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Haqqani network
Haqqani network
Haqqani network
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The Haqqani network is an Islamist Afghan group, built around the family of the same name,[21] that has used asymmetric warfare in Afghanistan to fight against Soviet forces in the 1980s, and US-led NATO forces and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan government in the 21st century. It is recognized as a terrorist organization by the United Nations.[22] It is considered to be a "semi-autonomous"[23] offshoot of the Taliban.[24][25][26] It has been most active in eastern Afghanistan and across the border in north-west Pakistan.[27]

Key Information

The Haqqani network was founded in 1970[28] by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a fundamentalist of the Zadran tribe, who fought for Yunus Khalis's mujahideen faction against the Soviets in the 1980s. Jalaluddin Haqqani died in 2018 and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani now leads the group.[29] The Haqqani network was one of the Reagan administration's most CIA-funded anti-Soviet groups in the 1980s.[30][4] In the latter stages of the war, Haqqani formed close ties with foreign jihadists, including Osama bin Laden,[23] becoming one of his closest mentors.[27] The Haqqani network pledged allegiance to the Taliban in 1995,[31] and has been an increasingly incorporated wing of the group ever since.[32] Taliban and Haqqani leaders have denied the existence of the "network", saying it is no different from the Taliban.[31] In 2012, the United States designated the Haqqani network as a terrorist organization.[33] In 2015, Pakistan banned the Haqqani network as part of its National Action Plan.[34]

The elusive[21] Haqqani network has been blamed for some of the deadliest attacks during the War in Afghanistan of 2001–2021, having a reputation of frequently using suicide bombings and being able to carry out complex attacks. They had long been suspected by the United States of ties with the Pakistani military establishment, a claim denied by Pakistan.[23][27] They have also been suspected of criminal activities such as smuggling and trafficking across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[35] Alongside Al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network maintained close ties with the anti-India Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba.[35] Following the fall of Kabul in 2021, the group was put in charge of domestic security by the Taliban.[35] The Wall Street Journal called the group the Taliban's "most radical and violent branch."[36]

Etymology

[edit]

The word Haqqani comes from Darul Uloom Haqqania, a madrassa in Pakistan that Jalal-ud-din Haqqani attended.[37]

Ideology and goals

[edit]

The Haqqani network's root values are nationalistic and religious. They are ideologically aligned with the Taliban, who have worked to eradicate Western influence and transform Afghanistan into a strictly sharia-following state and based on pashtunwali. This was exemplified in the government that formed after Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. Both groups have the common goal of disrupting the Western military and political efforts in Afghanistan and driving them from the country permanently.[38] Through the 2000s–2010s, the group was demanding that US and Coalition Forces, made up mostly of NATO nations, withdraw from Afghanistan and no longer interfere with the politics or educational systems of Islamic nations.[38]

History

[edit]

While the network became widely active during the Soviet–Afghan War in the 1980s, historical records show that Jalaluddin Haqqani had formed a movement in his local area Zerok District and assaulted the local pro-government Governor in an attack in June 1975.[28]

Jalaluddin Haqqani joined the Hezb-i Islami Khalis in 1978, becoming an Afghan mujahid. His personal Haqqani group was nurtured by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the 1980s Soviet–Afghan War.[39][40]

Haqqani family

[edit]

The Haqqani family hails from southeastern Afghanistan and belongs to the Mezi clan of the Zadran Pashtun tribe.[39][41][42] Jalalludin Haqqani rose to prominence as a senior military leader during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.[42] Like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Haqqani was more successful than other resistance leaders at forging relationships with outsiders prepared to sponsor resistance to the Soviets, including the CIA, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and wealthy Arab private donors from the Persian Gulf.

Al-Qaeda affiliation

[edit]

Jalaluddin Haqqani commanded a mujahideen army from 1980 to 1992 and is credited with the recruitment of foreign fighters. Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden both began their careers as volunteer fighters for the Haqqanis in the conflict against the Soviets. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the Haqqani network have been intertwined throughout their history.[43] According to a declassified US government report, a training facility belonging to Haqqani was located at Miram Shah, in which fighters of Pakistani Punjab, Arab, Kashmir, Uzbek and Afghanistan, all connected with either al-Qaeda or the Taliban, were in residence. Similar al-Qaeda-associated training facilities connected to Haqqani by US authorities have been reported in Northern Waziristan.[44]

The Haqqani network's relationship with al-Qaeda dates back to the founding of al-Qaeda. While al-Qaeda's stated goals are international in scope, the Haqqani network has limited its operations to regional matters concerning Afghanistan and Pashtun tribalism. The organizations share an ideological foundation; Jalaluddin Haqqani realized the importance of Azzam's "foundational Islamic legal decisions declaring the Afghan jihad a universally and individually binding duty borne by all Muslims worldwide." Though many Muslim leaders asked for aid from the oil wealthy Arab states in 1978 after Afghan communist and Soviet forces conquered Kabul, Jalaluddin Haqqani was the only Afghan Islamic resistance leader to also request foreign Muslim fighters, and his was the only group to welcome fighters from outside the region into its ranks, thus "linking it to the broader Jihad struggles and giving birth to the following decade to what would come to be known as global jihadism."[43]

The Haqqani network's use of the Saudi Arabian financiers and other Arab investors clearly highlights the groups understanding of global jihad.[43][vague]

Insurgent regions in Afghanistan and border regions of Pakistan, as of 2010

Many sources believe Jalaluddin Haqqani and his forces assisted with the escape of al-Qaeda into safe havens in Pakistan. It is well documented that the Haqqani network assisted with the establishment of safe havens. Analyst Peter Bergen argues this point in his book The Battle for Tora Bora.[45][46][47] Judging by the possibilities and the amount of US military assets focused on such a small region, the theory that the Haqqani network aided in the escape seems reasonable. Regardless of exactly what occurred in those mountains, the Haqqanis played a role. And their actions of providing safe havens for al-Qaeda and Bin Laden show the strength of bond and some role in or knowledge of al-Qaeda and Bin Laden's escape.

On 26 July 2020, a United Nations report stated that the al-Qaeda group is still active in twelve provinces in Afghanistan and its leader al-Zawahiri is still based in the country,[48] and the UN Monitoring Team has estimated that the total number of al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan were "between 400 and 600 and that the leadership maintains close contact with the Haqqani Network" and in February 2020, "al-Zawahiri met with Yahya Haqqani, the primary Haqqani network contact with Al Qaeda since mid-2009, to discuss ongoing cooperation".[48]

Taliban affiliation

[edit]
Main article: 2021 Taliban offensive

Foreign jihadists recognized the network as a distinct entity as early as 1994, but Haqqani was not affiliated with the Taliban until they captured Kabul and assumed de facto control of Afghanistan in 1996.[4][49] After the Taliban came to power, Haqqani accepted a cabinet-level appointment as Minister of Tribal Affairs.[11] Following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent overthrow of the Taliban government, the Haqqanis fled to the bordering Pakistani tribal regions and regrouped to fight against coalition forces across the border.[50] The Haqqanis have been known to dissent from the Taliban line by permitting music and education for women.[51] As Jalaluddin has grown older his son Sirajuddin has taken over the responsibility of military operations.[52] Journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad reported that President Hamid Karzai invited c. 2002 the elder Haqqani to serve as Prime Minister in an attempt to bring "moderate" Taliban into the government. However, the offer was refused by Jalaluddin.[11]

Voice of America reported that the Taliban gave the Haqqani network control over security operations in Kabul on 19 August in the days following the fall of Kabul in the 2021 Taliban offensive.[53][54] That same day Anas Haqqani met with former Afghan president Hamid Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah and Hezb-e-Islami fighter Gulbuddin Hekmatyar seeking a formal transfer of power to the Taliban leader Abdul Ghani Baradar. Rumors circulated that Anas was receiving instructions directly from Sirajuddin Haqqani, who was himself in Quetta, Pakistan.[55]

United States

[edit]

According to US military commanders, it is "the most resilient enemy network" and one of the biggest threats to the U.S.-led NATO forces and the Afghan government during the war in Afghanistan.[52][56] It is also the most lethal network in Afghanistan.[57] From 2010 the United States is offering a reward for information leading to the capture of their leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, in the amount of $5,000,000.[58]

Obama administration

[edit]

In September 2012, the Obama administration labeled the network as a foreign terrorist organization.[59] After this announcement, the Taliban issued a statement arguing that there is "no separate entity or network in Afghanistan by the name of Haqqani" and that Jalaluddin Haqqani is a member of Pakistan-based the Quetta Shura, the Taliban's top leadership council.[60]

Leadership

[edit]
  • Jalaluddin Haqqani – following his time as a commander in the Mujahideen Army (1980–1992), the network was founded under Haqqani during the insurgency against Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Haqqani himself was trained in Pakistan during the 1970s, in order to fight Prime Minister Mohammad Daud Khan, who had overthrown the previous ruler (and cousin), King Zahir Shah. During the Soviet invasion, the Pakistani government's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency became close with Haqqani and his organization, allowing them to become a main benefactor of American weapons, intelligence, and training. In the 1990s, Haqqani agreed to join the Taliban, arising to the position of Interior Minister. The United States attempted to convince Haqqani to sever ties with the Taliban, which he refused to do. In 2005 when Merjuddin Pathan was governor of the Khost Province, Haqqani approached him and wanting a dialogue with the Hamid Karzai Government, but neither Americans nor Karzai heeded the pleas of the governor. Afterwards when insurgency accentuated that Hamid Karzai's leadership in Afghanistan, approached Haqqani and offered him the position as Minister of Tribal Affairs in his cabinet, which Haqqani has also refused as it was too late. Since the emergence of the Haqqani network, Haqqani and his family have thrived off of the contacts made by Haqqani during the Cold War.[61] The BBC reported in July 2015 that Jalaluddin Haqqani had died of an illness and been buried in Afghanistan at least a year prior.[62] The Taliban rejected these reports.[63] On 3 September 2018, the Taliban released a statement via Twitter proclaiming Haqqani's death of an unspecified terminal illness.[64][65]
  • Sirajuddin Haqqani – He is one of Jalaluddin's sons and currently leads the day-to-day activities of the network.
  • Badruddin Haqqani – He was Sirajuddin's brother and an operational commander of the network. He was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan on 24 August 2012. Some Taliban commanders claimed the reports of his death were true while others claimed the reports were inaccurate.[66][67][68][69] However, U.S. and Pakistani officials confirmed his death.[70][71] The Taliban officially confirmed Badruddin's death a year later.[72]
  • Abdulaziz Haqqani – He is one of Jalaluddin's sons who became very influential following Badruddin Haqqani's death. Currently he serves as deputy to his brother Sirajuddin Haqqani.[73][74][75]
  • Khalil Haqqani was a leader of the Haqqani network.[76][77][78] The United States offered a US$5 million bounty for Khalil as one their most wanted terrorists.[79] In August 2021, after the fall of Kabul, Haqqani was seen roaming the streets of Kabul.[79] He was killed on 11 December 2024 by an ISIL suicide bomber in Kabul.[80][81]
  • Sangeen Zadran (killed 6 September 2013)[82] – According to the US State Department, he was a senior lieutenant to Sirajuddin and the shadow governor for Paktika province in Afghanistan. He was also one of the captors of U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl.[66][83][84][85][86]
  • Nasiruddin Haqqani – He was Sirajuddin's brother and a key financier and emissary of the network. As the son of Jalaluddin's Arab wife, he spoke fluent Arabic and traveled to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for fundraising.[66][87] He was killed by unknown assailants in Islamabad, Pakistan, on 11 November 2013.[88]
  • Maulvi Ahmad Jan (killed 21 November 2013)[89] The network's spiritual leader who was also responsible for organizing some of the network's most deadly attacks in Afghanistan.[89] He was subjected to UN sanctions[90] in March 2010[91] and had also served the Taliban government of Mullah Omar as federal minister for water and power,[91] before being appointed the Governor of the Zabul Province in 2000.[91] At the time of his death, Jan was thought be Sirajuddin Haqqani's chief deputy.[91]
  • Abdul Aziz Abbasin – According to the U.S. Treasury, he is "a key commander in the Haqqani Network" and serves as the "Taliban shadow governor of Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan."[92]
  • Haji Mali Khan – According to NATO, he is "the senior Haqqani commander in Afghanistan" and is uncle to Sirajuddin and Badaruddin.[93][94][95] ISAF also reported that he acted as an emissary between Baitullah Mehsud and the Haqqanis.[96] He was captured by ISAF forces on 27 September 2011.[94] He was released in a prisoner swap in November 2019.[97]

Following WikiLeaks' July 2010 publication of 75,000 classified documents the public learned that Sirajuddin Haqqani was in the tier one of the International Security Assistance Force's Joint Prioritized Effects List – its "kill or capture" list.[98]

Activities

[edit]

Anand Gopal of The Christian Science Monitor, citing unnamed US and Afghan sources, reported in June 2009 that the leadership is based in Miranshah, North Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan along the Afghan border.[6] It operates from at least three compounds: a Miranshah bazaar camp containing a madrassa and computer facilities, a compound in the nearby suburb of Sarai Darpa Khel and another compound in Danday Darpa Khel, where some of Jalaluddin's family stay.[41] The network is active in Afghanistan's southeastern areas of Paktia Province, Paktika Province, Khost Province, Wardak Province, Logar Province, and Ghazni Province.[6] In September 2011, Sirajuddin Haqqani told Reuters that the group feels "more secure in Afghanistan besides the Afghan people."[99]

Publications

[edit]

The Haqqanis have been described as notable writers, having published a number of books as well as editing and contributing to magazines, three of them, Manba' al-Jihad (one version in Pashto and another in Arabic) and Nusrat al-Jihad ("Support for Jihad", in Urdu), totaling more than 1000 pages between 1989 and 1993.[100]

Funding

[edit]

Some of Sirajuddin's brothers travel to the Persian Gulf region to raise funds from wealthy donors.[41][66] The New York Times reported in September 2011 that the Haqqanis have set up a "ministate" in Miranshah with courts, tax offices and madrassas, and that the network runs a series of front companies selling automobiles and real estate. They also receive funds from extortion, kidnappings and smuggling operations throughout eastern Afghanistan.[41] In an interview a former Haqqani commander called the extortion "the most important source of funding for the Haqqanis."[101] According to a tribal elder in Paktia, "Haqqani's people ask for money from contractors working on road construction. They are asking money or goods from shopkeepers... District elders and contractors are paying money to Afghan workers, but sometimes half of the money will go to Haqqani's people."[102]

Military strength

[edit]

Haqqani is reported to run his own training camps, to recruit his own foreign fighters, and to seek out financial and logistic support on his own, from his old contacts.[52] Estimates of the Haqqanis's numbers vary. A 2009 New York Times article indicates that they are thought to have about 4,000 to 12,000 Taliban under their command while a 2011 report from the Combating Terrorism Center places its strength roughly at 10,000-15,000.[4][9] During a September 2011 interview, Sirajuddin Haqqani said the figure of 10,000 fighters, as quoted in some media reports, "is actually less than the actual number."[99] Throughout its history the network's operations have been conducted by small, semi-autonomous units organized according to tribal and sub-tribal affiliations often at the direction of and with the logistical support of Haqqani commanders.[4]

The network is comprised broadly of four groups: those who have been with Jalalludin since the Soviet-era jihad, those from Loya Paktiya who have joined since 2001, those from North Waziristan who have joined in more recent years, and foreign militants of primarily Arab, Chechen and Uzbek origins. Leadership roles are mostly filled with personnel from the first group while the relative neophytes from Loya Paktia and non-Pushtuns are not part of this inner circle.[41][42]

The Haqqani network pioneered the use of suicide attacks in Afghanistan and tend to use mostly foreign bombers whereas the Taliban tend to rely on locals in attacks.[6] The network, according to the National Journal, supplies much of the potassium chlorate used in bombs employed by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Also, the network's bombs use more sophisticated remote triggering devices than the pressure-plated activators used elsewhere in Afghanistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani told MSNBC in April 2009 that his fighters had, "acquired the modern technology that we were lacking, and we have mastered new and innovative methods of making bombs and explosives."[103]

In late 2011, a 144-page book attributed to Sirajuddin Haqqani began circulating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Described by Newsweek as a "manual for guerrillas and terrorists," the Pashto-language book details instructions on setting up a jihadi cell, receiving financing, recruiting and training. The manual advises recruits that parental permission is not necessary for jihad, that all debts should be paid before joining, and that suicide bombings and beheadings are allowed by Islam.[104]

Attacks and alleged attacks

[edit]
  • 14 January 2008: The 2008 Kabul Serena Hotel attack is thought to have been carried out by the network.[52]
  • March 2008: Kidnapping of British journalist Sean Langan was blamed on the network.[105]
  • 27 April 2008: Assassination attempts on Hamid Karzai.[6]
  • 7 July 2008: US intelligence blamed the network for 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul.[106]
  • 10 November 2008: The kidnapping of David Rohde was blamed on Sirajuddin Haqqani.[107]
  • 30 December 2009: Camp Chapman attack is thought to have been carried out by the network.[108]
  • 18 May 2010: May 2010 Kabul bombing was allegedly carried out by the network.[109]
  • 19 February 2011: Kabul Bank in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.[110]
  • 28 June 2011: According to ISAF, elements of the Haqqani network provided "material support" in the 2011 attack on the Hotel Inter-Continental in Kabul.[111] The Taliban claimed responsibility.[112]
  • 10 September 2011: A massive truck bomb exploded outside Combat Outpost Sayed Abad in Wardak province, Afghanistan, killing five Afghans, including four civilians, and wounding 77 U.S. soldiers, 14 Afghan civilians, and three policemen. The Pentagon blamed the network for the attack.[113]
  • 12 September 2011: US Ambassador Ryan Crocker blamed the Haqqani network for an attack on the US Embassy and nearby NATO bases in Kabul. The attack lasted 19 hours and resulted in the deaths of four police officers and four civilians. 17 civilians and six NATO soldiers were injured. Three coalition soldiers were killed. Eleven insurgent attackers were killed.[114]
  • October 2011: Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security said that six people arrested in an alleged plot to assassinate President Karzai had ties to the Haqqani network.[115]
  • 15 April 2012: Haqqani network fighters initiate the summer fighting season, conducting a complex attack across Kabul, Logar and Paktia provinces. Several western embassies in Kabul were attacked in the Say Wallah district.
  • 1 June 2012: A massive suicide truck bomb breaches the southern perimeter wall of US Forward Operating Base Salerno in Khost province. A dozen Haqqani fighters wearing suicide vests entered the breach, but were isolated and killed by US Forces.
  • 31 May 2017: a truck bomb exploded in a crowded intersection in Kabul, Afghanistan, near the German embassy,[116] killing over 150 and injuring 413,[117] mostly civilians, and damaging several buildings in the embassy.[118][119] The attack was the deadliest terror attack to take place in Kabul. Afghanistan's intelligence agency NDS claimed that the blast was planned by the Haqqani network.[120][121]
  • 20 January 2018: an attack on Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul killed 40 people, with the Afghan government accusing the Haqqani network.[122] The attack led to U.S. president Donald Trump pressuring Pakistan to expel Haqqani and Taliban leaders from their territory.[123]
  • 27 January 2018: an ambulance was used as an explosive device in Kabul, exploding in a deadly attacked that claimed 103 lives. The U.S. and Afghan governments suspected the Taliban's Haqqani wing to have caused it.[124][125]
  • 25 March 2020: a Sikh shrine was attacked by guns and bombs in Kabul, killing 25 civilians. The Afghan government blamed the Haqqani network and linked ISIS-K militants for the attack.[126] Members of both the Haqqani network and Islamic State were arrested in connection by the Afghan intelligence.[127]

Location

[edit]

The Haqqani network operates in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Northern Pakistan, near the southeastern border of Afghanistan.[128] The network has used the ambiguity of the FATA to cloak its activities and avoid interference. The strategy worked well until President Obama ramped up UAV strikes in the Northern Waziristan region. The organizational headquarters is supposedly in Miram Shah, where the group operates base camps to facilitate activities such as weapons acquisitions, logistical planning and military strategy formulation. Haqqani-controlled regions of northern Pakistan have also served as strategic safe havens for other Islamic militant organizations, such as al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The strategic location of the Haqqani network facilitates interaction between many of the insurgent groups.[41]

Insurgent routes of infiltration from training camps in Pakistan

The Haqqani network's tribal connections in Northern Waziristan and the de facto regime that it has established with courts, law enforcement, medical care, and governance have often brought it great support from locals.[43] Its familiarity of terrain, such as mountain passes, also grants them excellent access between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In September 2011, Sirajuddin Haqqani claimed during a telephone interview with Reuters that the Haqqani network no longer maintained sanctuaries in northwestern Pakistan and the robust presence that it once had there and instead now felt safer in Afghanistan: "Gone are the days when we were hiding in the mountains along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Now we consider ourselves more secure in Afghanistan beside the Afghan people."[99] According to Haqqani, there were "senior military and police officials" who are aligned with the group and there are even sympathetic and "sincere people in the Afghan government who are loyal to the Taliban" who support the group's aim of liberating Afghanistan "from the clutches of occupying forces."[99] In response to questions from the BBC's Pashto service, Siraj denied any links to the ISI and stated that Mullah Omar is "our leader and we totally obey him."[129]

Foreign support

[edit]

Pakistan's alleged involvement

[edit]
See also: Pakistan–United States relations

While some Afghan and American officials accuse Pakistan of harboring the Haqqani network, Pakistan has denied any links.[31]

Abdul Rashid Waziri, a specialist at Kabul's Center for Regional Studies of Afghanistan, explains that links between the Haqqani network and Pakistan can be traced back to the mid-1970s,[39] before the 1978 Marxist revolution in Kabul. During the rule of President Daoud Khan in Afghanistan (1973–78), Jalaluddin Haqqani went into exile and based himself in and around Miranshah, Pakistan.[130] From there he began to form a rebellion against the government of Daoud Khan in 1975.[39] The network allegedly maintains ties with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and Pakistan's army had been reportedly reluctant to move against them in the past.[52][131]

The New York Times reported in September 2008 that Pakistan regards the Haqqani network as an important force for protecting its interests in Afghanistan in the event of American withdrawal from there and therefore is unwilling to move against them.[131] Pakistan presumably[by whom?] feels pressured that India, Russia, and Iran are gaining a foothold in Afghanistan. Since it lacks the financial clout of the other countries, Pakistan hopes that by being a sanctuary for the Haqqani network, it can assert some influence over its turbulent neighbor. In the words of a retired senior Pakistani official: "[We] have no money. All we have are the crazies. So the crazies it is."[132] The New York Times and Al Jazeera later reported in June 2010 that Pakistan's Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and chief of the ISI General Ahmad Shuja Pasha were in talks with Afghan President Hamid Karzai to broker a power-sharing agreement between the Haqqani network and the Afghan government.[133][134] Reacting to this report both President Barack Obama and CIA director Leon Panetta responded with skepticism that such an effort could succeed.[135] The effort to mediate between the Haqqanis and the Afghan government was launched by Pakistan after intense pressure by the US to take military action against the group in North Waziristan.[136] Karzai later denied meeting anyone from the Haqqani network.[137] Subsequently, Kayani also denied that he took part in the talks.[138]

Anti-American groups of Gul Bahadur and Haqqani carry out their activities in Afghanistan and use North Waziristan as rear.[139] The group's links to Pakistan have been a sour point in Pakistan–United States relations. In September 2011, the Obama administration warned Pakistan that it must do more to cut ties with the Haqqani network and help eliminate its leaders, adding that "the United States will act unilaterally if Pakistan does not comply."[140] In testimony before a US Senate panel, Admiral Mike Mullen stated that the network "acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency."[141] Although some U.S. officials allege that the ISI supports and guides the Haqqanis,[141][142][143][144][145] President Barack Obama declined to endorse that position and stated that "the intelligence is not as clear as we might like in terms of what exactly that relationship is"[146] and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said "We have no evidence of" Pakistani involvement in attacks on the US embassy in Kabul.[147]

Pakistan in return rejected the notion that it maintained ties with the Haqqani network or used it in a policy of waging a proxy war in neighboring Afghanistan. Pakistani officials deny the allegations by asserting that Pakistan had no relations with the network. In response to the allegations, Interior Minister Rehman Malik claimed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had "trained and produced" the Haqqani network and other mujahideen during the Soviet–Afghan War.[148][149][150][151] The Pakistani interior minister also warned that any incursion on Pakistani territory by U.S. forces will not be tolerated. A Pakistani intelligence official insisted that the American allegations are part of "pressure tactics" used by the United States as a strategy "to shift the war theatre."[152] An unnamed Pakistani official was reported to have said after a meeting of the nation's top military officials that "We have already conveyed to the US that Pakistan cannot go beyond what it has already done".[153] However, Pakistani claims were contradicted by the network's warnings against any U.S. military incursions into North Waziristan.[148][150] However a month after the allegation, ties improved slightly and the US asked Pakistan to assist it in starting negotiation talks with the Taliban.[154]

There was a paradigm shift within the Pakistani military and in 2014 the Pakistani Armed Forces launched a major offensive Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan, aimed at displacing all militants foreign and domestic from Pakistan, including the Haqqanni network. The operation was commanded by General Qamar Javed Bajwa.[155]

Alleged Iranian involvement

[edit]

Antonio Giustozzi, an expert on the Taliban with the Royal United Services Institute in London, said that the Haqqani network has been "getting closer" to Iran as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia cut funding to it.[15] In August 2020, US intelligence agencies assessed that Iran has been offering bounties to the Haqqani network to target US and coalition troops in Afghanistan. The US intelligence agencies identified payments linked to at least six attacks carried out by the militant group in 2019 including the Bagram Airfield attack.[14][156]

However, Iranian authorities denied making any payments to the militant group to target US troops in Afghanistan. Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Saeed Khatibzadeh, categorised the US intelligence report as propaganda. He also said that the US is trying to hide its "miscalculations" in Afghanistan by resorting to such propaganda.[157]

Opponents

[edit]

Coalition military offensives

[edit]

In July 2008, Jalaluddin's son Omar Haqqani was killed in a firefight with International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Coalition forces in Paktia.[158] In September 2008, the USAF drones fired six missiles at the home of the Haqqanis and a madrasah run by the network. However both Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin were not present though several family members were killed.[106] Among 23 people killed was one of Jalaluddin's two wives, sister, sister-in-law and eight of his grandchildren.[131] In March 2009, the US State Department announced a reward of $5 million for information leading to the location, arrest, or conviction of Sirajuddin under the Rewards for Justice Program.[159] In May 2010, US senator and United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chair Dianne Feinstein wrote to United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urging her to add the Haqqani network to U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.[160]

Coalition and Afghan forces killed a network leader, Fazil Subhan, plus an unknown number of Haqqani militiamen, in a raid in Khost in the second week of June 2010. In a press release, ISAF reported that Subhan helped facilitate the movement of Al-Qaeda fighters into Afghanistan.[161][162]

In late July 2011, U.S. and Afghan special forces killed dozens of insurgents during an operation in eastern Paktika province to clear a training camp the Haqqani network used for foreign (Arab and Chechen) fighters; reports of the number killed varied, with one source saying "more than 50"[163] to "nearly 80".[164] Disenfranchised insurgents told security forces where the camp was located, the coalition said.[163]

On 1 October 2011, NATO announced the capture of Haji Mali Khan, "the senior Haqqani commander in Afghanistan," during an operation in Jani Khel district of Afghanistan's Paktia province. Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid denied that the capture occurred while Haqqani network members declined to respond to the announcement.[93][94]

According to an unnamed Pakistani official a US drone strike on a compound killed Jamil Haqqani, an "important Afghan commander of Haqqani network" responsible for logistics in North Waziristan, on 13 October 2011. Three other network fighters were also killed in the two missile blasts. The compound was located in Dandey Darpakhel village, about 7 km (4 miles) north of Miranshah.[165]

In mid-October 2011, Afghan and NATO forces launched "Operation Shamshir" and "Operation Knife Edge" against the Haqqani network in south-eastern Afghanistan, with the intent to counter possible security threats in the border regions. An ISAF spokesman said that Operation Shamshir "was aimed at securing key population centers and expanding the Kabul security zone,"[166] while Afghan Defense Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak, explained that Operation Knife Edge would "help eliminate the insurgents before they struck in areas along the troubled frontier."[167] The two operations ended on 23 October 2011 and at least 20 insurgents, of the some 200 killed or captured, had ties to the Haqqani network according to ISAF.[5][166]

On 2 November 2011, The Express Tribune reported that the Pakistani Army had agreed with the United States to restrict the network's movement along the Afghan border in exchange for America dropping its demands for a full-scale offensive. The report emerged soon after a visit by Hillary Clinton to Pakistan.[168]

Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander of International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, has said that Haqqani can be defeated through a combination of a layered defense in Afghanistan and interdiction against the sanctuaries in Pakistan.[169]

In June 2014 a drone attack reportedly killed 10 members of the Haqqani network including a high-level commander, Haji Gul, in the country's tribal area of North Waziristan. The Pakistan government publicly condemned the attack, but according to a government official had privately approved it.[170]

Pakistani military offensive

[edit]

In 2014, the Pakistani Armed Forces launched a major offensive Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan aimed at displacing all militants foreign and domestic, including the Haqqani network from its soil. On 5 November 2014, Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, a senior commander for US and Nato forces in Afghanistan, said in a Pentagon-hosted video briefing from Afghanistan that the Haqqani network is now "fractured" like the Taliban. "They are fractured. They are fractured like the Taliban is. That's based pretty much on the Pakistan's operations in North Waziristan this entire summer-fall," he said, acknowledging the effectiveness of Pakistan's military offensive. "That has very much disrupted their efforts in Afghanistan and has caused them to be less effective in terms of their ability to pull off an attack in Kabul," Anderson added.[171]

Sanctions

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Until 1 November 2011, six Haqqani network commanders were designated as terrorists under Executive Order 13224 since 2008 and their assets were frozen while prohibiting others from engaging in financial transactions with them:[96]

  • In March 2008, the US State Department designated Sirajuddin Haqqani a terrorist and a year later issued a $5 million bounty for information leading to his capture.[96]
  • The State Department placed Nasiruddin Haqqani on its list of terrorists in July 2010.[96]
  • In February 2011, Khalil al Rahman Haqqani was designated a terrorist by the US State Department.[96]
  • In an effort to stop the flow of funds to the network, the US State Department announced on 16 August 2011 measures against Sangeen Zadran as "Shadow Governor for Paktika Province, Afghanistan and a commander of the Haqqani Network." The US designated Zadran under Executive Order 13224 while the United Nations listed him under Security Council Resolution 1988.[84][85]
  • The U.S. Department of Treasury added Abdul Aziz Abbasin, "a key commander in the Haqqani Network", to the list of individuals on the executive order in September 2011.[92][96]
  • On 1 November 2011, Haji Mali Khan, who was already in ISAF custody, was added to the list.[96]

In September 2011, the US Senate Appropriations Committee voted to make a $1 billion counter-insurgency aid package to the Pakistani military conditional upon Pakistani action against militant groups, including the Haqqani network. The decision would still need to receive approval from the US House of Representatives and the US Senate.[172] According to the press release, "[t]he bill includes strengthened restrictions on assistance for Pakistan by conditioning all funds to the Government of Pakistan on cooperation against the Haqqani network, al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations, with a waiver, and funding based on achieving benchmarks."[173]

On 7 September 2012, the Obama administration blacklisted the group as a foreign terrorist organization. The decision was mandated by Congress and was a source of debate within the administration.[59][174][175]

On 5 November 2012, the United Nations Security Council added the network to a blacklist of Taliban-related groups.[176]

On 9 May 2013, the government of Canada listed it as a terror group.[177]

In March 2015, the UK proscribed the Haqqani network as a terror group.[178]

On 25 August 2015, Abdulaziz Haqqani was sanction as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist with a reward of up to US$5 million for information regarding his location.[179][73][180]

Attempts to negotiate

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US officials confirmed that they held preliminary talks during the summer of 2011 with representatives of the militant network at the request of the ISI. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the US had reached out to the Haqqanis to gauge their willingness to engage in a peace process and that "Pakistani government officials helped to facilitate such a meeting."[181] The New York Times reported that talks secretly began in late August 2011 in the United Arab Emirates between a midlevel American diplomat and Ibrahim Haqqani, Jalalludin's brother. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, head of the ISI, brokered the discussion, but little resulted from the meeting.[182]

References

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Further reading

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Haqqani network

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The Haqqani Network (HQN) is a Sunni Islamist organization founded in the late 1970s by to resist the Soviet invasion of . Operating primarily from strongholds in Pakistan's North tribal area, the group has conducted cross-border operations into eastern , including high-profile suicide bombings and assaults targeting U.S., , and Afghan government forces, as well as Indian diplomatic facilities. Allied with the Afghan and al-Qaida since the , HQN maintained operational autonomy while providing logistical support and safe havens for affiliated fighters. Following Jalaluddin Haqqani's death in 2018, his son assumed leadership, directing attacks such as the assault on the Indian embassy in and the 2011 assault on the U.S. embassy compound. The U.S. government designated HQN a Foreign Terrorist in 2012 due to its role in orchestrating complex attacks that killed and wounded American personnel, prompting sanctions under and bounties on key figures. After the Taliban's 2021 return to power, was appointed acting interior minister, integrating network elements into Afghanistan's security apparatus while UN monitors noted continued ties to transnational jihadist networks. The group's resilience stems from familial command structures, funding via , , and , and sanctuary in ungoverned border regions, enabling it to outlast multiple counterterrorism campaigns.

Origins and Ideology

Founding and Etymology

The Haqqani Network originated as a mujahideen faction during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which began on December 24, 1979, when Jalaluddin Haqqani mobilized fighters from the southeastern Loya Paktia region, primarily among the Zadran Pashtun tribe, to conduct guerrilla operations against Soviet forces and their Afghan communist allies. Haqqani, born around 1939 in Gardez, Paktia Province, had earlier established himself as a religious scholar and militant leader through madrasa education in Afghanistan and Pakistan, aligning with Deobandi Islamist networks before formalizing his armed group in response to the invasion. By the early 1980s, his organization operated from sanctuaries in North Waziristan, Pakistan, receiving logistical and financial aid channeled through Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as part of broader mujahideen support, including indirect U.S. funding via Operation Cyclone. The network's name reflects its foundation on the Haqqani family lineage, with Jalaluddin as the patriarch whose surname—common among Afghan and Pakistani religious figures—denotes association with "" ( for "truth" or "right," a divine attribute in ) and extends to a kinship-based structure of relatives, tribal allies, and ideological adherents that sustains its command and operations. This familial core, including sons like Sirajuddin and Khalil, has perpetuated leadership continuity since Jalaluddin's reported death in 2018, distinguishing the group from more ideologically diffuse alliances.

Core Beliefs and Objectives

The Haqqani Network espouses a Deobandi Islamist ideology, rooted in the of Sunni jurisprudence and emphasizing the primacy of as the basis for governance. Central to its beliefs is the concept of as an individual religious obligation (fard 'ayn) against foreign occupiers and apostate regimes, framed as a defensive and expansive holy war to purify Muslim lands of non-Islamic influences. This worldview, shaped by founder Jalaluddin Haqqani's experiences in the anti-Soviet struggle, integrates Pashtun tribal codes with jihadist doctrine, rejecting secular or Western-style in favor of theocratic rule under a caliphate-like . The network's religious outlook, propagated through institutions like the Dar al-Ulum Haqqaniyya madrassa, portrays with invaders as a rejection of , mandating violent resistance to restore divine order. The group's primary objective is the complete expulsion of U.S.-led coalition forces from and the reestablishment of an Islamic Emirate enforcing strict , aligning operations under leadership as affirmed by in a 2008 statement: "all the wage under the leadership of [Mullah Mohammed Omar] against the American invaders and their lackeys." This entails , including suicide bombings, IED attacks, and assassinations targeting military installations, government officials, and civilians deemed complicit in the post-2001 order, with a focus on dominating southeastern 's Loya Paktia region. Secondary aims include consolidating power in Pakistan's North , where the network maintains training camps and extortion networks to sustain operations. In pursuit of broader jihadist goals, the Haqqani Network facilitates global militancy by sheltering affiliates, training foreign fighters from regions like and the , and enabling cross-border attacks, reflecting Jalaluddin Haqqani's 1980 declaration that constitutes an individual duty open to international volunteers. While prioritizing Afghan liberation, leaders such as have blurred distinctions between local and transnational terror, supporting ambitions for a unified Islamic through logistical aid to groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban . This dual focus underscores a strategic blend of regional control and ideological export, undeterred by designations as a terrorist entity by entities including the U.S. State Department since 2012.

Historical Evolution

Resistance Against Soviet Occupation

Jalaluddin Haqqani, a Pashtun cleric from the Zadran tribe, emerged as a leading commander following the Soviet Union's invasion of on December 24, 1979. Initially based in alongside other resistance leaders, Haqqani returned to eastern to organize fighters in the Loya Paktia region, encompassing Paktia, Paktika, and provinces. His forces specialized in asymmetric guerrilla tactics, including ambushes on Soviet convoys and outposts, which disrupted supply lines and inflicted casualties on occupying troops estimated at over 15,000 Soviet deaths throughout the war. Haqqani's network of fighters, drawn from local tribes and early foreign volunteers, operated independently of the major parties like Hezb-e-Islami, maintaining autonomy while coordinating with Pakistani (ISI) for logistics. This support channeled U.S. aid via , including weapons and funding totaling billions for groups, though Haqqani's faction received disproportionate shares due to its battlefield successes in rugged terrain that favored hit-and-run operations. By the mid-1980s, his command integrated Arab , precursors to , enhancing operational sophistication with volunteers funded by Saudi donors. The Haqqani group's resistance contributed to the broader strategy that prolonged the Soviet occupation until the Geneva Accords withdrawal on February 15, 1989. Haqqani's emphasis on ideological , rooted in Deobandi , solidified his faction's cohesion and laid the groundwork for the enduring Haqqani Network, distinct from other warlords by its early transnational ties and refusal to join interim governments post-withdrawal.

Afghan Civil War and Early Taliban Alliance

Following the collapse of the Soviet-backed Najibullah government in April 1992, Afghanistan fragmented into a civil war among former factions vying for control of and provincial territories. , whose network had commanded up to 10,000 fighters during the anti-Soviet resistance, maintained a power base in the southeastern provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and , leveraging cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan's . Rather than fully aligning with the fractured Peshawar Seven coalition—dominated by non-Pashtun groups like Ahmad Shah Massoud's or Burhanuddin Rabbani's government—Haqqani pursued selective engagements, including opportunistic clashes with rival warlords such as in Nangarhar, while avoiding the intense urban battles that devastated and killed tens of thousands of civilians between 1992 and 1994. This strategic restraint preserved his forces' cohesion and resources, estimated at several thousand combatants by mid-decade, amid widespread atrocities including rocket barrages and ethnic purges by factions like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, with which Haqqani had loose Pashtun ties but no formal merger. As lawlessness fueled banditry, trafficking, and local —exacerbating displacement of over 1 million Afghans by 1994—the movement emerged in under Mohammed Omar, initially as a Pashtun student combating predatory commanders. Haqqani, sharing the 's Deobandi Islamist and Pashtun tribal affiliations from the Zadran clan, recognized their momentum against the corrupt ; by 1995, he formally pledged allegiance, integrating his network as a semi-autonomous wing while providing seasoned fighters, logistics, and territorial control in Loya Paktia to bolster offensives. This alliance, solidified as the captured in September 1995 and advanced toward , enabled Haqqani to extend influence beyond his enclaves, including sheltering Arab volunteers linked to , who had transited through Haqqani-held areas since the late Soviet period. Haqqani's military expertise, honed in ambushes and , contributed to victories, such as the 1996 fall of , after which he was appointed a senior commander overseeing eastern operations. The partnership marked a shift from infighting to unified Islamist governance, though Haqqani retained operational independence, foreshadowing the network's hybrid role within the emirate.

Insurgency Against US-Led Forces (2001–2021)

Following the U.S.-led invasion of in October 2001, which toppled the regime harboring , the Haqqani Network retreated to safe havens in Pakistan's and surrounding tribal areas, where it regrouped and rearmed under the de facto leadership of Jalaluddin Haqqani's son, . From these bases, the network resumed operations against U.S., , and Afghan National Army forces by early 2002, integrating into the broader -led insurgency while maintaining operational autonomy, particularly in eastern 's Loya Paktia region along the border. The group exploited cross-border sanctuaries to launch cross-border raids, recruit fighters, and coordinate with , contributing to the insurgency's shift from sporadic guerrilla actions to sustained that inflicted steady attrition on coalition forces. The Haqqani Network specialized in high-impact tactics including improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), suicide bombings, and multi-stage assaults combining small-arms fire with explosives, often targeting urban centers like despite its rural strongholds. These methods, pioneered by —who reportedly oversaw the network's first in —enabled penetration of fortified areas and inflicted disproportionate psychological and material damage relative to the group's estimated 3,000–4,000 fighters. Operations focused on supply routes, forward operating bases, and symbolic targets, with the network claiming or being attributed responsibility for numerous ambushes in provinces like Paktia, Paktika, and , where it disrupted U.S. efforts to secure the border and train Afghan forces. Among its most prominent operations was the January 14, 2008, assault on 's Serena Hotel, where Haqqani-directed fighters used rockets, grenades, and suicide vests to kill at least six people, including a U.S. citizen and a Norwegian , in a coordinated breach of the heavily guarded site. On July 7, 2008, the network orchestrated a truck bomb attack on India's embassy in , killing 58 people including and Afghan civilians, aimed at undermining international support for the U.S.-backed . A similar embassy bombing in October 2009 killed 17, further demonstrating the group's capability for spectacular urban strikes. In eastern , a March 3, 2008, suicide bombing in Sabari targeted coalition patrols, killing two (ISAF) members. By the mid-2010s, under Sirajuddin's command from , the network escalated complex attacks, including the September 13, 2011, 20-hour siege on the U.S. Embassy and in using rocket-propelled grenades and suicide bombers, resulting in 14 Afghan deaths and highlighting vulnerabilities in the capital despite surged U.S. troop levels. The U.S. designated the Haqqani Network a foreign terrorist in , citing its role in over a dozen major assaults that year alone, though precise casualty attributions remain challenging amid overlapping claims. Safe havens in enabled resilience against U.S. drone strikes and raids, which killed key deputies but not core leaders, allowing continued operations that contributed to coalition fatigue and the 2020 Doha Agreement's concessions. As U.S. forces withdrew in 2021, the network shifted to supporting offensives, capturing key eastern districts and facilitating the fall of on August 15, 2021, without direct cessation of hostilities.

Post-Taliban Victory Role (2021–Present)

Following the 's capture of on August 15, 2021, the Haqqani Network transitioned from a semi-autonomous insurgent faction to a dominant element within the 's governing apparatus, leveraging its military networks to consolidate power alongside leadership. , designated leader of the network, assumed the role of Acting Minister of Interior on September 7, 2021, directing the national police () and intelligence-linked security units responsible for internal stability and efforts against rivals such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). His uncle, Khalil-ur-Rehman Haqqani, was appointed Acting Minister for Refugees and Repatriation, extending the network's influence over distribution and border management in eastern . This integration positioned the Haqqanis as key enforcers of edicts, including enforcement of sharia-based restrictions on women and media, while maintaining operational autonomy in their strongholds along the Pakistan- border. In its security role, the network has prioritized suppressing ISKP threats to rule, conducting raids and arrests in coordination with the Interior Ministry; for instance, following the August 26, , Kabul airport bombing that killed 13 U.S. service members and over 170 Afghans, Haqqani-led forces detained hundreds of ISKP suspects, though U.S. assessments indicate incomplete disruption of the group's capabilities. Despite public pledges to prevent terrorist attacks from Afghan soil, the Haqqani Network has been implicated in sheltering affiliates and facilitating Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operations, with UN sanctions monitors reporting sustained safe havens for foreign fighters under network protection as of 2022. No major cross-border attacks directly attributed to Haqqani fighters against U.S. or have occurred since , reflecting a shift toward amid resource constraints, though the network retains militant training camps in provinces like and . The Haqqanis have engaged in high-level diplomacy to bolster the regime's legitimacy, with Sirajuddin Haqqani meeting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on August 20, 2025, to discuss security cooperation and economic investments, amid Beijing's concerns over Uyghur militants. Similar outreach to Pakistani officials occurred in July 2025, focusing on border security amid TTP cross-border incursions. Internal challenges persist, exemplified by the March 2025 assassination of Khalil-ur-Rehman Haqqani, attributed to ISKP infiltration, which exposed factional tensions within the Taliban and vulnerabilities in Haqqani-controlled security perimeters. U.S. sanctions remain in effect, with a $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin, complicating international recognition while the network extracts revenue from narcotics trafficking and chromite mining in uncontrolled eastern territories.

Leadership and Internal Structure

The Haqqani Family Dynasty

The Haqqani Network's leadership is dominated by the extended Haqqani family, primarily the sons and brothers of founder , who established the group during the Soviet-Afghan War in the late 1970s. This dynastic structure has centralized command over military operations, financing, and political activities within the clan's tribal networks in Afghanistan's southeast and Pakistan's tribal areas, fostering operational continuity despite external pressures. Jalaluddin Haqqani, from the Zadran Pashtun tribe, built the network as a mujahideen faction before allying with the Taliban in the mid-1990s, serving as their tribal affairs minister until 2001. Afflicted by illness in his later years—reportedly limiting his involvement from around 2003—he delegated authority to his sons, ensuring familial succession. His death, unconfirmed publicly but estimated around 2018, did not disrupt the hierarchy, as operational control had already shifted. Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jalaluddin's eldest son (born circa 1978), has led the network's military wing since the mid-2000s, orchestrating high-profile attacks from bases in Pakistan's . Designated a global terrorist by the U.S. in 2007 for ties to and the , he evaded capture and, after the Taliban's victory, became acting , commanding Afghanistan's police and intelligence apparatus. Other sons handled specialized roles: Nasiruddin managed finances and suicide operations until his assassination by unidentified gunmen in on November 10, 2013; Badruddin oversaw foreign fighter coordination and was killed in a U.S. drone strike in in August 2012, with confirmation in 2013. The younger generation includes (born 1994), who focuses on political outreach and has conducted post-2021 interviews advocating governance while distancing from past violence. Brothers like directed fundraising from Gulf donors and served as refugees minister from September 2021 until his death in an Islamic State-claimed suicide bombing in on December 11, 2024. This family-centric model, rooted in tribal loyalty and polygamous kinship ties producing numerous siblings, has sustained the network amid U.S.-led strikes that eliminated at least three sons, yet vulnerabilities persist due to concentrated targets.

Organizational Hierarchy and Military Capacity

The Haqqani Network maintains a hierarchical structure dominated by the Haqqani family, functioning as a semi-autonomous entity embedded within the broader leadership. Founded by , the network transitioned to family control following his death around 2018, with his son assuming overall command. , designated a global terrorist by the U.S. with a $10 million bounty, serves as one of two deputies to supreme leader since 2016 and holds the position of acting Minister of Interior in the government established after August 2021. This dual role integrates Haqqani loyalists into key decision-making bodies, including the Taliban's Leadership Council, while preserving distinct command chains rooted in the network's traditional base in Loya Paktia, southeastern . Key family members reinforce the dynastic control: , Sirajuddin's uncle and also U.S.-designated with a $5 million bounty, was appointed Minister for Refugees and oversees Kabul's security apparatus. The structure emphasizes loyalty to the family patriarchs, with operational subunits handling logistics, intelligence, and attacks, often coordinated from safe havens in Pakistan's . Despite this embedding, tensions persist, as evidenced by reported internal clashes, such as a 2021 physical altercation between Sirajuddin and co-founder over cabinet allocations, highlighting the network's assertive pursuit of influence within the hierarchy. In terms of military capacity, the Haqqani Network wields substantial influence over internal security forces post-2021, with Sirajuddin directing approximately 230,000 police personnel and specialized units responsible for domestic order, border control, and operations. Prior to the Taliban victory, the network specialized in asymmetric tactics, including complex suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, kidnappings for ransom, and high-profile assaults on urban targets in and eastern provinces, maintaining resilience against U.S.-led efforts that failed to degrade its core capabilities significantly. It now nominates governors in eastern districts and controls security portfolios, leveraging historical ties to for operational expertise while shifting focus from insurgency to state enforcement. Exact fighter numbers remain opaque due to integration with forces, but the network's pre-2021 strength, drawn from Zadran Pashtun tribesmen, supported sustained operations across Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions.

Alliances and External Support

Ties to Taliban and Al-Qaeda

The Haqqani Network forged a strategic alliance with the in 1995, when founder joined the movement while retaining an independent power base along the - border. During the Taliban's rule from 1996 to 2001, Jalaluddin served as Minister of Tribal and Affairs, facilitating coordination on governance and military matters in eastern . This partnership deepened during the post-2001 insurgency against U.S.-led forces, where the Haqqani Network conducted high-profile attacks in and eastern provinces under the Taliban's broader umbrella, sharing fighters, logistics, and safe havens in North . Following the Taliban's recapture of in August 2021, Haqqani leader assumed the role of Acting Minister of Interior in the Taliban cabinet, embedding the network within the regime's security apparatus and overseeing police forces nationwide. This integration has enabled the Haqqani Network to influence Taliban policy on internal security and , while maintaining operational for cross-border activities. UN reports indicate that as of February 2021, the network operated under Taliban leadership, a dynamic that persisted post-victory despite nominal subordination. The Haqqani Network's ties to trace back to the against the Soviets, evolving into close operational links during the era, where hosted and provided sanctuary for training camps in his territories. These connections involved direct collaboration, including bin Laden's advocacy supported by Haqqani within councils, and extended to joint attacks during the 2001–2021 insurgency, such as suicide bombings and ambushes coordinated across the border regions. has maintained these bonds, with U.S. assessments designating him a senior figure linked to leadership for facilitating their presence in Haqqani-controlled areas. Post-2021, affiliates continue to benefit from Haqqani safe havens, underscoring enduring ideological alignment on global despite the 's state responsibilities.

Pakistani State Involvement and Safe Havens

The Haqqani Network has long benefited from operational safe havens in Pakistan's , particularly North Waziristan, where its leadership and fighters have regrouped, trained, and planned cross-border attacks into . These sanctuaries enabled the group to sustain its insurgency against U.S. and forces from 2001 to 2021, launching high-profile operations such as the 2011 attack on the U.S. Embassy in . U.S. intelligence assessments consistently identified North Waziristan as the Haqqani Network's primary base, hosting training camps, weapons storage, and coordination with allied militants like . Pakistan's (ISI) has been accused by senior U.S. officials of providing direct support to the Haqqani Network, treating it as a proxy to advance strategic interests in , including countering Indian influence. On September 22, 2011, then-Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen testified before the U.S. Senate that the Haqqani Network "acts as a veritable arm" of the ISI, with agency elements aiding in planning and executing attacks on American, , and allied targets. This involvement included logistical assistance, funding, and intelligence sharing, as evidenced by intercepted communications and captured operatives linking ISI officers to Haqqani facilitators. Despite Pakistani government denials of state sponsorship, the persistence of these havens despite repeated U.S. demands for action—culminating in the 2018 suspension of $300 million in —underscores tacit tolerance at minimum, if not active complicity within elements of the ISI's S Wing, responsible for militant networks. Operations like the 2014 Pakistani military offensive in North displaced militants but failed to dismantle Haqqani infrastructure, allowing the network to retain influence post-2021 takeover. U.S. congressional reports and analyses attribute this to Pakistan's "" doctrine, viewing the Haqqanis as leverage against a potentially hostile post-U.S. government.

Iranian Connections and Other Regional Backers

Despite profound sectarian divides, with the Sunni Deobandi Haqqani network ideologically opposed to Shia , the group has pursued pragmatic financial ties with Iranian backers to sustain operations against shared foes like U.S.-led coalition forces. Khalil , a senior network financier and brother of founder Jalaluddin , traveled to multiple times in the late 2000s to meet supporters and solicit funds, activities documented in U.S. Treasury Department designations issued on September 2, 2011. These efforts reportedly yielded financial contributions around 2009, channeled via networks, though exact amounts remain undisclosed. Such contacts underscore tactical convergence amid Iran's broader hedging strategy in , which included limited facilitation of insurgent logistics against while prioritizing anti-Taliban proxies. Broader allegations of Iranian material support to the Haqqani network and affiliates, including weapons or training via the (IRGC), have surfaced in U.S. legal actions, claiming assistance for attacks on American targets from through at least 2005 under directives from Khamenei and intermediaries. However, direct evidence remains sparse and contested, with Iran's primary Afghan engagements focused on Shia Hazara militias and economic influence rather than Sunni jihadists; U.S. intelligence assessments emphasize opportunistic rather than ideological alignment. Beyond , the Haqqani network draws sustained private donations from wealthy individuals and networks in Gulf states, building on fundraising established during the 1980s anti-Soviet . Donors in , the (UAE), , and contribute via mosque collections and transfers, with Nasiruddin Haqqani traveling to in 2004 to rally support and active in UAE cities like in 2009. Specific instances include a 2010 remittance of $3,000 from to a Haqqani commander, smuggled into eastern . These Gulf ties, often ideologically aligned with Salafi-Wahhabi currents, provide ideological and material continuity but lack state-level endorsement post-2001, contrasting with Pakistan's documented sanctuary role.

Operational Activities

Tactics and Notable Attacks

The Haqqani Network employs tactics characteristic of insurgent groups in , including ambushes on supply convoys using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), attacks on military outposts, and kidnappings for ransom or leverage. These operations leverage the group's strongholds in southeastern 's mountainous border regions, where fighters conduct hit-and-run raids before retreating to safe havens across the in . In high-profile urban operations, particularly in , the network favors complex, multi-phase attacks combining vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) with coordinated assaults by small teams of infiltrating militants armed with rifles, grenades, and vests to overwhelm security perimeters and target government or foreign installations. Such tactics aim to inflict mass casualties, disrupt governance, and generate value, often involving foreign fighters trained in Pakistan-based camps. Notable attacks attributed to the network include:
  • July 7, 2008, Indian Embassy bombing in : A truck bomb detonated outside the embassy, killing 58 people including Indian diplomats and Afghan civilians; U.S. linked the operation to Haqqani commanders coordinating from .
  • May 18, 2010, bombing: A bomber targeted a , killing a senior Afghan official and others; the Haqqani Network executed the attack to demonstrate reach into the capital.
  • August 10, 2010, guesthouse : A team attacked a civilian guesthouse frequented by foreigners, resulting in multiple deaths; Haqqani fighters used coordinated gunfire and explosives.
  • December 5, 2010, eastern bombing: A Haqqani operative detonated a vest near U.S. troops, killing two .
  • June 2012, attack: A bomber struck the base near the border, killing two U.S. personnel; the Haqqanis arranged the operation in retaliation for strikes on their sanctuaries.
These incidents highlight the network's operational sophistication and reliance on spectacular violence to sustain momentum against and Afghan forces.

Funding Mechanisms and Economic Networks

The Haqqani network derives funding from a combination of , , taxation on illicit trades such as narcotics, and operations through front businesses in , , and import-export sectors. These mechanisms evolved from cross-border activities in and , leveraging systems for money transfers to evade formal banking scrutiny. Prior to the 2021 Taliban takeover, the network reportedly extorted up to $1 million annually from international contractors like the on highway projects in eastern , enforcing payments through threats of disruption or attack. Kidnapping operations have been a core revenue stream, with the network collaborating with groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and to target high-value individuals including government officials, foreigners, and businessmen. Notable cases include the kidnapping of Afghan diplomat Haji Khaliq Farahi, yielding a $5 million negotiated in , and the 2009 abduction of journalist David Rohde, for which an initial $25 million demand was reduced to approximately $8 million paid to facilitators linked to the Haqqani leadership. Ransoms are often split among partners and laundered via networks, with funds deposited in North banks—over $300 million in cash over four years reported in one instance. In narcotics, the Haqqani network imposes taxes and protection fees on and precursor chemical shipments in southeastern , though it engages less directly in cultivation or processing compared to other factions. This includes coercion of traffickers for transit fees, contributing to broader revenues estimated at tens of millions annually from the trade, which the network accesses through territorial control and alliances. Post-2021, with Sirajuddin Haqqani's role as acting , the network benefits from Taliban-wide taxation systems like ushr (one-tenth tax) on agricultural output, including , and customs duties at borders, though specific Haqqani allocations remain opaque due to sanctions and lack of transparency. Donations from sympathetic donors in Gulf states such as the UAE, , , and supplement these activities, funneled through mosque collections, pilgrimages, and transfers—examples include $3,000 remittances from businessmen traced to network figures. Leaders like have historically traveled to the Gulf for fundraising, building on jihad-era networks from the . Economic networks extend to legitimate fronts, including madrassas, timber , and real estate in , which generate profits reinvested into operations despite U.S. Treasury designations targeting associated entities since 2011.

Conflicts and Opponents

Engagements with US-NATO Coalition

The Haqqani Network engaged the US-NATO coalition primarily through asymmetric warfare tactics, including suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), complex assaults, and ambushes targeting military outposts, convoys, and high-value installations in eastern Afghanistan and Kabul from 2001 to 2021. Operating from safe havens in Pakistan's North Waziristan, the group coordinated with the Taliban and al-Qaeda to inflict casualties and undermine coalition efforts, focusing on high-profile attacks to achieve propaganda victories. These engagements resulted in hundreds of coalition deaths, with the network claiming responsibility for some of the deadliest incidents against foreign forces. On March 3, 2008, a Haqqani suicide truck bombing targeted a guard tower at the Sabri District headquarters in , killing two soldiers and destroying the structure. publicly claimed responsibility, highlighting the group's intent to strike coalition personnel directly. In eastern provinces like Paktia and , Haqqani fighters frequently ambushed patrols and raided forward operating bases, such as the September 22, 2010, assault on Combat Outpost Spera in , where forces repelled attackers, killing 27 Haqqani militants attempting to overrun the position. High-profile urban assaults underscored the network's capability for coordinated operations. On January 14, 2008, gunmen stormed the Serena Hotel in during a visit by Norwegian officials, killing seven people in an armed assault. The June 28, 2011, attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in involved gunmen seizing multiple floors, resulting in 21 deaths including nine attackers; intercepts linked Badruddin Haqqani to directing the operation. Similarly, on September 13-14, 2011, approximately ten Haqqani fighters launched a 20-hour assault on the embassy, , and a diplomatic compound in using RPGs, AK-47s, and vests, killing 16 including five policemen and 11 civilians (over half children); commanders attributed the complex attack to the network. The coalition responded with targeted raids, special operations captures, and airstrikes to disrupt Haqqani leadership and networks. Afghan and coalition forces conducted numerous operations in Haqqani strongholds, such as the October 1, 2011, detention of Haji Mali Khan, the top Haqqani commander in Afghanistan who oversaw training camps. US drone strikes in Pakistan eliminated key figures, while ground operations in Afghanistan killed dozens of fighters in firefights, as in the May 28, 2009, raid in Paktika Province where 29 Haqqani militants died resisting detention of a senior commander. Despite these efforts, the network's resilience stemmed from cross-border sanctuaries, sustaining engagements until the 2021 coalition withdrawal.

Clashes with Pakistani Military

The Haqqani network has engaged in few, if any, direct clashes with the Pakistani military, setting it apart from anti-Pakistani groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which have conducted numerous attacks on Pakistani forces. This restraint stems from the network's operational focus on Afghanistan and alleged accommodations with elements of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), enabling safe havens in tribal areas like North Waziristan for staging cross-border operations. Pakistan's military operations in the (FATA), including airstrikes and ground incursions, have primarily targeted TTP and affiliated fighters hostile to the Pakistani state, with minimal reported engagement against Haqqani elements. During , initiated on June 15, 2014, to dismantle militant infrastructure in , Pakistani forces claimed to eliminate over 3,500 militants overall, but U.S. officials expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of decisive action against Haqqani leadership, noting that key figures like relocated to without significant combat. The operation displaced nearly one million civilians but resulted in no verified large-scale battles involving Haqqani fighters, who reportedly avoided prolonged resistance. Isolated incidents, such as the 2011 arrest of Haqqani financier Nasruddin Haqqani in , reflect sporadic Pakistani interdictions rather than sustained military confrontations. These actions have not provoked retaliation from the network, consistent with its strategic prioritization of Afghan targets over Pakistani ones. U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, which killed several Haqqani operatives between 2008 and 2018, were conducted independently of Pakistani ground forces and did not trigger Haqqani reprisals against the Pakistani military. The limited friction highlights Pakistan's selective approach, where Haqqani's utility as a proxy against perceived Indian-backed elements in outweighs the imperative for confrontation, despite international pressure. This dynamic has persisted post-2021 Taliban takeover in , with Haqqani figures like assuming prominent roles in the Islamic without disrupting Pakistani tolerance of residual networks.

Rivalries Within Afghanistan

The Haqqani network's primary rivalry within stems from its alignment with the against competing Islamist militants, particularly the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which denounces the as apostates for compromising on strict Salafi-jihadist ideology through pragmatic governance. ISKP has repeatedly targeted Haqqani figures and infrastructure, conducting bombings and s to undermine their . On December 11, 2024, a bomber detonated explosives inside the Ministry of Refugees in , killing acting minister Khalil ur-Rahman Haqqani, a senior Haqqani network leader and uncle to , along with six others; ISKP claimed responsibility, marking the highest-profile since August 2021. This attack underscores ISKP's operational focus on power centers, with Haqqani's death exacerbating vulnerabilities in the network's command structure amid ongoing clashes in eastern and northern provinces. The network also contributes to Taliban campaigns against the National Resistance Front (NRF), a non-Islamist rooted in Panjshir and provinces, led by as a successor to the that historically opposed Haqqani and forces during the 1990s civil war. Haqqani fighters, leveraging their strongholds in Loya Paktia, have supported offensives to encircle NRF positions, though the resistance has sustained guerrilla operations, inflicting casualties through ambushes and since 2021. These engagements reflect enduring ethnic and ideological divides, with Haqqani's Pashtun-centric network viewing Tajik-dominated NRF elements as threats to consolidation. Persistent NRF activity has strained resources, prompting deployments of Haqqani-aligned units to northern fronts despite the network's traditional focus on the southeast. Within the Taliban, the Haqqani network maintains a semi-autonomous factional identity, leading to tensions with the Kandahari old guard loyal to supreme leader over policy and resource control. In February 2023, Interior Minister publicly contradicted Akhundzada's decrees banning women from universities and NGOs, advocating phased implementation to avoid unrest, which exposed rare internal discord broadcast via Taliban media. Such rifts, compounded by competition for ministerial posts and patronage networks, have fueled unverified reports of assassinations and purges, including suspicions around the 2022 disappearance of deputy leader amid rumors of Haqqani involvement. Despite these frictions, Haqqani influence in security apparatuses has solidified its role, though factional balancing acts risk eroding unified command against external rivals like ISKP.

Assessments and Controversies

Strategic Effectiveness and Achievements

The Haqqani Network has exhibited strategic effectiveness in sustaining a resilient against U.S. and forces over two decades, leveraging cross-border sanctuaries in Pakistan's to conduct complex attacks on high-value targets in and eastern . This operational model allowed the network to maintain command structures and fighter networks intact, even as campaigns degraded other factions like the Quetta Shura. The network's emphasis on suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, and coordinated assaults inflicted disproportionate casualties relative to its size, contributing to the erosion of morale and political will for prolonged engagement. A pivotal achievement was the network's integration into the Taliban leadership, culminating in its instrumental role during the 2021 Afghan government collapse. Haqqani fighters, operating under Sirajuddin Haqqani's command, spearheaded offensives in key eastern provinces like Paktia and , accelerating the 's momentum toward and enabling the rapid seizure of power by August 2021. This success embedded the network within the regime, with Sirajuddin Haqqani appointed acting Minister of Interior on September 7, 2021, granting oversight of national police forces, security, and internal —positions that consolidated the network's influence over Afghanistan's coercive apparatus. Post-2021, the network's achievements include expanding territorial control through affiliated militias in regions like Kurram Agency, facilitating and foreign fighter transit to sustain Taliban operations against rivals such as the Islamic State-Khorasan Province. The U.S. decision in March 2025 to lift a $10 million bounty on underscored the network's de facto strategic leverage, reflecting pragmatic engagement with the government amid ongoing counterterrorism concerns. These outcomes affirm the network's adeptness at and alliance-building, achieving the expulsion of foreign forces and ascension to governance roles after decades of resistance.

Criticisms of Brutality and Terrorism

The Haqqani Network has been designated a foreign terrorist organization by the since September 2012, primarily due to its orchestration of high-profile attacks involving suicide bombings and coordinated assaults that have repeatedly targeted civilians, Afghan , and international personnel in urban centers like . These operations, often employing vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and gunmen, have resulted in indiscriminate civilian casualties, with U.S. assessments attributing the network's tactics to a deliberate strategy of instilling fear and undermining governance. The has similarly sanctioned the group under its Taliban-related regime, citing its role in attacks that killed non-combatants, including children. A prominent example is the January 14, 2008, assault on the Serena Hotel in , for which , the network's de facto leader, has been sought by U.S. authorities; gunmen and a suicide bomber killed at least six civilians and wounded others in a complex attack on the luxury hotel frequented by foreigners and locals. In June 2011, Haqqani operatives conducted an 18-hour siege on the Intercontinental Hotel in using eight gunmen and suicide bombers, resulting in 18 deaths, including nine civilians, with the assault highlighting the group's proficiency in prolonged, multi-stage operations that maximize casualties among non-military targets. The network's April 15, 2012, synchronized attacks across and other provinces involved multiple suicide bombings and gun battles, killing dozens, including civilians, and demonstrating a pattern of urban designed to overwhelm security responses and amplify psychological impact. Critics, including U.S. congressional reports and intelligence analyses, have condemned the Haqqani Network's reliance on bombings as particularly brutal, given their inherent lack of between combatants and innocents, often occurring in densely populated areas like markets and hotels. Such tactics have drawn international condemnation for violating principles of distinction in armed conflict, with the network's attacks contributing to thousands of deaths in over two decades, as documented in designations emphasizing their role in fostering instability through terror. While the group claims to target only "apostates" and occupiers, from post-attack investigations consistently reveals high tolls, underscoring the causal link between their methods and widespread suffering.

International Sanctions and Diplomatic Efforts

The formally designated the Haqqani Network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on September 19, 2012, following the enactment of the Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act earlier that year, which mandated action against the group for orchestrating attacks on and coalition forces. This FTO status, administered by the Department of State under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, criminalizes the provision of material support to the network (18 U.S.C. § 2339B), blocks its assets via the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and bars alien members from entering the country. Additional Treasury Department sanctions under have targeted network financiers and facilitators, freezing US-jurisdiction assets and prohibiting transactions with designated entities. The imposed sanctions on the Haqqani Network through its Al-Qaida and ISIL (Da'esh) Sanctions Committee (established under resolution 1267, later 1988 regime), listing the group as TAe.012 for its operational ties to the and Al-Qaida, including cross-border attacks from into . Key individuals, such as leader (listed in 2008 and updated), deputy Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani, and financier Nasiruddin Haqqani, face asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes for directing suicide bombings, kidnappings, and IED campaigns that killed hundreds of civilians and foreign troops. The aligns with UN listings, implementing parallel restrictive measures against network commanders for undermining Afghan stability. Diplomatic initiatives have sought to isolate the network through multilateral pressure on , where it maintains safe havens in North Waziristan, including demands for operations against its as a precondition for broader cooperation. During 2018–2021 - negotiations in , the Haqqani Network's integration into structures complicated delisting efforts, as Sirajuddin Haqqani's role as a negotiator and eventual acting post-August 2021 takeover raised doubts about commitments to sever Al-Qaida ties. The 2020 - agreement included pledges to prevent terrorist attacks from Afghan soil but exempted Haqqani sanctions, preserving leverage amid ongoing non-compliance documented in UN monitoring reports. In March 2025, the removed bounties totaling millions of dollars on and two other senior figures to enable pragmatic engagement with the de facto regime on issues like and , though FTO designations and OFAC sanctions remained intact, with Haqqani still listed as a . International non-recognition of the government persists, with sanctions regimes upheld to enforce compliance on and disavowal of transnational jihadism, despite critiques that fragmented enforcement has allowed the network to sustain operations via networks and .

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