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People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran
People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran
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The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) or Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) (Persian: سازمان مجاهدین خلق ایران, romanizedSâzmân-e Mojâhedin-e Khalgh-e Irân),[c] is an Iranian dissident organization. It was an armed group until 2003, afterwards transitioning into a political group.[14] Its headquarters is currently in Albania. The group's ideology was influenced by Islam and revolutionary Marxism; and while it denied Marxist influences, its revolutionary reinterpretation of Shia Islam was shaped by the writings of Ali Shariati.[15][16][17] After the Iranian Revolution, the MEK opposed the new theocratic Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, seeking to replace it with its own government.[18][19][20] At one point the MEK was Iran's "largest and most active armed dissident group",[21] and it is still sometimes presented by Western political backers as a major Iranian opposition group.[22][23][24] The MEK is known to be deeply unpopular today within Iran, largely due to its siding with Iraq in the Iran–Iraq War and continued ties with the government of Saddam Hussein afterwards.[25]

Key Information

The MEK was founded on 5 September 1965 by leftist Iranian students affiliated with the Freedom Movement of Iran to oppose the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.[3][26] The organization contributed to overthrowing the Shah during the 1979 Iranian Revolution. It subsequently pursued the establishment of a democracy in Iran, particularly gaining support from Iran's middle class intelligentsia.[27][28][29] The MEK boycotted the 1979 constitutional referendum, which led to Khomeini barring MEK leader Massoud Rajavi from the 1980 presidential election.[d][31][32] On 20 June 1981, the MEK organized a demonstration against Khomeini and against the ousting of President Abolhassan Banisadr and the protest was violently suppressed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which shot into the crowds, killing fifty and injuring hundreds, before later executing 23 further protesters who had been arrested, including teenage girls.[33][34][31] On 28 June, the MEK was implicated in the blowing up of the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) in the Hafte Tir bombing, killing 74 officials and party members.[35][36][37][38][39] A wave of killings and executions led by Ruhollah Khomeini's government followed, part of the 1981–1982 Iran Massacres.[40][41][42]

Facing the subsequent repression of the MEK by the IRP, Rajavi fled to Paris.[43][44][45] During the exile, the underground network that remained in Iran continued to plan and carry out attacks[46][47] and it allegedly conducted the August 1981 bombing that killed Iran's president and prime minister.[48][49][47] In 1983, the MEK began meeting with Iraqi officials.[50][51][52][53] In 1986, France expelled the MEK at the request of Iran,[54][55] forcing it to relocate to Camp Ashraf in Iraq. In 1987, it founded the "National Liberation Army of Iran" (NLA), with the sole objective of "toppling the Islamic Republic through military force from outside the country".[56][57][58] During the Iran-Iraq War, the MEK then sided with Iraq, taking part in Operation Forty Stars,[59][60][61][56] and Operation Mersad.[62][63] Following Operation Mersad, Iranian officials ordered the mass execution of prisoners said to support the MEK.[64] [42]The group gained significant publicity in 2002 by announcing the existence of Iranian nuclear facilities.[65][66] In 2003, the MEK's military wing signed a ceasefire agreement with the U.S. and was disarmed at Camp Ashraf.[67]

Between 1997 and 2013, the MEK was on the lists of terrorist organizations of the US, Canada, EU, UK and Japan for various periods.[68] The MEK is designated as a terrorist organization by Iran.[69] Critics have described the group as exhibiting traits of a "personality cult",[70] while its backers describe the group as proponents of "a free and democratic Iran" that could become the next government there.[71]

History

[edit]

Early years (1965–1970)

[edit]
Mohammad Hanifnejad
Ali-Asghar Badizadegan
Hanifnejad (left) and Badizadegan (right), two of the founders of the organization

The Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) was founded in 1965 by a group of Tehran University students who had opposed the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 1950s.[72][73][32] They considered the mainstream Liberation Movement too moderate and ineffective,[73] and aimed to establish a socialist state in Iran based on a modern and revolutionary interpretation of Islam that originated from Islamic texts like Nahj al-Balagha and some of Ali Shariati's works.[74][3][75][19][76][77] MEK founders included Mohammad Hanifnejad, Saeed Mohsen, and Ali Asghar Badiazadegan,[78] and it attracted primarily young, well-educated Iranians.[79] While MEK publications were banned in Iran, in its first five years, the group primarily engaged in ideological work.[80]

Schism (1970–1978)

[edit]
MEK's central committee members[81]
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Bahram Aram
Reza Rezaeia Taghi Shahram
Kazem Zolanvarb Majid Sharif Vaghefic
a Killed in action by SAVAK in 1973
b Arrested in 1972, executed in 1975
c Killed by Marxist offshoot in 1975 purge

During the 1970s, the MEK carried out a series of attacks against the Iranian and Western targets[32] and tried to kidnap the U.S. Ambassador to Iran Douglas MacArthur II in 1970.[82] Some sources attribute the attempted kidnap to other groups.[83][84][85]

By August 1971, the MEK's Central Committee included Reza Rezai, Kazem Zolanvar, and Brahram Aram.[81] 1971-1972 arrests and executions by the Shah's security services, also infighting within the organization "practically shattered the organization".[86] During August–September 1971, SAVAK managed to strike arrested and executed many members of MEK including its co-founders.[87] Some surviving members restructured the group by replacing the central cadre with a three-man central committee. Each of the three central committee members led a separate branch of the organization.[88] Two of the original central committee members were replaced in 1972 and 1973, and the replacing members were in charge of leading the organization until the internal purge of 1975.[87]

By 1973, MEK members that declared themselves Marxist–Leninist launched an "internal ideological struggle",[89] and by 1975 two opposing MEK factions had formed, one being Muslim and the other Marxist.[90] The Marxist offshoot asserted that "they had reached the conclusion that Marxism, not Islam, was the true revolutionary philosophy".[91] Members who did not convert to Marxism were expelled or reported to SAVAK.[89] This led to two rival Mojahedin, each with its own publication, its own organization, and its own activities.[92] The Marxist offshoot was initially known as the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist). A few months before the Iranian Revolution, the majority of the Marxist Mojahedin renamed themselves Peykar (Organization of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class) in 1978.[93] From 1973 to 1979, the Muslim MEK including Massoud Rajavi were mainly in prisons.[94] "Rajavi, upon release from prison during the revolution, had to rebuild the organization".[95][96]

Between 1973 and 1975, the Marxist–Leninist offshoot escalated their militant activities in Iran. In 1973, they engaged in two street battles with Tehran police and bombed ten buildings including Plan Organization, Pan-American Airlines, Shell Oil Company, Hotel International, Radio City Cinema, and an export company owned by a Baháʼí businessman. In February 1974, they attacked a police station in Isfahan and in April, they bombed a reception hall, Oman Bank, gates of the British embassy, and offices of Pan-American Oil company in protest of the Sultan of Oman's state visit. A communiqué by the organization declared that their actions had been to show solidarity with the people of Dhofar. On 19 April 1974, they attempted to bomb the SAVAK centre at Tehran University. On 25 May, they set off bombs at three multinational corporations.[97] Also Lt. Col. Louis Lee Hawkins, a U.S. Army comptroller, was shot dead in Tehran by MEK assailants in 1973.[98][97][failed verification] Leading up to the Islamic Revolution, members of the MEK conducted attacks and assassinations against both Iranian and Western targets.[99][100] In May 1972, an attack on Brig. Gen. Harold Price was attributed to the MEK.[101][102] These assassinations were carried out either by the Marxist offshoot[103][104][105][106] or Islamist branch of the MEK.[107][108][99]

In August 1976, a car carrying three American employees of Rockwell International - William Cottrell, Donald Smith, and Robert Krongard - was attacked, resulting in their deaths. While some sources suggest the MEK was responsible,[109] the Marxist offshoot, which at the time had retained the organization's name, claimed responsibility for the killings in their "Military Communique No.24", concluding that the murders were in retaliation for recent death sentences.[110]

1979 Iranian Revolution and subsequent power struggles

[edit]

The group supported the revolution in its initial phases,[111] and became "a major force in Iranian politics" according to Ervand Abrahamian.[112] However, it soon entered into conflict with Khomeini,[113] and became a leading opposition to the new theocratic regime.[114] By early 1979, the MEK had organized themselves and recreated armed cells, especially in Tehran and helped overthrow the Pahlavi regime.[115] In January 1979, Massoud Rajavi was released from prison and rebuilt the MEK together with other members that had been imprisoned.[115][113] Also in January 1979 the MEK released a program advocating for increased rights for ethnic minorities in Iran, the introduction of welfare-state policies, and gender equality; while the Khomeini regime perceived these demands as a threat.[116]

Its candidate for the head of the newly founded Council of Experts was Massoud Rajavi in the referendum of August 1979. He was not elected.[111] The MEK further launched an unsuccessful campaign supporting total abolition of Iran's standing military, the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, in order to prevent a coup d'état against the system. They also claimed credit for infiltration against the Nojeh coup plot.[117] The MEK was one of the supporters of the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran after the Iranian revolution although MEK has denied it.[118]

The MEK refused to participate in the December 1979 Iranian constitutional referendum organized by the Islamic Republican Party to ratify the Constitution drafted by the Assembly of Experts,[119] arguing that the new constitution had failed in many aspects "most important of all, accept the concept of the 'classless tawhidi society'".[119] Despite the opposition, the 3 December 1979 referendum vote approved the new constitution.[1][119] Once the constitution had been ratified, the MEK proposed Rajavi as their presidential candidate. In his campaign, Rajavi promised to rectify the constitution's shortcomings.[119] The conflict surrounding the Constitution intensified when the Assembly of Experts added numerous clauses that transferred sovereignty from the Iranian population to the ulama, shifting the power to senior clerics and away from the president and elected representatives. In the years that followed, the clerics strengthened their grip on the republic, eventually gaining control over all branches of government and fully establishing a theocratic state.[120] As a result of the boycott, Khomeini subsequently refused to allow Massoud Rajavi and MEK members to run in the 1980 Iranian presidential election.[121][122] Khomeini declared that "those who had failed to endorse the Constitution could not be trusted to abide by that Constitution".[30] In the March and April 1980 parliamentary elections, the MEK secured the second-highest number of votes. Massoud Rajavi garnered 500,000 votes, while his wife Maryam received over 250,000. However, Khomeini restricted both of them from entering the parliament (Majles).[116] Rajavi then allied with Iran's new president, Abolhassan Banisadr, elected in January 1980.[115]

Cultural revolution, Iranian protests, and subsequent oppression (1980–1981)

[edit]

On June 14, 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini initiated an order aimed to "purify" higher education by removing Western, liberal, and leftist elements, leading to the closure of universities, the banning of student unions, and violent occupations of campuses. Following the 1979 revolution, the MEK started to gain popularity among university students. During the Cultural Revolution in Iran, clerics imposed policies to Islamize Iranian society, including the expulsion of critical academics, the suppression of secular political groups, and the persecution of intellectuals and artists. These measures sparked large-scale protests across the country.[123][124][125]

On the final day of the elections, Rajavi met with President Abolhassan Banisadr, complaining that the IRP and its Hezbollah supporters were systematically intimidating voters, disrupting rallies, assaulting campaign workers, and setting ballot boxes on fire. The MEK then arrived at two key conclusions: first, that they had enough popular backing to serve as an opposition to the IRP; and second, that the IRP would not allow them to operate as an opposition.[126] The group began clashing with the ruling Islamic Republican Party while avoiding direct and open criticism of Khomeini.[5] The MEK was in turn suppressed by Khomeini's revolutionary organizations.[127]

In response to the widely disputed impeachment of President Banisadr, the MEK organized a large-scale protest against Khomeini on June 20, 1981, intending to topple the regime.[128] Big crowds gathered in various cities, with the Tehran protest alone attracting up to 500,000 people. Leading clerics proclaimed that demonstrators would be considered "enemies of God" and face immediate execution regardless of age. This marked the beginning of the 1981–1982 Iran Massacres led by the Islamic government.[123][129][130] [42]In the area around Tehran University, 50 people were killed, 200 wounded, and 1,000 taken into custody, surpassing the intensity of most street battles during the Islamic Revolution. 23 demonstrators were also executed by firing squads, with teenage girls among those executed. From June 24 to 27, the regime executed an additional 50 people. The reported number of executions increased to "600 by September, 1700 by October, and 2500 by December." Initially, the regime publicly displayed the bodies and took pride in declaring the execution of entire families, "including teenage daughters and 60-year-old grandmothers."[131][34][31] The MEK responded by declaring war against the Government of Islamic Republic of Iran,[132] and initiating a series of bombings and assassinations targeting the clerical leadership.[5]

In September 1980 during Iraq's invasion of Iran, the MEK stepped up to fight for their country despite its strained relationship with Khomeini's government. Thousands of MEK members joined the front lines.[133]

Hafte Tir bombing

[edit]

On 28 June 1981, the Islamic Republican Party headquarters was bombed in the Hafte Tir bombing, which killed 74 party officials and other party members, including Mohammad Beheshti, the party's secretary-general and Chief Justice of Iran, 4 cabinet ministers, 10 vice ministers and 27 members of the Parliament of Iran.[134][135] Iranian officials initially blamed various groups including the Iraqi government, SAVAK, and the United States.[136][137] Two days after the incident Ruhollah Khomeini accused the MEK.[138] In the years that followed, others were also held accountable, including a man named Mehdi Tafari executed by a Tehran tribunal for his alleged involvement.[139][140] Kenneth Katzman notes there is much speculation among academics and observers that the bombings could have been orchestrated by top IRP officials as a strategy to eliminate political opponents within the government.[49] According to the United States Department of State,[141] in addition to other sources,[142][143][144] the bombing was carried out by the MEK. Ervand Abrahamian argues that whatever the truth may be, the Islamic Republic used this incident to fight the MEK. The MEK declared that the bombing was a "natural and necessary reaction to the regime's atrocities",[139] and it never claimed responsibility for the attack.[145]

Open conflict with the Islamic Republican Party

[edit]
Bomb debris after assassination of President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar in 1981

In July 1981, the MEK then formed the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) with the stated goal of uniting the opposition to the Iranian government under one umbrella organization.[146] Rajavi assumed the position of chairman of the organization.[147] On 30 August 1981, they bombed the Prime Minister's office, killing the elected President Rajai and Premier Mohammad Javad Bahonar. Iranian authorities announced that Massoud Keshmiri, an MEK member was probably responsible.[148][149][150][151] The reaction to the Hafte Tir bombing and the bombing of the Prime Minister's office was intense, with many arrests and executions of Mojahedin.[152] The MEK responded by targeting key Iranian official figures for assassination, as well as attacking low-ranking civil servants and members of the Revolutionary Guards, along with ordinary citizens who supported the new government.[153]

Between June 1981 and April 1982, around 3,500 MEK members were either executed or killed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Another 5000 MEK prisoners were detained in camps, and another 8,000 were imprisoned for charges such as possessing copies of Mujahid newspaper. During the same period the MEK was responsible for about 65 percent of nearly 1,000 Khomeini officials killed.[154] From 26 August 1981 to December 1982, the MEK orchestrated 336 attacks against Khomeini officials.[155] In July 1982, 13 IRGC members and Mohammad Sadoughi were killed by MEK members.[34]

Exile and underground opposition activity (1982–1988)

[edit]

In 1982, the Islamic Republic cracked down MEK operations within Iran.[100] On 8 February Mousa Khiabani, Rajavi's deputy and the MEK's field commander in Iran was killed following a three-hour gunfight at a North Tehran safehouse.[156] Alongside him died his wife Azar Rezaei, Ashraf Rabiei, Rajavi's first wife and six others. Rajavi's son Mostafa survived and was later sent to Paris.[157][158] The MEK stressed the significance of ideology, which was shaped by its interpretation of what was missing in Iran at the time such as lack of freedom and human rights limitations by the Islamic Republic.[20] The majority of the MEK leadership and members fled to France, where it operated until 1985.[159] In 1983, the MEK started an alliance with Iraq following a meeting between Massoud Rajavi and Tariq Aziz.[160]

In 1986, after French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac struck a deal with Tehran for the release of French hostages held prisoners by the Hezbollah in Lebanon.[161] Also in June 1986, the Islamic Republic "won another major victory in its campaign to isolate the Mojahedin" by persuading the French government to close down the MEK headquarters in Paris. This improved relations between France and Iran. During this period other European nations declined to offer political asylum to the group. With no alternative available and a desire to maintain the group's cohesion, they ultimately decided to relocate to Iraq. James Piazza contends that the MEK's expulsion from France and relocation to Iraq is a "crucial episode" in the group's exile, as it appears Khomeini aimed to send the MEK to a remote place. However, the group ended up in a location that enabled it to continue its cross-border attacks. MEK representatives contend that their organization had little alternative to moving to Iraq considering its aim of toppling the Iranian clerical government.[162][55] By 1987, most MEK leaders were based in Iraq, where the group remained until the 2003 US invasion. According to the US State Department, the MEK was mainly supported by Iraq during that period and was fighting on the Iraqi side in the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War.[163]

From 1982 to 1988, despite the mounting casualties on both sides, the lingering underground presence of the MEK in Iran remained operational and went on to perform an average of sixty operations per week, resulting in assassinations of important Khomeini deputies.[158] The MEK came to be considered Iran's "largest and most active Iranian exile organization",[164][165][112] and its publications were commonly circulated within the Iranian diaspora.[166]

Operations Shining sun, Forty Stars, and Mersad

[edit]
National Liberation Army of Iran MD-500
MEK leader Massoud Rajavi with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.

The MEK's official argument for moving to Iraq was that it would place them geographically close to their enemy, the Islamic Republic government in Iran.[167][168] In 1987 Masoud Rajavi declared the establishment of the "National Liberation Army of Iran" (NLA). It served as an infantry force that included different militant groups members of the NCRI, and its sole objective was to "overthrow the Islamic Republic using a military force outside the country."[56][169][170] Through a broadcast on Baghdad radio, the MEK extended an invitation to all progressive-nationalist Iranian individuals to join the NLA in overthrowing the government of the Islamic Republic.[171]

On 27 March 1988, the NLA launched its first military offensive against the Islamic Republic's armed forces.[60] The NLA captured 600 square-kilometres of Islamic Republic territory and 508 soldiers from the Iranian 77th infantry division in Khuzestan Province.[172] The operation was named "Shining Sun"[59][60][61][56] (or "Operation Bright Sun")[172] in which according to Massoud Rajavi, 2000 soldiers of the Islamic Republic were killed and $100 million worth of equipment was captured and exhibited for journalists.[172]

Operation Forty Stars was launched on June 18, 1988. With 530 aircraft sorties and heavy use of nerve gas, they attacked to the Iranian forces in the area around Mehran, killing or wounding 3,500 and nearly destroying a Revolutionary Guard division. The forces captured the city and took positions in the heights near Mehran, coming close to wiping the whole Iranian Pasdaran division and taking most of its equipment.[173] While some sources claim that Iraq participated in the operation,[174] the MEK and Baghdad said Iraqi soldiers did not take part.[175][176]

Near the end of the Iran–Iraq War, a military force of 7,000 members of the MEK, armed and equipped by Saddam's Iraq and calling itself the National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA) was founded.[177] On 26 July 1988, six days after Ayatollah Khomeini had announced his acceptance of the UN-brokered ceasefire resolution, the NLA advanced under heavy Iraqi air cover, crossing the Iranian border from Iraq.[178] It seized the Iranian town of Islamabad-e Gharb. As it advanced further into Iran, Iraq ceased its air support and Iranian forces cut off NLA supply lines and counterattacked under cover of fighter planes and helicopter gunships. The MEK claims it lost 1,400 dead or missing and the Islamic Republic sustained 55,000 casualties. It claims to have killed 4,500 NLA during the operation.[179] The operation was called Foroughe Javidan (Eternal Light) by the MEK and the counterattack Operation Mersad by the Iranian forces.[180] Rajavi later stated that "the failure of Eternal Light was not a military blunder, but was instead rooted in the members' thoughts for their spouses".[34]

1988 execution of MEK prisoners

[edit]

Following the MEK's Operation Mersad against Iranian forces, thousands of imprisoned members of the MEK, along with members of other leftist opposition groups, were executed.[181][182] The Iranian government used the MEK's failed invasion as a pretext for the mass execution of those "who remained steadfast in their support for the MEK" and other jailed opposition group members.[183][34] Most of the prisoners executed were there for nonviolent activities like distributing newspapers and leaflets, joining protests, or raising money for the opposition. Some were imprisoned for holding outlawed political views.[184]: 11 

On 19 July 1988, the authorities isolated major prisons, having its courts of law go on an unscheduled holiday to prevent relatives from inquiring about those imprisoned,[185] and as Ervand Abrahamian notes, "thus began an act of violence unprecedented in Iranian history". Prisoners were asked if they were willing to denounce the MEK before cameras, help the IRI hunt down MEK members and name secret sympathizers. Those who gave unsatisfactory answers were promptly taken away and hanged.[185] Children and Women were among those executed.[186] Human rights groups say that the number of those executed remains uncertain, but "thousands of political dissidents were systematically subjected to enforced disappearance in Iranian detention facilities across the country",[183][187] with those executed charged with "moharebeh" or "waging war on God",[188] and of "disclosing state secrets" and threatening national security".[183] Since the executions, Amnesty International has stated that "there has also been an ongoing campaign by the Islamic Republic to demonize victims, distort facts, and repress family survivors and human rights defenders."[189][190] Under international law, these mass extrajudicial killings without fair proceedings were also considered systematic crimes against humanity.[191]

According to Professor Cheryl Bernard, the mass execution of political prisoners carried out by the Islamic Republic in 1981 caused the MEK to split into four groups: those that were arrested, imprisoned or executed, a group that went underground in Iran, another that left to Kurdistan and a final group that left to other countries abroad.[192] By the end of 1981, the principal refuge for many exiled members of the MEK had become France.[193]

Post-war Saddam era (1988–2003)

[edit]

The Iranian government is believed to be concerned about MEK activities in Iran, and MEK supporters are a major target of Iran's internal security apparatus abroad[194][195] and it is said to be responsible for killing MEK members, Kazem Rajavi on 24 April 1990 and Mohammad-Hossein Naghdi, a NCRI representative on 6 March 1993.[194] In 1991 the MEK was accused of helping the Iraqi Republican Guard suppress Shiite and Kurdish nationwide uprisings, a claim the MEK has consistently denied.[69][196] Ervand Abrahamian suggests that one motivation for the MEK's opposition to the clerical regime was its infringement on the rights of national minorities, especially the Kurds.[197]

In April 1992, the MEK attacked 10 Iranian embassies including the Iranian Mission to the United Nations in New York using different weapons, taking hostages, and injuring Iranian ambassadors and embassy employees. There were dozens of arrests.[198][199] According to MEK representatives, the attacks were a way to protest the bombing of a MEK military base where several people had been killed and wounded.[199]

In June 1998 FIFA president Sepp Blatter said that he received "anonymous threats of disruption from Iranian exiles" for the 1998 FIFA World Cup match between Iran and the U.S. football teams at Stade de Gerland.[200] The MEK bought some 7,000 out of 42,000 tickets for the match between, in order to promote themselves with the political banners they smuggled. The plan was ultimately foiled with TV cameras avoiding filming them, and intelligence sources having been tipped off about a potential pitch invasion. To prevent an interruption in the match, extra security entered Stade Gerland.[201]

In 1999, after a 2 1⁄2-year investigation, Federal authorities arrested 29 individuals in Operation Eastern Approach,[202] of whom 15 were held on charges of helping MEK members illegally enter the United States.[203] The ringleader pled guilty to providing phony documents to MEK members and to violations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.[204][205] In 2002 the NCRI publicly called or the formation of a National Solidarity Front to help overthrow Islamic Republic of Iran.[206]

2003 French arrests

[edit]

In June 2003, French police raided the MEK's properties, including its base in Auvers-sur-Oise, under the orders of anti-terrorist magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière, after suspicions that it was trying to shift its base of operations there. 160 suspected MEK members were then arrested, including Maryam Rajavi and her brother Saleh Rajavi.[207] After questioning, most of those detained were released, but 24 members, including Maryam Rajavi, were kept in detention.[208]

In response, 40 supporters began hunger strikes to protest the arrests, and 10 members including Neda Hassani, immolated themselves in various European capitals.[209][210] French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy declared that the MEK "recently wanted to make France its support base, notably after the intervention in Iraq", while Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, head of France's domestic intelligence service, claimed that the group was "transforming its Val d'Oise centre [near Paris] [...] into an international terrorist base".[209] Police found $1.3 million in $100 bills in cash in their offices.[211]

U.S. Senator Sam Brownback, a Republican from Kansas and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on South Asia, then accused the French of doing "the Iranian government's dirty work". Along with other members of Congress, he wrote a letter of protest to President Jacques Chirac, while longtime MEK supporters such as Sheila Jackson Lee, a Democrat from Texas, criticized Maryam Radjavi's arrest.[212] A court later found that there were no grounds for terrorism or terrorism-related finance charges.[213] In 2014, prosecuting judges also dropped all charges of money laundering and fraud.[214]

Post-U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003–2016)

[edit]
Entrance Gate of Ashraf City when populated by PMOI exiles

In May 2003, during the Iraq War, the Coalition forces bombed MEK bases and forced them to surrender.[215] This resulted in at least 50 deaths.[e][216] The US forces disarmed Camp Ashraf residents.[67] In the operation, the U.S. reportedly captured 6,000 MEK soldiers and over 2,000 pieces of military equipment, including 19 British-made Chieftain tanks.[217][218] Following the occupation the U.S. did not hand over MEK fighters to Iran.[219][220] The group's core members were for many years effectively confined to Camp Ashraf,[221] before later being relocated to a former U.S. military base, Camp Liberty, in Iraq.[222] Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney argued that the MEK should be used against Iran.[223][220] They were then placed under the guard of the U.S. Military. Defectors from the MEK requested assistance from the Coalition forces, who created a "temporary internment and protection facility" for them.[224] In the first year these numbered "several hundred", mainly Iranian soldiers captured in the Iran-Iraq war and other Iranians lured to the MEK.[225] In all, during the period of US control, nearly 600 members of the MEK defected.[226]

In June 2004, Donald Rumsfeld designated the MeK as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention.[227][223][228] and signed a formal ceasefire agreement.[67] Since 2009, when the Iraqi government became openly hostile to MEK, the U.S. led efforts to get the group's members out of Iraq.[229] After it was no longer designated as a terrorist group, the US was able to convince Albania to accept the remaining 2,700 members who were brought to Tirana between 2014 and 2016.[223][230][231][232]

Separate to events in Iraq, the organization launched a free-to-air satellite television network named Vision of Freedom (Sima-ye-Azadi) in England in 2003.[233] It previously operated Vision of Resistance analogue television in Iraq in the 1990s, accessible in western provinces of Iran.[234] They also had a radio station, Radio Iran Zamin, that was closed down in June 1998.[235] In 2006, an EU freeze on the group's funds was overturned by the European Court of First Instance.[236] In 2010 and 2011 Ali Saremi,[237][238][239] Mohammad Ali Haj Aghaei and Jafar Kazemi were executed by the Iranian government for co-operating with the MEK.[240][241]

Iraqi government crackdown (2009–2013)

[edit]

In 2009 American troops gave the Iraqi government responsibility of the MEK. Iraqi authorities, which were sympathetic to Iran, allowed Iran-linked militias to attack the MEK.[114] Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki announced that the militant group would not be allowed to base its operations from Iraqi soil.[242] On 23 January 2009, while on a visit to Tehran, Iraqi National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie reiterated the Iraqi Prime Minister's earlier announcement that the MEK organization would no longer be able to base itself on Iraqi soil and stated that the members of the organization would have to make a choice, either to go back to Iran or to go to a third country, adding that these measures would be implemented over the next two months.[243]

On 28 July 2009, Iraqi security forces raided MEK headquarters at Camp Ashraf. MEK claimed 11 dead and 400 injured in clashes while the Iraqi government claimed 30 policemen injured.[244][245] U.S. officials had long opposed a violent takeover of the camp northeast of Baghdad, and the raid is thought to symbolize the declining American influence in Iraq.[246] After the raid, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, stated the issue was "completely within [the Iraqi government's] purview".[247] In the course of attack, 36 Iranian dissidents were arrested and removed from the camp to a prison in a town named Khalis, where the arrestees went on hunger strike for 72 days. Finally, the dissidents were released when they were in an extremely critical condition and on the verge of death.[248]

In January 2010, Iranian authorities charged five MEK protesters of "rioting and arson" under the crime of moharebeh, an offence reserved for those who "take up arms against the state" and carries the death penalty.[249] In July 2010, the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal issued an arrest warrant for 39 MEK members, including Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, accusing them of crimes against humanity during the 1991 uprisings in Iraq. The MEK denied the charges.[250]

In 2012, the MEK moved from Camp Ashraf to Camp Hurriya in Baghdad (a onetime U.S. base formerly known as Camp Liberty). A rocket and mortar attack killed 5 and injured 50 others at Camp Hurriya on 9 February 2013. MEK residents of the facility and their representatives appealed to the UN Secretary-General and U.S. officials to let them return to Ashraf, which they said has concrete buildings and shelters that offer more protection. The United States has been working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the resettlement project.[251]

In 2013, 52 unarmed MEK members were killed during an attack on Camp Ashraf. 7 other members were also reported missing. Iraqi security forces are thought to be responsible for the assault, with guidance and support from the Iranian government.[252]

Iran's nuclear programme

[edit]

The MEK and the NCRI revealed the existence of Iran's nuclear program in a press conference held on 14 August 2002 in Washington, D.C. MEK representative Alireza Jafarzadeh stated that Iran is running two top-secret projects, one in the city of Natanz and another in a facility located in Arak, which was later confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.[253][254]

Journalists Seymour Hersh and Connie Bruck have written that the information was given to the MEK by Israel.[255] Among others, it was described by a senior IAEA official and a monarchist advisor to Reza Pahlavi, who said before MEK they were offered to reveal the information, but they refused because it would be seen negatively by the people of Iran.[256][257] Similar accounts could be found elsewhere by others, including comments made by US officials.[254]

On 18 November 2004, MEK representative Mohammad Mohaddessin used satellite images to state that a new facility existed in northeast Tehran named "Center for the Development of Advanced Defence Technology". This allegation by MEK and all their subsequent allegations were false.[254]

In 2010 the NCRI claimed to have uncovered a secret nuclear facility in Iran. These claims were dismissed by U.S. officials, who did not believe the facilities to be nuclear. In 2013, the NCRI again claimed to have discovered a secret underground nuclear site.[258]

In 2012, NBC News' Richard Engel and Robert Windrem published a report quoting U.S. officials, who spoke to NBC News on condition of anonymity, that the MEK was being "financed, trained, and armed by Israel's secret service" to assassinate Iranian nuclear scientists.[259][260] A senior U.S. State Department official said the Department never claimed that the MEK was involved in the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists.[261] Former CIA case officer in the Middle East, Robert Baer said that the perpetrators "could only be Israel", and that "it is quite likely Israel is acting in tandem with" the MEK.[262]

On 27 November 2020, Iran's top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated. Iranian Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, who heads the Supreme National Security Council, blamed Mujahideen-e-Khalq and Israel.[263]

Settlement in Albania (2016–present)

[edit]

In 2016, the United States brokered a deal to relocate the MEK to Albania. About 3,000 members moved to Albania, and the U.S. donated $20 million to the U.N. refugee agency to help them resettle.[264] On 9 September 2016, more than 280 remaining MEK members were relocated to Albania.[232] Camp Ashraf 3 is located in Manëz, Durrës County, where they have been protested by the locals.[4]

Relationship during Trump presidency

[edit]

In 2017, the year before John Bolton became President Trump's National Security Adviser, Bolton addressed members of the MEK and said that they would celebrate in Tehran before 2019.[265] By 2018, operatives of the MEK were believed to be still conducting covert operations inside Iran to overthrow Iran's government.[266] It also maintained some operations in France, and in January 2018, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani phoned French president Emmanuel Macron, asking him to order kicking the MEK out of its base in Auvers-sur-Oise, alleging that the MEK stirred up the 2017–18 Iranian protests.[267] By 2018, over 4,000 MEK members had entered Albania, according to the INSTAT data.[268]

On 30 June 2018, Rudy Giuliani, Donald Trump's personal lawyer, lectured an MEK gathering in Paris, calling for regime change in Tehran. John McCain and John Bolton have met the MEK's leader Maryam Rajavi or spoken at its rallies.[269][270]

John Bolton speaking at a MEK event

During the Free Iran 2019 conference in Albania, former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani attended an MEK podium, where he described the group as a "government-in-exile", saying it is a ready-to-go alternative to lead the country if the Iranian government falls.[229] Additionally, the Trump administration said it would not rule out the MEK as a viable replacement for the current Iranian regime.[271]

Islamic Republic of Iran operations against MEK inside Europe

[edit]

On 30 June 2018 Belgian police arrested married couple of Iranian heritage Amir Saadouni and Nasimeh Naami on charges of "attempted terrorist murder and preparing a terrorist act" against an MEK rally in France. The couple had in their possession half of a kilogram of TATP explosives and a detonator. Police also detained Asadollah Asadi, an Iranian diplomat in Vienna. German prosecutors charged Asadi with "activity as foreign agent and conspiracy to commit murder by contacting the couple and giving them a device containing 500 grams of TATP". Prosecutors said Asadi was a member of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security service, an organization that focuses on "combating of opposition groups inside and outside of Iran".[272][273][274] Iran responded that the arrests were a "false flag ploy", with the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman saying the "two suspects in Belgium were in fact members of the People's Mujahideen".[275] In October 2018, the French government officially and publicly blamed Iran's Intelligence Service for the failed attack against the MEK. U.S. officials also condemned Iran over the foiled bomb plot that France blames on Tehran.[276] In December 2018, Albania expelled two Iranian diplomats due to alleged involvement in the bomb plot against the MEK (where Mayor Giuliani and other US government officials were also gathered) accusing the two of "violating their diplomatic status".[277][278] Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that the MEK incited violence during the 2017–2018 Iranian protests.[279]

In October 2019, Albanian police discovered an Iranian paramilitary network that allegedly planned attacks against MEK members in Albania. Albania's police chief, Ardi Veliu, said that the Iran Revolutionary Guard's foreign wing operated an "active terrorist cell" that targeted members of the MEK. A police statement said that two Iranian security officials led the network from Tehran, and that it was allegedly linked to organised crime groups in Turkey. It also said that the network used a former MEK member to collect information in Albania. Valiu also said that a planned attack on the MEK by Iranian government agents was foiled in March.[280]

In 2020, newspaper De Standaard said evidence that Iranian intelligence and security was involved in the failed 2018 bomb plot against an MEK rally was mounting. In a note to the federal prosecutor's office, the State Security writes that "the attack was devised in the name and under the impetus of Iran", with the note also describing one of the case's suspects, Asadollah Asadi, as a MOIS agent. Amir Saadouni and Nasimeh Naami, who in 2018 were found with half a kilo of explosives and are also being charged in the case, admitted that they had been in contact with Asadollah Asadi.[281][273] In October 2020, the Iranian diplomat Asadollah Asadi charged in Belgium with planning to bomb a rally by the MEK "warned authorities of possible retaliation by unidentified groups if he is found guilty". Asadi would become the first Iranian diplomat to go on trial on charges of terrorism within the European Union.[282][283] In February 2021, Asadi and his accomplices were found guilty of attempted terrorism and Asadi was sentenced to 20 years in prison.[284]

In September 2022, Albania suffered a second cyber-attack, resulting in it cutting diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic and ordering Iranian embassy staff to leave.[277][285][286] According to the FBI and CISA, the cyberattacks were motivated by Albania's hosting of the MEK.[287]

In 2023, Deputy Minister of International Affairs of the Judiciary Kazem Gharibabadi opened a case against 107 members of the MEK for treason, calling the organization "a terrorist group whose hands are stained with the blood of thousands of Iranians".[288]

Ideology

[edit]

Before the revolution

[edit]

In the 1960s the MEK created a series of pamphlets designed to outline their worldviews. Their work "The Portrait of a Muslim" is thought to be the "first book in Persian" to systematically interpret "early Shiism as a protest movement against class exploitation and state oppression." The group's early ideology asserted that science, reason, and modernity were compatible with Islam. They adopted the concept of class struggle from Karl Marx but rejected being labeled as Marxists or socialists as they believed in the spiritual dimension of human beings, a concept incompatible with Marxist philosophy. During this period, the MEK's ideology embraced class struggle and historical determinism but rejected the denial of God.[289]

According to Katzman, the MEK's early ideology is a matter of dispute. While scholars generally describe the MEK's ideology as an attempt to combine "Islam with revolutionary Marxism", today the organization claims that it has always emphasized Islam, and that Marxism and Islam are incompatible. Despite their Marxist influence, the group never used the terms "socialist" or "communist" to describe themselves.[76][77] Katzman writes that their ideology "espoused the creation of a classless society that would combat world imperialism, international Zionism, colonialism, exploitation, racism, and multinational corporations".[15] The MEK's ideological foundation was developed during the period of the Iran revolution. According to its official history, the MEK first defined itself as a group that wanted to establish a nationalist, democratic, revolutionary Muslim organization in favour of change in Iran.[290]

Historian Ervand Abrahamian observed that the MEK were "consciously influenced by Marxism, both modern and classical", but they always denied being Marxists because they were aware that the term was colloquial to 'atheistic materialism' among Iran's general public. The Iranian regime for the same reason was "eager to pin on the Mojahedin the labels of Islamic-Marxists and Marxist-Muslims".[291]

According to Abrahamian, it was the first Iranian organization to develop systematically a modern revolutionary interpretation of Islam that "differed sharply from both the old conservative Islam of the traditional clergy and the new populist version formulated in the 1970s by Ayatollah Khomeini and his disciples".[112] Abrahamian said that the MEK's early ideology constituted a "combination of Muslim themes; Shii notions of martyrdom; classical Marxist theories of class struggle and historical determinism; and neo-Marxist concepts of armed struggle, guerilla warfare and revolutionary heroism".[292] According to James Piazza, the MEK worked towards the creation by armed popular struggle of a society in which ethnic, gender, or class discrimination would be obliterated.[293]

Nasser Sadegh told military tribunals that although the MEK respected Marxism as a "progressive method of social analysis, they could not accept materialism, which was contrary to their Islamic ideology". The MEK eventually had a falling out with Marxist groups. According to Sepehr Zabir, "they soon became Enemy No. 1 of both pro-Soviet Marxist groups, the Tudeh and the Majority Fedayeen."[117]

The MEK's ideology of revolutionary Shi'ism is based on an interpretation of Islam so similar to that of Ali Shariati that "many concluded" they were inspired by him. According to Ervand Abrahamian, it is clear that "in later years" that Shariati and "his prolific works" had "indirectly helped the Mujahedin".[294]

In the group's "first major ideological work", Nahzat-i Husseini or Hussein's Movement, authored by one of the group's founders, Ahmad Reza'i, it was argued that Nezam-i Towhid (monotheistic order) sought by the prophet Muhammad, was a commonwealth fully united not only in its worship of one God but in a classless society that strives for the common good. "Shiism, particularly Hussein's historic act of martyrdom and resistance, has both a revolutionary message and a special place in our popular culture."[295]

As described by Abrahamian, one Mojahedin ideologist argued:

Reza'i further argued that the banner of revolt raised by the Shi'i Imams, especially Ali, Hassan, and Hussein, was aimed against feudal landlords and exploiting merchant capitalists as well as against usurping Caliphs who betrayed the Nezam-i-Towhid. For Reza'i and the Mujahidin it was the duty of all Muslims to continue this struggle to create a 'classless society' and destroy all forms of capitalism, despotism, and imperialism. The Mojahedin summed up their attitude towards religion in these words: 'After years of extensive study into Islamic history and Shi'i ideology, our organization has reached the firm conclusion that Islam, especially Shi'ism, will play a major role in inspiring the masses to join the revolution. It will do so because Shi'ism, particularly Hussein's historic act of resistance, has both a revolutionary message and a special place in our popular culture.[296]

After the revolution

[edit]
MEK demonstrators carrying Lion and Sun flags and those of 'National Liberation Army of Iran'.

Massoud Rajavi supported the idea that Shi'ism is compatible with pluralistic democracy.[158] In 1981, after signing the "covenant of freedom and independence" with Banisadr, and establishing NCRI Massoud Rajavi made an announcement to the foreign press about the MEK's ideology saying that "First we want freedom for all political parties. We reject both political prisoners and political executions. In the true spirit of Islam, we advocate freedom, fraternity, and an end to all repression, censorship, and injustices."[297] They appealed to all opposition groups to join NCRI. Some secular groups had reservations that an "Islamic Democratic People's Republic" was unattainable, while Massoud Rajavi maintained that Shiite religion and pluralistic democracy are compatible.[298] Along with former Iranian president Abolhassan Banisadr, Rajavi published a Covenant promoting freedom of speech, press, and religion in Iran, as well as protection of Iranian minorities, "especially the Kurdish minority".

In 2001, Kenneth Katzman wrote that the MEK had "tried to show itself as worthy of U.S. support on the basis of its commitment to values compatible with those of the United States – democracy, free market economics, protection of the rights of women and minorities, and peaceful relations with Iran's neighbors", but some analysts dispute that they are genuinely committed to what they state.[299] According to Department of State's October 1994 report, the MEK used violence in its campaign to overthrow the Iranian regime.[300] A 2009 U.S. Department of State report stated that their ideology was a blend of Marxism, Islamism and feminism.[301]

The MEK says it is seeking regime change in Iran through peaceful means with an aim to replace the clerical rule in Iran with a secular government.[302] It also claims to have disassociated itself from its former revolutionary ideology in favor of liberal democratic values, but they fail to "present any track record to substantiate a capability or intention to be democratic".[303]

The MEK says it supports a "secular democratic system", where their leader, Maryam Rajavi, calls for a "pluralist system", a non-nuclear Iran, human rights and freedom of expression, a separation of government and religion, and an end to Sharia law.[304]

Ideological revolution and women's rights

[edit]

During the transitional period, the MEK projected an image of a "forward looking, radical and progressive Islamic force". Throughout the revolution, the MEK played a major role in developing the "revolutionary Muslim woman", which was portrayed as "the living example of the new ideal of womanhood".[305] The MEK is "known for its female-led military units".[306] According to Ervand Abrahamian, the MEK "declared that God had created men and women to be equal in all things: in political and intellectual matters, as well as in legal, economic, and social issues."[307] According to Tohidi, in 1982, as the government in Tehran led an expansive effort to limit women's rights, the MEK adopted a female leadership. In 1987, the National Liberation Army (NLA), "saw female resistors commanding military operations from their former base at Camp Ashraf (in Diyala, Iraq) to Iran's westernmost provinces, where they engaged alongside the men in armed combat with Iran's regular and paramilitary forces".[308][309]

Shortly after the revolution, Rajavi married Ashraf Rabii, an MEK member regarded as "the symbol of revolutionary womanhood".[310] Rabii was killed by Iranian forces in 1982. On 27 January 1985, Massoud Rajavi appointed Maryam Azodanlu as his co-equal leader. The announcement, stated that this would give women equal say within the organization and thereby "would launch a great ideological revolution within Mojahedin, the Iranian public and the whole Muslim World".[311]

In 1985, Rajavi launched an "ideological revolution" banning marriage and enforced divorce on all members who were required to separate from their spouses.[34] Five weeks later, the MEK announced that its Politburo and Central Committee had asked Rajavi and Azondalu, who was already married, to marry one another to deepen and pave the way for the "ideological revolution". At the time Maryam Azodanlu was known only as the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi. According to the announcement, Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to facilitate this 'great revolution.' According to Ervand Abrahamian "in the eyes of traditionalists, particularly among the bazaar middle class, the whole incident was indecent. It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani's younger sister. It involved women with young children and wives of close friends – a taboo in traditional Iranian culture;" something that further isolated the Mojahedin and also upset some members of the organization. Also according to Abrahamian, "the incident was equally outrageous in the eyes of the secularists, especially among the modern intelligentsia. It projected onto the public arena a matter that should have been treated as a private issue between two individuals."[311] Many criticized Maryam Azodanlu's giving up her own maiden name (something most Iranian women did not do and she herself had not done in her previous marriage). They would question whether this was in line with her claims of being a staunch feminist.[311]

Maryam Rajavi became increasingly important over feminism-colored politics. The emancipation of women is now depicted in Maryam Rajavi's writings "as both a policy end and a strategy toward revolutionizing Iran. Secularism, democracy, and women's rights are thus today's leading themes in the group's strategic communications. As for Maryam Rajavi's leadership, in 2017 it appears to be political and cultural; any remnants of a military force and interest in terrorist strategies have faded away."[312]

Cult of personality

[edit]

The MEK has been described as a cult of personality by a variety of sources.[313][314][315][316] The MEK has been described as a "cult" by the Iranian government and Iraqi politician Samir Sumaidaie.[317] On May 25, 1981, Khomeini appeared on national television accusing those who criticized the Islamic Consultative Assembly's decisions of having a cult of personality.[318]

It has also been described as a cult by the United States government, and another retired United States general described it as "Cult? How about admirably focused group?".[319] Romain Nadal said the MEK had a "cult nature", and Bernard Kouchner said he was ashamed by Nadal's criticism.[320] Also numerous academics[321][322][62][323] and former MEK members who defected[324][325] have described it as a cult.[326]

Some sources argue that the Iranian government exploits such allegations to demonize the MEK.[327] The Iranian government is reportedly running a disinformation campaign to discredit the MEK, with the head of the Mackenzie Institute commenting that "Iran is trying to get other countries to label it as a terrorist cult".[328][329] According to a RAND Corporation report for the US government, during Masoud Rajavi's "ideological revolution", members were required to give "near-religious devotion" to its leaders. Also according to RAND, the MEK had "many of the typical characteristics of a cult, such as authoritarian control, confiscation of assets, sexual control (including mandatory divorce and celibacy), emotional isolation, forced labour, sleep deprivation, physical abuse and limited exit options," while this is vehemently denied by its supporters and leaders.[330] United Press International (UPI) said that "The truth is that the group's ideology has evolved over the years in order to adapt with the region's geopolitical changes."[331]

In 1990 MEK leadership ordered all couples to divorce, forbid them from remarrying, and children were sent away.[332][34] Children were removed from the MEK camp because MEK "resistance fighters" are required to dedicate themselves to their cause.[333][334] Critics often describe the MEK as the "cult of Rajavi", arguing that it revolves around the husband-and-wife duo, Maryam and Massoud Rajavi.[212][335] Members reportedly had to participate in regular "ideological cleansings".[336] According to RAND, members were lured in through "false promises of employment, land, aid in applying for asylum in Western countries" and then prevented from leaving.[330] Masoud Banisadr, a vocal former member, suggested that the MEK had become a cult in order to survive.[337][338]

Structure and organization

[edit]

Organizations

[edit]

Alongside its central organization, the PMOI has a political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), established in 1981 with the stated goal of uniting the opposition to the Iranian government under one umbrella organization. The organization has the appearance of a broad-based coalition, but analysts consider NCRI and MEK to be synonymous and recognize the NCRI as an only "nominally independent" political wing of the PMOI.[22][339][340][341] In 2002 the FBI reported that the NCRI has always been "an integral part" of the MEK and its "political branch".[342]

The PMOI also historically maintained a dedicated armed wing known as the National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA) that was established in 1987 to serve as an infantry force and coordinate the different militant groups members of the NCRI.[171] It was formally disbanded in 2003 during the Iraq war.[343]

Through its history, the MEK has maintained several front organizations including the Association of Iranian Scholars and Professionals, the Association of Iranian Women, Iran Aid, the California Society for Democracy, the Iranian-American Community of Northern Virginia and the Union Against Fundamentalism.[344][345]

Membership

[edit]

Before the Iran-Iraq war, the MEK was estimated to have about 2,000 members, peaking at 10,000 to 15,000 during the 1980s.[f] In the 2000s, the organization had between 5,000 and 10,000 members, with 2,900 to 3,400 at Camp Ashraf.[b] In February 2020, the MEK claimed to have 2500 members in its Albania camp (§ Settlement in Albania (2016–present)); a New York Times reporter visiting the camp estimated 200 people were present over two days.[114]

Fundraising

[edit]

During its life in exile, MEK was initially financed by backers including Saddam Hussein,[350][351][352][353] and later a network of fake charities based in European countries.[354][355][356]

In 2004, a report by the US weapons inspector Charles Duelfer claimed that Saddam Hussein provided millions of dollars from the United Nations' Oil-for-Food program to the MEK.[353][351][357]

In Germany, the MEK used a NGO to "support asylum seekers and refugees". Another alleged organization collected funds for "children whose parents had been killed in Iran" in sealed and stamped boxes placed in city centers. According to the Nejat Society, in 1988, the Nuremberg MEK front organization was uncovered by police. Initially, The Greens supported these organizations while it was unaware of their purpose.[354]

In 1999, United States authorities arrested 29 individuals in Operation Eastern Approach,[202] of whom 15 were held on charges of helping MEK members illegally enter the US.[203] The ringleader pleaded guilty to providing phony documents to MEK members and violation of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.[204][205]

The MEK also operated a UK-based charity, Iran Aid, which claimed to raise money for Iranian refugees. In 2001, the Charity Commission for England and Wales closed it down after finding no "verifiable links between the money donated by the British public [approximately £5 million annually] and charitable work in Iran".[355][303][358]

In December 2001, a joint FBI-Cologne police operation discovered what a 2004 report calls "a complex fraud scheme involving children and social benefits", involving the sister of Maryam Rajavi.[359] The High Court ruled to close several MEK compounds after investigations revealed that the organization fraudulently collected between $5 million and $10 million in social welfare benefits for children of its members sent to Europe.[355]

In 2003, General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) claimed that Netherlands charity that raises money for "children who suffer under the Iranian regime" (SIM (Dutch: Stichting Solidariteit met Iraanse Mensen)) was fundraising for the MEK. A spokesperson for the charity said that SIM was unrelated to the MEK and that these allegations were "lies from the Iranian regime".[187]

As RAND Corporation policy reported, MEK supporters seek donations at public places, often showing "gruesome pictures" of human rights victims in Iran and claiming to raise money for them but funneling it to MEK.[355] A 2004 report by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) states that the organization is engaged "through a complex international money laundering operation that uses accounts in Turkey, Germany, France, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates".[359]

On 19 November 2004, two front organizations called the Iranian–American Community of Northern Virginia and the Union Against Fundamentalism organized demonstrations in front of the Capitol building in Washington, D.C., and transferred funds for the demonstration, some $9,000 to the account of a Texas MEK member. Congress and the bank in question were not aware that the demonstrators were actually providing material support to the MEK.[303] According to Spiegel Online security experts say that U.S., Saudi Arabia and Israel provide the group with financial support, though there is no proof for this supposition and MEK denies this.[210] The Hamburg state court ordered Der Spiegel in 2019 to remove unsupported claims from an article that accused the MEK of "torture" and "psychoterror."[360]

Intelligence capabilities

[edit]

During the years MEK was based in Iraq, it was closely associated with the intelligence service Mukhabarat (IIS),[361][362] and even had a dedicated department in the agency. Directorate 14 of the IIS worked with the MEK in joint operations while Directorate 18 was exclusively responsible for the MEK and issued the orders and tasks for their operations.[363][364] The MEK offered IIS with intelligence it gathered from Iran, interrogation and translation services.[365]

A 2008 report by the United States Army Intelligence Center, states that the MEK operates a HUMINT network within Iran, which is "clearly a MEK core strength". It has started a debate among intelligence experts that "whether western powers should leverage this capability to better inform their own intelligence picture of the Iranian regime's goals and intentions".[366] Rick Francona told Foreign Policy in 2005 that the MEK teams could work in conjunction with collection of intelligence and identifying agents. U.S. security officials maintain that the organization has a record of exaggerating or fabricating information, according to Newsweek. David Kay believes that "they're often wrong, but occasionally they give you something".[367]

American government sources told Newsweek in 2005 that the Pentagon is hoping to utilize MEK members as informants or give them training as spies for use against Tehran.[368]

The MEK is able to conduct "telephone intelligence" operations effectively, i.e. gathering intelligence through making phone calls to officials and government organizations in Iran.[369] According to Ariane Tabatabai, the MEK's "capabilities to conduct terrorist attacks may have decreased in recent years."[370]

Propaganda and social media

[edit]

The MEK's first act of counter-propaganda was to release about 2014 Iranian prisoners of war within a period of 9 months. It started on 11 March 1986 when the NLA released 370 prisoners of war. They then released 170 prisoners of war in November 1987 that had been captured by the NLA. A third wave of 1300 prisoners of war were released in August 1988, with some joining the NLA ranks. During the last release, Massoud Rajavi promoted it this as an act of compassion by the NCRI, which was in contrast to the Islamic Republic's "cruel manner of treating" prisoners of war.[56] In the 1980s and the 1990s, their propaganda was mainly targeted against the officials in the establishment.[312] According to Anthony H. Cordesman, since the mid-1980s the MEK has confronted Iranian representatives overseas through "propaganda and street demonstrations".[371] Other analysts have also alleged that there is a propaganda campaign by the MEK in the West, including Christopher C. Harmon[372] and Wilfried Buchta,[373] and others.[374]

According to Kenneth Katzman, the MEK is able to mobilize its exile supporters in demonstration and fundraising campaigns. The organization attempts to publicize regime abuses and curb foreign governments' relations with Tehran. To do so, it frequently conducts anti-regime marches and demonstrations in those countries.[65]

A 1986 U.S. State Department letter to KSCI-TV described "MEK propaganda" as being in line with the following: "[T]he Iranian government is bad, the PMOI is against the Iranian government, the Iranian government represses the PMOI, therefore, the PMOI and its leader Rajavi are good and worth of support."[375] According to Masoud Kazemzadeh, the MEK has also used propaganda against defectors of the organization.[376]

Al Jazeera reported on an alleged Twitter-based MEK campaign. According to Exeter University lecturer Marc Owen Jones, accounts tweeting #FreeIran and #Iran_Regime_Change "were created within about a four-month window", suggesting bot activity.[377]

In an article published by The Intercept on 9 June 2019, two former MEK members claimed that "Heshmat Alavi" is not a real person, and that the articles published under that name were actually written by a team of people at the political wing of MEK. Alavi contributed to several media outlets including Forbes, The Diplomat, The Hill, The Daily Caller, The Federalist and the English edition of Al Arabiya's website. According to The Intercept, one of Alavi's articles published by Forbes was used by the White House to justify Donald Trump Administration's sanctions against Iran.[378] Since the article's publication, Twitter has suspended the "Heshmat Alavi" account, and the writings in the name of "Heshmat Alavi" were removed from The Diplomat and Forbes' website.[378] A website purported to be a personal blog of "Heshmat Alavi" published a post with counterclaims saying that their Twitter account had been suspended.[378][379]

Terrorist designation

[edit]

Assignment of designation

[edit]

The countries and organizations below have officially listed MEK as a terrorist organization:

Currently listed by Iran Designated by the current government[380] since 1981, also during Pahlavi dynasty[381] until 1979
Iraq Designated by the post-2003 government[250][382][dubiousdiscuss]
Formerly listed by United States Designated on 8 July 1997, delisted on 28 September 2012[383]
United Kingdom Designated on 28 March 2001,[383] delisted on 24 June 2008[383]
European Union Designated in May 2002,[383] delisted on 26 January 2009[383]
Japan Designated on 5 July 2002,[384] delisted on 24 March 2013[385]
Canada Designated on 24 May 2005,[386] delisted on 20 December 2012[387]
Other designations Australia Not designated as terrorist but added to the 'Consolidated List' subject to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 on 21 December 2001[388]
United Nations The group was described as "involved in terrorist activities" by the United Nations Committee against Torture in 2008[389]

In 1997, the United States put the MEK on the U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.[69][390] The Los Angeles Times reported a senior official of the Clinton administration as saying that the designation of the MEK as a terrorist group "was intended as a goodwill gesture to Tehran and its newly elected president, Mohammad Khatami".[391][69]

In 2004, the United States also considered the group as "noncombatants" and "protected persons" under the Geneva Conventions.[392] In 2002, the European Union, pressured by Washington, added MEK to its terrorist list.[393] In 2009, the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice denied the MEK its request to be delisted.[394] In 2008, the United Nations Committee against Torture said the MEK was involved in terrorist activities.[389]

After the US invasion of Iraq, the MEK had a strong support base in the United States to be removed from its list of Foreign Terrorists Organizations, consequently turning it into a legitimate actor.[28][395]

Removal of designation

[edit]

The United Kingdom lifted the MEK's designation as a terrorist group in June 2008,[396] followed by the Council of the European Union on 26 January 2009.[397][398] It was also lifted in the United States following a decision by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton[222] on 21 September 2012 and lastly in Canada on 20 December 2012.[387]

The Council of the European Union removed the group's terrorist designation following the Court of Justice of the European Union's 2008 ruling, which criticized France for failing to reveal new supposed evidence that the MEK posed a terrorist threat.[397] The EU courts declared that the listing was unlawful because of "serious procedural failures" and lack of evidence connecting the MEK with terrorist activities.[399] Delisting allowed MEK to pursue tens of millions of dollars in frozen assets[398] and lobby in Europe for more funds. It also removed the terrorist label from MEK members at Camp Ashraf in Iraq.[400]

Rudy Giuliani, Newt Gingrich, James T. Conway, Bill Richardson and other American politicians at the MEK event in 2018

On 28 September 2012, the U.S. State Department formally removed MEK from its official list of terrorist organizations, beating a 1 October deadline in an MEK lawsuit.[222][401] Secretary of State Clinton said in a statement that the decision was made because the MEK had renounced violence and had cooperated in closing their Iraqi paramilitary base.[402] It was reported that MEK was removed from the U.S. list of terrorist organizations after intensive lobbying by a bipartisan group of lawmakers.[114] An official denied that lobbying by well-known figures influenced the decision.[402][403] Some former U.S. officials vehemently reject the new status and believe the MEK has not changed its ways.[404] MEK leaders began a lobbying campaign to be removed from the list by promoting the group as a viable opposition to the clerical regime in Iran.[405][406][34] During 2011, lobbying firms DLA Piper, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld and DiGenova & Toensing were paid almost $1,5 million by Iranian American organisations to lobby for delisting the MEK in the US.[407]

The MEK advocated to remove itself from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, having paid high-profile officials upwards of $50,000 give speeches calling for delisting.[408][409] Ervand Abrahamian, Shaul Bakhash, Juan Cole and Gary Sick among others, published "Joint Experts' Statement on the Mujahedin-e Khalq" on Financial Times voicing their concerns regarding MEK delisting.[410] The National Iranian American Council denounced the decision, stating it "opens the door to Congressional funding of the M.E.K. to conduct terrorist attacks in Iran" and "makes war with Iran far more likely."[222] Iran state television also condemned the delisting of the group, saying that the U.S. considers MEK to be "good terrorists because the U.S. is using them against Iran".[411]

The campaign to delist the MEK in the European Union counted with Spanish MEP Alejo Vidal-Quadras as one of its lobbyists. Vox, the far-right party he founded, later received funding by the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The party received almost €1 million between December 2013 and April 2014.[412]

Foreign relations

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Letter in Persian requesting that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union lend any amount of money (up to US$300,000,000) to the Mojahedin Organization and requesting that the supporters of the Mojahedin Organization be allowed to cross the Soviet-Iranian border and be granted a temporary asylum. Memorandum to the CK KPSS from Olfat.[413]

While dealing with anti-regime clergy in 1974, the MEK became close with secular Left groups in and outside Iran. These included the confederation of Iranian Students, The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, among others.[414] The MEK sent five trained members into South Yemen to fight in the Dhofar Rebellion against Omani and Iranian forces.[415]

On 7 January 1986, the MEK leaders sent a twelve-page letter to the "comrades" of Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, asking for temporary asylum and a loan of $300 million to continue their "revolutionary anti-imperialist" actions. It is not clear how the Soviets responded, according to Abbas Milani.[416][better source needed]

Israel's foreign intelligence agency Mossad maintains connections with the MEK, dating back to the 1990s.[417] Until 2001, the MEK received support from the Taliban.[418] The MEK was also among the opposition groups receiving support from Gulf nations such as Saudi Arabia.[419]

In April 2012, journalist Seymour Hersh reported that the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command had trained MEK operatives at a secret site in Nevada from 2005 to 2009. According to Hersh, MEK members were trained in intercepting communications, cryptography, weaponry and small unit tactics at the Nevada site up until President Barack Obama took office in 2009.[390]

Position on the Israel–Palestinian conflict

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Initially, the MEK used to criticize the Pahlavi dynasty for allying with Israel and Apartheid South Africa,[420] calling them racist states and demanding cancellation of all political and economic agreements with them.[421] The MEK opposed Israeli–Palestinian peace process[422] and was anti-Zionist.[423]

The MEK's Central Cadre established contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), by sending emissaries to Paris, Dubai, and Qatar to meet PLO officials.[424] On 3 August 1972, they bombed the Jordanian embassy as a means to avenge King Hussein's unleashing his troops on the PLO in 1970.[425]

Relations with the United States

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In the late 1970s, the intelligentsia as a class in Iran was distinctly nationalistic and anti-imperialistic. The MEK had impeccable nationalistic credentials, calling for the nationalization of foreign companies and economic independence from the capitalist world, and praising writers such as Al-e Ahmad, Saedi and Shariati for being "anti-imperialist".[426] Rajavi in his presidential campaign after revolution used to warn against what he called the "imperialist danger."[119] The matter was so fundamental to MEK that it criticized the Iranian government on that basis, accusing the Islamic Republic of "capitulation to imperialism" and being disloyal to democracy that according to Rajavi was the only means to "safeguard from American imperialism."[427]

After exile, the MEK sought the support of prominent politicians, academics and human rights lawyers. Rajavi tried to reach as broad a Western public as possible by giving frequent interviews to Western newspapers. In these interviews, Rajavi toned down the issues of imperialism, foreign policy, and social revolution. Instead, he stressed the themes of democracy, political liberties, political pluralism, human rights, respect for 'personal property,' the plight of political prisoners, and the need to end the senseless war.[428]

Hyeran Jo, associate professor of Texas A&M University wrote in 2015 that the MEK is supported by the United States.[429] In January 1993, President-elect Clinton wrote a private letter to Massoud Rajavi, in which he set out his support for the organization.[430] The organization has also received support United States officials including Tom Ridge, Howard Dean, Michael Mukasey, Louis Freeh, Hugh Shelton, Rudy Giuliani, John Bolton, Bill Richardson, James L. Jones, and Edward G. Rendell.[431][432]

As Mukasey mentioned in The New York Times, in 2011 he had received $15,000 to $20,000 to present a lecture about "MEK-related events", as well as what he listed as "a foreign agent lobbying pro bono for MEK's political arm".[433] Rendell said he had been paid to speak in support of the MEK[434] and Hamilton said he was paid to "appear on a panel Feb. 19 at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington."[435] In February 2015, The Intercept published that Bob Menendez, John McCain, Judy Chu, Dana Rohrabacher and Robert Torricelli received campaign contributions from MEK supporters.[436]

Some politicians have declared receiving payment for supporting the MEK, but others support the group without payment.[437][62][438] In May 2018, Daniel Benjamin who held office as the Coordinator for Counterterrorism between 2009 and 2012, told The New York Times that the MEK offered him money in exchange for his support.[439]

Human rights record

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In 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki told the MEK it had to leave Iraq, but the MEK responded that the "request violated their status under the Geneva Convention". Al-Maliki and the Iraqi Ministry of Justice maintained that the MEK had committed human rights abuses in the early 1990s when it aided Saddam Hussain's campaign against the Shia uprising.[440] According to Time magazine, the MEK has denied aiding Saddam in quashing Kurdish and Shia rebellions.[441]

In May 2005, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report describing prison camps run by the MEK and severe human rights violations committed by the group against its members, ranging from prolonged incommunicado and solitary confinement to beatings, verbal and psychological abuse, coerced confessions, threats of execution, and torture that in two cases led to death.[442] This report was disputed by the UK's Lord Corbett.[383][358] Human Rights Watch released a statement in February 2006, stating the criticisms they received concerning the substance and methodology of the [No Exit] report, was unwarranted.[443]

Former American military officers who had aided in guarding the MEK camp in Iraq gave differing accounts. Those suggested by MEK said its members had been free to leave the camp and that they had not found any prison or torture facilities. Captain Woodside who was not one of those who MEK suggested, said that US officers did not have regular access to camp buildings, or to group members and that it was difficult for members to leave.[114] Jo Hyeran, in her work examining humanitarian violations of rebel groups to international law, states that the MEK has not accepted International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits to its detention centers.[444] According to criticism of Human Right groups, marriage had been banned in the camp.[445] Upon entry into the group, new members are indoctrinated in ideology and a revisionist history of Iran. All members are required to participate in weekly "ideologic cleansings".[446] Members who defected from the MEK and some experts say that these Mao-style self-criticism sessions are intended to enforce control over sex and marriage in the organization as a total institution.[301] MEK denied the brainwashing describing it as part of Iranian 'misinformation campaign.'[114][447] Also Abbas Milani calls those describing MEK as a cult as lobbyists paid by Iranian regime.[416] In July 2020 a German court ordered the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to remove false information about the MEK.[448]

Intelligence campaigns against the MEK

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The Shah's regime waged a propaganda campaign against the MEK, accusing them "of carrying out subversive acts at the behest of their foreign patrons" and claiming that "the shoot-outs and bombings caused heavy casualties among bystanders and innocent civilians, especially women and children". It also obtained "public confessions" that accused former colleagues of crimes including sexual promiscuity. The regime claimed that the MEK were "unbelievers masquerading as Muslims", and used the Quranic term "monafeqin" (hypocrites) to describe them.[449]

The Islamic Republican Party later used many of the same tactics, labelling the MEK "Marxist hypocrites and Western-contaminated 'electics', and as 'counter-revolutionary terrorists' collaborating with the Iraqi Ba'thists and the imperialists".[449] After the 1994 Imam Reza shrine bomb explosion in Mashhad which killed 25 and wounded at least 70 people, the Iranian regime immediately blamed the MEK. A month after the attack, a Sunni group calling itself "al-haraka al-islamiya al-iraniya" claimed responsibility for the attack. Despite this, the Iranian government continued to hold the MEK responsible for both attacks.[450] According to an anonymous U.S. official, Ramzi Yousef built the bomb and MEK agents placed it in the shrine.[451]

Even into the 2000s, the MEK has remained a major target of Iran's internal security apparatus.[452] Since 2001, several reports by Dutch, German and US intelligence services have noted the ongoing efforts by the Iran's Ministry of Intelligence to "track down and identify those who are in contact with opposition groups abroad", including the MEK.[453][454] German and US intelligence have noted that Iranian intelligence was directly financing a misinformation campaign and trying to recruit active or former members of opposition groups, sometimes through "threats to use force against them or their families living in Iran".[453][455][456]

In 2018, U.S. District Court charged two alleged Iran agents of "conducting covert surveillance of Israeli and Jewish facilities in the United States and collecting intelligence on Americans linked to a political organization that wants to see the current Iranian government overthrown". During the court process, it was revealed that the two alleged agents of Iran had mostly gathered information concerning activities involving the MEK.[457] The two men pleaded guilty in November 2019 to several charges including conspiracy and "acting as an undeclared agent of the Iranian government". The Justice Department said that one of the men arrived in the US to gather "intelligence information" about the MEK (as well as Israeli and Jewish entities). The other admitted to taking photographs at a 2017 MEK rally in order to profile attendees.[458][459]

In January 2020, Ahmadreza Mohammadi-Doostdar, an Iranian-American, was sentenced by a U.S. court to 38 months in prison for conducting surveillance on American MEK members.[460] In September 2020 The New York Times published a report where researchers alleged that opponents of the Iranian regime had been targets of a cyber attack by Iranian hackers through a variety of infiltration techniques. MEK was reportedly among the most prominent targets of the attacks.[461]

Targeting of MEK members outside Iran

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From 1989 to 1993, the Islamic Republic of Iran carried out numerous assassinations of MEK members. Between March and June 1990, three MEK members were assassinated in Turkey. On 24 February 1990, Dr Kazem Rajavi (a National Council member) was assassinated in Geneva. In January 1993, an MEK member was murdered in Baghdad.[56]

On 23 September 1991, an attempt was carried out to assassinate Massoud Rajavi in Baghdad. In August 1992, a MEK member was kidnapped and brought to Iran. In September 1992, MEK offices in Baghdad were broken into. In January 1993, a MEK bus was bombed without casualties. Towards the end of 1993, anonymous gunmen attacked Air France offices and the French embassy in Iran after France allowed Maryam Rajavi and 200 MEK members to enter France.[56]

In March 1993, the NCRI's spokesman was murdered in Italy. In May 1990, a MEK member was murdered in Cologne. In February 1993, a MEK member was murdered in Manila. In April 1992, a MEK member was murdered in the Netherlands. In August 1992, a MEK member was murdered in Karachi. In March 1993, two assassins on motorcycles murdered NCRI representative Mohammad Hossein Naqdi in Italy.[462] This led to the European Parliament issuing a condemnation of the Islamic Republic of Iran for political murder.[56]

The Iranian regime is also believed to be responsible for killing NCR representative in 1993, and Massoud Rajavi's brother in 1990. The MEK claims that in 1996 a shipment of Iranian mortars was intended for use by Iranian agents against Maryam Rajavi.[452] In May 1994, Islamic Republic agents assassinated two MEK members in Iraq. In May 1995, five MEK members were assassinated in Iraq. In 1996, two MEK members were murdered in Turkey (including NCRI member Zahra Rajabi); in the same year two MEK members were killed in Pakistan and another one in Iraq.[56][463][464][465]

Perception

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Inside Iran

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After the 1979 Iranian revolution, the MEK gained significant support from the Iranian public, becoming the most popular dissident group.[466][114] It also received support from national figures including intellectuals, military officers, and athletes.[467] However, after becoming more violent and siding with Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War the MEK's standing inside Iran diminished.[25] Its supporters within Iran have remained persistent, resisting the regime's attempts to eradicate the organization from the country.[468]

Inside Iran, the strength of the MEK is uncertain since many of its supporters have been executed, tortured, or jailed.[469][56] Karim Sadjadpour believes the MEK is a "fringe group with mysterious benefactors" with a negligible amount of supporters in Iran.[433] Kenneth Katzman wrote in 2001 that the MEK is "Iran's most active opposition group".[22] A 2009 report published by the Brookings Institution notes that the organization appears to be undemocratic and lacking popularity but maintains an operational presence in Iran, acting as a proxy against Tehran.[470] The group has been described as Iran's main political opposition group.[471][472]

The Iranian government consistently refers to the organization with this derogatory name monafiqeen (Persian: منافقین, lit.'the hypocrites'). The term is derived from the Quran, which describes it as people of "two minds" who "say with their mouths what is not in their hearts" and "in their hearts is a disease".[473]

While Khomeini and the MEK had allied against the Shah, Khomeini "disliked the MEK's philosophy, which combined Marxist theories of social evolution and class struggle with a view of Shiite Islam that suggested Shiite clerics had misinterpreted Islam and had been collaborators with the ruling class",[115] and by mid-1980, clerics close to Khomeini were openly referring to the MEK as "monafeghin", "kafer", and "elteqatigari".[474] The MEK in turn accused Khomeini and the clerics of "monopolizing power", "hijacking the revolution", "trampling over democratic rights", and "plotting to set up a fascistic one-party dictatorship".[29]

By other Iranian opposition parties

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During the 1970s the group received assistance from the Liberation Movement.[295] In the 1980s, the MEK and the Kurdish Democratic Party, the National Democratic Front, the Hoviyat Group, and other groups joined the National Council of Resistance of Iran.[467] Other groups opposing Khomeini's government, such as the National Resistance Movement of Iran (NAMIR), led by Shapour Bakhtiar, criticized and rejected cooperation with the MEK.[475] Kenneth Katzman suggests that it's hard to determine the level of MEK support among Iran's exiles. While certain groups have distanced themselves from the organization, others have lent their support.[468]

Due to its anti-Shah stance before the revolution, the MEK is not close to monarchist opposition groups and Reza Pahlavi, Iran's deposed crown prince.[468] Commenting on the MEK, Pahlavi said in an interview: "I cannot imagine Iranians ever forgiving their behavior at that time [siding with Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war]. [...] If the choice is between this regime and the MEK, they will most likely say the mullahs".[476]

Iran's deposed president Abolhassan Banisadr ended his alliance with the group in 1984, denouncing its stance during the Iran–Iraq War.[468]

In the media

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The MEK has been featured in several documentaries, including A Cult That Would Be an Army: Cult of the Chameleon (2007),[477] The Strange World of the People's Mujahedin (2012)[478][479] and Midday Adventures (2017).[480]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), is an exiled Iranian opposition group founded on September 5, 1965, in Tehran by leftist students including Mohammad Hanifnejad, Saeed Mohsen, and Ali-Asghar Badizadegan, initially to resist the Pahlavi monarchy through a synthesis of Shiite Islamic and Marxist ideologies. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the PMOI initially supported Ayatollah Khomeini but turned against the emerging Islamic Republic after its leadership was purged in 1981, prompting Massoud Rajavi to flee to France and later establish armed resistance from bases in Iraq under Saddam Hussein's protection. The organization formed the National Liberation Army in 1987 and conducted cross-border operations against Iranian targets during the Iran-Iraq War, allying with Iraq despite the conflict's sectarian undertones, which drew accusations of treason from Tehran and led to its designation as a terrorist entity by the United States in 1997 for attacks including assassinations of regime officials and civilian bombings. The PMOI renounced violence in 2001; after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq disarmed its forces and relocated members to Camp Ashraf, it complied with demands for disarmament and relocation to Albania by 2016, resulting in its delisting as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. in 2012, the EU in 2009, and other allies based on cessation of terrorist activities and assurances against future violence. Under Maryam Rajavi's leadership as president-elect of the affiliated National Council of Resistance of Iran, the PMOI now pursues nonviolent political advocacy for a secular, democratic republic, exposing Iranian nuclear sites and rallying international support, though it faces persistent criticism for alleged authoritarian internal structures, cult-like devotion to its leaders, and historical rights abuses such as forced separations and self-flagellation rituals among members.

Origins and Early Development

Founding and Ideological Roots (1965–1975)

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) was established on September 5, 1965, by a group of Iranian engineering students, including Mohammad Hanifnejad, Saeed Mohsen, and Ali-Asghar Badizadegan, who sought to resist the authoritarian rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. These founders, influenced by the broader opposition landscape including the Freedom Movement of Iran, aimed to mobilize against the Shah's regime, which they viewed as a client state of Western imperialism, particularly the United States and United Kingdom. The organization emerged in an era of intensified SAVAK repression following the 1963 uprising, where initial nonviolent protests had failed, prompting a turn toward clandestine operations and ideological preparation for armed resistance. Ideologically, the PMOI blended Shia Islamic tenets with Marxist analytical frameworks, creating a syncretic doctrine that framed class struggle and anti-imperialism within a monotheistic worldview, rejecting Marxism's atheism while adopting its emphasis on historical materialism adapted to Islamic eschatology. Founders like Hanifnejad, a devout Muslim who studied Marxist texts, envisioned an "Islamic socialism" that portrayed the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali as revolutionary archetypes against oppression, drawing partial inspiration from thinkers like Ali Shariati but prioritizing collective guerrilla preparation over purely theological reform. This ideology positioned the Shah's modernization as exploitative capitalism serving foreign interests, advocating for a classless society achieved through jihad-like mobilization of the oppressed masses. During 1965–1975, the PMOI operated underground with a core membership of around 30 by 1971, focusing on recruitment from universities and technical fields, ideological training via study circles, and small-scale sabotage to challenge the regime's security apparatus. The group's publications, such as internal manifestos, emphasized dialectical progression toward revolution, interpreting Quranic verses through a lens of perpetual struggle against tyranny, which distinguished it from both secular Marxists and traditional clerics. By mid-decade, despite arrests— including Hanifnejad's execution in 1972—the organization had solidified its roots as a vanguard of Islamist-leftist opposition, laying groundwork for broader alliances in the late 1970s without yet fracturing over purist interpretations.

Internal Schisms and Pre-Revolution Resistance (1975–1979)

In 1975, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) experienced a profound internal schism triggered by intensifying ideological debates over the compatibility of Islam and Marxism-Leninism. A majority faction among the organization's free members rejected the Islamic elements of the founding ideology, embracing atheism and dialectical materialism as articulated in a manifesto that declared religion an opiate of the masses and prioritized class struggle over spiritual synthesis. This group reorganized as the Organization of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class (known as Peykar), conducting purges against dissenting members and effectively seizing control of the PMOI's external apparatus. The minority faction, comprising most imprisoned cadres including Massoud Rajavi, repudiated the manifesto and upheld the original doctrine blending Shia Islamic concepts of justice and martyrdom with Marxist anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism. Rajavi, who had been incarcerated since 1971 and initially sentenced to death (commuted to life imprisonment through international advocacy), emerged as the de facto leader of this faction from within Evin Prison, coordinating clandestine communications to maintain organizational loyalty and denounce the Marxist takeover as a deviation from the founders' vision. The schism resulted in violent confrontations, executions of perceived rivals by the Peykar faction, and a drastic reduction in the PMOI's operational capacity, with membership splintering and resources diverted amid ongoing SAVAK repression. From 1975 to 1979, the surviving Islamic-oriented PMOI faction, severely hampered by the split and prior arrests, shifted focus from large-scale guerrilla operations to survival, ideological reaffirmation, and limited underground activities against the Shah's regime. Actions included sporadic propaganda distribution, recruitment in universities, and small-scale sabotage, such as a reported bomb attack on the Israeli Cultural Center in Tehran and disruptions in industrial strikes, though these were constrained by the loss of experienced fighters to the rival faction. By 1978, as mass protests escalated against Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule—fueled by economic discontent, corruption, and Amnesty International-documented torture—the PMOI aligned with broader opposition currents, participating in urban demonstrations while avoiding premature armed clashes on advice from allied groups like the National Front. Rajavi's release in January 1979, amid a general amnesty for political prisoners during revolutionary turmoil, enabled him to formally assume leadership and integrate the PMOI into the anti-monarchical coalition, contributing to the Shah's ouster on February 11, 1979.

Involvement in the 1979 Revolution and Initial Conflicts

Participation in Overthrowing the Shah and Embassy Takeover Support

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), engaged in armed resistance and demonstrations against Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's regime throughout the 1970s, contributing to the revolutionary momentum that led to the monarchy's collapse on February 11, 1979. As a leftist-Islamist guerrilla group, the PMOI conducted assassinations, bombings, and urban warfare against the Shah's security apparatus, including SAVAK, positioning itself within a coalition of opposition forces that included Islamists, leftists, and nationalists. During the final days of the uprising in early February 1979, PMOI militants participated in seizing key sites such as the imperial palace (Niavaran Palace) and neutralizing police and royal guard units, aiding the revolutionaries' control over Tehran. This involvement aligned with the PMOI's ideological synthesis of Marxism and Shi'a Islam, which framed the Shah's ouster as essential to dismantling perceived imperialist dependencies. Following the Shah's departure and the establishment of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's provisional government, the PMOI initially aligned with the revolutionary establishment, participating in early post-revolution activities and refraining from immediate opposition. On November 4, 1979, when students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking 52 American diplomats and staff hostage for 444 days, the PMOI expressed support for the action, interpreting it as a legitimate response to U.S. interventionism, including the Shah's refuge in America after his exile. Analyses based on eyewitness testimonies and contemporaneous PMOI documents indicate that individual members joined the embassy occupiers, providing logistical aid and ideological justification, despite the organization's later denials of direct orchestration. U.S. government assessments have corroborated this endorsement, noting the PMOI's alignment with Khomeini's anti-American rhetoric during this period, which delayed their rift with the clerical regime until mid-1979 over issues like clerical dominance and suppression of secular-leftist elements. This provisional backing reflected the PMOI's strategic prioritization of consolidating revolutionary gains over immediate ideological purity.

Shift to Armed Opposition Against Khomeini (1979–1981)

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) initially engaged in political activities supportive of the revolutionary upheaval against the monarchy but grew disillusioned with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's consolidation of power, which prioritized clerical dominance over pluralistic governance. The group, led by Massoud Rajavi—who had been released from the Shah's prisons amid the revolutionary amnesty—advocated for a synthesis of Islamic principles and democratic republicanism, boycotting the December 1979 constitutional referendum that enshrined Khomeini's doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist). This stance led to Rajavi's disqualification from the January 1980 presidential election, prompting the PMOI to align with elected President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, a fellow critic of the emerging theocracy's suppression of secular and leftist factions. Tensions escalated through 1980 as the regime dismantled opposition newspapers, arrested PMOI cadres, and rigged parliamentary elections, which the group boycotted, citing fraud and exclusion of non-Islamist voices. By early 1981, the PMOI shifted from underground organizing to public demonstrations against regime violence, including a April 24 rally in Tehran drawing over 150,000 protesters decrying the extrajudicial killings of dozens of its members and sympathizers. The decisive catalyst came with the regime's June 1981 impeachment proceedings against Bani-Sadr, whom the PMOI viewed as a bulwark against fundamentalist monopoly. On June 20, 1981 (30 Khordad in the Iranian calendar), the PMOI mobilized nationwide protests, with estimates of 500,000 participants marching in Tehran alone toward the parliament to demand Bani-Sadr's defense, an end to clerical interference in state affairs, and the separation of religion from politics. Khomeini-labeled "hypocrites," the demonstrators faced a brutal crackdown by Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah militias, who fired indiscriminately into crowds, killing between 400 and 1,000 people and wounding thousands more; Rajavi himself evaded capture but fled to France shortly thereafter. This massacre, interpreted by PMOI leadership as irrefutable evidence of the regime's totalitarian intent, prompted an internal decision to abandon non-violent tactics in favor of armed resistance to counter systematic elimination. The armed phase commenced eight days later on June 28, 1981 (Hafte Tir), when a bomb detonated at the Islamic Republican Party headquarters in Tehran during a leadership meeting, obliterating the facility and killing 74 senior officials, including Chief Justice and party secretary-general Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, a key architect of the judiciary's Islamization. PMOI operatives, including suicide bomber Monireh Ahmadzadeh, executed the attack, which the group publicly claimed as retaliation for the June 20 slaughter and prior repressions; regime sources and independent accounts corroborate the PMOI's responsibility, though Iranian authorities framed it as justification for intensified purges. Subsequent operations in July and August 1981 targeted prosecutors, guards commanders, and regime figures, including the August 30 bombing of Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar's office, killing him and his predecessor; these actions, numbering over a dozen high-profile hits by year's end, reflected the PMOI's strategy of decapitating the clerical elite to disrupt governance and rally anti-Khomeini sentiment, amid a regime response that executed thousands of suspected sympathizers. From exile, Rajavi formalized this insurgency on July 29, 1981, by founding the National Council of Resistance of Iran as a coalition umbrella, signaling the PMOI's intent to prosecute the struggle internationally while sustaining domestic guerrilla warfare.

Escalation of Armed Struggle and Repression

Key Bombings and Operations (1981–1983)

Following the impeachment of President Abolhassan Banisadr on June 21, 1981, and amid escalating repression, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) initiated a phase of "active resistance" characterized by targeted bombings and assassinations against Islamic Republic officials. This campaign, which intensified from mid-1981, aimed to disrupt the regime's leadership and military structures, with the PMOI claiming responsibility for operations as legitimate countermeasures to state executions of its members. Between June and September 1981 alone, the group conducted multiple high-profile attacks, contributing to a reported total of over 300 operations against regime targets through 1982. The most devastating strike occurred on June 28, 1981, known as the Haft-e Tir bombing, when a bomb detonated at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party in Tehran during a meeting of senior leaders. The explosion killed Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, the party's secretary-general and chief justice, along with approximately 74 other officials, including four cabinet ministers and numerous parliament members. The PMOI never acknowledged responsibility, saying the bombings were a "natural and necessary reaction to the regime's atrocities", though Iranian authorities labeled it terrorism and used it to justify mass arrests and executions of MEK supporters. On August 30, 1981, another bombing targeted the Prime Minister's office in Tehran, killing President Mohammad-Ali Rajai, Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, and several aides during a meeting. The attack, executed via an explosive device allegedly planted by a PMOI infiltrator, Masoud Keshmiri, further destabilized the regime's executive branch, prompting emergency leadership transitions. The PMOI never acknowledged responsibility for the attack, though Iranian authorities attributed it to the group. Subsequent operations in late 1981 and 1982 included assaults on Revolutionary Guard facilities and assassinations of mid-level officials, such as the July 1982 killing of 13 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps members alongside cleric Mohammad Sadoughi. By 1983, however, intensified regime counteroffensives, including purges and executions, curtailed the PMOI's domestic capabilities, forcing a shift toward exile-based activities. These actions, while effective in inflicting leadership losses—estimated at dozens of high-ranking casualties—accelerated the PMOI's designation as a terrorist entity by Iran and strained its international standing.

Iran-Iraq War Alliances and Major Battles (1980–1988)

At the outset of the Iran-Iraq War on September 22, 1980, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) opposed the Iraqi invasion and participated in defensive efforts against Iraqi forces alongside other Iranian groups. However, following intensified repression by the Khomeini regime, including mass arrests and executions of PMOI members in 1981–1983, the organization's leadership, led by Massoud Rajavi, sought exile. Initially relocating to France, the PMOI established bases in Iraq in 1986 after negotiations with Saddam Hussein's government, marking a strategic alliance against the common adversary in Tehran. This partnership provided the PMOI with sanctuary, training facilities, and military equipment, including artillery and armored vehicles, in exchange for supporting Iraq's military objectives. The PMOI formalized its military wing as the National Liberation Army (NLA) in June 1987, comprising several thousand fighters based primarily at Camp Ashraf near the Iran-Iraq border. From these positions, the NLA conducted cross-border raids and sabotage operations targeting Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) installations and supply lines throughout the mid-1980s, aiming to weaken the regime's war effort. These actions aligned with Iraqi strategy, as the PMOI provided intelligence and occasionally participated in joint assaults, though the group maintained operational independence to preserve its image as an Iranian liberation force rather than an Iraqi proxy. The PMOI's most significant engagement occurred in the final phase of the war with Operation Forough-e Javidan (Eternal Light), launched on July 26, 1988, in coordination with Iraqi forces. The NLA, supported by Iraqi air cover and artillery, advanced into western Iran, capturing the towns of Kerend and Sarpol-e Zahab and reportedly inflicting casualties on Iranian defenders. Iranian forces responded with Operation Mersad, a rapid counteroffensive led by the IRGC, which encircled and decimated the NLA units within days, resulting in approximately 2,000–4,000 PMOI fatalities and the retreat of survivors to Iraq. This operation, timed amid UN-brokered ceasefire talks, underscored the PMOI's tactical reliance on Iraqi backing but highlighted the limits of their cross-border incursion against Iran's mobilized defenses.

Mass Executions of MEK Prisoners (1988)

In the summer of 1988, following Iran's acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 on July 18, which ended the Iran-Iraq War, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a religious decree ordering the execution of political prisoners affiliated with the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), whom the regime labeled as monafeqin (hypocrites). The decree targeted primarily MEK supporters who had previously been convicted of political offenses, many of whom had completed their sentences or been granted amnesty but remained imprisoned due to their refusal to renounce the organization. This action was precipitated by the MEK's Operation Eternal Light in June 1988, a military incursion into Iranian territory from Iraq, which the regime viewed as a existential threat amid the ceasefire. Across Iran's prisons, including major facilities such as Evin in Tehran and Gohardasht in Karaj, three-member "death commissions" were established to implement the decree, comprising judiciary representatives, intelligence officials, and religious judges. These panels conducted brief interrogations, often lasting minutes, questioning prisoners on their loyalty to the MEK, willingness to perform military service against the organization, acceptance of theocratic rule, and renunciation of their beliefs; those classified as "steadfast" in their MEK allegiance—typically refusing to condemn the group or spy on fellow inmates—were sentenced to immediate execution by hanging. The process, spanning late July to early September 1988, was conducted in secrecy, with no trials, legal representation, or family notifications; bodies were transported to unmarked mass graves, and official death certificates falsely listed causes such as "heart failure" or omitted details entirely. Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, then Khomeini's designated successor, protested the killings in recorded meetings, calling them the "biggest crime" of the revolution, but was subsequently purged from power. The executions disproportionately affected MEK prisoners, who constituted the majority of victims, alongside smaller numbers from left-wing groups like the Fedaian and Tudeh Party; women prisoners, including MEK members, faced identical scrutiny and were hanged in groups. Estimates of the death toll vary due to the regime's suppression of records, but Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch document thousands killed, with corroborated lists identifying at least 4,000-5,000 names, primarily MEK affiliates, across 32 provinces. Higher figures, up to 30,000, have been cited by survivor accounts and opposition sources but lack independent verification beyond the documented minimum. Both organizations classify the events as extrajudicial killings and crimes against humanity, noting the systematic nature and intent to eliminate perceived internal threats. The Iranian government has denied the scale and extralegal character, attributing deaths to wartime necessities or individual crimes, while suppressing public discussion and prosecuting truth-seekers.

Exile Under Saddam Hussein and Post-War Adaptation

Operations in Iraq and Survival Strategies (1988–2003)

Following the failure of Operation Eternal Light on July 25, 1988, which involved approximately 7,000 National Liberation Army (NLA) fighters invading Iran and resulted in over 1,500 MEK casualties, the organization consolidated its forces at Camp Ashraf in Diyala Province, Iraq, about 20 miles from the Iranian border. This base, established earlier with Saddam Hussein's support, housed around 7,000 members by late 1988 and served as the primary hub for subsequent military operations. The MEK's NLA conducted numerous cross-border raids into Iran throughout the 1990s, targeting Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) positions and government sites, including mortar attacks documented between 2000 and 2001. These operations were enabled by Iraqi regime provisions of weapons, ammunition, vehicles, tanks, and military training, in exchange for MEK intelligence and security assistance. The MEK's survival in Iraq hinged on its strategic alliance with Saddam Hussein, who viewed the group as a counterweight to Iran. During the 1991 Gulf War, MEK forces remained inactive against the U.S.-led coalition, avoiding deployment by Iraqi command and relying on their fortified positions at Camp Ashraf for protection. Post-war, amid Shia and Kurdish uprisings, the MEK reportedly assisted Iraqi forces in suppression efforts, including operations against rebels, which bolstered their patronage but eroded domestic Iranian support. To mitigate vulnerabilities, the organization evacuated children and families to Europe in August 1990 and recruited Iranian prisoners of war and dissidents, with about 45% of post-1988 members joining under such circumstances, often through retention tactics like confiscating identity documents. From 1991 to 2003, amid UN sanctions on Iraq, the MEK adapted by sustaining low-intensity NLA activities while emphasizing political and propaganda efforts internationally. Camp Ashraf evolved into a self-contained compound, supporting around 3,800 members by 2003 through internal fundraising and ideological indoctrination. As the U.S. invasion loomed, the MEK signed a ceasefire with coalition forces on April 15, 2003, followed by disarmament on May 10, 2003, securing temporary protected status and averting immediate disbandment. This pragmatic shift preserved the organization's core while navigating the collapse of their primary patron.

French Arrests and International Pressure (2003)

On June 17, 2003, French authorities conducted coordinated raids on properties associated with the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) in Auvers-sur-Oise near Paris and other locations in the Paris region, arresting approximately 160 members, including co-leader Maryam Rajavi. The operation involved over 1,300 police officers and resulted in the seizure of about $1.38 million in cash, along with documents and vehicles. French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy described the sites as a "base camp" for the group, accusing it of criminal association aimed at preparing terrorist acts and financing terrorism, in line with the European Union's 2002 designation of the PMOI as a terrorist entity. The arrests occurred amid France's efforts to engage Tehran diplomatically, coinciding with international scrutiny of Iran's nuclear program and domestic unrest; Iran's Foreign Ministry welcomed the action as a "positive step," prompting PMOI accusations that France had capitulated to Tehran's demands to curry favor. This reflected broader pressure on European states to curb groups like the PMOI, which had been listed as a terrorist organization by the EU following its history of armed operations against Iranian targets, though critics argued the timing served French geopolitical interests over evidence of imminent threats from French soil. PMOI supporters responded with widespread protests, including hunger strikes outside the Auvers-sur-Oise compound and at least a dozen self-immolations by members in France, London, and elsewhere to denounce the detentions as politically motivated persecution. U.S. officials, while maintaining the PMOI's terrorist designation, expressed reservations about the raids, viewing them as potential appeasement of Iran amid tensions over weapons of mass destruction; Secretary of State Colin Powell's administration monitored the situation closely. Most detainees were released shortly after, with Rajavi freed conditionally on July 2, 2003, by a Paris appeals court after five days in custody; formal investigations proceeded against 17 individuals, but the case largely concluded without convictions, leading the PMOI to pledge cessation of military activities in Europe.

Relocation and Modern Operations

U.S. Invasion Aftermath and Iraqi Crackdowns (2003–2016)

Following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, coalition forces raided Camp Ashraf on April 10, 2003, where approximately 3,000 MEK members were based, leading to the surrender of their weapons. In June 2003, the U.S. military disarmed the group and granted them "protected persons" status under the Fourth Geneva Convention, confining them to Ashraf and prohibiting attacks on coalition or Iraqi forces. This protection shielded the MEK from immediate expulsion, despite their prior alliance with Saddam Hussein, as the group had declared neutrality during the invasion. As U.S. forces prepared to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi government under the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement, tensions escalated. In 2009, the Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki with ties to Iran, demanded the MEK relocate from Ashraf to Camp Liberty near Baghdad by the end of the year, citing sovereignty concerns. On July 28, 2009, Iraqi security forces entered Ashraf, resulting in one MEK member killed and dozens injured in clashes. The deadlock persisted until April 8, 2011, when Iraqi forces, using armored vehicles and helicopters, stormed Ashraf, killing 34-36 MEK residents and injuring over 300, according to U.S. and UN reports; Iraqi officials claimed five soldiers died in the operation. This incident, described by MEK supporters as a massacre, prompted international condemnation and accelerated UN-brokered relocation talks. By September 2012, most residents had transferred to Camp Liberty under a U.S.-Iraq-UN agreement, though conditions there were criticized for inadequate shelter and security. In September 2012, the U.S. State Department delisted the MEK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, citing renunciation of violence and lack of activity since 2001, which eased some diplomatic pressures but did not halt Iraqi actions. At Camp Liberty, attacks continued, including a February 9, 2013, rocket assault that killed five MEK members and injured dozens, attributed to Iranian-backed militias by U.S. and MEK sources. Iraqi crackdowns persisted amid Iranian influence, with further relocations to Albania beginning in 2016 under UN auspices to resolve the impasse. Throughout this period, the MEK maintained non-violent resistance, focusing on lobbying and propaganda while enduring confinement and periodic violence.

Transfer to Albania and Ongoing Resistance Activities (2016–Present)

In September 2016, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), finalized the transfer of approximately 2,700 remaining members from Camp Ashraf in Iraq to Albania, following a U.S.-brokered agreement facilitated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The relocation, which began with smaller groups as early as 2013, addressed ongoing security threats to the group in Iraq from Iranian-backed militias and aimed to provide a safer base for operations. The United States contributed $20 million to support the UNHCR's efforts, while Albania's government agreed to host the exiles at a new site named Ashraf-3 near Tirana, marking the end of decades-long presence in Iraq. This move was prompted by post-2003 U.S. invasion vulnerabilities and Iraqi government pressures, with the PMOI relinquishing its weapons under a 2003 U.S.-supervised deal. Since resettlement, the PMOI has maintained Ashraf-3 as its primary headquarters, where members engage in non-violent resistance activities focused on political advocacy, intelligence gathering on the Iranian regime, and international lobbying for regime change. The group, under the leadership of Maryam Rajavi through the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), has organized annual gatherings in Paris and other locations to promote its 10-point democratic platform, attracting supporters including Western politicians and emphasizing opposition to Iran's nuclear program and human rights abuses. Inside Iran, PMOI-affiliated networks have reportedly supported protests, such as those in 2017-2018 and the 2022 nationwide uprisings following Mahsa Amini's death, by disseminating information and coordinating dissident actions, though the regime attributes unrest to the group without independent verification. The organization has cultivated ties with Albanian locals, including aid after the 2019 earthquake, while facing periodic threats from Iranian agents, leading Albania to expel Iran's ambassador in December 2018 over assassination plots. Iranian retaliation against Albania's hosting has included state-sponsored cyberattacks, such as the July 2022 "HomeLand Justice" ransomware operation targeting government systems, which U.S. and Albanian authorities attributed to Iranian actors motivated by the PMOI's presence. In June 2023, Albanian police raided Ashraf-3 with around 100 officers, seizing electronic devices amid investigations into alleged financial crimes and labor violations by camp residents; the PMOI condemned the action as influenced by Iranian pressure, while authorities cited evidence of illicit activities, though no arrests were reported. As of 2025, the PMOI continues operations from Albania, with an estimated several thousand members focused on cyber-propaganda, exposés of regime corruption, and alliances with anti-Iranian governments, amid ongoing Iranian threats including proxy harassment and disinformation campaigns. The group's activities remain delisted from U.S. and EU terrorist designations since 2012, positioning it as a key exiled opposition force despite criticisms of internal cult-like dynamics from defectors and analysts.

Ideological Framework

Pre-Revolution Islamic-Marxist Synthesis

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mujahedin-e Khalq, was founded on September 6, 1965, by Mohammad Hanifnejad, Said Mohsen, and Ali Asghar Badizadegan, engineers and students disillusioned with the Shah's regime and seeking an alternative to both secular Marxism and clerical traditionalism. The group's early ideology emerged from clandestine study circles that critiqued the Pahlavi monarchy's alignment with Western imperialism and domestic capitalism, drawing on Shia Islamic texts reinterpreted through a lens of revolutionary activism. Central to this synthesis was the fusion of Marxist concepts of class struggle and historical dialectics with Shia eschatology, positing history as an ongoing conflict between the forces of tawhid (divine unity and justice) embodied by Imam Ali and the Prophet Muhammad, and the taghut (tyranny) represented by oppressors like the Shah and global powers. Influenced by Ali Shariati's lectures, which portrayed Islam as inherently egalitarian and anti-exploitative akin to socialism, the PMOI rejected Marxist atheism while adopting its anti-imperialist fervor and advocacy for collectivizing economic resources to eliminate exploitation. They viewed the Imams not as passive spiritual figures but as prototypes of guerrilla fighters against injustice, justifying armed struggle as a religious duty (jihad) aligned with proletarian revolution. This ideological framework emphasized social justice, land reform, and workers' control over production, grounded in selective Quranic interpretations that condemned usury and hoarding as un-Islamic, while incorporating Marxist critiques of bourgeois nationalism. The PMOI distinguished itself from the Tudeh Party's orthodox communism by insisting on Islam's revolutionary primacy, claiming that true monotheism inherently opposed polytheistic capitalism and imperialism. Critics, including the Shah's regime and conservative clerics, derided them as "Islamic Marxists" for this hybrid approach, which prioritized lay intellectuals over seminary authority and envisioned a post-revolutionary society free of both clerical dominance and atheistic materialism. Despite internal debates, this synthesis fueled early operations, including assassinations of U.S. military personnel and SAVAK officials, framing such acts as defensive jihad against foreign-backed tyranny.

Post-Revolution Shift to Democratic Federalism and Secularism

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), initially aligned with an Islamic-Marxist framework, faced systematic exclusion and violent suppression by Ayatollah Khomeini's regime, which consolidated power through the imposition of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist). In response, PMOI leader Massoud Rajavi established the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) in Paris on July 29, 1981, as a coalition umbrella to articulate an alternative vision for Iran's governance, explicitly rejecting clerical rule and advocating a pluralistic republic based on popular sovereignty. The NCRI platform, adopted shortly thereafter, emphasized the separation of religion and state to prevent the fusion of theocracy and politics observed under the new regime, alongside commitments to universal suffrage, freedom of expression, and equality irrespective of gender, ethnicity, or belief. This ideological pivot toward secularism marked a departure from the PMOI's pre-revolution synthesis of Islam and Marxism, reframing resistance as a defense of democratic principles against religious despotism rather than an Islamist uprising. By 1985, amid the Iran-Iraq War and exile in Iraq, Rajavi publicly outlined commitments to a non-theocratic future, including protections for minority rights and decentralized governance structures to accommodate Iran's ethnic diversity, such as autonomy for Kurdish regions within a unified republic. These elements constituted a federalist orientation, prioritizing regional self-administration and cultural preservation over centralized control, contrasting sharply with the Persian-centric, unitary theocracy in Tehran. The shift was pragmatic, driven by the PMOI's marginalization—evidenced by the execution of over 2,000 members in the early 1980s—and aimed at broadening appeal among secular Iranians, liberals, and minorities disillusioned by Khomeini's purges. Maryam Rajavi, who assumed leadership roles alongside Massoud after his disappearance around 2003, formalized this evolution in her Ten-Point Plan presented to the European Parliament on January 17, 2006, which reiterated rejection of absolute clerical authority, separation of religion from state institutions, abolition of the death penalty, and gender equality through equal rights in all spheres. The plan also endorsed autonomy for national minorities, including Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Turkmen, framing federalism as a mechanism for equitable power-sharing in a democratic framework, while opposing separatism to maintain territorial integrity. This platform has since guided PMOI/NCRI activities, with annual endorsements from international figures underscoring its democratic credentials, though Iranian regime propaganda dismisses it as opportunistic. The transition reflects causal adaptation to survival needs post-revolution, prioritizing verifiable commitments to pluralism over ideological purity, as evidenced by the PMOI's delisting from U.S. and EU terrorist designations in 2012 after demonstrating non-violent advocacy aligned with these principles.

Positions on Nuclear Program, Women's Rights, and Minority Autonomy

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), via its affiliated National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), opposes the Iranian regime's nuclear program as a pathway to weapons development, advocating for its complete dismantlement in favor of a non-nuclear state. Maryam Rajavi's Ten-Point Plan, presented in 2006 and reaffirmed in subsequent NCRI declarations, specifies in its ninth point the commitment to "a non-nuclear Iran, free of weapons of mass destruction," rejecting any military nuclear ambitions while permitting civilian applications under international safeguards. This position stems from the PMOI's exposure of covert sites, including the Natanz uranium enrichment facility revealed on August 14, 2002, which triggered IAEA investigations confirming undeclared activities, and more recent disclosures such as the "Kavir Plan" for nuclear warheads unveiled by the NCRI on June 11, 2025. The group argues that the regime's program, advanced through ballistic missile integration and enrichment to near-weapons-grade levels by 2025, endangers regional stability and necessitates regime change to enforce verifiable denuclearization. On women's rights, the PMOI promotes comprehensive gender equality as a foundational principle, positioning women as equals in leadership and rejecting the regime's institutionalized subordination. The fifth point of Rajavi's Ten-Point Plan mandates "full equality between men and women" with women's "active and equal participation in all political, economic, and social arenas, including in the leadership of the country," abolishing discriminatory laws on inheritance, marriage, and employment. This is embodied in the PMOI's internal structure, where an all-female Leadership Council has directed operations since 1986, comprising 24 women elected unanimously in 2024, and Maryam Rajavi's role as NCRI president-elect since 1993. The organization condemns mandatory hijab and gender apartheid under the theocracy, crediting women's resistance units with galvanizing uprisings like the 2022 protests following Mahsa Amini's death in custody on September 16, 2022, and frames female agency as antithetical to clerical misogyny. The PMOI endorses autonomy for Iran's ethnic and religious minorities to preserve cultural, linguistic, and administrative self-governance within a unitary republic, countering the regime's assimilationist policies. Rajavi's seventh point in the Ten-Point Plan guarantees "the rights of all ethnic and religious minorities are protected," enabling development of their languages and cultures alongside explicit autonomy for Iranian Kurdistan—encompassing decentralized control over education, media, and local governance—while upholding national sovereignty and rejecting secessionism. This federalist model extends to other groups like Baluchis, Azeris, and Arabs, promising equitable resource allocation and representation to mitigate conflicts exacerbated by the regime's suppression, as evidenced in Kurdish uprisings since 1979 and Baluchi protests in 2024. The NCRI's platform integrates these commitments into a broader democratic framework, emphasizing minority rights as inseparable from universal freedoms to foster national cohesion post-regime change.

Organizational Structure and Capabilities

Leadership Hierarchy and Membership Demographics

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) maintains a centralized leadership structure dominated by the Rajavi family, with Maryam Rajavi serving as secretary-general since 1985 and as president-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the group's political coalition acting as a parliament-in-exile. Massoud Rajavi, co-founder and longtime joint leader with Maryam, has not appeared publicly since 2003 following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, with his whereabouts unknown and some analysts speculating he is deceased. The organization operates through a commander corps that is predominantly composed of women, reflecting an internal emphasis on gender parity in operational roles, though the overall hierarchy remains tightly controlled at the top with limited transparency on subordinate decision-making bodies. Membership consists primarily of Iranian expatriates, estimated at 5,000 to 10,000 globally as of 2011, with a core presence in Albania's Camp Ashraf-3 following relocations from Iraq. The group features a notable proportion of female members, distinguishing it from many other militant organizations, with women holding significant positions in leadership and resistance networks; this composition stems from post-1980s ideological shifts promoting women's emancipation and equality. Demographically, members are overwhelmingly ethnic Persians or other Iranian nationalities, aged predominantly in middle to older adulthood due to decades of exile and internal commitments that have included practices such as mandatory divorces and celibacy to prioritize organizational loyalty. The MEK supplements its core cadre with informal "resistance units" inside Iran, though verifiable active participation numbers remain elusive and are contested by regime sources.

Military, Intelligence, and Resistance Networks

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) formed the National Liberation Army (NLA) in 1987 as its principal military arm, basing operations from camps in Iraq with logistical and financial support from Saddam Hussein's regime. The NLA conducted cross-border raids and offensives against Iranian government and military targets, including mortar attacks and hit-and-run operations in the 1990s and early 2000s targeting Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) facilities and personnel. Notable actions included the 1988 Operation Forough-e Javidan (Eternal Light), a large-scale incursion into western Iran that aimed to capture cities and spark uprisings but was repelled by Iranian forces in Operation Mersad, resulting in heavy NLA casualties. By 2003, following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, NLA activities ceased as forces disarmed under coalition oversight, with remaining fighters confined to Camp Ashraf. The PMOI's intelligence networks, sustained through covert sympathizers and operatives inside Iran, have focused on gathering and disseminating information on regime vulnerabilities, particularly its nuclear program. In August 2002, the PMOI's affiliate National Council of Resistance of Iran publicly disclosed previously undeclared uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Arak, revelations later verified by International Atomic Energy Agency inspections that prompted heightened international scrutiny. Subsequent disclosures, such as details on nuclear warhead design organizations in 2017, have been attributed by the PMOI to its domestic sources, though independent verification varies; U.S. intelligence assessments have occasionally credited such tips with advancing awareness of Iran's covert activities. These networks operate clandestinely, evading IRGC counterintelligence amid regime claims of fabricated intelligence, but their outputs have influenced policy debates on sanctions and non-proliferation. Post-2003, the PMOI shifted from overt military engagements to decentralized resistance networks inside Iran, comprising "Resistance Units"—small, autonomous cells of activists conducting sabotage, anti-regime graffiti, and mobilization for protests. These units have been active in major unrest, including the 2017-2018 and 2022 nationwide uprisings, where they reportedly organized strikes and distributed materials calling for regime overthrow, according to PMOI statements and congressional testimonies. Operating without formal command structures to minimize infiltration risks, the networks emphasize women's leadership and non-lethal disruption, contrasting earlier armed tactics; Albanian-based leadership coordinates via secure communications, though exact scale remains unverified due to secrecy. Iranian authorities attribute numerous internal disruptions to these cells, executing alleged members in waves, such as over 100 claimed PMOI affiliates in 1988, underscoring the networks' perceived threat despite limited independent confirmation of operational scope.

Funding, Propaganda, and Social Media Operations

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), derives its primary funding from private donations by Iranian expatriates in the United States and Europe who oppose the Iranian clerical regime. Prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the group received the majority of its financial and military support from Saddam Hussein's government, which provided bases, equipment, and operational funding. After 2003, with the loss of Iraqi patronage, the PMOI shifted to soliciting contributions through front organizations targeting exile communities, enabling the maintenance of operations despite asset freezes during its foreign terrorist organization designation period. The 2012 U.S. delisting unfroze associated assets and permitted financial transactions with American entities, facilitating expanded advocacy efforts. In 2012, Iranian exiles and aligned lobbyists raised millions through targeted campaigns to influence policy, including payments to U.S. advocates for delisting support. The PMOI conducts propaganda operations via dedicated media outlets, including Simay Azadi (also known as INTV), a Paris-based satellite television channel that broadcasts news critical of the Iranian regime, highlights internal resistance activities, and promotes the group's leadership and platform. This channel, supported by the PMOI's network, receives endorsement from internal Resistance Units, which view it as a key tool for countering regime-controlled media. The organization maintains a sophisticated global advocacy apparatus, including lobbying in Western capitals through affiliates like the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and the Organization of Iranian American Communities (OIAC), which host events featuring former officials to advance delisting and policy goals. These efforts, described by critics such as the French Foreign Ministry in 2014 as involving "intense campaigns of influence and disinformation," have included paid advertisements and enlistment of figures like Rudy Giuliani for public endorsements. On social media, the PMOI operates official accounts, such as on X (formerly Twitter), to publicize Resistance Units' actions inside Iran, including protests, banner displays, and anti-regime messaging, aiming to amplify dissent and mobilize diaspora support. These units, estimated to have conducted over 20,000 acts of defiance by mid-2024, use platforms to document and disseminate evidence of regime abuses, breaking state media monopolies and fostering coordinated unrest. Iranian officials have voiced alarm over the PMOI's reach on Telegram and similar apps, citing their role in influencing public sentiment during uprisings like those in 2019 and 2022. This digital strategy complements offline operations, such as annual mass gatherings in Europe drawing tens of thousands, funded by supporter contributions to project organizational strength and ideological appeals.

Historical Terrorist Listings and Delistings

The United States Department of State designated the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on October 8, 1997, citing the group's history of bombings, assassinations, and other attacks primarily targeting Iranian government officials, military personnel, and civilians in Iran and abroad during the 1980s and 1990s. This designation imposed financial sanctions, travel restrictions, and material support prohibitions under U.S. law. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks and heightened global counterterrorism efforts, the United Kingdom proscribed the PMOI as a terrorist organization under the Terrorism Act 2000 in March 2001, making membership or support illegal. The European Union similarly added the group to its common list of terrorist entities on December 2, 2002, via Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, freezing assets and imposing travel bans based on evidence of past violent operations. Delistings began in the late 2000s amid legal challenges, cessation of armed activities by the PMOI since a 2001 renunciation of violence and a 2003 operational standstill agreement with U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, and lack of verified post-2003 terrorist incidents attributable to the group. The UK Court of Appeal ruled on June 6, 2008, that the Home Secretary's proscription decision lacked sufficient public evidence, prompting the government to delist the PMOI on June 23, 2008, after failing to overturn the judgment on national security grounds. The EU followed with formal removal from its terrorist list on January 26, 2009, after the European Court of First Instance annulled the designation in December 2006 for procedural flaws, requiring the Council to reassess and ultimately conclude that ongoing threats were not substantiated. The U.S. maintained its FTO status longer, despite federal court orders in 2010 and 2012 mandating review or delisting due to expired designations and absence of recent activity. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton revoked the designation on September 28, 2012, effective immediately, stating that the PMOI had not been credibly linked to terrorist acts since 2001 and had cooperated with U.S. forces, though the decision emphasized continued monitoring for any resumed violence. Parallel to the FTO delisting, the U.S. Treasury removed the PMOI from its Specially Designated Global Terrorist list under Executive Order 13224 on the same date. These actions aligned with similar delistings in Canada (December 2012) and Japan (2013), reflecting a consensus among Western governments that the group's operational shift to political advocacy diminished its terrorist classification, despite persistent Iranian regime claims of ongoing threats. The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), pursued multiple judicial challenges against its inclusion on terrorist lists in the European Union, resulting in several annulments by the Court of First Instance (now General Court). In December 2006, the court annulled the 2005 listing decision for failing to provide an adequate statement of reasons justifying the freeze of PMOI assets under EU anti-terrorism regulations. The Council of the EU relisted the group shortly thereafter, but the court annulled this action in December 2008, ruling it constituted a manifest error of assessment due to insufficient evidence of terrorist activities post-2001 and reliance on unsubstantiated claims of ongoing threats. These rulings highlighted procedural deficiencies and evidentiary weaknesses in the designations, which had partly drawn from intelligence shared by member states potentially influenced by Iranian inputs. The EU delisted the PMOI in January 2009 following the final annulment. In the United States, the PMOI initiated legal proceedings in 1997 against its Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. After years of litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a writ of mandamus in July 2010, directing the State Department to resolve the delisting petition within a statutory timeframe, as the agency had unreasonably delayed despite the PMOI's cessation of armed operations since 2003. The court emphasized that designations require current evidence of terrorism or support for it, rejecting indefinite reliance on historical actions from the 1980s and 1990s. On September 28, 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton revoked the FTO status, concluding that the PMOI had renounced violence, relocated from Iraq to Europe, and demonstrated no engagement in terrorist acts qualifying under the criteria. The United Kingdom proscribed the PMOI under the Terrorism Act 2000 in March 2001, but faced domestic challenges via the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC). In 2007-2008, POAC reviews found the proscription unsustainable due to lack of recent evidence of direct involvement in terrorism, leading to delisting in June 2008. These outcomes across jurisdictions underscored a pattern where initial listings rested on outdated or unverified intelligence, often amplified by Iranian regime lobbying, while courts demanded empirical proof of contemporary threats. Evidence of Iranian regime fabrications emerged in the context of these delistings, as judicial scrutiny exposed reliance on regime-supplied disinformation portraying the PMOI as persistently violent. For instance, EU court opinions criticized the opacity of "secret evidence" from Iranian sources, which alleged fabricated plots and defector testimonies to sustain listings, without corroboration from independent verification. U.S. delisting reviews similarly discounted regime claims of ongoing MEK attacks, finding no verifiable incidents after 2001, amid documented Iranian efforts to influence Western designations through diplomatic pressure and false narratives. The regime's Ministry of Intelligence has been implicated in coordinated disinformation, including coerced "defector" accounts exaggerating internal abuses to delegitimize the PMOI, as cross-examined in legal proceedings and contradicted by neutral assessments of the group's post-2003 non-violence. Such tactics reflect the regime's strategic use of fabrications to counter the PMOI's opposition role, though courts prioritized causal evidence over unproven allegations, leading to uniform delistings by 2012.

Foreign Relations

Alliances with Iraq, U.S., and Israel

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) established a strategic alliance with Iraq under Saddam Hussein beginning in the mid-1980s, relocating its operations to Iraqi territory around 1986 after facing suppression from the newly established Iranian Islamic Republic. Saddam's regime provided the MEK with military bases, including Camp Ashraf near the Iran-Iraq border, financial support, weapons, and logistical aid to conduct operations against Iran. In return, the MEK supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), forming its National Liberation Army (NLA) in 1987 and launching cross-border offensives, such as Operation Eternal Glory on June 20, 1988, which involved over 7,000 MEK fighters advancing into Iranian territory. This partnership extended to the MEK assisting Iraqi forces in suppressing Shiite and Kurdish uprisings post-war, though the group denied direct involvement in chemical attacks or genocide. Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, American forces initially protected MEK members at Camp Ashraf, disarming them in 2003 while granting protected persons status under the Geneva Conventions to avoid Iranian demands for extradition. The MEK renounced violence in 2001 and lobbied intensively for removal from the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization list, culminating in its delisting on September 28, 2012, by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who cited the group's cessation of terrorist activities and compliance with disarmament. U.S. support has included public endorsements from figures like John Bolton and Rudy Giuliani, who spoke at MEK events, and congressional resolutions advocating for the group as a democratic alternative to the Iranian regime, though critics noted paid advocacy exceeding $2 million to U.S. officials. Relations with Israel have involved alleged covert cooperation against the Iranian regime, particularly in targeting its nuclear program. U.S. officials reported in 2012 that Israel's Mossad recruited MEK operatives for assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, including the killings of Massoud Ali-Mohammadi in January 2010 and Majid Shahriari in November 2010, with the MEK providing intelligence and logistical support while Israel handling technical execution to maintain deniability. Iranian authorities have consistently attributed such operations to joint MEK-Israeli efforts, a claim echoed in reports of funding and training ties dating back to 2002, though Israel has not officially confirmed beyond implicit acknowledgments in media. This alignment stems from shared opposition to the Iranian government, with the MEK benefiting from Israeli intelligence capabilities despite lacking formal diplomatic ties.

Stances on Israel-Palestine and Regional Conflicts

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), through its affiliation with the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), advocates for a future Iranian government that would terminate all financial and military support to Middle Eastern militant groups designated as terrorist organizations by Western governments, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This position is outlined in the NCRI's Ten-Point Plan for Iran's democratic future, which emphasizes non-interference in neighboring countries' affairs and respect for regional sovereignty as prerequisites for peace. The PMOI frames these proxies as instruments of the Iranian regime's "export of fundamentalism," arguing that Tehran's backing—estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars annually to Hezbollah alone—prolongs conflicts and diverts resources from Iran's domestic crises. On the Israel-Palestine conflict, PMOI leader Maryam Rajavi has expressed support for ceasefires and lasting peace, welcoming U.S.-brokered proposals to end the Gaza war in October 2025 while criticizing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for rejecting them to sustain his "anti-Zionist" rhetoric as a distraction from internal unrest. In a 2023 statement, Rajavi accused the regime of "instrumentalizing the Palestinian issue" to mask its economic failures and human rights abuses, asserting that genuine solidarity with Palestinians requires halting Tehran's proxy funding rather than rhetorical posturing. Earlier, in July 2014 amid Israeli military operations in Gaza, Rajavi condemned "savage attacks against Palestinian people," reflecting a historical aversion to civilian casualties, though the PMOI prioritizes regime change as the causal remedy for regional instability over direct endorsement of either side's maximalist claims. In broader regional conflicts, the PMOI denounces Iran's role in fueling violence through proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, which it claims have resulted in over 200,000 deaths in Syria alone since 2011 due to Tehran's military intervention alongside Bashar al-Assad. Rajavi has highlighted vulnerabilities in these networks following setbacks, such as Hezbollah's diminished capabilities after Israeli operations in 2024, as opportunities to dismantle the "axis of resistance" that serves only the clerical rulers' survival. The organization maintains that a post-regime Iran would pursue normalized relations with neighbors, including Israel, based on mutual security interests, aligning with reported historical cooperation between PMOI figures and Israeli entities against shared threats. This stance contrasts sharply with the regime's ideological commitment to Israel's destruction, which the PMOI views as a barrier to any resolution in Palestine or the Levant.

Iranian Regime's Extraterritorial Plots Against MEK

The Iranian regime has pursued extraterritorial operations against the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), including terrorist plots and assassination attempts targeting its members and gatherings in Europe, as part of a broader strategy to suppress opposition abroad. These activities, often orchestrated by the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have involved diplomats and proxies to conduct surveillance, recruitment, and attacks on MEK dissidents relocated from Iraq to Albania and other sites. A key incident occurred on June 30, 2018, when Belgian authorities foiled a plot to bomb the MEK's annual "Free Iran" rally at Villepinte near Paris, attended by over 100,000 supporters including European politicians. Iranian diplomat Assadollah Assadi, stationed at Iran's embassy in Vienna, supplied approximately 500 grams of TATP explosive to a Belgian-Iranian couple, Amir Saadouni and Nasime Sabouri, who were arrested while transporting the device from Belgium toward France; a third accomplice, Mehrdad Arefi, provided logistical support. In a 2021 trial in Antwerp, Belgium, Assadi was sentenced to 20 years in prison for terrorist murder conspiracy, while Saadouni and Sabouri received 15- and 20-year terms, respectively; the court established links to Iranian intelligence based on forensic evidence, communications, and Assadi's role in activating sleeper cells. Iran denied involvement, claiming the operatives acted independently, but the verdict highlighted regime orchestration. In Albania, host to MEK's Camp Ashraf-3 since 2016, the regime has mounted espionage and attack plans against relocated members. On December 19, 2018, Albania expelled Iranian Ambassador Gholam Hossein Mohammadnia and a deputy for "activities threatening national security," tied to a thwarted terrorist plot against MEK dissidents; U.S. officials praised the action as countering Iranian support for terrorism. Albanian police in October 2019 dismantled a "terrorist cell" surveilling and targeting Iranian exiles, including MEK affiliates, following intelligence on Iranian embassy involvement. Further expulsions occurred in January 2020, when two additional diplomats were deported for violating status with subversive actions. These efforts reflect Iran's use of diplomatic cover to infiltrate and threaten MEK communities, prompting heightened Albanian and U.S. vigilance. The regime's pattern extends to attempted assassinations of MEK leaders, such as a 1991 car bomb targeting Massoud Rajavi in Baghdad, though primarily European cases post-2010 underscore MOIS/IRGC reliance on proxies amid international scrutiny. U.S. assessments note over 100 Iran-linked plots or attacks abroad since 1979, including against dissidents like MEK, often evading detection through criminal networks. Convictions like Assadi's and diplomatic expulsions affirm the operations' state sponsorship, contrasting regime denials with judicial findings.

Controversies and Criticisms

Past Violent Actions and Terrorism Accusations

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) conducted assassinations of U.S. personnel in Iran during the 1970s as part of its armed opposition to the Shah's regime. On May 23, 1973, MEK members assassinated U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins, a military advisor, in Tehran. In May 1975, the group killed two U.S. Air Force officers and an Iranian employee in an attack on a U.S. Embassy vehicle. In 1976, MEK operatives assassinated three American employees of Rockwell International. These actions contributed to the U.S. government's later assessment of the MEK as having a history of terrorism targeting American interests. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the MEK initially participated in the new Islamic Republic but soon opposed Ayatollah Khomeini's consolidation of power, leading to armed clashes. In June 1981, the group was attributed with the bombing of the Islamic Republican Party headquarters in Tehran, killing Chief Justice Mohammad Beheshti and approximately 72 others. On August 29, 1981, a bombing killed President Mohammad-Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. These incidents formed part of a broader wave of bombings and assassinations against regime officials in the early 1980s, prompting the Iranian government to execute thousands of MEK members and sympathizers in response. Exiled to Iraq by the mid-1980s with support from Saddam Hussein's regime, the MEK established the National Liberation Army (NLA) and launched cross-border attacks into Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. In July 1988, the NLA conducted Operation Forough Javidan, a major offensive involving thousands of fighters that briefly captured several Iranian cities before being repelled, resulting in significant casualties on both sides. The group continued sporadic mortar attacks, bombings, and assassinations against Iranian targets into the 1990s, including targeted killings of nuclear scientists and officials. These activities led to international terrorism designations. The U.S. State Department listed the MEK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997, citing its killings of U.S. citizens in the 1970s and ongoing attacks on Iranian regime targets. The European Union designated it in 2002 for similar reasons, including plots against Iranian interests abroad, such as the 1992 raids on Iranian diplomatic missions in multiple countries. In 2003, French authorities arrested over 150 MEK members for allegedly planning terrorist attacks in Europe. The Iranian government has accused the MEK of killing over 6,000 of its officials since 1979, though independent estimates suggest hundreds, with the MEK disputing inflated figures as regime propaganda. U.S. assessments have consistently described these methods as terrorism, despite later delistings influenced by political considerations.

Claims of Cult-Like Practices and Internal Coercion

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) has been accused of cult-like practices, including a personality cult around leaders Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, enforced through isolation, indoctrination, and coercive mechanisms within its Iraqi camps, particularly Camp Ashraf. Human Rights Watch reported in 2005 that the MEK leadership maintained strict control over members via "operations rooms" that monitored behavior, suppressed dissent, and imposed punishments such as beatings, sleep deprivation, and confinement in small, dark cells for perceived disloyalty. Defectors have detailed mandatory self-criticism sessions, where members publicly confessed ideological shortcomings in marathon gatherings resembling show trials, fostering guilt and conformity. Issa Azadeh, a former MEK member who defected in 2014 after joining in the 1980s, described these sessions as tools for psychological coercion, alongside physical torture including beatings and four months of solitary confinement for questioning orders. The U.S. State Department and UNHCR have characterized the MEK as exhibiting cult-like traits, such as prohibiting family contact—labeling relatives as "poison"—and deceiving recruits about the group's nature to ensure retention. Following Massoud Rajavi's "Ideological Revolution" in the late 1980s, married members were coerced into divorce and celibacy to redirect personal loyalties exclusively to the leadership, with women reportedly pressured into sexual relations with Rajavi as a supposed act of devotion; Batool Sultani, who defected in 2006, alleged over 400 women participated, marked by pendants. Reza Sadeghi, defecting in 2006, recounted threats of execution and a broken finger during detention for attempting escape, highlighting barriers to voluntary exit. Allegations of forced sterilizations emerged from female defectors, with Sultani claiming hysterectomies were imposed on at least 50 women by 1998 to eradicate "hope for the future" and prevent divided allegiances; Sima, who left in 2014, reported surgical removal of her ovaries under duress. These practices, per RAND Corporation analysis, trapped even initial volunteers in a cult of personality, complicating relocation efforts post-2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The MEK's hierarchical structure under Maryam Rajavi has sustained such internal dynamics, with up to 700 members reportedly detained, tortured, or disappeared for dissent since the 1980s.

Counterarguments: Regime Propaganda and Comparative Context

Critics of the MEK argue that terrorism designations and related accusations largely originated from or were amplified by the Iranian regime's systematic disinformation campaigns, which seek to delegitimize the group as the primary organized opposition. Iranian intelligence minister Mahmoud Alavi admitted in a 2021 state television interview that the regime allocates significant resources to propaganda operations targeting the MEK, including fabricating narratives to portray it as a terrorist entity devoid of popular support. Leaked internal documents and defector analyses indicate the regime recruits and coaches expelled MEK members to produce scripted testimonies of abuse, with cases like those publicized in Western media often traced to regime-orchestrated "troll farms" and paid operatives. Independent judicial reviews have repeatedly undermined these claims, leading to delistings that reflect a lack of verifiable evidence for ongoing threats. The European Court of First Instance ruled in 2009 that the EU's evidence against the MEK for terrorism was insufficient and politically motivated, ordering its removal from the terrorist list, a decision upheld despite appeals. Similarly, the U.S. State Department delisted the MEK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in September 2012 following federal court mandates for review, citing the group's 2001 renunciation of violence and absence of attacks since then, with no intelligence indicating future intent. These outcomes contrast with the regime's unsubstantiated assertions, highlighting how designations were initially influenced by appeasement toward Tehran rather than empirical threat assessments. In comparative context, the MEK's historical armed resistance mirrors tactics employed by other groups that transitioned from insurgency to political legitimacy after ceasefires, without perpetual terrorist stigma. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) conducted bombings and assassinations for decades yet saw its political wing, Sinn Féin, integrated into governance post-1998 Good Friday Agreement, as violence subsided and democratic participation ensued. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), responsible for aircraft hijackings and the 1972 Munich massacre, was delisted by the U.S. in 1991 after renouncing terrorism and recognizing Israel, enabling its role in the Oslo Accords. The MEK's operational halt in 2001, amid U.S. protection in Iraq and focus on advocacy, parallels these shifts, where past actions against authoritarian targets were reframed as legitimate resistance rather than inherent criminality. Allegations of cult-like practices, often centered on internal discipline and leadership veneration, are similarly contextualized as adaptations to decades of exile, persecution, and guerrilla warfare, not unique pathologies. Such structures resemble those in historical liberation movements, like the African National Congress's military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe, which enforced ideological conformity and operational secrecy during apartheid-era struggle without cult labels persisting post-victory. Regime-amplified defector accounts, lacking corroboration beyond coerced narratives, fail to account for the MEK's sustained voluntary rallies—such as the 2018 Paris gathering attended by over 100,000 supporters—or endorsements from Western policymakers, which indicate broad agency rather than coercion. This comparative lens underscores how adversarial regimes routinely pathologize opponents' organizational rigor to obscure their threat as alternatives to the status quo.

Human Rights Record and Internal Practices

Alleged Abuses Within MEK and Defector Testimonies

A 2005 Human Rights Watch report, based on interviews with 12 former MEK members who had defected from camps in Iraq, documented allegations of systematic human rights abuses, including prolonged solitary confinement, physical beatings, sleep deprivation, and verbal abuse used to punish dissent or attempts to leave the organization. These defectors described being held against their will in facilities resembling prisons, with one case involving 18 months in isolation. Former members further alleged coercive practices aimed at enforcing ideological conformity, such as mandatory self-criticism sessions where individuals publicly confessed perceived personal failings or disloyalty, often under duress similar to interrogation tactics. Forced divorces were reportedly imposed on married couples to eliminate family attachments, with threats of punishment for non-compliance, alongside vows of celibacy that banned sexual relations and marriages within the group. A 2009 RAND Corporation analysis characterized these elements as indicative of cult-like control, trapping members in a cycle of voluntary enlistment turning into involuntary retention through psychological manipulation. More recent defector accounts, including interviews with six former high-ranking members published in 2020, detailed ongoing abuses such as forced hysterectomies on dozens of women to suppress hopes of motherhood and reinforce devotion to the leadership, with specific cases like one operative undergoing the procedure in 2011. Testimonies also included allegations of torture via beatings and extended solitary confinement for dissent—such as four months for one defector—and purges following the Iran-Iraq War that detained up to 700 members, some of whom were allegedly executed. Additional claims involved sexual exploitation, with records purportedly showing over 400 women coerced into relations with MEK leader Massoud Rajavi as part of rituals to prove loyalty.

MEK's Exposures of Iranian Regime Atrocities

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), operating through its political coalition the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), has disclosed numerous instances of atrocities committed by the Iranian regime, including mass executions, covert weapons development, and violent suppressions of dissent. These revelations, often based on intelligence gathered by MEK networks inside Iran, have prompted international scrutiny and corroboration by entities such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and human rights organizations. A pivotal exposure involved the 1988 prison massacres, where NCRI documentation in the early 1990s detailed the extrajudicial execution of at least 5,000 MEK prisoners—part of an estimated 30,000 political dissidents killed on orders from Ayatollah Khomeini during a three-month period in summer 1988. MEK sources provided survivor testimonies, fatwa texts classifying MEK supporters as mohareb (waging war against God), and lists of victims, which aligned with later audio recordings from Hossein-Ali Montazeri confirming the regime's "death commissions" that interrogated and hanged prisoners en masse. These disclosures, initially disseminated through NCRI publications like Crime Against Humanity, contributed to UN reports and Amnesty International's 2018 classification of the events as ongoing crimes against humanity, despite regime denials. In the nuclear domain, MEK intelligence in August 2002 revealed Iran's undeclared uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water reactor at Arak, sites previously concealed from IAEA inspectors, prompting global revelations that reshaped diplomatic pressure on Tehran. Subsequent NCRI reports, including a February 2025 disclosure of two covert sites developing nuclear warheads for missiles with over 3,000 km range under the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), have highlighted ongoing deception, with elements corroborated by IAEA findings on undeclared activities. The regime has accused MEK of fabricating such intelligence to undermine negotiations, yet these exposures have forced structural changes in Iran's nuclear apparatus post-2003. MEK Resistance Units and NCRI monitoring have also documented regime crackdowns on protests, reporting over 1,500 deaths in the November 2019 fuel price uprising—many by sniper fire and live ammunition—and systematic executions targeting protesters in the 2022 nationwide unrest following Mahsa Amini's death. In 2024-2025, NCRI tallied over 100 executions monthly, disproportionately affecting MEK affiliates, as a response to internal dissent, with these figures drawing from smuggled footage and defector accounts that parallel Amnesty International's estimates of 300+ protest-related killings in 2022. Such exposures underscore MEK's role in amplifying empirical evidence of regime brutality, often amid Tehran’s efforts to attribute unrest to foreign-MEK conspiracies.

Women's Roles and Gender Equality Initiatives

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) has positioned women in prominent leadership roles since the 1980s, with Maryam Rajavi assuming co-leadership alongside Massoud Rajavi in February 1985, followed by her election as the organization's Secretary General in 1989. In 1993, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), of which the PMOI is the main constituent, elected Rajavi as its President-elect for a transitional government, formalizing women's equal stake in political authority. This structure reflects the PMOI's internal policy of gender parity, where women hold approximately half of senior positions across decision-making bodies. The PMOI's gender equality initiatives are codified in the NCRI's platform, particularly Maryam Rajavi's Ten-Point Plan for Iran's future, announced in 2006 and reaffirmed in subsequent NCRI gatherings. The plan mandates complete equality in political, social, cultural, and economic spheres, including equal participation of women in political leadership; abolition of discrimination against women; freedom to choose clothing without compulsion; and equal rights in marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance. It further commits to equal pay for equal work, women's access to all professions, and protections against violence or exploitation, positioning these as foundational to a post-theocratic republic. Women have actively participated in the PMOI's operational roles, comprising a significant portion of its Resistance Units inside Iran, which conduct protests and symbolic actions against the regime, as evidenced by over 20,000 documented activities supporting the Ten-Point Plan since 2018. Historically, female members formed the backbone of the PMOI's National Liberation Army during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, serving as commanders and combatants, with tens of thousands credited for sacrifices that elevated women's status within the organization. These initiatives, as articulated by PMOI leadership, aim to counter the Iranian regime's gender apartheid by modeling parity, though implementation details derive primarily from organizational statements and defector accounts remain contested in external analyses.

Perception and Influence

Support Among Iranian Public and Diaspora

Support for the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) within Iran remains difficult to quantify accurately due to the regime's severe repression, including executions and imprisonment of suspected sympathizers, which discourages open expression. Analysts have described the group's backing inside the country as marginal, attributing this to decades of state propaganda depicting the MEK as collaborators with foreign enemies and Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the 1980-1988 war. No recent, reliable public opinion surveys conducted inside Iran specifically measure MEK support levels, as such polling risks participant safety; broader surveys indicate widespread rejection of the Islamic Republic, with over 80% of respondents in a 2023 GAMAAN poll favoring secular governance alternatives, though without direct attribution to the MEK's platform. In the Iranian diaspora, the MEK maintains a dedicated base demonstrated through large-scale organized events. For instance, a September 6, 2025, rally in Brussels marking the group's 60th anniversary drew tens of thousands of participants, described by attendees as the largest anti-regime protest in over four decades, highlighting orderly mobilization and vocal opposition to both theocracy and monarchy. Similar gatherings, such as a October 20, 2025, rally in Bern, Switzerland, protesting regime executions, underscore ongoing activist engagement among expatriates. However, diaspora politics are fragmented, with the MEK representing one faction alongside figures like Reza Pahlavi, who garners broader admiration in some communities; a 2013 survey of Iranian Americans reported only 5% support for the MEK, though this predates recent delistings and may not reflect current European-based activism. The MEK's visibility in exile contrasts with its limited infiltration of domestic protests, despite claims of covert influence in uprisings like those in 2017-2018 and 2022, where anti-regime graffiti and chants echoed the group's slogans but lacked verifiable mass affiliation. Overall, while diaspora rallies provide empirical evidence of committed support, the absence of comprehensive, unbiased polling inside Iran leaves the extent of latent public sympathy—potentially amplified by shared opposition to the regime—uncertain and overshadowed by the group's historical baggage and rival opposition narratives.

Views from Other Opposition Groups and Analysts

Other Iranian opposition groups, including monarchist factions aligned with Reza Pahlavi, have frequently criticized the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) as lacking broad domestic support and exhibiting cult-like internal dynamics that undermine its credibility as a unifying force against the regime. Reza Pahlavi, in a February 28, 2023, statement, echoed regime narratives by portraying the MEK as a problematic entity, prompting accusations from MEK supporters of him regurgitating Tehran propaganda to marginalize rivals, though Pahlavi's broader calls for opposition unity have often excluded the group due to ideological differences over republicanism versus monarchy. Monarchist-leaning analysts argue that the MEK's insistence on a secular democratic republic alienates potential allies who favor restoring constitutional monarchy, exacerbating fragmentation in the diaspora opposition. Non-monarchist opposition figures and coalitions, such as those in the Alliance for Democracy and Freedom in Iran, have similarly distanced themselves from the MEK, citing its historical alliance with Saddam Hussein during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War as a betrayal that erodes trust among regime opponents. This view persists despite the MEK's organizational discipline, with critics noting its absence from protest slogans during the 2022-2023 uprising, suggesting limited grassroots appeal inside Iran compared to more amorphous democratic movements. Some leftist or reformist exile groups further decry the MEK's past Marxist-Islamist fusion and armed tactics as incompatible with non-violent transition strategies, reinforcing perceptions of the group as an outlier rather than a collaborative partner. Independent analysts largely concur that the MEK's influence is constrained by its exile status and historical baggage, rendering it marginal in Iran's internal political dynamics despite lobbying successes abroad. A 2025 Congressional Research Service report assesses the MEK as playing no substantive role in the Islamic Republic's authoritarian system, attributing this to sustained regime repression and the group's delinking from domestic networks post-1980s. Experts like those at the American Enterprise Institute describe the MEK's ideology as a persistent blend of Marxism and Khomeinist Islamism, questioning its democratic bona fides and predicting organizational challenges absent leadership transitions, such as after Massoud Rajavi's potential death. Broader commentary, including from the Council on Foreign Relations, highlights ongoing controversy over the MEK's terrorism delistings and alliances, with many viewing it as a disciplined but unpopular force unlikely to lead regime change without wider Iranian buy-in. U.S. State Department evaluations, as referenced in 2025 policy briefs, explicitly deem the MEK non-viable as a credible democratic alternative, prioritizing opposition movements with verifiable internal traction over exiled entities reliant on foreign advocacy.

Media Portrayals and Shifts Post-Delistings

Prior to the delistings, Western media outlets frequently depicted the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) as a terrorist entity with cult-like characteristics, citing its history of attacks against U.S. personnel in the 1970s and operations alongside Saddam Hussein's regime during the Iran-Iraq War. Following the European Union's removal of the group from its terrorist list in 2009 and the U.S. State Department's delisting on September 28, 2012—based on the MEK's cessation of armed activities since 2003 and commitment to renunciation—media coverage showed limited positive shifts, often retaining skeptical or derogatory framing. Post-delisting, prominent outlets like The New York Times continued to label the MEK as a "cult," emphasizing its internal practices and alliances, such as with former U.S. officials like John Bolton, while noting its promotion by conservative figures despite widespread Iranian scorn. Similarly, Wired described it as an "Iranian cult" no longer officially terrorist, highlighting persistent allegations of coercive leadership under Maryam Rajavi. Al Jazeera portrayed the group as "cult-like" in its September 28, 2012, coverage of the U.S. delisting, linking it to opposition against the Shah and post-revolution clashes without acknowledging the legal basis for removal. These portrayals often drew from defector accounts and Iranian regime narratives, which the MEK has contested as fabricated propaganda, though independent verification remains challenging due to restricted access to its camps. Some analyses noted a "wild history" of transformation, with The Guardian in 2018 questioning whether the MEK represented Iranian democracy or remained terrorists/cultists, amid its lobbying efforts and events attended by U.S. politicians. However, coverage in left-leaning media frequently amplified cult allegations over the delistings' implications, such as the group's exposure of Iranian nuclear sites, potentially reflecting broader institutional biases against opposition groups not aligned with prevailing narratives. Congressional reports post-2012 acknowledged the delisting but highlighted ongoing controversies, including the MEK's irrelevance among many Iranians and historical violence, without endorsing media's cult framing as definitive. Overall, while delistings enabled greater visibility for MEK rallies—drawing tens of thousands annually in Paris—media shifts toward neutrality were minimal, with negative tropes persisting in outlets like The Huffington Post, which in 2012 called delisting pragmatic but the group a "militant cult of personality."

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