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Compellence is a form of coercion that attempts to get an actor (such as a state) to change its behavior through threats to use force or the actual use of limited force.[1][2][3] Compellence can be more clearly described as "a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary's will or incentive structure. It is a strategy that combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled increments, in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. The aim is to induce an adversary to comply with one's demands, or to negotiate the most favorable compromise possible, while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation."[4]

As distinguished from deterrence theory, which is a strategy aimed at maintaining the status quo (dissuading adversaries from undertaking an action), compellence entails efforts to change the status quo (persuading an opponent to change their behavior).[5] Compellence has been characterized as harder to successfully implement than deterrence.[1][6] Compellence can entail strategies to punish an adversary, raise the risk for an adversary, or deny the adversary from achieving their objectives.[6][1] Successful instances of compellence in one case may have a deterrent effect on other states,[7][8][1] whereas a reputation for a lack of resolve may undermine general deterrence[9] and future compellence.[10]

Background

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Compellence is one form of coercion.[1][6] Some scholars conflate coercion and compellence.[6]

Compellence typically entails efforts to change the decision calculus of an adversary by manipulating the costs and benefits of certain actions.[6] Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman define compellence as "getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it". Coercion strategy "relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision making but may also include limited uses of actual force".[11] Joseph Nye emphasizes that compellence depends upon the credibility and the cost of the threat.[12] "If a threat is not credible, it may fail to produce acceptance and it may lead to costs to the reputation of the coercing state. In general, threats are costly when they fail, not only in encouraging resistance in the target, but also in negatively influencing third parties observing the outcome."[12]

The term deterrence is differentiated from compellence. In his influential work, Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling puts forth a general concept of coercion theory as it emerges beyond deterrence. According to Schelling, deterrence is merely a passive threat aimed at keeping an adversary from acting. It is only a threat. "Initiative is placed on the opponent to take the first action triggering a response from the coercer." Schelling believes that deterrence does not present "a comprehensive picture of coercion, leading Schelling to introduce the concept of compellence".[13]

'Compellence', in contrast to 'deterrence', shifts the initiative for the first action to the coercer. While deterrence means waiting passively in hope of not seeing a response, compellence is active, thereby, "inducing his withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collaboration by an action that threatens to hurt".[13] When differentiating between deterrence and compellence, deterrence can be described as "drawing a line in the sand" and acting only if the adversary crosses it; in contrast, compellence "requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if he acts" as in deterrence. "Coercion composed of both compellence and deterrence is about action and inaction."[13] Alexander L. George, a scholar of international relations and former professor of political science at Stanford University, was a pioneer in the field of political psychology.[14] Like Schelling before him, Alexander George worked to create a diplomatic strategy of coercion; his was the theory of compellence. Unlike Schelling, George's theory of 'compellence' is different than Schelling's 'coercive warfare', in that he believed that compellence was "a subset of coercion and compellence". He viewed it as encompassing "defensive" compellent actions only: to force a target to stop or reverse action already taken, rather than an offensive goal of forcing them to do something ... Compellence essentially is the embodiment of a "carrot and stick" philosophy: motivation is used to induce a target to submit to your wishes, while appearing threatening at the same time".[13]

Types of coercive strategy

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Alexander George's types

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According to Alexander George, compellence seeks to achieve three objectives. First, it attempts to persuade an adversary to turn away from its goal. Second, it seeks to convince an adversary to reverse an action already taken. Third, it may persuade an adversary to make "fundamental changes in its government".[15] When constructing a compellence strategy, policymakers must consider certain variables or "empty boxes" that must be filled. They must decide "what to demand of the opponent; whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with demand; whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance; and whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand".[16]

Alexander George developed a framework in which a number of "variants" or methods of using compellence could be deployed to achieve these objectives. These variants include the following:

  1. Ultimatum
  2. Tacit ultimatum
  3. Try-and-see
  4. Gradual turning of the screw

The first variant of the 'compellence' strategy is the classic 'ultimatum'. An ultimatum itself has three distinct components: "a demand on the opponent; a time limit or sense of urgency for compliance with the demand; and a threat of punishment for noncompliance that is both credible to the opponent and sufficiently potent to impress upon him that compliance is preferable".[16]

The second variant of compellence, 'tacit ultimatum', is similar to 'ultimatum' except that it doesn't set forth an explicit time limit.

The third variant of compellence, the 'try-and-see', addresses strictly the first component of the 'ultimatum' variant, "a demand on the opponent". There is no time limit set, no sense of urgency conveyed, instead the coercer makes a single threat or takes a single action "to persuade the opponent before threatening or taking another step".[16]

Finally, the 'gradual turning of the screw' approach is similar to the 'try-and-see' method in that it makes a threat but then "relies the threat of a gradual, incremental increase of coercive pressure rather than threatening large escalation to strong, decisive military action if the opponent does not comply".[16]

Other types

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Thomas Schelling and Robert Pape distinguished between coercive strategies that sought to:

  1. Punish: Raise the costs for the adversary
  2. Risk: Raise the probability of future costs for the adversary
  3. Deny: Prevent the adversary from obtaining their objectives.[1][6]

Pape also added the strategy of decapitation, which typically entails targeting leaders.[6] Alexander Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran distinguish between two punishment strategies: (i) Coercive victimization (which raises the costs of war for a government by targeting its civilians) and (ii) Eliminationist victimization (which removes civilians from territory).[17]

Intrawar compellence

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Intrawar compellence refers to compellence within the context of a war: a war has broken out but the actors are still seeking to coerce the adversary to take a certain action. According to Thomas Schelling, "War is always a bargaining process" where actors engage in threats and counter-threats, as well as proposals and counter-proposals. According to Schelling, the bargaining process appears most prominently in the context of "limited wars" where actors hold the full use of force in reserve so as to threaten the adversary to make concessions.[18]

Requirements for success

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Among the numerous theories on compellence, Peter Viggo Jakobsen's (1998) ideal policy succinctly identifies the four key conditions the coercer must meet to maximize the chance of success to stop or undo acts of aggression:

  1. A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost.
  2. A deadline for compliance.
  3. An assurance to the adversary against future demands.
  4. An offer of inducements for compliance.

The first requirement in Jakobsen's 'ideal policy' is to make the threat so great that non-compliance will be too costly for the resisting actors.[19] The second requirement demands that after maximizing the credibility of the threat, the coercer must set a specific deadline, as failure to set a deadline for compliance "is likely to be interpreted as evidence that the coercer lacks the will to implement the threat".[19] Assurance against new demands must also be carried out for greater chance of success. Jakobsen points out that the incentive to comply with the coercer's demands will be significantly downgraded if the resisting actor fears compliance will merely invite more demands. The last requirement for successful coercion is the effective use of inducements, which are important facilitators used to give more credibility and assurance.[19]

According to Richard Ned Lebow, a credible threat entails:[20]

  1. A formulated commitment
  2. A communication of that commitment to the other side
  3. The capability to back up the commitment
  4. The will to back up the commitment

According to Robert Art, the perquisites for compellence success are:[3]

  1. Clear objectives
  2. Strong motivation
  3. Domestic and international support
  4. Strong leadership
  5. Clearly stated demands
  6. Creation of a sense of urgency in the other state's mind
  7. Making the target fear unacceptable escalation
  8. Asymmetry in motivation

Credibility

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Main article: Credibility (international relations)

Much of the scholarship on compellence focuses on the credibility of coercive threats as a key component of the success of compellence.[21][22][9][23][1][20] According to Anne Sartori, states rarely seek to obtain goals through bluffing, because doing so undermines their reputation in future crises.[24] Survey experiment data from Barbara Walter and Dustin Tingley confirm the findings of Sartori's study, as they find that people "invest more heavily in reputation building if they believe a game will be repeated many times."[25]

Credibility (or reputation) refers to the degree to which an actor is expected to uphold their commitments based on past behavior.[26][9] In terms of credible compellence, credibility entails that defiance will be met with punishment, and that compliance will be met with restraint.[27][22] One of the main problems in compellence is that it is hard to credibly signal that compliance will not lead to punishment.[22][28][27] Scholars have argued that when great powers increase their power, their credibility to engage in restraint decreases.[22][29]

To enhance the credibility of threats, some scholars argue that audience costs are effective in doing so.[30][31][32] Other scholars dispute that audience costs enhance credibility.[33][34] Military mobilizations during a crisis may bolster compellent threats, but scholars dispute whether it is because it "ties the hands of the leader" or because it alters the local military balance of power.[35]

Some scholars question whether credibility or reputation matters in international disputes.[36][37]

Nuclear weapons

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Scholars have debated whether nuclear weapons provide states with an advantage in compelling other states. Matthew Kroenig has argued that nuclear superiority enhances the probability of success in a bargaining dispute.[38] Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann dispute that nuclear weapons have compellence utility, as they find no evidence in their dataset on compellent threats that nuclear weapons increase compellence success.[39][40] A 2023 study found that a state with nuclear weapons is less likely to be targeted by non-nuclear states, but that a state with nuclear weapons is not less likely to target other nuclear states in low-level conflict.[41]

Case studies

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Success

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Scholars have found that compellence is less likely to be successful than deterrence.[3][1] Studies have indicated that "punishment" strategies that target civilians tend to be ineffective.[6][17][42]

President John F. Kennedy used compellence successfully in 1962 when he was able to bring about a peaceful resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis and avert possible warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union. When Kennedy learned of the Soviet Union's attempt to deploy forty-two medium-range and twenty-four intermediate-range ballistic missiles into Cuba, he established a naval blockade and threatened an invasion of Cuba with force to remove the missiles already there.[5]

Instead of resorting to a strictly military strategy to forcibly remove the missiles, Kennedy decided to use compellence. He initiated this strategy by first using the 'Try-and-See' approach. The giant naval blockade, along with a massive buildup of U.S. military forces, was a message to Nikita Khrushchev to persuade him that the U.S. was able and willing to use force if needed to remove this missile threat from Cuba.[43] The blockade limited the showdown to Kennedy and Khrushchev rather than develop into all-out war. Because of Kennedy's tough naval blockade, Khrushchev "directed all Soviet vessels carrying missiles and other military equipment to Cuba to immediately turn back".[5]

To intensify the compellence strategy, Kennedy shifted from the 'Try-and-See' approach to a hybrid of a virtual 'ultimatum' and a carrot-and-the stick approach.[16] Kennedy addressed the sense of urgency about the growing hostile situation by standing firm and tightening the naval blockade as well as conveying to Khrushchev the continued threat of a possible invasion of Cuba. As a result of Kennedy's successful use of compellence added to negotiated concessions, Khrushchev agreed to remove missiles in place and to discontinue the deployment of new missiles into Cuba while the U.S. agreed to remove its Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey and to call off any invasion of Cuba.[16][44]

Failure

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During the 1990–91 Gulf War, compellence failed to persuade Saddam Hussein to exit Kuwait and move his military forces back to Iraq; though the use of deterrence effectively convinced the Iraqi president that he could not invade further south into Saudi Arabia, it did little to expel him from Kuwait.[5] Initially, the Bush administration along with the United Nations issued sanctions to pressure Iraq to withdraw troops inside Kuwait. The UN Security Council placed economic sanctions by imposing an embargo on Iraq's imports and exports. This initial stage of the crisis was the United States' attempt to use the coercive diplomatic variant, 'Gradual Turning of the Screw' to apply pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply to the demands to leave Kuwait.[16]

Then the Bush administration, along with the UN Security Council, used the variant 'ultimatum' by setting a deadline of January 15, 1991, for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. When this deadline came and passed, without Saddam Hussein's compliance, Operation Desert Storm commenced and military force was used to remove Iraq's forces from Kuwait. Despite the massive build-up of U.S. forces along the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border, economic sanctions, and a declared deadline for withdrawal, Saddam Hussein failed to remove his forces.[16] In this instance, compellence failed, leading to the Gulf War, which concluded with the United States and coalition forces succeeding in removing Saddam Hussein's troops from Kuwait. Thus, when implementing compellence not only the benefits but also the aftermath must be considered. Especially in the 21st century, every nation is interdependent so other forces by state actors may affect a nation's diplomacy.

Some have suggested that the 2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis was an attempt at compellence, which resulted in the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine when Ukraine failed to accede to Russia's demands.[45] The invasion was also widely regarded as a failure to achieve Putin's goals [46] though many questions remain as to what those goals were.

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Compellence

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Compellence is a concept in denoting the use of threats, demonstrations of force, or limited military actions to induce an adversary to undertake a specific course of action that it would otherwise avoid, in contrast to deterrence, which seeks to prevent an opponent from initiating undesired behavior. Originating from economist and strategist Thomas Schelling's analysis in his 1966 book Arms and Influence, compellence emphasizes manipulating an adversary's incentives through credible commitments to escalate costs unless compliance occurs, often requiring the coercer to demonstrate resolve by initiating while holding out the of cessation upon capitulation. Unlike brute force aimed at physical , successful compellence hinges on psychological and political leverage, such as signaling the ability to impose ongoing pain without full-scale war, though empirical assessments reveal it as generally more challenging and less reliable than deterrence due to asymmetries in , commitment credibility, and the target's domestic incentives to resist visible concessions. Key historical applications include Allied campaigns in intended to force German surrender short of invasion and U.S. efforts during the to compel North Korean withdrawal, yet studies indicate low success rates—around 35% in modern interstate crises—attributable to factors like the coercer's inability to make threats self-enforcing or the target's willingness to absorb costs for reputational gains. Controversies surrounding compellence center on its theoretical optimism versus real-world failures, with critics arguing that and make targets more resolute under duress, prompting calls for integrated approaches blending military pressure with diplomatic off-ramps to enhance efficacy in protracted conflicts.

Definition and Origins

Conceptual Definition

Compellence refers to the use of threats or limited force to induce an adversary to perform a specific action that it otherwise would not undertake, such as ceasing an ongoing or making concessions. This concept, formalized by economist and strategist , emphasizes manipulating the target's incentives through credible threats of punishment rather than relying solely on overwhelming military conquest. Schelling distinguished compellence as an active form of , where the initiator must often demonstrate resolve by initiating harm—such as strikes or sanctions—until compliance occurs, contrasting with passive strategies that merely warn against initiation. In contrast to deterrence, which seeks to dissuade an opponent from starting an undesired action by threatening retaliation, compellence demands that the target reverse course or affirmatively act, imposing higher demands on the coercer's and the target's of costs. Scholarly analyses note that compellence is generally more challenging than deterrence because it requires the adversary to incur immediate sunk costs in changing behavior, and the coercer risks escalation if threats lack follow-through, potentially eroding future leverage. Schelling argued that effective compellent threats must be "self-limiting," signaling a clear path to upon compliance, to avoid the target perceiving unlimited demands. The strategy hinges on psychological and informational dynamics, where the coercer exploits asymmetry in resolve or , but success depends on the target's ability to verify commitments and the absence of domestic or allied constraints that undermine threat credibility. Empirical studies of historical cases, such as U.S. efforts in the 1991 to compel Iraqi withdrawal from , illustrate that compellence often fails without rapid, visible demonstrations of force, as prolonged threats allow targets to adapt or rally opposition.

Historical Development and Key Theorists

The modern theory of compellence emerged during the era, as strategists grappled with the implications of nuclear weapons for and bargaining in international conflicts. Prior to its formalization, elements of compellent logic appeared in earlier military thought, such as Carl von Clausewitz's discussions of forcing an enemy to comply through graduated pressure in (1832), but these lacked the systematic distinction from deterrence or brute force. The concept gained prominence in U.S. strategic debates from the 1950s onward, influenced by and the need to manage escalation risks in limited wars, as seen in analyses of crises like the (1948–1949) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). Thomas Schelling, a Nobel Prize-winning , is credited with coining the term "compellence" and providing its foundational framework in Arms and Influence (1966). Schelling defined compellence as a coercive requiring an adversary to take specific positive actions—such as withdrawing forces or ceasing aggression—through threats of punishment or the initiation of limited force, in contrast to deterrence, which merely seeks to maintain the status quo by deterring undesired initiatives. He argued that compellence demands demonstrable actions by the coercer to build , making it inherently riskier and less symmetric than deterrence, as the opponent must actively concede rather than simply refrain. This distinction built on Schelling's prior exploration of conflict as bargaining in The Strategy of Conflict (1960), where he emphasized manipulating uncertainty and commitment to influence opponent calculations. Alexander L. George, a political scientist, advanced compellence theory by integrating it with diplomatic practice in his studies of coercive diplomacy, distinguishing defensive variants (halting or reversing ongoing actions) from more aggressive forms akin to Schelling's offensive compellence. In Force and Statecraft (co-authored with Richard Smoke, 1983) and The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (co-authored with William E. Simons, 1994), George proposed a typology of coercive strategies, including explicit ultimatums, tacit ultimatums, and "try-and-see" approaches that combine military pressure with negotiation to compel compliance. He stressed preconditions like clear communication of demands, proportionality in threats, and opponent vulnerability to inducements, drawing empirical lessons from historical cases such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, where U.S. naval quarantine compelled Soviet withdrawal of missiles. George's framework highlighted compellence's empirical challenges, noting its lower success rate compared to deterrence due to informational asymmetries and domestic audience costs.

Distinction from Deterrence

Compellence differs from deterrence in that the former seeks to induce an adversary to perform a specific action or cease an ongoing one, thereby altering the status quo, whereas deterrence aims to prevent an adversary from initiating an undesired action, thereby preserving the existing state of affairs. This distinction, articulated by in his 1966 work Arms and Influence, hinges on the initiative and timing: deterrence relies on passive threats to maintain , while compellence typically requires the coercer to undertake an initial provocative step—such as limited military action—that generates ongoing costs reversible only upon compliance. Implementation challenges further underscore the divide, as compellence demands demonstrable resolve through active manipulation of risks, often escalating tensions to signal credibility, in contrast to deterrence's emphasis on credible commitments to punish future violations without immediate disruption. Schelling noted that compellence is inherently more demanding because it compels the target to overcome domestic or perceptual barriers to reversal, whereas deterrence aligns with the adversary's natural inclination toward inaction amid uncertainty. Empirical analyses, such as those reviewing crises, confirm compellence's lower success rates—around 35% in some datasets—compared to deterrence, attributable to the target's ability to frame non-compliance as defense. The strategic grammar also varies: deterrence benefits from in threats to foster self-deterrence, allowing the adversary to rationalize restraint, while compellence necessitates precise signaling of termination conditions to guide compliance without provoking total resistance. This asymmetry explains why compellent threats often incorporate "carrots" like assurances of post-compliance, absent in pure deterrence scenarios.

Relation to Brute Force and Coercive Diplomacy

Compellence, as articulated by in his 1966 work Arms and Influence, fundamentally differs from brute force in its reliance on influencing an adversary's rather than negating their capacity to resist. Brute force entails the direct application of military power to seize objectives or destroy capabilities irrespective of the target's voluntary compliance, such as through or , rendering the adversary's choices irrelevant by overwhelming them physically. In contrast, compellence operates through graduated threats or limited force that manipulate the target's perceived costs and benefits, preserving their agency while compelling action, such as withdrawal from territory, by making non-compliance more painful than . This distinction underscores compellence's dependence on credible signaling and the adversary's rational assessment, whereas brute force prioritizes unilateral capability dominance, often at higher resource costs and with risks of prolonged resistance. Schelling positioned compellence within the broader category of , which contrasts with brute force by aiming to shape behavior through psychological and strategic manipulation rather than sheer destruction. For instance, during the 1962 , U.S. naval efforts exemplified compellent pressure by raising escalation risks to induce Soviet withdrawal, avoiding brute force's full that might have ignored Soviet decision . Empirical analyses indicate that brute force succeeds in territorial conquest but falters in extracting specific behavioral changes post-conquest, as occupied populations often resist without ongoing , whereas compellence's focus on voluntary compliance can yield more stable outcomes if the target perceives the threat as tailored and reversible. Coercive diplomacy, developed by Alexander George in works like Forceful Persuasion (1991), represents a refined subset or variant of compellence that integrates explicit diplomatic demands with threats of limited force, explicitly designed as an alternative to all-out war or brute force. Unlike Schelling's broader compellence, which may involve ongoing military operations to enforce compliance (e.g., intrawar bombing to halt advances), George's coercive diplomacy emphasizes pre-conflict or crisis-phase persuasion, where the coercer communicates clear terms, a deadline, and a credible to prompt immediate reversal of undesired actions, such as in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when U.S. nuclear alerts contributed to Israeli restraint. This approach prioritizes asymmetry in resolve and information, requiring the target to doubt their ability to withstand costs without necessitating actual combat, though failure often escalates to brute force if demands are ignored. The overlap between compellence and coercive diplomacy lies in their shared coercive logic—altering target incentives via pain infliction—but George's typology adds operational prerequisites like proportionality ( fitting the demand) and strong assurances post-compliance, which Schelling treated more implicitly. Quantitative reviews of historical cases, such as those in the International Crisis Behavior dataset spanning 1918–2007, show coercive diplomacy succeeding in about 35% of instances when combining with limited force, outperforming pure threats but underperforming brute force in raw territorial gains, highlighting its niche for policy-specific concessions over total victory. Critics note that both strategies risk miscalculation if the target values intrinsic goals (e.g., survival) over extrinsic costs, potentially devolving into brute force when compellent signals fail to overcome domestic audience effects or sunk costs.

Types of Compellent Strategies

Schelling's Framework and Risk Manipulation

formalized the concept of compellence in his 1966 book Arms and Influence, distinguishing it from deterrence as a requiring the coercer to actively induce an adversary to perform a desired action, often through demonstrable threats of punishment conditional on non-compliance. Unlike deterrence, which relies on passive threats to prevent initiation of undesired behavior, compellence demands initiation of coercive pressure by the compellent state, such as limited military actions, to signal resolve and shift the adversary's cost-benefit calculus. Schelling emphasized that successful compellence hinges on manipulating the adversary's perceptions of inevitable harm unless compliance occurs, rather than overwhelming force alone. Central to Schelling's framework is the manipulation of risk, particularly through , where the compellent actor escalates tensions to a point where mutual looms, compelling the adversary to concede to avoid catastrophe. In , the coercer does not issue fully controlled threats but instead creates scenarios of shared vulnerability, such as naval blockades or airspace incursions that risk accidental escalation into full conflict. This approach leverages the adversary's fear of uncontrolled outcomes, as the compellent side appears willing to court danger, thereby imposing psychological pressure without immediate all-out violence. A key mechanism Schelling described is "the threat that leaves something to chance," introduced in his 1960 work The Strategy of Conflict and elaborated in Arms and Influence, wherein the coercer deliberately introduces uncertainty into the escalation ladder, making war a probabilistic outcome rather than a certain one. By committing to actions that partially relinquish control—such as deploying forces in ambiguous postures—the compellent actor forces the adversary to weigh the risk of miscalculation against the costs of defiance, often yielding leverage disproportionate to actual capabilities. This risk-sharing dynamic, Schelling argued, is particularly potent in nuclear contexts, where even low probabilities of catastrophe amplify stakes, though it presumes rational actors capable of accurate risk assessment. Empirical applications, such as Cold War crises, illustrate how this framework enabled compellence without brute conquest, but successes depended on credible communication of risks to avoid mutual misperception.

Alexander George's Typology

Alexander L. George, in developing the framework of coercive diplomacy—a strategy that overlaps with compellence by seeking to induce an adversary to alter its behavior through threats of force combined with diplomatic engagement—outlined a typology of tactical variants based on the mode of communicating demands and applying pressure. This typology, detailed in his analyses of historical cases, differentiates approaches primarily by the explicitness of threats, the firmness of commitments, and the pacing of escalation, emphasizing that success hinges on the coercer's ability to signal resolve without tipping into full-scale war. George's variants build on Thomas Schelling's broader compellence concept by incorporating diplomatic persuasion to make demands more palatable and credible, arguing that pure military compellence often fails without such elements. The variant involves a clear, explicit accompanied by a specific of if unmet by a defined deadline, requiring high in the coercer's willingness and ability to follow through. George noted this approach's reliance on precise communication to minimize miscalculation, as seen in limited historical successes where the target perceived the as proportionate and reversible upon compliance. In contrast, the employs an implied rather than overt , allowing the coercer to maintain about escalation while still signaling costs for defiance; this suits scenarios where explicitness might provoke premature resistance or domestic backlash against the coercer. George further distinguished the try-and-see approach, where initial limited pressure tests the adversary's response without a binding commitment to further action, enabling the coercer to gauge compliance propensity and adjust demands iteratively. This variant risks appearing irresolute if the test fails, potentially undermining future credibility, but George observed it as useful when intelligence on the target's incentives is uncertain. Finally, the gradual turning of the screw entails incremental escalation of costs over time without a fixed deadline, aiming to wear down resistance through accumulating pressure rather than shock; George highlighted its application in protracted crises, such as certain episodes, but warned of its vulnerability to adversary or counter-escalation if increments prove too slow or predictable. Across these variants, George stressed common preconditions for compellent efficacy, including the target's perception of viable exit options, the coercer's restraint in military means to preserve bargaining space, and alignment between the demand's urgency and the offered diplomatic reassurances. Empirical reviews of cases from 1914 to the 1990s, as analyzed by George and collaborators, indicate varying rates—higher for tacit or try-and-see in low-stakes disputes but lower for gradual approaches against ideologically committed foes—underscoring the typology's utility in tailoring strategies to contextual variables like power asymmetry and domestic politics.

Intrawar and Peacetime Variants

Intrawar compellence refers to the application of coercive threats or limited force during an active armed conflict to induce an adversary to undertake specific actions, such as territorial withdrawal, cessation of offensive operations, or acceptance of negotiated terms, rather than pursuing total defeat. This variant leverages the existing wartime environment, where violence provides a mechanism for signaling resolve and imposing incremental costs, but it demands precise escalation control to avoid broadening the conflict into mutual exhaustion. Scholars distinguish it from peacetime efforts by noting that intrawar dynamics lower the barrier to initiating coercive acts, as already validates the , yet heighten risks of miscalculation due to heightened emotions and sunk costs on both sides. Empirical studies of intrawar compellence, particularly through air and naval campaigns, indicate moderate efficacy when paired with denial strategies—disrupting enemy capabilities—over pure punishment of civilian morale, with success in forcing behavioral change occurring in roughly 44% of documented cases involving threats to compel . For instance, during the 1991 , U.S.-led coalition air operations combined with ground maneuvers compelled Iraqi forces to retreat from by denying operational freedom and threatening regime survival, though the rapid conventional victory blurred lines with brute force. In contrast, the U.S. (1965–1968) in failed to compel North Vietnamese concessions despite over 864,000 tons of bombs dropped, as absorbed costs due to ideological commitment and sanctuary protections. Peacetime compellence, conversely, operates in the absence of hostilities and relies on credible threats of initiating force or demonstrations thereof to prompt compliance, often framed as coercive diplomacy to avert escalation. This approach faces steeper challenges, as it requires the target to reverse ongoing actions or initiate costly reversals without the immediate pressure of losses, testing the coercer's for follow-through more acutely than intrawar scenarios. Alexander George's typology highlights variants like the "," demanding immediate compliance under explicit threat, and the "try-and-see" method, involving tentative force to probe reactions, both aimed at exploiting the target's aversion to onset. A prominent peacetime success was the 1962 , where President Kennedy's naval "quarantine" and implicit escalation threats compelled Soviet Premier Khrushchev to dismantle offensive missiles in by October 28, 1962, after 13 days of , bolstered by assured U.S. nuclear superiority and public commitment. Failures, such as prewar ultimatums preceding , underscore how peacetime compellence falters when targets perceive bluffs or domestic audiences constrain retaliation, with overall success rates lower than intrawar efforts due to the absence of kinetic leverage. Quantitative reviews of 19th- and 20th-century crises find compellent demands met in under 30% of cases without force initiation, emphasizing the need for swift, unambiguous signaling.

Preconditions for Effective Compellence

Commitment and Credibility of Threats

In compellence, the commitment of the coercer to execute threatened is essential, as it directly underpins the target's that defiance will incur costs exceeding the benefits of resistance. emphasized that credible commitments manipulate the coercer's own options, rendering retreat irrational or impossible, thereby shifting the onus of decision-making to the target. For instance, deploying forces in a manner that ties national honor or resources to response—such as U.S. troops in acting as a "" for escalation—signals irrevocable resolve, making the threat self-enforcing without requiring constant reaffirmation. Credibility further demands that the target perceives the coercer's resolve as genuine, assessed through demonstrated willingness to bear escalation risks rather than mere capability. In compellence, unlike deterrence, threats must compel active behavioral change, amplifying the need for overt signals of intent, such as partial mobilization or deadlines, to convince the target that inaction by the coercer equates to weakness. Historical mechanisms include self-binding tactics, like the U.S. , which congressionally obligated defense of , enhancing perceived commitment beyond presidential discretion. Reputations from prior follow-through can bolster this, though empirical analyses of U.S. coercive indicate mixed effects, with resolve often overriding reputational consistency due to context-specific stakes. Challenges arise from the assurance dilemma, where bolstering threat credibility—via mobilization or rhetoric—can erode assurances that punishment ends upon compliance, prompting targets to doubt conditional restraint and opt for defiance. Targets weigh not only threat severity but also assurance viability, as seen in cases like U.S. efforts against Iran, where domestic opposition undermined perceptions of post-compliance de-escalation. Effective preconditions thus require disentangling demands from extraneous issues and leveraging verifiable de-escalation signals, ensuring the coercer's commitment appears calibrated rather than absolute. Without such balance, even capable threats falter, as targets anticipate entrapment over coercion.

Assured Capabilities and Escalation Control

Assured capabilities in compellence refer to the compeller's possession of sufficient military, economic, or other coercive instruments to credibly execute threatened punishments, ensuring the target perceives defiance as leading to unacceptable costs. Without such capabilities, threats remain hollow, as the target can rationally discount them based on the compeller's inability to follow through. emphasized that effective compellence requires not only the potential to harm but a demonstrated readiness to initiate actions that incrementally raise the target's risks, backed by tangible means of enforcement. In conventional contexts, this often entails superiority in relevant domains, such as or naval blockades, allowing precise application of force without immediate recourse to . Escalation control complements assured capabilities by enabling the compeller to modulate the intensity and scope of coercive actions, signaling resolve while preserving options to de-escalate upon compliance. This involves maintaining "escalation dominance," where the compeller holds advantages at successive levels of conflict, denying the target equivalent escalation paths and limiting unintended spirals. Schelling noted that uncontrolled escalation undermines compellence by shifting focus from targeted to mutual destruction, particularly in nuclear scenarios where assured retaliation capabilities deter active enforcement. Empirical analyses indicate that compellers with robust command structures and flexible postures—such as graduated response options—achieve better outcomes, as seen in historical cases where mismatched escalation ladders led to target defiance. In nuclear compellence, assured capabilities intersect with mutual assured destruction dynamics, complicating enforcement since targets may preemptively escalate to avoid coerced concessions under nuclear shadow. Studies show that while nuclear arsenals enhance general deterrence, they rarely translate to compellent success without conventional escalation control, as targets weigh the risk of crossing red lines into existential threats. Thus, effective compellence demands integrated strategies where assured capabilities ensure enforceability, and escalation control prevents the coercion from boomeranging into broader conflict.

Target's Incentives and Domestic Factors

The success of compellence hinges on the target's incentives, particularly an of motivation where the coercer demonstrates greater resolve and the target perceives defiance as more costly than compliance. Alexander George identified this as the primary factor favoring coercive diplomacy, emphasizing that the target must view the demanded action as feasible and less burdensome than enduring escalating threats or . Such incentives are amplified when the coercer aligns threats with the target's vulnerabilities, such as economic dependencies or imbalances, making continued resistance rationally untenable. However, targets often weigh not only immediate costs but also long-term reputational damage from yielding, which coercers frequently underestimate, thereby eroding compliance prospects. Domestic factors profoundly shape the target's capacity and willingness to concede, as leaders confront internal pressures that can elevate the political price of submission. Audience costs—penalties from domestic publics or elites for perceived weakness—constrain compliance, particularly in regimes where backing down risks eroding legitimacy or sparking opposition. In democracies, fragmented power structures, including interest groups and public opinion, often rigidify resolve by complicating any framing of concessions as non-capitulatory, while autocratic leaders may prioritize regime survival over defiance if internal cohesion falters. These dynamics contribute to compellence's empirical failure rate of about 35 percent across historical cases, as domestic imperatives routinely trump external coercion. Leadership perceptions of these constraints further mediate outcomes, with targets more amenable when compliance aligns with domestic interests or averts internal crises.

Empirical Effectiveness

Quantitative Studies on Success Rates

Quantitative analyses of compellence have primarily drawn on of militarized to assess rates, defined as the target's full compliance with the compeller's demands without escalation to full-scale . Todd S. Sechser's Militarized Compellent Threats dataset, covering 210 interstate compellent threat episodes from 1918 to 2001, reports a success rate of approximately 39% for explicit threats achieving target compliance. This figure aligns closely with other derivations from the same data, estimating full-compliance at 41.4%. These rates are notably lower than those for deterrence, highlighting compellence's inherent challenges, as targets must actively alter ongoing behavior rather than merely abstain.
StudyPeriodSuccess RateScope
Sechser (2011)1918–200139%Interstate compellent threats (n=242 explicit threats)
Downes & Glaser (2024)Various30%Nuclear compellence cases
Specialized studies on nuclear compellence reveal even lower efficacy. Alexander B. Downes and Charles L. Glaser's analysis of historical nuclear threats identifies a 30% success rate, with triumphs often tied to non-nuclear factors like conventional superiority rather than atomic leverage alone. Similarly, Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann's examination of nuclear-armed states' coercive efforts, using the same compellent threats dataset, finds no statistically significant advantage for possessors over non-nuclear , attributing this to credibility deficits in demonstrating resolve without self-harm. U.S.-centric analyses, such as those of post-1945 threats, report higher rates—around 55% overall—but these decline post-Cold War, suggesting power asymmetries aid but do not guarantee outcomes. These findings underscore compellence's empirical limitations, with hinging less on preponderance than on target perceptions of costs and the compeller's commitment, as evidenced by bivariate correlations in Sechser's data showing demonstrations of boosting odds but not overcoming structural barriers. Broader coercive diplomacy reviews, encompassing compellent elements, corroborate low rates (e.g., 35%), emphasizing selection effects where compellers initiate only winnable cases, yet failures persist due to resolve mismatches.

Factors Explaining Variance in Outcomes

Empirical analyses of compellent threats, such as Todd Sechser's dataset of 242 militarized compellent threats from 1918 to 2001, reveal a success rate of approximately 39%, with variance largely attributable to the perceived credibility of the coercer's resolve rather than raw capabilities or al factors alone. Sechser's findings emphasize that threats succeed when targets perceive the coercer as willing to escalate costs during the crisis, influenced by demonstrations of force or alliances signaling commitment, rather than post-hoc assessments of . For instance, demonstrations significantly reduce target resistance, as evidenced in regression models from a study of 112 dyads post-1950, where such actions lowered defiance probabilities (p<0.01), though they appeared in 72% of cases without guaranteeing outcomes. A primary determinant across studies is of motivation, where the target faces higher expected costs from defiance than the coercer does from enforcement; Alexander George identified this as the core condition in case-based analyses of coercive , arguing that targets comply when their stakes in maintaining the exceed the coercer's enforcement costs. This aligns with first-principles logic: compellence fails when targets calculate that partial defiance or escalation yields better utility, as seen in 57% of post-1950 episodes resulting in mutual unfavorable outcomes like or . Relative military power, measured by composite indices of national capability (CINC), shows insignificant effects, underscoring that material superiority alone does not compel without perceived resolve. Clarity and feasibility of demands further explain variance; ambiguous or overly broad requirements increase miscalculation risks, while specific, achievable actions—such as territorial withdrawals rather than —raise compliance odds by minimizing the target's perceived sunk costs. Target domestic factors, including regime type and , modulate responses: democracies similar to the coercer exhibit higher resistance thresholds due to audience costs, yet economic ties can incentivize compliance to avoid sanctions. In peace operations contexts, additional variance stems from strategic execution, with gradual escalation ("turning the screw") and negation of counter-coercion—via stronghold neutralization or severing third-party support—favoring success over blunt ultimatums, as demonstrated in cases like INTERFET in East Timor (1999), where incremental force and isolation yielded compliance without full-scale .
FactorEffect on SuccessEmpirical Support
Asymmetry of MotivationIncreases compliance when target stakes higherGeorge's case studies; explains ~20-30% variance in qualitative assessments
Military DemonstrationsReduces resistance (p<0.01)112-dyad analysis, 1918-2001 data
Demand Clarity/FeasibilityHigher for specific actionsSechser's MCT dataset; vague demands correlate with 60%+ failure
Third-Party Support AbsenceEnhances isolation, aiding denial strategiesEast Timor (1999): Indonesian withdrawal key to militia defeat
These factors interact causally: high coercer resolve amplifies capability perceptions, but without addressing target incentives or external backstops, even superior forces falter, as in 65% of analyzed threats escalating to limited conflict.

Illustrative Case Studies

Successful Applications

One prominent example of successful compellence occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, when the under President imposed a naval on and issued ultimatums demanding the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear missiles deployed there. The , facing credible threats of escalation including potential airstrikes and , agreed to dismantle and remove the missiles by October 28, 1962, averting direct superpower conflict. This outcome demonstrated effective signaling of resolve, as Kennedy's administration combined public demands with private assurances against invading , influencing Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's cost-benefit calculations without resorting to full-scale war. In 1994, the successfully compelled Haiti's , led by Raoul Cédras, to relinquish power and restore elected President through threats of multilateral invasion backed by UN Security Council Resolution 940. On September 15, 1994, President announced the imminent deployment of U.S. forces, prompting negotiations that culminated in the junta's agreement to step down; U.S. troops entered peacefully on September 19, 1994, facilitating Aristide's return on October 15 without combat. The strategy's success hinged on the credibility of U.S. military superiority and offers of safe exile for junta leaders, which reduced their domestic incentives to resist. NATO's Operation Allied Force in 1999 provides another case, where sustained airstrikes from March 24 to June 10 compelled Yugoslav President to withdraw forces from and accept UN Resolution 1244 terms, including international . After 78 days of bombing targeting and assets, Milošević capitulated on June 9, 1999, allowing ground entry on June 12 and halting ethnic operations that had displaced over 1.4 million . This coercive campaign succeeded by escalating costs asymmetrically while avoiding ground troops, though it required alliance unity and precise targeting to maintain pressure without broadening the conflict.

Failed Attempts

The ' Operation , a sustained bombing campaign against from March 2, 1965, to November 1, 1968, sought to compel to halt its support for the insurgency in and enter negotiations on favorable terms. Involving over 300,000 sorties and the delivery of approximately 864,000 tons of ordnance, the operation inflicted significant material damage, including the destruction of infrastructure and supplies, yet failed to alter North Vietnamese behavior; infiltration into the South continued unabated, and Hanoi's commitment to unification intensified. Analysts attribute this failure to the regime's ideological resolve, effective dispersal of forces, external sanctuary in and , and the campaign's gradual escalation, which permitted adaptation and propaganda framing of the attacks as unifying aggression. U.S. compellence efforts against in the prelude to the 1991 exemplified another prominent failure. Following 's invasion of on August 2, 1990, the and UN imposed comprehensive , naval blockades, and explicit military threats, including President George H.W. Bush's declaration on , 1990, demanding withdrawal by January 15, 1991, or face force. Saddam Hussein's regime, however, refused compliance, perceiving U.S. threats as bluffing due to domestic political constraints and miscalculating unity; sanctions, while disruptive, did not sufficiently raise the costs of defiance relative to the perceived benefits of retaining 's oil fields. This stalemate necessitated Operation Desert Storm's full-scale invasion on January 17, 1991, underscoring compellence's vulnerability to entrenched leader perceptions and the limits of non-invasive punishment against revisionist powers. Coercive diplomacy toward North Korea in 1994 provides a further case of compellence breakdown. Amid Pyongyang's violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and plutonium reprocessing at Yongbyon, the Clinton administration deployed Patriot missiles to South Korea, conducted joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises, and prepared for potential strikes, aiming to compel verifiable cessation of its nuclear program. North Korea rebuffed these measures, escalating by unloading spent fuel rods and threatening war, which exposed the asymmetry in resolve; U.S. restraint to avoid peninsula-wide conflict diluted threat credibility, while bilateral incentives overshadowed punishment, ultimately yielding to former President Jimmy Carter's intervention and the 1994 Agreed Framework rather than coerced concessions. These episodes highlight recurrent patterns in failed compellence, including targets' capacity to absorb costs, mismatched risk tolerances, and the challenges of signaling without immediate action.

Ambiguous or Mixed Results

In the 2013 Syrian chemical weapons crisis, the employed compellence through threats of strikes following the Ghouta attack that killed approximately 1,400 civilians, aiming to force President Bashar al-Assad's to relinquish its stockpiles. After deploying naval assets and preparing airstrikes, diplomatic maneuvering via led to join the on September 14, resulting in the destruction of over 1,300 metric tons of agents and 27 production facilities by mid-2014. However, outcomes were mixed: while substantial occurred, Assad retained residual capabilities, and regime forces resumed chemical attacks, including in 2014 and in 2017, indicating deterrence failures and incomplete compliance driven by regime survival priorities over sustained concessions. The 1994 Haitian crisis exemplified borderline compellence, where the sought to compel the led by to restore elected President after his 1991 ouster. , a UN embargo from October 1993, and escalating threats culminated in President Bill Clinton's September 15 televised for withdrawal, backed by preparations. Cédras resigned on October 10, allowing Aristide's return on October 15 without full-scale invasion, though 20,000 U.S. troops deployed to stabilize. Results proved ambiguous: short-term restoration succeeded amid junta internal stresses amplified by , but long-term instability persisted, with Aristide's later ouster in 2004 and ongoing governance failures, highlighting coercion's dependence on target vulnerabilities without addressing domestic roots. NATO's 1999 Operation Allied Force against represented mixed compellence to halt in and compel to withdraw forces. From March 24 to June 10, airstrikes targeted Serbian military assets after failed Rambouillet talks, pressuring to accept refugee returns and autonomy. Milošević capitulated on , enabling KFOR deployment, but ambiguities arose: initial refugee exodus worsened (over 800,000 displaced), civilian casualties exceeded 500, and coercion relied on air power alone without ground invasion, sparking debate on whether withdrawal stemmed from bombing efficacy or parallel factors like Russian mediation and internal Serbian opposition. Post-conflict independence in 2008 further underscored partial success, as violence recurred without full resolution of ethnic tensions.

Criticisms and Limitations

Theoretical Shortcomings

Compellence theory, as articulated by , presumes rational actors who respond predictably to credible threats by weighing costs and benefits, yet this overlooks cognitive biases, emotional factors, and irrational resolve observed in historical conflicts, such as the Viet Cong's willingness to endure unlimited pain irrespective of strategic odds. Schelling's framework reduces to a mechanistic logic, imposing a false purity on warfare by neglecting Clausewitzian concepts like , interdependence of actions, and of in , which complicate isolating causal effects in crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. A core theoretical asymmetry posits compellence as inherently more demanding than deterrence, requiring the target to undertake active, observable concessions that provoke domestic backlash and reputational costs, whereas deterrence merely sustains the with passive inaction; empirical analyses indicate compellent threats succeed in only about 35% of cases, underscoring the theory's underestimation of these barriers to compliance. Communication of threats remains problematic, as precise signaling is essential but prone to misperception due to cultural differences or incomplete information, eroding credibility without direct escalation that risks uncontrolled escalation. The theory's analytical emphasis yields elegant models but falters in prescriptive utility for practitioners, failing to integrate organizational dynamics, second-order consequences, or hybrid strategies adaptable to non-interactive or mixed-game scenarios, rendering it ill-suited for real-world policy formulation beyond abstract hypotheses. Treating compellence as a singular causal mechanism oversimplifies outcomes, ignoring multifaceted interactions that defy binary success-failure metrics and demand contextual nuance beyond Schelling's game-theoretic abstractions.

Practical and Ethical Constraints

Compellence demands that the coercing state demonstrate resolve through initial actions or escalating costs, unlike deterrence, which allows passive threats, thereby heightening the risk of unintended escalation or in prolonged conflicts. This active requirement often strains resources and domestic political support, as sustained demonstrations of commitment can provoke backlash or without guaranteed compliance. Logistical constraints, such as limited on target vulnerabilities or the defender's ability to harden key assets, further undermine effectiveness, particularly in denial-focused strategies where alone fails to neutralize ongoing threats. Empirical analyses of in compellent campaigns reveal low success rates, with coercive bombing succeeding in fewer than 10% of cases from 1917 to 1991, as adversaries often absorb costs without capitulating unless core denial capabilities are directly impaired. Variance arises from targets' intrinsic motivations, such as ideological commitments or fear of domestic reprisal for yielding, which blunt external pressure regardless of threat credibility. Ethically, compellence raises concerns under just war principles, as the deliberate imposition of harm to manipulate sovereign decisions challenges right intention by prioritizing instrumental over de-escalatory alternatives. Strategies involving punishment, such as , frequently violate norms by inflicting disproportionate civilian casualties, as evidenced in historical cases where air campaigns caused tens of thousands of deaths without achieving policy shifts. Proportionality is strained when compellent threats escalate to existential risks, potentially legitimizing preemptive under while eroding norms against coercive interference in internal affairs.

Modern Applications and Evolutions

Compellence in Nuclear and Asymmetric Contexts

In nuclear strategy, compellence entails the threat or limited use of nuclear weapons to induce an adversary to perform an action, contrasting with deterrence's focus on preventing undesired behavior. Thomas Schelling's framework highlights compellence's reliance on credible threats and demonstrations of resolve, often through brinkmanship, to manipulate an opponent's risk calculations in high-stakes crises. Nuclear superiority enhances compellence's viability by signaling overwhelming retaliatory capacity, enabling a state to impose costs that outweigh the adversary's resistance without mutual destruction. Historical instances underscore both successes and constraints. The U.S. atomic bombings of on August 6, 1945, and on August 9, 1945, compelled Japan's on August 15, 1945, averting prolonged invasion amid conventional stalemate. In the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, U.S. naval and implicit nuclear signaling forced Soviet withdrawal of missiles from by October 28, 1962, though success hinged on Khrushchev's perception of U.S. commitment rather than explicit nuclear threats. The 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis saw China's second nuclear threat prompt Soviet concessions on disputed territories, illustrating compellence's potential in peer-like nuclear dyads when paired with surprise or escalation dominance. Quantitative assessments identify only three plausible nuclear compellent successes since 1945, attributing efficacy to factors like surprise attacks and asymmetric nuclear postures, while noting failures in cases lacking clear enforceability. Asymmetric contexts complicate compellence, as stronger states confront weaker, often non-state with decentralized operations, ideological motivations, and high tolerance for attrition, rendering punishment strategies less effective than against rational state hierarchies. Non-state groups evade targeting through and exploitation, diluting the credibility of threats and shifting focus to tactics that raise operational costs without direct elimination. For example, U.S.-led coalitions in (2003–2011) and (2001–2021) applied airstrikes and raids to compel insurgent cessation of attacks, yet and resilience persisted, with groups reconstituting via asymmetric tactics like improvised explosives, underscoring compellence's limits absent reforms. In sub-state conflicts, compellence by denial has yielded mixed results; UN in the of Congo's Ituri from 2012 onward used robust patrols to compel armed groups like the FRPI to halt village raids, reducing incidents by imposing mobility constraints and logistical disruptions. Empirical reviews of state-non-state interactions reveal low success rates, even against materially inferior foes, due to insurgents' ability to externalize costs onto civilians or patrons, often resulting in prolonged attrition rather than decisive behavioral change. These dynamics highlight compellence's adaptation toward hybrid denial-punishment mixes in , though ideological commitment frequently overrides coercive pressures.

Cyber Compellence and Hybrid Threats

Cyber compellence refers to the strategic use of cyber operations to actively coerce an adversary into altering its behavior or reversing an action, extending traditional compellence theory—originally articulated by Thomas Schelling in 1966—into the digital domain by leveraging disruptions, data leaks, or system manipulations to impose costs and signal resolve. Unlike deterrence, which aims to prevent undesired actions through threats, cyber compellence demands observable compliance, such as halting operations or making concessions, often through denial-of-service attacks, wiper malware, or propaganda disruptions that degrade capabilities without kinetic escalation. However, its efficacy is constrained by cyberspace's attributes: ambiguous attribution enables deniability, reversible effects limit sustained pressure, and the domain's interdependence risks blowback, making credible threats difficult to calibrate. Empirical analyses indicate limited success for cyber compellence. A dataset of over 200 coercive cyber incidents from 2000 to 2014 found concessions in fewer than 10% of cases, primarily when paired with non-cyber leverage, as cyber actions alone rarely impose decisive costs or alter resolve. One rare example occurred in November 2014, when North Korean actors, identified by the U.S. government as the Guardians of Peace, hacked Entertainment in response to the film , leaking sensitive data and issuing threats that initially compelled Sony to cancel its theatrical release on December 25, 2014, demonstrating how targeted cyber punishment can exploit reputational vulnerabilities. In contrast, the U.S. Cyber Command's operations against , initiated in April 2016, involved disrupting online and command networks but yielded negligible battlefield impacts, with no of compelled territorial withdrawals despite hundreds of kinetic strikes. Similarly, alleged U.S. cyber interference with North Korean missile tests in 2017 disrupted several launches but failed to halt the program, as technical failures were confounded with cyber effects, underscoring attribution challenges in sustaining compellent . Hybrid threats amplify cyber compellence by integrating digital operations with kinetic, informational, and economic elements to coerce below the threshold of open war, blurring peacetime-wartime distinctions and exploiting gray-zone ambiguities. Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea exemplifies this: cyber attacks on Ukrainian communication networks, combined with "little green men" special forces and disinformation campaigns, disrupted coordination and compelled Kyiv's provisional acceptance of the status quo without full-scale invasion, achieving de facto control over the peninsula by March 2014. In the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia employed hybrid tactics including pre-invasion wiper malware like HermeticWiper on January 13, 2022, targeting government systems alongside missile strikes and information operations, yet these failed to compel capitulation; Ukraine's resilience, bolstered by rapid international aid and preemptive cyber hardening, sustained resistance. The CyberPeace Institute documented over 650 pro-Russian cyber incidents since February 2022, including DDoS and data destruction, but quantitative assessments of conflicts in Ukraine (2014–2016) reveal no causal link between 1,841 cyber events and kinetic outcomes like troop movements, indicating cyber's supplementary rather than decisive role in hybrid compellence. Scholars attribute hybrid cyber compellence's inconsistencies to synchronization failures: cyber effects dissipate quickly without kinetic reinforcement, and adversaries like have developed adaptive defenses, such as distributed networks and allied intelligence sharing, reducing vulnerability. frameworks emphasize hybrid threats' multidomain nature, where cyber enables for , but from Russo-Ukrainian engagements suggests it excels in disruption over behavioral change, often requiring escalation to achieve limited gains. This evolution challenges traditional compellence by favoring persistent, low-intensity pressure over decisive strikes, yet source biases in Western analyses—such as overemphasis on Russian aggression—must be weighed against verified incident data to avoid inflating cyber's coercive potential.

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  74. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Cyber-Compellence-%253A-Applying-Coercion-in-the-Age-Jensen/aad808b706370ec473f47b9159e1026bdda0c4a0
  75. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/zhukov/files/kz_idf_v25.pdf
  76. https://www.cigionline.org/documents/3540/PB_no.209.pdf
  77. https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/news/cyber-dimensions-of-a-hybrid-warfare/
  78. https://institutdelors.eu/content/uploads/2025/04/PP281_The-cybersecurity-dimension-of-the-war-in-Ukraine_Barichella_EN.pdf
  79. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/7/pdf/241007-hybrid-threats-and-hybrid-warfare.pdf
  80. https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/11/Assessing-Russian-Cyber-and-Information-Warfare-in-Ukraine.pdf
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