Recent from talks
Contribute something
Nothing was collected or created yet.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
View on Wikipedia
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),[a] also known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards,[19] is a multi-service primary branch of the Iranian Armed Forces. It was officially established by Ruhollah Khomeini as a military branch in May 1979 in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution.[1][20] Whereas the Iranian Army protects the country's sovereignty in a traditional capacity, the IRGC's constitutional mandate is to ensure the integrity of the Islamic Republic.[21] Most interpretations of this mandate assert that it entrusts the IRGC with preventing foreign interference in Iran, thwarting coups by the traditional military, and crushing "deviant movements" that harm the ideological legacy of the Islamic Revolution.[22]
As of 2024[update], the IRGC had approximately 125,000 total personnel. The IRGC Navy is now Iran's primary force exercising operational control over the Persian Gulf,[23] serving as a de facto coast guard. The IRGC's Basij, a paramilitary volunteer militia, has a further approximately 90,000 active personnel.[24][25] It operates a media arm, known as "Sepah News" within Iran.[26] On 16 March 2022, it adopted a new independent branch called the "Command for the Protection and Security of Nuclear Centres" involved with Iran's nuclear program.[27] Currently, the IRGC is designated as a terrorist organization by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Ecuador, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Sweden and the United States.[28][29][30]
Originating as an ideological militia, the IRGC has taken on a growing role in nearly every aspect of Iranian politics, economics (including energy and food industries) and society. In 2010, BBC News described the organization as a "business empire".[31] In 2019, Reuters described it as "an industrial empire with political clout".[32] IRGC's expanded social, political, military, and economic role under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—especially during the 2009 presidential election and the suppression of post-election protests—has led many Western analysts to argue that it has surpassed even the country's ruling clerical class in terms of political power.[33][34][35][36]
From 2019 to 2025, Hossein Salami served as the IRGC's incumbent commander-in-chief.[37][32] He was killed along with numerous senior officers during the wave of Israeli strikes launched on 13 June 2025.[38]
Terminology
[edit]Government organizations in Iran are commonly known by one-word names (that generally denote their function) rather than acronyms or shortened versions, and the general populace universally refers to the IRGC as Sepâh (سپاه) (Sepoy; Sipahi). Sepâh has a historical connotation of soldiers, while in modern Persian it is also used to describe a corps-sized unit – in modern Persian Artesh (ارتش) is the more standard term for an army.
Pâsdârân (پاسداران) is the plural form of Pâsdâr (پاسدار), meaning "Guardian", and members of Sepah are known as Pāsdār, which is also their title and comes after their rank.
Apart from the name Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,[39][40][41] the Iranian Government, media, and those who identify with the organization generally use Sepāh-e Pâsdârân (Army of the Guardians), although it is not uncommon to hear Pâsdârân-e Enghelâb (پاسداران انقلاب) (Guardians of the Revolution), or simply Pâsdârân (پاسداران) (Guardians) as well. Among the Iranian population, and especially among diaspora Iranians, using the word Pasdaran indicates hatred or admiration for the organization.
Most foreign governments and the English-speaking mass media tend to use the term Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG) or simply the Revolutionary Guards.[42] In the US media, the force is frequently referred to interchangeably as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[43][44][45][46] The US government standard is Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,[47] while the United Nations uses Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.[48]
Organization
[edit]| Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps |
|---|
| Command |
|
Supreme Leader Commanders Joint Staff |
| Military branches |
|
Ground Forces Aerospace Force Navy Quds Force Basij |
| Intelligence agencies |
|
Intelligence Organization Intelligence Protection Organization |
| Personnel |
| Ranks insignia |
| Facilities |
|
Imam Hossein University Baqiyatallah University University of Command and Staff Amir Al-Momenin University |
The force's main role is to provide national security. It is responsible for internal and border security, law enforcement, and also Iran's missile forces. IRGC operations are geared towards asymmetric warfare and less traditional duties. These include the control of smuggling, control of the Strait of Hormuz, and resistance operations.[49] The IRGC is intended to complement the more traditional role of the regular Iranian military, with the two forces operating separately and focusing on different operational roles.[49]
The IRGC is a combined arms force with its own ground forces, navy,[23] air force, intelligence,[50] and special forces. It also controls the Basij militia. The Basij is a volunteer-based force, with 90,000 regular soldiers and 300,000 reservists. The IRGC is officially recognized as a component of the Iranian military under Article 150 of the Iranian Constitution.[51] It is separate from, and parallel to, the other arm of Iran's military, which is called Artesh (another Persian word for an army). Especially in the waters of the Persian Gulf, the IRGC is expected to assume control of any Iranian response to attacks on its nuclear facilities.[23]
History and structure
[edit]The IRGC was formed on 5 May 1979[52][53] following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in an effort to consolidate several paramilitary forces into a single force loyal to the new government and to function as a counter to the influence and power of the regular military, initially seen as a potential source of opposition because of its traditional loyalty to the Shah. From the beginning of the new Islamic government, the Pasdaran (Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami) functioned as a corps of the faithful. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic entrusted the defense of Iran's territorial integrity and political independence to the regular military (artesh), while it gave the Pasdaran the responsibility of preserving the Revolution itself.[54]
Days after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's return to Tehran on 1 February 1979, Mehdi Bazargan's interim administration established the Pasdaran under a decree issued by Khomeini on 5 May. The Pasdaran was intended to protect the Revolution and to assist the ruling clerics in the day-to-day enforcement of the new government's Islamic codes and morality. There were other, perhaps more important, reasons for establishing the Pasdaran. The Revolution needed to rely on a force of its own rather than borrowing the previous regime's tainted units. As one of the first revolutionary institutions, the Pasdaran helped legitimize the Revolution and gave the new government an armed basis of support. Moreover, the establishment of the Pasdaran served notice to both the population and the regular armed forces that the Khomeini government was quickly developing its own enforcement body.[54]
Thus, the Pasdaran, along with its political counterpart, Crusade for Reconstruction, brought a new order to Iran. In time, the Pasdaran would rival the police and the judiciary in terms of its functions.

Although the IRGC operated independently of the regular armed forces, it was often considered to be a military force in its own right due to its important role in Iranian defense. The IRGC consists of ground, naval, and aviation troops, which parallel the structure of the regular military. The Pasdaran was "given control of Iran's ballistic missile program in both missile employment and development.[55]
Also contained under the umbrella of the more conventional Pasdaran, were the Basij Forces (Mobilization Resistance Force), a network of potentially up to a million active individuals who could be called upon in times of need. The Basij could be committed to assist in the defense of the country against internal or external threats, but by 2008 had also been deployed in mobilizing voters in elections and alleged tampering during such activities. Another element was the Quds Force, a special forces element tasked with unconventional warfare roles and known to be involved in providing assistance and training to various militant organizations around the world.[54]
The Pasdaran is closely associated with Supreme Leader Khamenei who came to power in 1989, and used the Pasdaran to build support using expropriated state resources. Reportedly he reached "far down into the ranks and appointed new colonels and brigadiers. 'Khamenei micromanages the whole system, so everyone is loyal to him, He is hyperactive. He knows every low-ranking commander and even the names of their children'", according to Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.[56]
The Basij and Pasdaran were instrumental in crushing the Green Movement, and this power gave them political supremecy in Iran. According to at least one source (Abbas Milani, the director of the Iranian Studies program at Stanford), the regime "clearly ... believed it was going to lose control, and the IRGC and the Basij saved the day. The result is that the IRGC now has the upper hand. Khamenei knows that without the IRGC he'd be out of a job in twenty-four hours."[57]

Yahya Rahim Safavi, head of the IRGC since 1997, was dismissed as commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards in August 2007. The dismissal of Safavi disrupted the balance of power in Iran to the advantage of conservatives. Analysis in the international press considered the removal of Safavi to be a sign of change in the defense strategies of Iran, but the general policies of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are not personally determined by its commander.[54]
Iran's top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in Tehran, Iran on 27 November 2020. Fakhrizadeh was believed to be the primary force behind Iran's covert nuclear program for many decades. The New York Times reported that Israel's Mossad was behind that attack and that Mick Mulroy, the former Deputy Defense Secretary for the Middle East said the death of Fakhirizadeh was "a setback to Iran's nuclear program" and he was also a senior officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and that "will magnify Iran's desire to respond by force."[58]
The Corps have occasionally distributed food aid packages.[59]
Military structure
[edit]
In late July 2008, reports originating that the IRGC was in the process of dramatically changing its structure. In a shake-up, in September 2008 Iran's Revolutionary Guards established 31 divisions and an autonomous missile command. The new structure changes the IRGC from a centralized to a decentralized force with 31 provincial corps, whose commanders wield extensive authority and power. According to the plan, each of Iran's thirty provinces will have a provincial corps, except Tehran Province, which will have two.[60]
Cyber Security Command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
[edit]In 2007 command for cyber security was established part of cyberdefense of IRGC. It was renamed in 2014, abbreviated GCDC or CIOC.[61]
Joint Staff
[edit]Basij
[edit]
Basij Mustazafin were initially separate organizations but were merged in 1980 into Corps and merged to its land forces since 2008.[62][63][64] The Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia or "plainclothes militia" founded by the order of the Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979. On 4 November 1979, in an address to the Revolutionary Guards during the Iran hostage crisis, Khomeini ordered the creation of an army of "twenty million Iranians" (Artesh-e bis million), proclaiming:
Equip yourself, get military training and train your friends. Give military training to those who are not trained. In an Islamic country, everyone should be a soldier and have military training. ... a country with 20 million young people [should have] 20 million riflemen, an army of 20 million"[65]
This pronouncement and Article 151 of the constitution, which calls for the government to "provide a program of military training, with all requisite facilities, for all its citizens, in accordance with the Islamic criteria, in such a way that all citizens will always be able to engage in the armed defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran," are believed to refer to the Basij.[66] While "Iranian official estimates sometime put their total part-time and full-time strength at more than 20 million", others estimate the Basij as having "a core strength of 90,000, and up to 600,000" (CSIS, 11 January 2018, p. 4); at 100,000 with "hundreds of thousands of additional Basij could be mobilized in the event or an all-out war" (CRS, 23 May 2018, p. 18).[54]
The Basij are "the most visible symbol" of the Pasdaran's strength, whose members "can be seen on street corners in every Iranian city".[56] They are (at least in theory) subordinate to, and receive their orders from, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. However they have also been described as "a loosely allied group of organizations" including "many groups controlled by local clerics." Currently, the Basij serve as an auxiliary force engaged in activities such as internal security as well as law enforcement auxiliary, the providing of social service, organizing of public religious ceremonies, and as morality police and the suppression of dissident gatherings.
Quds Force
[edit]The elite Quds Force (or Jerusalem Force), sometimes described as the successor to the Shah's Imperial Guards, is estimated to be 2,000–5,000 in number.[24] It is a special operations unit, handling activities abroad.[32][67] The force's main mission is training, directing, and liasoning with Iranian proxies.
Aerospace Force
[edit]
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air and Space Force[68] (IRGCASF; Persian: نیروی هوافضای سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی, romanized: niru-ye havâfazây-e sepâh-e pâsdârân-e enghelâb-e eslâmi, officially acronymed NEHSA)[citation needed] is the strategic missile, air, and space force within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran. It was renamed from the IRGC Air Force into the IRGC Aerospace Force in 2009.[69] Its 15,000 personnel man around 80 aircraft and operates several thousand short- and medium-range mobile ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-3/3B with a range of up to 2,100 kilometers.
Navy
[edit]
IRGC started naval operations using mainly swarm tactics and speedboats during "Tanker War" phase of the Iran–Iraq War.
IRGC Navy and the regular Artesh Navy overlap functions and areas of responsibility, but they are distinct in terms of how they are trained and equipped—and more importantly also in how they fight. The Revolutionary Guards Navy has a large inventory of small fast attack craft, and specializes in asymmetric hit-and-run tactics. It is more akin to a guerrilla force at sea, and maintains large arsenals of coastal defense and anti-ship cruise missiles and mines.[70] It has also a Takavar (special force) unit, called Sepah Navy Special Force (S.N.S.F.). The navy received 750 new ships in July 2024.[71]
Ground forces
[edit]Nuclear forces
[edit]Intelligence organization
[edit]Corps Intelligence directorate are accused of meddling in the 2021 Iranian presidential election.[72]
Auxilaries
[edit]The IRGC has recruited, funded, and trained two key militias to fight in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen as well as Iranian Balochistan which are led by IRGC commanders and even operate from Iran. These are:
Liwa Fatemiyoun (a Shia Afghan militia founded in 2013)[73][74][75]
Liwa Zainebiyoun (a Shia Pakistani militia founded in 2015)[76][77][78]
Size
[edit]
The 2020 edition of The Military Balance, published by IISS, says the IRGC has about 190,000 active personnel and controls the Basij on mobilisation (as much as 40,000 active paramilitary forces).[8] It estimates the Ground Force is 150,000 strong and the Aerospace Force, which controls Iran's strategic-missile force, has some 15,000 personnel.[8] The Naval Forces are estimated to size at least 20,000, including 5,000 Marines.[8]
Senior commanders
[edit]- Major General Hossein Salami X (Commander-in-chief)
- Commodore Ali Fadavi (Second-in-command)
- Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour (Revolutionary Guards' Ground Forces)
- Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh X (Revolutionary Guards' Aerospace Force)
- Commodore Alireza Tangsiri (Revolutionary Guards' Navy)
- Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani (Commander of the Mobilized Basij forces)
- Brigadier General Esmail Qaani X (Quds Force)
- Brigadier General Mehdi Rabbani X
- Brigadier General Gholamreza Mehrabi X
Iran–Iraq War
[edit]Lebanon Civil War
[edit]During the Lebanese Civil War, the IRGC allegedly sent troops to train fighters in response to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.[79] In Lebanon, political parties had staunch opinions regarding the IRGC's presence. Some, mainly the Christian militias such as the Lebanese Forces, Phalanges, and most of the Christian groups declared war on the IRGC, claiming they violated Lebanese sovereignty, while others, including Muslim militias, were neutral to their presence. Groups such as the PSP and Mourabiton did not approve of their presence, but to preserve political alliances they decided to remain silent on the matter.
2006 Lebanon War
[edit]During the 2006 Lebanon War, several Iranian Revolutionary Guards were reportedly killed by Israeli forces in Baalbek, a town close to the Syrian border.[80] Israeli officials believe that Iranian Revolutionary Guards forces were responsible for training and equipping the Hezbollah fighters behind the missile attack on the INS Hanit which left four Israeli sailors dead and seriously damaged the vessel.[81]
2006 plane crash
[edit]In January 2006, an IRGC Falcon crashed near Oroumieh, about 560 miles northwest of Tehran, near the Turkish border, Iranian media reported. All fifteen passengers died, including twelve senior IRGC commanders. Among the dead was General Ahmad Kazemi, the IRGC ground forces commander, and Iran–Iraq War veteran.[82]
Gen. Masoud Jazayeri, spokesman for the IRGC, told state radio that both of the plane's engines had failed, its landing gear had jammed, and there was snow and poor visibility at the time.[83]
Possible attacks on Quds Force
[edit]On 7 July 2008, investigative journalist and author Seymour Hersh wrote an article in The New Yorker stating that the Bush Administration had signed a presidential finding authorizing the CIA's Special Activities Division to begin cross border paramilitary operations from Iraq and Afghanistan into Iran. These operations would be against the Quds Force, the commando arm of the IRGC that had been blamed for repeated acts of violence in Iraq, and "high-value targets" in the war on terror.[84]
October 2009 Pishin bombing
[edit]In October 2009, several top commanders of the Revolutionary Guards were killed in a suicide bombing in the Pishin region of Sistan-Baluchistan, in the south-east of Iran. The Iranian state television said 31 people died in the attack, and more than 25 were injured. Shia and Sunni tribal leaders were also killed. The Sunni Baluchi insurgent group Jundullah claimed responsibility for the attack. The Iranian government initially blamed the United States for involvement in the attacks,[85] as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and later Pakistan for their alleged support of the Jundallah group.[86][87] The United States denied involvement,[88] but some reports of US assistance to Jundallah during the Bush administration have come from Western sources.[89] The attacks appear to have originated in Pakistan and several suspects have been arrested.[90]
Syria, 2011–2024
[edit]Prior to the Syrian war, Iran had between 2,000 and 3,000 IRGC officers stationed in Syria, helping to train local troops and managing supply routes of arms and money to neighboring Lebanon.[91]
General Qa'ani, Senior officer of Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, said: "If the Islamic Republic was not present in Syria, the massacre of civilians would have been twice as bad. They had physically and non-physically stopped the rebels from killing many more among the Syrian people."[92]
Iranian Revolutionary Guard soldiers, along with fellow Shi'ite forces from Hezbollah and members of Iran's Basij militia participated in the capture of Qusair from rebel forces on 9 June 2013.[93][94] In 2014, Iran increased its deployment of IRGC in Syria.[91]
By late 2015, 194 IRGC troops had been killed in Syria; almost all of these soldiers were officers, with several even reaching the rank of Brigadier.[95][96] Additionally, 354 Afghan combatants had died[97][98] who were fighting under the command of the IRGC, as part of the IRGC-equipped and trained Fatemiyoun Brigade, which is part of Hezbollah Afghanistan.[99] Another 21 Pakistanis also died as part of the Zainabiyoun Brigade.[98][100]
The Afghan and Pakistani immigrants volunteered to go to Syria in exchange for salaries and citizenship. The Afghans were recruited largely from refugees inside Iran, and usually had combat experience before joining the IRGC; their status as members of the Iranian military is only vaguely acknowledged and sometimes denied, despite the troops being uniformed fighters led by IRGC officers. They were trained and equipped in Iran, paid salaries by the Iranian military, and received state funerals involving uniformed IRGC personnel.[99] Mid to late October 2015 was particularly bloody for the IRGC, due to them stepping up their involvement in offensives around Aleppo. During this time, 30 IRGC officers, including "three generals, battalion commanders, captains and lieutenants" and "one pilot" were killed in fighting in Syria, as were several Afghan and Pakistani auxiliaries.[101][102]
The fallen included General Hossein Hamadani,[103] Farshad Hosounizadeh (IRGC colonel and former commander of the Saberin Special Forces Brigade), Mostafa Sadrzadeh (commander of the Omar Battalion of the Fatmiyoon Brigade), and Hamid Mojtaba Mokhtarband (IRGC commander).[102]
Iraq, 2014–present
[edit]Two battalions of Revolutionary Guards were reported to be operating in Iraq trying to combat the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive.[104] The IRGC is considered to be a principle backer of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a loose coalition of Shi'a militias allied with the Iraqi government in its fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Major General Qasem Soleimani was an instrumental force in the Iranian ground mission in Iraq against ISIS, purportedly planning the Second Battle of Tikrit.[105]
In December 2014, Brigadier General Hamid Taqavi, a veteran of the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War, was killed by snipers in Samarra.[106] In May 2017, Shaaban Nassiri, a senior IRGC commander was killed in combat near Mosul, Iraq.[107] In December 2019, the U.S. Air Force conducted airstrikes on weapons caches and facilities of the IRGC-sponsored militant group Kata'ib Hezbollah. In retaliation, the group attacked the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in the Green Zone.[108][109]
On 3 January 2020, Soleimani was killed in a U.S. drone strike at Baghdad International Airport along with the PMF commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.[110]
2014 Israeli drone shoot down
[edit]Iran revolutionary guards said that they had shot down an Israeli drone approaching the Natanz nuclear facility.[111][112][113] According to ISNA, "The downed aircraft was of the stealth, radar-evasive type ... and was targeted by a ground-to-air missile before it managed to enter the area."[111][113] The statement by revolutionary guards did not mention how they recognized it as an Israeli drone. Israel offered no comment.[112]
Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752
[edit]Iranian authorities initially denied responsibility for the Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 incident. However, the IRGC later admitted that the plane had been shot down by mistake.[114]
The Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps took "full responsibility" for unintentionally shooting down the airplane with a surface-to-air missile on 8 January 2020.[115] President Hassan Rouhani stated that the plane was approaching an IRGC base when it was shot down: according to a senior Revolutionary Guards commander, the plane was mistaken for a cruise missile.[116] On 17 January 2020, the IRGC were protected by Ali Khamenei in the Friday sermon. He said that the downing was a "bitter" tragedy and additionally declared that "Iran's enemies" used the crash and the military's admission to "weaken" the IRGC.[117]
Special Operation inside Pakistan
[edit]On 3 February 2021, IRGC announced that it had conducted an intelligence-based operation inside Pakistani territory to rescue two of its border guards who were taken as hostages by Jaish ul-Adl organization two and a half years ago.[118]
Involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian war
[edit]On 21 October 2022, a White House press release stated that Iranian troops were in Crimea assisting Russia in launching drone attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure.[119] On 24 November, Ukrainian officials said the military had killed ten Iranians and would target any further Iranian military presence in Ukraine.[120] The Institute for the Study of War assessed that these are likely Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC-affiliated personnel, as this formation is the primary operator of Iranian drones.[121]
April 2024 Iranian strikes against Israel
[edit]On 13 April 2024, the IRGC, in collaboration with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Hezbollah, and the Ansar Allah (Houthis), launched retaliatory attacks against Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights with loitering munitions, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.[122] It was retaliation for the Israeli bombing of the Iranian embassy in Damascus on 1 April,[123] which killed two Iranian generals.[124] The strike was seen as a spillover of the Gaza war and marked Iran's first direct attack on Israel since the start of their proxy conflict.[125] The attack was the largest attempted drone strike in history,[126][127] intended to overwhelm anti-aircraft defenses. It was the first time since Iraq's 1991 missile strikes that Israel was directly attacked by a state force.[128]
June 2025 Iran-Israel war
[edit]On 13 June Israel launched a "preemptive" strike targeting high-ranking members of the Islamic revolution and Irans nuclear infrastructure and key nuclear scientists.[129] The opening attack killed 30 IRGC generals and 9 nuclear scientists. The strike, referred to as Operation Rising Lion launched the 12 day Iran-Israel war. An Israeli and US airstrikes damaged the nuclear facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow. Notable IRGC generals killed during the 12 day war include:[130]
- Hossein Salami, commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,
- Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of the armed forces and the second-highest commander after Ayatollah Khamenei.
- Gholamali Rashid, deputy commander in chief of the Armed Forces.
- Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the airspace unit of the Revolutionary Guards.
- Gholamreza Mehrabi, deputy intelligence chief of the Armed Forces.
- Mehdi Rabbani, deputy commander of operations for the Armed Forces.
- Davood Sheikhian, the commander of air defense.
- Khosro Hassani, the deputy intelligence chief of the aerospace unit.
- Mohammad Kazemi, the head of the intelligence
- Hassan Mohaqiq, the deputy to General Kazemi.
Influence
[edit]Political
[edit]| Part of a series on |
| Conservatism in Iran |
|---|
As an elite group, members of Pasdaran have an oversized influence in Iran's political world. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (President 2005–2013) joined the IRGC in 1985, serving first in military operation in Iraqi Kurdistan before leaving the front line to take charge of logistics. A majority of his first cabinet consisted of IRGC veterans.[131] Nearly one third of the members elected to Iran's Majlis in 2004 are also "Pásdárán".[132] Others have been appointed as ambassadors, mayors, provincial governors and senior bureaucrats.[67] However, IRGC veteran status does not imply a single viewpoint.[133]
Strengthening the power of the IRGC was their actions against the Green Movement, where thousands of Iranians protested election irregularities in the 2009 victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad over "a well-liked" reformer Mir-Hossein Mousavi. As "the demonstrations gained strength, the security forces swept in, arresting, beating, and killing protesters". The IRGC was thought to be crucial in crushing the movement which "marked a turning point" for the Islamic Republic.[57]
In a video leaked to the internet, the leader of the Pasdaran at the time, (General Mohammad Ali Jafari), opposed the protest as challenging 'the tenets of the revolution', but warned that it 'was a blow that weakened the fundamental pillars of the regime,' and demonstrated that Iran's rulers "could no longer count on popular support", 'Anyone who refuses to understand these new conditions will not be successful'.[57]
Ayatollah Khomeini urged that the country's military forces should remain unpoliticized. However, the Constitution, in Article 150, defines the IRGC as the "guardian of the Revolution and of its achievements" which is at least partly a political mission. His original views have therefore been the subject of debate. Supporters of the Basiji have argued for politicization, while reformists, moderates and Hassan Khomeini opposed it. President Rafsanjani forced military professionalization and ideological deradicalization on the IRGC to curb its political role, but the Pasdaran became natural allies of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei when reformists threatened him.[133] The IRGC grew stronger under President Ahmedinejad, and assumed formal command of the Basiji militia in early 2009.[134]
Although never explicitly endorsing or affiliating themselves with any political parties, the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran (or Abadgaran), is widely viewed as a political front for the Revolutionary Guards. Many former members (including Ahmadinejad) have joined this party in recent years and the Revolutionary Guards have reportedly given them financial support.
Economic activity
[edit]IRGC first expanded into commercial activity through informal social networking of veterans and former officials. IRGC officials confiscated assets of many refugees who had fled Iran after the fall of Abolhassan Banisadr's government. It is now a vast conglomerate, controlling Iran's missile batteries and nuclear program but also a multibillion-dollar business empire reaching almost all economic sectors.[33] Estimates of the fraction of Iran's economy that it controls through a series of subsidiaries and trusts[135] vary from ten percent[136] to over 50.[56]
The Los Angeles Times estimates that IRGC has ties to over one hundred companies, with its annual revenue exceeding $12 billion in business and construction.[137] IRGC has been awarded billions of dollars in contracts in the oil, gas and petrochemical industries, as well as major infrastructure projects.[138]
The following commercial entities have been named by the United States as owned or controlled by the IRGC and its leaders.[139]
- Khatam al-Anbia Construction Headquarters, the IRGC's major engineering arm & one of Iran's largest contractors employing about 25,000 engineers and staff on military (70%) and non-military (30%) projects[133] worth over $7 billion in 2006.[139]
- Oriental Oil Kish (oil and gas industry)[140]
- Ghorb Nooh[140]
- Sahel Consultant Engineering[140]
- Ghorb Karbala[140]
- Sepasad Engineering Co. (excavation and tunnel construction)[140]
- Omran Sahel[140]
- Hara Company (excavation and tunnel construction)[140]
- Gharargahe Sazandegi Ghaem[140]
- Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute (subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbia)
- Fater Engineering Institute (subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbia)
In September 2009, the Government of Iran sold 51% of the shares of the Telecommunication Company of Iran to the Mobin Trust Consortium (Etemad-e-Mobin), a group affiliated with the Guards, for the sum of $7.8 billion. This was the largest transaction on the Tehran Stock Exchange in history.[141][142] IRGC also owns 45% participation in automotive Bahman Group and has a majority stake in Iran's naval giant SADRA through Khatam al-Anbia.[133][143]
The IRGC also exerts influence over bonyads, wealthy, non-governmental ostensibly charitable foundations controlled by key clerics. The pattern of revolutionary foundations mimics the style of informal and extralegal economic networks from the time of the Shah. Their development started in the early 1990s, gathered pace over the next decade, and accelerated even more with many lucrative no-bid contracts from the Ahmadinejad presidency.[140] The IRGC exerts informal, but real, influence over many such organizations including:
- Mostazafan Foundation (Foundation of the Oppressed or The Mostazafan Foundation)
- Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan (Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs)[133]
As an elite force with great economic assets it has developed into what some observers call an "untouchable élite" and somewhat isolated in Iranian society. According to a "former senior Middle Eastern intelligence officer", the Guard and their families "have their own schools, their own markets, their own neighborhoods, their own resorts. The neighborhoods look like a carbon copy of Beverly Hills."[56]
Former Bank Ansar and Bank Mehr Iranian were run by corps IRGC Cooperation Bonyad until merger with state Bank Sepah.[144]
In 2023, Israel seized millions of dollars in cryptocurrency belonging to Hezbollah and the Quds force of the IRGC.[145]
Between 2023 and 2025, Iran significantly increased its military budget, with a substantial portion directed to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In 2023, Iran's military expenditure was estimated at $10.3 billion, with the IRGC receiving approximately 37% of this budget, amounting to around $3.8 billion. By 2024, the total military budget rose to approximately $16.7 billion, with $10.9 billion officially allocated to military entities and an additional $5.9 billion channeled through oil revenues and the National Development Fund. In 2025, the Iranian government proposed a 200% increase in the military budget, allocating over half of its oil and gas export revenues—estimated at €12 billion—to the armed forces, including the IRGC. This surge in funding underscores Iran's focus on enhancing its military capabilities amid escalating regional tensions.[146][147]
Environmental
[edit]Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s pursuit of food self-sufficiency has driven a state-led campaign of agricultural expansion that has severely strained the country’s limited water resources. This push, heavily reliant on water-intensive crops such as wheat, rice, and sugar beet, has often ignored ecological constraints. With agriculture accounting for approximately 92% of water usage and among the lowest levels of water productivity in the region, Iran’s water crisis is deeply entwined with governance failures, ideological policies, and entrenched institutional interests.[148]
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who holds a deep entanglement in Iran’s economic, infrastructural, and environmental governance, has had a significant effect on Iran's environmental standing. Through its engineering arm, Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), the IRGC has been a principal actor in Iran’s dam-building spree, water transfer schemes, and large-scale infrastructure projects. Peripheral provinces such as Khuzestan, which are home to marginalized ethnic communities, have suffered disproportionately from these ecological disruptions.[149]
The IRGC and its affiliated economic networks, sometimes referred to as the “water mafia,” have profited immensely from this system. While the official rhetoric remains fixated on sovereignty and resistance economics, the practical outcome has been a politicized water economy marked by mismanagement and corruption. The Majlis Research Center itself acknowledged in 2023 that the current model of water governance is incompatible with the country’s hydrological realities.[150]
Analysis
[edit]Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues that the IRGC is "the spine of the current political structure and a major player in the Iranian economy."[151] The once theocratic state has evolved into a garrison state, like Burma, whereby the military dominates social, cultural, political, and economic life, protecting the government from internal rather than external opponents.[151]
Greg Bruno and Jayshree Bajoria of the Council on Foreign Relations agree, stating that the IRGC has expanded well beyond its mandate and into a "socio-military-political-economic force" that deeply penetrates Iran's power structure.[152] "The Guards' involvement in politics has grown to unprecedented levels since 2004, when IRGC won at least 16 percent of the 290 seats" in the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran.[152] During the elections of March 2008, IRGC veterans won 182 out of 290 seats, helping Mahmoud Ahmadinejad consolidate power.[153]
Half of Ahmadinejad's cabinet was composed of former IRGC officers while several others were appointed to provincial governorships.[153]
Ali Alfoneh of the American Enterprise Institute contends that "While the presence of former IRGC officers in the cabinet is not a new phenomenon, their numbers under Ahmadinejad—they occupy nine of the twenty-one ministry portfolios—are unprecedented."[154] Additionally, Ahmadinejad successfully purged provincial governorships of Rafsanjani and Khatami supporters and replaced them not only with IRGC members, but also members of the Basij and the Islamic Republic prison administration.[155]
The IRGC chief, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, announced that the Guards' would go through internal restructuring in order to counter "internal threats to the Islamic Republic."[153] Bruce Riedel, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and former CIA analyst, argues the Guards was created to protect the government against a possible coup.[152]
Since the disputed 2009 presidential elections, debate over how powerful the IRGC is has reemerged. Danielle Pletka and Ali Alfoneh see the irreversible militarization of Iran's government.[152] Abbas Milani, director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University, believes the Guards' power actually exceeds that of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.[152] Frederic Wehrey, adjunct Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation believes the Revolutionary Guards is not a cohesive unit of similar-minded conservatives but rather a factionalized institution that is hardly bent on overthrowing their masters.[152]
U.S. Department of the Treasury terrorist aid claims
[edit]The U.S. Department of the Treasury claims the Corp has supported several organizations the U.S. deems to be terrorist, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Taliban.[156] In the U.S. Department of the Treasury's report, four IRGC senior officials, Hushang Alladad, Hossein Musavi, Hasan Mortezavi, and Mohammad Reza Zahedi, were specifically named for providing support to terrorist organizations. Hushang Alladad, a financial officer for the IRGC, was cited as personally administering financial support to terrorist groups including Hizballah, Hamas, and PIJ.[156]
Both General Hossein Musavi and Colonel Hasan Mortevazi were claimed to have provided financial and material support to the Taliban. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the IRGC commander in Lebanon, was claimed to have played a crucial role in Iran's aid to Hizballah. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Zahedi served as a liaison to Hizballah and Syrian intelligence services as well as taking part in weapon deals involving Hizballah.[156]
The U.S. Treasury report goes on to detail the IRGC's methods of support for terrorist groups: "The Government of Iran also uses the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and IRGC-QF to implement its foreign policy goals, including, but not limited to, seemingly legitimate activities that provide cover for intelligence operations and support to terrorist and insurgent groups. These activities include economic investment, reconstruction, and other types of aid to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon, implemented by companies and institutions that act for or on behalf of, or are owned or controlled by the IRGC and the Iranian government."[156]
Corporations in media
[edit]Similar organizations
[edit]Since November 2023, the military of Islamic Emirate have created Supreme leader-led task forces in Afghanistan similar to the Revolutionary Guard.[159]
Controversy
[edit]From its origin as an ideologically driven militia, the IRGC has taken an ever more assertive role in virtually every aspect of Iranian society. Its part in suppressing dissent has led many analysts to describe the events surrounding the 12 June 2009 presidential election as a military coup, and the IRGC as an authoritarian military security government for which its Shiite clerical system is no more than a facade.[33]
Since its establishment, IRGC has been involved in many economic and military activities among which some raised controversies. The organization has been accused of smuggling (including importing illegal alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and satellite dishes, into Iran via jetties not supervised by the Government[133][160][161][162]), training and supplying Hezbollah[163][164] and Hamas[165] fighters, and of being involved in the Iraq War.[166]
In December 2009, evidence uncovered during an investigation by the Guardian newspaper and Guardian Films linked the IRGC to the kidnappings of 5 Britons from a government ministry building in Baghdad in 2007. Three of the hostages, Jason Creswell, Jason Swindlehurst and Alec Maclachlan, were killed. Alan Mcmenemy's body was never found but Peter Moore was released on 30 December 2009. The investigation uncovered evidence that Moore, 37, a computer expert from Lincoln was targeted because he was installing a system for the Iraqi Government that would show how a vast amount of international aid was diverted to Iran's militia groups in Iraq.[167]
According to Geneive Abdo, IRGC members were appointed "as ambassadors, mayors, cabinet ministers, and high-ranking officials at state-run economic institutions" during the administration of president Ahmadinejad.[36] Appointments in 2009 by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have given "hard-liners" in the guard "unprecedented power" and included "some of the most feared and brutal men in Iran."[36]
In May 2019, the United States accused the IRGC of being "directly responsible" for an attack on commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman. Michael M. Gilday, United States director of the Joint Staff, described US intelligence attributing that the IRGC used limpet mines to attack four oil tankers anchored in the Gulf of Oman for bunkering through the Port of Fujairah.[168]
In April 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the IRGC unveiled the Mostaan 110, an experimental medical device that the IRGC claimed could detect instances of COVID-19 using electromagnetic radiation. The IRGC's claims of Mostaan 110's capabilities were met with widespread criticism from both Iranian and international experts, who called it pseudoscientific and compared it to the ADE 651, a fake explosive detector with a similar design.[169][170][171][172]
In December 2022, German authorities accused the IRGC of attempting to orchestrate attacks against synagogues in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and spying on the president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany.[173] Moreover, in 2020, IRGC members were exposed as having given a talk to UK students in which one spoke of an apocalyptic war with Jews.[174]
In July 2024, it was suspected that the IRGC had attempted to assassinate the former Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[175][176]
Terrorist designation and sanctions
[edit]Since 15 April 2019, the United States, which opposes the activities of Sepah, considers the IRGC as a terrorist organization,[177] which some top CIA and Pentagon officials reportedly opposed.[178] On 8 April, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tweeted in Hebrew that America's terrorist designation was the fulfillment of "another important request of mine."[179] This designation was criticized by a number of governments including Turkey, Iraq and China as well as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Iran's parliament, in which members wore IRGC uniforms in protest.[180]
On 29 April 2019, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Mulroy said Iran posed five threats. The first was Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. The second was to maritime security in the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab, because a substantial portion of energy trade and commercial goods go through those areas. The third was because of their support to proxies and militant organizations, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, Houthis in Yemen, some Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and safe-harboring senior al-Qaeda leaders in Iran. The fourth was Iranian made ballistic missiles sent to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen for use against Saudi Arabia and to Syria with Hezbollah to use against Israel. Cyber is the fifth threat and a growing concern.[181][182][183] He also said that the terrorist designation did not grant any additional authorities to the Department of Defense and that they were not asking for any.[183]
The IRGC has never been designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations, although the UNSCR 1929 had its assets frozen (this was lifted in 2016). Since 2010, the European Union has imposed broad sanctions on the IRGC and many of its members, without designating it as a terrorist organization.[184][185]
Although Saudi Arabia and Bahrain already designated the IRGC as a terrorist organisation,[186][187] several countries such as Australia are examining the possibility to designate the group as well. Canada outlawed the Quds Force in 2012.[188][189] On 3 October 2022, in reaction to the death of Mahsa Amini and the persecution of protestors in the protests that ensued, Canada officially sanctioned the IRGC. Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly announced sanctions targeting 9 entities, including the Morality Police and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and 25 individuals, that include high-ranking officials and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These individuals include IRGC Commander-in-Chief Major General Hossein Salami, and Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force of the IRGC.[190]
On 7 October 2022, the Canadian government expanded the sanctions, banning 10,000 members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from entering the country permanently, which represents the top 50% of the organization's leadership. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau added that Canada plans to expand the sanctions against those most responsible for Iran's "egregious behavior". Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland added that Iran was a "state sponsor of terror", and that "it is oppressive, theocratic and misogynist; The IRGC leadership are terrorists, the IRGC is a terrorist organization".[191][192]
According to Arab News, a 2020 report by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change said that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is an "institutionalized militia" that "uses its vast resources to spread a 'mission of jihad' through an 'ideological army' of recruits and proxies".[193] In 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the IRGC is "probably the most designated organisation – one way or another – in the world among the organisations that we designate, including the foreign terrorist organisation designation".[194]
In January 2023, it was reported that the United Kingdom was preparing to declare the IRGC a terrorist organization; this did not subsequently occur.[195]
On 18 January 2023, the European Parliament passed an amendment proposed by the ECR Group, to call for the EU and its member states to include the IRGC on the EU's terrorist list.[196]
On 19 June 2024, Canada designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization under the nation's Criminal Code, citing “disregard for human rights” and “willingness to destabilize the international rules-based order.”[30]
In March 2025, the United States reportedly requested the new transitional administration in Syria to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization as a condition for partial sanctions relief.[197]
On 25 April 2025, Paraguay designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization.[14]
On 26 August 2025, Australia indicated that it would designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, pending legislation. This followed attacks on Jewish sites in Australia which the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation determined were directed by the IRGC.[198]
On 16 September 2025, Ecuador designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization alongside Hamas and Hezbollah, citing threats to Ecuador's sovereignty and national security.[199]
Response to terrorist organization designation
[edit]The move was met with unfavorable reactions from Iranian leaders and militants.[200] Shortly after the US announced the designation, the Iranian government declared the United States Central Command, whose area of responsibility includes the Middle East, as a terrorist organization.[201] According to Iran's Supreme National Security Council, the move "was in response to the illegal and unwise move from the U.S."[201] The next day, Iranian Members of Parliament displayed their support of the IRGC by collectively wearing green military pants and chanted "death to America" as they opened session. Iranian president Hassan Rouhani also responded to the move, commenting that it was a mistake which would only increase the IRGC's popularity in Iran and elsewhere.[201]
Since the designation, the United States Department of State's Rewards for Justice Program has offered a reward of up to US$15 million for financial background information about the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its branches,[202] including an IRGC financier, Abdul Reza Shahlai,[b] who it says was responsible for a raid that killed five American soldiers in Karbala, Iraq on 20 January 2007.[205]
Following Canada's designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization, Iran strongly condemned the move. As a result, the Foreign Ministry summoned the Italian ambassador in Tehran, who represents Canadian interests in the country. In a statement, the ministry expressed Iran's “strong protest” over what it described as an “unlawful and internationally illegal” act by the Canadian government. The statement also warned of potential consequences and emphasized Iran's right to take necessary and reciprocal measures. According to the ministry, the Italian ambassador pledged to promptly convey the message to Canadian authorities.[206] Spokesperson Nasser Kanaani called the move “hostile” and contrary to international law while the acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri said on X that the Canadian government will be responsible for the consequences of this provocative and irresponsible decision, referring to the designation.[207]
See also
[edit]- Composite Index of National Capability
- Islamic Republic of Iran Army
- Ministry of Revolutionary Guards
- Rahian-e Noor
- Operations attributed to Israel in Iran
- Economic activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
- Unit 190
- Unit 840
- Iran's ballistic missiles program
- Imam Ali Central Security Headquarters
- Alborz Corps
- Unit 700
- Vali-ye Amr special forces unit
References
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ Persian: سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی, romanized: Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī, lit. 'Army of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution'
- ^ The United States unsuccessfully targeted Abdul Reza Shahlai in Yemen on the same day of assassination of Qasem Soleimani,[203] which led to the death of Mohammad Mirza, a Quds Force operative, instead.[204]
References
[edit]- ^ a b Abedin, Mahan (2011). "Iran's Revolutionary Guards: Ideological But Not Praetorian". Strategic Analysis. 35 (3): 381–385. doi:10.1080/09700161.2011.559965. S2CID 153976967.
- ^ "Timeline of Military and Security Events". United States Institute of Peace. 10 August 2021. Archived from the original on 5 September 2019. Retrieved 17 April 2024.
- ^ a b Nick Pay, Vahid; and Omond, Andrew (2 January 2023). "Military Ideology and Foreign Policy: A Constructivist Examination of the IRGC'S Ideological Influence". Asian Affairs. 54 (1): 18–43. doi:10.1080/03068374.2023.2174687. ISSN 0306-8374.
These efforts flow from Article 11 of the IRGC's 1982 statute, which expressly requires the organisation to train and educate its members according to Islamic teachings and to promote the Khomeinist constitutional principle of velayat-e faqīh (Guardianship of the Jurist) in ideological, political, and military domains
- ^ Shah, Sikander Ahmed (30 April 2024). Federalist Solutions to Pakistan's Political Crises. Lexington Books. p. 170. ISBN 978-1-6669-5546-0.
Iran, already an Islamic Republic, leveraged the Shi'a Islamist Ideology to gain support and recruitment from within and beyond Iran, with a specific view towards defending against threats—real or perceived—to the Shi'a Muslim identity, and to further a revolutionary Shi'a Islamist ideology. Iran's military, specifically the IRGC, is unique in the sense of not only using sectarian differences to effect its political will domestically, but also to further its ideology beyond its national borders, garnering support and traction from Shi'a political pockets across the region.
- ^ "By EXECUTIVE ORDER OF THE SUPREME LEADER, Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi has been appointed as TEMPORARY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE IRGC". X (formerly Twitter). Retrieved 13 June 2025.
- ^ Golkar, Saeid (February 2019), The Supreme Leader and the Guard: Civil-Military Relations and Regime Survival in Iran (PDF) (Policy Watch), The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 3, archived from the original (PDF) on 29 November 2020, retrieved 23 August 2020
- ^ "Iran's Revolutionary Guards: powerful group with wide regional reach". Reuters. 13 April 2024.
- ^ a b c d The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) (2020). "Middle East and North Africa". The Military Balance 2020. Vol. 120. Routledge. pp. 348–352. doi:10.1080/04597222.2020.1707968. ISBN 978-0-367-46639-8. S2CID 219624897.
- ^ Rome, Henry (17 June 2020), "Iran's Defense Spending", The Iran Primer, The United States Institute for Peace, archived from the original on 22 June 2021, retrieved 23 August 2020
- ^ The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will be proscribed as a terrorist organisation. What does this mean?
- ^ "Bahrain Terrorist List (individuals – entities)". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain. Archived from the original on 17 October 2020. Retrieved 3 March 2020.
- ^ "Currently listed entities". Public Safety Canada. Government of Canada. 21 December 2018. Archived from the original on 1 March 2020. Retrieved 2 March 2020.
- ^ "Ecuador Labels IRGC as "Terrorist Organization"". WANA. 16 September 2025. Retrieved 16 September 2025.
- ^ a b "Paraguay hits Iran's IRGC with terrorist designation; expands designations for Hamas, Hezbollah". United Press International. 25 April 2025.
- ^ "Saudi, Bahrain add Iran's Revolutionary Guards to terrorism lists". Reuters. 23 October 2018. Archived from the original on 8 April 2019. Retrieved 8 April 2019.
- ^ "Swedish Parliament Votes To Designate Iran's IRGC As Terrorist". Iran International. 7 June 2023. Archived from the original on 15 May 2023. Retrieved 15 May 2023.
- ^ "Treasury Designates the IRGC under Terrorism Authority and Targets IRGC and Military Supporters under Counter-Proliferation Authority". treasury.gov. Archived from the original on 15 June 2019. Retrieved 28 June 2019.
- ^ "Designation of Terrorist Organizations" (PDF). NBCTF. Retrieved 27 June 2025.
- ^
- "Iranian Revolutionary Guards capture commercial ship in Persian Gulf". The Times of Israel. Archived from the original on 21 June 2024. Retrieved 14 August 2024.
- Rothwell, James (4 January 2023). "Iranian Revolutionary Guards commander mysteriously 'shot dead on doorstep'". The Telegraph. ISSN 0307-1235. Archived from the original on 21 June 2024. Retrieved 14 August 2024.
- "Iranian Revolutionary Guards die in suspected poisoning in Syria – report". The Jerusalem Post. 10 February 2024. ISSN 0792-822X. Archived from the original on 21 June 2024. Retrieved 14 August 2024.
- "Iranian Revolutionary Guard 'on the ground' aiding Russia in Crimea, says intelligence report". Sky News. Archived from the original on 21 June 2024. Retrieved 14 August 2024.
- ^ IISS Military Balance 2006, Routledge for the IISS, London, 2006, p. 187
- ^ "Profile: Iran's Revolutionary Guards" . BBC News. 18 October 2009.
- ^ Morris M Mottale. "The birth of a new class – Focus". Al Jazeera English. Archived from the original on 7 June 2015. Retrieved 29 October 2013.
- ^ a b c "The Consequences of a Strike on Iran: The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy" GlobalBearings.net, 15 December 2011.
- ^ a b Abrahamian, Ervand, History of Modern Iran, Columbia University Press, 2008 pp. 175–76
- ^ Aryan, Hossein (5 February 2009). "Iran's Basij Force – The Mainstay of Domestic Security. 15 January 2009". RFERL. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Archived from the original on 10 January 2012. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
- ^ "Picture imperfect" Archived 12 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine 9 March 2013 The Economist
- ^ "برای حفاظت از تاسیسات هستهای ایران، 'فرماندهی سپاه هستهای' تشکیل شده است" [In order to protect Iran's nuclear facilities, the "Nuclear Corps Command" has been established]. 15 March 2022. Archived from the original on 16 March 2022. Retrieved 23 March 2022.
- ^ Nicole Gaouette (8 April 2019). "Trump designates elite Iranian military force as a terrorist organization". CNN. Archived from the original on 14 May 2019. Retrieved 10 May 2019.
- ^ "Saudi, Bahrain add Iran's IRGC to terror lists – SPA". euronews. 23 October 2018. Archived from the original on 10 May 2019. Retrieved 10 May 2019.
- ^ a b Yousif, Nadine (19 June 2024). "Canada lists Iran's Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist group". BBC News. Archived from the original on 21 June 2024. Retrieved 20 June 2024.
- ^ Gregory, Mark (26 July 2010). "Expanding business empire of Iran's Revolutionary Guards". BBC News. BBC News.
- ^ a b c Hafezi, Parisa (21 April 2019). "Khamenei names new chief for Iran's Revolutionary Guards". Reuters. Archived from the original on 30 July 2019. Retrieved 19 September 2020.
- ^ a b c Slackman, Michael (21 July 2009). "Hard-Line Force Extends Grip Over a Splintered Iran". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 19 July 2016. Retrieved 21 July 2009.
- ^ "Arrests at new Iranian protests". BBC News. 21 July 2009. Archived from the original on 22 July 2009. Retrieved 21 July 2009.
- ^ "Crisis as Opportunity for the IRGC". Stratfor. 27 July 2009. Archived from the original on 5 August 2009. Retrieved 1 August 2009.
- ^ a b c Abdo, Geneive (7 October 2009). "The Rise of the Iranian Dictatorship". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 11 October 2009. Retrieved 13 October 2009.
- ^ Gladstone, Rick (21 April 2019). "Iran's Supreme Leader Replaces Head of Revolutionary Guards". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 22 April 2019. Retrieved 10 May 2019.
- ^ "مرگ سردار سلامی و تنی چند از فرماندهان سپاه". ایرنا (in Persian). 13 June 2025. Retrieved 13 June 2025.
- ^ "Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps". irna.ir. Retrieved 12 February 2019.[dead link]
- ^ "Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, part 2". irib.ir. Archived from the original on 13 February 2019. Retrieved 12 February 2019.
- ^ "The alarming of Islamic revolutionary guard corps chief to the enemies". iribnews.ir. Archived from the original on 13 February 2019. Retrieved 12 February 2019.
- ^ Steven Morris & Ewen MacAskill (7 April 2007). "Someone said, 'Lads, I think we're going to be executed' 7 April 2007". Guardian. London. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
- ^ "Brainroom Facts: Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps". Fox News. 23 March 2007. Archived from the original on 16 October 2012. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
- ^ "Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Quds Force)". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 30 March 2016. Retrieved 7 April 2016.
- ^ Hirsch, Michael; Dehghanpisheh, Babak; Hosenball, Mark (15 February 2007). "The New Enemy?". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 1 April 2007.
- ^ Chua-Eoan, Howard (23 March 2007). "Why Iran Seized the British Marines". Time. Archived from the original on 20 December 2011. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
- ^ "Fact Sheet: Treasury Designates Iranian Entities Tied to the IRGC and IRISL". treasury.gov. Archived from the original on 13 April 2016. Retrieved 7 April 2016.
- ^ "SECURITY COUNCIL TOUGHENS SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, ADDS ARMS EMBARGO, WITH UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION 1747 (2007) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases". un.org. Archived from the original on 13 April 2016. Retrieved 7 April 2016.
- ^ a b "Jane's World Armies profile: Iran". JDW. Jane's Information Group. 29 August 2006. Archived from the original on 3 January 2007. (extract). (subscription required)
- ^ Hughes, Robin (4 October 2006). "Iran and Syria advance SIGINT co-operation". JDW. Janes Information Group. Archived from the original on 3 January 2007.
- ^ "ICL – Iran – Constitution". Archived from the original on 14 November 2007. Retrieved 23 November 2007.
- ^ Ostovar, Afshon P. (2009). "Guardians of the Islamic/muslim Revolution Ideology, Politics, and the Development of Military Power in Iran (1979–2009)" (PhD Thesis). University of Michigan. Archived from the original on 2 October 2013. Retrieved 26 July 2013.
- ^ Frederic Wehrey; Jerrold D. Green; Brian Nichiporuk; Alireza Nader; Lydia Hansell; Rasool Nafisi; S. R. Bohandy (2009). "The Rise of the Pasdaran" (PDF). RAND Corporation. Archived (PDF) from the original on 7 October 2013. Retrieved 20 August 2013.
- ^ a b c d e "Iran's Revolutionary Guards". Council of Foreign Relations. 20 April 2023. Archived from the original on 20 October 2021. Retrieved 2 October 2023.
- ^ Frick, Matthew M. (2008). "Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. An Open Source Analysis" (PDF). JFQ (49). Archived (PDF) from the original on 3 April 2022. Retrieved 11 October 2022.
- ^ a b c d Filkins, Dexter (18 May 2020). "TheTwilight of the Iranian Revolution". New Yorker. Archived from the original on 16 March 2021. Retrieved 7 June 2020.
- ^ a b c Filkins, Dexter (24 May 2020). "The Twilight of the Iranian Revolution". The New Yorker. Archived from the original on 11 October 2022. Retrieved 11 October 2022.
- ^ "State Media Says Iran's Top Nuclear Scientist Killed in Ambush". The New York Times. 27 November 2020. Archived from the original on 27 November 2020. Retrieved 14 March 2022.
- ^ "توزیع جیره غذایی معادل "۲۰ دلار" توسط سپاه و بسیج بین مردم؛ اسحاق جهانگیری: آمریکا در فروپاشی اقتصاد ایران شکست خورده!".
- ^ "IRGC Revamps To Counter Enemy Within « Strategic Policy Consulting, Inc". Spcwashington.com. 22 October 2010. Archived from the original on 9 January 2016. Retrieved 15 November 2011.
- ^ "Supreme Leader: Do Not Let the Enemy Dominate Cyberspace". American Enterprise Institute – AEI. Archived from the original on 7 May 2023. Retrieved 7 May 2023.
- ^ "بررسی ادغام سپاه پاسداران و نيروی بسيج از ديد دکتر عليرضا نوری زاده". 2 October 2007. Archived from the original on 9 January 2024. Retrieved 9 January 2024.
- ^ "تغییرات مهم و تجدید ساختار: سپاه آماده می شود". BBC News فارسی. 8 October 2009. Archived from the original on 9 January 2024. Retrieved 9 January 2024.
- ^ بوالهری, روزبه (5 October 2009). "ادغام بسیج در سپاه؛ آمادگی بیشتر برای مقابله با تظاهرات". رادیو فردا.
- ^ "Iran Told to Prepare for War". The Washington Post. 27 November 1979. Archived from the original on 7 August 2022. Retrieved 11 January 2022.
- ^ "The Basij Resistance Force". Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. 6 October 2010. Archived from the original on 25 December 2022. Retrieved 11 October 2022.
- ^ a b "Q+A-Iran's Revolutionary Guards weave powerful web". Reuters. 23 July 2009. Archived from the original on 26 July 2009. Retrieved 24 July 2009.
- ^ Cordesman, Anthony H. (30 May 2019). "The Iranian Missile Threat". Center for Strategic and International Studies. Archived from the original on 4 June 2023.
- ^ Iran Military Power (PDF). Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. 2019. ISBN 978-0-16-095157-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 June 2021. Retrieved 3 April 2021 – via Defense Intelligence Agency.
- ^ Michael Connell (12 March 2013), Gulf III: Iran's Power in the Sea Lanes, The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, archived from the original on 11 January 2016, retrieved 5 January 2016
- ^ "سرلشکر سلامی: نیروی دریایی سپاه سابقه نبردی موفق در مقابل آمریکا دارد – ایسنا". www.isna.ir. 30 July 2024. Retrieved 14 August 2024.
- ^ "انتخابات ۱۴۰۰ – برخی نهادهای زیرنظر قوه قضائیه، خبرنگاران را برای انتقاد احتمالی از ابراهیم رئیسی "تهدید کردهاند"" [1400 (Solar Hijri calendar) elections – Some institutions under the supervision of the judiciary have "threatened" journalists for possible criticism of Ebrahim Raisi.]. Voice of America. 19 May 2021. Archived from the original on 19 May 2021. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
- ^ Amir Toumaj (2 April 2017). "Qassem Soleimani reportedly spotted in Syria's Hama province". Long War Journal. Retrieved 3 April 2017.
- ^ Jamal, Ahmad Shuja (March 2019). "The Fatemiyoun Army:Reintegration into Afghan Society" (PDF). United States Institute of Peace. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 July 2019. Retrieved 24 August 2021.
- ^ Cairo, Waleed Abu al-Khair in. "IRGC chief directs foreign mercenaries in Syria". Diyaruna. Retrieved 23 June 2025.
- ^ "التعرف على جثة امر لواء زينبيون الايراني الذي قتل في سوريا بنيران داعش الارهابي قبل عامين" [Identification of the body of the order of the Iranian Zainabiyoun Brigade, who was killed in Syria by ISIS terrorist fire two years ago]. IraqNewspaper.net (in Arabic). 12 June 2019.
- ^ Cairo, Waleed Abu al-Khair in. "IRGC chief directs foreign mercenaries in Syria". Diyaruna. Retrieved 23 June 2025.
- ^ "Meet the Zainebiyoun Brigade: An Iranian Backed Pakistani Shia Militia Fighting in Syria". Archived from the original on 2 May 2016. Retrieved 28 April 2016.
- ^ "frontline: terror and Tehran: inside Iran: the structure of power in Iran". PBS. Archived from the original on 1 June 2012. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
- ^ Zeev Schiff (1 November 2006). Israel's War With Iran Archived 12 September 2017 at the Wayback Machine. New York Times.
- ^ "Israel: Iran Aided Hezbollah Ship Attack". The Washington Post. 15 July 2006. Archived from the original on 30 October 2019. Retrieved 17 November 2016.
- ^ "Plane crash kills Iran commander". BBC News. 9 January 2006. Archived from the original on 30 March 2012. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
- ^ Military Plane Crashes in Iran; Senior Officer and 12 Others Die Archived 8 January 2018 at the Wayback Machine, New York Times, 10 January 2006.
- ^ Hersh, Seymour (7 July 2008). "Preparing the Battlefield: The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran". The New Yorker.
- ^ "Larijani Blames US for Terrorist Attack on IRGC Commanders" Archived 12 January 2012 at the Wayback Machine. Fars News Agency. 18 October 2009.
- ^ "Iran vows response to suicide blast" Archived 6 August 2011 at the Wayback Machine. Al Jazeera. 18 October 2009.
- ^ Police Chief Holds Pakistan Accountable for Terror Attack in Iran Archived 11 January 2012 at the Wayback Machine. Fars News Agency. 21 October 2009.
- ^ Derakhsi, Reza (19 October 2009). "US, UK behind attack on Guards, claims Iran" Archived 10 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine. The Independent.
- ^ "Consider Jundallah's Attack in a Wider Context". Pulsemedia.org. 18 October 2009. Archived from the original on 17 December 2011. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
- ^ Dareini, Ali Akbar (21 October 2009). "Iran arrests suspects in attack on military chiefs". The Seattle Times. Tehran. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 14 July 2012.
- ^ a b Iran boosts support to Syria Archived 29 May 2018 at the Wayback Machine, Telegraph, 21 February 2014
- ^ "Iran confirms sending troops to Syria, says bloodshed otherwise would be worse". Al Arabiya. 28 May 2012. Archived from the original on 2 July 2012. Retrieved 29 August 2012.
- ^ Karouny, Mariam (9 June 2013). "Syrian forces capture final rebel stronghold in Qusair region". Reuters. Archived from the original on 13 June 2013. Retrieved 26 July 2013.
- ^ Neriah, Jacques (29 May 2013). "Iranian Forces on the Golan?". Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs. JCPA. Archived from the original on 13 August 2013. Retrieved 26 July 2013.
- ^ "Mapping the Deaths of Iranian Officers Across Syria". 30 October 2015. Archived from the original on 31 October 2015. Retrieved 1 November 2015.
- ^ "Iranian media is revealing that scores of the country's fighters are dying in Syria". The Washington Post. 27 November 2015. Archived from the original on 27 November 2015. Retrieved 27 November 2015.
- ^ "Number of Iranian, Afghani fighters killed in Syrian civil war hits 400". Trend. 27 June 2015. Archived from the original on 20 October 2015. Retrieved 28 October 2015.
- ^ a b "Iran's involvement in Syria, units and losses October 2015" Archived 19 November 2015 at the Wayback Machine, PBS/Levantine Group, 29 October 2015, citing Iranian state media.
- ^ a b "Iran's Afghan Shiite Fighters in Syria" Archived 24 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine, Washington Institute, 3 June 2015
- ^ "Shiite Combat Casualties Show the Depth of Iran's Involvement in Syria". Archived from the original on 4 August 2015. Retrieved 3 August 2015.
- ^ The report came from "officers in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as websites affiliated with it", according to an unsympathetic source (MEMRI)
- ^ a b "IRGC-Affiliated Website: Some 30 IRGC Officers Killed On Syrian Front In The Past Two Weeks". MEMRI. 30 October 2015. Archived from the original on 1 November 2015. Retrieved 1 November 2015.
- ^ Sepanews.com, 10 October 2015
- ^ "US under pressure to act as Iran helps Iraq fight al-Qa'ida". Irish Independent. Archived from the original on 13 June 2014. Retrieved 13 June 2014.
- ^ Chulov, Martin (7 December 2014). "Qassem Suleimani: can this man bring about the downfall of Isis?". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 8 January 2018.
- ^ "Iranian general killed by sniper bullet in embattled Iraqi city". Reuters. 28 December 2014. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017.
- ^ Dehghanpisheh, Babak (27 May 2017). "Senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard killed fighting Islamic State in Iraq: Tasnim". Reuters. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017.
- ^ "US attacks Iran-backed militia in Iraq and Syria". 30 December 2019. Archived from the original on 12 January 2020. Retrieved 12 January 2020.
- ^ "Attack on US Embassy exposes widening US-Iraq divide on Iran". Associated Press News. 2 January 2020. Archived from the original on 15 January 2020. Retrieved 12 January 2020.
- ^ "US kills Iran's most powerful general in Baghdad airstrike". Associated Press News. 2 January 2020. Archived from the original on 3 January 2020. Retrieved 12 January 2020.
- ^ a b "Iran says it shot down Israeli drone". Al Jazeera English. 24 August 2014. Archived from the original on 26 August 2014. Retrieved 24 August 2014.
- ^ a b "Iran 'shoots down Israeli drone' near Natanz nuclear site". BBC News. 24 August 2014. Archived from the original on 24 August 2014. Retrieved 24 August 2014.
- ^ a b Balali, Mehrdad; Moghtader, Michelle (24 August 2014). "Iran says it shoots down Israeli spy drone". Reuters. Archived from the original on 26 August 2014. Retrieved 24 August 2014.
- ^ "Iran plane crash: Khamenei defends armed forces in rare address". BBC News. 17 January 2020. Archived from the original on 8 June 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
- ^ "Suleimani's death stifled rebellion in Iran. But a downed jetliner reignites dissent". Los Angeles Times. 11 January 2020. Archived from the original on 12 January 2020. Retrieved 12 January 2020.
- ^ "Iran admits to 'unintentionally' shooting down Ukrainian airliner, blames 'human error'". Los Angeles Times. 13 January 2020. Archived from the original on 14 January 2020. Retrieved 14 January 2020.
- ^ "Iran's Khamenei defends Revolutionary Guard in rare Friday sermon". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 17 January 2020. Retrieved 18 January 2020.
- ^ "Iran frees 2 soldiers kidnapped in Pakistan". Anadolu Agency. 3 February 2021. Archived from the original on 4 February 2021. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
- ^ Madhani, Aamer; Miller, Zeke (21 October 2022). "US: Iranian troops in Crimea backing Russian drone strikes". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 3 May 2023. Retrieved 22 October 2022.
- ^ Hird, Karolina; Mappes, Grace; Bailey, Riley; Howard, Angela; Kagan, Frederick W. (25 November 2022). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 25". Institute for the Study of War. Archived from the original on 14 December 2023. Retrieved 26 November 2022.
- ^ Hird, Karolina; Bailey, Riley; Mappes, Grace; Barros, George; Kagan, Frederick W. (12 October 2022). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 12". Institute for the Study of War. Archived from the original on 14 January 2024. Retrieved 26 November 2022.
- ^ "Mapping the wide-scale Iranian drone and missile attacks". Washington Post. 14 April 2024. Archived from the original on 14 April 2024. Retrieved 14 April 2024.
- ^ Tanyos, Faris; Tabachnick, Cara (13 April 2024). "Iran launches drones toward Israel in retaliatory attack after consulate strike in Syria". CBS News. Archived from the original on 13 April 2024. Retrieved 13 April 2024.
- ^ "Israeli strike on Iran's consulate in Syria killed 2 generals and 5 other officers, Iran says". AP News. 1 April 2024. Archived from the original on 19 April 2024. Retrieved 19 April 2024.
- ^ McKernan, Bethan; Graham-Harrison, Emma; Borger, Julian; Beaumont, Peter (14 April 2024). "Iran launches hundreds of drones and cruise missiles at Israel in unprecedented attack". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 14 April 2024. Retrieved 14 April 2024.
- ^ "The largest drone attack in history". iranpress.com. 14 April 2024.
- ^ Motamedi, Maziar. "'True Promise': Why and how did Iran launch a historic attack on Israel?". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 14 April 2024. Retrieved 14 April 2024.
- ^ Johny, Stanly (14 April 2024). "Analysis: By attacking Israel, Iran turns shadow war into direct conflict". The Hindu. Archived from the original on 14 April 2024. Retrieved 14 April 2024.
- ^ "Israel launches strike against Iran". Politico.
- ^ Regalado, Francesca; Ward, Euan; Fassihi, Farnaz; Granados, Samuel; Chutel, Lynsey (13 June 2025). "These Are Iranian Generals and Scientists Killed by Israel". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 6 July 2025.
- ^ "18 of Iran's 21 new ministers hail from Revolutionary Guards, secret police". Iran Focus. 14 August 2005. Archived from the original on 22 February 2012. Retrieved 22 July 2009.
- ^ Roy, Olivier, The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East, Columbia University Press, 2008, p.133, 135
- ^ a b c d e f Wehrey; et al. (2009). The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-4620-8. Archived from the original on 15 June 2010. Retrieved 20 June 2015. in full Archived 2 October 2012 at the Wayback Machine brief summary Archived 2 October 2012 at the Wayback Machine(PDF)
- ^ Daragahi, Borzou. (6 July 2009). "Iran's Revolutionary Guard acknowledges taking a bigger role in nation's security" Archived 10 July 2009 at the Wayback Machine. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 9 July 2009.
- ^ "Profile: Iran's Revolutionary Guards". BBC News. 26 October 2007. Archived from the original on 27 December 2008. Retrieved 27 December 2008.
- ^ Ganji, Akbar (10 November 2013). "Revolutionary Pragmatists". Foreign Affairs. Archived from the original on 5 March 2020. Retrieved 12 November 2013.
The Revolutionary Guards are no longer simply a military institution. They are among the country's most important economic actors, controlling an estimated ten percent of the economy, directly and through various subsidiaries.
- ^ Murphy, Kim (26 August 2007). "Iran's $12-billion enforcers". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 11 October 2012. Retrieved 27 December 2008.
- ^ Moaveni, Azadeh (5 September 2007). "Iran's Rich Revolutionary Guard". Time. Archived from the original on 1 December 2008. Retrieved 27 December 2008.
- ^ a b "Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism". United States Department of the Treasury. 25 October 2007. Archived from the original on 23 July 2009. Retrieved 24 July 2009.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Ilias, Shayerah (12 June 2008). "CRS Report for Congress – Iran's Economy – Order Code RL34525" (PDF). Congressional Research Service, U.S. State Department. Archived (PDF) from the original on 27 June 2017. Retrieved 25 June 2017.
- ^ "Iran's Rev. Guard buys stake in Iran telecom". AP: Newsday.com. 27 September 2009.
- ^ Slackman, Michael (8 October 2009). "Elite Guard in Iran Tightens Grip With Media Move" Archived 10 November 2016 at the Wayback Machine. New York Times.
- ^ Sayami, Ardalan (23 March 2010). "1388: Year of Militarization of Iran's Economy". Payvand News. Archived from the original on 26 March 2010. Retrieved 16 June 2010.
- ^ "U.S. Sanctions Target Iranian-Linked 'Front Company Network'". Radiofreeeurope/Radioliberty. Archived from the original on 23 April 2022. Retrieved 23 April 2022.
- ^ "Israel seizes millions in Iran Quds Force, Hezbollah crypto assets". Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 11 October 2023. Retrieved 28 June 2023.
- ^ Hakamian, Mahmoud (11 November 2024). "Iran's military-security budget to increase by 200 percent |". People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran. Retrieved 11 May 2025.
- ^ "Iran's Military Budget: A Quarter of the Nation's Finances Amid Economic Challenges". Iran Open Data Center. 19 September 2024. Retrieved 11 May 2025.
- ^ Calabrese, Dr John (23 May 2024). "Iran: Running Out of Time to Avoid Running Out of Water?". Modern Diplomacy. Retrieved 20 July 2025.
- ^ Qaed, Anas Al (16 May 2023). "The Economic Empire of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran". Gulf International Forum. Retrieved 20 July 2025.
- ^ esennett (15 May 2025). "Feeding the 'water mafia': Sanctions relief and Iran's water crisis". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 20 July 2025.
- ^ a b Khalaji, Mehdi (17 August 2007). "Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps, Inc". The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Archived from the original on 26 September 2012. Retrieved 11 October 2012.
- ^ a b c d e f Bruno, Greg and Jayshree Bajoria (12 October 2011). "Iran's Revolutionary Guards". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 12 November 2012. Retrieved 11 October 2012.
- ^ a b c Alfoneh 2008, p. 3.
- ^ Alfoneh 2008, p. 6.
- ^ Alfoneh 2008, p. 7.
- ^ a b c d "Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran's Support for Terrorism Treasury Announces New Sanctions Against Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force Leadership". U.S. Department of the Treasury. 3 August 2010. Archived from the original on 9 May 2019.
- ^ "The Revolutionary Guards' Media Cartels". Archived from the original on 24 March 2022. Retrieved 24 March 2022.
- ^ "Warrior, Interrogator, Artist; The Man Who Leads IRGC's Cultural Onslaught". RFE/RL. 11 August 2020. Archived from the original on 9 May 2022. Retrieved 24 March 2022.
- ^ "نبیل: کار تشکیل نیروی مشابه به سپاه پاسداران ایران در قندهار تکمیل است" (in Persian). 30 October 2023. Archived from the original on 3 November 2023. Retrieved 3 November 2023.
- ^ "Iran's Revolutionary Guards: Showing who's boss". Economist.com. 27 August 2009. Archived from the original on 2 September 2009. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
- ^ "Iran's resilient opposition: The regime's ramparts are shaky". Economist.com. 10 December 2009. Archived from the original on 4 February 2010. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
- ^ Erlich, Reese; Scheer, Robert (2007). The Iran Agenda. PoliPointPress. p. 80. ISBN 9780977825356. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
iran revolutionary guard liquor.
- ^ Baer, p. 250.
- ^ "The Attack in the Golan Exposes Iran's Growing Presence along Israel's Borders". Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA). 19 January 2015. Archived from the original on 21 January 2015. Retrieved 29 January 2015.
- ^ Mazzetti, Mark (1 January 2009). "Striking Deep Into Israel, Hamas Employs an Upgraded Rocket Arsenal Archived 17 April 2009 at the Wayback Machine". New York Times.
- ^ "Iran's Revolutionary Guards patrol Persian Gulf, U.S. says". CNN. 29 November 2007. Archived from the original on 6 November 2012. Retrieved 25 December 2011.
- ^ Grandjean, Guy (30 December 2009). "Revealed: hand of Iran behind Britons' Baghdad kidnapping". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on 18 April 2010. Retrieved 25 April 2010.
- ^ "Iran directly behind tanker attacks off UAE coast, US says". Gulf news. 25 May 2019. Archived from the original on 4 June 2019. Retrieved 3 June 2019.
- ^ "Fact Check: How Big of a Lie is the Guards' Coronavirus Detector?". Archived from the original on 29 November 2021. Retrieved 23 March 2022.
- ^ Saliba, Emmanuelle; Gharagozlou, Leila (20 April 2020). "Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps says its handheld device can detect coronavirus, scientists scoff". NBC News. Archived from the original on 17 October 2022. Retrieved 17 October 2022.
- ^ "Iran's IRGC doubles down on claims of coronavirus detection machine – Al-Monitor: Independent, trusted coverage of the Middle East". Al-Monitor. 16 April 2020. Archived from the original on 17 October 2022. Retrieved 17 October 2022.
- ^ "Iranians Make Fun Of 'Coronavirus Detection Device' Promoted By Revolutionary Guard". Radio Farda. 13 July 2020. Archived from the original on 17 October 2022. Retrieved 17 October 2022.
- ^ "Iran's IRGC responsible for antisemitic attacks in Germany – report". Jerusalem Post. 1 December 2022. Archived from the original on 3 December 2022. Retrieved 3 December 2022.
- ^ "UK officials probe Iran generals' antisemitic talks to students". BBC News. 22 January 2024. Archived from the original on 19 April 2024. Retrieved 16 April 2024.
- ^ Leishman, Fiona (24 July 2024). "Iranian President narrowly escapes assassination plot after his car is sabotaged". The Mirror. Retrieved 24 July 2024.
- ^ "Former Iranian president Ahmadinejad narrowly escapes assassination attempt – Türkiye Today". Archived from the original on 26 July 2024. Retrieved 24 July 2024.
- ^ Brice, Makini (15 April 2019). "U.S. officially designates Iran's Revolutionary Guards a terrorist group". Reuters. Archived from the original on 16 April 2019. Retrieved 16 April 2019.
- ^ Wong, Edward; Schmitt, Eric (8 April 2019). "Trump Designates Iran's Revolutionary Guard a Foreign Terrorist Group". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 8 April 2019. Retrieved 8 April 2019.
- ^ Kershner, Isabel; Halbfinger, David M. (9 April 2019). "Exit Polls Suggest No Clear Winner in Israeli Election". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 10 April 2019. Retrieved 9 April 2019.
- ^ "Iran condemns, reciprocates designation of IRGC as terrorist organization – Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East". 8 April 2019. Archived from the original on 22 April 2019. Retrieved 22 April 2019.
- ^ "Middle East Security Still Critical To US, Says Pentagon Official". eurasiareview.com. 2 May 2019. Archived from the original on 5 May 2019. Retrieved 5 May 2019.
- ^ "Middle East Strategic Alliance Effort Aimed at Stabilization". Archived from the original on 5 May 2019. Retrieved 5 May 2019.
- ^ a b "Syria and Middle East Security, Michael Mulroy Remarks | C-SPAN.org". Archived from the original on 30 June 2019. Retrieved 2 July 2019.
- ^ "Europe Stays Silent over Designation of Guards as 'Terrorist Group'". 13 April 2019. Archived from the original on 22 April 2019. Retrieved 22 April 2019.
- ^ "Sanctions Tally – European Union | Iran Watch". Archived from the original on 22 April 2019. Retrieved 22 April 2019.
- ^ "Saudi, Bahrain add Iran's Revolutionary Guards to terrorism lists". Reuters. 23 October 2018. Archived from the original on 8 April 2019. Retrieved 8 April 2019.
- ^ Ballhaus, Rebecca (8 April 2019). "U.S. Designates Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Terror Organization". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 8 April 2019. Retrieved 8 April 2019.
- ^ "Will Canada also designate the IRGC as a foreign terrorist entity?". 16 April 2019. Archived from the original on 22 April 2019. Retrieved 22 April 2019.
- ^ "Australia and the IRGC: Is a ban necessary?". 9 April 2019. Archived from the original on 22 April 2019. Retrieved 22 April 2019.
- ^ "Canada slaps new sanctions on Iran over death of Mahsa Amini". globalnews.ca. 3 October 2022. Archived from the original on 7 October 2022. Retrieved 7 October 2022.
- ^ "Canada bans more than 10K Iran Revolutionary Guard members from entering country". globalnews.ca. 7 October 2022. Archived from the original on 7 October 2022. Retrieved 7 October 2022.
- ^ "Canada to ban Iran's IRGC leaders from entry, expand sanctions". Reuters. 7 October 2022. Archived from the original on 7 October 2022. Retrieved 7 October 2022.
- ^ "Report compares Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Daesh, Al-Qaeda". Arab News. 4 February 2020. Archived from the original on 8 February 2020. Retrieved 8 February 2020.
- ^ "Focus on the IRGC 'terror' designation in Iran nuclear talks". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 1 April 2022. Retrieved 1 April 2022.
- ^ "Iran's Revolutionary Guards set to be labelled as terrorist group by UK". BBC News. BBC News. 3 January 2023. Archived from the original on 3 January 2023. Retrieved 3 January 2023.
- ^ "PV-9-2023-01-18-RCV_FR" (PDF). European Parliament. 18 January 2022. pp. 57–58. Archived (PDF) from the original on 19 January 2023. Retrieved 18 January 2022.
- ^ "US offers Syrian government conditions for limited sanctions relief". AL-Monitor: The Middle Eastʼs leading independent news source since 2012. Retrieved 2 April 2025.
- ^ "Australia expels Iranian ambassador after ASIO says it directed antisemitic attacks". ABC News. 26 August 2025. Retrieved 26 August 2025.
- ^ "Ecuador Labels IRGC as "Terrorist Organization"". WANA. 16 September 2025. Retrieved 16 September 2025.
- ^ Clarke, Colin (11 April 2019). "The Revolutionary Guards Are Ready to Strike Back". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 21 April 2019.
- ^ a b c Eqbali, Aresu (8 April 2019). "Iran Labels U.S. Central Command a Terrorist Organization". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 9 May 2019.
- ^ "Act of Terror: Information on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps". Rewards for Justice. Archived from the original on 22 December 2021. Retrieved 14 December 2019.
- ^ "On the day U.S. forces killed Soleimani, they targeted a senior Iranian official in Yemen". The Washington Post. 10 January 2020. Archived from the original on 11 January 2020. Retrieved 11 January 2020.
- ^ "U.S. Strike on Iranian Commander in Yemen the Night of Suleimani's Assassination Killed the Wrong Man". The Intercept. 10 January 2020. Archived from the original on 18 October 2021. Retrieved 11 January 2020.
- ^ "US offering $15 million for info on Iranian planner of 2007 Karbala attack that killed 5 US troops". Military Times. 5 December 2019. Archived from the original on 17 December 2021. Retrieved 14 December 2019.
- ^ "Iran Summons Italian Envoy to Protest Canada's Listing of IRGC as Terrorist". Iran International. 20 June 2024. Retrieved 2 May 2025.
- ^ "Iran summons Italy envoy over Canada sanctions". Al Arabiya English. 21 June 2024. Retrieved 2 May 2025.
Sources
[edit]- Alfoneh, Ali (Fall 2008). "The Revolutionary Guards' Role in Iranian Politics". Middle East Quarterly. 15 (4): 3–14. Retrieved 11 October 2012.
Further reading
[edit]- Azizi, Arash (November 2020). The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US, and Iran's Global Ambitions. New York: Oneworld Publications. ISBN 9781786079442.
- Alemzadeh, Maryam (2021). "The attraction of direct action: the making of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Iranian Kurdish conflict". British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 50 (3): 589–608. doi:10.1080/13530194.2021.1990013. S2CID 239554621.
- Hesam Forozan, The Military in Post-Revolutionary Iran: The Evolution and Roles of the Revolutionary Guards, c. 2017
- Safshekan, Roozbeh; Sabet, Farzan, "The Ayatollah's Praetorians: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 2009 Election Crisis", The Middle East Journal, Volume 64, Number 4, Autumn 2010, pp. 543–558(16).
- Wise, Harold Lee (2007). Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987–88. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-970-5. (discusses U.S. military clashes with Iranian Revolutionary Guard during the Iran–Iraq War)
- Posch, Walter (2024). "The Iranian Security Apparatus" (PDF). Vienna: Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie.
- Johny, Shelly (2007). "Iranian Political System and the IRGC" (PDF). Air Power. 2 (3): 111–137. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 June 2025.
External links
[edit]- Official media news outlet used by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (in Persian) (archived)
- Vali Nasr and Ali Gheissari (13 December 2004) "Foxes in Iran's Henhouse", New York Times op-ed article about the growing IRGC role in Iran's power structure
- David Ignatius (17 April 2008) "A Blast Still Reverberating" Washington Post Discussion of 1983 Beirut US Embassy bombing
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
View on GrokipediaThe Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC; Persian: سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی, Sepâh-e Pasdârân-e Enqelâb-e Eslâmi, lit. 'Army of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution'; motto: وَأَعِدُّوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ, Quran 8:60, translating to "Prepare against them what you believers can of military power") is a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces established in May 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini immediately following the Iranian Revolution, with the core mandate to safeguard the Islamic Republic's revolutionary ideology, political system, and institutions against perceived internal dissent and external aggression.[1][2][3] Functioning as an ideologically motivated parallel to Iran's conventional army (Artesh), the IRGC maintains independent ground forces, a navy focused on asymmetric warfare in the Persian Gulf, an aerospace command overseeing ballistic missiles and drones, the Quds Force for directing proxy militias and extraterritorial operations across the Middle East, and the Basij Resistance Force as a mass paramilitary network for domestic suppression and mobilization.[1][3][4] The organization has expanded its influence through extensive economic control via state-linked conglomerates that manage construction, telecommunications, oil, and smuggling networks, enabling it to evade international sanctions and fund operations independently of central government oversight.[1][5][6] The IRGC's defining characteristics include its role in exporting Iran's revolutionary doctrine via support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, which has fueled regional conflicts and attacks on civilian targets, leading to its designation as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States in 2019, Canada in 2024, Australia in 2025, and the European Union in 2026, and similar listings or sanctions by other Western governments for institutional involvement in terrorism and human rights abuses.[7][8][9] Its military capabilities, including short-range ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles deployed in recent proxy engagements, underscore its prioritization of asymmetric power projection over conventional defense.[10][11]
Establishment and Ideology
Founding and Legal Framework
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), formally known as Sepāh-e Pasdāran-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi, was founded by decree of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on April 5, 1979, shortly after the victory of the Iranian Revolution, to consolidate disparate paramilitary militias that had emerged to defend the nascent Islamic Republic against internal dissent and potential military coups.[12][13] Khomeini explicitly tasked the IRGC with protecting the revolution's ideological purity and achievements, distinguishing it from the regular Iranian Army (Artesh), which was viewed with suspicion due to its ties to the overthrown Pahlavi monarchy and perceived loyalty risks.[1][2] This separation ensured the IRGC's primary focus on regime preservation rather than conventional territorial defense, reflecting Khomeini's first-hand experience with praetorian guard failures in other revolutions.[14] The IRGC's establishment predated the formal adoption of Iran's 1979 Constitution, which was approved by referendum on December 2–3, 1979, but provided its enduring legal foundation under Article 150.[15] This article mandates the IRGC's perpetual role in "guarding the Revolution and its achievements," extending to ideological missions such as global jihad to propagate divine sovereignty, while maintaining organizational independence from the Army yet cooperating on border security and related duties.[15][16] The provision underscores the IRGC's dual military-ideological character, positioning it as a parallel force loyal directly to the Supreme Leader, bypassing conventional chains of command under the Ministry of Defense.[1] Subsequent laws, including the 1982 Statute of the IRGC, further delineated its administrative, financial, and operational autonomy, reinforcing its status as a state institution exempt from typical parliamentary oversight.[16]Core Mandate and Doctrinal Principles
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), known in Persian as Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami, was founded by a decree from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on April 22, 1979, shortly after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, with its first units becoming operational on May 5, 1979.[17] [12] Khomeini's directive explicitly tasked the IRGC with consolidating disparate revolutionary militias into a unified force to guard against internal subversion, potential coups modeled on the 1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, and external aggression, thereby serving as an ideological bulwark parallel to the conventional Artesh armed forces.[1] This mandate prioritizes the preservation of the revolution's theocratic foundations over conventional territorial defense, positioning the IRGC as the regime's primary enforcer of doctrinal fidelity.[18] Doctrinally, the IRGC's principles are anchored in Khomeini's doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), which vests absolute authority in the Supreme Leader as the earthly deputy of the Hidden Imam, rendering obedience to him equivalent to divine command.[18] [4] The organization's charter, approved by Iran's Majlis in October 1982, mandates the ideological indoctrination of personnel through Islamic teachings, emphasizing amr bil ma'ruf wa nahi anil munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil) as a perpetual duty that justifies preemptive action against perceived threats to sharia governance.[4] This framework rejects secular nationalism in favor of a transnational Shia Islamist worldview, framing conflicts as existential holy wars (jihad fi sabil Allah) between believers and unbelievers, with Quranic injunctions (e.g., Surah al-Anfal 8:60) invoked to legitimize armament and expansionism in preparation for the Mahdi's return.[4] The IRGC's doctrinal orientation extends to an explicit mission of exporting the revolution, as articulated in Iran's 1979 Constitution (Article 150) and reinforced in IRGC training modules, which obligate the use of state resources for military, political, and cultural operations to propagate velayat-e faqih globally and dismantle non-Islamic regimes.[4] This includes fostering alliances with Shia militias and "oppressed" groups against adversaries like the United States, Israel, and Sunni monarchies, viewing such efforts as fulfilling Khomeini's vision of Islam's triumph over "arrogant powers."[1] [4] Internally, the principles demand unyielding loyalty to the Supreme Leader, with deviation equated to apostasy, enabling the IRGC to suppress dissent as a defense of revolutionary purity rather than mere political control.[18] While official rhetoric portrays this as defensive jihad, the doctrine's emphasis on offensive propagation has sustained proxy networks, underscoring a causal link between ideological absolutism and Iran's regional destabilization.[1] [4]Organizational Structure
Command Hierarchy and Leadership
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains a centralized command hierarchy under the direct authority of Iran's Supreme Leader, who serves as the ultimate commander-in-chief of the armed forces and appoints the IRGC's top leadership, including the Commander-in-Chief and heads of major branches such as the Ground Forces, Aerospace Force, Navy, and Quds Force.[1][16] This structure ensures the IRGC's loyalty to the theocratic regime, operating parallel to and independent from Iran's regular army (Artesh) and bypassing oversight by the elected president or Ministry of Defense.[1] The Supreme Leader's representative within the IRGC further embeds ideological oversight, enforcing adherence to velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist).[19] The IRGC Commander-in-Chief holds operational control over all branches, including the extraterritorial Quds Force and the domestic Basij militia, with a deputy commander assisting in administration and a joint staff coordinating inter-branch activities. Subordinate levels include 31 provincial corps (each mirroring the national structure with ground, intelligence, and cultural units), district commands, and specialized units reporting upward through regional commanders.[16] Appointments to senior roles emphasize ideological purity and combat experience, often drawn from veterans of the Iran-Iraq War, fostering a network of informal influence among long-serving officers.[20] Historically, the position of IRGC Commander-in-Chief has seen continuity under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, with key figures including Mohsen Rezaee (1981–1997), who expanded the force during the Iran-Iraq War; Yahya Rahim Safavi (1997–2007), who prioritized asymmetric warfare capabilities; Mohammad Ali Jafari (2007–2019), who reorganized branches for hybrid operations; and Hossein Salami (April 2019–June 13, 2025), who oversaw missile advancements and proxy expansions until killed in Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian nuclear sites.[21][22] On June 13, 2025, Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour, previously a deputy operations chief and provincial commander, as permanent Commander-in-Chief, signaling a shift toward hardened operational leadership amid escalating regional tensions.[23] Pakpour's tenure has involved rapid personnel replacements, including Brigadier General Mohammad Karami as Ground Forces commander on June 19, 2025.[24] This hierarchy prioritizes rapid decision-making for both domestic suppression and foreign expeditions, with the Quds Force commander (currently Esmail Qaani, appointed January 2020 following Qasem Soleimani's death) enjoying semi-autonomous status under the Commander-in-Chief for overseas operations.[1] Internal promotions and loyalty purges, such as Jafari's 2019 replacement amid perceived inefficacy against protests, underscore the system's adaptability to regime threats while maintaining clerical dominance.[25]Military Branches and Units
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains a parallel military structure to Iran's regular army (Artesh), comprising specialized branches focused on ideological defense, asymmetric warfare, and regime protection. These branches include the Ground Forces, Aerospace Force, Navy, Quds Force, and Basij Resistance Force, each designed to operate independently while coordinating under IRGC central command. This organization emphasizes rapid mobilization, missile-centric deterrence, and paramilitary integration over conventional symmetry with peer adversaries.[26][1] The IRGC Ground Forces, known as Nezsa, form the core land component, structured around provincial headquarters that coordinate paramilitary and conventional units for territorial defense and internal stabilization. They encompass 10 divisions specializing in infantry, artillery, armored warfare, and engineering, with ranks spanning 17 levels to facilitate hierarchical control. These forces prioritize defensive depth and integration with Basij militias, maintaining an order of battle oriented toward last-resort reserves rather than offensive maneuver.[27][28] The Aerospace Force oversees Iran's ballistic and cruise missile arsenal, drone operations, air defense systems, and nascent space program, functioning as the IRGC's strategic deterrent arm. Divided into subunits for surface-to-surface missiles, air defense, aviation (including helicopters and limited fixed-wing assets), and unmanned aerial vehicles, it has conducted flight tests and satellite launches, such as the Qased vehicle in 2020, to extend reach beyond regional theaters. This branch's emphasis on indigenous development, including hypersonic prototypes, reflects a doctrine of standoff precision strikes over air superiority.[29][30][31] The IRGC Navy concentrates on littoral asymmetric tactics in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, employing swarms of fast-attack craft, anti-ship missiles, and midget submarines to deny access rather than project blue-water power. Organized into five divisions—fleet operations, missile units, marine commandos, naval aviation, and drones—it maintains regional bases for rapid deployment, with assets like Houdong-class boats enabling hit-and-run interdiction. This structure supports Iran's anti-access/area-denial strategy, prioritizing disruption of maritime commerce over fleet engagements.[32][33] The Quds Force serves as the IRGC's extraterritorial branch, specializing in unconventional warfare, proxy cultivation, and covert operations abroad to export revolutionary influence. It coordinates training, arming, and advising allied militias in regions like the Middle East and beyond, drawing on specialized units for intelligence and sabotage since its formal establishment in 1988. Unlike domestic branches, its mandate extends to direct combat support, as seen in Syrian interventions alongside regime allies.[1][34][35] The Basij Resistance Force operates as a mass-mobilization paramilitary under IRGC oversight, recruiting volunteers for ideological enforcement, crowd control, and auxiliary combat roles. Structured into provincial battalions such as Ashura units and specialized organizations like the Professors Basij, it integrates millions of part-time members into IRGC operations, emphasizing human-wave tactics and societal penetration over professional standing armies. This branch bolsters the IRGC's domestic resilience by embedding regime loyalty at grassroots levels.[36][26][37]Personnel Strength and Recruitment
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains an estimated 150,000 to 190,000 active personnel across its ground forces, navy, aerospace force, and other specialized units, excluding the Basij paramilitary militia.[1] This figure reflects core professional forces dedicated to operational roles, with ground forces comprising the largest component at over 150,000 troops organized into provincial units.[1] Personnel estimates derive primarily from U.S. intelligence assessments, which account for IRGC's parallel structure to Iran's regular military (Artesh) and its exemption from mandatory conscription, favoring selective enlistment instead.[1] The Basij Resistance Force, a volunteer paramilitary arm subordinate to the IRGC, claims a potential mobilization capacity of 10 million members, though active and trained operatives number in the low millions at most, with estimates ranging from 1.5 million to over 10 million depending on mobilization levels.[37][38] Basij ranks swell during crises through rapid call-ups from neighborhood bases, universities, and workplaces, but sustained active strength is constrained by training and equipping limitations, often relying on light arms and ideological motivation rather than full-time professionalization.[37] IRGC recruitment prioritizes ideological loyalty to the Supreme Leader and the principles of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, employing a vetting process distinct from the conscription-based system of the Artesh.[39] Candidates, typically volunteers rather than draftees, undergo extensive background checks, ideological indoctrination, and physical assessments conducted through IRGC-affiliated institutions, including specialized universities like Imam Hussein University.[4] This selective approach ensures recruits align with the Corps' doctrinal emphasis on asymmetric warfare and regime defense, with reported incentives including economic benefits and social prestige within Iran's theocratic system.[40] Basij recruitment draws from a broader societal pool, targeting youth, students, and civilians via mass campaigns that emphasize voluntary service for "mobilization of the oppressed" against perceived internal and external threats.[38] Enrollment often occurs through local resistance bases (paygah-e moqavemat), with minimal barriers to entry for initial membership but progression to active roles requiring further ideological training and oaths of allegiance.[41] The process fosters a pyramid structure, where core full-time cadres oversee part-time volunteers, enabling scalable mobilization for domestic security operations while embedding IRGC influence in civil society.[37]Economic and Auxiliary Networks
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains extensive economic networks that span construction, energy, telecommunications, smuggling, and other sectors, enabling self-funding parallel to state budgets and insulating operations from sanctions. These activities, often conducted through affiliated conglomerates and front companies, generate revenue estimated to control 20-40% of Iran's non-oil economy, though precise figures vary due to opacity.[1][42] This economic dominance emerged post-Iran-Iraq War, when the IRGC leveraged reconstruction contracts to build entities like the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), founded in 1979 and expanded in the 1980s to handle engineering megaprojects.[6][43] Khatam al-Anbiya serves as the IRGC's flagship economic arm, overseeing subsidiaries that execute dams, pipelines, railways, airports, and oil infrastructure, with contracts valued in billions of dollars; by 2017, it had completed over 3,000 projects domestically and pursued international ventures in Syria and Iraq.[44][45] In December 2024, IRGC elements expanded influence over Tehran's oil exports, complicating Western enforcement of sanctions by blending military oversight with commercial shipping.[46] These operations, exempt from competitive bidding under Iranian law, prioritize IRGC loyalty over efficiency, fostering corruption and inefficiency as evidenced by project delays and cost overruns in sectors like petrochemicals.[47][48] Auxiliary networks include cooperative foundations tied to the IRGC and its Basij paramilitary wing, which facilitate welfare, recruitment, and economic infiltration at the grassroots level. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation and Basij Cooperative Foundation manage investments in manufacturing, agriculture, and small-scale enterprises, providing financial incentives to loyalists while evading taxes and oversight.[48] Basij units support rural development projects under IRGC auspices, enhancing the organization's image as an economic patron amid Iran's sanctions-induced stagnation.[49] Additionally, the IRGC engages in illicit activities such as narcotics and alcohol smuggling via front companies, bolstering revenues for military procurement and proxy funding despite international designations.[6] IRGC-linked bonyads, or parastatal foundations, form a broader auxiliary layer intertwined with military interests, channeling expropriated assets into sectors like mining and finance under the guise of charitable work.[44] This military-bonyad complex, evolving since the 1980s, sustains IRGC influence by blending ideological patronage with profit-driven monopolies, often at the expense of private sector competition.[6][50] Such structures reinforce the IRGC's praetorian role, funding extraterritorial operations while entrenching domestic power.[1]Formative Conflicts
Role in the Iran-Iraq War
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), formally established on May 5, 1979, as a paramilitary force to safeguard the Islamic Revolution, assumed a central defensive role immediately after Iraq's invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980.[51] Initially numbering in the thousands and lacking conventional training or equipment, the IRGC operated parallel to the regular Artesh army, prioritizing ideological commitment over professional hierarchy to mobilize revolutionary fervor against the invading forces.[52] This dual structure led to tensions but enabled rapid deployment of volunteers, with the IRGC focusing on irregular warfare and urban defense in early battles such as the defense of Khorramshahr, where its forces endured heavy losses amid Iraqi advances.[53] From mid-1982 onward, the IRGC spearheaded Iran's counteroffensives, shifting from defense to offensive operations aimed at expelling Iraqi troops and pursuing regime change in Baghdad.[1] It led major assaults including Operation Ramadan in July 1982, which penetrated Iraqi territory toward Basra, and the subsequent Karbala series of operations in 1986–1987, notably Karbala-5 in January 1987, which sought to capture the strategic port city but resulted in Iranian advances stalled by Iraqi chemical weapons and fortifications.[54] These efforts relied heavily on the Basij Resistance Force, a volunteer militia subordinated to the IRGC in 1980, which grew to approximately 500,000 members by the war's end and provided manpower for mass infantry charges.[55] The IRGC's integration of Basij units emphasized martyrdom ideology rooted in Shia traditions, enabling sustained offensives despite material disadvantages.[56] IRGC tactics centered on "human wave" assaults, where lightly armed Basij volunteers advanced en masse to overwhelm Iraqi positions, clear minefields by foot, and draw fire to expose enemy defenses for follow-on attacks.[57] This approach, while inflicting pressure on Iraqi lines, incurred disproportionate casualties due to Iraq's superior armor, artillery, and airpower; Iranian claims record 155,081 Basij "martyrs" from direct combat, contributing to Iran's overall war dead estimated at over 200,000 military personnel.[58] The IRGC's forces, expanding to rival the Artesh in size by 1988, documented these methods through embedded historians to codify revolutionary warfare distinct from conventional doctrine, fostering a narrative of sacrificial triumph that bolstered domestic recruitment and loyalty.[53] The war's attrition ultimately transformed the IRGC from a nascent militia into a hardened, ideologically driven institution, embedding it as Iran's primary defender against external threats.[59]Early Post-War Reorganization
Following the Iran-Iraq War ceasefire on August 20, 1988, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) initiated a reorganization to adapt its wartime structure to peacetime priorities, emphasizing reconstruction, economic integration, and sustained ideological defense capabilities. This shift involved demobilizing some irregular volunteers while preserving a core force estimated at around 350,000 personnel, with a focus on professionalizing command hierarchies and expanding auxiliary functions to prevent disbandment pressures similar to those faced by the regular Artesh army.[60][61] A pivotal development was the establishment of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters in December 1989, decreed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to leverage IRGC engineering expertise for rebuilding war-damaged infrastructure, including roads, dams, and oil facilities. This entity, initially comprising 12 subsidiary companies, secured no-bid government contracts worth billions, marking the IRGC's entry into state-dominated economic sectors and providing revenue streams independent of budgetary oversight. Analysts attribute this expansion to President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's strategy of co-opting the IRGC through economic incentives, thereby redirecting its influence from direct politics while fostering a parallel power base that controlled up to 20-40% of Iran's construction market by the mid-1990s.[43][62][61] Concurrently, the IRGC formalized its extraterritorial operations by structuring the Quds Force as a distinct branch around 1990, building on ad hoc wartime units like the Ramezan Headquarters that had supported Shia militias in Iraq and Lebanon. This reorganization centralized command for foreign proxy activities, separating them from domestic ground forces and enabling covert deployments without full integration into the conventional military. Proposals in the mid-1990s to merge the IRGC with the Artesh for efficiency were rejected, preserving its ideological autonomy under the Supreme Leader's direct oversight as mandated by Iran's constitution.[63][1][64] These changes entrenched the IRGC as a hybrid military-economic entity, with post-war budgets rising from wartime lows through self-generated funds, though critics from opposition sources highlight resultant monopolies that stifled private enterprise and contributed to inefficiencies documented in later audits.[60][65]Domestic Operations
Internal Security and Basij Mobilization
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) plays a central role in Iran's internal security framework, tasked with countering domestic threats to the regime through ideological enforcement, surveillance, and rapid response capabilities. Established to protect the Islamic Revolution, the IRGC coordinates with paramilitary auxiliaries to maintain order, particularly during periods of unrest, by deploying forces to suppress activities deemed subversive. This includes monitoring opposition groups and mobilizing volunteers for crowd control and deterrence operations.[1][66] Integral to these efforts is the Basij Resistance Force, a volunteer paramilitary militia founded in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini to create a mass-based "army of 20 million" for defending the revolution against internal and external enemies. Placed under direct IRGC command in 2007, the Basij operates with branches in nearly every Iranian city and town, functioning as an auxiliary force for enforcing state control, conducting surveillance, and providing manpower for security operations. Its structure emphasizes grassroots mobilization through mosques, universities, and neighborhoods, enabling quick assembly for regime defense. Estimates of active Basij personnel vary, but it maintains a network capable of deploying tens of thousands for domestic missions, supplemented by full-time units integrated into IRGC commands.[37][1][38] Basij mobilization has been pivotal in quelling major waves of protests challenging the regime's authority. Following the disputed June 2009 presidential election, Basij forces, alongside IRGC units, were deployed nationwide to suppress demonstrations alleging electoral fraud, resulting in widespread arrests, beatings, and attacks on student dormitories; the U.S. Treasury later sanctioned IRGC elements for these human rights abuses. In November-December 2019 protests triggered by fuel price hikes, Basij personnel participated in crackdowns that the IRGC's internal reports described as organized uprisings, leading to hundreds of deaths according to regime admissions. During the 2022-2023 protests sparked by Mahsa Amini's death in custody, Basij forces supported police and IRGC in suppressing unrest, with U.S. sanctions targeting commanders for roles in arrests, detentions, and alleged violence including shootings and assaults; at least 46 Basij and IRGC personnel were reported killed in clashes.[67][3][68] Beyond protest suppression, the Basij conducts routine internal security drills and patrols to expand surveillance networks, as seen in nationwide exercises in August 2025 aimed at enhancing neighborhood intelligence and rapid response readiness. These activities underscore the IRGC's strategy of leveraging Basij's ideological commitment to sustain regime stability amid economic discontent and political dissent, often prioritizing loyalty enforcement over conventional policing.[69][70]Suppression of Protests and Political Dissent
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has played a central role in Iran's internal security apparatus, deploying its forces and affiliated Basij militia to quell domestic unrest, often employing lethal force, mass arrests, and intimidation tactics to maintain regime control. Established to safeguard the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the IRGC views protests challenging the theocratic system as existential threats, justifying aggressive responses under the doctrine of preserving velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist).[1] This involvement extends beyond conventional military duties, integrating the IRGC into political suppression, with its intelligence units monitoring dissidents and coordinating crackdowns alongside state police.[71] During the 2009 Green Movement protests, triggered by allegations of fraud in the presidential election won by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on June 12, 2009, the IRGC escalated its suppression following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's June 2009 speech framing the demonstrations as a war against the regime. IRGC units, including plainclothes Basij forces, conducted raids, beatings, and shootings in Tehran and other cities, contributing to the deaths of at least 72 protesters by early July 2009, according to human rights documentation, though official figures were lower. The IRGC's actions included besieging opposition leaders' homes and orchestrating show trials, solidifying its dominance in post-election security operations.[72][73] In the November 2019 protests, sparked by a fuel price hike announced on November 15, 2019, IRGC forces participated in a nationwide crackdown that resulted in 321 documented deaths over five days, with security personnel using live ammunition against unarmed demonstrators in at least 40 cities. Amnesty International's analysis of verified cases indicated that most killings involved unlawful lethal force, including headshots from close range, executed by IRGC and Basij members alongside other forces; the IRGC later assessed the unrest as a coordinated foreign-backed uprising in internal reports. Internet shutdowns, ordered with IRGC input, facilitated the operation, preventing real-time documentation and exacerbating isolation.[74][68] The IRGC's most extensive recent deployment occurred during the 2022 protests following Mahsa Amini's death in custody on September 16, 2022, after her arrest for hijab violations; IRGC and Basij units led the violent response, killing over 500 protesters and detaining more than 22,000 by March 2023, per United Nations findings. Tactics included indiscriminate shootings, vehicle rammings into crowds, and targeted assassinations of protest leaders, particularly in Kurdish and Baluchistan regions where IRGC provincial corps like the Salman Corps were prominent. U.S. Treasury sanctions highlighted IRGC commanders' direct oversight of these operations, which aimed to instill fear and deter mobilization through executions of protesters charged with "enmity against God."[75][70][76] Across these episodes, the IRGC has consistently integrated cyber surveillance and economic pressure, such as asset seizures from dissidents, to preempt and prolong suppression, reflecting its dual military-political mandate. While regime narratives attribute violence to "rioters," independent verifications consistently document disproportionate force by IRGC-led units, contributing to cycles of unrest despite short-term stabilization.[4][77]Foreign Interventions and Proxy Warfare
Quds Force Operations in the Middle East
The Quds Force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' branch for extraterritorial operations, has conducted extensive activities in the Middle East to export Iran's revolutionary ideology, support allied regimes, and counter adversaries through training, arming, and advising proxy groups.[1] Established under Qasem Soleimani's leadership until his death in January 2020, the force prioritizes creating and sustaining Shia-aligned militias to extend Tehran's influence.[78] Its operations emphasize asymmetric warfare, intelligence gathering, and logistics, often evading direct attribution to Iran.[79] In Syria, the Quds Force deployed operatives following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings to bolster Bashar al-Assad's regime against Sunni rebels and ISIS.[1] It coordinated foreign Shia fighters, including Afghan Fatemiyoun and Pakistani Zainebiyoun brigades, numbering in the thousands, while providing tactical advice and artillery support in key battles such as the defense of Aleppo in 2016.[78] Iranian sources claim over 2,100 IRGC personnel, many from Quds units, died in Syria by 2020, reflecting the intensity of engagements that transformed the IRGC into an expeditionary force.[80] Quds commanders, including those killed in Israeli strikes on Damascus consulate in April 2024, oversaw militia integration into Syrian Arab Army operations.[81] In Iraq, Quds Force elements trained and funded Shia militias, such as Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, since the 2003 U.S. invasion, enabling attacks on American forces via explosively formed penetrators that killed over 600 U.S. personnel by 2011.[63] During the ISIS campaign from 2014, it supported Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units, supplying advanced weaponry and advisors to retake territories like Tikrit in 2015, while embedding operatives to ensure loyalty to Tehran over Baghdad.[82] Post-ISIS, these networks, backed by Quds funding estimated at millions annually per group, conducted over 200 attacks on U.S. targets in 2023-2024, escalating regional tensions.[83] Quds Force operations extend to Lebanon through deep integration with Hezbollah, providing rocket technology transfers and joint command structures, as seen in maritime weapons shipments overseen in April 2025.[84] In Yemen, despite a dedicated Houthi focus, Quds advisors like Abdul Reza Shahlai have operated since 2011, facilitating drone and missile programs used in Red Sea attacks starting October 2023.[85] For Palestinian groups, the force's Palestine Corps branch channels funds and training to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, contributing to capabilities demonstrated in the October 7, 2023, assault on Israel.[86] These efforts, sanctioned by the U.S. as terrorist activities, underscore the Quds Force's role in a networked proxy strategy amid ongoing Israeli counterstrikes targeting its personnel.[87]Support for Regional Militias and Hezbollah
The Quds Force, the external operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), coordinates support for Hezbollah and various Shia militias across the Middle East, enabling Iran to extend its influence through proxy forces while avoiding direct conventional confrontation.[1] This assistance includes financial transfers, weapons shipments, logistical aid, and training programs, often channeled through smuggling networks to evade international sanctions.[88] Hezbollah, founded in 1982 with IRGC backing during Lebanon's civil war, receives the most extensive support, including precision-guided missiles, drones, and tactical expertise that have enhanced its arsenal against Israel.[1][63] IRGC support to Hezbollah intensified following the U.S. designation of the group as a terrorist organization in 1997 and escalated after the 2006 Lebanon War, with Iran providing reconstruction funds and military advisors to rebuild Hezbollah's capabilities.[89] In the lead-up to the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel, Quds Force operatives, including branch head Saeed Izadi, coordinated with Hezbollah and Hamas leaders to align operations within Iran's "Axis of Resistance," though Iranian officials denied direct involvement in the assault itself.[90] Captured Gaza documents from 2023 reveal discussions between Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iranian representatives on potential multi-front attacks, with Quds Force commander figures like those slain in 2025 Israeli strikes having financed and trained Hamas militants.[91][92] By early 2025, amid Israeli operations degrading Hezbollah's leadership, IRGC units assisted in rehabilitating the group's infrastructure in Lebanon, deploying engineering and missile expertise.[93] Beyond Hezbollah, the IRGC-Quds Force sustains Shia militias in Iraq, such as Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, which collectively number tens of thousands of fighters integrated into Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[88] These groups, designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S., have conducted over 150 attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and mid-2024, using IRGC-supplied rockets, drones, and improvised explosive devices.[94] In Syria, IRGC-backed militias like the Fatemiyoun Brigade—composed of Afghan recruits numbering up to 20,000—and Liwa Zainebiyoun provide ground support to the Assad regime, with Iran expending billions in aid to sustain these forces against rebels and ISIS remnants since 2011.[95][96] This proxy network, operational through 2025, allows the IRGC to project power regionally, with Quds Force commanders directing attacks from Yemen's Houthis to Palestinian groups, though direct control varies by proxy.[82][97] U.S. assessments highlight the IRGC's role in arming these militias with short-range ballistic missiles and anti-tank systems, contributing to persistent instability.[98]Involvement in Yemen and Beyond
The Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has supplied Yemen's Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, with advanced weaponry, training, and operational guidance since at least 2009, escalating after the Houthis' 2014 capture of Sanaa.[99] This support includes the transfer of attack drones, cruise missiles, and components for medium-range ballistic missiles, enabling the Houthis to conduct long-distance strikes despite a Saudi-led coalition blockade.[100] IRGC advisors have trained Houthi fighters in missile assembly, drone operations, and asymmetric tactics, with evidence from intercepted shipments showing Iranian-designed systems like the Qasef-1 drone and Burkan ballistic missiles adapted for Houthi use.[101] While Tehran maintains that its role is limited to ideological alignment rather than direct command, U.S. and UN assessments indicate Quds Force orchestration of smuggling routes via dhows from Iranian ports to Houthi-held areas.[102] IRGC personnel, including Quds Force commanders, have maintained an on-the-ground presence in Yemen to direct Houthi operations, particularly since the group's escalation of attacks on Red Sea shipping starting in November 2023 amid the Israel-Hamas conflict.[103] These advisors, often embedded with Houthi units, have coordinated drone and missile launches targeting commercial vessels, with Iranian-supplied precision-guided munitions used in over 100 documented attacks by mid-2024, disrupting global trade routes and prompting U.S.-led coalition responses.[100] Joint IRGC-Hezbollah teams have provided technical expertise for targeting systems, enhancing Houthi accuracy against ships linked to Israel, the U.S., and allies, as evidenced by debris analysis from strikes like the January 2024 attack on the MV Gibraltar Eagle.[103] By July 2025, Yemeni forces loyal to the recognized government intercepted a major Iranian arms shipment destined for the Houthis, containing missile fuel components and explosives traceable to IRGC suppliers.[104] This involvement extends beyond Yemen's borders through the Houthis' projection of power into international waters, where IRGC-enabled capabilities have inflicted economic costs exceeding $1 billion in rerouted shipping by early 2024, while serving Tehran's broader strategy of pressuring adversaries without direct confrontation.[101] Further afield, the Quds Force has leveraged proxy networks in Africa and South Asia for logistics and ideological outreach, including arms smuggling routes through Sudan and Somalia to bypass sanctions, though direct combat support remains concentrated in the Middle East.[105] In Latin America, IRGC-linked operatives have facilitated fundraising and potential attack planning via Hezbollah networks in Venezuela and the Triple Frontier region, as seen in disrupted plots like the 2021 foiled attack on a U.S. base using Iranian-supplied components routed through proxies.[106] These extraterritorial activities underscore the IRGC's use of deniable proxies to extend influence, with recent cases including a Pakistani national's 2025 conviction for transporting IRGC materials to Yemen via global shipping lanes.[107]Direct Military Engagements
Escalations with Israel (2024-2025)
In 2024, the longstanding shadow war between Iran and Israel transitioned to overt direct strikes, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) playing a central role in Iran's retaliatory operations. On April 13, 2024, the IRGC launched Operation True Promise I, deploying over 300 drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles—many fired from IRGC Aerospace Force bases—directly at Israeli military sites and airbases in response to an April 1 Israeli airstrike on Iran's consulate in Damascus, Syria, which killed 16 individuals, including seven IRGC Quds Force officers such as Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi.[108] [109] Israeli air defenses, supported by U.S., British, French, and Jordanian forces, intercepted approximately 99% of the projectiles, limiting damage to minor impacts on Nevatim Airbase and a Jordanian site.[109] Israel countered on April 19 with precision strikes using drones and missiles on IRGC-linked radar and air defense installations near Isfahan, avoiding nuclear sites to signal restraint while demonstrating reach into Iranian territory.[109] Escalations intensified through 2024 with IRGC-orchestrated proxy attacks via Hezbollah and targeted assassinations attributed to Israel, including strikes on IRGC personnel in Syria and Lebanon, setting the stage for broader conflict.[110] These exchanges eroded deterrence thresholds, as Iran's nuclear advancements—estimated by Israeli intelligence to approach breakout capacity—prompted preemptive action. On June 13, 2025, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, a large-scale aerial campaign involving hundreds of strikes on IRGC missile production facilities, nuclear enrichment sites like Natanz and Fordow, and command nodes across 24 Iranian provinces, assassinating key IRGC leaders including the intelligence chief and two generals.[111] [112] The IRGC responded with barrages of ballistic missiles from western and central launch sites, achieving limited direct hits on Israeli civilian and military areas in the north and center, though most were intercepted by multilayered defenses.[113] [114] The Twelve-Day War, spanning June 13 to 25, 2025, inflicted significant losses on the IRGC, including degradation of its missile arsenal and exposure of command vulnerabilities, marking the most direct conventional clash since the Iran-Iraq War.[115] A U.S.-brokered ceasefire took hold on June 25 after Iranian strikes on a U.S. base in Qatar, but IRGC Aerospace and Quds Force elements continued asymmetric harassment via proxies.[116] Post-war, the new IRGC commander warned of unleashing "the gates of hell" against any renewed Israeli attacks, underscoring persistent doctrinal commitment to retaliation despite operational setbacks.[117] These events highlighted the IRGC's pivot from proxy coordination to frontline missile warfare, though Israeli air superiority and allied intercepts revealed limitations in Iran's offensive capabilities.[118]April 2024 Strikes on Israel
On April 1, 2024, Israel conducted an airstrike on Iran's consulate in Damascus, Syria, killing seven members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including senior Quds Force commander Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi and his deputy Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi.[119][120][121] The strike targeted IRGC personnel coordinating operations in Syria and Lebanon, prompting Iran to vow retaliation.[122] In response, the IRGC launched Operation True Promise on the night of April 13-14, 2024, marking Iran's first direct military attack on Israel from its territory.[123] The IRGC Aerospace Force deployed approximately 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles targeting Israeli military sites, including the Nevatim Airbase.[124][125] IRGC Commander Hossein Salami described the operation as an effort to establish a "new equation" with Israel by demonstrating Iran's long-range strike capabilities.[126] Israel, supported by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Jordan, intercepted nearly all incoming projectiles, achieving an estimated 99% success rate through systems like Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow.[127][128][129] Minimal damage occurred, limited to a Bedouin girl injured by debris and superficial hits at Nevatim base, with no significant disruption to Israeli operations.[130][127] Iranian state media and IRGC officials claimed the attack succeeded in piercing Israeli defenses and validating their missile technology, though independent assessments highlighted the operation's military ineffectiveness due to advance warning and allied coordination, which allowed pre-positioning of interceptors.[131][123] The event escalated direct tensions but de-escalated short-term through mutual restraint, with Israel opting for a limited response on April 19 targeting an inactive IRGC radar site in Isfahan.[132][133]June 2025 Iran-Israel War
The June 2025 Iran-Israel war commenced on June 13 with Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command structures, resulting in the deaths of several senior IRGC officers, including intelligence chief Mohammed Kazemi.[112][134] These strikes also eliminated other top military commanders linked to the IRGC, disrupting its operational leadership.[135] In retaliation, the IRGC, primarily through its Aerospace Force, orchestrated multiple waves of ballistic missile and drone attacks on Israeli military targets, including Nevatim and Hatzerim airbases.[136] The IRGC launched over 500 ballistic missiles and approximately 1,100 drones toward Israel during the 12-day conflict, with the 17th wave reported on June 20 targeting specific facilities.[137] These assaults caused around 50-60 direct impacts in Israel, resulting in 31 fatalities.[118] On June 23, the IRGC extended its strikes to the U.S.-operated Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, firing targeted missiles in response to American involvement.[115] The IRGC's missile campaigns demonstrated its reliance on asymmetric warfare capabilities, though many projectiles were intercepted by Israeli and allied defenses, including U.S. THAAD systems that expended 25% of their interceptors.[138] Post-war assessments highlighted vulnerabilities in IRGC command chains exposed by the initial Israeli decapitation strikes, prompting calls within the organization to extend missile ranges for future deterrence.[137] The conflict concluded by June 25 without broader escalation, but it underscored the IRGC's central role in Iran's direct confrontation strategy against Israel.[139]Other Incidents and Asymmetric Actions
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) has conducted asymmetric maritime operations in the Strait of Hormuz, employing fast-attack craft for vessel seizures and harassment of international shipping. On May 3, 2023, IRGCN forces seized the Panamanian-flagged tanker Niovi after swarming it with a dozen fast-attack boats, forcing it to reverse course toward Iranian waters near Bandar Abbas.[140] [141] In another incident on June 11, 2025, IRGCN confirmed the seizure of a Togo-flagged tanker bound for the UAE, detaining its crew on claims of sanctions violations.[142] These actions align with IRGCN tactics of close-proximity approaches and armed boardings to assert control over the waterway, through which 20% of global oil transits.[143] [144] IRGC-affiliated cyber actors have executed disruptive operations targeting critical infrastructure and political entities abroad. In December 2024, actors using the "CyberAv3ngers" persona compromised Israeli-made Unitronics programmable logic controllers (PLCs) across multiple U.S. sectors, including water utilities, as retaliation for regional conflicts.[145] U.S. indictments in September 2024 charged three IRGC cyber operatives with a "hack-and-leak" campaign aimed at influencing the 2024 U.S. elections by targeting officials and leaking data.[146] These efforts, often conducted via proxies or state-linked groups, focus on ransomware, data exfiltration, and infrastructure sabotage, with warnings issued about potential escalations against vulnerable U.S. networks.[147] [148] Beyond regional theaters, the IRGC-Quds Force has orchestrated extraterritorial assassination plots using criminal networks. In 2011, IRGC operatives plotted to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, D.C., by hiring assassins via a Mexican cartel.[149] U.S. charges in October 2024 accused IRGC Brigadier General Ruhollah Bazghandi of contracting Eastern European organized crime to murder a U.S. citizen of Iranian origin in New York.[150] European operations include thwarted plots in multiple countries, with a Quds Force operative admitting in 2022 to planning killings in Turkey, Germany, and France.[151] Such activities, designated by the U.S. Treasury as IRGC-directed, involve recruiting locals or proxies to evade detection and target dissidents, journalists, and officials.[152] [153]Political and Economic Power
Influence on Iranian Governance
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) exerts significant influence over Iran's governance as a parallel institution to the regular armed forces, designed to safeguard the ideological purity of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the authority of the Supreme Leader. Established in May 1979 under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's directive, the IRGC answers directly to the Supreme Leader rather than the elected president or Majlis (parliament), enabling it to operate independently of civilian oversight and embed revolutionary principles into state decision-making.[1] This structure has allowed IRGC commanders and veterans to permeate key governmental bodies, with numerous alumni holding positions in the cabinet, judiciary, and Majlis, thereby aligning policy with hardline Islamist priorities over reformist or moderate agendas.[1] In electoral politics, the IRGC has played a pivotal role in vetting candidates and shaping outcomes to favor loyalists, as evidenced by its involvement in the 2009 presidential election, where it allegedly assisted in manipulating results to secure Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory amid widespread fraud allegations and subsequent mass protests.[1] The Corps' Basij paramilitary wing, integrated under its command since 2007, mobilizes voters and enforces turnout in line with regime directives, while a covert network has been reported to rig elections by infiltrating political processes and disqualifying opponents through the Guardian Council, which IRGC allies influence.[154] In the Majlis, IRGC-affiliated legislators—numbering prominently after the 2008 and subsequent elections—have prioritized legislation supporting the Corps' expansion, including budgets for military adventurism and suppression mechanisms, effectively subordinating parliamentary functions to security imperatives.[61] [155] The IRGC's governance influence extends to internal security, where it deploys forces to quash dissent, preserving the regime's control during crises such as the 2009 Green Movement protests, the 2019 fuel price demonstrations, and the 2022 nationwide uprising following Mahsa Amini's death.[70] IRGC units, including the Sarallah Headquarters, coordinated lethal responses, arresting thousands, coercing confessions, and using Basij militias for street-level intimidation, resulting in hundreds of protester deaths and reinforcing the Corps' veto power over any challenge to theocratic rule.[156] [157] This repressive apparatus not only stabilizes governance under the Supreme Leader but also positions the IRGC as a kingmaker in succession dynamics, leveraging its mobilized networks to endorse and protect Khamenei's heir, ensuring continuity of its dominant role.[158]Control of Economic Foundations and Sanctions Evasion
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) exerts extensive control over Iran's economy through its engineering arm, Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, established in 1979, which manages major infrastructure projects including dams, highways, tunnels, and water conveyance systems.[159] This entity, owned and controlled by the IRGC, has secured contracts worth billions, such as those in energy, telecommunications, and construction, often bypassing competitive bidding due to preferential government allocations.[6] Recent estimates of the IRGC's control over Iran's economy vary widely due to the opaque nature of its operations and lack of official data, typically ranging from 20% to 60%, with many sources citing figures around 30-50%. These assessments rely on indirect indicators like contracts, subsidiaries, and sector dominance (e.g., construction, oil, telecom), and the IRGC's economic role has reportedly expanded under sanctions.[1] The IRGC achieves this dominance through direct holdings and affiliated bonyads—charitable foundations repurposed for commercial gain that evade taxes and oversight.[160][161] These bonyads, intertwined with IRGC operations, facilitate revenue streams in sectors like oil refining, mining, and agriculture, enabling the Corps to amass parallel wealth structures that undermine private enterprise.[44] IRGC-linked entities, including Khatam al-Anbiya and cooperatives like AQR and EIKO, collectively dominate over half of Iran's economy by leveraging state contracts and asset transfers, with more than $100 billion in public assets privatized to IRGC-affiliated groups between 2005 and 2013.[162][163] This control extends to "water mafia" operations monopolizing irrigation and desalination projects, exacerbating resource mismanagement amid chronic shortages.[44] The Corps' economic footprint, formalized through post-1979 expansion into civilian sectors, prioritizes ideological loyalty over efficiency, crowding out non-aligned businesses and fostering corruption via no-bid deals and smuggling adjuncts.[164] To circumvent international sanctions imposed since 2010 targeting its economic arms, the IRGC employs sophisticated evasion tactics, including illicit oil smuggling networks that disguise Iranian crude as originating from Iraq or Malaysia via ship-to-ship transfers and ghost fleets.[165][166] These operations, often coordinated by IRGC-Qods Force affiliates, generated hundreds of millions of dollars annually from oil sales as of 2022, funding proxy militias and military programs.[167] In 2025, U.S. actions exposed networks smuggling millions of barrels, utilizing Iraqi intermediaries like Salim Ahmed Said's companies to launder proceeds through money laundering hubs in Turkey and the UAE.[168][169] FinCEN advisories from June 2025 highlight red flags in these schemes, such as falsified documents and opaque shipping firms, underscoring the IRGC's reliance on global illicit networks to sustain revenue amid export restrictions that reduced official oil sales.[170] Sanctions evasion bolsters the Corps' autonomy, allowing it to redirect funds—estimated at up to a third of defense allocations—to asymmetric warfare capabilities, though it perpetuates economic distortion by prioritizing regime survival over domestic welfare.[6][171]International Status and Sanctions
Designations as Terrorist Organization
The United States designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on April 15, 2019, following an announcement by President Donald Trump on April 8, 2019. This marked the first instance of a state-affiliated entity being listed as an FTO by the U.S. Department of State, citing the IRGC's foundational role in supporting terrorism, including direct involvement in plotting attacks and the deaths of over 600 American personnel since 1983. The designation imposes severe restrictions, including asset freezes, travel bans, and prohibitions on material support, aiming to disrupt the IRGC's global operations.[7][172][173] Canada listed the IRGC as a terrorist entity under its Criminal Code on June 19, 2024, enabling prosecutions for support, asset seizures, and travel restrictions. The decision followed years of parliamentary pressure and was justified by evidence of the IRGC's role in transnational terrorism, including plots against Canadian interests and support for groups like Hezbollah. This listing reflects Canada's assessment of the IRGC's threat to national security, distinct from earlier sanctions on its Qods Force subunit.[174][175] Several other nations have similarly classified the IRGC or its components as terrorist organizations, often in response to its proxy activities and regional destabilization efforts. Australia designated the full IRGC as a state sponsor of terrorism on November 27, 2025, aligning with its counterterrorism framework to curb financing and operations. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization in 2019, viewing it as a primary sponsor of militias threatening Gulf security, and imposed parallel measures, including after welcoming the U.S. action. Sweden's parliament voted on May 10, 2023, to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization. These designations underscore a pattern among adversaries of Iran prioritizing empirical evidence of IRGC-orchestrated attacks over diplomatic reticence.[176][177][178][179][180]| Country | Designation Date | Scope and Implications |
|---|---|---|
| United States | April 15, 2019 | Full IRGC as FTO; prohibits support, freezes assets globally.[181] |
| Canada | June 19, 2024 | Full IRGC; criminalizes membership, funding, and travel.[174] |
| Australia | November 27, 2025 | Full IRGC as state sponsor; enhances prosecutorial tools against terrorism financing.[176] |
| Saudi Arabia | 2019 | Full IRGC; measures against sponsorship of militias and terrorism.[179] |
| Bahrain | 2019 | Full IRGC; aligns with Gulf security responses to Iranian threats.[180] |
| Sweden | May 10, 2023 | Full IRGC following parliamentary vote; supports counterterrorism efforts.[177] |
