulus and response.[25][26] This problem is avoided by functionalist approaches, which define mental states through their causal roles but allow both external and internal events in their causal network.[27][28][6] On this view, the definition of pain-state may include aspects such as being in a state that "tends to be caused by bodily injury, to produce the belief that something is wrong with the body and ... to cause wincing or moaning".[29][7]

One important aspect of both behaviorist and functionalist approaches is that, according to them, the mind is multiply realizable.[30] This means that it does not depend on the exact constitution of an entity for whether it has a mind or not. Instead, only its behavioral dispositions or its role in the causal network matter.[27][29] The entity in question may be a human, an animal, a silicon-based alien or a robot. Functionalists sometimes draw an analogy to the software-hardware distinction where the mind is likened to a certain type of software that can be installed on different forms of hardware. Closely linked to this analogy is the thesis of computationalism, which defines the mind as an information processing system that is physically implemented by the neural activity of the brain.[3][31]

One problem for all of these views is that they seem to be unable to account for the phenomenal consciousness of the mind emphasized by consciousness-based approaches.[7] It may be true that pains are caused by bodily injuries and themselves produce certain beliefs and moaning behavior. But the causal profile of pain remains silent on the intrinsic unpleasantness of the painful experience itself. Some states that are not painful to the subject at all may even fit these characterizations.[7][29]

Externalism

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Main article: Externalism

Theories under the umbrella of externalism emphasize the mind's dependency on the environment. According to this view, mental states and their contents are at least partially determined by external circumstances.[32][33] For example, some forms of content externalism hold that it can depend on external circumstances whether a belief refers to one object or another.[34][35] The extended mind thesis states that external circumstances not only affect the mind but are part of it.[36][37] The closely related view of enactivism holds that mental processes involve an interaction between organism and environment.[38][39]

Classifications of mental states

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There is a great variety of types of mental states, which can be classified according to various distinctions. These types include perception, belief, desire, intention, emotion and memory. Many of the proposed distinctions for these types have significant overlaps and some may even be identical. Sensory states involve sense impressions, which are absent in non-sensory states. Propositional attitudes are mental states that have propositional contents, in contrast to non-propositional states. Intentional states refer to or are about objects or states of affairs, a feature which non-intentional states lack. A mental state is conscious if it belongs to a phenomenal experience. Unconscious mental states are also part of the mind but they lack this phenomenal dimension. Occurrent mental states are active or causally efficacious within the owner's mind while non-occurrent or standing states exist somewhere in the back of one's mind but do not currently play an active role in any mental processes. Certain mental states are rationally evaluable: they are either rational or irrational depending on whether they obey the norms of rationality. But other states are arational: they are outside the domain of rationality. A well-known classification is due to Franz Brentano, who distinguishes three basic categories of mental states: presentations, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate.

Types of mental states

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There is a great variety of types of mental states including perception, bodily awareness, thought, belief, desire, motivation, intention, deliberation, decision, pleasure, emotion, mood, imagination and memory. Some of these types are precisely contrasted with each other while other types may overlap. Perception involves the use of senses, like sight, touch, hearing, smell and taste, to acquire information about material objects and events in the external world.[40] It contrasts with bodily awareness in this sense, which is about the internal ongoings in our body and which does not present its contents as independent objects.[41] The objects given in perception, on the other hand, are directly (i.e. non-inferentially) presented as existing out there independently of the perceiver. Perception is usually considered to be reliable but our perceptual experiences may present false information at times and can thereby mislead us.[42] The information received in perception is often further considered in thought, in which information is mentally represented and processed.[43] Both perceptions and thoughts often result in the formation of new or the change of existing beliefs. Beliefs may amount to knowledge if they are justified and true. They are non-sensory cognitive propositional attitudes that have a mind-to-world direction of fit: they represent the world as being a certain way and aim at truth.[44][45] They contrast with desires, which are conative propositional attitudes that have a world-to-mind direction of fit and aim to change the world by representing how it should be.[46][47] Desires are closely related to agency: they motivate the agent and are thus involved in the formation of intentions. Intentions are plans to which the agent is committed and which may guide actions.[48][49] Intention-formation is sometimes preceded by deliberation and decision, in which the advantages and disadvantages of different courses of action are considered before committing oneself to one course. It is commonly held that pleasure plays a central role in these considerations. "Pleasure" refers to experience that feels good, that involves the enjoyment of something.[50][51] The topic of emotions is closely intertwined with that of agency and pleasure. Emotions are evaluative responses to external or internal stimuli that are associated with a feeling of pleasure or displeasure and motivate various behavioral reactions.[52][53] Emotions are quite similar to moods, some differences being that moods tend to arise for longer durations at a time and that moods are usually not clearly triggered by or directed at a specific event or object.[52][53] Imagination is even further removed from the actual world in that it represents things without aiming to show how they actually are.[54] All the aforementioned states can leave traces in memory that make it possible to relive them at a later time in the form of episodic memory.[55][56]

Sensation, propositional attitudes and intentionality

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An important distinction among mental states is between sensory and non-sensory states.[57] Sensory states involve some form of sense impressions like visual perceptions, auditory impressions or bodily pains. Non-sensory states, like thought, rational intuition or the feeling of familiarity, lack sensory contents.[58] Sensory states are sometimes equated with qualitative states and contrasted with propositional attitude states.[7][8] Qualitative states involve qualia, which constitute the subjective feeling of having the state in question or what it is like to be in it.[7] Propositional attitudes, on the other hand, are relations a subject has to a proposition. They are usually expressed by verbs like believe, desire, fear or hope together with a that-clause.[59][60][8] So believing that it will rain today, for example, is a propositional attitude. It has been argued that the contrast between qualitative states and propositional attitudes is misleading since there is some form of subjective feel to certain propositional states like understanding a sentence or suddenly thinking of something.[61] This would suggest that there are also non-sensory qualitative states and some propositional attitudes may be among them.[61][62] Another problem with this contrast is that some states are both sensory and propositional. This is the case for perception, for example, which involves sensory impressions that represent what the world is like. This representational aspect is usually understood as involving a propositional attitude.[63][64]

Closely related to these distinctions is the concept of intentionality. Intentionality is usually defined as the characteristic of mental states to refer to or be about objects or states of affairs.[15][16] The belief that the moon has a circumference of 10921 km, for example, is a mental state that is intentional in virtue of being about the moon and its circumference. It is sometimes held that all mental states are intentional, i.e. that intentionality is the "mark of the mental". This thesis is known as intentionalism. But this view has various opponents, who distinguish between intentional and non-intentional states. Putative examples of non-intentional states include various bodily experiences like pains and itches. Because of this association, it is sometimes held that all sensory states lack intentionality.[65][66] But such a view ignores that certain sensory states, like perceptions, can be intentional at the same time.[66] It is usually accepted that all propositional attitudes are intentional. But while the paradigmatic cases of intentionality are all propositional as well, there may be some intentional attitudes that are non-propositional.[67][68] This could be the case when an intentional attitude is directed only at an object. In this view, Elsie's fear of snakes is a non-propositional intentional attitude while Joseph's fear that he will be bitten by snakes is a propositional intentional attitude.[67]

Conscious and unconscious

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A mental state is conscious if it belongs to phenomenal experience. The subject is aware of the conscious mental states it is in: there is some subjective feeling to having them. Unconscious mental states are also part of the mind but they lack this phenomenal dimension.[69] So it is possible for a subject to be in an unconscious mental state, like a repressed desire, without knowing about it. It is usually held that some types of mental states, like sensations or pains, can only occur as conscious mental states.[70][71] But there are also other types, like beliefs and desires, that can be both conscious and unconscious. For example, many people share the belief that the moon is closer to the earth than to the sun. When considered, this belief becomes conscious, but it is unconscious most of the time otherwise. The relation between conscious and unconscious states is a controversial topic. It is often held that conscious states are in some sense more basic with unconscious mental states depending on them.[3][8][9] One such approach states that unconscious states have to be accessible to consciousness, that they are dispositions of the subject to enter their corresponding conscious counterparts.[72][73] On this position there can be no "deep unconscious", i.e. unconscious mental states that can not become conscious.[12]

The term "consciousness" is sometimes used not in the sense of phenomenal consciousness, as above, but in the sense of access consciousness. A mental state is conscious in this sense if the information it carries is available for reasoning and guiding behavior, even if it is not associated with any subjective feel characterizing the concurrent phenomenal experience.[3][13][74] Being an access-conscious state is similar but not identical to being an occurrent mental state, the topic of the next section.

Occurrent and standing

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A mental state is occurrent if it is active or causally efficacious within the owner's mind. Non-occurrent states are called standing or dispositional states. They exist somewhere in the back of one's mind but currently play no active role in any mental processes.[75][76] This distinction is sometimes identified with the distinction between phenomenally conscious and unconscious mental states.[77][78] It seems to be the case that the two distinctions overlap but do not fully match despite the fact that all conscious states are occurrent. This is the case because unconscious states may become causally active while remaining unconscious. A repressed desire may affect the agent's behavior while remaining unconscious, which would be an example of an unconscious occurring mental state.[77][78][79] The distinction between occurrent and standing is especially relevant for beliefs and desires. At any moment, there seems to be a great number of things we believe or things we want that are not relevant to our current situation. These states remain inactive in the back of one's head even though one has them.[77][79] For example, while Ann is engaged in her favorite computer game, she still believes that dogs have four legs and desires to get a pet dog on her next birthday. But these two states play no active role in her current state of mind.[77] Another example comes from dreamless sleep when most or all of our mental states are standing states.[75]

Rational, irrational and arational

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Certain mental states, like beliefs and intentions, are rationally evaluable: they are either rational or irrational depending on whether they obey the norms of rationality.[80] But other states, like urges, experiences of dizziness or hunger, are arational: they are outside the domain of rationality and can be neither rational nor irrational.[80] An important distinction within rationality concerns the difference between theoretical and practical rationality.[81] Theoretical rationality covers beliefs and their degrees while practical rationality focuses on desires, intentions and actions.[82] Some theorists aim to provide a comprehensive account of all forms of rationality but it is more common to find separate treatments of specific forms of rationality that leave the relation to other forms of rationality open.[81]

There are various competing definitions of what constitutes rationality but no universally accepted answer.[82] Some accounts focus on the relation between mental states for determining whether a given state is rational. In one view, a state is rational if it is well-grounded in another state that acts as its source of justification.[83] For example, Scarlet's belief that it is raining in Manchester is rational because it is grounded in her perceptual experience of the rain while the same belief would be irrational for Frank since he lacks such a perceptual ground. A different version of such an approach holds that rationality is given in virtue of the coherence among the different mental states of a subject.[84][85] This involves an holistic outlook that is less concerned with the rationality of individual mental states and more with the rationality of the person as a whole.[86] Other accounts focus not on the relation between two or several mental states but on responding correctly to external reasons.[87][88] Reasons are usually understood as facts that count in favor or against something.[89] On this account, Scarlet's aforementioned belief is rational because it responds correctly to the external fact that it is raining, which constitutes a reason for holding this belief.

Classification according to Brentano

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An influential classification of mental states is due to Franz Brentano. He argues that there are three basic kinds: presentations, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate.[90][91][92][93] All mental states either belong to one of these kinds or are constituted by combinations of them. These different types differ not in content or what is presented but in mode or how it is presented. The most basic kind is presentation, which is involved in every mental state. Pure presentations, as in imagination, just show their object without any additional information about the veridical or evaluative aspects of their object. A judgment, on the other hand, is an attitude directed at a presentation that asserts that its presentation is either true or false, as is the case in regular perception. Phenomena of love and hate involve an evaluative attitude towards their presentation: they show how things ought to be, and the presented object is seen as either good or bad. This happens, for example, in desires.[90][91] More complex types can be built up through combinations of these basic types. To be disappointed about an event, for example, can be construed as a judgment that this event happened together with a negative evaluation of it.[90] Brentano's distinction between judgments, phenomena of love and hate, and presentations is closely related to the more recent idea of direction of fit between mental state and world, i.e. mind-to-world direction of fit for judgments, the world-to-mind direction of fit for phenomena of love and hate and null direction of fit for mere presentations.[90] Brentano's tripartite system of classification has been modified in various ways by Brentano's students. Alexius Meinong, for example, divides the category of phenomena of love and hate into two distinct categories: feelings and desires.[94] Uriah Kriegel is a contemporary defender of Brentano's approach to the classification of mental phenomena.[95]

Academia

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Discussions about mental states can be found in many areas of study.

In cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind, a mental state is a kind of hypothetical state that corresponds to thinking and feeling, and consists of a conglomeration of mental representations and propositional attitudes. Several theories in philosophy and psychology try to determine the relationship between the agent's mental state and a proposition.[96][97][98][99]

Instead of looking into what a mental state is, in itself, clinical psychology and psychiatry determine a person's mental health through a mental status examination.[100]

Epistemology

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Mental states also include attitudes towards propositions, of which there are at least two—factive and non-factive, both of which entail the mental state of acquaintance. To be acquainted with a proposition is to understand its meaning and be able to entertain it. The proposition can be true or false, and acquaintance requires no specific attitude towards that truth or falsity. Factive attitudes include those mental states that are attached to the truth of the proposition—i.e. the proposition entails truth. Some factive mental states include "perceiving that", "remembering that", "regretting that", and (more controversially) "knowing that".[101] Non-factive attitudes do not entail the truth of the propositions to which they are attached. That is, one can be in one of these mental states and the proposition can be false. An example of a non-factive attitude is believing—people can believe a false proposition and people can believe a true proposition. Since there is the possibility of both, such mental states do not entail truth, and therefore, are not factive. However, belief does entail an attitude of assent toward the presumed truth of the proposition (whether or not it is so), making it and other non-factive attitudes different from a mere acquaintance.

See also

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References

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Sources

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Mental state

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A mental state is an internal psychological condition or process of the mind, encompassing phenomena such as thoughts, beliefs, desires, , perceptions, intentions, and sensations, which can occur either consciously or nonconsciously. These states are not directly observable but are inferred through , self-report, and neural activity, forming the basis of individual and social understanding. In and , mental states are often viewed as constructed from distributed networks involving affective, conceptual, and executive processes, rather than localized in specific regions. Philosophically, mental states are distinguished by several key characteristics, or "marks," that set them apart from purely physical processes: (directedness toward an object or content), (subjective experience or awareness), (subject to standards of correctness or rationality), (goal-directedness), and sometimes (autonomous decision-making). These attributes highlight ongoing debates about the mind-body relationship, including how mental states relate to physical causation and whether nonconscious states fully qualify as mental. In , the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others—known as mentalizing or —is crucial for , moral judgment, and interpersonal relations, though terminological inconsistencies across disciplines have complicated research. Mental states also play a pivotal role in fields like and , where alterations in states such as delusions or diminished capacity influence diagnosis and legal responsibility. Overall, understanding mental states bridges , , and , revealing their dynamic construction from sensory inputs, prior experiences, and bodily signals.

Core Concepts

Definition

A mental state refers to an internal condition of the mind, encompassing thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and intentions that constitute the subjective landscape of conscious and nonconscious experience and cognitive processing. These states are properties or events unique to thinking and feeling creatures, distinguishing them from mere physical or mechanical occurrences. They fundamentally shape an individual's personal experience and exert influence over behavior by interacting causally with environmental stimuli and bodily actions. Central attributes of mental states include their subjectivity, which captures the qualitative or phenomenal character inherent in experiences like sensations; , whereby they are accessible primarily through first-person , granting the subject privileged authority over their own psychological condition; and a causal role, through which they guide decisions, motivations, and responses to the world. This combination of features underscores the intimate, explanatory power of mental states in accounting for human agency and . Representative examples illustrate these attributes: a , such as I believe it will rain, functions as a cognitive representation that informs expectations and preparations; a desire, like wanting , serves as a motivational force directing goal-oriented ; and a , such as feeling a , embodies a subjective sensory episode that demands immediate and response. In distinction from physical states, mental states are not directly reducible to states or purely physical-chemical processes, as evidenced by their functional across diverse biological systems; rather, they are often characterized as supervenient on physical processes, such that no mental difference can occur without a corresponding physical difference, though ongoing debates concern the extent of this dependence and potential non-reducibility.

Historical Development

The concept of mental states originated in , where the (psyche) was seen as encompassing cognitive, emotional, and perceptual processes. , in his (circa 375 BCE), proposed a tripartite division of the into rational (logistikon), spirited (thumoeides), and appetitive (epithumetikon) parts, positing that justice in the individual arises from the rational part governing the others to maintain psychic harmony. , in De Anima (circa 350 BCE), advanced this by defining the as the form (eidos) and actuality (entelecheia) of a living body, integrating faculties like sensation, , and as essential activities that enable and thought without separating from body. During the medieval period, the notion of mental states shifted toward a more pronounced separation from the physical world, culminating in ' substance dualism in the . In (1641), Descartes distinguished between res cogitans (thinking substance, or mind) and res extensa (extended substance, or body), arguing that mental states—such as , understanding, and willing—are properties of an immaterial, non-extended substance inherently known through . This framework emphasized mental states as private, indivisible, and independent of spatial extension, influencing subsequent views on and . The Enlightenment and brought empiricist and idealist perspectives that reframed mental states as derived from or shaping experience. , in (1689), advocated empiricism by asserting that the mind begins as a (blank slate), with all mental states—ideas and perceptions—arising from sensory experience and internal reflection, rejecting innate principles. , in (1781), introduced , contending that mental states involve a priori structures like space, time, and categories of understanding that actively organize sensory data, making experience possible rather than passively receiving it. In the late , made a brief but influential contribution by reintroducing in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), defining mental phenomena as directed toward objects, a concept later elaborated in . In the 20th century, revolutionized the understanding of mental states by introducing the in (1900), proposing that repressed desires and memories operate below awareness, driving behavior through mechanisms like dream symbolism and slips of the tongue. Early 20th-century was dominated by , which emphasized observable behavior and rejected references to internal mental states as unscientific. , particularly Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1953), shifted focus toward language and observable behavior, with the challenging the idea of mental states as purely internal and ineffable, insisting that meaning and understanding are public and rule-following practices. Post-1950s, the integrated mental states with scientific inquiry, drawing on , , and to model as information processing, as exemplified by Chomsky's critique of and the adoption of computational metaphors for the mind. This interdisciplinary approach restored legitimacy to internal mental processes, paving the way for to treat mental states as empirically investigable constructs amenable to experimental and theoretical analysis.

Philosophical Perspectives

Consciousness and Epistemology-Based Approaches

In consciousness-based approaches to mental states, a central idea is that mental states are defined by their subjective character, or the "what it is like" to undergo them, which distinguishes conscious experiences from mere physical or functional processes. This criterion, articulated by , emphasizes that a state is mental if there is something it feels like from the inside, as illustrated by the irreducibility of a bat's echolocation experience to objective descriptions. Such views root mental states in phenomenal , where —the raw, subjective feels or sensory qualities of experience, such as the redness of or the of a —serve as the hallmark of mentality. Epistemologically, these approaches highlight privileged access to one's own mental states through , allowing direct, first-person knowledge that is immune to certain doubts. famously exemplified this in his cogito argument, where the act of doubting one's existence affirms the indubitable presence of a thinking mind: "I think, therefore I am." This introspective reliability underpins the view that mental states are epistemically private, accessible only to the subject. However, distinguishes phenomenal consciousness (the experiential "what it is like") from access consciousness (states available for reasoning, report, and control), arguing that the former does not necessarily entail the latter, as seen in cases like where experiences occur without cognitive access. Challenges to these views arise from illusionism, which denies the existence of as intrinsic properties, positing instead that our intuitions about them are illusory byproducts of cognitive processes. , in "Quining Qualia," contends that qualia cannot coherently meet criteria like or intrinsicness, reducing them to functional or representational roles without genuine subjective feels. Further criticisms include the , which questions how we can know that others possess mental states, given that we infer them only through behavioral rather than direct access, as noted in his analysis of matter and . Additionally, about introspection's reliability suggests that self-reports often confabulate causes, with individuals attributing mental processes to incorrect sources due to limited direct access to cognitive mechanisms. These issues highlight tensions between the immediacy of first-person and third-person verification in epistemology-based accounts.

Intentionality and Representational Approaches

refers to the directedness of mental states toward objects or contents, a concept central to understanding mental phenomena in . introduced this thesis in his 1874 work Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, arguing that every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, distinguishing mental from physical phenomena. This directedness, or "aboutness," allows mental states to refer to objects that may be immanent—existing only within the mind, such as fictional entities—or transcendent, corresponding to real-world items. 's view posits as the mark of the mental, enabling thoughts to be inherently representational without requiring the object's actual existence. Representational approaches build on intentionality by conceiving mental states as internal representations that bear content, determining their meaning and function. In representationalism, mental states are relations to mental symbols or structures that stand for external or internal objects, providing a framework for cognition. A seminal example is Jerry Fodor's language of thought hypothesis, outlined in his 1975 book The Language of Thought, which proposes that thinking occurs in an innate, language-like medium called Mentalese, composed of symbols with syntactic and semantic properties. According to Fodor, these internal representations enable systematicity in thought—such as the ability to infer from "John loves Mary" to "Mary is loved by John"—and productivity, allowing novel combinations of ideas, with content arising from the compositional structure of these mental symbols. Within representational theories, intentional content is categorized as narrow or wide, reflecting debates over whether meaning is determined solely by internal states or by external factors. Narrow content is individualistic, fixed by the subject's intrinsic psychological properties, independent of the environment. In contrast, wide content incorporates relational aspects, such as causal history or surroundings, as illustrated by Hilary Putnam's 1975 in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'." Putnam imagines a Twin Earth identical to except that its clear liquid, twater (XYZ), differs chemically from 's (H₂O); a person and their molecular duplicate on Twin Earth would have the same narrow content when thinking about "" (e.g., a wet, drinkable liquid), but differing wide contents due to the environmental distinction, showing that intentional states depend on external conditions. These approaches apply to explain propositional attitudes like and desires, which possess specific content such as "believing that P" or "desiring Q," where P and Q are propositions. In representational terms, a that it will rain involves a with the content "it will rain," directed toward a possible state of affairs, allowing for truth-evaluation and . Desires similarly represent desired outcomes, integrating with to guide action, as their intentional content bridges internal states to external goals. This framework underscores how mental states' representational nature facilitates understanding, prediction, and interaction with the world.

Behaviorist and Functionalist Views

Behaviorism emerged as a philosophical and psychological approach that sought to eliminate references to unobservable mental entities by reducing mental states to dispositions for behavior. In his 1913 manifesto, proposed that should focus solely on objective, experimental study of behavior, defining mental states not as inner processes but as tendencies to respond in specific ways to stimuli. This view rejected as unreliable, insisting that predictions and control of behavior suffice for understanding the mind. Gilbert Ryle advanced this perspective in 1949 by critiquing the Cartesian notion of the mind as an inner theater, labeling it a "category mistake" that wrongly treats mental states as private, ghostly occurrences separate from public actions. For Ryle, mental states are instead behavioral dispositions, such as knowing how to perform a task, which manifest in observable conduct rather than hidden mechanisms. This approach aimed to dissolve the mind-body problem by showing that mental concepts belong to the same logical category as behavioral ones. Behaviorism divided into methodological and logical variants, with the former restricting scientific inquiry to observable behavior while allowing unobservable mental states in principle, and the latter analytically equating mental states with behavioral dispositions. Methodological , as practiced by early figures like Watson, emphasized empirical methods without denying inner states outright. Logical , more philosophically rigorous, faced challenges in accounting for complex behaviors like , where dispositions alone seemed insufficient to capture the full concept. Critiques highlighted these limitations, notably Noam Chomsky's 1959 review of B. F. Skinner's , which argued that behaviorist accounts fail to explain the creative and innate aspects of , as they reduce to stimulus-response chains without addressing internal generative structures. Chomsky demonstrated that behaviorism's reliance on observable inputs and outputs overlooks the poverty of stimulus in learning, leading to its decline as a dominant . Functionalism addressed behaviorism's shortcomings by defining mental states in terms of their functional roles within a system, rather than strictly observable behaviors. formulation of machine functionalism posited that mental states are abstract states specified by their causal relations to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and other mental states, analogous to computational states in a . This allows for multiple realizability, where the same mental state, like , can be instantiated by diverse physical substrates—biological brains, silicon chips, or even alien physiologies—as long as the functional organization remains equivalent. The , proposed by in 1950, underscores functionalism's emphasis on behavioral indistinguishability, suggesting that if a can produce responses indistinguishable from a human's in , it should be regarded as possessing the relevant mental states. This criterion shifts focus from internal constitution to external performance, aligning with functionalist views that mental equivalence follows from matching functional profiles.

Externalist Theories

Externalist theories in the philosophy of mind assert that the nature and content of mental states are partially constituted by factors external to the individual, such as the physical or , thereby rejecting the internalist assumption that mental states supervene solely on internal physical properties. This view emerged prominently in the late as a challenge to individualistic conceptions of the mind, emphasizing relational dependencies that extend beyond the boundaries of the and . A foundational form of externalism is content externalism, which holds that the intentional content of a mental state, such as a , is determined not just by the individual's internal states but by their causal relations to the external world. Hilary Putnam's 1975 of Twin Earth illustrates this: imagine two identical individuals, one on and one on a distant planet indistinguishable except that the clear liquid there is XYZ, not H₂O; the Earthling's that "water is wet" refers to H₂O, while the Twin Earthling's refers to XYZ, despite identical internal , showing that meaning is fixed externally. Putnam argued that this undermines the idea that meanings are "in the head," as semantic content depends on environmental factors like chemical composition. Building on content externalism, vehicle externalism or active externalism extends the locus of cognitive processes beyond the biological organism to include external tools and artifacts that function as part of the mind's machinery. In their 1998 paper, Andy Clark and proposed the through the case of Inga and Otto: Inga remembers a museum's location internally, but Otto, with Alzheimer's, relies on a as a aid; if the notebook is reliably used and accessible, it qualifies as part of Otto's cognitive state on parity with Inga's brain, suggesting that "leaks" into the environment via coupled systems. This parity principle holds that if a process is functionally equivalent whether performed internally or externally, it should be treated similarly in accounts of the mind. Social externalism further specifies how social and linguistic practices shape mental content, contending that beliefs and thoughts are individuated relative to communal norms and shared meanings. Tyler Burge's thought experiments demonstrate this: consider an English speaker with a medical condition believing "" affects the ; on , this is false due to linguistic conventions limiting "" to joints, but if transported to a linguistic where "" includes conditions, the belief becomes true, indicating that content depends on social context rather than alone. Burge used such indexical cases to argue that propositional attitudes are anti-individualistic, as their individuation requires reference to external social facts. These externalist approaches carry significant implications for traditional views of mental states, challenging the Cartesian notion of their privacy and transparency by showing that one cannot fully specify or access the content of one's own thoughts without environmental or social input. They also undermine in , implying that explanations of must incorporate relational and embedded factors rather than isolating the mind within the body.

Classifications and Types

Broad Categories of Mental States

Mental states in and are often categorized into several broad types based on their functional roles, contents, and phenomenological characteristics. These categories provide a taxonomic framework for understanding the diversity of mental phenomena without delving into deeper ontological debates. Key distinctions include propositional attitudes, sensory states, emotional states, and volitional states, each serving distinct purposes in and . Propositional attitudes are content-bearing mental states directed toward propositions, typically expressed through "that"-clauses, such as believing that or desiring that one succeeds. These states include beliefs, which represent commitments to truth; desires, which motivate pursuits; and hopes, which project future possibilities. They are intentional in nature, meaning they are about or directed at something, and play a central role in reasoning and . Sensory states, in contrast, are non-propositional and characterized by qualitative, phenomenal experiences, such as perceptions of visual scenes, pains from , or itches on the skin. Unlike propositional attitudes, these states do not involve abstract representations but directly register sensory inputs, providing immediate, subjective that ground of the environment. Paradigmatic examples include visual perceptions and bodily sensations, which lack the truth-evaluable content of beliefs but contribute to the richness of conscious . Emotional states encompass affective mental conditions like , , or , which often combine intentional directedness with physiological and subjective feelings. These states are typically intentional, targeting objects or situations—such as of a —but also involve non-intentional components like mood tones. Emotions integrate evaluations with bodily responses, influencing and appraisal in ways distinct from pure or sensation. Volitional states, such as and decisions, are action-oriented mental states that bridge and execution, guiding deliberate . commit an agent to future actions, often resolving conflicts among desires, while decisions mark the formation of such commitments. These states exhibit a practical , differing from passive attitudes by actively shaping conduct over time. These categories interrelate dynamically; for instance, sensory states like perceptions often provide justificatory grounds for propositional attitudes, as when visual input supports the that an object is present, thereby linking immediate to cognitive endorsement.

Conscious vs. Unconscious States

Conscious mental states are those that an individual can report and access through , such as current thoughts or immediate sensory experiences that enter phenomenal . These states are typically available for verbal articulation and deliberate reflection, distinguishing them from deeper layers of . For instance, pondering a consciously involves focal on the reasoning process, allowing metacognitive monitoring. In contrast, unconscious mental states exert implicit influences on without entering , often shaping actions through processes or repressed content. Freud developed the topographical model of the mind, whereby the unconscious—comprising repressed desires and instincts—forms the largest portion of mental activity, often analogized as the submerged part of an , with only a small fraction being conscious. The concept of the unconscious was prominently featured in his 1900 work , while the full model distinguishing conscious, , and unconscious was elaborated in his 1915 paper "The Unconscious". Empirical evidence for unconscious perception comes from subliminal priming experiments, where stimuli presented below the threshold of facilitate subsequent processing. Anthony Marcel's 1983 studies on visual masking demonstrated that masked words could prime semantic associations without conscious detection, showing that perceptual processing occurs unconsciously and affects recognition tasks. These findings challenge the notion that all mental content requires , highlighting unconscious states' role in implicit learning and . Debates persist on whether unconscious processes qualify as truly mental, particularly regarding and understanding. John Searle's Chinese Room argument (1980) contends that syntactic manipulation, as in computational systems, lacks semantic content or genuine understanding, implying that unconscious operations might mimic mentality without possessing it. Critics argue this raises questions about whether purely implicit states, devoid of phenomenal experience, constitute mental states at all. Modern integrates these ideas through dual-process theories, distinguishing (fast, intuitive, often unconscious) from System 2 (slow, deliberate, conscious) thinking. Daniel Kahneman's 2011 framework in elucidates how unconscious heuristics enable rapid judgments but can lead to biases, while conscious deliberation overrides them for accuracy. This perspective bridges Freudian influences with experimental evidence, emphasizing unconscious states' adaptive yet fallible contributions to .

Occurrent vs. Standing States

In , mental states are distinguished based on their temporal and causal profiles into occurrent and standing states. Occurrent states are episodic and actively occurring at a moment, involving ongoing mental activity that is causally efficacious in the agent's . For instance, experiencing current or actively thinking through a exemplifies an occurrent state, as it is a transient unfolding in real time. Standing states, in contrast, are dispositional or latent, existing in the background of the mind without being actively manifested, yet poised to influence or thought when triggered. A example is a general in the of , which persists as a stable ready to guide actions—such as avoiding a cliff—without requiring constant active consideration. This dispositional account traces back to Armstrong's 1968 materialist , which posits that many mental states are fundamentally dispositions to produce certain occurrent responses under specific conditions, thereby grounding mental phenomena in physical causal structures. The distinction carries implications for understanding behavioral consistency, as standing states provide a stable framework for traits like character. For example, standing desires—such as a persistent aversion to —underlie consistent across situations, manifesting as occurrent desires only when relevant stimuli arise, thus explaining why individuals exhibit reliable patterns without perpetual active deliberation. Transitions between these states occur dynamically; repeated occurrent experiences, such as through learning or , can consolidate into enduring standing states, altering dispositions over time—for instance, initial occurrent encounters with evidence may form a lasting that influences future judgments.

Rationality Dimensions

Mental states can be evaluated along dimensions of , which assess their alignment with norms governing formation, maintenance, and action. These dimensions distinguish between structural rationality, focused on the internal coherence of an agent's attitudes, and substantive rationality, concerned with how well those attitudes correspond to external evidence or reasons. Propositional attitudes, such as and intentions, serve as primary bearers of these rationality norms, as they possess truth-apt content subject to evaluation. Rational mental states exhibit coherence among an agent's beliefs and intentions, ensuring logical consistency and practical alignment, while also being -based in their responsiveness to available information. For instance, Bayesian updating represents a model of rational , where prior beliefs are adjusted probabilistically in light of new to maintain coherence and accuracy. This process aligns with substantive rationality by corresponding to objective probabilities and empirical data, promoting decisions that maximize expected utility. In contrast, irrational mental states violate these norms through , contradiction, or failure to integrate evidence, leading to incoherent or unsubstantiated attitudes. A classic example is , where conflicting cognitions—such as a and a contrary action—produce psychological discomfort, often resolved irrationally by altering beliefs rather than behaviors. Phobias illustrate irrational fears, involving intense, persistent anxiety toward benign objects or situations despite recognition of their harmlessness, defying evidential norms. Arational mental states fall outside rationality evaluations altogether, lacking propositional content and thus not truth-apt or normatively assessable. Mere sensations, such as feelings of or , exemplify this category; they report qualitative experiences without aiming at representational accuracy or coherence, rendering them neither rational nor irrational. Theories of rationality further delineate these dimensions through coherence and correspondence approaches. Coherence theories prioritize holistic consistency across an agent's mental web, as in Donald Davidson's view that rationality emerges from interpreting s within a broadly coherent system, imputing attitudes only under principles of charity that assume maximal rationality. Correspondence theories, conversely, emphasize alignment with external facts, evaluating states by their fidelity to reality rather than internal harmony alone.

Brentano's Classification

Franz , in his seminal work Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint published in 1874, proposed a foundational classification of all mental phenomena into three mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories: presentations, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate. This schema posits that every mental act belongs to one of these classes, distinguished by their fundamental relation to an intentional object, thereby establishing as the defining mark of the mental. Presentations, or Vorstellungen, constitute the most basic class of mental phenomena, serving as the simple apprehension or representation of an object without affirmation or . For instance, the act of seeing a color or hearing a exemplifies a presentation, where the mind is directed toward the object in a neutral, perceptual manner. Brentano emphasized that presentations form the foundational layer upon which the other categories are built, as they provide the content that judgments and reference. Judgments, or Urteile, involve an affirmative or negative stance toward a , such as accepting or denying the or attributes of the presented object. Examples include believing that a seen object exists or disbelieving a reported fact, where the mental act goes beyond mere representation to assert truth or falsity. Brentano viewed judgments as derivative from presentations, requiring a prior act of representation to which the or disbelief attaches. Phenomena of and hate encompass emotional or volitional attitudes directed toward an object, characterized by a positive () or negative (hate) orientation, such as desire, , or aversion. For example, desiring the achievement of a or hating an illustrates this category, where the mental involves an intrinsic pro- or con-attitude rather than cognitive affirmation. Like judgments, these phenomena presuppose presentations as their objects but differ in their non-cognitive, evaluative . Brentano's classification profoundly influenced subsequent philosophical developments, laying the groundwork for Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method and sparking enduring debates on the nature of in mental states.

Interdisciplinary Approaches

Psychological and Cognitive Perspectives

In , mental states are empirically investigated as dynamic cognitive and affective processes that influence , , and . Psychological perspectives emphasize observable and measurable aspects of mental states, drawing from experimental methods to explore how individuals process and respond to stimuli. These views treat mental states not as abstract entities but as functional components of and learning, often quantified through controlled studies and validated instruments. Cognitive psychology conceptualizes mental states as components of an information-processing system, where the mind operates like a computational device handling inputs, storage, and outputs. A seminal framework is Jerry Fodor's theory of the modular mind, which posits that certain mental states arise from domain-specific modules—specialized processors for tasks like or vision—that operate automatically and encapsulate their operations from central cognition. This modularity allows for efficient handling of perceptual mental states, such as rapid , without interference from higher-level beliefs. Fodor's model highlights how these modules contribute to the formation of representational mental states, influencing overall . Developmental theories further elucidate how mental states evolve through structured stages. Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive development, developed from the 1920s to the 1970s, describes mental states as shaped by progressive schemas—mental frameworks for organizing experiences—that adapt via assimilation and accommodation. In the sensorimotor stage (birth to about 2 years), mental states are primarily action-based, lacking symbolic representation; by the formal operational stage (adolescence onward), individuals form abstract mental states involving hypothetical reasoning. These stages illustrate how environmental interactions refine mental states, enabling more complex attitudes and problem-solving. Piaget's work underscores the constructive nature of mental states in child development. Measurement of mental states relies on standardized psychological tools to capture both explicit and implicit dimensions. Self-report scales, such as the developed by in 1932, assess attitudes and beliefs by having individuals rate statements on a continuum (e.g., from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree"), providing quantifiable insights into conscious mental states like opinions on social issues. For unconscious biases, the (IAT), introduced by Anthony Greenwald and colleagues in 1998, measures automatic associations between concepts (e.g., pairing racial groups with positive or negative attributes) through response latencies, revealing mental states that individuals may not verbally endorse. These methods enable reliable empirical assessment, with the IAT demonstrating moderate test-retest reliability in detecting implicit prejudices. Altered mental states in psychological disorders are characterized by persistent distortions in cognition and emotion, diagnosable through clinical criteria. Major depressive disorder, for instance, manifests as a mental state dominated by negative attitudes, including pervasive sadness and anhedonia, lasting at least two weeks and impairing daily functioning. According to the DSM-5 criteria established by the American Psychiatric Association in 2013, diagnosis requires five or more symptoms, such as diminished interest in activities or recurrent thoughts of death, excluding those better explained by other conditions. This framework highlights how depressive mental states disrupt information processing, leading to biased interpretations of events. Classic experiments reveal how situational factors can rapidly alter mental states. Stanley Milgram's obedience study, conducted in 1961 and published in 1963, demonstrated that ordinary individuals could shift from ethical beliefs to compliance with harmful actions under perceived authority, with 65% of participants administering what they believed were lethal electric shocks to a learner. This finding illustrates the malleability of mental states, where authority cues override personal convictions, informing understandings of belief formation in social contexts. The experiment's results emphasize the role of contextual pressures in shaping occurrent mental states like obedience.

Neuroscientific Correlates

Neuroscientific research seeks to identify the (NCC), defined as the minimal set of neural events and mechanisms sufficient for a specific conscious percept, as proposed by and in their seminal 1990 framework focusing on visual awareness through synchronous neural firing in the . This approach emphasizes empirical investigation of brain activity patterns that accompany mental states, distinguishing them from mere functional descriptions by grounding them in biological substrates. Specific brain regions are implicated in various mental states, with the playing a central role in processing emotions such as fear and anxiety through its connections to sensory and autonomic systems, as evidenced by lesion and imaging studies showing heightened amygdala activation during emotional arousal regardless of valence. The , particularly the dorsolateral and ventromedial areas, supports and intentional mental states, including and goal-directed behavior, where it modulates cognitive control to align actions with internal intentions. For instance, Benjamin Libet's 1983 experiments using EEG revealed a readiness potential—a slow negative shift in brain activity—emerging approximately 350 milliseconds before conscious of intent to act, originating in the but influenced by prefrontal inputs, challenging notions of volitional control in mental states. Neuroimaging techniques provide key evidence linking mental states to brain activity; (fMRI) has demonstrated that formation and trust involve activation in the , as shown in a 2008 study where participants evaluated true and false statements, revealing distinct patterns for versus disbelief. (EEG), with its high , is particularly suited for capturing occurrent mental states—transient, active processes like focused attention or retrieval—through analysis of event-related potentials and oscillatory rhythms, such as waves during tasks. A central debate in neuroscientific correlates of mental states revolves around ' 1995 distinction between the "hard problem" of explaining why physical processes give rise to subjective experience () and the "easy problems" of identifying functional mechanisms, such as or reportability, which NCC research primarily addresses through observable functions but leaves the experiential aspect unresolved. Recent advances in , a technique using light-sensitive proteins to manipulate neural activity with precision, have enabled direct causal links between specific circuits and mental states; for example, 2010s studies in mice optically stimulating basolateral amygdala neurons induced fear responses, while inhibiting infralimbic cortex projections suppressed fear expression, providing mechanistic insights into emotional mental states.

Applications and Implications

Epistemological Issues

Epistemological discussions of mental states center on their role in constituting , particularly through the traditional of as justified true (JTB). Gettier's 1963 paper introduced counterexamples, known as Gettier problems, demonstrating that JTB is insufficient for because a subject can hold a justified true without possessing , often due to lucky coincidences such as environmental factors unbeknownst to the believer. For instance, in one case, a person justifiably believes a false that leads to a true via chance, undermining the claim that mental states alone guarantee epistemic warrant. These problems highlight about deriving directly from introspected mental states, prompting ongoing debates on additional conditions like no false lemmas or defeat. A key tension in arises between regarding the justification provided by mental states. Internalism posits that justification depends solely on factors internal to the mind, accessible via reflection, such as coherence among beliefs. Laurence BonJour's 1985 coherentist theory exemplifies this, arguing that empirical is justified by the mutual support of a doxastic system, where mental states like perceptual seemings contribute to overall coherence without requiring external reliability. In contrast, externalism, including , maintains that justification stems from external relations, such as the reliability of belief-forming processes, even if the subject lacks internal access to those factors. Alvin Goldman's 1979 reliabilist account treats mental processes—such as or —as justified if they reliably produce true beliefs, emphasizing causal reliability over subjective mental states alone. The problem of other minds further complicates epistemological access to mental states, questioning how one knows the mental states of others beyond one's own. Traditional approaches include inference to the best explanation, where observed behavior is taken as evidence for internal states, versus the argument from analogy, which extrapolates from one's own mind-body correlation to others. Bertrand Russell's 1921 neutral monism offers a framework here, positing that both mind and matter derive from neutral events, potentially easing solipsistic barriers by suggesting mental states are inferred from shared neutral constructs rather than direct observation. This debate underscores skepticism about intersubjective knowledge, as mental states remain private yet essential for social epistemology. Self-knowledge of one's own mental states presents unique epistemological challenges, particularly concerning and transparency. Philosophers debate whether introspective access provides infallible or privileged , with anti- challenging content individualism by linking mental states to external factors. Tyler Burge's 1996 work argues that self-knowledge entitlements arise from social and linguistic practices, preserving despite content depending on environmental relations, thus reconciling anti- with reliability. This view implies that while mental states offer transparent access, their justificatory force involves external constraints, bridging internalist intuitions with broader epistemological realism. In legal systems, particularly under , the concept of mens rea, or "guilty mind," refers to the mental state required to establish criminal liability, encompassing elements such as , , recklessness, and . Intent involves a purposeful desire to achieve a result or conscious awareness of a high probability of it occurring, while recklessness denotes a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will follow from one's conduct. The American Law Institute's (1962) formalized these categories into a structured framework, defining four levels of —purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently—to promote uniformity in assessing criminal responsibility based on the defendant's mental attitude toward the prohibited conduct. The further illustrates how altered mental states can negate criminal liability by excusing acts that would otherwise constitute crimes. Originating from the established by the in 1843, the defense requires that the defendant, due to a defect of reason from disease of the mind, either did not know the nature and quality of the act or did not know it was wrong. In the , the Durham rule, articulated in Durham v. United States (1954), broadened this by holding that an accused is not criminally responsible if their unlawful act was the "product" of mental disease or defect, shifting focus from cognitive understanding to causal influence of the mental condition. However, the Durham rule faced criticism for its vagueness in defining "product" and was largely rejected by 1972 in favor of tests like the American Law Institute's formulation, which combines with lack of substantial capacity to conform conduct to the law. Landmark cases highlight the interplay between mental states, intent, and necessity in legal judgments. In R v. Dudley and Stephens (1884), two shipwreck survivors were convicted of murder for killing and cannibalizing a cabin boy to survive starvation, with the court ruling that necessity does not justify homicide, as it would undermine the absolute sanctity of innocent life regardless of the defendants' desperate mental state or intent to preserve their own lives. This decision reinforced that even extreme circumstances do not excuse intentional killing, emphasizing the mental element of deliberate choice over survival-driven impulses. In ethical contexts, mental states play a central role in theories of . , as developed by in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), evaluates actions based on their tendency to promote pleasure and avert , treating these mental states as the ultimate measures of utility and value, with the greatest principle guiding aggregate . refined this in Utilitarianism (1863), distinguishing "higher" pleasures of the intellect and sentiments from "lower" sensory ones, arguing that competent judges prefer the former for their superior quality, thus prioritizing refined mental experiences in ethical calculations. In contrast, deontological , as outlined by in Groundwork of the (1785), emphasizes the worth of actions arising from the agent's intentions and adherence to duty via the , where good will—rational commitment to universalizable maxims—matters more than consequential mental states like pleasure or . Modern extends these debates by examining how activity informs concepts of and . Joshua Greene's 2001 fMRI study demonstrated that moral judgments involving direct personal harm engage emotional regions like the more intensely than impersonal ones, suggesting that utilitarian decisions may require overriding intuitive emotional responses with deliberate cognitive control, raising questions about the voluntariness of in ethical choices. These findings fuel neuroethical discussions on whether undermines traditional notions of , as in Benjamin Libet's experiments showing unconscious activity preceding conscious , potentially challenging legal and ethical assumptions of autonomous mental states in responsibility attributions.

Role in Artificial Intelligence

The debate over mental states in (AI) centers on whether machines can genuinely possess , beliefs, or desires, or merely simulate them. John Searle's argument, introduced in 1980, distinguishes between strong AI—which posits that appropriately programmed computers can have true mental states—and weak AI, which views computers as tools for simulating cognition without understanding. In the , a person who does not understand Chinese follows syntactic rules to manipulate symbols, producing outputs indistinguishable from a native speaker, yet lacks semantic comprehension; Searle argues this shows that syntax alone cannot produce semantics or , implying strong AI cannot achieve genuine mental states. Functionalist perspectives counter that mental states are defined by their causal roles in information processing, not intrinsic properties, so AI systems realizing these roles would possess mental states. Alan Turing's 1950 imitation game, now known as the , proposes evaluating machine intelligence by whether it can mimic human conversation indistinguishably, suggesting that behavioral equivalence suffices for attributing mental states like beliefs or desires. This approach aligns with functionalism by focusing on input-output relations rather than internal mechanisms, influencing early AI development where systems were designed to emulate cognitive functions. Contemporary large language models (LLMs), such as those in the GPT series, demonstrate advanced simulation of mental states, including elements of —the ability to attribute beliefs and desires to others. Evaluations in the 2020s show and similar models performing comparably to or exceeding young humans on false-belief tasks, inferring mental states from contextual cues to generate coherent responses. For instance, these models can predict actions based on simulated agent beliefs, raising questions about whether such capabilities indicate emergent or sophisticated . However, performance varies across benchmarks, with LLMs excelling in explicit tasks but faltering in implicit or counterfactual scenarios requiring nuanced mental state ascription. Ethical considerations arise from the asymmetry in ascribing mental states to AI: humans readily adopt an toward machines exhibiting goal-directed behavior, treating them as agents with beliefs and desires for predictive purposes, even if no true mentality exists. Daniel Dennett's framework of the posits this as a pragmatic , more successful than physical or stances for complex systems like chess-playing programs, but it risks anthropomorphizing AI and blurring lines in . This stance highlights potential ethical pitfalls, such as over-attributing agency to non-sentient systems, which could influence human-AI interactions without reciprocal ethical obligations. Prospects for conscious AI involve theories like integrated information theory (IIT), which quantifies consciousness via Φ, the measure of irreducible causal power within a system, applicable to computational architectures. Giulio Tononi's 2004 formulation suggests that sufficiently integrated machine systems could generate high Φ values, potentially yielding genuine mental states, including phenomenal experience. Applications to AI explore whether recurrent neural networks or neuromorphic hardware might achieve this integration, though empirical tests remain limited, focusing instead on theoretical extensions to non-biological substrates. Externalism, positing mental states as extending into environmental interactions, briefly supports this by implying AI cognition could incorporate external tools or data flows.

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