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Easter Sunday Raid on Ceylon
Part of the Pacific Theatre of World War II
Date5 April 1942
Location
Colombo, British Ceylon
Result Japanese victory
Belligerents
Empire of Japan Japan
Casualties and losses
7 aircraft[1]

26 aircraft

Many more killed on the ground.[2]

The Easter Sunday Raid was an air attack on Colombo, Ceylon during the Indian Ocean raid by carrier-based aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy on 5 April 1942. The Japanese objective was to destroy the Ceylon-based British Eastern Fleet in harbour. The British preemptively dispersed shipping from the harbours before the attacks due to advance warning from intelligence in March 1942, and air reconnaissance during the raid.

The attacking Japanese aircraft were met by fighters of the Royal Air Force's (RAF) 222 Group, commanded by Air Vice-Marshal John D'Albiac, and the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm (FAA), and anti-aircraft artillery. Port facilities were damaged, and ships both in harbour and – having dispersed – on the ocean were sunk or damaged. The bulk of the British Eastern Fleet was not found and survived.

The raid demonstrated Ceylon's vulnerability; British forces were not prepared to face further Japanese carrier raids. The Eastern Fleet relocated its main base to East Africa, from which it regularly deployed carrier task forces into the central and eastern Indian Oceans.

Background

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Main article: Indian Ocean raid § Background

British preparations

[edit]

Upon Japan's entry into the Second World War, the air defences on Ceylon consisted of only four obsolescent three-inch anti-aircraft guns at Trincomalee. The sole RAF squadron was 273 Squadron based at China Bay near Trincomalee; it flew four Vickers Vildebeest and four Fairey Seals torpedo bombers.[1] With the loss of Singapore in February 1942, British planners identified the island as essential to the defence of India and Allied lines of communication through the Indian Ocean.[3] The threat of Japanese carrier-borne air attack was recognized from the examples of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and Darwin in February 1942.[1]

Ceylon's air defences were reinforced in early 1942. Eight Hawker Hurricane fighters arrived on 23 February; they flew in from Karachi where they had been assembled from crates delivered by Cefn-Y-Bryn. 60 Hurricanes arrived on 6 and 7 March; they were ferried by HMS Indomitable[4] from the Middle East for 30 and 261 Squadrons RAF;[5] a Hurricane from 30 Squadron was lost in a crash at sea on 4 April. On 5 April, there were 37 or 38 serviceable Hurricanes near Colombo.[4] By 4 April, there were 803 and 806 Naval Air Squadrons (NAS) from the FAA,[6] and 44 Fairey Fulmars. The number of anti-aircraft guns increased to 144 by 4 April.[7]

222 Group also received Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boats, which spotted and shadowed the Japanese fleet during the raid. The only air reinforcement to Ceylon in the two months after 7 December 1941 consisted of the first Catalina.[1] By 4 April, there were seven operational aircraft;[7] four RAF, two Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), and one Dutch. Two RAF and three Dutch were unserviceable, with at least some being overhauled at Bangalore. Two more RCAF aircraft arrived on 6 and 7 April after the raid started.[4] Squadrons operating Catalinas included 205 Squadron RAF and 413 Squadron RCAF.[8]

Other air reinforcements included maritime and naval strike aircraft.[7]

The airbases at Ratmalana, near Colombo, and China Bay were expanded. Another was established at the Colombo Racecourse to relieve congestion at Ratmalana.[5] The Catalinas operated from Koggala and the adjacent lagoon, near the southern tip of the island.[9] The Japanese were unaware of the bases at the Colombo Racecourse[6] and Koggala.[9]

Colombo and Trincomalee each received a radar station.[7]

The Colombo radar station unit was AMES 254. Its personnel arrived on 18 March and its equipment on 22 March. The station became operational at the Royal Colombo Golf Club – about 6 miles (9.7 km) north of Ratmalana – on 25 March, and was connected by telephone to the No. 20 Operations Room on 28 March.[10]

The station at Trincomalee was established by AMES 272.[10]

Japanese preparations

[edit]

The initial IJN order authorizing the raid ("Operation C") was issued on 9 March 1942. By 16 March, the plan was to depart from Staring Bay, Celebes, on 26 March for an attack on Colombo ("C day") on 5 April;[11] these dates were honoured in the actual execution.[12]

The core of the Japanese force, commanded by Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, was five aircraft carriers; Akagi, Shōkaku and Zuikaku in Carrier Division 5, and Sōryū and Hiryū in Carrier Division 2.[13]

First moves

[edit]

Japanese preparations were detected by Allied intelligence. The British defensive plan was based on assessments from the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB), which expected a "C day" of 1 April.[11] As a result, British forces at Ceylon went on alert a few days too early. The Eastern Fleet, led by Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville, sortied on 30 March and deployed in a patrol area 100 miles (160 km) south of the island. Land-based aerial reconnaissance concentrating on the southeast. The deployments accurately reflected the direction that the Japanese would approach.[14]

With no sightings of the Japanese, the Eastern Fleet retired late on 2 April toward Addu Atoll to refuel at Port T, about 600 miles (970 km) southwest of Ceylon.[14] Ships were detached to resume previous commitments; the heavy cruisers HMS Cornwall and HMS Dorsetshire were sent to Colombo, and HMS Hermes to Trincomalee.[15] Ceylon air defences stood down, but long range Catalina patrols continued.[16]

Attack on Colombo

[edit]

Arrival of the Japanese fleet

[edit]
Leonard Birchall piloted the Catalina that initially spotted the Japanese fleet.

The Japanese cancelled a planned reconnaissance of Colombo harbour on 4 April by cruiser floatplanes.[17]

Before dawn on 4 April, Catalina QL-A of 413 Squadron RCAF, piloted by Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall, took off from Koggala to patrol the southernmost patrol sector. Later that day, the crew decided to repeat an assigned leg that took them to the southern-most point of their patrol; the repetition was conducted for navigational purposes.[18] At 16:00, at the southern-most point of the repeated leg, QL-A spotted the Japanese fleet on the southern horizon about 360 mi (310 nmi; 580 km) south-east of Ceylon.[19][8][14] The flying boat was attacked by at least 12 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters as it closed to get an accurate sighting. The radio was destroyed mid-transmission[19] so that the sighting, but not the size of the fleet, was reported.[14] Within seven minutes, QL-A was forced to make an emergency landing on the ocean. Strafing Zeroes sank the flying boat and killed two crew members in the water. Only six of the nine crew, including Birchall, survived to be captured by the Japanese destroyer Isokaze.[19] The prisoners claimed to have taken off from Colombo instead of Koggala,[9] and this was reported to the fleet flagship Akagi late on 4 April;[20] Koggala was not struck during the raid.[9] The prisoners also denied making any reports; this was undermined when the Japanese intercepted a signal from Colombo asking QL-A to repeat its report, indicating that surprise was lost.[19]

Catalina FV-R from 205 Squadron RAF, piloted by Flight Lieutenant "Jock" Graham, took off at 17:45 and took over shadowing the Japanese fleet. FV-R made reports at 22:37, and on 5 April at 00:45 and 06:15. The last reported Japanese ships 110 miles (180 km) and 195 degrees from Dondra Head, the southern tip of Ceylon. The Catalina was shot down by Japanese fighters about 90 minutes after making the final report, with the loss of the entire crew.[8]

Within an hour of QL-A's report, D’Albiac met with his subordinates to discuss an anticipated Japanese strike after dawn. 222 Group issued Operation Order No. 43 before midnight to warn subordinate units, and units went on alert at 04:00 on 5 April.[8][21] Per Operation Order No. 43, 803 NAS launched a six Fulmars from Ratmalana early on 5 April to conduct a line patrol from Bentota, 35 mi (56 km) south of Colombo on the west coast, to Pottuvri on the east coast.[22] Ships were ordered to disperse from the harbours at Colombo and Trincomalee. Cornwall and Dorsetshire left Colombo late on 4 April to rejoin the Eastern Fleet,[23] part of which had started sailing back to Ceylon from Port T after the QL-A report.[15]

At 05:45 on 5 April, Catalina BN-L of 240 Squadron RAF, piloted by Flight Lieutenant Bradshaw, took off to shadow the Japanese fleet.[21]

Failure of British early warning

[edit]
Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters escorted the attacking bombers.

The Japanese carriers began flying off 91 bombers and 36 fighters for the strike on Colombo[24] shortly after 06:00 on 5 April.[25]

Shortly after 06:40, Catalina BN-L spotted four Japanese aircraft flying north but misidentified them as Hurricanes and made no report. The flying boat was seen by the Japanese; Hiryu received a report of the encounter at 06:45.[21] The strike group approached Colombo from the sea to the south-east;[7][21] this course prevented detection by coast watchers and the 803 NAS line patrol.[22] AMES 254 and its radar also failed to detect or report the inbound strike.[26]

British fighter pilots waited for a scramble order that, due to the lack of early warning, never came. Instead they were forced to take off under fire, instead of starting the engagement pre-positioned in the air.[27]

The attack

[edit]
RAF Hawker Hurricanes made up the bulk of the defending fighters.

At 07:30, an advance force of nine Zero fighters from Hiryu flew over the Colombo Racecourse airbase and were spotted from the ground. The 14 Hurricanes of 258 Squadron RAF took off in good order by 07:35 and climbed toward the harbour. The airbase avoided attack.[6]

At 07:40, 38 Aichi D3A "Val" bombers from Shokaku and Zuikaku were spotted from Ratmalana. 14 from Zuikaku attacked the airbase at 07:45 as Hurricanes from 30 Squadron RAF were taking off in ones and twos. 21 Hurricanes took off (four were still on the ground when the first bombs fell) and another – the commanding officer's – was disabled attempting to take-off. Six Fulmars from 803 and 806 NAS also took off from Ratmalana. These British fighters were fully occupied defending the airbase, and were aided by heavy cloud cover. The first Hurricanes airborne attacked the bombers before any bombs were dropped. Five Vals and a Zero were destroyed, and up to six more Vals were damaged. In exchange, eight Hurricanes and three Fulmars were shot down. The airbase suffered little damage.[6]

19 Vals from Shokaku attacked the harbour around 07:50; they ultimately sank the armed merchant cruiser HMS Hector and damaged the submarine depot ship Lucia. They were set upon by 258 Squadron RAF shortly afterwards,[9] which decided to concentrate on bombers rather than the covering Zeros.[6] One Val was shot down, and damaged another, in exchange for eight Hurricanes destroyed and two badly damaged.[9]

The Shokaku Vals fully occupied 258 Squadron RAF, allowing the remaining bombers to attack the harbour and port unimpeded by British fighters.[9] Five Vals from Zuikaku damaged the British tanker San Cirilo. 53 Nakajima B5N "Kate" torpedo bombers, acting as level bombers, sank the old destroyer HMS Tenedos, damaged the merchant ship Benledi, and hit port facilities.[9]

In addition, the Norwegian tanker Soli was sunk and the British freighter Clan Murdoch was damaged.[20]

The Japanese strike was recovered by their carriers from 09:45 to 10:30.[13]

Second strike cancelled

[edit]
Main article: Indian Ocean raid § Loss of Dorsetshire and Cornwall

Carrier Division 5 reserve strike force was armed with high explosive bombs for a second strike on Colombo. This was cancelled when Japanese scout aircraft discovered Dorsetshire and Cornwall at 10:00 on 5 April. Carrier Division 5 reserve strike force was ordered to attack the British cruisers, but rearming with torpedoes encountered delays, and the cruisers were sunk by Carrier Division 2 instead.[28]

Aftermath

[edit]

British aircraft losses

[edit]

30 Squadron RAF had seven serviceable aircraft by nightfall. Eight Hurricanes had been shot down, and several damaged. Five pilots were killed and two wounded.[6]

258 Squadron RAF suffered eight Hurricanes shot down and two badly damaged, as well as five pilots killed and two wounded.[9]

803 and 806 NAS suffered four Fulmars shot down and three pilots killed.[6]

Six Fairey Swordfish from 788 Naval Air Squadron were also shot down; they were transferring from China Bay to Colombo for a strike on the Japanese fleet and arrived during the attack.[6]

Radar

[edit]

According to AMES 254's logs, its radar was operational during the battle and it did not detect the incoming strike.[10] Official post-war technical histories attributed the failure to technical limitations of the radar,[10] and operator error caused by fatigue due to "unequally divided watch-keeping roster."[29]

The short time that AMES 254 had been in Colombo may not have been sufficient to train operators to identify false radar echoes produced by local conditions; real echoes may have been mistaken for false echoes[10] Additionally, the radar antenna projected "lobes" in which objects might be detected, with gaps between lobes or lobes overlapping. The height of an object heavily affected detection range. The trajectory of the incoming Japanese aircraft may have inadvertently taken advantage in gaps between lobes.[29]

AMES 254 may simply not have had enough time to process the radar data, especially if operator fatigue was a factor.[29] The terrain around the radar limited maximum range to 60 mi (97 km). The distance travelled by Japanese aircraft between the edge of that radius to Ratmalana was 54 mi (87 km), and could be covered by a Zero at cruise speed in about 17 minutes. During the battle it took five minutes for the Hurricanes to take off and another six to climb to interception altitude. This left only six minutes for AMES 254 to report to No. 20 Operations Room and for orders to be issued to pilots.[10]

Awards

[edit]

Birchall was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for the sighting made by Catalina QL-A on 4 April,[30] and was called the "Saviour of Ceylon" by Canadian media. He was a prisoner of war for the remainder of the war.[31]

British Commonwealth units in Ceylon at the time of the attack

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Ground

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Ceylonese units

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Commonwealth units

[edit]

Air

[edit]

Royal Air Force

[edit]

Fleet Air Arm

[edit]

See also

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References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Easter Sunday Raid

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Easter Sunday Raid was a surprise aerial assault launched by carrier-based aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy against the British naval base at Colombo, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), on 5 April 1942, during World War II's Indian Ocean campaign. As part of Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's broader offensive to neutralize Allied forces in the region, the raid targeted the harbor, shipping, and Ratmalana airfield, resulting in the sinking of the destroyer HMS Tenedos and auxiliary cruiser HMS Hector, along with damage to other vessels and infrastructure. The attack was preceded by an early warning from Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall, who spotted the approaching Japanese fleet from his Catalina flying boat on 4 April, earning him the nickname "Saviour of Ceylon." In the initial wave, approximately 127 Japanese aircraft—including 36 A6M fighters, 38 D3A Val dive bombers, and 53 B5N Kate torpedo bombers—struck at dawn, exploiting the Easter Sunday timing when many defenders were attending services. British defenses, comprising Hurricanes, fighters, and anti-aircraft batteries under Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, claimed to have downed around 24 to 32 enemy planes while losing 13 Hurricanes along with Fulmars and other aircraft, for a total of around 27 British planes destroyed. The raid caused significant civilian casualties, with approximately 37 to 85 deaths and 77 injuries reported across sources, including 20 at the Angoda Mental Hospital, underscoring the attack's impact on non-combatants. A secondary phase of the operation targeted the heavy cruisers HMS Cornwall and HMS Dorsetshire, which were en route to join the Eastern Fleet; over 50 Japanese aircraft sank both Cornwall and Dorsetshire, leading to over 1,122 survivors being rescued amid heavy losses of around 425 personnel across the cruisers. This episode highlighted the vulnerability of unescorted British ships to coordinated carrier strikes, forcing Admiral James Somerville's Eastern Fleet to withdraw to safer positions like the . The raid's strategic significance lay in its demonstration of Japanese naval aviation prowess, akin to the attack, though British intelligence and preparations mitigated a total disaster by preserving the core fleet as a deterrent against further incursions. It formed the opening salvo of the larger , which continued with strikes on on 9 April, sinking the carrier HMS Hermes and escalating Allied casualties to over 1,000, but ultimately failed to secure Japanese dominance in the theater due to logistical constraints and mounting losses elsewhere in the Pacific.

Strategic Context

Allied Vulnerabilities in the

The fall of on 15 February 1942 marked a devastating blow to British military prestige, resulting in the largest capitulation in the nation's history with over 80,000 troops surrendering to Japanese forces. This defeat shattered the myth of as an impregnable fortress and crippled British naval across , as the loss of the island's strategic eliminated a key forward operating hub for the Royal Navy in the . Consequently, the British were compelled to withdraw major fleet elements southward, exposing vast stretches of the to Japanese incursion and forcing a reevaluation of defensive postures in the region. Compounding this setback, the Japanese conquest of the progressed rapidly in early , with the fall of key islands including by mid-March, securing control over abundant oil fields and eliminating another major Allied stronghold. These losses severed access to critical resources and bases, rendering Allied supply routes to and the perilously vulnerable to Japanese interdiction across the . Without the protective screen of Dutch territories, convoys carrying essential war materials faced heightened risks of and air attack, straining the logistical backbone of British operations in and beyond. In the wake of these territorial collapses, Ceylon assumed paramount importance as the primary naval hub for the British Eastern Fleet, which was formally established and placed under the command of Admiral Sir in March 1942. Somerville's fleet, comprising aging battleships, cruisers, and limited carrier support, relied heavily on Ceylon's deep-water ports at and for maintenance, resupply, and as a staging point to safeguard remaining Allied sea lanes. This dependence amplified the island's strategic value, as any disruption there could isolate British forces and hinder responses to Japanese advances in the theater. Ceylon's economic contributions further underscored its vulnerability, as the island served as a major exporter of tea and rubber—vital commodities for Allied industry and logistics during the war. from Ceylon helped sustain morale and rations for British troops and civilians, while rubber supplies supported and equipment production amid global shortages. Additionally, its central position in the made Ceylon an indispensable refueling and repair stop for merchant convoys shuttling oil, troops, and supplies from the to the and , thereby tying the island's defense directly to the broader Allied sustainment effort.

Japanese Expansion Goals in 1942

In early 1942, as part of their broader Pacific campaign following successes in , Japan's Imperial Navy pursued expansion into the to weaken British colonial holdings and secure strategic dominance. The , conducted from March to April 1942 and designated Operation C, encompassed multiple coordinated actions, including the occupation and attacks on the in late March to establish forward bases and disrupt Allied logistics in the . This larger operation aimed to challenge British naval superiority and isolate key Allied territories by targeting vital maritime routes. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo commanded the First Air Fleet, known as the Kido Butai or Mobile Force, which formed the striking arm of Operation C. On March 9, 1942, Admiral , Commander-in-Chief of the , issued direct orders to Nagumo to execute the raid, emphasizing the destruction of enemy naval assets and infrastructure in the region. Nagumo's force, comprising five fleet carriers, battleships, cruisers, and supporting vessels with over 300 aircraft, departed from Staring Bay in the Celebes on March 26 to carry out these objectives. The primary goals focused on neutralizing the British Eastern Fleet based in Ceylon, thereby preventing it from interfering with Japanese advances in and beyond. By severing Allied supply lines across the , particularly those connecting to and , sought to cripple British reinforcements and resource flows, including critical rubber shipments from Ceylon that supported the . This disruption was intended to force the Royal Navy into a defensive posture and open pathways for further Japanese incursions toward the . Supporting these aims, Japanese submarines conducted reconnaissance in early 1942, positioning themselves off key Ceylon ports like and to gather intelligence on British defenses. These vessels, including I-2, I-3, I-4, I-6, and I-7, reported on the substantial naval and air forces present, providing Nagumo with essential data on Allied dispositions despite the challenges of limited visibility and detection risks. This intelligence informed the timing and targeting of the carrier strikes, enhancing the operation's potential effectiveness.

Prelude to the Raid

British Defensive Measures in Ceylon

In response to the growing Japanese threat in the Indian Ocean following the fall of , the British established a comprehensive defensive in Ceylon under Sir Geoffrey Layton, who was appointed , Ceylon on 5 1942, with authority over all military and civil defenses. Layton's command integrated ground, naval, and air forces to protect key installations, particularly Harbor and , which were vital for Allied supply lines to and the . Air defense responsibilities fell to John D'Albiac, who took command of No. 222 Group on 13 1942, overseeing the Royal Air Force's operational assets and coordinating with naval elements to counter anticipated carrier-based air raids. To bolster ground-based air defenses, British forces deployed multiple anti-aircraft units across Ceylon's strategic sites. By late 1942, the island had 52 heavy anti-aircraft guns and 64 light guns, with reinforcements including the 1st Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, (24 mobile 3.7-inch guns arriving 1 ), the 65th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment (up to 20 static 3.7-inch guns, 11 operational by early April), and the 43rd and 55th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments (72 40 mm guns combined, arriving 4 March). The Ceylon Garrison Artillery contributed additional 40 mm guns, totaling around 62 land-based anti-aircraft pieces in the area by early April, positioned to protect harbors, airfields, and fuel depots. Searchlights were integrated into these defenses, particularly around and Ratmalana, to support night operations and enhance gunner visibility against low-level attackers, though their deployment remained limited compared to gun batteries. Fighter squadrons were concentrated at key RAF bases to provide interception capability. At Ratmalana airfield near , No. 30 Squadron operated 22 Hawker Hurricane IIB fighters, while squadrons 803 and 806 Naval Air Squadrons each fielded 12 II fighters, totaling 46 aircraft ready for rapid scramble. China Bay, the primary base near , hosted No. 261 Squadron with 16 Hurricane IIBs and No. 273 Squadron with 16 Fulmar I and II fighters, supported by additional Martlet fighters from No. 888 Squadron, though some were unserviceable. A secondary strip at the accommodated No. 258 Squadron's 14 Hurricanes by late March, allowing for dispersed operations to mitigate airfield vulnerability. These deployments emphasized high-altitude , drawing lessons from to prioritize radar-directed fighters over harbor static defenses. Naval protection was adjusted by relocating the bulk of the Eastern Fleet under Sir , who assumed command on 26 March 1942, to Addu Atoll in the by 2 April, approximately 600 miles southwest of Ceylon. This move aimed to evade Japanese detection and preserve capital ships—including carriers HMS Indomitable and Formidable, battleship HMS Warspite, and supporting cruisers and destroyers—while leaving only lighter elements, such as the carrier and older battleships, in Ceylon waters for coastal patrol. Consequently, Colombo Harbor was lightly protected, relying on dispersed merchant shipping and minimal surface escorts rather than a concentrated fleet anchorage. Reconnaissance efforts were limited but critical, utilizing flying boats from No. 240 Squadron (RAF) and No. 413 Squadron (RCAF), based at the secluded Koggala lagoon, with six aircraft operational by early April. These long-range patrols covered sectors southeast of Ceylon, providing early warning of approaching threats up to 400 miles out. Complementing this, the Y-Service's arm, through the Far East Combined Bureau in , intercepted and decrypted Japanese JN-25B naval codes by early March, identifying carrier movements from Staring Bay and forecasting an attack on Ceylon around early April, which informed patrol scheduling and alert postures.

Japanese Naval Planning and Deployment

The Japanese naval planning for the Easter Sunday Raid, part of Operation C, was orchestrated by Vice Admiral commanding the 1st Carrier Air Fleet (Kidō Butai) with the primary objective of neutralizing British naval forces in the by striking key ports in Ceylon. The composition centered on five fleet carriers—Akagi (flagship), Hiryū, Sōryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku—embodying the core striking power with approximately 275 aircraft including A6M Zero fighters, D3A Val dive bombers, and B5N Kate torpedo bombers. Supporting these were the 3rd Squadron comprising the fast battleships Kongō (), Haruna, Hiei, and Kirishima for heavy gunfire support and anti-submarine screening; the 8th Cruiser Squadron with heavy cruisers Tone () and Chikuma, each equipped with four floatplanes for , plus light cruiser Abukuma; and with nine destroyers divided into Divisions 17 and 18 for escort duties. A dedicated supply unit including oilers ensured logistical sustainability during the extended voyage. The fleet departed its anchorage at Staring Bay in the Celebes (modern , ) on March 26, 1942, at 0800 hours Japan Standard Time, initiating a meticulously planned circuitous route designed to evade Allied detection and conserve fuel. Steering southward through the Ombai Strait, the formation passed west of , conducting underway refueling north of from March 31 to April 2 with four attached oilers that were subsequently detached. The route then curved westward into the , skirting south of the recently captured —secured by Japanese forces on March 23—to maintain and avoid British patrol lines, positioning the approximately 250 nautical miles southeast of Ceylon by early April without alerting enemy . This logistical approach prioritized surprise, drawing on lessons from the operation while accounting for the longer transit distances in the . Aerial reconnaissance played a critical role in validating the approach, with floatplanes from heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma planned for launch on 5 April but canceled on 3 April; primary pre-strike surveys on 4 April were conducted by "" flying boats operating from Japanese bases on the . These seaplanes reported sparse Allied warship activity at and confirmed clear weather conditions, enabling Nagumo to refine strike parameters without compromising the fleet's position. This layered minimized risks from British dispositions, which were dispersed across Ceylon's harbors in of a potential threat. Coordination with submarine wolfpacks from Submarine Squadron 2, based at , further enhanced through advance scouting of Ceylon's ports. Submarines I-2, I-3, and I-7 formed a picket line, with I-2 patrolling off from March 31 to April 3 and transmitting weather and reconnaissance reports indicating no major British fleet presence, while I-3 positioned off by April 2 to monitor harbor traffic and patrol vessels. These boats, operating as an integrated wolfpack, relayed real-time intelligence via encrypted bursts to Nagumo's , spotting auxiliary ships like the oiler Glenshiel (sunk by I-7 on April 3) and confirming the absence of capital ships, which informed the decision to prioritize the Colombo strike. Similar support from I-10 and I-16 in broader patrols provided supplementary spotting for British shipping, ensuring the carrier force's undetected advance.

The Attack Unfolds

Japanese Carrier Fleet Approach

Following their earlier deployment across the from advanced bases in the , the Japanese carrier task force under Vice Admiral maneuvered into final attack position approximately 200 nautical miles southeast of Ceylon at dawn on Sunday, April 5, 1942. The weather cooperated fully with the operation, offering clear skies that enhanced visibility for the assembled strike force and a calm that supported stable carrier deck operations. At 06:15, the five carriers—Akagi, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku—launched 127 aircraft in total, including dive bombers, torpedo bombers adapted for level bombing, and Mitsubishi A6M fighters for escort duties. The air group was strategically divided, with 53 B5N level bombers assigned to strike targets in Colombo Harbor, 38 D3A dive bombers directed toward the island's key airfields and other installations, escorted by 36 A6M fighters to neutralize British air defenses.

Breakdown of British Early Warning Systems

The British early warning systems in Ceylon during the lead-up to the Easter Sunday Raid suffered from a combination of incomplete intelligence assessments and operational shortcomings, allowing the Japanese carrier force to approach undetected until provided partial alerts on the eve of the attack. (SIGINT) from the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) had decrypted Japanese JN-25B codes by early March 1942, revealing plans for a carrier raid on around 1-2 , but the analysis underestimated the force size (five carriers instead of the expected two) and failed to account for a schedule delay that pushed the operation to 5 . This misjudgment stemmed from incomplete decryption of revised Japanese orders, leading command centers to relax alerts prematurely. Coastal reconnaissance efforts, primarily conducted by Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Air Force Catalina flying boats, were hampered by limited availability and identification errors, resulting in delayed or incomplete warnings. On 4 April, a No. 413 Squadron Catalina (QL-A), piloted by Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall, sighted the Japanese Kidō Butai approximately 360 miles southeast of Ceylon at 1600 hours and transmitted a report identifying two carriers and escorts, providing about 15 hours' notice before the air strikes; however, the aircraft was shot down shortly after, preventing further details on the full fleet composition. Earlier that day, another Catalina from No. 240 Squadron (BN-L) had spotted Japanese aircraft at 0640 hours but misidentified them as friendly British planes, delaying its report by roughly 50 minutes and contributing to fragmented situational awareness. These patrols were further constrained by ongoing maintenance challenges with the aging Catalina fleet, including engine reliability issues in the tropical climate, which reduced the number of sorties and left gaps in coverage over critical approach sectors. Radar detection capabilities were severely limited by inadequate infrastructure and environmental factors, offering minimal seaward coverage against the inbound Japanese formations. Ceylon's sole operational radar station, Experimental Station (AMES) 254—a Chain Home-type system installed at Colombo's Ridgeway Golf Links and activated on 25 March 1942—had a maximum range of about 60 miles but suffered from persistent blind spots caused by surrounding hills, permanent echoes from terrain, and gaps in its vertical polar diagram, rendering it ineffective for tracking low-flying or distant naval targets over the ocean. Operator fatigue from extended 9-hour shifts exacerbated these technical limitations, preventing timely detection of the launched from the carriers around 0630 hours on 5 April, approximately 200 miles south of Ceylon. A secondary station at Diyatalawa provided inland monitoring but lacked seaward orientation, leaving the primary approach vectors unmonitored. Communication delays between SIGINT intercepts, reconnaissance reports, and operational command centers in compounded these vulnerabilities, resulting in no coordinated alert before the raiders appeared overhead. Although Birchall's 4 April sighting reached Eastern Fleet headquarters via radio, the incomplete fleet details and lack of follow-up meant Vice Admiral James Somerville's staff could not confirm the threat's scale, leading to insufficient dispersal of aircraft and ships. Intercepts from and carrier-based patrols offshore yielded no detections, as Japanese forces maintained a cautious distance from shore, while fragmented radio relays from SIGINT to No. 20 Operations Room delayed fighter scrambles by up to an hour. These systemic lags ensured that defending Hurricanes and remained grounded until visual sightings at approximately 0730 hours, when the first Japanese bombers were already in visual range.

Execution of the Air Strikes on Colombo

At approximately 07:40 on 5 1942, of 127 Japanese carrier-based aircraft from the Kidō Butai fleet, including dive bombers, torpedo bombers, and fighters, arrived over after launching from carriers positioned about 200 nautical miles southeast of the . The attackers focused primarily on Harbor's facilities, the nearby Kolonnawa oil storage tanks, and the RAF Ratmalana airfield south of the city, aiming to disrupt British naval operations and logistics in the . Due to a breakdown in British early warning systems, the raid caught ground defenses largely unprepared, allowing the Japanese formations to penetrate with minimal initial interception. The assault on the harbor involved coordinated dive-bombing and runs, resulting in the sinking of the armed merchant HMS Hector after multiple direct hits and the destroyer HMS Tenedos, which was immobilized in refit and exploded following bomb strikes. Several other vessels sustained damage, including the depot ship HMS Lucia, which suffered a large hole in its side, and merchant ships such as Benledi and San Cirilo. Attacks on the Kolonnawa oil tanks were less successful; although targeted, the Japanese bombers mistakenly struck the nearby Angoda Mental Asylum, igniting fires but failing to cause significant fuel storage disruption. In response, British air defenses scrambled around 41 fighters, primarily Hawker Hurricanes from Nos. 30 and 258 Squadrons along with Fairey Fulmars from Nos. 803 and 806 Naval Air Squadrons, though many arrived after the initial bombing wave had begun. These aircraft engaged the Japanese formations in fierce dogfights over the harbor and airfield, claiming 27 enemy planes shot down—including several D3A Vals and at least one —while suffering losses of approximately 20 fighters, with 10 pilots killed. Additionally, six Fairey torpedo bombers attempting to land at Ratmalana were intercepted and destroyed by Japanese . Ground damage was concentrated in the harbor area, where workshops and repair facilities were heavily bombed and set ablaze, alongside disruptions to port operations. At Ratmalana airfield, strafing and bombing destroyed several hangars, a repair shop, and fuel dumps, though overall structural damage remained limited due to partial cloud cover and fighter interceptions. Civilian casualties totaled 85 deaths and 77 injuries, including at least 20 at the Angoda Mental Asylum from the errant strikes on the oil tank area. The raid lasted about 20 minutes before the Japanese aircraft withdrew southward to their carriers.

Decision to Abort the Second Wave

Following the first wave's attack on , which targeted harbor facilities and airfields but encountered no major British warships, Japanese reconnaissance floatplanes launched from heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma at 0600 on , 1942, conducted searches southwest of the harbor. These floatplanes, including an E7K from Tone, reported no significant enemy naval presence in or near Harbor, confirming the absence of capital ships such as battleships or carriers. Vice Admiral , commanding the Kidō Butai carrier force, assessed that the British Eastern Fleet had evaded the trap and dispersed to sea, rendering a second strike on ineffective for achieving decisive results against major surface units. This evaluation, informed by the floatplane reports and the first wave's observations of only minor vessels like the auxiliary cruiser HMS Hector and destroyer HMS Tenedos, prompted Nagumo to cancel the planned afternoon follow-up wave of approximately 53 D3A dive bombers originally intended to further pound the port. Instead, at around 1000, upon a subsequent floatplane sighting of British heavy cruisers HMS Cornwall and HMS Dorsetshire approximately 100 miles southwest of Ceylon, Nagumo redirected the reserve aircraft to pursue and sink these fleeing targets, prioritizing opportunistic destruction over redundant harbor bombardment. The decision to abort the Colombo second wave also stemmed from mounting operational risks, including fuel constraints after the long transit into the Indian Ocean and the potential for Allied counterattacks following the earlier detection of the Japanese fleet by a British Catalina flying boat on April 4. Prolonged loitering near Ceylon increased exposure to British reconnaissance and air strikes from the dispersed Eastern Fleet, which Nagumo sought to avoid to preserve his carriers for subsequent objectives. By midday on April 5, after recovering the first wave aircraft and launching the redirected strike against the cruisers, Nagumo ordered the Kidō Butai to withdraw southward on a course of 135 degrees, shifting strategic focus to an anticipated attack on Trincomalee scheduled for April 9.

Immediate Aftermath

Damage Assessment and Casualties

The Japanese aircraft struck several vessels in Harbour, sinking the armed merchant cruiser HMS Hector and the destroyer HMS Tenedos, while damaging the submarine depot ship HMS Lucia and the tanker SS San Cirilo; Japanese reports greatly overstated these successes, claiming the sinking of five warships and thirty merchant vessels. British casualties from the raid totaled approximately 85 civilians killed and 77 injured, including 20 at the Angoda Mental Hospital from strikes on populated areas, and about 55 military personnel killed (primarily from the sunk ships and aircraft losses) with additional wounded. These figures pertain to the attack on Colombo harbor and airfield and do not include the concurrent air strike on HMS Cornwall and HMS Dorsetshire en route to join the fleet, which sank both cruisers with over 400 personnel killed. Harbor operations faced significant disruptions lasting several weeks due to damage to docks, workshops, and berthed ships, while infrastructure impacts included hits on oil storage facilities at Kolonnawa causing fires, alongside cratering of runways at Ratmalana airfield—with three bomb craters temporarily hampering aircraft movements; the Colombo Racecourse airfield escaped damage as its location was unknown to the attackers. Japanese losses during the broader operations on April 5 amounted to 18-20 aircraft and 33 aircrew, with most stemming from engagements over and the attack on the cruisers, as well as operational accidents during recovery to the carriers.

Analysis of British Aircraft Losses

During the Easter Sunday Raid on April 5, 1942, British forces in Ceylon suffered significant aircraft losses, with a total of 27 (RAF) and (FAA) planes destroyed primarily on the ground at Ratmalana airfield and other locations near . These included approximately 15 Hawker Hurricanes, 4 Fairey Fulmars, and 6 , many of which were caught in the open due to the Japanese attackers' achievement of complete tactical surprise. The raid, led by Japanese carrier-based aircraft under , exploited the vulnerability of these aircraft, which were fully fueled and armed in preparation for routine patrols, making them highly susceptible to strafing and bombing runs. Key contributing factors to the ground losses were inadequate aircraft dispersal and insufficient camouflage measures at forward bases like Ratmalana, where squadrons such as No. 30 RAF (equipped with Hurricanes) and FAA units were concentrated without effective protective dispersion across multiple sites. This lack of preparation stemmed from overreliance on early warning systems that failed to detect the approaching Japanese fleet, allowing low-level attacks to target exposed rows of parked aircraft with minimal interference from ground defenses. As a result, the destruction represented nearly half of the available British fighter strength in Ceylon, severely limiting immediate response capabilities. In addition to ground losses, British interceptors engaged the Japanese formations in the air, but suffered 7 fighters downed during these skirmishes, primarily due to numerical inferiority against the more maneuverable A6M fighters escorting the bombers. Squadrons like No. 258 RAF, flying Hurricanes, managed to claim several Japanese aircraft but were overwhelmed by the raid's scale, with pilots facing coordinated attacks from superior numbers of Zeros that outclassed the British machines in dogfights over . Post-raid salvage efforts yielded only partial recovery of damaged , as many were beyond repair from and structural damage, further hampering air defenses against potential follow-up threats in the theater. This incomplete restoration left Ceylon's squadrons understrength, forcing reliance on reinforcements and contributing to a temporary vulnerability in the region's aerial coverage.

Long-Term Consequences

Enhancements to Radar and Detection

Following the Easter Sunday Raid, which exposed the limitations of Ceylon's early warning systems due to incomplete coverage, the British rapidly implemented reforms to bolster and detection capabilities across the and the theater. Sir Geoffrey Layton, appointed , Ceylon, on 5 March 1942, was granted extensive authority to reorganize defenses, including the installation of additional sets at key sites. By mid-1942, AMES Type 271 centimetric systems were deployed to enhance surface and air detection, providing more reliable tracking of approaching threats over the previous improvised warning network that had faltered during the attack. These upgrades addressed the prior scarcity of assets, with only one AMES unit operational beforehand, and significantly improved response times for air defenses in and . Civil defense structures were expanded to support these technical enhancements, including the reorganization of observer networks akin to the Royal Observer Corps and their integration with improved for accelerated alerts. Layton's reforms revamped local coordination between naval, military, and air forces, incorporating better communication lines to fuse data with intercepted signals, thereby reducing the delays that had plagued the raid response. This integration allowed for faster dissemination of warnings, drawing on lessons from the incomplete pre-raid setup where detection errors contributed to vulnerability. To extend detection beyond land-based systems, the British shifted emphasis toward offshore patrols, utilizing s for closer maritime surveillance and enhancing Consolidated Catalina flying boat operations for long-range reconnaissance. Catalinas, capable of patrolling up to 420 miles from , were prioritized for scouting Japanese carrier groups, complementing the new installations and providing early identification of fleet movements. Naval forces, including squadrons from Force A and B, intensified these patrols post-raid to create a layered detection perimeter around Ceylon. These enhancements in Ceylon influenced broader Allied strategies, with lessons on radar deployment and integrated warning networks applied to reinforce defenses in , where similar systems were extended to protect key ports and airfields. The reforms also informed protective measures for , underscoring the need for robust offshore reconnaissance and radar coverage to safeguard supply lines across the , though specific adaptations varied by theater. By late 1942, these changes had transformed Ceylon into a more resilient base, deterring further large-scale Japanese incursions.

Strategic Impact on the Indian Ocean Campaign

The Easter Sunday Raid on on April 5, 1942, temporarily paralyzed the port as a viable base for the British Eastern Fleet, inflicting significant damage to harbor facilities, oil storage, and air defenses, which compelled the Royal Navy to disperse its forces and rely more heavily on eastern ports such as Bombay and Kilindini for operations and resupply. This shift undermined 's role as a forward naval hub in the , exposing the vulnerability of Ceylon-based assets and forcing Admiral Sir to reposition his fleet southward to Addu Atoll and eventually to safer anchorages in and , thereby ceding tactical initiative to the Japanese in the central for several months. The raid's momentum carried into a follow-up Japanese strike on Trincomalee on April 9, where carrier aircraft from Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's fleet sank the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes, the destroyer HMAS Vampire, and auxiliary vessels such as the corvette HMS Hollyhock, while damaging the harbor; earlier on April 5, the heavy cruisers HMS Cornwall and HMS Dorsetshire had been sunk in a separate strike en route to Ceylon. Yet the operation ultimately failed to lure the main Eastern Fleet into a decisive engagement, as Somerville's forces had already withdrawn to avoid confrontation. This partial success disrupted British naval cohesion but did not achieve the broader Japanese objective of neutralizing Allied sea power in the Bay of Bengal, allowing the Eastern Fleet to survive intact despite heavy losses in shipping and aircraft. The operation's limited strategic yield stemmed from Nagumo's decision to abort a second wave against Colombo due to fuel constraints and the absence of the primary target, preserving British convoy routes in the long term while highlighting the raid's role as a high-risk probe rather than a campaign-ending blow. For , the raid provided a morale boost following the triumphs at and in , reinforcing perceptions of unchallenged carrier dominance and briefly projecting power into the theater, but it also accelerated overextension by diverting five fleet carriers and supporting battleships back to the Pacific, where they would face defeat at the in June 1942 due to similar reconnaissance and coordination shortcomings exposed during Operation C. In the broader context, the events underscored the fragility of fragmented Allied command structures in the region, prompting calls for integrated leadership that culminated in the appointment of Louis Mountbatten as of in 1943, which streamlined operations and bolstered defenses against further Japanese incursions while securing vital supply lines to the and beyond.

Awards and Honors Conferred

Leonard Birchall of No. 413 Squadron, , was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for his flight on 4 April 1942, during which he sighted the approaching Japanese carrier fleet and transmitted a critical warning that allowed British forces in Ceylon to prepare defenses for the impending Easter Sunday Raid. His actions, despite subsequent capture after his Catalina flying boat was shot down, were recognized for demonstrating outstanding courage and devotion to duty in the face of enemy fighters. Several pilots who engaged Japanese aircraft during the raid on received the Distinguished Flying Cross for their gallantry. P. C. Fletcher of No. 258 Squadron led his squadron in intercepting dive bombers, destroying one enemy aircraft while wounded, and was awarded the DFC for his leadership under fire. S. R. Peacock-Edwards of the same squadron was credited with destroying at least one Japanese aircraft in a fierce engagement involving six enemies and received the DFC for his skill and determination. Ground crew, anti-aircraft gunners, and personnel who manned positions and responded to the attack amid intense bombing were honored through Mentions in Despatches and commendations for brave conduct. Welders Don John Palihakkara and Kuruwitage Girigoris Silva were commended for their efforts in Civil Defence services during the raid, while Overseer Forest Raymond Swan received the for gallantry in maintaining harbor operations under fire. Mechanical superintendents Richard Shepperd Shaw and Arthur William Henry Phelps were awarded the Member of the for their leadership in damage control and resilience. No was awarded for actions related to the raid, though post-event inquiries highlighted the effectiveness of air defense efforts and led to these various honors recognizing the collective resilience of personnel in defending . Japanese records on awards for the Easter Sunday Raid are limited, with no specific decorations or promotions directly attributed to Chūichi Nagumo or his subordinates for this operation, though Nagumo's command of the broader contributed to his later advancement to full admiral in 1943.

Forces Engaged

British and Units in Ceylon

The air defenses of Ceylon in 1942 were primarily provided by squadrons equipped with fighter aircraft. No. 30 Squadron , operating Hawker Hurricane IIb fighters, was based at Ratmalana airfield near , having arrived in early March to bolster island defenses. No. 258 Squadron , also flying Hurricanes (including IIb and I variants), was formed on 1 March 1942 and stationed at Ratmalana and the airstrip, contributing to the fighter cover for key installations. Additionally, the deployed fighter squadrons, with No. 803 and No. 806 Squadrons based at Ratmalana, providing reconnaissance and interception capabilities from naval air facilities. Ground forces in Ceylon formed the Ceylon Garrison, responsible for defending strategic ports and airfields, under the overall command structure that included local volunteer units. The Ceylon Light Infantry Volunteers, a expanded to multiple battalions by , provided support and duties across the , drawing from local recruits to supplement regular troops. The 21st (East Africa) Brigade (elements later incorporated into the 11th East Africa Division), arrived in March to reinforce defenses, focusing on jungle training and coastal security with African colonial troops. Naval presence in Ceylon's harbors, particularly and , was limited to defensive and auxiliary vessels due to the dispersal of the main Eastern Fleet. Harbor defense included smaller warships such as the HMS Tenedos and the HMS Hector, alongside auxiliary vessels like the submarine depot ship HMS Lucia, which supported submarine operations and port logistics. contributions extended to auxiliary roles, with Indian troops from elements of the 20th Indian Division providing infantry brigades and an armored car battalion for mobile defense and . Australian personnel served in naval auxiliary capacities, including crews on destroyers like HMAS Norman attached to Eastern Fleet duties in the region. New Zealand troops participated in limited support roles, primarily through individual attachments to RAF units and ground logistics, enhancing the multinational defensive posture. Defenses also included anti-aircraft batteries and systems coordinated under Sir Geoffrey Layton.

Japanese Naval and Air Components

The Japanese naval component for the Easter Sunday Raid, conducted on April 5, 1942, as part of Operation C in the Indian Ocean, was centered on Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo's First Air Fleet (Kidō Butai), comprising five fleet aircraft carriers: the flagship Akagi, Hiryū, Sōryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku. These carriers formed the core striking force, with Akagi, Hiryū, and Sōryū providing the primary fighters for the initial assault wave, while Shōkaku and Zuikaku contributed dive bombers. Supporting the carrier group were all four Kongō-class battleships—Kongō, Haruna, Hiei, and Kirishima—which offered heavy escort and potential gunfire support, along with heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma tasked with reconnaissance; floatplanes from Tone and Chikuma detected British cruiser movements in the Bay of Bengal earlier that day, enabling precise targeting. The air groups aboard these carriers were tailored for long-range strikes, with Akagi embarking 19 A6M2 Zero fighters, 17 D3A1 Val dive bombers, and 18 B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers under the command of its air group leader. Hiryū and Sōryū carried similar breakdowns, Hiryū with 18 fighters, 18 Val dive bombers, and 18 Kate torpedo bombers, and Sōryū with 20 fighters, 18 Val dive bombers, and 18 Kate torpedo bombers, emphasizing a balanced force for escort, precision , and anti-shipping roles. Shōkaku and Zuikaku focused more on dive-bombing capacity, Shōkaku hosting 18 fighters, 19 Val dive bombers, and 19 Kate torpedo bombers, and Zuikaku 18 fighters, 19 Val dive bombers, and 18 Kate torpedo bombers, though some aircraft were held in reserve. For the Colombo attack, the first wave launched 127 aircraft total: 36 Zeros for fighter escort, 38 Vals configured for dive- runs, and 53 Kates armed for level bombing and . Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, an experienced aviator from the Pearl Harbor raid, led the air strike from a Kate bomber launched from Akagi, coordinating the assault on Colombo's harbor, oil tanks, and Ratmalana airfield before directing bomb releases. The operation incurred losses of seven aircraft and several veteran pilots, including experienced Zero and Val crew members, underscoring the attrition on Japan's elite carrier air groups. The A6M2 Zero fighters excelled in providing air superiority through superior maneuverability at low speeds and extended range exceeding 1,800 miles, enabling effective protection against British Hurricanes and Fulmars during the raid. Complementing them, the D3A1 Val dive bombers achieved notable accuracy by employing steep dives followed by shallow-angle releases at around 2,000 feet, allowing precise hits on grounded and port infrastructure despite defensive . Kates, meanwhile, targeted shipping with 800 kg semi-armor-piercing bombs or conducted high-level attacks on land objectives.

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