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Military Sealift Command
Military Sealift Command
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Military Sealift Command
The official seal of Military Sealift Command.
Active9 July 1949 – present
Country United States of America
Branch United States Navy
TypeComponent Command
RoleSea-based transportation
HeadquartersNaval Station Norfolk, Norfolk, Virginia, U.S.
Commanders
Current commander
  • RADM Philip E. Sobeck, USN
  • (8 Sept 2023 – present)[1][2]
Insignia
Flag

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is an organization that controls the replenishment and military transport ships of the United States Navy. Military Sealift Command has the responsibility for providing sealift and ocean transportation for all US military services as well as for other government agencies. It first came into existence on 9 July 1949 when the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) became solely responsible for the Department of Defense's ocean transport needs. The MSTS was renamed the Military Sealift Command in 1970.

Military Sealift Command ships are made up of a core fleet of ships owned by the United States Navy and others under long-term-charter augmented by short-term or voyage-chartered ships.[3]

  • During a time charter MSC takes control of a merchant ship and operates it for the chartered amount of time. During this time the ship is crewed by civilian mariners and MSC pays for all expenses. Time chartered ships are not subject to inspections from foreign governments when in port, and MSC has operational control.
  • Voyage chartered ships are crewed by civilian mariners, and MSC only pays the fee for transporting the cargo. These ships are chartered for the voyage, subject to inspections, and MSC does not have operational control of the ship.[4]

The Navy-owned ships carry blue and gold stack colors, are in service with the prefix USNS (United States Naval Ship), rather than in commission (with a USS prefix), have hull numbers as an equivalent commissioned ship would have with the prefix T- and are primarily civilian crewed by either civil service mariners[5] or contract crews (see United States Merchant Marine) as is the case of the special mission ships.[6] Some ships may have Navy or Marine Corps personnel on board to carry out communication and special mission functions, or for force protection.[7] Ships on charter or equivalent, retain commercial colors and bear the standard merchant prefix MV, SS, or GTS, without hull numbers.

Eight programs compose Military Sealift Command: Fleet Oiler (PM1), Special Mission (PM2), Strategic Sealift (PM3), Tow, Salvage, Tender, and Hospital Ship (PM4), Sealift (PM5), Combat Logistics Force (PM6), Expeditionary Mobile Base, Amphibious Command Ship, and Cable Layer (PM7) and Expeditionary Fast Transport (PM8).

MSC reports to the Department of Defense's Transportation Command for defense transportation matters, to the Navy Fleet Forces Command for Navy-unique matters, and to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) for procurement policy and oversight matters.[8]

Command structure

[edit]
Rear Admiral Philip E. Sobeck, commander of Military Sealift Command.
MSC ships are identified by the blue and gold stripes on their stacks.
Military Sealift Command ships as of January 2022

Military Sealift Command is organized around eight programs:

  • Fleet Oiler Program N031 (formerly Combat Logistics Force (PM1)[9] or Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force NFAF)
  • Special Mission Program N032 (formerly (PM2))[10]
  • Strategic Sealift Program N033 (Formerly Prepositioning (PM3))[11]
  • Tow, Salvage, Tender, and Hospital Ship Program N034 (Formerly Service Support (PM4))[12]
  • Sealift Program N035 (Formerly Sealift (PM5))[13]
  • Combat Logistics Force Program N036 (Formerly Fleet Ordnance and Dry Cargo (PM6))
  • Expeditionary Mobile Base, Amphibious Command Ship, and Cable Layer Program N037 (Formerly Afloat Staging Command Support (PM7))
  • Expeditionary Fast Transport Program N038 (Formerly Joint High Speed Vessel (PM8))

On 9 January 2012, the MSC command organization was reorganized via a realignment of its structure to increase its efficiency while maintaining effectiveness. To better manage this new program structure, MSC repositioned three of its key Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel, with one SES acting as the program executive over MSC's government-operated ships, a second SES serving as the program executive over contract-operated ships, and a third SES overseeing total force manpower management for MSC worldwide operations. Also, MSC realigned two of its four mission-driven programs (Combat Logistics Force and Special Mission) and adding a fifth program (Service Support). The Prepositioning and Sealift programs are unchanged by the 2012 reorganization.[14]

As of June 2013, Military Sealift Command operated around 110 ships, and employed 9,800 people (88% of whom are civilians).[15]

In 2015, the Military Sealift Command underwent further restructuring with the relocation from the former headquarters at Washington Navy Yard to Naval Station Norfolk.

Fleet Oiler Program N031

[edit]
An Oiler conducts a replenishment-at-sea with USCGC Stratton, 2012
A Fleet Oiler (formerly the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force) ship, USNS Kanawha, bearing the blue-and-gold stripes on its stack

The Combat Logistics Force was the part of the MSC most associated with directly supporting the Navy. In 1972, a study concluded that it would be cheaper for civilians to man USN support vessels such as tankers and stores ships. The CLF is the American equivalent of the British Royal Fleet Auxiliary. These MSC ships are painted haze gray and can be easily identified by the blue and gold horizontal bands around the top of their central smokestack.

The Combat Logistics Force was formerly called the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force.[16] After a 2012 reorganization, this program now maintains the 32 government-operated fleet underway replenishment ships from the former Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF). Fleet replenishment oilers form the Oilers Program N031, while the dry cargo/ammunition ships and fast combat support ships were separated to Explosive Program N036.

Fleet Oiler Program ship types;[17]

Special Mission Program N032

[edit]

Military Sealift Command's Special Mission Program controls 24 ships that provide operating platforms and services for unique US Military and federal government missions. Oceanographic and hydrographic surveys, underwater surveillance, missile flight data collection and tracking, acoustic research and submarine support are among the specialized services this program supports. Special mission ships work for several different US Navy customers, including the Naval Sea Systems Command and the Oceanographer of the Navy. These ships like those of the NFAF are painted haze gray with blue and gold stack bands.

After a 2012 reorganization, this program now maintains all of its 24 contract-operated ships involved in missile range instrumentation, ocean surveillance, submarine and special warfare support, oceanographic survey, and navigation test support. Some of its ships were transferred to the new Service Support program.[14]

Special Mission ship types;[18]

Strategic Sealift Program N033

[edit]
Main article: Maritime prepositioning ship

Military Sealift Command's Prepositioning Program is an element in the US's triad of power projection into the 21st century—sea shield, sea strike and sea basing. As a key element of sea basing, afloat prepositioning provides the military equipment and supplies for a contingency forward deployed in key ocean areas before need. Part the prepositioning strategy is forward presence and power projection. Prepositioning extends the reach of operations, isolates conflicts away from the United States, allows for a swift response to conflict, and reduces time and resources delegated to transporting cargo.[19] The MSC Prepositioning Program supports the US Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and the Defense Logistics Agency. Prepositioning ships remain at sea, ready to deploy on short-notice the vital equipment, fuel and supplies to initially support military forces in the event of a contingency. The Prepositioning Program consists of 34 at-sea ships plus two aviation support ships kept in reduced operating status. These ships wear civilian livery, and are only designated "USNS" if government-owned; those chartered from civilian owners are either "SS" or "MV". Two Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships (T-AKE) are included in the program in a Reduced Operational Status (ROS).

Strategic Sealift Program ship types;[20]

Tow, Salvage, Tender, and Hospital Ship Program N034

[edit]
USNS Comfort (T-AH-20)

Formerly Service Support (PM4) it consists of fleet ocean tugs, rescue and salvage ships, submarines tenders, and hospitals ships formerly from the NFAF.[14] Command ships and cable layers were transferred to the N037 program.

Service Support ship types;[21]

Sealift Program N035

[edit]

The mission of the Sealift Program is to provide ocean transportation to the Department of Defense by meeting its sealift requirements in peace, contingency, and war with quality, efficient cost effective assets and centralized management. This is achieved through the use of commercial charter vessels, Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off ships, and the Maritime Administration's Ready Reserve Force, including the eight former MSC fast sealift ships. Sealift is divided into three separate project offices: Tanker Project Office, Dry Cargo Project Office and the Surge Project Office.

Sealift Program Ship Types;[22]
  • Dry Cargo Ships (T-AK)
  • Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships (T-AKR)
  • Tankers (T-AOT)

Combat Logistics Force Program N036

[edit]

Formerly the Fleet Ordnance and Dry Cargo (PM6), it is composed of twelve Dry Cargo/Ammunition ships and two Fast Combat Support ships. Dry Cargo and Ammunition ships, or T-AKEs, were designed to replenish dry and refrigerated stores as well as ordnance. They have replaced combat stores ships and ammunition ships incorporating the capabilities of both platforms into one hull. These multi-product ships increase the delivery capability to provide food, fuel, spare parts, ammunition and potable water to the U.S. Navy and allies' ships. Fast Combat Support Ships or T-AOEs provide parts, supplies and fuel at sea.

Combat Logistics Force Ship Types;[23]

Expeditionary Mobile Base, Amphibious Command Ship, and Cable Layer Program N037

[edit]

Formerly the Afloat Staging Command Support (PM7) program, it is composed of the Expeditionary Mobile Base ships (replacement for the Afloat Forward Staging Base), the Amphibious Command Ship Mount Whitney, and the cable layer Zeus.

Afloat Staging Command Support Program Ship Types;[24]

Expeditionary Fast Transport Program N038

[edit]
USNS Brunswick (T-EPF-6)

This consists of the class of ships formerly known as the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program but was changed to (EPF) in September 2015. The Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) program is a cooperative effort for a high-speed, shallow draft vessel intended for rapid intratheater transport of medium-sized cargo payloads. The EPF will reach speeds of 35–45 knots (65–83 km/h; 40–52 mph) and will allow for the rapid transit and deployment of conventional or special forces as well as equipment and supplies.

Expeditionary Fast Transport Program Ship Types;[24]

Area commands

[edit]

MSC headquarters is located at Naval Station Norfolk in Norfolk, VA.[25] As a result of a 2012 organization, MSC's 12 worldwide MSC ship support units (SSUs) will now report to the MSC operational area commands in their respective areas of responsibility. These are responsible for crewing, training, equipping and maintaining MSC's government-owned, government-operated ships.[14][26]

  • MSC Atlantic in Norfolk. In October 2013, the MSCLANT Task Force Designator changed from CTF-23 to CTF-83. Missions, functions and tasks remained unchanged.[27]
  • MSC Pacific in San Diego
  • MSC Europe & Africa in Naples
  • MSC Central in Bahrain
  • MSC Far East in Singapore

Formerly, these SSUs had reported to MSC's Military Sealift Fleet Support Command (MSFSC), a subordinate command of Military Sealift Command and is a single Type Commander (TYCOM) execution command having worldwide responsibility to crew, train, equip and maintain MSC government-owned, government-operated ships. MSFSC officially stood up on 13 November 2005. Stand up of the Ship Support Units (SSUs) followed establishment of MSFSC, their parent command. SSU San Diego stood up in conjunction with MSFSC. By late 2008, all subordinate SSUs were fully operational.

MSFSC was formed from the following MSC elements: Portions of Sealift Logistics Command Atlantic and the former Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force East; Portions of Sealift Logistics Command Pacific; Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force West (except those positions remaining in SSU San Diego); and The Afloat Personnel Management Center.

MSFSC was also responsible for providing support to other MSC assets as directed. MSFSC has ship support units, or SSUs, in Naples, Bahrain, Singapore, Guam, Yokohama and San Diego. The SSUs (except for Guam and Yokohama) are collocated with their respective numbered fleet operational logistics task force commanders and Sealift Logistics Commands, but are not within that chain of command. SSUs provide local TYCOM support to ships in their area of operations and report directly to MSFSC. MSFSC was disestablished following restructuring when Military Sealift Command relocated to Naval Station Norfolk from the Washington Navy Yard.

Sealift's capabilities are significantly hampered by biofouling.[28] Maintenance is sometimes performed to remove fouling, but sealift maintenance must follow the Uniform National Discharge Standards for the chemicals used in this process.[28]

History

[edit]

Military sea transportation prior to 1949

[edit]

As early as 1847, both the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy chartered American merchant ships separately. Following the Mexican–American War, Brigadier General Thomas S. Jesup, Quartermaster of the Army, recommended that the Navy be given responsibility for all water transportation requirements for the military. However, each service managed their own sea transportation throughout the nineteenth century and both World Wars.

In World War II, four government agencies conducted military sealift functions, the Naval Overseas Transportation Service (NOTS), the Army Transport Service, the U.S. Maritime Commission's War Shipping Administration, and the Fleet Support Services. To oversee these organizations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the Joint Military Transportation Command.

Military Sea Transportation Service

[edit]

On 15 December 1948, the Secretary of Defense James Forrestal issued a statement, "all military sea transport including Army transports would be placed under Navy command." Issues with funding held up the transfer of the functions to the Navy. The new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, issued a memorandum on 12 July 1949 that detailed service responsibilities and the funding of the new Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS).[29]

MSTS became the single managing agency for the Department of Defense's ocean transportation needs. The command assumed responsibility for providing sealift and ocean transportation for all military services as well as for other government agencies. The new command set up subcomponents, for example, Military Sea Transportation Service Pacific (ComMSTSPac).

Nine months after its creation, MSTS responded to the challenge of the Korean War. On 6 July 1950, eleven days after the initial invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops, MSTS deployed the 24th Infantry Division for duty in Japan to Pusan, South Korea. In addition to transporting troops and combat equipment to and from Korea, command ships supplied US bases and Distant Early Warning line construction sites and supported US nation building efforts from Europe and Africa, to the Far East.

The 1960s brought the conflict in Southeast Asia. From 1965 to 1969 MSTS moved almost 54 million tons of combat equipment and supplies and almost 8 million long tons of fuel to South Vietnam. The Vietnam War era also marked the last use of MSC troop ships for personnel movement. Currently, most US troops are prepositioned by air.

Military Sealift Command

[edit]

MSTS was renamed Military Sealift Command (MSC) in 1970. In 1971 Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt proposed the use of MSC ships for direct support of the fleet at sea. Heretofore, these civilian-crewed ships had only been used for point to point transport of cargo. To determine the feasibility of this concept, Admiral Zumwalt directed the formation of a special study group to recommend how the navy could better utilize the MSC fleet to save both manpower and money. The high cost of training personnel after the advent of the all-volunteer navy made it imperative that seagoing personnel be assigned to complex warships of the fleet whenever possible. The study concluded that significant savings could be achieved if civilian mariners could be substituted for uniformed navy sailors in fleet support ships.

In 1972 a joint U.S. Navy-Maritime Administration project called "Charger Log" was established to test whether or not a union-crewed merchant ship could provide some or all of the fleet support services normally provided by navy oilers. Extensive trials were conducted using the civilian crewed merchant tanker SS Erna Elizabeth equipped with both alongside and astern fueling gear to test the feasibility of augmenting (not replacing) the service force with ships of the U.S. Merchant Marine. The success of 'Charger Log' contributed to the formation of the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force.

The navy oiler USS Taluga (AO-62) was the first fleet-support ship to be placed under MSC control.[30] Decommissioned on 4 May 1972, she was transferred to the MSC and redesignated T-AO-62. After its transfer, the ship underwent a thorough overhaul that included refurbishment of equipment, gear, and refueling rigs, modification of crew quarters, and the removal of armaments. She entered service with a crew of 105 civilian mariners hired by the government augmented by a sixteen-member naval complement.

The shortage of multiproduct replenishment ships in the early 1970s led to the development of an improvised system for dispensing fuel from ammunition and stores ships that allowed them to transfer fuel to smaller combatants. Neither type of ship had cargo fuel, but each could share its own fuel with destroyers and frigates in an emergency. The lack of sufficient numbers of AOEs or AORs precluded the deployment of these types in support of any of the surface warfare groups, which were generally composed of destroyers and frigates. The old saying that necessity is the mother of invention proved to be true when Rear Admiral John Johnson devised a practical solution to the shortage of fuel-carrying UNREP ships based on the modification of existing cargo transfer gear on ammunition and stores ships. As commander Task Force 73 (the service force of the Seventh Fleet) in 1973, Admiral Johnson had to contend with the problem of how to provide logistic support for the two Seventh Fleet destroyers deployed to the Indian Ocean for an extended period of time. The answer was to turn the USS Kiska (AE-35) into a mini multiproduct ship by adding two cargo reefer boxes as deck cargo and outfitting it with a jury-rigged fuel station. The latter was achieved by temporarily rigging a 7-inch fuel hose to the starboard side cargo station—the one closest to the ship's fuel receiving raiser. The highline was used as a span wire, and fuel hose saddles were supported from a wire whip from a nearby hauling winch or a fiber whip from a nearby gypsy. Fuel was pumped from the ship's own fuel bunkers to the receiving ship alongside using the fuel-transfer pump normally carried aboard the AE. The pumping rate was considerably less than that of a fleet oiler and, while workable, contained many drawbacks.

By the time the USNS Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO-187) entered service on 19 December 1986, the Navy had transferred the five Second World War vintage tankers of the Mispillion class and the six 1950s-built Neosho-class fleet oilers to the Military Sealift Command.

Through the 1970s and 1980s MSC provided the Department of Defense with ocean transportation. During the first Persian Gulf War, consisting of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, MSC distinguished itself as the largest source of defense transportation of any nation involved. Command resources delivered more than 12 million tons (11 million metric tonnes) of wheeled and tracked vehicles, helicopters, ammunition, dry cargo, fuel and other supplies and equipment during the war. At the high point of the war, more than 230 government-owned and chartered ships delivered the largest part of the international arsenal that defeated Saddam Hussein in Iraq. MSC was also involved in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, delivering 61,000,000 square feet (5.7 km2) of cargo and 1,100,000,000 US gallons (4,200,000 m3) of fuel by the end of the first year.

In August 2017, the Government Accountability Office issued a report detailing readiness issues that limited at-sea mission capabilities, prompting an investigation from the Department of Defense's Inspector General.[31]

List of commanders

[edit]
No. Commander[32] Term
Portrait Name Took office Left office Term length
17
Michael P. Kalleres
Kalleres, Michael P.Vice Admiral
Michael P. Kalleres
(1939–2010)		August 1992August 1994~2 years, 0 days
18
Philip M. Quast
Quast, Philip M.Vice Admiral
Philip M. Quast
(1939–2019)		August 1994[33]February 1997~2 years, 184 days
19
James B. Perkins III
Perkins, James B. IIIVice Admiral
James B. Perkins III
(1942–2021)		February 1997[34]February 1999~2 years, 0 days
20
Gordon S. Holder
Holder, Gordon S.Vice Admiral
Gordon S. Holder
(born 1946)		February 1999[35]30 August 2001~2 years, 210 days
21
David L. Brewer III
Brewer, David L. IIIVice Admiral
David L. Brewer III
(born 1946)		30 August 2001[36]10 March 20064 years, 192 days
22
Robert D. Reilly Jr.
Reilly, Robert D. Jr.Rear Admiral
Robert D. Reilly Jr.
(born 1953)		10 March 2006[37]16 October 20093 years, 220 days
23
Mark H. Buzby
Buzby, Mark H.Rear Admiral
Mark H. Buzby
(born 1956)		16 October 2009[38]10 May 20133 years, 206 days
24
Thomas K. Shannon
Shannon, Thomas K.Rear Admiral
Thomas K. Shannon
(born 1960)		10 May 2013[39]25 August 20163 years, 107 days
25
Dee L. Mewbourne
Mewbourne, Dee L.Rear Admiral
Dee L. Mewbourne
(born 1961)		25 August 2016[40]28 June 20192 years, 307 days
26
Michael A. Wettlaufer
Wettlaufer, Michael A.Rear Admiral
Michael A. Wettlaufer
(born c. 1960)		28 June 2019[41]8 September 20234 years, 72 days
27
Philip E. Sobeck
Sobeck, Philip E.Rear Admiral (lower half)
Philip E. Sobeck		8 September 2023Incumbent2 years, 42 days

Notable ships

[edit]
Further information: List of Military Sealift Command ships

History Military Sealift Command operated former ships of the U.S. Navy, which upon decommissioning changes prefixes from United States Ship (USS) to United States Naval Ship (USNS). In rare instances, ships were transferred from MSC to the U.S. Navy, being commissioned and receiving the USS-prefix.

  • USNS Point Barrow (T-AKD-1) was launched in 1957 and delivered to the Military Sea Transportation Service as a Cargo Ship Dock. She was later extensively modified and in 1974 reclassified a "Deep Submergence Support Ship" and renamed USS Point Loma (AGDS-2).
  • USNS Lewis B. Puller (T-ESB 3) is the first purpose-built Expeditionary Mobile Base (previously Mobile Landing Platform, then Afloat Forward Staging Base) vessel for the United States Navy. She was delivered to Military Sealift Command in 2015, then later commissioned on 17 August 2017 in Bahrain, with her prefix changing from USNS to USS and her hull designation changing from T-ESB-3 to ESB-3.[10] She is the first overseas commissioning of a U.S. Navy warship.
  • USS Coronado (AGF-11) was an Austin-class amphibious transport dock (LPD) commissioned in 1970 fitted with an additional superstructure level for command ship duties. In 2003 she was decommissioned, re-designated as USNS Coronado (T-AGF-11) with the intention of being operated by a civilian MSC crew. It was concluded shortly thereafter that the operations the ship engaged in required her to be a USS warship and thus she was transferred back to the Navy and recommissioned. She was finally decommissioned for the last time in 2006 and was later used for a SINKEX in 2012.
  • USS Ponce (AFSB(I)-15) was an Austin-class amphibious transport dock (LPD) commissioned in 1971, and was planned for decommissioning in 2012, but was converted at short notice into the Afloat Forward Staging Base and operated by Military Sealift Command. She was relieved by the USNS Lewis B. Puller (T-ESB-3) in 2017, after which she was finally retired after 46 years of service.
  • USS Card (CVE-11) was a Bogue-class escort aircraft carrier laid down in 1941 as a C-3 cargo ship, then acquired from the Maritime Commission while under construction and converted into an escort carrier, and decommissioned after World War 2. In 1958 she was placed into service with Military Sea Transportation Service as a civilian aircraft transport and later sunk pierside after being attacked by the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War, killing five civilian crew members.
  • USS Taluga (AO-62) was a Cimarron-class fleet oiler acquired by the U.S. Navy during World War II. In 1972 she was decommissioned and turned over to the Military Sealift Command for civilian operation as USNS Taluga (T-AO-62) in a then-experimental use of the Military Sea Transportation Service's ability.
  • USNS LCPL Roy M. Wheat (T-AK-3016) was originally launched in 1987 by the Black Sea Shipyard in Mykolaiv, Ukrainian SSSR as the GTS Vladimir Vaslyayev, she was acquired in 1997 by the US Navy and began conversion in 2001 for transfer to the Military Sealift Command, in 2003 this conversion was completed and she was renamed in honor of US Marine and Medal of Honor recipient Roy M. Wheat.[42] The conversion process included a 118 ft midbody hull extension, the installation of two cargo cranes, installation of fore and aft garages, strengthening and increasing the length of the stern ramp, a stern helicopter deck, conversion of the electrical system from 50  Hz to 60  Hz, the replacement of the ship's generator and electrical switching gear replacement, new Vosper-Thornycroft machinery control systems, new and larger accommodations, and climate control systems for the cargo holds.[43] LCPL Roy M. Wheat left service and was struck December 30, 2021[44]

See also

[edit]

Comparable organizations

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Military Sealift Command

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from Grokipedia
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is a major operational command of the United States Navy, established on October 1, 1970, as the successor to the Military Sea Transportation Service, tasked with providing ocean transportation and logistics support to the Department of Defense and other U.S. government agencies. MSC operates a diverse fleet of over 140 non-commissioned vessels, including fleet replenishment oilers, dry cargo and ammunition ships, expeditionary fast transports, and special mission platforms such as hospital ships and surveillance vessels, primarily crewed by approximately 9,000 U.S. civilian mariners supplemented by a small cadre of active-duty Navy personnel. Its mission encompasses strategic sealift for deploying and sustaining combat forces, underway replenishment at sea, and specialized operations like missile range instrumentation and cable laying, enabling global power projection across the full spectrum of military activities. MSC's fleet supports joint and combined operations by transporting equipment, fuel, supplies, and personnel, playing a pivotal role in major contingencies such as the Persian Gulf War and ongoing sustainment missions, while maintaining prepositioned stocks in strategic locations worldwide. Headquartered in , under the oversight of U.S. Fleet Forces Command and reporting to U.S. Transportation Command for responsibilities, MSC manages a $5 billion annual operation that sustains naval and expeditionary forces without the vessels entering foreign ports under combat conditions. Despite its critical function, MSC has faced persistent challenges, including mariner shortages and aging infrastructure, which have raised concerns about the adequacy of U.S. strategic capacity for high-intensity conflicts, as highlighted by U.S. Transportation Command leadership.

Mission and Strategic Role

Core Functions and Responsibilities

The (MSC) executes core functions centered on delivering strategic , agile , and specialized missions to sustain U.S. joint warfighters worldwide under all conditions, operating 24/7/365. These responsibilities encompass providing ocean transportation and for all U.S. services and agencies, including the movement of equipment, combat forces, and prepositioned combat cargo to enable rapid global . MSC's logistics functions focus on combat sustainment, such as of fuel, , and provisions to naval combatants, alongside service and command support for fleet operations. The command manages a fleet of approximately 125 ships daily to assure these services during peacetime and wartime, strategically positioning and fostering partnerships with entities like U.S. Transportation Command and fleets. Specialized missions include ocean surveillance, towing, salvage, submarine support, cable laying and repair, missile range operations, and deployment of hospital ships for humanitarian relief and medical support. Overall, MSC operates over 140 vessels to deliver these maritime capabilities, supporting objectives with an annual scope exceeding $5 billion.

Contribution to U.S. Military Power Projection

The (MSC) contributes to U.S. military power projection by providing essential strategic and sustainment capabilities that enable the rapid deployment and long-term support of joint forces across global theaters. MSC operates a fleet of approximately 140 ships crewed by over 6,100 mariners, delivering , , supplies, and to sustain U.S. forces worldwide under all conditions. This function is critical for , as sea transport remains the most efficient means for moving large volumes of and bulk in major contingencies, far exceeding capacities. MSC's prepositioning program enhances rapid response by maintaining afloat stocks of , Marine Corps, , , and on forward-deployed ships, allowing forces to draw pre-staged equipment upon arrival in theater without relying solely on vulnerable surge . These prepositioned vessels, including large roll-on/roll-off cargo ships, store and transport warfighting essentials, directly supporting the initial phases of by reducing deployment timelines from weeks to days. In exercises such as Valiant Shield, MSC ships demonstrate for regional , honing skills in contested environments. Combat ships operated by MSC, including fleet oilers and dry cargo/ vessels, sustain naval strike groups through replenishment at sea, ensuring continuous operations without port dependency. For instance, during RIMPAC 2024, MSC vessels provided to multinational forces, validating in large-scale exercises. Historically, in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, MSC ships delivered 3.4 million tons of cargo and 6.8 million tons of fuel, underscoring 's role in enabling decisive force projection over vast distances. This capability remains foundational, as disruptions to would severely limit U.S. ability to project and sustain combat power against peer adversaries.

Civilian vs. Military Crewing Model

The (MSC) predominantly employs a civilian crewing model for its fleet of approximately 125 ships, utilizing Mariners (CIVMARs) who operate under federal regulations rather than military uniforms or discipline. These civilian mariners, numbering around 5,600 to fill about 4,500 billets, handle core maritime functions such as , , deck operations, and supply , adhering to commercial crewing standards that emphasize and minimal levels. In contrast, U.S. combatant ships are crewed entirely by active-duty trained for wartime combat roles, including weapons handling and tactical operations, which demands larger crews and military-specific protocols. This civilian model enables MSC to leverage a pool of experienced merchant mariners for sustained logistics and prepositioning missions without diverting naval personnel from warfighting duties. Certain MSC vessels incorporate hybrid crewing, combining operators with small detachments—typically 5-20 Navy personnel—for specialized tasks like communications, , or command oversight, as seen on command ships such as the USNS . This approach maintains efficiency for routine operations while embedding expertise for integration with naval forces. Advantages of the model include significant cost savings—estimated at 40-50% lower than fully crewing due to commercial wage structures and reduced overhead—and access to a flexible capable of extended deployments without the personnel constraints of the all-volunteer force. However, it introduces challenges such as higher attrition rates among CIVMARs, driven by demanding sea-to-shore rotations (often following a 1:2 or 1:1.22 model where balances sea time), leading MSC to sideline 17 vessels in 2024 to alleviate mariner shortages. Critics of the civilian model argue it may limit operational agility in high-threat environments, as CIVMARs lack the combat training and chain-of-command responsiveness of military sailors, potentially requiring augmentation or transfer of ships to control during conflicts. Nonetheless, empirical performance data from operations like Shield/Storm demonstrates the model's effectiveness for non-combatant , where civilian-crewed ships delivered over 12 million tons of cargo with reliability exceeding that of some military alternatives. Proponents emphasize that this structure aligns with first-principles economics, prioritizing scalable sustainment over redundant militarization, though ongoing retention issues underscore the need for enhanced incentives like improved and training reimbursements to sustain the workforce.

Organizational Structure

Headquarters and Governance

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) maintains its headquarters at in , with primary facilities at 471 East C Street, Buildings SP-47 and SP-48. This location centralizes command, control, and administrative functions for MSC's global operations, supporting coordination with U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) and other entities. In October 2014, MSC received approval to consolidate its geographically dispersed headquarters elements at , enhancing efficiency in oversight of its fleet and shore-based personnel. MSC operates as a major subordinate command under USFFC, with its Commander, Military Sealift Command (COMSC)—a billet—exercising authority over missions, ship operations, and support for the Department of Defense. The COMSC reports through multiple specialized chains of command to address distinct operational and administrative requirements: to U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) for defense appropriation and strategic matters; to USFFC for Navy-specific operational direction; to Strategic Systems Programs for special mission vessel support; and to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for , Development, and Acquisition for procurement and sustainment activities. This structure ensures alignment with joint force needs while leveraging civilian expertise in ship management, as MSC employs over 1,600 government civilians and contracts with commercial operators alongside its military staff of approximately 280 personnel. Current leadership includes Acting Commander Rear Adm. Kimberly Walz, who oversees strategic direction and force employment; Executive Director Jeffrey D. Hood, managing civilian workforce and business operations; Capt. Thomas E. Cunningham III, handling internal coordination; and Force Master Chief Steven W. Bosco, advising on enlisted matters. Rear Adm. Philip E. Sobeck assumed command on September 8, 2023, succeeding Rear Adm. Michael A. Wettlaufer, prior to the acting arrangement. Governance emphasizes a hybrid model blending command with civilian crewing to optimize cost-effectiveness and operational flexibility, as evidenced by MSC's role as the primary provider of ocean transportation for combatants and prepositioned .

Program Oversight and Subdivisions

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) maintains program oversight through a multifaceted reporting structure that integrates operational, logistical, and acquisition responsibilities across U.S. military commands. Headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, MSC reports concurrently to four primary entities: the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) for global sealift and prepositioning missions; Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) for Atlantic-based fleet support; Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT) for Pacific operations; and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) for shipbuilding, modernization, and sustainment programs. This dual-chain framework ensures alignment with joint force requirements while enabling specialized naval sustainment, with tactical control delegated to five geographic area commands: MSC Atlantic (Norfolk), MSC Pacific (San Diego), MSC Europe and Africa (Naples, Italy), MSC Central (Bahrain), and MSC Far East (Singapore). MSC subdivides its operations into functional directorates and mission-specific programs managed by dedicated Program Managers (PMs), facilitating efficient resource allocation and mission execution. Key directorates include N1 (Total Force Management) for personnel oversight; N3 () for vessel operations and maintenance; N4 () for supply chain coordination; N7 () for technical development; and N04 (Maritime Operations) for fleet deployment and training. Program subdivisions encompass PM1 (Fleet Oiler Force) for combat logistics; PM2 (Special Mission) for oceanographic and cable ships; PM3 (Prepositioning and Seabasing) for forward-deployed stocks; PM4 (Service Support) for fleet auxiliary vessels; PM6 (Fleet Ordnance and Dry Cargo) for ammunition and replenishment; and PM8 (Expeditionary Fast Transport) for high-speed intra-theater lift. These units, supported by six global maintenance hubs in locations including , , and , total approximately 9,714 personnel, comprising civil service mariners, contractors, and military staff as of 2025. Oversight mechanisms emphasize in contracting, inventory management, and readiness, with periodic audits addressing issues such as excess spare parts and subcontractor to mitigate risks in civilian-crewed operations. Program managers coordinate with area commands to execute tactical missions, ensuring seamless integration of capabilities into broader U.S. and operations.

Fleet Oiler and Combat Logistics Programs

The Fleet Oiler program, designated as Program Manager 1 (PM1) within the Military Sealift Command, oversees the operation of fleet s (T-AO) that deliver , , and limited dry stores to U.S. combatants during operations. These ships enable extended at-sea operations for carrier strike groups and surface action groups by transferring up to 120,000 barrels of per mission via connected or astern refueling methods. As of August 2025, MSC operates 15 such oilers, primarily from the . Kaiser-class, which entered service starting in and features a length of 677.5 feet, beam of 97.5 feet, and capacity for 180,000 barrels of cargo. The program is undergoing recapitalization with the John Lewis-class (T-AO 205), designed to replace aging Kaiser-class vessels with 20 new ships capable of carrying 162,000 barrels of fuel and enhanced dry cargo handling. The lead ship, (T-AO 205), completed its first fleet-tasked in March 2025 and deployed with the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group later that year, demonstrating improved speed, stability, and defensive systems over predecessors. Subsequent deliveries, including (T-AO 210) in 2025, continue this transition to sustain logistics in high-threat environments. Complementing the Fleet Oiler program, MSC's Combat Logistics programs manage the broader Combat Logistics Force (CLF), which integrates oilers with dry cargo/ ships (T-AKE) from the Lewis and Clark-class and legacy fast combat support ships (T-AOE) to furnish , food, parts, and other . The CLF comprises approximately three dozen ships across these classes, crewed by civilian mariners under military oversight, forming the primary for naval forces to maintain combat endurance without reliance on foreign ports. PM6 specifically handles fleet ordnance and dry cargo elements, ensuring synchronized delivery during operations like RIMPAC 2024, where CLF ships supported multinational replenishments. These programs emphasize surge capacity and resilience, with CLF ships equipped for connected replenishment at speeds up to 20 knots and via for distant transfers. Challenges include mariner shortages prompting the sidelining of non-essential vessels in late 2024 to preserve crewing for core CLF assets, underscoring the force's operational tempo demands. Overall, the integration of Fleet Oiler and Combat Logistics capabilities under MSC sustains U.S. naval by delivering decisive in contested seas.

Special Mission and Strategic Sealift Programs

The Special Mission Program (PM2) manages approximately 20 ships that serve as operating platforms for unique U.S. military and government missions, including oceanographic surveys, missile tracking, salvage operations, and expeditionary medical support. These vessels enable specialized tasks such as hydrographic mapping, acoustic surveillance for submarine detection, and instrumentation for missile range testing, often in support of the U.S. Navy's research, development, test, and evaluation efforts. Key ship classes include the Stalwart-class ocean surveillance ships (T-AGOS), designed for towing surveillance arrays to monitor underwater threats; Pathfinder-class survey ships (T-AGS), equipped with multibeam echo sounders and side-scan sonar for seabed mapping; and Safeguard-class salvage and diving ships (T-ARS), capable of towing damaged vessels up to 19,000 tons and providing underwater repair services. Hospital ships under this program, such as (T-AH 19) and (T-AH 20), each feature 12 operating rooms, 1,000 beds, and capacity for 1,200 personnel, enabling humanitarian assistance and disaster relief while maintaining surge medical support for combat operations. Missile range instrumentation ships like USNS Howard O. Lorenzen (T-AGM 25) support telemetry tracking and optical observation for tests, ensuring precise data collection over vast ocean ranges. These ships are crewed by a mix of mariners and specialists, allowing flexibility for operations in contested environments. The Strategic Sealift Program provides essential capabilities for the rapid, large-scale movement of U.S. forces, , and sustainment supplies during contingencies, integrating active-duty ships with the Force to achieve surge deployment rates exceeding 1.5 million square feet of deck space activation within 30 days. This program operates (RO/RO) vessels and other transport ships optimized for , such as the Watson-class large, medium-speed RO/RO ships (T-AKR), which can carry up to 300,000 square feet of vehicle storage and self-sustain for 30 days at sea. These assets support joint force by transporting tanks, helicopters, and wheeled vehicles across global theaters, with historical deployments enabling the delivery of over 90 percent of in major operations like Desert Shield. The program's readiness is maintained through prepositioning integration and voluntary intermodal sealift agreements, ensuring scalability from peacetime logistics to full-spectrum conflict response.

Expeditionary and Support Programs

The Expeditionary Fast Transport (T-EPF) program, designated PM8, operates a class of high-speed, shallow-draft vessels designed for intra-theater deployment of personnel, equipment, and supplies to support U.S. military operations in contested or austere environments. These ships, measuring 338 feet in length and 93.5 feet in beam with a displacement of approximately 2,400 tons, achieve speeds exceeding 35 knots and feature a for via helicopters, enabling rapid transit over 1,200 nautical miles while carrying up to 600 short tons of cargo. As of 2024, the fleet includes 13 active T-EPFs, such as (T-EPF-6), crewed primarily by civilian mariners under Military Sealift Command oversight to augment naval amphibious capabilities without requiring dedicated military hulls. The Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) program, evolved from the Mobile Landing Platform initiative and managed under PM7, provides versatile afloat forward staging bases for rotary-wing aviation, special operations forces, and mine countermeasures in support of expeditionary warfare. These converted transport vessels, with a length of 784 feet and capacity for over 150 personnel plus mission modules, facilitate at-sea transfer of equipment to smaller craft and serve secondary roles in counter-piracy, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance. The class comprises four ships, including USNS Lewis B. Puller (ESB-3), operated by mixed civilian-military crews to extend operational reach in distributed maritime operations as of 2025. Support programs encompass auxiliary capabilities critical to fleet sustainment, including the hospital ship (T-AH) subclass under PM4, which maintains two floating medical facilities—USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) and (T-AH-20)—each equipped with over 1,000 beds, 12 operating rooms, and capacity for mass casualty response equivalent to a major . These 894-foot vessels, activated for surge support during conflicts or disasters, rely on mariner crews for navigation and engineering while integrating naval medical staff for treatment delivery, as demonstrated in deployments supporting combat operations and humanitarian missions. Additionally, the tow, salvage, and tender elements of PM4 provide ocean-going recovery and repair services, though fleet reductions in idled select vessels to address mariner shortages amid high operational tempos.

Fleet Composition and Capabilities

Ship Types and Inventory

The Military Sealift Command operates approximately 125 ships, consisting of government-owned, long-term chartered, and short-term chartered vessels crewed by civilian mariners under direction. These assets are grouped into programs supporting , prepositioning, special missions, and surge , with nearly 100 government-owned ships contributing to naval and . Replenishment ships enable sustained naval operations through underway delivery of fuel and supplies. The Fleet Oiler program (PM1) includes 15 T-AO class vessels, such as the 14 remaining Henry J. Kaiser-class oilers and emerging John Lewis-class replacements, each capable of carrying over 156,000 barrels of fuel for transfer to warships and auxiliaries. Complementing these, 14 Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo and ammunition ships (T-AKE) deliver ordnance, provisions, and spare parts, with capacities for 6,000 tons of dry cargo and multi-product replenishment stations. Prepositioning vessels store warfighting equipment and sustainment stocks at sea or forward locations to facilitate rapid force assembly. The Maritime Prepositioning Force program maintains ships tailored for Marine Corps, , and other prepositioned stocks, including roll-on/roll-off ships (T-AKR) and vessels that support initial sustainment for brigade-sized units without reliance on vulnerable shore infrastructure. Special mission ships execute roles such as , surveying, and humanitarian support. This category encompasses ocean surveillance ships (T-AGOS) for acoustic tracking, cable repair vessels (T-ARC), hydrographic surveyors, two ships (T-AH)—USNS and USNS —each with over 1,000 beds and surgical suites, and expeditionary platforms including 13 Expeditionary Fast Transports (T-EPF) for intra-theater lift and Expeditionary Sea Bases (T-ESB) for repair and staging. Strategic sealift provides contingency transport for heavy equipment, drawing on a mix of surge-capable roll-on/roll-off ships, breakbulk carriers, and tankers, many activated from the Ready Reserve Force to move armored vehicles, helicopters, and supplies across oceans during major operations.

Technological and Operational Features

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet employs diverse propulsion technologies optimized for logistics efficiency and endurance, with diesel-electric systems in the Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo and ammunition ships (T-AKE) providing integrated power generation for propulsion, auxiliary systems, and cargo handling, enabling operation for extended periods without combat hardening. These ships achieve speeds of 20 knots and ranges exceeding 14,000 nautical miles, supporting at-sea delivery of ammunition, dry goods, refrigerated cargo, and limited fuels via modular holds and automated cargo management. In contrast, the John Lewis-class fleet replenishment oilers (T-AO 205) utilize twin-shaft geared medium-speed diesel engines paired with power take-off/take-in generators, delivering up to 30,000 tons of fuel for underway replenishment while maintaining compatibility with legacy systems. Underway replenishment (UNREP) remains a core operational feature, with combat force ships equipped for connected replenishment (CONREP) using tensioned receiving stations, spanwires, and high-capacity hoses to transfer fuel, ordnance, and supplies at relative speeds of 10-15 knots, as demonstrated by the (T-AO 205) in its first fleet-tasked evolution on March 19, 2025. (VERTREP) support integrates landing decks and hangar spaces on classes like T-AKE and T-AO, allowing rotary-wing to deliver palletized in tandem with surface transfers, enhancing flexibility in dynamic environments. Expeditionary platforms, such as the Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPF), incorporate aluminum hulls with waterjet for speeds over 43 knots and drafts under 14 feet, enabling rapid personnel and light shuttling in littoral zones without reliance on ports. Special mission ships feature advanced sensor suites, including multibeam swath bathymetry and acoustic profilers for oceanographic surveys, operated by civilian crews under military oversight to map seabeds and support submarine cable laying. Automation across the fleet reduces crewing needs—Lewis and Clark-class vessels require fewer than 200 personnel—through centralized bridge controls, predictive maintenance systems, and electric drive efficiencies, though older platforms like Henry J. Kaiser-class oilers face limitations from aging diesel plants prone to breakdowns. Emerging adaptations include hybrid unmanned integrations for surveillance and logistics in contested areas, alongside enhanced satellite communications for real-time coordination with naval forces. These features prioritize commercial-off-the-shelf reliability over militarized survivability, reflecting MSC's role in sustaining power projection through volume and availability rather than direct combat engagement.

Prepositioning and Surge Capacity

The Military Sealift Command's prepositioning program strategically positions military equipment, supplies, and sustainment materiel aboard ships in key oceanic regions to enable rapid deployment for U.S. forces, supporting the , , , Marine Corps, and . These assets form the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), which facilitates the quick assembly of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in austere environments by combining prepositioned with arriving troops via inter-theater and maritime connectors. Initiated in the early 1980s, the program originally assembled equipment and 30 days of supplies for Marine Corps units on chartered vessels, evolving to include diverse types such as vehicles, , and products. MSC operates 14 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) as of October 2021, classified under T-AK, T-AKR, and T-AOT designations, capable of discharging containerized, liquid, or motorized cargo either pier-side or offshore using organic lighterage systems like floating causeways. These ships sustain a MAGTF for up to 30 days without resupply, with examples including Expeditionary Transfer Docks (ESDs) and Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) integrated into the MPF for enhanced seabasing, allowing transfers between vessels at sea. The program positions squadrons in locations such as and the to reduce response times, though aging hulls—many over 50 years old—have prompted recapitalization efforts, including contracts for modern J-Class open-hull vessels to replace legacy MPS and Auxiliary Crane Ships (ACS). Surge capacity within MSC encompasses the rapid activation and deployment of sealift assets to meet contingency demands, providing approximately 90 percent of the cargo space required for operational plans through a fleet that includes Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships under the Sealift Program (PM5). Each LMSR offers over 300,000 square feet of cargo capacity optimized for wheeled and tracked vehicles, with 19 such ships added via the Strategic Sealift Acquisition Program contributing five million square feet total, two million dedicated to prepositioning. The broader surge fleet, comprising about 50 ships maintained at a cost of $742.5 million from fiscal years 2016 to 2018, integrates with the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) to deliver nearly 50 percent of government-owned surge capability, though vessels average 46 years of age, risking capacity shortfalls. Readiness assessments highlight vulnerabilities, with only 40 percent of the organic fleet fully mission-capable during a 2019 stress test, and projections indicating a 25 percent loss in surge cargo capacity by 2027 due to retirements without full replacements. Inaccurate readiness reporting has undermined planning confidence, as a single ship's unavailability can disrupt operational timelines, prompting ongoing DoD efforts to mitigate risks through and acquisition. These capabilities underscore MSC's role in bridging peacetime positioning with wartime surge, though empirical data on aging and readiness gaps indicate structural challenges in sustaining full-spectrum demands.

Operational Areas and Deployments

Geographic Commands and Coverage

The Military Sealift Command achieves global coverage through five geographic area commands that exercise tactical control over assigned U.S. Transportation Command and MSC forces, while providing operational expertise to numbered fleet commanders and geographic combatant commanders. These commands execute strategic , coordination, and specialized missions tailored to regional theaters, ensuring sustainment for forces across competition, crisis, and conflict scenarios. MSC Atlantic, headquartered in , supports operations in the , aligning with the Second Fleet (North Atlantic) and Fourth Fleet (South and /Caribbean), and contributes to U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command requirements. MSC Pacific, based in San Diego, California, oversees Eastern Pacific and Central Pacific activities, supporting the Third Fleet and integrating with U.S. Command for broad-area . MSC Central, located in , , manages and Arabian Gulf operations under the Fifth Fleet, delivering direct sustainment to U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility amid high-threat environments. MSC Europe and Africa, headquartered in , , coordinates Mediterranean, European, and African theater support for the Sixth Fleet, enabling U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command objectives through prepositioned assets and rapid response capabilities. MSC Far East, operating from , focuses on the western Pacific and , enhancing maritime prepositioning squadrons and logistics for contingencies. These area commands collectively enable MSC's fleet to operate in ports across every continent, including , with maintenance hubs in , , , , , and ensuring vessel readiness and regional persistence. By aligning with the Navy's six numbered fleets and the six geographic combatant commands, MSC provides "no-fail" and service support, prepositioning combat cargo and conducting to sustain over 140 ships globally.

Key Historical and Recent Operations

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) has supported major U.S. military operations since the , providing critical capabilities. In July 1950, MSC ships transported the U.S. Army's 24th Division and its from to Pusan, , just 11 days after the North Korean invasion. During the from 1965 to 1973, MSC delivered over 40,000 troops and handled 99 percent of ammunition and fuel, as well as 95 percent of other supplies, vehicles, and materials, operating up to 527 ships at peak and transporting approximately 54 million tons of combat and supplies between 1965 and 1969, including 8 million tons of fuel. In 1975, MSC facilitated evacuations including , where ships embarked over 50,000 evacuees from Saigon. In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (1990-1991), MSC managed over 230 government-owned and chartered ships at peak, transporting more than 12 million tons of vehicles, helicopters, ammunition, cargo, and fuel to support coalition forces in the . For Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (2001-2013), MSC moved 126.2 million square feet of equipment and supplies and delivered 25.7 billion gallons of fuel, with ships like conducting extended deployments for replenishment and . Recent operations include humanitarian support during the COVID-19 pandemic, where USNS Comfort arrived in New York Harbor on March 30, 2020, to serve as a referral hospital for non-COVID-19 patients, freeing local facilities to focus on the virus. In the Red Sea from 2023 to 2024, amid Houthi threats, MSC ships such as USNS Supply (October 2023-May 2024) and USNS Arctic provided replenishment under Operation Prosperity Guardian, earning commendations for sustaining carrier strike groups despite risks. In early 2025, MSC chartered vessels like MV Ocean Gladiator and MV Ocean Giant supported Operation Deep Freeze by resupplying U.S. Antarctic stations with cargo offloads completed by March.

Historical Evolution

Pre-1949 Sealift Foundations

The foundations of U.S. military sealift prior to 1949 relied heavily on arrangements and separate service-specific organizations, evolving from reliance on commercial merchant vessels supplemented by limited government-owned ships. During the , both the and competed for scarce shipping resources, as seen in 1847 when Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup advocated for centralized control over military water transport to resolve inter-service rivalries for merchant tonnage. In practice, operations during conflicts like the Civil War involved chartering civilian ships for troop and supply movements, with the Union Army managing its own transports under the Department, establishing a precedent for service autonomy in sealift. The Spanish-American War of 1898 marked a pivotal development, prompting the formal organization of the Army Transport Service (ATS) as an integral branch of the Army Quartermaster Department to handle sea-going logistics independently of the . The ATS managed a mix of purchased, chartered, and requisitioned vessels to deploy over 100,000 troops to and the , highlighting the need for dedicated military oversight amid commercial shipping shortages. Subsequent operations, such as the Philippine Insurrection and the of 1900, expanded ATS capabilities with time-chartered steamers and colliers, laying groundwork for wartime surge capacity. By , the ATS fleet grew to more than 50 ships supporting the , though disciplinary challenges among civilian crews led to a temporary transfer of control to the Navy's Naval Overseas Transportation Service in before Army resumption in 1919. On the Navy side, sealift evolved through auxiliary forces and dedicated transport units, with the establishment of the Naval Transportation Service (NTS) on July 3, 1920, by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Robert E. Coontz to consolidate post-World War I assets from the disbanded Cruiser and Transport Force and Naval Overseas Transportation Service. The NTS focused on amphibious and logistics support using attack transports and cargo vessels, maintaining a smaller peacetime fleet that expanded during crises. World War II amplified these parallel structures: the ATS, absorbed into the Army Transportation Corps' Water Division in 1942, peaked with 35 troop transports, 16 large cargo ships, and extensive auxiliary craft, employing about 15,000 civilian seamen and suffering 529 fatalities from enemy action. Concurrently, the NTS handled naval logistics, while broader merchant shipping fell under the War Shipping Administration, resulting in fragmented operations across four entities that strained resource allocation despite Joint Military Transportation Command oversight from 1946. This duality underscored persistent inefficiencies, with inter-service competition for tonnage persisting from the 1840s onward.

Military Sea Transportation Service Era

The Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) was established on October 1, 1949, as a unified agency under the U.S. to consolidate ocean transportation responsibilities previously divided among the 's Fleet Support Service, the Transportation Service, the Air Force's Service, and the War Shipping Administration's residual activities from . This merger aimed to streamline for the Department of Defense by centralizing control over approximately 200 ships initially, including troop transports, cargo vessels, and tankers, many of which were surplus from wartime fleets. Headquartered initially in , New York, MSTS operated under the and reported to the Military Sea Transportation Office, focusing on both peacetime sustainment and rapid surge capabilities for military deployments. During the (1950–1953), MSTS played a pivotal role in operations, transporting over 5 million troops and vast quantities of across the Pacific to support U.N. forces. By mid-1950, following North Korea's invasion of on June 25, MSTS activated its fleet to move the U.S. Eighth Army and X Corps, including critical heavy equipment that could not be airlifted, with ships like the USNS General W.H. Gordon redesignated for MSTS use to ferry divisions such as the 2nd Infantry Division. Operations involved chartering commercial vessels under the Defense Production Act, expanding the fleet to over 300 ships by 1952, and coordinating with Pacific ports for offloading, which sustained combat operations despite logistical strains from limited ready tonnage and enemy threats to sea lanes. In the Vietnam War era, MSTS escalated support starting with deliveries to French forces in 1951, but peaking from 1965 onward with the transport of 54 million tons of combat equipment and supplies, plus 8 million tons of fuel, to U.S. and allied troops in between 1965 and 1969. Key efforts included sustaining operations like the buildup of Marine Corps bases in and Army divisions in the , using breakbulk and containerized shipping to handle diverse cargoes from ammunition to vehicles, often under hazardous conditions with ships vulnerable to mines and attacks. MSTS also managed troop rotations, moving over 3.8 million personnel via sea, which complemented but proved more cost-effective for bulk , though challenges arose from port congestion and the need for specialized vessels like roll-on/roll-off ships introduced in the mid-1960s. Beyond major conflicts, MSTS handled routine Cold War tasks such as prepositioning supplies in and the Pacific, supporting exercises like NATO's REFORGER, and providing shipments, while gradually incorporating civilian mariners under union contracts to crew its mostly government-owned but commercially operated fleet. By 1970, operational demands exposed limitations in integrating specialized sealift with emerging naval requirements, leading to MSTS's redesignation as the Military Sealift Command on October 1, 1970, to emphasize combat support roles.

Establishment and Vietnam War Period

The Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS), established on October 1, 1949, to consolidate Department of Defense ocean transportation under a unified naval command, underwent a significant reorganization during the Vietnam War, culminating in its redesignation as the Military Sealift Command (MSC) on October 1, 1970. This transition reflected evolving doctrinal needs for dedicated sealift capabilities amid sustained combat logistics demands, shifting emphasis from broad transportation services—including passenger liners—to specialized cargo and replenishment fleets operated primarily by civilian mariners under naval oversight. The renaming aligned with broader U.S. military adaptations to prolonged overseas commitments, where sea-based sustainment proved indispensable for projecting power without reliance on allied ports or vulnerable land routes. Throughout the (1965–1973 for major U.S. involvement), MSTS/MSC vessels formed the backbone of American logistics, delivering 99 percent of all supplies and equipment to from U.S. ports over distances exceeding 10,000 miles. Between 1965 and 1969 alone, the command transported approximately 54 million tons of combat equipment and general , alongside nearly 8 million tons of products, sustaining troop levels that peaked at over 500,000 personnel. In 1965, MSTS ships carried 82,800 troops across the Pacific, complementing airlifts of 85,100, though sea transport declined thereafter as faster aerial methods assumed primacy for personnel movement. This era marked the final operational use of dedicated troopships, with MSC's fleet—including breakbulk freighters, tankers, and roll-on/roll-off vessels—expanding to over 150 ships by war's end to handle diverse cargoes from ammunition to vehicles under hazardous conditions, including occasional enemy attacks on anchored vessels. The command's performance underscored the causal primacy of reliable in enabling ground operations, as delays in resupply could directly impair in a theater lacking robust . Post-renaming, MSC integrated lessons from —such as the need for prepositioned stocks and rapid surge capacity—laying groundwork for future prepositioning programs, though the war exposed vulnerabilities like dependence on crews in zones, prompting enhanced naval coordination without altering the hybrid crewing model. By 1973, as U.S. forces withdrew, MSC had facilitated the retrograde of equipment, transporting millions more tons back to the , affirming its role as a enabler of strategic mobility.

Post-Cold War Reforms and Challenges

Following the in , the Military Sealift Command (MSC) encountered significant challenges stemming from post-Cold War defense budget reductions and strategic drawdowns, which diminished overseas force levels and pressured resources amid expectations of reduced global threats. These cuts exacerbated vulnerabilities in the U.S. merchant marine , including a shrinking fleet of government-owned and commercially available vessels, as maritime trade growth outpaced domestic capabilities. By the early , the declining pool of qualified mariners—estimated at fewer than 10,000 active U.S.-flagged seafarers capable of support—threatened rapid , with critics noting insufficient training for wartime loading and operations. Activation of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), comprising over 140 ships by 1991, revealed operational hurdles during contingencies, including delays in crewing, maintenance backlogs at repair facilities, and coordination issues among operators, despite successful deployments in Operation Desert Storm where MSC managed 253 ships to deliver surge cargo. Post-Desert Storm assessments highlighted warranted criticisms of prepositioning program inefficiencies, such as equipment readiness gaps and overreliance on aging vessels, even as the afloat prepositioning fleet validated rapid response by offloading supplies within weeks of activation. In response, MSC pursued internal reforms, including a reorganization to streamline accountability for programs like maritime prepositioning ships and vessels, aiming to reduce redundancies and enhance program oversight. This "reinvention" effort, outlined in early planning, involved structural modifications to align with shifting Department of Defense priorities, such as integrating lessons from the 1990 Mobility Requirements Study that redefined sealift needs for regional conflicts over peer threats. Prepositioning adaptations advanced with the introduction of the first MSC station ship in 1991, enabling sustained equipment storage at forward sites like , though persistent manning shortages from commercial outsourcing limited full scalability into the early 2000s.

21st-Century Adaptations

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks and the ensuing Global War on Terror, the Military Sealift Command adapted its operations to support rapid deployments of equipment, fuel, and supplies, which constituted over 90 percent of the materiel sustaining U.S. forces in and . This involved enhancing prepositioned afloat stocks near potential theaters, enabling quicker response times compared to land-based warehousing, as demonstrated during Operation Iraqi Freedom where delivered critical and combat support units. MSC's fleet, including roll-on/roll-off vessels, facilitated the surge of and Marine Corps units, underscoring the command's pivot toward expeditionary in asymmetric conflicts rather than solely Cold War-era mass mobilization. Fleet modernization emerged as a core adaptation to address aging infrastructure and evolving threats, with the introduction of new vessel classes starting in the early 2000s. The Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) program expanded strategic capacity through 20 converted or newly built ships, prioritizing speed and vehicle throughput for 21st-century . Subsequent acquisitions included the Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo and ammunition ships, commissioned from 2006 onward, which improved efficiency for carrier strike groups. By the 2010s, MSC integrated Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPF) for high-speed intra-theater movement, adapting to distributed maritime operations amid peer competitors like . The John Lewis-class fleet oilers, with the first deliveries in the early 2020s, replaced the obsolescent Henry J. Kaiser-class, incorporating design enhancements for fuel transfer in contested seas. Operational adaptations extended to specialized missions, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, where hospital ships like USNS Comfort supported post-Hurricane Katrina recovery in 2005 and deployed for surgical capacity in combat zones. In response to manpower constraints, MSC implemented the Tactical Advisor program in 2018 to bridge training gaps for civilian mariners interfacing with naval combatants. However, persistent challenges arose from an aging fleet and civilian mariner shortages, prompting the Navy in November 2024 to approve a workforce revitalization initiative, including sidelining 17 vessels to reallocate personnel and boost recruitment. These measures aim to sustain readiness for joint forces in contested environments, with projections for up to 20 new ships entering service by 2029.

Leadership

Commanders and Key Personnel

The Commander of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) is the senior military officer responsible for directing the organization's operations, , and support to the U.S. and Department of Defense, overseeing a civilian-manned fleet of approximately 130 ships and more than 9,000 personnel. This position, typically held by a (and occasionally a in earlier periods), reports administratively to the , U.S. Fleet Forces Command, and operationally to U.S. Transportation Command during activations. As of January 2026, Rear Adm. Benjamin R. Nicholson serves as commander, having assumed the role on November 13, 2025, succeeding Rear Adm. Philip E. Sobeck. Preceding commanders include:
Rank and NameTenureKey Notes
Rear Adm. Philip E. SobeckSeptember 8, 2023 – November 13, 2025Assumed command succeeding Rear Adm. Michael A. Wettlaufer; emphasized readiness amid global tensions, including support for operations in the Indo-Pacific and prepositioning forces.
Rear Adm. Michael A. WettlauferJune 28, 2019 – September 8, 2023Assumed command amid pre-COVID preparations; managed pandemic response, including crew rotations and sustainment of capabilities; 28th overall.
Rear Adm. (later Vice Adm.) Dee L. MewbourneAugust 25, 2016 – June 28, 2019Oversaw for operations like the response to Hurricanes Matthew and Irma; focused on fleet modernization and prepositioned stocks.
Rear Adm. Thomas K. ShannonMay 2013 – August 25, 2016Directed sustainment for and other contingencies; emphasized maritime prepositioning ships' role in rapid deployment.
Rear Adm. Mark H. October 16, 2009 – March 2013Managed surge during Operations and Iraqi Freedom drawdowns; later served as Maritime Administrator.
Earlier notable commanders include Vice Adm. Michael P. Kalleres (1992–1994), who advanced post-Cold War restructuring of sealift assets. Key supporting personnel include the (civilian), currently Jeffrey D. Hood, who handles administrative and contracting oversight, and the Chief of Staff, Capt. Thomas E. Cunningham III. The Force Master Chief, Steven W. Bosco, represents enlisted perspectives on mariner welfare and training.

Governance and Accountability Mechanisms

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) operates under a hybrid governance structure integrating military command authority with civilian management expertise, reporting through multiple chains of command to ensure alignment with both naval operational needs and broader Department of Defense (DoD) transportation objectives. Specifically, MSC reports to the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) for defense transportation system matters, to the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) and for Navy-specific operational and administrative functions, and to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition for and acquisition oversight. This multi-chain reporting framework, headquartered in , facilitates tactical control via five geographic area commands—Atlantic, Pacific, Europe/Africa, Central, and Far East—that coordinate with numbered fleet logistics staffs to manage vessel deployments and sustainment. Organizational governance is structured around directorates such as N00 (Commander), N1 (Total Force Management), N4 (Logistics), and N6 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, and Chief Information Officer), supported by an Inspector General office (N02IG) responsible for internal investigations and compliance enforcement. These elements oversee a workforce of approximately 9,714 personnel, including civil service mariners, commercial contractors, military personnel, and civilians, with policies emphasizing readiness certifications, maintenance planning, and cybersecurity compliance reviews to maintain operational accountability. Funding mechanisms, drawing from Navy appropriations and the Defense Working Capital Fund, incorporate cost-recovery targets to align resource allocation with mission requirements. Accountability is enforced through a combination of internal controls, external audits, and statutory oversight. The DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducts regular evaluations, such as the 2020 audit of surge sealift readiness reporting, which assessed USTRANSCOM's oversight of MSC's condition metrics, and a 2024 review of contract mariner support for surge missions, identifying gaps in training and equipment provisioning. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) provides independent scrutiny, as in its 1995 review of MSC's contractor oversight for ship overhauls, which highlighted deficiencies in subcontract management and prompted procedural enhancements. Congressional committees exercise authority via authorizations and directed audits, ensuring fiscal and operational transparency, while MSC's internal management controls—outlined in DoD directives—mandate vulnerability assessments and performance metrics tied to warfighter support goals, such as the 2026 Campaign Plan for war readiness.

Controversies and Criticisms

Manning and Labor Issues

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) has faced persistent challenges in recruiting and retaining civilian mariners, who comprise the majority of its operational aboard prepositioning, fleet support, and special mission ships. These shortages have intensified in recent years, driven by from commercial shipping for qualified personnel, an aging mariner pool, and demanding sea duties that deter younger entrants. As of October 2024, MSC reported difficulties maintaining adequate crewing levels, prompting operational adjustments to prevent burnout and overdue crew reliefs. In response to these manning gaps, MSC announced plans in November 2024 to sideline 17 support vessels, including fleet replenishment oilers and expeditionary transfer docks, to redistribute personnel and achieve a target 95 percent manning fill rate for tasked ships by September 2025. This measure aims to reduce strain on overworked mariners, who often face extended deployments without timely rotations, exacerbating retention issues. Rear Adm. Philip Sobeck, MSC commander, emphasized that such steps are necessary to restore workforce health amid a national shortage of U.S. merchant mariners capable of operations. The launched a dedicated MSC Workforce Initiative on November 21, 2024, focusing on enhanced incentives, pay competitiveness with industry standards, and improved aboard vessels to boost retention. Officials have identified bureaucratic hiring delays and insufficient training pipelines as contributing factors, with civil service mariners citing lower compensation relative to equivalents as a primary deterrent. Broader analyses indicate that the U.S. lacks sufficient sealift-qualified mariners, with a assessment revealing a deficit of approximately 1,839 individuals against needs, a gap that has persisted and worsened due to limited maritime academies and declining interest in sea careers. Labor relations have also involved negotiations with unions representing contract and mariners, such as the Seafarers International Union, addressing allowances and onboard conditions. While no major strikes have disrupted operations recently, unresolved tensions over compensation structures and policies have led to voluntary separations, further straining . MSC's reliance on a mix of government-employed and contractor-operated crews introduces variability in standards, with some reports highlighting inconsistencies in and oversight that compound retention challenges.

Management Efficiency and Cost Overruns

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) has faced persistent criticisms regarding management efficiency, particularly in contract oversight and contractor-operated ship programs. A 1994 Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation revealed contract abuses that resulted in poorly maintained ships, unqualified crews, and increased costs to the government, stemming from inadequate monitoring of contractor performance and internal controls. Similarly, a 1995 GAO report highlighted weak controls over contractor-operated ships, including insufficient government visitation and reliance on contractors' self-reported data, which undermined and fleet readiness. These issues persisted into the mid-1990s, with contract administration lapses leading to unsafe conditions and higher-than-necessary expenditures on repairs and compliance. Maintenance backlogs and deferred work have exacerbated overruns across MSC's fleet. Deferred in MSC vessels, as noted in broader U.S. Services analyses, ties up assets in extended repair periods, inflating long-term operating and support while reducing for missions. Navy-wide delays, which affect MSC ships, have driven operating up by billions, with hours lost due to overruns contributing to inefficiencies estimated at over $1.5 billion in avoidable expenditures as of 2019. Overhead allocation practices at MSC Pacific, scrutinized in a aligned with concerns, further strained budgets by distributing indirect expenses inefficiently across operations. Recent manning shortages have compounded these inefficiencies, forcing operational cutbacks and indirect cost increases. As of early 2025, MSC aimed to achieve a 95 percent mariner fill rate by to address chronic understaffing, which has led to overdue reliefs and sidelined at least 14 support ships. These shortages, rooted in and retention challenges under MSC's hybrid civil service-contractor model, reduce fleet utilization and elevate per-ship operating expenses through reliance on temporary fixes and reduced . While MSC has made strides in resolving pay discrepancies—reducing unresolved issues from over 1,100 in early 2024 to fewer than 150 by early 2025—systemic management gaps continue to hinder cost-effective operations.

Safety and Incident Records

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) maintains a safety record marked by periodic Class A mishaps—defined as incidents involving death, permanent total , or over $2 million—and personnel , amid the inherent risks of civilian-crewed auxiliary operations in high-tempo environments. Naval Safety Command data indicate that the U.S. Navy's afloat mishap rate hit a decade high in 2024, driven in part by four Class A afloat incidents on MSC vessels, though these did not result in crew injuries. These events underscore vulnerabilities in , , and handling, with historical Government Accountability Office () assessments highlighting weak controls on contractor-operated ships, including documented unsafe conditions like leaking fuel lines and oil. Personnel incidents have included fatalities from falls and equipment failures. In 2006, two MSC workers died when a JLG aerial lift tipped over during operations on a U.S. Navy vessel, due to improper positioning of the fly tower. On June 27, 2019, civil service mariner Martin Anthony, 51, a boatswain's mate, fell approximately 25 feet to his death while conducting aloft maintenance on the dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS William McLean (T-AKE 13) near Bahrain. Common nonfatal injuries reported among MSC mariners involve slips and falls, crush injuries, burns, back strains, equipment malfunctions, overboard incidents, and repetitive stress, often linked to the demands of underway replenishment and cargo handling. Vessel-specific mishaps have featured groundings and structural . The dry cargo ship USNS Alan Shepard (T-AKE 3) ran aground in Bahrain's harbor on July 15, 2023, mere minutes after the master departed the bridge for dinner, with the third mate assuming conning duties; an investigation cited loss of situational , inadequate bridge resource management, and procedural lapses as causal factors, resulting in hull requiring repairs. In a separate event on September 23, 2024, the replenishment oiler USNS Big Horn (T-AO 198) suffered an underwater allision to its stern while operating in the Arabian Sea off , causing hull breaches, flooding, and rudder that rendered it non-operational and required towing to Duqm port; no fuel spill occurred, but the incident strained support for regional carrier operations. Such occurrences reflect broader challenges in sustaining an aging fleet under extended deployments, though MSC emphasizes mishap reporting and corrective actions to mitigate recurrence.

Debates on Privatization and Alternatives

Proponents of greater argue that expanding reliance on commercial shipping could alleviate fiscal pressures on the Military Sealift Command (MSC), which operates an aging fleet prone to high maintenance costs and manning shortages. For instance, the (CBO) in 2019 outlined options such as enhancing the Maritime Security Program (MSP), where private ship owners receive annual stipends—approximately $5 million per large vessel in recent iterations—to prioritize U.S. government use during surges, potentially costing less in peacetime than sustaining government-owned ships. This approach leverages the U.S.-flagged commercial fleet, which numbered about 180 active oceangoing vessels in 2023, to supplement MSC's 60 prepositioning and surge ships, reducing the need for costly new government acquisitions estimated at $18 billion over 30 years under full recapitalization plans. Critics, including Department of Defense officials, contend that over-dependence on private alternatives undermines wartime reliability, as commercial operators prioritize profitable routes and may hesitate in high-risk conflicts. A 2025 assessment highlighted that current strategies relying on commercial and are "suboptimal" for peer conflicts, citing historical delays in mobilizing Voluntary Intermodal participants—contracts with 34 carriers committing over 500 ships but often limited by peacetime commercial commitments—during exercises simulating contingencies. Empirical data from the 1991 showed VISA ships delivering only 40% of expected capacity initially due to activation hurdles, reinforcing arguments for retaining MSC's organic control over specialized vessels like the 14 Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo/ammunition ships. Think tanks like advocate hybrid reforms, proposing deregulation of laws such as the Jones Act to expand a dual-use commercial fleet capable of seamless military transition, potentially adding 20-30 militarily useful vessels annually without direct government ownership. However, analyses from the 1990s onward have noted that while auxiliary operations—such as chartering tankers—saved millions in specific cases, broader risks eroding the civilian mariner reserve, with MSC's 5,000 mariners forming the backbone of surge readiness amid a national shortage of 1,000-2,000 qualified officers as of 2024. In response to these tensions, the Navy's 2018 modernization plan blended approaches, extending life on 31 existing ships while incorporating private partnerships, though congressional oversight persists due to evidenced inefficiencies in past commercial integrations.

Achievements and Impact

Logistical Successes in Conflicts

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) has played a pivotal role in enabling U.S. military operations through strategic , delivering vast quantities of equipment, supplies, and fuel to sustain forces in remote theaters. In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (1990–1991), MSC mobilized over 230 ships to transport more than 12 million tons of supplies, including wheeled and tracked vehicles, helicopters, , and dry , establishing it as the primary provider of defense transportation during the conflict. MSC-controlled vessels specifically moved 3.4 million tons of and equipment alongside 6.8 million tons of fuel across global distances, supporting the rapid buildup of coalition forces in . By acquiring 253 ships for surge operations, with 209 completing missions, MSC ensured logistical readiness that contributed to the ground campaign's success, demonstrating the effectiveness of prepositioned assets and Force activation. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003), MSC achieved similar feats by delivering over 21 million square feet of warfighting equipment and supplies, 260 million gallons of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), 1.1 million tons of dry cargo, 61,000 vehicles, and more than 1,000 tanks from January through April 2003 alone. This supported the swift invasion and initial stabilization phases, with MSC ships providing and port-to-point distribution critical for sustaining mechanized units in a high-tempo environment. Post-9/11 operations, encompassing and , saw MSC deliver over 25 billion gallons of fuel and 126 million square feet of combat gear, underscoring its capacity for sustained logistics in prolonged engagements. These efforts highlight MSC's strategic value in conflicts requiring overseas , where accounted for the majority of transport—such as 2.4 million tons of cargo in Desert Storm—far outpacing capabilities and enabling operational tempo without reliance on vulnerable host-nation . Investments in surge shipping and civilian-manned fleets proved decisive, as evidenced by the absence of major shortfalls in these campaigns, though challenges in activation times informed later reforms.

Strategic Enablers of U.S. Foreign Policy

The (MSC) enables U.S. by furnishing the maritime logistics essential for , deterrence, and alliance sustainment. As the Department of Defense's primary transportation provider, MSC operates around 125 ships that deliver strategic , prepositioning, and continuous resupply to support joint forces in remote and contested environments. This capability underpins the ability to deploy and sustain operations far from U.S. shores, directly facilitating policy objectives such as countering aggression in the and . MSC's surge sealift assets, including roll-on/roll-off vessels and tankers, allow for the rapid movement of and Marine Corps units during crises, as demonstrated in historical operations where MSC handled the bulk of initial deployments. The Combat Logistics Force, comprising fleet replenishment oilers and dry cargo/ammunition ships, extends naval endurance by providing of fuel, ordnance, and provisions, critical for maintaining forward presence that deters adversaries and reassures partners. For example, in October 2020, USNS Laramie replenished USS Ross in the , enabling operations that signal U.S. commitment to allies amid Russian activities. By mitigating sealift capacity risks outlined in the National Defense Strategy, MSC ensures logistical readiness for high-end conflicts, supporting broader goals of global stability and interest protection without reliance on vulnerable alone. Over 140 vessels under MSC management in 2024 further enable specialized missions, such as resupply, which reinforce scientific and presence in strategic polar regions. These functions collectively amplify U.S. strategic influence, allowing policymakers to pursue objectives from crisis response to long-term competition.

Innovations and Reforms

In response to aging infrastructure and evolving operational demands, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) has pursued fleet recapitalization, planning the delivery of up to 20 new ships equipped with modernized systems within five years from 2023, alongside 12 new ship classes entering service over the subsequent decade. These efforts include emerging capabilities such as unmanned aerial resupply systems and expeditionary munitions reload mechanisms to support distributed maritime logistics in contested environments. Technological integrations have focused on enhancing connectivity and cybersecurity. In 2025, MSC initiated the Civilian Mariner Wireless Network (CivMar WiN), a secure system utilizing Starshield technology with wireless access points, initially deployed on vessels like USNS Harvey Milk (T-AO 206) and USNS Joshua Humphreys (T-AO 188), with plans to equip 56 government-operated ships by early 2027. This innovation provides mariners with for , communication, and personal use, aiming to boost and retention amid workforce shortages. Complementary reforms include upgrades, such as consolidation and cloud migration, to ensure continuity of services and operational efficiency. Workforce and operational reforms have addressed manning deficiencies and administrative inefficiencies. To alleviate strain on civilian mariners, MSC announced in November 2024 the sidelining of 17 support vessels—including Expeditionary Sea Bases, Spearhead-class Expeditionary Fast Transports, and replenishment oilers—for extended maintenance, freeing 600-700 personnel to improve the manning ratio from 1.27 to 1.75 mariners per billet and enable reactivation as recruitment grows. In early 2025, implementation of a 4-and-2 rotation schedule enhanced work-life balance, while adjustments to able seaman promotion eligibility reduced required sea time to 180 days, facilitating quicker advancements and contributing to a drop in overdue reliefs from 39 personnel in August 2023 to 13 by January 2025. Administrative streamlining involved reorganizing pay and travel teams, hiring additional staff, and piloting voucher processing automation, halving average processing times and reducing unresolved pay issues from over 1,100 at the start of 2024 to under 150 by early 2025. These measures target a 95% manning fill rate for operational ships by September 2025 and zero overdue reliefs exceeding seven days. Additionally, the Adaptive Force Package, established in 2018, integrates modular capabilities like containerized adapter kits onto MSC platforms to enable non-standard missions in distributed operations.

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