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Peshmerga
پێشمەرگه
Pêşmerge
Flag of Kurdistan, used by the Peshmerga
MottoEy Reqîb[1]
Founded
Current form2003; 23 years ago (2003) (Kurdistan Region)
HeadquartersErbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq
Websitegov.krd/mopa
Leadership
President of Kurdistan RegionNechirvan Barzani
Minister of Peshmerga AffairsShoresh Ismail Abdulla
Personnel
Military age21–41
ConscriptionNone
Active personnel138,000 (planned end strength by 2026; current estimates 150,000–200,000)[2][3]
Industry
Domestic suppliersIraq Iraqi Ministry of Defense[4]
Foreign suppliers
Current:
Former:
Related articles
History19th century - 21st century
RanksMilitary ranks of the Peshmerga

The Peshmerga (Kurdish: پێشمەرگه, romanized: Pêşmerge, lit. ''Those Who Face Death'')[27] are the internal security forces of the Kurdistan Region. According to the Constitution of Iraq, regional governments are responsible for "the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces, and guards of the region."[28] Other Kurdish security institutions include the Zêrevanî (gendarmerie), Asayish (security and counterterrorism service), Parastin u Zanyarî (intelligence agency) and the region's Kurdish police force. The Peshmerga's history dates back to the 19th century, when they began as a tribal paramilitary border guard under the Ottoman Turks and the Safavid Iranians. By the 20th century, they had evolved into a disciplined and well-trained guerrilla force, and were institutionalized in the 21st century under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).[29]

Formally, the Peshmerga are under the command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA) of the KRG. In practice, however, the Peshmerga's structure is largely divided and controlled separately by the two Iraqi Kurdish political parties: the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Unifying and integrating the Peshmerga under the MoPA has been on the Kurdistan Region's public agenda since 1992, with significant progress under a 2022 U.S.-KRG Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) aiming for full unification by 2026, though challenges like partisanship and external threats persist.[30][2][31]

Besides being the official name for the KRG's internal security forces, historically the word Peshmerga has also been used for a variety of Kurdish militias and armed groups, especially in Iranian Kurdistan. A few examples are the Peshmerga of the KDPI, PAK and Komala.[32]

Etymology

[edit]

The word "Peshmerga" can be translated to "to stand in front of death",[33][34][35] and Valentine states it was first used by Qazi Muhammad in the short-lived Mahabad Republic (1946–47).[36] The word is understandable to Persian speakers.[37] Because, the name was also used to refer to an elite unit within the Sassanid Empire's military, specifically a sub-unit of the Pushtigban, called the Gyan-avspar.[38] These warriors were renowned for their unwavering loyalty and bravery, often serving as the last line of defense for the Sassanid kings.[39][40][41][42]

History

[edit]
Main article: History of the Peshmerga

The Kurdish warrior tradition of rebellion has existed for thousands of years along with aspirations for independence. Early Kurdish warriors fought with and against the various Persian empires, the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire.[29][43]

Early Kurdish revolts

[edit]

The Kurdish revolts of the early 20th century, such as the Sheikh Said rebellion, the rebellion of Xoybûn, and the uprisings led by Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji, played an important role in the development of the modern Peshmerga. These events provided early experience in guerrilla and non-conventional warfare against state authorities and contributed to the spread of Kurdish nationalism among Kurdish fighters. They also strengthened the Barzani tribe, from which key leaders like Ahmed Barzani and Mustafa Barzani emerged.[44]

Building on the military experience gained during these uprisings, Mustafa Barzani later organized Kurdish forces in order to liberate Kurdistan. In 1943, he led approximately 2,000 Kurdish fighters in an uprising against the Iraqi Army and British forces, an event often regarded as a precursor to the modern Peshmerga forces that would later emerge, particularly during the period of the Republic of Mahabad.[44]

Mahabad Republic

[edit]

During the brief existence of the self-declared Republic of Mahabad (1946–1947), a contingent led by Mustafa Barzani served as its official military force after Barzani crossed the Iraq–Iran border to support the establishment of the Kurdish state in Iranian Kurdistan.[45][46]

According to Kurdish lore, the leaders of Mahabad gathered to choose a name for their army. As the story goes, they struggled to find a suitable word for 'soldier.' A server, overhearing their discussion, suggested peshmerga, a slang term from his nearby village. The name was adopted, and the force was formally named the Peshmerga.[47] Furthermore, under president Qazi Muhammad’s orders, a committee of “hand-picked litterateurs and writers” also developed distinct Kurdish military terminology to define ranks and positions.[48]

Mustafa Barzani (center front) with other Kurdish military officials of the Republic of Mahabad.

The relative of Simko Shikak, Amr Khan Shikak, along with the tribal leader of Baneh, Hama Rashid, Khan Banei, and Zero Beg Herki, were appointed as Marshals of the Peshmerga army by the Minister of War, Mohammed Hossein Saif Qazi. Due to his extensive warfare experience Mustafa Barzani was appointed as Marshal and chief of staff[44] of the army. Officers maintained a professional appearance through their Soviet-style uniforms, further advised and organized by the Soviet military officer Captain Salahaddin Kazimov. The Soviets continued their influence by sending at least 60 Kurdish officers to Soviet Azerbaijan for additional military training. The Mahabad army consisted of about 70 officers, 40 non-commissioned officers, and 1,200 privates. As one of the senior leaders, Mustafa Barzani was responsible for appointing officers within the ranks.[48]

In order to protect the republic's sovereignty, the Peshmerga engaged in their first battle at Qahrawa, near the town of Saqqez. They ambushed an Iranian garrison, killing 21 soldiers, wounding 17, and capturing 40. By mid-May 1946 Kurdish forces numbered approximately 12,750 Peshmerga, but most Kurdish offensives were limited to minor skirmishes.[48]

See also: Republic of Mahabad § Aftermath

After the withdrawal of Soviet support and the subsequent collapse of the republic, including the execution of its head of state, Qazi Muhammad, most Peshmerga forces, among them Barzani's force, retreated to Iraqi Kurdistan, where they re-emerged as guerrillas that continued to fight the Iranian and Iraqi governments throughout the remainder of the 20th century.[44][49]

Iraqi Kurdistan

[edit]
Mid-20th-century Peshmerga fighters with the famous Kurdish guerrilla fighter Mama Risha (center back).

In Iraq, most of these Peshmerga fighters continued to be led by Mustafa Barzani and his newly established Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).[46] The first major war fought by the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan was the First Iraqi–Kurdish War, lasting from 1961 until 1970, in which Barzani and his forces fought for independence. The war resulted in the signing of the Iraqi–Kurdish Autonomy Agreement. Kurdish autonomy had failed to be implemented by 1974, which led to the Second Iraqi–Kurdish War in 1975. Jalal Talabani, a leading member of the KDP, left the same year to revitalize the resistance and founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). This event created the baseline for the political discontent between the KDP and PUK that divides Peshmerga forces and much of Kurdish society to this day.[50][51]

Kurdish fighter during the 1991 Iraqi uprisings (Raperîn)

After Mustafa Barzani's death in 1979, his son Masoud Barzani took over his position.[46] As tension increased between the KDP and PUK, most Peshmerga forces fought to keep Iraqi Kurdistan under their own party's control, whilst also fighting off the Iraqi Army's incursions. Following the First Gulf War and the 1991 uprisings (Raperîn), and subsequent official autonomy for the Kurdistan Region, the Kurdish Civil War broke out, a conflict between the rivaling KDP and PUK parties, in which Peshmerga forces were used to fight against each other.[52] The civil war officially ended in September 1998 when Barzani and Talabani signed the Washington Agreement establishing a formal peace treaty.[53] In the agreement, the parties agreed to share oil revenue and power, deny the use of Iraqi Kurdistan to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and to not allow Iraqi troops into the Kurdish regions. By then, around 5,000 Peshmerga and civilians had been killed on both sides, and many more had been evicted for being on the "wrong side".[54]

2003 invasion of Iraq

[edit]
See also: Operation Viking Hammer and Iraqi no-fly zones conflict
Kurdish and U.S. special forces after defeating Ansar al-Islam during Operation Viking Hammer in Halabja, Iraqi Kurdistan.

In the years after, tensions remained high, but both parties came closer to each other, and in 2003 both of them, jointly took part in the overthrowing of the Baathist regime as part of the Iraq War and the broader Global War on Terror.[55] The CIA and other US special forces, who arrived in Iraq in early 2002, conducted unconventinal warfare operations with the Peshmerga against Ansal al-Islam terrorists and organized the Peshmerga to form a 'northern Front' against Saddam Hussein's troops.[56] As the U.S. bombing campaign and subsequent invasion of Iraq began, Peshmerga forces, operating alongside U.S. Special Forces, advanced beyond the Kurdistan Region and took control of large areas that were widely regarded as Kurdish but had previously been outside Kurdish control. These areas included Sinjar, Tuz Khurmatu, Khanaqin, and Kirkuk.[57] The Peshmerga played a key role in helping the United States on the mission to capture Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.[58][59]

After the overthrowing, the Peshmerga were politically recognized and obtained a special legal position. This improvement came from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) with issuing orders that recognized the Peshmerga and exempted them from disbandment.[60] However, the decision was preceded by disagreements between Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani and the U.S. Administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer, who regarded the continued existence of the Peshmerga as a "red line" in the formation of the new Iraqi state. Barzani rejected calls for disbandment, reportedly telling Bremer to "be a man and come to Kurdistan to disband [the] Peshmerga." Bremer subsequently abandoned his efforts to disband the Peshmerga.[61] In August 2003, parts of the Peshmerga were assigned to border security and oil pipeline protection, while others trained with coalition troops. Peshmerga units collaborated closely with U.S. forces on patrols, interrogations, and security missions. At one point, the Peshmerga made up 30% of the new Iraqi Army.[60]

In 2004, CTG Kurdistan, an elite special forces unit within the Peshmerga, captured Saudi-born Pakistani terrorist Hassan Ghul, who was operating for al-Qaeda in Iraq. Ghul was turned over to American intelligence officers shortly afterwards, which eventually led to the killing of Osama bin Laden in a covert American military operation in Pakistan in 2011.[62][63][64]

[edit]

Article 117 of the new 2005 Iraqi Constitution allowed federal regions (such as the Kurdistan Region) to establish their own internal security services; that is, the “police, security forces and guards of the region”. The Peshmerga are legally recognized as one of these permissible regional internal security forces.[65]

In 2006, a major conference in Erbil, involving the KRG, Iraqi Government, and Multinational Forces in Iraq, further clarified the Peshmerga's role: defending the Kurdistan Region, supporting federal security efforts, fighting terrorism, and preserving constitutional institutions. This situation remained stable and helped the Peshmerga to reorganise and train its troops in military academies in the Zakho-Duhok area and Qalachulan-Sulaymaniyah area.[60][66]

2014 War against the Islamic State

[edit]
2015 VOA report about Peshmerga fighting IS south of Erbil

In 2014, the Peshmerga and Iraqi Armed Forces withdrew from the Nineveh Plains, which was said by the locals as being a contributing factor of the quick Islamic State victory in the invasion, and the widespread massacre of Yazidis, who were rendered defenseless.[67] After the retreat and with the capital Erbil, only being 30-minutes away from ISIS' threat, the Peshmerga fought back and recaptured wast territories of the Kirkuk, Nineveh and Diyala Governorates. Special Forces of the Peshmerga were also involved in joint special operations with the U.S. during the war, like in the Hawija prison raid. According to Myles B. Caggins III, the Senior Spokesperson for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS at the time, the Peshmerga made the "ultimate sacrifice" in the War Against the Islamic State with over 1,300 Peshmerga fighters being killed, and upwards of 8,000 being wounded.[68] As stated by a report of the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the Peshmerga are seen by locals as heroes due to their involvement in the fight against ISIS.[69] In the fall of 2017, however, the Peshmerga suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Iraqi armed forces and lost vast territories due to the 2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict.[70]

Post-2017 reforms and advancements

[edit]
Main article: Peshmerga § Unification efforts

Following the defeat of ISIS in 2017, Peshmerga reforms focused on unification and modernization. In September 2022, the U.S. and KRG renewed a MoU to create a unified, nonpartisan force under MoPA command by 2026, including disbanding partisan Units 70 and 80, establishing two Area Commands and 11 light infantry divisions, and achieving a planned strength of 138,000.[2] By mid-2025, four divisions were operational, biometric enrollment exceeded 85%, and unification entered its final phase, with completion expected by year-end.[71][72] Advancements included the 2025 'Peshmerga Medical Force Readiness Initiative' and proposals for air defense systems.[73][74] Continued Coalition support via CTEF provided stipends, vehicles, and equipment.[2] However, progress has been slowed by KDP-PUK division, ISIS' threat, and disputes with the central government in Baghdad.[75]

Structure

[edit]

Party affiliations

[edit]

The Peshmerga are mostly divided among forces loyal to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and those loyal to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),[76] while other, minor Kurdish parties such as the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party also have their own small Peshmerga units.[77] The Islamic Movement of Kurdistan also had its own Peshmerga unit, which became an official Peshmerga branch during the Iran-Iraq war, and was disarmed in 2003.[78] In daily life and the media, Peshmerga are referred to as Peshmerga i parti (KDP) or Peshmerga i yaketi (PUK) – i.e., KDP peshmerga or PUK Peshmerga.[79] The KDP and PUK do not disclose information about the composition of their forces with government or media.[76] Thus there is no reliable number of how many Peshmerga fighters exist.[76] Media outlets have speculated that there are between 150,000 and 200,000 Peshmerga, but this number is highly disputed.[80][81] The Peshmerga are divided into a KDP-governed "yellow" zone covering Dohuk Governorate and Erbil Governorate and a PUK-governed "green" zone covering Sulaymaniyah Governorate and Halabja Governorate.[82][76][30] Each zone has its own branch of Peshmerga with their own governing institutions that do not coordinate with the other branch.[30][83]

Unification efforts

[edit]

As a result of the split nature of the Peshmerga forces, there is no central command center in charge of the entire force, and Peshmerga units instead follow separate military hierarchies depending on political allegiance.[84] Multiple unification and depoliticizing efforts of the Peshmerga have been made since 1992. Many deadlines have been missed,[30] reforms have been watered down,[76] and most of the Peshmerga are still under the influence and command of the KDP and the PUK.

Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs

[edit]
Main article: Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs

After gaining autonomy in 1991 the Kurdistan Region created its own proto-defence ministry: The Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA). The Ministry was established to professionalize, unify, and centralize command of the party-affiliated Peshmerga forces, but in its early years it lacked real authority, something that became evident during the Kurdish civil war. Following the end of the civil war the KDP and PUK agreed to the re-establishment of the unified Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, which was favoured by the overall KRG Unification Agreement, and formally took place in 2006. In January 2010, the MoPA created the first, to itself subordinate, integrated Peshmerga brigade, called a Regional Guard Brigade (RGB). Three more RGBs were formed in March of the same year. Mario Fumerton and Wladimir van Wilgenburg commented, "The KDP’s temporary alliance with Saddam Hussein to expel the PUK from Erbil in 1996 is still remembered as a grave betrayal; conversely, many KDP members recall being driven out of other territories by the PUK. In part for these reasons, each side keeps a portion of its own forces under direct party control as a final guarantee to maintain the balance of power."[85][86][87]

In 2016 and 2017, following the events of the Iraqi Civil War, the United States and several European nations pressured the PUK and KDP to set up more mixed brigades as a condition for aid and funding. The PUK and KDP united 12 to 14 brigades under the RGB, which were then placed under the command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.[76] The Netherlands, the US, the UK, and Germany form the Multi-National Advisory Group (MNAG) that supports the project to establish a "modern, effective, affordable, and accountable Peshmerga."[88] In addition, to support reform efforts, the United Kingdom appointed a Special Defence Adviser to the MoPA.[89]

In 2022, the KDP's 1st Support Force and the PUK's 2nd Support Force were integrated into the MoPA, a move described by Col. Todd Burroughs, deputy director of the US-led coalition's Military Advisor Group North, as a 'significant step in the Peshmerga reform process.'[88][90]

2022 Memorandum of understanding

[edit]

A major step towards unification was reached in 2022, when a four-year memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the US Department of Defense and Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs was signed, outlining conditions and timelines for integration into MoPA, effective until September 2026.[68][2]

By 2025, unification was in its final phase, with 10 additional brigades formed, two command regions planned, and salary payments digitialized via the 'MyAccount' system.[91][2] An Inspector General Report for Operation Inherent Resolve report noted progress in establishing four divisions, but highlighted delays in the development of Area Commands and persistent partisanship.[2] As of Q2 2025, 28 Regional Guard Brigades were unified, 4 divisions operational, biometric enrollment exceeded 85%, and a four-year budget was submitted for a 138,000-strong force. Salary digitization via 'MyAccount' was nearing completion.[2][92]

Future outlook

[edit]

In spite of all reforms, officers partially still continue to report to and take orders from their party leaders who also control the deployment of forces loyal to them and appoint front-line and sector commanders.[30] Critical reforms stalled include the full incorporation of Units 80 and 70, and additional division HQs, amid U.S. frustration over partisanship.[2][93] Peshmerga officials repeatedly affirm that full unification will be completed by 2026, if not sooner and U.S. officials stress that they will continue supporting unifying efforts.[94][95]

Combat Forces

[edit]

Both the KDP and the PUK Peshmerga rely heavily on irregulars in times of conflict to increase their ranks.[96] However, both maintain several professional military brigades. The Peshmerga forces are described as a secular force with a Muslim majority and smaller Assyrian, Chaldean Catholic, Yazidi, Shabak and Kaka'i units.[65][97][98][99][100] Though some units are composed of minorities, they are not segregated and serve in regular infantry divisions too.[101] In 2016 the MoPA intended to create a military division for the Arabs and Turkmen of Kirkuk Province, but financial difficulties halted the project.[102] Most minority units have been formed, when the Peshmerga took over the disputed territories in the War against the Islamic State.[103]

The following units are affiliated with or have been identified within the Peshmerga force:

Force Estimated size Command Description
MoPA-affiliated units
Regional Guard Brigades (RGB)[30][76][104] 73,000 (as of 2025, with 28 unified brigades)[2][105][106] Şoreş Îsmaîl MoPA's main force. Supposedly apolitical.[107]
1st Support Forces Command[108] 10,000 combined with the 2nd Support Forces.[90] Lt. Gen. Sihad Barzani Transferred to MoPA from KDP in 2022. Focuses on support roles, including artillery and officer training.
2nd Support Forces Command[108] 10,000 combined with the 1st Support Forces.[90] Maj. Gen. Mariwan Muhammed Amin Transferred to the MoPA from PUK in 2022. Focuses on support roles.
KDP-affiliated units
80 Unit[30][76][104] 50,000–60,000 Najat Ali Salih KDP. In process of integration into MoPA by 2026.[2][109]
Zeravani[30] 51,000–120,000 active personnel and 250,000 reservists[29][110] Masoud Barzani KDP's militarized police force.
Gulan Special Forces[111][112] 6,000 (2016)[113] Mansour Barzani Special forces commanded by Mansour Barzani.
Peshmerga Roj[104] 3,000–6,000 fighters Ibrahim Biro and Brig. Gen. Mohammed Rejeb Dehdo Military wing of the ENKS. Consists of Kurds from Syria. Located in the KRG, Pro-KDP and takes orders from Masoud Barzani.
Counter Terrorism Department (Kurdistan Region)[114] N/A N/A Counterterrorism unit part of the Kurdistan Region Security Council.
Barzan Forces[115][116][117] N/A N/A Brigade formation, consisting of men recruited from the Barzani clan. Its also known as Barzan Army.
Halo Special Forces[118] N/A Rawan Barzani N/A
Black Tiger Battalion[119] N/A Sirwan Barzani Formed to confront the Islamic State in 2014 under Sirwan Barzani, who carries the nickname 'Black Tiger'.
Presidential Guard (Kurdistan Region)[30] N/A Nechirvan Barzani Military unit tasked with protecting the President of Kurdistan Region.
PUK-affiliated units
70 Unit[30][76][104] 50,000–60,000 Sheikh Jaafar Sheikh Mustafa PUK. In process of integration into MoPA by 2026.[2][109]
Defense and Emergency Forces (DEF)[120][121] 32,000[121] N/A PUK's equivalent of KDP's Zeravani. They are also known as Black Forces.
CTG Special Forces[30] 5,000[122] Wehab Helebcî One of the most elite Special Forces unit in Iraq.
Hezekani Kosrat Rasul[30] 2,000–3,000 Kosrat Rasul Ali Kosrat Rasul Ali's personal protection brigade, one of the last remaining units to defend during the Kirkuk crisis.[123]
Kurdistan Commando Forces[124] 500–10,000 Diyar Omar Well-equipped Special Operations Commando unit.[125]
Golden Force[126][127] N/A Barham Sheikh Mohammed Sub-unit of the Kurdistan Commando Forces.
Presidential Peshmerga Brigade[30] N/A Hero Ibrahim Ahmed

(Jalal Talabani formerly)

A unit which was stationed in Baghdad during the presidency of Jalal Talabani.[66]
Minority units
Êzîdxan Protection Force or "Yazidi Peshmerga"[128] 7,000[129]–8,000[130]–10,000[104] Haydar Shesho and Qasim Shesho Pro-KDP. Yazidi Democratic Party. Incorporated into MoPA.[131]
Jazeera Brigade[103][104] 2,000 Brig. Gen. Bolond Hussayn Brigade of Ethnic-Arabs from Zummar and Rabia. Affiliated with the MoPA. Formed by the KDP.
Battalion of the Assyrian Democratic Movement[132][133] ~ 360 (1993), ~ 2,000 (2014) William Ishaya (formerly) Neutral between the KDP and PUK. Affiliated with the MoPA. Military wing of the Assyrian Democratic Movement.
Nineveh Plain Guard Forces (NPGF) or "Christian Peshmerga"[104][134][135] 1,500–2,500 Sarkis Aghajan Mamendo (unconfirmed) Pro-KDP. Affiliated with the MoPA. Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council.
Shabak Battalion[100] ~ 1,000 Col. Mahmood Shabak Battalion made up of the Shabak minority.
Kaka'i Battalion[136][137] ~ 680 (August 2015) Nezar and Adel Kakai Battalion made up of the Kaka'i religious minority. Affiliated with the MoPA.
Tiger Guards[138][139] ~ 600 (March 2015) N/A Christian brigade under the authority of the KRG.[138]
Nineveh Plains Force (NPF)[104][135] ~ 500 (July 2015) Romeo Hakari Pro-KDP. Affiliated with the MoPA. Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party.
Dwekh Nawsha[104][133] ~ 100–250 Lt. Col. Odisho Pro-KDP. Military wing of the Assyrian Patriotic Party. Not as clearly acting as official sub-units of Kurdish forces as the NPGF or NPF.
Asayish (security force)
KDP Asayish Unknown Barzan Qassab KDP. Affiliated with the Ministry of Interior.
PUK Asayish Unknown N/A PUK. Affiliated with the Ministry of Interior.
PUK Asayish SWAT units Unknown N/A PUK.
Others
KDPS Peshmerga[140] 3,000 N/A Peshmerga force of the Kurdistan Social Democratic Party.

Specialized Units

[edit]

The Peshmerga Media Cell is one of the specialized units of the MoPA. Established in January 2022, it was created to professionalize the force's information and media operations. The unit acts as the official channel for statements on Peshmerga activities, with responsibilities that include safeguarding operational security, protecting journalists reporting from conflict zones, and ensuring the dissemination of accurate information to local and international audiences.[141] It has also received support from international coalition advisers in developing media and information management practices.[142]

2025 Order of Battle (MoPA)

[edit]

Units reporting to the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs:

It is planned that by the end of 2026, the Regional Guard Brigades will make up 11 Peshmerga divisions in total.[143][168]

Peshmerga in the Iraqi Army

[edit]

Due to limited funding and the vast size of the Peshmerga forces, the KRG planned to downsize its forces from large numbers of low-quality forces to a smaller but much more effective and well-trained force.[169] Consequently, in 2009, the KRG and Baghdad engaged in discussions about incorporating parts of the Peshmerga forces into the Iraqi Army in what would be the 15th and 16th Iraqi Army divisions.[170][171] However, after increasing tension between Erbil and Baghdad regarding the disputed areas, the transfer was largely put on hold. Some Peshmerga were already transferred but reportedly deserted again, and there are allegations that former Peshmerga forces remained loyal to the KRG rather than their Iraqi chain of command; regardless, thousands of members of the 80 Unit of KDP and the 70 Unit of PUK are based in Baghdad and cooperate well with other Iraqi forces.[172][173][174]

The Presidential Peshmerga Brigade of the PUK was stationed in Baghdad and paid by the Iraqi government during the presidency of Jalal Talabani.[66]

Ranks

[edit]
Main article: Military ranks of the Peshmerga

The Peshmerga, despite wearing a variety of uniform types, consistently maintain proper standards of dress. This includes the correct display of rank insignia for both enlisted personnel and commissioned officers, as well as the proper wear of headgear. In addition, they have designated ceremonial and duty uniforms that project a highly professional appearance.[175]

Officers can be promoted by the President of the Kurdistan Region for outstanding military and civil achievements.[176]

Inventory and capabilities

[edit]
Main article: List of equipment of the Peshmerga


Peshmerga forces largely rely on old arms captured from battles. The Peshmerga captured large stockpiles of weapons during the 1991 Iraqi uprisings.[177] Several stockpiles of weapons were captured from the old Iraqi Army during the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, in which Peshmerga forces were active. Following the retreat of the new Iraqi Army during the June 2014 Islamic State offensive, Peshmerga forces reportedly again managed to get hold of weapons left behind by the Iraqis.[178] Since August 2014, Peshmerga forces have also captured weapons from the Islamic State.[179]

Peshmerga soldiers stand in formation during the Modern Brigade Course graduation ceremony.

The Peshmerga arsenal is limited and confined by restrictions because the Kurdish Region has to purchase arms through the Iraqi government. Due to disputes between the KRG and the Iraqi government, arms flows from Baghdad to Kurdistan Region have been almost nonexistent, as Baghdad fears Kurdish aspirations for independence.[180][181][76] After the Islamic State offensive of August 2014, multiple governments armed the Peshmerga with light arms, night-vision devices, and ammunition.[182][183] However, Kurdish officials and Peshmerga stressed that they were not receiving enough and Baghdad was blocking arms from reaching the KRG, emphasizing the need for weapons to be sent directly and not through Baghdad.[184][185] Despite this, the United States has maintained that the government of Iraq is responsible for the security of Iraqi Kurdistan and that Baghdad must approve all military aid.[76] As of 2025, continued CTEF support provided vehicles, heavy equipment, small arms, ammunition, and non-lethal aid, with proposals for air defenses in the 2024 NDAA.[2][186]

The Peshmerga lack a proper medical corps and communication units.[76] This became apparent during the Islamic State offensive in 2014 where the Peshmerga found itself lacking ambulances and frontline field hospitals, forcing wounded fighters to walk back to safety.[76] There is also a lack of communication tools, as Peshmerga commanders are forced to use civilian cellphones to communicate with each other.[76] Under the guidance of the US-led coalition the Peshmerga started to standardize it's weapons systems, replacing Soviet-era weapons with NATO firearms.[76] In 2015, for the first time, Peshmerga soldiers received urban warfare and military intelligence training from foreign trainers of the CJTF–OIR.[187] Some Peshmerga of the MoPA have also been trained by American private military contractors like DynCorp.[188] By 2025, advancements included the Peshmerga Medical Force Readiness Initiative to address field hospital shortages.[189]

Issues

[edit]

Peshmerga has been accused of corruption, partisanship, nepotism and fraud.[190][191][192][193] The Peshmerga was accused of listing "ghost employees" who do not exist or do not show up for work, but receive salaries. Those setting up the scam split the salary with these employees.[76]

In addition the KDP and PUK have used the Peshmerga to exert a monopoly on the use of force within their zones.[76] In 2011 KDP Peshmerga fired on anti-government protesters in Sulaymaniyah, and the PUK later used its own security forces to break up these protests,[30] leading to criticism from all of the opposition parties in the Kurdistan Region Parliament. In 2014 the KDP used its Peshmerga forces to stop delegates from the Gorran Movement to enter Erbil and attend parliament.[76]

Outside of Kurdistan Region the Peshmerga has been criticized for using force to exert control of local Arab, Yazidi and Assyrian communities, particularly during the Iraqi Civil War.[194]

concerns about persistent partisanship remain.[2] In 2025, U.S. reports expressed frustration over stalled unification due to party lines, despite commitments.[93]

Role of women

[edit]
Main article: Kurdish women

Historic involvement

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People's Defense Units' (YPG) woman volunteer with Peshmerga soldier

Women have played a significant role in the Peshmerga since its foundation, compared to other Middle Eastern militaries. The Kurdish Zand tribe was known for allowing women in military roles.[29] During the Iraqi–Kurdish conflict the majority of women served within the Peshmerga in supporting roles such as building camps, taking care of the wounded, and carrying munitions and messages.[96] Several women brigades served on the front lines. The PUK started recruiting women during the Kurdish Civil War. Women were given a 45-day basic training, which included parade drills and basic marksmanship training with various rifles, mortars, and RPGs.[29]

Modern era

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In the months leading up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the United States launched Operation Viking Hammer which dealt a huge blow to Islamic terrorist groups in Iraqi Kurdistan and uncovered a chemical weapons facility.[195][196][197][198][199] The PUK later confirmed that female Kurdish fighters had participated in the operation.[96]

Female Peshmerga soldiers training with G36's

In 2014 the Peshmerga had at least 600 women in their ranks.[200] The number of women increased significantly during the war against ISIS due to a shortage of manpower and the desire for revenge.[200] The Peshmerga have one entirely female brigade.[201] In the KDP, these Peshmerga women have been refused access to the frontline and are mostly used in logistics and management positions,[202] while PUK Peshmerga women are deployed on the front lines and are actively engaging in combat.[203][204][29] Women are paid the same as men.[200]

Famous female fighters

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Margaret George Malik was an iconic Assyrian guerilla fighter who was given a leading position in important battles such as the Battle of Zawita Valley.[205][206][207] She was nicknamed "Joan of Arc of Kurdistan" for the courage she displayed in combat. In 1995 Colonel Nahida Rashid created the first women's Peshmerga unit. Other well known female Peshmergas are Hero Ibrahim Ahmad, Amineh Kakabaveh, Pakhshan Zangana, and Kafiya Suleiman.[208]

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  • Peshmerga Special Forces gathered near the Syrian border in 2014
    Peshmerga Special Forces gathered near the Syrian border in 2014
  • Peshmerga soldiers in ceremonial gear
    Peshmerga soldiers in ceremonial gear
  • Peshmerga Parade
    Peshmerga Parade
  • Peshmerga meet Anti-IS Coalition advisors
    Peshmerga meet Anti-IS Coalition advisors

References

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Further reading

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Peshmerga

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The Peshmerga are the official military forces of the (KRG), tasked with defending the borders, sovereignty, and internal stability of the autonomous in northern . The term "Peshmerga," derived from Kurdish words meaning "those who face ," underscores their origins as resilient guerrilla fighters who have confronted existential threats from successive Iraqi regimes since the mid-20th century. Formally under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, these forces embody a national institution symbolizing heroism and sacrifice, though in practice they have long been fragmented by affiliations to major Kurdish parties such as the (KDP) and the (PUK). Since the 2014 ISIS offensive, the Peshmerga have been instrumental in reclaiming vast territories in northern Iraq from the terrorist group, suffering approximately 12,000 fatalities in the process and earning recognition as a vital partner in the international coalition's campaign. This role highlighted their effectiveness in defensive operations but also exposed vulnerabilities, including initial setbacks against ISIS advances and the challenges of partisan command structures that complicated coordinated responses. Ongoing U.S.-funded reforms aim to unify brigades, digitize payments, and depoliticize the force, with nearly 95% of unified units receiving allowances digitally by mid-2025, fostering a more professional and national-oriented military. Despite these advances, persistent internal divisions and incomplete integration efforts remain defining characteristics, potentially undermining long-term cohesion amid regional tensions with and neighboring states.

Etymology

Linguistic and Cultural Origins

The term Peshmerga originates from the Kurdish language, specifically composed of the elements pêş (meaning "front" or "before") and merg or merga (meaning ""), yielding a of "those who face " or "one who stands before ". Kurdish belongs to the Northwestern Iranian branch of the Indo-Iranian language family, with the term appearing in both and Sorani dialects spoken by in regions spanning modern-day , , , and . The earliest documented English usage of Peshmerga dates to 1963, though the word predates this in Kurdish oral and traditions, reflecting a cultural of warriors embodying against existential threats. Its formal adoption as a designation for organized Kurdish fighters emerged in the mid-20th century, amid revolts against centralizing states, with some accounts attributing initial usage to during the short-lived in 1946, where it connoted guerrilla forces confronting superior odds. The term's etymological roots evoke ancient Indo-Iranian motifs of heroic defiance, akin to Persian concepts of martyrdom in battle (), but adapted to Kurdish tribal and communal resilience against imperial domination. Culturally, Peshmerga encapsulates the Kurdish ethos of berxwedan (resistance), where individual valor serves survival in a historically fragmented homeland lacking sovereign recognition. This linguistic construct underscores a pragmatic : fighters not as seekers of death, but as interposers against it for kin and , distinguishing it from suicidal ideologies by emphasizing strategic . In Kurdish folklore and epics, such as those drawing from medieval resistances against , Seljuk, and Ottoman incursions, precursors to the term highlight nomadic horsemen (siyç) who prioritized defense over personal preservation, embedding Peshmerga in a continuum of tactics honed over centuries. The word's evolution from descriptive to synonymous with Kurdish national defense illustrates its role in forging identity amid and , often invoked in poetry and anthems to rally against assimilationist policies.

Historical Development

Early Formations and Revolts (1920s-1960s)

The earliest organized Kurdish armed resistance in emerged in the aftermath of , as tribal militias challenged British mandate authorities seeking to incorporate Kurdish regions into the new Iraqi state. In May 1919, Shaykh , a Sufi leader, initiated a revolt from , proclaiming himself ruler of and mobilizing around 500 fighters, including a young ; British forces, employing aircraft for suppression, defeated the uprising by June 1919, leading to Barzanji's temporary exile. Barzanji returned in 1922, sparking further revolts that controlled parts of southern until British aerial bombardments and ground operations quelled the resistance, prompting a short-lived recognition of limited Kurdish autonomy in 1923 before full integration into . A subsequent wave of unrest occurred in 1931–1932, led by Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, Mustafa's brother, who unified several tribes in protest against Iraq's impending and membership without provisions for Kurdish self-rule. The rebels achieved initial successes, including a battle where Barzani forces inflicted 13 deaths and 34 wounds on Iraqi troops, but Iraqi army advances supported by British air bombings inflicted heavy casualties on the , numbering in the hundreds, and forced the revolt's collapse by mid-1932. The term "Peshmerga," denoting "those who face death," gained formal usage among Kurdish fighters during the mid-1940s, though organized formations trace to 1943 when , returning from exile, assembled an initial force of 750 tribal warriors in the Barzan region to raid stations and frontier posts amid economic grievances and demands for . Under Barzani's command, the group expanded to nearly 2,000 by late 1943, structured into combat units with appointed leaders like Muhammad Amin Mirkhan and enforced discipline codes; victories in battles such as Gora Tu and Mazna (1943–1944) secured the release of Sheikh Ahmed Barzani in 1944 and bolstered calls for regional , but intensified Iraqi offensives compelled a retreat into by October 1945. Following these events, Barzani established the (KDP) in 1946 to coordinate political and military efforts for Kurdish rights within . After years in Soviet exile until 1958, Barzani's forces initially cooperated with 's new republican government under , aiding in suppressing anti-regime uprisings like those in (1959) and Sidakan (1959). Tensions escalated over unfulfilled autonomy promises, culminating in the KDP's declaration of revolt on September 10, 1961, which ignited the September Revolution—a sustained guerrilla campaign where Peshmerga seized strategic mountain passes and disrupted Iraqi supply lines. By 1962, Peshmerga strength had grown to 15,000–20,000 organized into units like dasta (squads) and pal (companies), unifying tribes against Iraqi air strikes on areas like Barzan, though the conflict persisted without decisive resolution into the late 1960s.

Mahabad Republic and Immediate Aftermath (1946-1970s)

The Republic of Mahabad, proclaimed on January 22, 1946, in northwestern Iran under Soviet influence, marked an early institutionalization of Peshmerga forces as the official military of a Kurdish proto-state. Mustafa Barzani, leader of Kurdish fighters from Iraq's Barzani tribe, arrived in Mahabad with several thousand armed men in late 1945 and was appointed Minister of Defense, commanding the Peshmerga units that defended the republic against potential threats. These forces, numbering around 3,000-5,000 irregular fighters at peak, relied on tribal levies and Soviet-supplied arms to maintain order and deter Iranian incursions, though they engaged in limited skirmishes rather than full-scale war until the republic's end. The collapsed on , 1946, after Soviet withdrawal allowed Iranian troops to advance; Barzani's Peshmerga resisted fiercely in battles around , inflicting casualties but ultimately withdrawing to avoid encirclement. Barzani led approximately 500-1,000 Peshmerga fighters on a grueling 53-day exodus starting May 18, 1947, crossing into Soviet to evade Iranian pursuit, preserving a core of experienced guerrilla cadres. This retreat, involving heavy losses from combat and hardship, shifted Peshmerga operations from state defense to survival and exile-based reorganization, with Barzani establishing training camps in the USSR where fighters honed tactics for future insurgencies. Barzani's Peshmerga remnants remained in Soviet exile until 1958, when he returned to following the overthrow of the , initially cooperating with the new republican government under Abd al-Karim Qasim. Tensions escalated over Kurdish demands for , culminating in the September Revolution on September 11, 1961, when Barzani proclaimed an uprising from bases in , mobilizing Peshmerga forces estimated at 15,000-20,000 by mid-decade. These guerrillas, operating in mountainous terrain, employed to seize control of rural areas, capturing towns like and Rawanduz by 1962 and forcing Iraqi army withdrawals through ambushes that inflicted disproportionate casualties despite inferior conventional weaponry. The First Iraqi-Kurdish War (1961-1970) saw Peshmerga evolve into a more structured insurgency, bolstered by external aid including arms from and , enabling sustained control over 80% of Kurdistan's territory by 1965. Iraqi counteroffensives, involving chemical weapons and scorched-earth policies, displaced tens of thousands but failed to dislodge core Peshmerga strongholds, as fighters adapted with fortified positions and supply lines. The conflict ended with the March 11, 1970, autonomy agreement, negotiated between Barzani and , which recognized Kurdish rights to self-rule in specified areas and integrated select Peshmerga units into Iraq's national guard, though implementation faltered amid mutual distrust. This pact temporarily legitimized Peshmerga as a political-military entity, numbering around 50,000 by 1970, but sowed seeds for renewed fighting after Baghdad's 1974 abrogation.

Ba'athist Oppression and Anfal Genocide (1970s-1991)

Following the 1970 Iraqi-Kurdish Autonomy Agreement, which promised Kurds regional self-governance, official recognition of the Kurdish language, and representation in national institutions, implementation disputes arose as Baghdad unilaterally drafted an autonomy statute in March 1974 that excluded key oil-rich areas like Kirkuk from Kurdish control. This triggered the Second Iraqi-Kurdish War (1974-1975), during which Peshmerga forces under the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) mounted guerrilla offensives against Iraqi army positions in northern Iraq, capturing territory and disrupting government supply lines with support from Iran and covert U.S. aid. The conflict ended in March 1975 after the Algiers Accord between Iraq and Iran, which halted Tehran's backing of the Kurds, leading to a Peshmerga collapse; thousands of fighters surrendered or fled, and over 200,000 Kurds were forcibly relocated to southern Iraq as part of early Arabization policies. The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) revived Peshmerga activity, as Kurdish fighters, numbering around 50,000-100,000 across KDP and PUK factions, exploited Iraq's preoccupation to launch cross-border raids into , coordinating with Iranian forces to seize towns and sabotage oil infrastructure. Iraqi retaliation escalated with scorched-earth tactics, including the destruction of over 4,000 Kurdish villages by 1983 and widespread use of chemical weapons against Peshmerga positions starting in 1983, such as attacks on Barzani tribesmen. These measures aimed to dismantle Kurdish resistance bases, displacing populations and integrating areas via settlement of Arab families, but Peshmerga persisted in hit-and-run operations, controlling significant rural swathes by 1987. The Anfal campaign (February-September 1988), orchestrated by Ali Hassan al-Majid under Saddam Hussein's regime, represented the apex of Ba'athist anti-Kurdish operations, targeting Peshmerga-held areas in the Garmian and Badinan regions through phased military sweeps involving artillery barrages, chemical bombardments, and mass executions. In the first phase, Iraqi forces sealed off valleys, herded civilians into complexes for "registration," and executed non-combatants, killing an estimated 50,000-100,000 Kurds overall, with Peshmerga units suffering heavy losses while attempting to shield evacuations. The Halabja attack on March 16, 1988, following a joint Peshmerga-Iranian capture of the city, deployed a cocktail of mustard gas, sarin, and tabun, killing 3,200-5,000 civilians and wounding 7,000-10,000, decimating local resistance capabilities. Subsequent phases razed 2,000 villages and deported survivors, effectively depopulating Peshmerga strongholds; al-Majid's directives explicitly authorized village destruction and chemical use against "saboteurs." By 1989-1991, surviving Peshmerga regrouped in remote mountains, sustaining low-level amid ongoing chemical strikes and executions, which claimed up to 182,000 Kurdish lives in total during Anfal. Iraqi courts later convicted and al-Majid of genocide for these acts in 2006-2007 trials, based on evidence of systematic intent to eradicate Kurdish rural and resistance networks. Peshmerga resilience, though battered, laid groundwork for the 1991 post-Gulf War uprising, where fighters briefly overran Iraqi garrisons before regime counteroffensives.

Gulf Wars, Safe Haven, and Autonomy (1991-2003)

Following the conclusion of the on February 28, 1991, Kurdish forces, including Peshmerga units affiliated with the (KDP) and (PUK), participated in a widespread uprising against the Iraqi regime starting in mid-March. Encouraged by U.S. President George H.W. Bush's calls for Saddam Hussein's removal but lacking direct coalition support, the Peshmerga briefly captured major cities such as on March 19 and . Iraqi counteroffensives, however, rapidly reversed these gains, ousting Peshmerga from by March 29 and forcing a retreat from and Dohuk by early April, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands and the flight of over 1.5 million toward the Turkish and Iranian borders. In response to the humanitarian crisis, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991, condemning Iraq's repression of civilians, including , and demanding access for international relief efforts to affected populations. This paved the way for , a U.S.-led multinational effort launched on , involving forces from 13 countries, which established secure relief corridors and a safe haven in northern north of the 36th parallel. Ground troops, peaking at over 20,000, secured areas around and later withdrew to by July 15, while air enforcement of a prevented Iraqi incursions, enabling displaced to return and Peshmerga forces to reconsolidate control over approximately 80% of by late 1991. succeeded Provide Comfort in January 1997, maintaining aerial patrols until 2003. The safe haven facilitated de facto Kurdish autonomy, shielding the region from Baghdad's direct control and allowing the Peshmerga to function as the primary security force against sporadic Iraqi incursions. In May 1992, parliamentary elections established the Regional Government (KRG), with Peshmerga units under KDP leader and PUK leader securing territorial divisions. Autonomy endured amid economic challenges, including reliance on smuggling and limited oil revenues, but was undermined by intra-Kurdish conflict. Tensions between KDP and PUK Peshmerga escalated into from 1994 to 1998, triggered by disputes over revenue from the Turkish border crossing at Ibrahim Khalil and political dominance, leading to battles that killed over 2,000 and divided into KDP-controlled west and PUK-controlled east. Peshmerga forces, estimated at 70,000-120,000 total, clashed repeatedly, with external involvement including Iranian support for PUK and alleged Iraqi aid to KDP. U.S.-mediated on September 17, 1998, restored a fragile power-sharing arrangement, though partisan Peshmerga structures persisted until after 2003.

Post-2003 Reintegration and Rise of ISIS (2003-2014)

Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Peshmerga forces collaborated with coalition troops, securing northern cities such as on April 10, 2003, after Iraqi units fled, with U.S. providing air support and coordination. This cooperation extended to operations in disputed territories, where Peshmerga units filled security vacuums left by the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, including advances into areas like and Diyala province. Although initial U.S. plans envisioned partial reintegration of Peshmerga into the new Iraqi , the forces largely retained autonomy under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), functioning as the region's official military per the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which recognized Kurdish and regional security responsibilities. Peshmerga numbers, estimated at 100,000–120,000 in 2003, expanded amid unification efforts between the (KDP) and (PUK) factions, driven by post-invasion imperatives to consolidate under a single command. The 2006 KDP-PUK Unification Agreement renewed commitments to merge party-affiliated units, leading to the formalization of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs in 2007 and the creation of Regional Guards Brigades in 2009–2010 as non-partisan formations. By 2014, total strength approached 150,000–200,000, with approximately 40,000 under the ministry's 14 brigades and the remainder tied to KDP (80 Units) or PUK (70 Units) structures, reflecting incomplete integration amid partisan divisions. Tensions with Baghdad escalated over disputed territories, exemplified by the 2008 Khanaqin crisis in Diyala province, where the Iraqi Army's 1st Division deployed to replace Peshmerga garrisons, prompting a standoff resolved only through U.S. mediation without gunfire but highlighting unresolved Article 140 implementation on Kirkuk and other areas. Peshmerga maintained forward positions in these zones, cooperating sporadically with Iraqi forces against Sunni insurgents like Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in border regions such as Diyala, where joint operations quelled militant activity in the mid-2000s. However, limited combat experience since 1991 and reliance on static defense left Peshmerga underprepared for AQI's evolution into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by 2013–2014. As consolidated in western and exploited Sunni grievances, Peshmerga secured the KRG's borders but faced initial probes in early , with Iraqi Army collapses in June—such as Mosul's fall on June 10—prompting Peshmerga advances into to prevent chaos, inadvertently extending frontlines. These moves strained resources, as Peshmerga prioritized territorial defense over offensive capabilities, setting the stage for offensives in July–August targeting and Makhmour. Despite U.S. arms flows via the KRG, equipment shortages and partisan command fractures hampered readiness against 's conventional tactics.

War Against ISIS and Territorial Gains (2014-2017)

In June 2014, following the rapid collapse of in on June 10, Peshmerga units advanced into the disputed province, assuming control of the city and its oil fields as Iraqi troops fled the offensive. This move secured approximately 350,000 barrels per day of oil production under Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) administration and expanded Peshmerga presence into multi-ethnic areas long contested between and . By mid-August 2014, however, forces overran Peshmerga positions in Zumar, , and Makhmour, displacing thousands of and prompting a tactical retreat due to insufficient heavy weaponry and ammunition shortages. The initiated airstrikes against on August 8, 2014, targeting positions near and providing immediate relief to Peshmerga lines, followed by the deployment of advisors and delivery of arms including AT-4 anti-tank weapons and ammunition. In October 2014, coalition-backed Peshmerga offensives recaptured Rabia and parts of the corridor, severing a key supply route from to . These operations, supported by over 2,000 coalition airstrikes in Kurdish-controlled sectors by mid-2015, enabled Peshmerga forces—numbering around 150,000-200,000 personnel—to stabilize fronts in and Diyala provinces. A pivotal victory occurred on , 2015, when approximately 7,500 Peshmerga troops, coordinated with U.S. and airstrikes, liberated town from after two days of intense fighting, rescuing remaining Yazidi holdouts and destroying ISIS fortifications. This battle, involving KDP-aligned Peshmerga units, resulted in hundreds of ISIS casualties and secured the district, though post-liberation control disputes with PKK-linked YPG forces highlighted intra-Kurdish rivalries. By 2016, Peshmerga secured eastern flanks during the coalition's offensive, capturing and holding Gwer, thereby gaining de facto administration over additional disputed territories encompassing roughly 40% expansion beyond pre-2014 KRG borders. These gains, while militarily driven by Peshmerga resilience and coalition enablement, incorporated oil-rich and strategically vital areas like the fields and , bolstering KRG economic leverage but fueling tensions with over constitutional claims. Peshmerga casualties exceeded 10,000 by 2017, reflecting heavy frontline engagement, though internal divisions between KDP and PUK brigades occasionally hampered unified command. The period marked Peshmerga's transformation into a coalition-aligned force, receiving over $250 million in U.S. aid for training and equipment modernization by 2017.

Independence Referendum, Territorial Losses, and Recovery (2017-2022)

On September 25, 2017, the held an in the and the disputed territories, including , which Peshmerga forces had secured in 2014 amid the Iraqi army's retreat from advances. Approximately 92.73% of voters supported independence, with turnout around 72% of eligible voters in the region. Peshmerga units, expanded during the anti- campaign, maintained control over these areas, providing the territorial leverage that enabled the vote's inclusion of disputed zones beyond the KRG's constitutional borders. The Iraqi central government, under Prime Minister , rejected the referendum's legitimacy and demanded Peshmerga withdrawal from disputed areas to pre-2014 lines by October 15, 2017, imposing economic sanctions including flight bans and budget cuts. On October 16, Iraqi federal forces, supported by Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), launched offensives, rapidly advancing into after Peshmerga factions—particularly those affiliated with the (PUK)—withdrew without significant resistance, citing orders from PUK leadership influenced by Iranian pressures and internal KDP-PUK divisions. Clashes were limited, with estimates of dozens of Peshmerga casualties, but the lack of unified command and preparation for against a reorganized Iraqi led to the swift loss of key sites like 's oil fields and military bases. By late October 2017, Peshmerga relinquished approximately 40% of the territories gained since 2014, including parts of , , and Diyala provinces, severing access to Kirkuk's oil revenues that had bolstered KRG finances. The retreat exposed vulnerabilities in Peshmerga cohesion, as party-loyal units prioritized political alignments over joint defense, exacerbating economic fallout from lost exports and Baghdad's . Iranian-backed militias played a role in facilitating Iraqi advances, particularly in PUK-controlled areas, highlighting external influences on Kurdish fractures. In response, the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA) accelerated unification reforms from 2018, aiming to consolidate around 200,000 fighters into a professional force under centralized command, reducing partisan brigades through a 31-point plan that included salary standardization, brigade restructuring, and of excess personnel. U.S. support via a 2017 (renewed in subsequent years) provided training, equipment stipends (phased out by 2026), and assistance for counter-ISIS operations, enabling Peshmerga to conduct stabilization missions in border areas while partisan units handled most remnant threats. By 2022, reforms achieved partial brigade integration and downsizing, though KDP-PUK rivalries slowed full unification, with MoPA forces focusing on defensive postures amid ongoing Baghdad-Erbil tensions over oil and budgets. Peshmerga recovery emphasized institutionalization, with international partners like the U.S. and allies prioritizing anti- residual threats in disputed zones, where Peshmerga patrolled alongside Iraqi forces under fragile truces. Economic constraints from territorial losses prompted efficiency drives, including equipment modernization from U.S. and European donors, but persistent party control over units limited operational autonomy. Despite setbacks, Peshmerga maintained deterrence against resurgence, contributing to Iraq's overall stabilization by 2022, though vulnerabilities to internal divisions remained evident in stalled territorial negotiations.

Ongoing Reforms and Stabilization (2023-2025)

In 2023, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) advanced Peshmerga unification by consolidating 28 brigades under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA), with oversight from Coalition Forces, aiming for completion within two years. This process involved biometric registration to reduce duplicate payrolls and patronage networks tied to the and , though political divisions persisted as barriers. By mid-2023, reforms emphasized professionalization, including unified command structures and logistics simplification, to enhance operational efficiency amid Iraq's fragile security environment. Efforts intensified in 2024-2025, with KDP and PUK agreeing in January 2025 to merge Units 70 and 80 under the Davar Command by March, marking a step toward a national army framework. By September 2025, seven divisions had been formed from brigade consolidations, with four more planned, nearing the final unification stage under a US-backed initiative that shifted focus to division-level command for better control. chaired a September 15, 2025, meeting to accelerate MoPA reforms, approving restructuring aligned with broader priorities, including establishment of two command regions by year's end to support a unified force. International partners bolstered these reforms through training and funding; the reaffirmed commitment on September 18, 2025, via a 2022 security assistance agreement, with the 2025 budget allocating $57.8 million for Peshmerga equipment and training, rising slightly for 2026. Joint drills for merging units commenced in July 2025, while Forces provided advisory support, though US officials expressed frustration in August 2025 over delays attributed to partisan resistance. Full unification is targeted for 2026, contingent on sustained political will, to stabilize the region against threats like Turkish incursions and Iranian-backed militias. Stabilization efforts included salary regularization and infrastructure builds, with MoPA achieving key reforms in unifying KDP- and PUK-affiliated forces despite Baghdad's inconsistent funding. Coordination with improved via joint operations, but Peshmerga retained autonomy under the Iraqi Constitution, focusing internally on counter-terrorism readiness post-ISIS. These measures aim to forge a cohesive force capable of defending amid ongoing geopolitical pressures.

Organizational Structure

Political Party Affiliations and Divisions

The Peshmerga forces maintain strong affiliations with the two primary political parties in Iraq's : the (KDP) and the [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan](/page/Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) (PUK). The KDP controls the 80 Units (also referred to as Unit 80), comprising approximately 50,000 fighters loyal primarily to party leadership rather than the regional government. Similarly, the PUK oversees the 70 Units (Unit 70), with a comparable force of around 50,000 personnel whose allegiance prioritizes partisan structures over centralized command. These party-affiliated contingents constitute the majority of Peshmerga strength, exceeding the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs' (MOPA) unified brigades by a factor of roughly three to one. This partisan alignment fosters operational divisions, manifesting in geographically delineated security zones: the KDP-dominated "Yellow Zone" in the west and north, and the PUK-led "" in the south and east. Such fragmentation undermines unified command, as forces respond to party directives during conflicts, evident in historical intra-Kurdish clashes like those in the and coordination issues against from 2014 onward. Party loyalties, rooted in decades of and patronage networks, perpetuate nepotism and resistance to subordination under MOPA, with older generations exhibiting particularly entrenched partisan ties. Reform initiatives since 2017 have sought to dismantle these divisions by integrating Units 70 and 80 into MOPA's structure, including partial transfers of PUK forces into the ministry's Second and Fourth Divisions by early 2025. Plans announced in January 2025 envision restructuring into two regional commands—Region One and Region Two—each with five divisions, aiming for completion before 2026, though KDP-PUK rivalries have delayed full unification, leaving significant partisan contingents intact as of September 2025. These efforts, driven by figures like KDP leader , emphasize transcending party influences for a national force, yet persistent political incentives and allegations continue to hinder progress.

Unification Efforts and Agreements

Efforts to unify the Peshmerga, traditionally divided along lines of allegiance to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), date back to the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 1992, with formal unification under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA) proposed as a core objective. These divisions stemmed from the 1990s Kurdish civil war, which fragmented command structures into partisan militias, complicating centralized control despite shared Kurdish national goals. The 1998 Washington Agreement, brokered by the , ended active hostilities between the KDP and PUK, laying groundwork for cooperation but leaving Peshmerga forces under separate party commands. This was followed by the 2006 Unification Agreement, signed by KDP leader and PUK leader , which committed both parties to integrating their forces into a unified structure, including the creation of the MoPA as a proto-defense ministry to oversee non-partisan brigades. However, implementation stalled due to entrenched partisan loyalties, with KDP and PUK maintaining parallel commands for Units 70 (PUK-aligned) and 80 (KDP-aligned), respectively. Post-2017 reforms accelerated after territorial losses to Iraqi forces, emphasizing depoliticization and integration under MoPA. In 2023, the KRG entered a 35-point agreement with international partners, including the U.S.-led , to professionalize the force through brigade restructuring, equipment inventories, and unification of partisan units into Regional Guard Brigades. A September 2022 U.S.-KRG security agreement further outlined military assistance for unification, focusing on institutional gaps and between KDP and PUK forces. By 2025, unification progressed to near-final stages, with seven divisions formed and four more planned, alongside the integration of Units 70 and 80 expected by March, aiming for completion by September 2026. U.S. delegations reaffirmed support in September 2025 meetings, highlighting ongoing funding, training, and coordination to overcome political hurdles. Despite advances, challenges persist from partisan resistance and budgetary disputes with , which have delayed salary payments and full MoPA authority.

Ministry Oversight and Command Hierarchy

The Peshmerga forces fall under the formal oversight of the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA), which was established to administer personnel, logistics, procurement, and modernization efforts for the approximately 125,000-strong force. The ministry operates from and is led by a minister and , supported by a secretary general and specialized directorates for contracts, armament, volunteers, and finance, handling administrative and budgetary functions. However, operational command remains partially decentralized due to historical divisions between the (KDP) and (PUK), with many units retaining party loyalties despite legal mandates for unity under the KRG presidency. According to the KRG's 1992 constitution, the President of serves as the supreme of the Peshmerga, with authority over strategic decisions and deployments, though day-to-day oversight is delegated to MoPA. Reforms initiated post-2017 have aimed to centralize this hierarchy, including the creation of unified brigades like the Regional Guard Brigades, which report directly to MoPA rather than party militias. As of December 2024, MoPA announced plans for two operational command centers—divided into geographic "Davar" areas—overseeing 11 military divisions to streamline the chain of command and reduce partisan fragmentation. By September 2025, unification efforts had progressed to form seven divisions under this structure, with four more in development, supported by U.S. assistance emphasizing a single professional command to enhance efficiency and . Despite these advances, challenges persist, including political resistance from KDP and PUK factions that maintain parallel command chains for non-integrated units, leading to duplicated efforts and uneven resource allocation. The Peshmerga Executive Steering Committee, co-chaired with the U.S. Department of Defense, continues to monitor milestones for full institutionalization, including standardized reporting lines from to ministry level.

Integration with Iraqi Security Forces

The Peshmerga, as the military forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), hold a distinct status under Article 121(5) of the Iraqi Constitution, which assigns regional governments responsibility for while recognizing Peshmerga as a legitimate component of Iraq's overall defense framework. This provision formalized their role post-2003, distinguishing them from federal (ISF) under the Ministry of Defense in , with Peshmerga command remaining under KRG's Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs rather than integrated into the national chain of command. Full subordination to federal authority has not occurred, as KRG maintains operational autonomy to safeguard regional interests, amid ongoing disputes over funding, salaries, and control of territories like . Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, select Peshmerga units were temporarily tasked with federal roles, including border security, oil pipeline protection, and joint with forces, totaling around 7,000 personnel trained by U.S. forces in some estimates. However, these arrangements did not lead to permanent incorporation, as Peshmerga retained loyalty to KRG (KDP and PUK) and regional oversight, contrasting with the ISF's centralized structure dominated by Shi'a Arab elements after Sunni boycotts post-2003. Cooperation intensified during the 2014-2017 campaign against , where Peshmerga forces—numbering approximately 200,000 at peak mobilization—fought alongside ISF units, such as in the Battle of , supported by U.S.-led airstrikes and logistics. A 2016 U.S.-KRG facilitated this partnership, providing equipment and without altering Peshmerga's regional status. Post-2017 Kurdistan independence referendum, relations strained as Iraqi forces retook disputed areas, prompting limited agreements on joint security, such as the 2021 pact for two mixed Peshmerga-ISF brigades in contested zones and the Sinjar Agreement to counter PKK influence. Yet, integration efforts faltered due to mutual distrust: Baghdad delayed Peshmerga salary payments (pegged at Iraqi army levels but often underfunded) and reduced Kurdish representation in the federal military to under 1% by 2025, violating constitutional quotas for ethnic balance. KRG reforms since 2023 emphasize internal unification—merging party-affiliated brigades into nine professional divisions—over federal absorption, with U.S. support continuing but potentially shifting toward ISF priorities as of August 2025. This parallel structure sustains Peshmerga effectiveness in regional defense but perpetuates Iraq's fragmented security apparatus, hindering unified national command.

Combat Formations and Special Units

The Peshmerga forces are primarily structured around Regional Guard Brigades, with ongoing reforms consolidating these into divisional commands for improved operational cohesion. As of October 2023, twenty-eight such brigades had been unified under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA), including Brigades 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, and 30, while Brigades 25 and 27 were nearing completion. Two division headquarters were established by this period to oversee brigade-level operations, with proposals for two additional headquarters pending approval. By September 2025, seven divisions were operational as part of a U.S.-backed unification plan, with four more in development to form a total of eleven divisions across two military zones. Earlier integration efforts between 2010 and 2013 merged approximately 42,000 personnel from partisan Unit 70 (affiliated with the ) and Unit 80 (affiliated with the ) into fourteen unified , though partisan influences have persisted in command structures. These typically consist of infantry-focused units equipped for defensive and roles, with brigade sizes varying from 3,000 to 5,000 personnel depending on recruitment and reform progress. Special units within the Peshmerga include and rapid-reaction formations designed for high-intensity operations. The brigades, functioning as a and special intervention force under the Regional Government's Ministry of Interior, provide internal security and quick-response capabilities, with historical formations totaling around 30,000 troops organized into divisions. The Gulan Special , an unit linked to KDP leadership and commanded by figures such as Mansour Barzani, specialize in and direct-action missions, including operations against ISIS remnants. Additional specialized elements, such as the Counter-Terrorism Group (, operate as one of Iraq's most capable contingents, focusing on intelligence-driven raids and neutralization. These units, while integrated into broader reforms, often retain semi-autonomous operational chains tied to political affiliations, complicating full unification.

Military Capabilities

Equipment Inventory and Modernization

The Peshmerga's equipment inventory features a mix of legacy Soviet-era systems, battlefield captures from , and targeted international donations, reflecting limited centralized procurement prior to recent reforms. Small arms predominantly consist of assault rifles and variants, supplemented by PK-series machine guns, heavy machine guns, and rocket launchers for infantry support. Anti-tank capabilities include and TOW guided missiles, effective against armored advances during the conflict. Heavier assets remain constrained, with armored forces relying on antiquated T-55, , and tanks, many salvaged from pre-2003 Iraqi arsenals or post-liberation captures, lacking modern upgrades like reactive armor or advanced fire control. inventories include towed howitzers, bolstered by U.S. deliveries of new systems in August 2024 to enhance support. Armored personnel carriers and MRAP vehicles form the mobility backbone, though quantities are insufficient for sustained mechanized operations, with partisan divisions between KDP and PUK units leading to duplicated or incompatible stockpiles. Modernization initiatives, accelerated since 2018 as part of unification under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, prioritize standardization, logistics interoperability, and acquisition of defensive technologies. The has provided heavy weapons shipments in 2024 and committed nearly $250 million in security assistance for equipment and , including and potential air defense systems authorized by a 2023 congressional bill. contributed advanced weapons, armored vehicles, and communications gear in January 2025, alongside training to integrate these assets. U.S. funding for Peshmerga training and procurement rose to $61 million in 2025, focusing on countering residual ISIS threats and Iranian-backed militias. These efforts aim to phase out obsolete gear, but progress is hampered by budget disputes with and internal factionalism, resulting in uneven distribution across brigades.

Training Programs and International Assistance

The Peshmerga maintain internal training facilities, such as the Menila Training Center in northern Iraq, where units conduct exercises simulating front-line attacks and defensive maneuvers. These programs emphasize basic skills, route clearance, and counter-improvised explosive device (IED) tactics, often building on coalition-provided methodologies. International assistance to Peshmerga training expanded significantly following the rise of , coordinated through the Global Coalition to Defeat under , which advises and equips Kurdish forces to enable independent operations against remnants of the group. The initiated formal training in early 2015, deploying advisors to sites including Irbil, where approximately 100 Peshmerga began brigade-level instruction on January 23, 2015; this effort targeted three Peshmerga brigades as part of a broader plan announced by President Obama in to train nine Iraqi and three Kurdish brigades. By 2016, U.S. and coalition assessments evaluated these programs' effectiveness in enhancing Kurdish Security Forces' operational capacity against . Training continued into 2018 with $365 million allocated for Peshmerga sustainment, including skill development in combat and . U.S. efforts persisted as of August 2021, with military experts committed to ongoing Peshmerga instruction. Germany contributed substantially from 2014 onward, deploying around 100 troops in December 2014 to northern for Peshmerga instruction in weapons handling, urban combat, and patrolling; initial sessions also occurred in starting September 28, 2014. Up to 150 German soldiers extended this mandate through 2017, focusing on experienced fighters rather than novices, though training paused in October 2017 amid tensions. The led coalition efforts in specialized areas, funding counter-IED and announced on October 13, 2014, and providing instruction in , medical response, and for Kurdish forces from 2017 to 2019. , alongside other coalition members like , supplied advisors for weaponry and , integrated into broader post-2014 support packages. Coalition-wide programs, active as of September 2024, continue to emphasize detect-and-defeat IED skills and operational readiness.

Operational Strengths and Limitations

The Peshmerga have demonstrated notable operational strengths rooted in their fighters' high motivation, familiarity with rugged northern Iraqi terrain, and experience in , enabling effective defensive operations and localized counteroffensives. During the 2014–2017 campaign against the , Peshmerga forces, bolstered by coalition airstrikes and intelligence, successfully liberated key areas such as in November 2015, where over 7,500 Kurdish and Yezidi fighters expelled ISIS militants and severed a critical supply route along Highway 47 between and . Their morale, encapsulated in the term meaning "those who face death," has sustained prolonged engagements, particularly in protecting core Kurdish territories like . However, these strengths are constrained by deep political fragmentation, with forces divided along party lines such as the (KDP) and (PUK), resulting in disjointed command structures and rivalries that delayed unified responses, as seen in intra-Kurdish tensions during the Sinjar operation. This disunity hampers large-scale and , perpetuating a reliance on coalitions rather than integrated operations. Equipment deficiencies further limit conventional capabilities; historically equipped as light infantry with outdated Soviet-era armaments, the Peshmerga proved vulnerable to ISIS's captured heavy weaponry during the August 2014 offensive, where militants overran positions along a 650-mile front due to the Kurds' lack of tanks, artillery, and recent combat experience. As of 2024, persistent shortages include no combat aircraft, minimal utility helicopters, absence of drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and inadequate air defenses against rocket, artillery, and drone attacks from Iran-backed militias, exemplified by strikes on the Khor Mor gas field. Baghdad's restrictions have blocked transfers of advanced systems like Javelin missiles and surveillance drones, despite U.S. deliveries of items such as 36 M119 howitzers in August 2024, underscoring ongoing dependence on external aid for modernization.

Societal and Demographic Aspects

Role of Women in Combat and Support

Women have participated in the Peshmerga since the , with formal integration into beginning in amid opposition to Saddam Hussein's regime, leading to the establishment of dedicated all-female units. These units, numbering around 500 fighters by 2015, underwent specialized military and were assigned to guard sensitive sites post-2003, though they retained capabilities. Unlike many regional militaries, Peshmerga policy permits women to serve alongside men in frontline roles, a practice that gained prominence during the fight against starting in 2014. During the ISIS conflict, female Peshmerga units, such as the Sun Brigade formed around 2016, engaged in direct combat operations, with nearly 200 women aged 18-38 receiving Peshmerga training by early 2017; this included 127 Yazidi recruits focused on liberating their communities. These fighters contributed to defensive efforts in northern Iraq, screening displaced women at checkpoints—a tactical advantage given ISIS beliefs about purification through combat with females—and providing immediate medical aid via individual first aid kits (IFAKs). However, post-ISIS territorial defeats by 2017, many female units shifted toward support functions like border security, protection of women's shelters, and logistics, amid reports of reduced frontline deployments. In support capacities, women have handled communications, medical services, and welfare for internally displaced persons, leveraging their roles to address gender-specific needs in conflict zones. training programs, including advanced instructor courses completed by female Peshmerga in and in November (year unspecified in reports but post-ISIS era), enhanced their operational effectiveness in both combat and advisory roles. As of March 2025, female participation remains low at approximately 1% of Peshmerga forces, prompting the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs to launch initiatives aiming for 6% integration, including plans for a dedicated female while allowing role flexibility. This push reflects ongoing efforts to balance traditional combat integration with expanded support functions, though challenges like recruitment halts in 2015 temporarily limited growth.

Recruitment, Demographics, and Veteran Affairs

Recruitment into the Peshmerga occurs primarily through voluntary contractual enlistment overseen by the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, with no formal conscription in place. Candidates typically must be aged 18 to 30 and hold at least a high school diploma, undergoing selective evaluations that prioritize fitness, loyalty, and skills amid unification reforms. During intensified drives, such as in June 2015 against ISIS, thousands of volunteers applied for new brigades, but officials rejected most to maintain standards, reflecting a preference for quality over quantity in party-influenced but increasingly centralized processes. While enlistment remains uncoerced, social pressures from families or communities in Kurdish areas can encourage participation, particularly in regions with strong martial traditions. The Peshmerga's demographics are dominated by Iraqi Kurds, comprising the vast majority of personnel and reflecting the ethnic composition of the , where form about 15-20% of Iraq's total but maintain concentrated regional control. Forces are historically segmented by political affiliation, with (KDP)-aligned units drawing more speakers from and Dohuk, and (PUK)-aligned units favoring Sorani speakers from , though unification efforts under the Ministry aim to dilute these divides. Ethnic minorities, including , Assyrian , and Turkmen, constitute a minority share, often integrated into specialized or regional roles following ISIS-era displacements. Overall strength hovers around 150,000 to 200,000 active fighters, supplemented by reserves, with the absence of limiting broader societal representation and favoring volunteers from tribal or politically connected networks. Age profiles skew toward combat-ready adults, with service eligibility spanning 21 to 41 years, blending veterans from prior conflicts like the Iran-Iraq War and Anfal with younger ISIS-era recruits. Veteran affairs are administered by the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, encompassing pensions, medical care, and retirement benefits for former fighters, including those disabled in battles against from 2014 onward. However, systemic delays plague disbursements, with retirees protesting an 18-month pension freeze as of April 2025, attributed to chronic funding shortfalls from Regional Government (KRG) budget constraints and federal disputes over salary equalization. The Peshmerga Pension Authority has advocated aligning benefits with Iraq's unified retirement law while preserving regional adjustments, amid KRG directives in September 2025 to accelerate processing for unification-linked retirees. Structural issues, including party-based payrolls and oil revenue withholding by , exacerbate inconsistencies, though international coalition stipends indirectly bolster active forces and reform efforts that could extend to veteran equity.

Controversies and Criticisms

Internal Challenges: Corruption, Nepotism, and Delays

The Peshmerga have faced persistent internal challenges stemming from corruption, which has manifested in practices such as the inflation of troop numbers through ""—non-existent personnel listed on payrolls to siphon funds—and of military resources. These issues have been exacerbated by the dual command structure inherited from the (KDP) and (PUK), allowing party-affiliated units to operate parallel to the unified Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA), established in 2014 to centralize control but undermined by partisan interference. For instance, audits have revealed discrepancies where reported Peshmerga strength exceeded actual deployable forces by up to 50% in some brigades, diverting salaries intended for active fighters. Nepotism has further entrenched inefficiencies, with senior command positions often allocated based on familial or political rather than merit, particularly within the Barzani and Talabani clans dominating KDP and PUK forces, respectively. This has led to unqualified appointments and resistance to merit-based reforms, as evidenced by stalled unification efforts where party elites prioritize patronage networks over operational cohesion. Reports indicate that such favoritism contributes to low morale and duplicated efforts, with promotions frequently bypassing competent officers in favor of relatives of political leaders, hindering the integration of forces post-2017 setbacks. Delays in salary payments and have compounded these problems, often linked to scandals and fiscal mismanagement within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), directly impacting Peshmerga readiness. Public sector salary arrears, including for Peshmerga, reached months-long backlogs by 2014-2017 amid oil revenue disputes with and internal graft, eroding troop motivation and contributing to desertions during critical operations against . As recently as 2025, U.S. officials expressed frustration over protracted reform delays, attributing them to entrenched and that perpetuate underfunding and uneven equipping, with some units waiting over six months for pay amid ongoing party control over budgets. These challenges have persisted despite international aid, as partisan divisions impede the MoPA's enforcement of unified standards, resulting in fragmented logistics and delayed modernization initiatives. The Peshmerga's legal status derives from Article 121(5) of Iraq's 2005 Constitution, which vests regional governments with authority to administer for maintaining order within their territory, explicitly recognizing the Peshmerga as the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) official regional military. This provision formalizes their role as a legitimate state entity under Iraqi law, distinct from irregular militias, with command structures remaining under KRG control rather than federal oversight. , however, has persistently challenged this autonomy, asserting that the Peshmerga should integrate into the to ensure unified command and prevent regional , a position reinforced by demands for Peshmerga subordination during federal military reforms. Budgetary relations between and form a core friction point, with the federal government constitutionally required to allocate a proportionate share of national revenues to the KRG, including funds for Peshmerga salaries estimated at around $900 million annually as part of the region's 17% entitlement under pre- formulas. Payments have been repeatedly delayed or conditioned on concessions over exports, territorial control, and fiscal transparency, escalating since amid disputes over Kurdish independent sales and peaking after the when halted transfers entirely, forcing the KRG to borrow heavily to cover shortfalls. By mid-2025, these withholdings persisted, prompting KRG Reber Ahmed to publicly condemn on July 15 for breaching obligations to remit Peshmerga wages, which had left thousands of fighters unpaid for months and strained operational readiness. In June 2025, major Kurdish parties, including the and , threatened withdrawal from Iraq's federal political process unless salary arrears—accumulating to billions of dollars since 2022—were cleared, highlighting how Baghdad's leverage over finances has been used to extract compliance on issues like oil revenue normalization and disputed territories such as . Efforts at resolution, such as a 2023 tripartite memorandum between Erbil, Baghdad, and international auditors, temporarily resumed partial payments but faltered by 2024 over verification disputes, with federal allocations covering only about 60% of committed amounts. On September 16, 2025, the KRG reiterated calls for parity in Peshmerga remuneration with salaries, currently averaging $800–$1,200 monthly versus federal troops' higher scales, underscoring systemic underfunding that compromises and modernization despite Peshmerga contributions to national security against . These fiscal weaponizations reflect Baghdad's strategy to centralize control, eroding Kurdish fiscal independence while Peshmerga forces remain dependent on erratic federal disbursements amid KRG's constrained domestic revenues.

Interactions with Non-Kurdish Populations: Control and Displacement

During the advance against in 2014, Peshmerga forces seized control of disputed territories including , parts of Ninewa, and Diyala governorates, areas previously administered by the Iraqi central government but claimed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This expansion facilitated efforts to reverse Saddam Hussein's campaigns, which had forcibly displaced and resettled in Kurdish-majority regions since the 1970s. However, these operations involved the systematic eviction of Arab residents and demolition of their homes, often extending to structures not demonstrably built illegally, displacing tens of thousands and preventing returns. Amnesty International documented deliberate destruction by Peshmerga between September 2014 and March 2015 in at least 13 Arab villages across Ninewa (e.g., Sibaya, where over 700 of 897 structures were razed), , and Diyala, using bulldozers, explosives, and . confirmed near-total in sites like Tabaj Hamid and Jumeili (95% of buildings), attributing the actions to a campaign of rather than isolated military necessities, though framed by KRG as targeting -linked sites. The KRG rejected these findings, asserting that Peshmerga operations cleared fortifications and spared civilians, without evidence of systematic abuse. Human Rights Watch reported similar demolitions in Kirkuk governorate villages post-ISIS recapture, including al-Murra (entirely leveled in July 2015), Qarah Tappah (over 100 homes in late October 2016), Qutan (90 of 100 homes on October 21, 2016), and Qoshkaya (30+ homes in May 2015 and additional in October 2016), displacing 3,000–4,000 residents in Qarah Tappah alone. Peshmerga cited removal of ISIS-planted explosives or punishment for resident collaboration with militants, but experts questioned the scale, noting many homes showed no explosive residue and demolitions preceded detailed searches. Turkmen communities in Kirkuk faced targeted expulsions, such as in Yengice village in May 2017, where Peshmerga and allied forces evicted hundreds of displaced Turkmen families sheltering there since ISIS's 2014 , citing security risks without alternative housing provided. Broader Turkmen complaints during Peshmerga control (2014–2017) included arbitrary arrests and harassment, contributing to political tensions in multi-ethnic areas. These practices fueled accusations of ethnic favoritism, though Peshmerga maintained actions prioritized and counter-ISIS measures over demographic engineering. Iraqi federal forces' 2017 retaking of these territories reversed some Kurdish gains but displaced in turn, highlighting reciprocal control disputes.

Human Rights Allegations and Infighting

documented the deliberate destruction by Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) security forces, including Peshmerga units, of hundreds of Arab homes and entire villages in disputed territories of and governorates between September 2014 and May 2016, following the defeat of forces. Specific cases included the razing of 523 homes in Barzan village and 120 in Hamad Agha, often using fire, explosives, or heavy machinery weeks or months after combat ended, with evidence from , over 120 eyewitness interviews, and site visits to 13 locations. These actions displaced thousands of Arab residents and prevented their return in some areas as late as 2020, amid claims of reversing Saddam Hussein's policies but lacking military necessity in many instances. Amnesty International similarly reported mass destruction in Arab villages across Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Diyala governorates recaptured from ISIS between September 2014 and March 2015, with satellite imagery showing bulldozer tracks and the demolition of up to 700 of 897 structures in Sibaya subdistrict alone. The organization alleged these acts constituted collective punishment potentially amounting to war crimes, targeting communities suspected of ISIS collaboration, though the KRG maintained the demolitions were for security reasons, such as clearing improvised explosive devices or punishing sympathizers. The KRG established an investigative committee in April 2016 and issued a presidential decree in March 2016 ordering protection of civilian property, but U.S. State Department reports indicate limited accountability for such abuses. Peshmerga forces have faced additional allegations of civilian endangerment during operations, including indiscriminate firing in disputed areas near on October 16, 2017, which killed at least seven civilians amid clashes with Iraqi forces. The KRG has consistently refuted claims of systematic violations, attributing damage to coalition airstrikes or remnants and emphasizing the forces' role in liberating areas from and atrocities. Infighting among Peshmerga ranks stems primarily from partisan divisions between the (KDP)-affiliated 80th Unit and the (PUK)-affiliated 70th Unit, which operate as party militias rather than unified under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA). This fragmentation, rooted in the 1994-1998 KDP-PUK civil war that killed thousands and partitioned into rival zones, has persisted despite reform initiatives launched in 2017 with U.S., UK, German, and Dutch support to integrate forces and achieve biometric enrollment. Reform efforts, including a 2022 U.S.-KRG memorandum requiring partisan unit reorganization and electronic payroll by October 2024, have unified 28 brigades but stalled on integrating the 70th and 80th units due to intra-party resistance and disputes with , exacerbating vulnerabilities exposed in the 2017 loss of . These divisions undermine operational cohesion, with Peshmerga loyalty often prioritizing party leaders over regional command, as seen in boycotts and conflicts hindering MoPA oversight. Such infighting has delayed modernization and weakened defenses against threats like Iranian-backed militias, though partial progress in brigade unification continues amid ongoing KDP-PUK tensions.

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