Morean War
Morean War
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Morean War

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Morean War
Part of the Great Turkish War
and the Ottoman–Venetian wars

Medal commemorating the Venetian victories in the Morean War, struck by Georg Hautsch in Nuremberg in 1687. It shows the main Venetian commanders (Francesco Morosini, Otto Wilhelm Königsmarck, Girolamo Cornaro) on the obverse, and the main fortresses captured by the Venetians on the reverse.
Date25 April 1684 – 26 January 1699
(14 years, 9 months and 1 day)
Location
Result Venetian victory
Territorial
changes
Morea ceded to Venice; Venetian gains in inland Dalmatia
Belligerents

Republic of Venice
Holy Roman Empire

Sovereign Military Order of Malta Knights of Malta
Papal States
Greek rebels
Montenegrin volunteers
Mani
 Morlachs

Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire
Ottoman Vassals:

Commanders and leaders
Republic of Venice Francesco Morosini
Republic of Venice Girolamo Cornaro
Republic of Venice Hannibal von Degenfeld
Republic of Venice Otto Wilhelm Königsmarck
Republic of Venice Stojan Janković 
Bajo Pivljanin 
Pavlos Makris
Limberakis Gerakaris (Early 1696 until Late 1696)
Ottoman Empire Mehmed IV
Ottoman Empire Suleiman II
Ottoman Empire Ahmed II
Ottoman Empire Ismail Pasha
Ottoman Empire Mahmud Pasha
Mezzo Morto
Limberakis Gerakaris (1688 until Early 1696)

The Morean war (Italian: Guerra di Morea), also known as the Sixth Ottoman–Venetian War, was fought between 1684–1699 as part of the wider conflict known as the "Great Turkish War", between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire. Military operations ranged from Dalmatia to the Aegean Sea, but the war's major campaign was the Venetian conquest of the Morea (Peloponnese) peninsula in southern Greece.

On the Venetian side, the war was fought to avenge the loss of Crete in the Cretan War (1645–1669). It happened while the Ottomans were entangled in their northern struggle against the Habsburgs – beginning with the failed Ottoman attempt to conquer Vienna and ending with the Habsburgs gaining Buda and the whole of Hungary, leaving the Ottoman Empire unable to concentrate its forces against the Venetians. As such, the Morean War was the only Ottoman–Venetian conflict from which Venice emerged victorious, gaining significant territory. Venice's expansionist revival would be short-lived, as its gains would be reversed by the Ottomans in 1718.

Background

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Map of south-eastern Europe c. 1670.

Venice had held several islands in the Aegean and the Ionian seas, together with strategically positioned forts along the coast of the Greek mainland since the carving up of the Byzantine Empire after the Fourth Crusade. With the rise of the Ottomans, during the 16th and early 17th centuries, the Venetians lost most of these, including Cyprus and Euboea (Negropont) to the Turks. Between 1645 and 1669, the Venetians and the Ottomans fought a long and costly war over the last major Venetian possession in the Aegean, Crete. During this war, the Venetian commander, Francesco Morosini, made contact with the rebellious Maniots. They agreed to conduct a joint campaign in the Morea. In 1659, Morosini landed in the Morea, and together with the Maniots, he took Kalamata. He was soon after forced to return to Crete, and the Peloponnesian venture failed.[citation needed]

During the 17th century, the Ottomans remained the premier political and military power in Europe, but signs of decline were evident: the Ottoman economy suffered from the influx of gold and silver from the Americas, an increasingly unbalanced budget and repeated devaluations of the currency, while the traditional timariot cavalry system and the Janissaries, who formed the core of the Ottoman armies, declined in quality and were increasingly replaced by irregular forces that were inferior to the regular European armies.[1] The reform efforts of Sultan Murad IV (r. 1623–1640), and the able administration of the Köprülü dynasty of Grand Viziers, whose members governed the Empire from 1656 to 1683, managed to sustain Ottoman power and even enabled it to conquer Crete, but the long and drawn-out war there exhausted Ottoman resources.[2]

As a result of the Polish–Ottoman War (1672–76), the Ottomans secured their last territorial expansion in Europe with the conquest of Podolia, and then tried to expand into Ukrainian territory on the right bank of the Dnieper River, but were held back by the Russians. The Treaty of Bakhchisarai made the river Dnieper the boundary between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.[3]

In 1683, a new war broke out between Austria and the Ottomans, with a large Ottoman army advancing towards Vienna. The Ottoman siege was broken in the Battle of Vienna by the King of Poland, Jan Sobieski.[4] As a result, an anti-Ottoman Holy League was formed at Linz on 5 March 1684 between Emperor Leopold I, Sobieski, and the Doge of Venice, Marcantonio Giustinian.[5] Over the next few years, the Austrians recovered Hungary from Ottoman control, and even captured Belgrade in 1688 and reached as far as Niš and Vidin in the next year.[6] The Austrians were now overextended, as well as being embroiled in the Nine Years' War (1688–97) against France. The Ottomans, under another Köprülü Grand Vizier, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, regained the initiative and pushed the Austrians back, recovering Niš and Vidin in 1690 and launching raids across the Danube. After 1696, the tide turned again, with the capture of Azov by the Russians in 1696 followed by a disastrous defeat at the hands of Eugene of Savoy at the battle of Zenta in September 1697. In its aftermath, negotiations began between the warring parties, leading to the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699.[7]

Venice prepares for war

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The Austrians and Poles considered Venetian participation in the war as a useful adjunct to the main operations in Central Europe, as its navy could impede the Ottomans from concentrating their forces by sea and force them to divert forces away from their own fronts.[8][9] Other than that, the allies' esteem for Venetian capabilities was low, as the Republic's power was in evident decline; indeed it was precisely the retreat of Venetian influence in Italy and the Adriatic that enabled a rapprochement between Vienna and Venice, hitherto rivals in these areas.[10] On the Venetian side, the debate in the Senate about joining the war was heated, but in the end the war party prevailed, judging the moment as an excellent and unique opportunity for a revanche.[11] As a result, when news arrived in Venice on 25 April 1684 of the signing of the Holy League, for the first and only time in the Ottoman–Venetian Wars, the Most Serene Republic declared war on the Ottomans, rather than the other way around.[10][12]

Nevertheless, at the outbreak of the war, the military forces of the Republic were meagre. The long Cretan War had exhausted Venetian resources, and Venetian power was in decline in Italy as well as the Adriatic Sea. While the Venetian navy was a well-maintained force, comprising ten galleasses, thirty men-of-war, and thirty galleys, as well as auxiliary vessels, the army comprised 8,000 not very disciplined regular troops. They were complemented by a numerous and well-equipped militia, but the latter could not be used outside Italy. Revenue was also scarce, at little more than two million sequins a year.[10][13] Venice received considerable subsidies from Pope Innocent XI, who played a leading role in forming the Holy League and, according to the historian Peter Topping, "nearly impoverished the Curia in raising subsidies for the allies".[11]

According to the reports of the English ambassador to the Porte, Lord Chandos, the Ottomans' position was even worse: on land they were reeling from a succession of defeats, so that the Sultan had to double the pay of his troops and resort to forcible conscription.[14] At the same time, the Ottoman navy was described by European observers like Chandos, Luigi Ferdinando Marsili and Paul Rycaut as being in a sore state, both numerically and qualitatively; the Moldavian prince Demetrius Cantemir reports that the fleet scarcely had six men-of-war ready for operations, and was about to bring ten further to the Imperial Arsenal to be fitted out for war. However, the Ottomans could also count on the assistance of the fleets of their vassals, the Barbary states.[15][16][17] The Venetians on the other hand mobilized a fleet of 28 galleys, six galeasses, one bastard galley (as the flagship) and 12 men-of-war.[18]

This left the Venetians with an uncontested supremacy at sea, while the Ottomans resorted to using light and fast galleys to evade the Venetian fleet and resupply their fortresses along the coasts.[15] The Ottomans believed that the Venetians would target Crete, and already before the outbreak of hostilities sent their chief admiral, the Kapudan Pasha, to the island with 40 galleys carrying reinforcements and provisions for the island's garrison.[19] In view of its financial weakness, Venice determined to bring the war to Ottoman territory, where they could conscript and extract tribute at will, before the Ottomans could recover from the shock and losses incurred at Vienna and reinforce their positions.[13] Despite some thoughts of directing the Venetian assault against Castelnuovo (Herceg Novi in Montenegro), in the end it was decided to leave the matter to the decision of the commander-in-chief.[17]

Morosini, having a distinguished record and great experience of operations in Greece, was chosen as Captain General of the Sea and commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force.[10] His chief rival, Girolamo Cornaro, was named Provveditore Generale da Mar, Alvise Pasqualigo as provveditore generale in Dalmatia and other senior patricians were appointed to posts in the fleet squadrons.[16][20] Venice increased her forces by enrolling large numbers of mercenaries from Italy and the German states, and raised funds by selling state offices and titles of nobility. Financial and military aid in men and ships was secured from the Knights of Malta, the Duchy of Savoy, the Papal States and the Knights of St. Stephen of Tuscany, and experienced Austrian officers were seconded to the Venetian army.[10] In addition to the aid supplied by the Knights of St. Stephen, the grand duke of Tuscany also sent to Morea about 3,000 soldiers in four contingents from 1684 to 1688, plus 14 ships and their attendant sailors (8 galleys, 4 galiots, 2 other vessels).[21] In the Venetian-ruled Ionian Islands, similar measures were undertaken; over 2,000 soldiers, apart from sailors and rowers for the fleet, were recruited.[10] On 10 June 1684, Morosini set sail from Venice, and sailed to Corfu, where he was joined by Venice's allies: five Papal galleys under Paolo Emilio Malaspina, four galleys and a man-of-war from Tuscany under Camillo Guidi, and seven galleys and three men-of-war of the Knights of Malta, under Giovanni Battista Brancaccio.[22]

Venetian offensive

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Operations in western Greece (1684)

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Sketch of the Siege of Santa Maura, by Jacob Peeters

The first target of the Venetian fleet was the island of Lefkada (Santa Maura). Morosini's political rival, Girolamo Cornaro, tried to preempt him and seize the Castle of Santa Maura, which he believed to be lightly defended, before the arrival of the fleet from Venice. With a small force he sailed from Corfu to the island, but finding the fortress strongly garrisoned, he turned back. As a result of this misadventure, Cornaro was sidelined for the first year of the war, during which he served as governor of the Ionian Islands, before he was appointed to command in Dalmatia in late 1685.[23][24] Once Morosini arrived at Corfu, he and the council of his commanders decided to resume the failed enterprise, so as to at least eliminate the island as a base for piracy. No definite plans were made after that, with Morosini envisaging an assault on Negroponte (Chalkis) with a view towards gaining a base of operations in the Aegean, or alternatively focusing on capturing the coast of Albania.[25] On 18 July 1684, the fleet left Corfu, receiving a papal benediction by the local Catholic bishop, Marcantonio Barbarigo, a rite normally associated with the departure of a crusade.[26] Two days later, the fleet arrived at Santa Maura. After a siege of 16 days, the fortress capitulated on 6 August 1684.[27][28]

Engraving of the Venetian attack on Preveza, by Vincenzo Coronelli

The Venetians then crossed onto the mainland region of Acarnania. The offshore island of Petalas was occupied on 10 August by Count Niccolo di Strassoldo and Angelo Delladecima. Reinforced with volunteers, mostly from Cephalonia, the Venetians then captured the towns of Aitoliko and Missolonghi. Greek leaders from across Epirus, from Himarra and Souli and the armatoloi captains of Acarnania and Agrafa, had contacted the Venetians with proposals for a common cause; with the Venetian advance, a general rising occurred in the area of Valtos and Xiromero. Muslim villages were attacked, looted, and torched, and Ottoman rule collapsed across western Continental Greece. By the end of the month the Ottomans only held on to the coastal fortresses of Preveza and Vonitsa.[27] The Venetian fleet engaged in raids along the coast of Epirus up to Igoumenitsa and even on the north-western coast of the Peloponnese, near Patras, before launching a concerted effort to capture the castle of Preveza on 21 September. The castle surrendered after eight days, and Vonitsa was captured by Delladecima's men a few days later. At the end of autumn, Morosini appointed Delladecima as military governor of the region stretching from the Gulf of Ambracia to the river Acheloos.[29] Already in this early part of the war, the Venetians began suffering great casualties on account of disease; Count Strassoldo was one of them.[30] These early successes were important for the Venetians because they secured their communications with Venice, denied to the Ottomans the possibility of moving troops through the area, and provided a springboard for possible future conquests on the Greek mainland.[31]

At the same time, Venice set about providing Morosini with more troops, and concluded treaties with the rulers of Saxony and Hannover, who were to provide contingents of 2,400 men each as mercenaries. After the treaty was signed in December 1684, 2,500 Hannoverians joined Morosini in June 1685, while 3,300 Saxons arrived a few months later. In spring and early June 1685, the Venetian forces gathered at Corfu, Preveza, and Dragamesto: 37 galleys (17 of which Tuscan, Papal, or Maltese), 5 galleasses, 19 sailing ships, and 12 galleots, 6,400 Venetian troops (2,400 Hannoverians and 1,000 Dalmatians), 1,000 Maltese troops, 300 Florentines, and 400 Papal soldiers. To them were added a few hundred conscripted and volunteer Greeks from the Ionian Islands and the mainland.[32][33]

Conquest of the Morea (1685–87)

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Coron and Mani (1685)

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The Siege of Coron, depicted by Vincenzo Coronelli
The Battle of Kalamata, by Vincenzo Coronelli

Having secured his rear during the previous year, Morosini set his sights upon the Peloponnese, where the Greeks had begun showing signs of revolt. Already in spring 1684, the Ottoman authorities had arrested and executed the Metropolitan of Corinth, Zacharias, for participating in revolutionary circles. At the same time, insurrectionist movements began among the Maniots, who resented the loss of privileges and autonomy, including the establishment of Ottoman garrisons in the fortresses of Zarnata, Kelefa, and Passavas, that they had suffered due to their collaboration with the Venetians in the Cretan War. In early autumn, an assembly under the presidency of the local bishop, Joachim, decided to approach the Venetians for aid, and on 20 October, a ten-man embassy arrived at Zakynthos to treat with Morosini. The discussions dragged on until February 1685, when at last the Venetian commander-in-chief resolved to supply the Maniots with quantities of guns and ammunition. In the meantime, the Ottoman authorities had not been idle. Already in the preceding months they had reinforced their troops in Laconia, and in February the new serasker (Ottoman commander-in-chief) of the Morea, Ismail Pasha, invaded the Mani peninsula with 10,000 men. The Maniots resisted, but their renewed pleas for aid to the Venetians in early March resulted only in the dispatch of four ships with ammunition under Daniel Dolfin. As a result, the Maniots were forced to submit, and gave up their children as hostages to the serasker.[34][35]

At long last, on 21 June the Venetian fleet set sail for the Peloponnese, and on 25 June, the Venetian army, over 8,000 men strong, landed outside the former Venetian fort of Coron (Koroni) and laid siege to it. The Maniots remained passive at first, and for a time the position of the besieging Christian troops was threatened by the troops led by the governor of Lepanto, Halil Pasha, and the fresh reinforcements disembarked by the Ottoman fleet under the Kapudan Pasha, both at Nauplia and at Kalamata. The Ottoman efforts to break the siege were defeated, and on 11 August, the fortress surrendered. During the negotiations, the garrison was massacred due to suspicion of treachery.[33][36]

In the final stage of the siege, 230 Maniots under the Zakynthian noble Pavlos Makris had taken part, and soon the area rose up in revolt again, encouraged by Morosini's presence at Coron. The Venetian commander now targeted Kalamata, where the Kapudan Pasha had landed 6,000 infantry and 2,000 sipahi cavalry, and established an entrenched camp. On 10 September, the Venetians and Maniots obtained the surrender of the fortress of Zarnata, its garrison of 600 being allowed safe passage to Kalamata, but its commander retiring to Venice and a rich pension. After the Kapudan Pasha rejected an offer of Morisini to disperse his army, the Venetian army, reinforced by 3,300 Saxons and under the command of general Hannibal von Degenfeld, attacked the Ottoman camp and defeated them on 14 September. Kalamata surrendered without a fight and its castle was razed, and by the end of September the remaining Ottoman garrisons in Kelefa and Passavas had capitulated and evacuated Mani. Passavas was razed, but the Venetians in turn installed their own garrisons in Kelefa and Zarnata, as well as the offshore island of Marathonisi, to keep an eye on the unruly Maniots, before returning to the Ionian Islands to winter.[33][37]

The campaigning season was concluded with the capture and razing of Igoumenitsa on 11 November.[33] Once again, disease took its toll among the Venetian army in its winter quarters. Losses were particularly heavy among the German contingents, which complained about the negligence shown to them by the Venetian authorities, and the often spoiled food they were sent: the Hannoverians alone lost 736 men to disease in the period from April 1685 to January 1686, as opposed to 256 in battle.[38]

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View of the fortress and harbour of Modon in 1688

In the next year, the Ottomans seized the initiative by attacking Kelefa in early March, forcing Morosini to hasten his departure from the Ionian Islands. The Ottomans raised the siege and withdrew at the arrival of a Venetian fleet under Venieri, and on 30 March, Morosini began landing his troops in the Messenian Gulf.[33][39] The Venetian forces were slow to assemble, and Morosini had to await the arrival of reinforcements in the form of 13 galleys from the Papal States and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, as well as further mercenaries, which raised his army to some 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse, before commencing his advance in late May. Following a recommendation by Morosini himself, the veteran Swedish marshal Otto Wilhelm Königsmarck was appointed head of the land forces, while Morosini retained command of the fleet. Königsmarck also requested, and was granted, that the Venetians hire several other experienced officers, particularly experts in siege warfare.[39][40]

On 2 June, Königsmarck landed his army at Pylos, where the Old Navarino castle surrendered the next day, after the aqueduct providing its water supply was cut. Its garrison, comprising black Africans, was transported to Alexandria. The more modern fortress of New Navarino was also besieged and surrendered on 14 June, after one of its magazines exploded, killing its commander, Sefer Pasa, and many of his senior officers. Its garrison, 1,500 soldiers and a like number of civilian dependents, were transported to Tripoli. Attempts by the Ottoman serasker to relieve the fortress or impede the Venetians ended in a defeat in battle, after which the Venetians moved to blockade and besiege another former Venetian stronghold, Modon (Methoni), on 22 June. Although well fortified, supplied, and equipped with a hundred guns and a thousand-strong garrison, the fort surrendered on 7 July, after sustained bombardment and successive Venetian assaults. Its population of 4,000 was likewise transported to Tripoli. At the same time, a Venetian squadron and Dalmatian troops captured the fort of Arkadia (modern Kyparissia) further north.[41][42]

View of Nauplia from the sea, with the heights of Palamidi in the background, by Vincenzo Coronelli

The Venetians then, in a lightning move, retired their field army from Messenia and landed it at Tolo between 30 July and 4 August, within striking distance of the capital of the Peloponnese, Nauplia. On the very first day, Königsmarck led his troops to capture the hill of Palamidi, then only poorly fortified, which overlooked the town. The commander of the city, Mustapha Pasha, moved the civilians to the citadel of Akronauplia, and sent urgent messages to the serasker Ismail Pasha for aid; before the Venetians managed to complete their disembarkation, Ismail Pasha arrived at Argos with 4,000 horse and 3,000 foot, and tried to assist the besieged garrison. The Venetians launched an assault against the relief army on 7 August that succeeded in taking Argos and forcing the pasha to retreat to Corinth, but for two weeks, from 16 August, Königsmarck's forces were forced to continuously repulse attacks from Ismail Pasha's forces, fight off the sorties of the besieged garrison, and cope with a new outbreak of the plague – the Hannoverians counted 1,200 out of 2,750 men as sick and wounded. On 29 August Ismail Pasha launched a large-scale attack against the Venetian camp, but was heavily defeated after Morosini landed 2,000 men from the fleet on his flank. Mustapha Pasha surrendered the city on the same day, and on the next day, Morosini staged a triumphal entry in the city. The city's seven thousand Muslims, including the garrison, were transported to Tenedos.[41][43] News of this major victory was greeted in Venice with joy and celebration. Nauplia became the Venetians' major base, while Ismail Pasha withdrew to Vostitsa in the northern Peloponnese after strengthening the garrisons at Corinth, which controlled the passage to Central Greece. The Ottoman forces elsewhere fell into disarray when false rumours circulated that the Sultan had ordered the Peloponnese evacuated; thus at Karytaina Ottoman troops killed their commander and dispersed.[41]

The Ottoman fleet, under the Kapudan Pasha, which had arrived in the Saronic Gulf to reinforce the Ottoman positions in Corinth, was forced by these news to turn back to its base in the Dardanelles. In early October, Morosini led his own ships in a vain search for the Ottoman fleet; as part of this expedition, Morosini landed at the Piraeus, where he was met by the Metropolitan of Athens, Jacob, and notables of the town, who offered him 9,000 reales as tribute. After visiting Salamis, Aegina, and Hydra, Morosini returned with the fleet to the bay of Nauplia on 16 October.[41] At about the same time, the dissatisfaction among the German mercenaries, due to their losses to disease and the perceived neglect in the sharing of spoils, reached its peak, and many, including the entire Saxon contingent, returned home. Nevertheless, Venice was able to make up the losses by a new recruitment drive in Hesse, Württemberg, and Hannover. Due to the imminent outbreak of the Nine Years' War and the general demand for mercenaries, most of the new recruits were not veteran soldiers; the recruiters were even forced to recruit French deserters, and over 200 men deserted in turn during the march to Venice. Once again, the need to await reinforcement delayed the start of Venetian operations in 1687 until July.[44][45]

Patras and the completion of the conquest (1687)

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View of Patras in 1708, by Vincenzo Coronelli

In the meantime, the Ottomans had formed a strong entrenched camp at Patras, with 10,000 men under Mehmed Pasha. As the Ottomans were resupplied from across the Corinthian Gulf by small vessels, Morosini's first step was to institute a naval blockade of the northern Peloponnesian coast. Then, on 22 July, Morosini landed the first of his 14,000 troops west of Patras. Two days later, after the bulk of the Venetian forces had landed, Königsmarck led his army to attack the Ottoman camp, choosing a weak spot in its defences. The Ottomans fought valiantly, but by the end of the day, they were forced to retreat, leaving behind over 2,000 dead and wounded, 160 guns and many supplies, 14 ships, and their commander's own flag.[46][47] The defeat demoralized the Ottoman garrison of Patras Castle, which abandoned it and fled to the fortress of Rio (the "Castle of the Morea"). The next day, with Venetian ships patrolling off the shore, Mehmed and his troops abandoned Rio as well and fled east. The retreat quickly degenerated into a panic, which was often joined by the Greek villagers, and which spread on the same day to the mainland across the Corinthian Gulf as well. Thus within a single day, 25 July, the Venetians were able to capture, without opposition, the twin forts of Rio and Antirrio (the "Little Dardanelles") and the castle of Naupaktos (Lepanto). The Ottomans halted their retreat only at Thebes, where Mehmed Pasha set about regrouping his forces.[48]

The Venetians followed up this success with the reduction of the last Ottoman bastions in the Peloponnese: Chlemoutsi surrendered to Angelo De Negri from Zakynthos on 27 July, while Königsmarck marched east towards Corinth. The Ottoman garrison abandoned the Acrocorinth at his approach after torching the town, which was captured by the Venetians on 7 August. Morosini now gave orders for the preparation of a campaign across the Isthmus of Corinth towards Athens, before going to Mystras, where he persuaded the Ottoman garrison to surrender, and the Maniots occupied Karytaina, abandoned by its Ottoman garrison. The Peloponnese was under complete Venetian control, and only the fort of Monemvasia (Malvasia) in the southeast, which was placed under siege on 3 September, continued to resist, holding out until 1690.[48] These new successes caused great joy in Venice, and honours were heaped on Morosini and his officers. Morosini received the victory title "Peloponnesiacus", and a bronze bust of his was displayed in the Hall of the Great Council of Venice, something never before done for a living citizen. Königsmarck was rewarded with 6,000 ducats in a gold basin and a pay rise to 24,000 ducats a year, Maximilian William of Brunswick-Lüneburg, who commanded the Hannoverian troops, received a jewelled sword valued at 4,000 ducats, and similar gifts were made to many officers in the army.[49]

Occupation of Athens (1687–88)

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Engraving depicting the Venetian siege of the Acropolis of Athens, September 1687. The trajectory of the shell that hit the Parthenon, causing its explosion, is marked.

The Venetian position in the Peloponnese could not be secure as long as the Ottomans held onto eastern Central Greece, where Thebes and Negroponte (Chalkis) were significant military strongholds.[50] Thus, on 21 September 1687, Königsmarck's army, 10,750 men strong, landed at Eleusis, while the Venetian fleet entered Piraeus. The Turks quickly evacuated the town of Athens, but the garrison and much of the population withdrew to the ancient Acropolis of Athens, determined to hold out until reinforcements arrived from Thebes. The Venetian army set up cannon and mortar batteries on the Pnyx and other heights around the city and began a siege of the Acropolis, which would last six days (23–29 September) and would cause much destruction to the ancient monuments. The Ottomans first demolished the Temple of Athena Nike to erect a cannon battery, and on 25 September, a Venetian cannonball exploded a powder magazine in the Propylaea. The most important damage caused was the destruction of the Parthenon. The Turks used the temple for ammunition storage, and when, on the evening of 26 September 1687, a mortar shell hit the building, the resulting explosion killed 300 people and led to the complete destruction of the temple's roof and most of the walls. Despite the enormous destruction caused by the "miraculous shot", as Morosini called it, the Turks continued to defend the fort until a relief attempt from the Ottoman army from Thebes was repulsed by Königsmarck on 28 September. The garrison then capitulated, on condition of being transported to Smyrna.[51][52]

The triumphal entrance to the Arsenal of Venice, built between 1692 and 1694, with the lion statues brought by Morosini from the Piraeus.

Despite the fall of Athens, Morosini's position was not secure. The Ottomans were amassing an army at Thebes, and their 2,000-strong cavalry effectively controlled Attica, limiting the Venetians to the environs of Athens, so that the Venetians had to establish forts to secure the road linking Athens to Piraeus. On 26 December, the 1,400-strong remnant of the Hannoverian contingent departed, and a new outbreak of the plague during the winter further weakened the Venetian forces. The Venetians managed to recruit 500 Arvanites from the rural population of Attica as soldiers, but no other Greeks were willing to join the Venetian army. In a council on 31 December, it was decided to abandon Athens and focus on other projects, such as the conquest of Negroponte. A camp was fortified at the Munychia to cover the evacuation, and it was suggested, but not agreed on, that the walls of the Acropolis should be razed. As the Venetian preparations to leave became evident, many Athenians chose to leave, fearing Ottoman reprisals: 622 families, some 4,000–5,000 people, were evacuated by Venetian ships and settled as colonists in Argolis, Corinthia, Patras, and Aegean islands. Morosini decided to at least take back a few ancient monuments as spoils, but on 19 March the statues of Poseidon and the chariot of Nike fell down and smashed into pieces as they were being removed from the western pediment of the Parthenon. The Venetians abandoned the attempt to remove further sculptures from the temple, and instead took a few marble lions, including the famous Piraeus Lion, which had given the harbour its medieval name "Porto Leone", and which today stands at the entrance of the Venetian Arsenal. On 10 April, the Venetians evacuated Attica for the Peloponnese.[53][54]

Attack on Negroponte (1688)

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Medal struck in Nuremberg in 1688 in honour of Morosini's conquest of the Morea and his election as Doge of Venice

On 3 April 1688, Morosini was elected as the new Doge of Venice, but retained command of the Venetian forces in Greece. The Senate made great efforts to replenish its forces in Greece, but once again, the need to await the expected reinforcements delayed the start of operations until the end of June.[55][56] Despite the failure of the Athens expedition, the fortunes of war were still favourable: the Ottomans were reeling from a series of defeats in Hungary and Dalmatia: following the disastrous Battle of Mohács, in November 1687, a mutiny broke out that resulted in the dismissal and execution of the Grand Vizier Sarı Süleyman Pasha and even the deposition of Sultan Mehmed IV (r. 1648–1687), who was replaced by his brother Suleiman II (r. 1687–1691).[57] Several of Morosini's councillors suggested the moment opportune to attempt a reconquest of Crete, but the new Doge refused, and insisted on a campaign against Negroponte.[55]

On 11 July, the first Venetian troops began disembarking at Negroponte, and laid siege to it two days later. The Venetians had assembled a substantial force, 13,000 troops and further 10,000 men in the fleet, against the Ottoman garrison of 6,000 men, which offered determined resistance. The Venetian fleet was unable to fully blockade the city, which allowed Ismail Pasha's forces, across the Euripus Strait, to ferry supplies to the besieged castle. The Venetians and their allies suffered great losses, especially from another outbreak of the plague, including General Königsmarck, who succumbed to the plague on 15 September, while the Knights of Malta and of St. Stephen departed the siege in early autumn. After a last assault on 12 October proved a costly failure, Morosini had to accept defeat. On 22 October, the Venetian army, having lost in total c. 9,000 men, left Negroponte and headed for Argos. with them went the warlord Nikolaos Karystinos, who had launched an uprising in southern Euboea and had tried, without success, to capture the castle of Karystos.[58][59]

Depleted by the siege and by illness, the remnants of the Hannoverian and Hessian mercenaries departed Greece on 5 November. Morosini attempted an unsuccessful attack on Monemvasia in late 1689, but his failing health forced him to return to Venice soon after. He was replaced as commander-in-chief by Girolamo Cornaro.[58][60] This marked the end of Venetian ascendancy, and the beginning of a number of successful, although in the end not decisive, Ottoman counteroffensives.

Battles in Dalmatia

[edit]
Knin during the Venetian siege of 1687

In the Morean War, the Republic of Venice besieged Sinj in October 1684 and then again March and April 1685, but both times without success.[61] In the 1685 attempt, the Venetian armies were aided by the local militia of the Republic of Poljica, who thereby rebelled against their nominal Ottoman suzerainty that had existed since 1513.[61] In an effort to retaliate to Poljica, in June 1685, the Ottomans attacked Zadvarje, and in July 1686 Dolac and Srijane, but were pushed back, and suffered major casualties.[62] With the help of the local population of Poljica as well as the Morlachs, the fortress of Sinj finally fell to the Venetian army on 30 September 1686.[63] On 1 September 1687 the siege of Castelnuovo started, and ended with a Venetian victory on 30 September.[64] Knin was taken after a twelve-day siege on 11 September 1688.[65] The capture of Knin marked the end of the successful Venetian campaign to expand their territory in inland Dalmatia, and it also determined much of the final border between Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina that stands today.[65] The Ottomans would besiege Sinj again in the Second Morean War, but would be repelled.

On 26 November 1690, Venice took Vrgorac, which opened the route towards Imotski and Mostar.[65] In 1694 they managed to take areas north of the Republic of Ragusa, namely Čitluk, Gabela, Zažablje, Trebinje, Popovo, Klobuk and Metković.[65] In the final peace treaty, Venice did relinquish the areas of Popovo polje as well as Klek and Sutorina, to maintain the pre-existing demarcation near Ragusa.[66]

Ottoman resurgence

[edit]

The new Ottoman sultan initially desired a peace settlement, but the outbreak of the Nine Years' War in 1688, and the subsequent diversion of Austrian resources towards fighting France, encouraged the Ottoman leadership to continue the war. Under the capable leadership of the new Grand Vizier, Köprülü Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, the Ottomans went over to the counteroffensive.[67] As the main effort was directed against Austria, the Ottomans were never able to spare enough men to reverse the Venetian gains completely.

The rise and fall of Limberakis Gerakaris

[edit]

In late 1688, the Turks turned for help to the Maniot buccaneer Limberakis Gerakaris, who had helped them during their invasion of Mani in the Cretan War, but had since been imprisoned at Constantinople for acts of piracy. He was released, invested as "Bey of Mani", allowed to recruit a force of a few hundreds, and joined the Ottoman army at Thebes. Despite the fact that he never commanded any major army, Gerakaris was to play a major role in the latter stages of the war, since his daring and destructive raids destabilized Venetian control and proved a continuous drain on the Republic's resources.[58][68] In spring 1689, Gerakaris conducted his first raid against the Venetian positions in western Central Greece, with a mixed force of 2,000 Turks, Albanians, Slavs and Maniots. Gerakaris seized and torched Missolonghi, plundered the regions of Valtos and Xiromero, and launched attacks on the Venetian strongholds in Aitoliko and Vonitsa.[58]

To counter this new threat, the Venetians renewed their attempts to win over local leaders and recruit local and refugee Greeks into militias. In this way, the Republic formed two warbands, one at Karpenisi under the Greek armatoloi captains and Dalmatian officers Spanos, Chormopoulos, Bossinas, Vitos, and Lubozovich, and another at Loidoriki under the captains Kourmas, Meïdanis, and Elias Damianovich. At the same time, the large swathe of no man's land between the Ottoman strongholds in the east and the Venetian-held territories in the west was increasingly a haven for independent warbands, both Christian and Muslim, who were augmented by Albanian and Dalmatian deserters from the Venetian army. The local population was thus at the mercy of the Venetians and their Greek and Dalmatian auxiliaries on the one hand, who extracted protection money, the depredations of marauding warbands, and the Ottomans, who still demanded the payment of regular taxes. The complexity of the conflict is illustrated by the fact that Gerakaris was repulsed in June 1689 in an attack on Salona (Amfissa) by the local inhabitants under Dimitrios Charopolitis and Elias Damianovich, but at about the same time, Gerakaris defended the villages of Agrafa and Karpenisi from marauding Christian warbands.[69] Gerakaris attempted to persuade many of the independent warbands to enter Ottoman service, but without much success. He was more successful in persuading many of the Athenians who had fled the city in 1688 to return to their homes, after the Ottoman serasker guaranteed that there would be no reprisals against them.[70]

In 1690, the reinforced Ottoman forces swept through Central Greece, and although they were repulsed in an attack on Lepanto, they re-established control over the hinterland east of Lepanto.[71] The Venetians too scored a success: Monemvasia fell on 12 August 1690, thus removing the last Ottoman bastion in the Morea.[72]

In 1692, Gerakaris spearheaded an Ottoman invasion of the Peloponnese. He took Corinth, and unsuccessfully besieged the Acrocorinth and Argos, before being forced to withdraw by the arrival of Venetian reinforcements. After renewed invasions into the Peloponnese in 1694 and 1695, Gerakaris went over to the Venetian camp. In 1696, after negotiations and the mediation of Panagiotis Doxaras, Gerakaris officially joined the Venetians with several terms and conditions; for example, he was awarded with the Order of Saint Mark.[73] Gerakaris's defection to the Venetians was a plight to the Ottoman war effort causing them to go on the defensive, in order to prevent Greek lands from being captured.[73] However, his brutal and savage treatment of the civilian population and his intriguing for the position of Bey of Mani could not be tolerated for long by Venice, and after the brutal sack of Arta in 27 August 1696, Gerakaris was arrested and imprisoned at Brescia.[74]

Operations in Montenegro

[edit]
The fortresses of Castelnuovo (Herceg Novi) and Cattaro (Kotor), by Vincenzo Coronelli

Venetians had important ties and considerable support among the Montenegrins, with solid ground established previously during the Cretan war. Venice strongly considered placing Montenegro under its own protection. In 1685, Montenegrin Metropolitan Rufim Boljević had died."The most loyal friend of Venice" at the time, as said by the Venetians themselves,[75] after a brief tenure of Vasilije Veljekrajski was replaced by Visarion Borilović Bajica. Borilović ascended to the throne as a protege of his relative Patriarch of Peć Arsenije III Čarnojević. Previously a great supporter of Venice, after establishment of contact with Emperor's representatives in 1688, Arsenije became an important ally of the Habsburgs in the Balkans. Venetians were worried that under Arsenije's influence, who himself was of Montenegrin origin, the Montenegrins would lean more towards the Austrians, and thus kept at distance Visarion as well. The course of the Great Turkish war did not always coincide with Venetian interests, and thus this two-sided politics resulted in indecisive and irregular shape of the war in Montenegro. In their effort to win over Montenegrins at their side, Venice sent a detachment of Hajduks, led by their compatriot Bajo Pivljanin to Cetinje to rise the population against the Ottomans in 1685. The detachment was composed mainly of Montenegrins from Grbalj and Boka Kotorska. Previously, they demonstrated their intents during a short night attack on Herceg Novi on 22 August 1684. The Vizier of Skhoder, Suleyman Bushati, after threatening and pacifying the tribes of Kuči and Kelmendi, gathered an army and marched towards Cetinje, when the Pivljanin and his hajduks, accompanied by Venetian detachment and joined by some Montenegrins decided to make a last stand. The confrontation resulted in Battle of Vrtijeljka, where the Ottoman forces annihilated the hajduks and penetrated to Cetinje. After plundering Cetinje, Bushati retreated. Undetermined, with result in low rate of mobilisation, Montenegrin attitude towards the war quickly changed, and despite the fact that handful of them were forcibly mobilised during Bushati's attack on Budva in 1686 they were now in favor of Venice.[citation needed]

Visarion Borilović, who was elected in the meantime, devised a closer war plan with the Venetians, and sent 1500 Montenegrins under Duke Vučeta Bogdanović from Njeguši in the aid of Girolamo Cornaro during his attack on Herceg Novi. Venetian fleet set sails from Hvar and in couple of days reached Castelnuovo on 2 September.[76] Venetians commenced a siege, followed by heavy bombardment on a daily basis. Ottomans tried to break the blockade by sending reinforcements commanded by Topal Hussein Pasha of Bosnia on 15 September. They were ultimately defeated by Montenegrins on Kameno. Herceg Novi surrendered to the Venetians on 31 September ending almost a century and a half rule of the Ottomans established in 1540. The Ottomans tried to retaliate in March and May 1688. Suleyman Pasha Bushati attacked Montenegrin Highland tribe Kuči, only to suffer a devastating defeat twice, with 1500 casualties and lost Medun to them. In the summer of the same year, at the tribal assembly in Gradac in Lješanska nahija, Montenegro officially recognised Venetian suzerainty.[77]

Metropolitan Visarion thus invited nobleman from Kotor Ivan "Zane" Grbičić to Cetinje the following year, who was then elected the first Montenegrin Guvernadur. Venetians established a garrison in Cetinje, and fortified themselves in Cetinje Monastery. In July 1691 Suleyman was defeated yet again during his expeditions of punishment by Piperi and Bjelopavlići. In 1692 Visarion Borilović Bajica died under mysterious circumstances. The popular conspiracy theory has it that he was poisoned by the Venetians. In September of the same year, Suleyman launched another large campaign against Montenegro. The Venetian forces had no intent of facing him like the hajduks did seven years earlier and in turn retreated to the sanctuary of Cetinje monastery. Ottoman army reached Cetinje almost without a fight, with handful of Montenegrins giving only resistance. After negotiations, Venetian army was allowed to retreat from Cetinje. Before their departure, they time-mined the monastery, destroying it permanently. This move was quite unpopular among the local population and resulted in Montenegro turning its back on Venice. The strong ties remained, with guvernadur title being passed to the House of Vukotić, and then after, to the House of Radonjić. Ottoman army retreated from Cetinje shortly after.[78]

Capture of Kanina and Valona (1690)

[edit]
The Siege of Kanina, by Vincenzo Coronelli

In an effort to aid the Greeks of Himara, who had rebelled against the Turks, and after some successes in northern Albania and Montenegro, the Venetian fleet launched an attack against the Ottoman port and fortress of Valona. The Venetians landed troops on 11 September 1690, but instead of confronting them, the Ottomans withdrew and divided their 7,000 troops in the area between the Valona and the inland fortress of Kanina. The Venetians forced Kanina to surrender on 17 September, and Valona was captured on the next day, after its garrison evacuated it. This success allowed the Venetians to expand the area under their control along the coasts and interior of Epirus to Argyrokastron, Himara, Souli, and even the vicinity of Arta.[72]

The Ottoman reaction was not long delayed: in early 1691, Grand Vizier Fazıl Mustafa Pasha sent reinforcements under Kaplan Pasha and Djafer Pasha, the new serasker of the Morea, Hoca Halil Pasha, and Suleiman Pasha of Shkoder, to regain the lost territories in the western Balkans. By 14 March, the Ottomans had recovered Valona and regained control of northern Epirus. For the next two years, the local inhabitants, particularly in Himara, were subject to brutal reprisals, which led many to flee to Corfu, and others to convert to Islam to save themselves.[74]

Attack on Crete (1692)

[edit]

After ensuring the defense of the Isthmus of Corinth, with 2,000 foot soldiers, 4,000 cavalry and 250 Greeks, the Venetians turned their attention to Crete.[79] In 1692, a Venetian fleet comprising 34 galleons and 27 other vessels under Domenico Mocenigo attacked Crete and laid siege to its capital Candia, while at the same time the Greeks of the island rose up against the Ottomans.[79] Despite this, the attempt to retake Crete failed due to several factors, such as Mocenigo's reluctance and Christian desertions, among others.[79] Mocenigo ended the siege, took with him 2,000 Cretans who worked with him against the Ottomans, and left to the Peloponnese.[79]

Final years of the war

[edit]

Hoping to reinvigorate the Venetian cause, Morosini himself returned to the Morea in 1693. His advanced age denied him the chance to prove his abilities again, and on 16 January 1694, he died at Nauplia. His successor, Antonio Zeno [it], against the advice of his officers, led an expedition against the rich island of Chios, off the coast of Asia Minor. The island was taken easily, but the Turkish response was swift and massive. A double naval battle near the Oinousses Islands in February 1695 resulted in a Venetian defeat, and forced a humiliating Venetian withdrawal from Chios.[80]

The Ottomans were encouraged to invade the Morea again, but were defeated by General Steinau and driven back to their base at Thebes. At the same time, Steinau succeeded in bringing Gerakaris to come over to the Venetian side (see above).[81]

[edit]

There were several naval clashes between the opposing fleets, such as at Lesbos in 1690, at Andros in 1696 and also in September 1697,[82] at Lemnos in July 1697, and at Samothrace in 1698, but they were generally indecisive and failed to shift the balance of forces.[citation needed]

Aftermath

[edit]
Venetian four-zecchino coin celebrating the Treaty of Karlowitz

The Treaty of Karlowitz, signed in January 1699, confirmed the Venetian possession of Kephalonia, and the Morea with the island of Aigina, which became organized as the "Kingdom of the Morea" (Italian: Regno di Morea), divided into four provinces: Romania, with seat at Nafplion (Napoli di Romania), Laconia, with seat at Monemvasia (Malvasia), Messenia, with seat at Navarino, and Achaea, with seat at Patras (Patrasso). The war had created a demographic and economic crisis in the Peloponnese.[83] According to the first census conducted by the Venetians, there were 86,468 people in the peninsula compared to a pre-war population of around 200,000.[84] Although the Venetians managed to restore some prosperity – the population allegedly rose to some 250,000 by 1708, probably driven by immigration[84] – they failed to win the trust of their Greek Orthodox subjects, who were used to a relative autonomy under the Turks and resented the Venetian bureaucracy. The Venetians also launched a great fortification project throughout the Morea, whose results can still be seen today. Nevertheless, Venice itself was too weakened to effectively assert its authority, and in 1715 a swift Ottoman campaign (in what was often termed the Second Morean War) reclaimed the Morea.[85]

Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 8–9.
  2. ^ Chasiotis 1975, p. 9.
  3. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 13–14.
  4. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 14–16.
  5. ^ Setton 1991, p. 271.
  6. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 16–17.
  7. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 17–19.
  8. ^ Setton 1991, p. 272.
  9. ^ Topping 1976, p. 159.
  10. ^ a b c d e f Chasiotis 1975, p. 19.
  11. ^ a b Topping 1976, p. 160.
  12. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 172.
  13. ^ a b Finlay 1877, p. 174.
  14. ^ Setton 1991, pp. 275–276.
  15. ^ a b Setton 1991, p. 276.
  16. ^ a b Pinzelli 2003, p. 84.
  17. ^ a b Nani Mocenigo 1935, p. 258.
  18. ^ Pinzelli 2003, p. 83.
  19. ^ Pinzelli 2003, pp. 84–85.
  20. ^ Nani Mocenigo 1935, pp. 257–258.
  21. ^ Gregory Hanlon. "The Twilight Of A Military Tradition: Italian Aristocrats And European Conflicts, 1560-1800." Routledge: 1997. Pages 167-169.
  22. ^ Pinzelli 2003, pp. 85–86.
  23. ^ Paton 1940, pp. 48–49.
  24. ^ Pinzelli 2003, pp. 86–87.
  25. ^ Pinzelli 2003, p. 87.
  26. ^ Pinzelli 2003, pp. 87–88.
  27. ^ a b Chasiotis 1975, p. 20.
  28. ^ Setton 1991, pp. 290–291.
  29. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 20–21.
  30. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 175.
  31. ^ Chasiotis 1975, p. 22.
  32. ^ Finlay 1877, pp. 175–176, 177 (note 2).
  33. ^ a b c d e Chasiotis 1975, p. 23.
  34. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 20, 22–23.
  35. ^ Finlay 1877, pp. 176–177.
  36. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 177.
  37. ^ Finlay 1877, pp. 177–179.
  38. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 179 (note 1).
  39. ^ a b Finlay 1877, p. 179.
  40. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 23–24.
  41. ^ a b c d Chasiotis 1975, p. 24.
  42. ^ Finlay 1877, pp. 179–180.
  43. ^ Finlay 1877, pp. 181–182.
  44. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 24–25.
  45. ^ Finlay 1877, pp. 180–183.
  46. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 25–26.
  47. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 183.
  48. ^ a b Chasiotis 1975, p. 26.
  49. ^ Finlay 1877, pp. 183–184.
  50. ^ Chasiotis 1975, p. 27.
  51. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 27–28.
  52. ^ Finlay 1877, pp. 184–186.
  53. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 28–29.
  54. ^ Finlay 1877, pp. 186–188.
  55. ^ a b Chasiotis 1975, p. 29.
  56. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 189.
  57. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 29–30.
  58. ^ a b c d Chasiotis 1975, p. 30.
  59. ^ Finlay 1877, pp. 189–191.
  60. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 191.
  61. ^ a b Nazor 2002, p. 50.
  62. ^ Nazor 2002, pp. 50–51.
  63. ^ Nazor 2002, p. 51.
  64. ^ Čoralić 2001.
  65. ^ a b c d Nazor 2002, p. 52.
  66. ^ Nazor 2002, p. 53.
  67. ^ Stavrianos 1958, p. 174.
  68. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 192.
  69. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 30–31.
  70. ^ Finlay 1877, pp. 192–193.
  71. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 193.
  72. ^ a b Chasiotis 1975, p. 31.
  73. ^ a b Vakalopoulos, Apostolos (1961). Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού: Τουρκοκρατία 1669–1812 (in Greek). Εκδόσεις Ηρόδοτος. pp. 29–43.
  74. ^ a b Chasiotis 1975, p. 32.
  75. ^ Stanojević 1970, p. 329.
  76. ^ Komar.
  77. ^ Malbaša.
  78. ^ Stanojević.
  79. ^ a b c d Chasiotis 1975, p. 34.
  80. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 232.
  81. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 233.
  82. ^ Anderson, R. C. (1952). Naval wars in the Levant, 1559–1853. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 231.
  83. ^ Finlay 1877, p. 234.
  84. ^ a b McGowan 2010, p. 91.
  85. ^ Chasiotis 1975, pp. 39–43.

References

[edit]

General references

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Morean War (1684–1699), also known as the Sixth Ottoman–Venetian War, was a conflict between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire, during which Venice achieved its sole major territorial victory over the Ottomans by conquering the Morea (Peloponnese) peninsula.[1] This war formed part of the larger Great Turkish War, initiated by the Holy League following the Ottoman failure at the 1683 Siege of Vienna, with Venice joining the anti-Ottoman coalition in 1684 to exploit the empire's divided resources.[2] Venetian naval superiority and amphibious operations enabled the capture of strategic fortresses such as Koroni, Modon, Nauplion, and Patras, culminating in the occupation of most of the Morea by 1687 under the command of Francesco Morosini, who earned the nickname "Peloponnesiac" for these successes.[3] Despite fierce Ottoman resistance and a resurgence that recaptured some areas, Venice retained control over the region through persistent sieges and alliances with local Greek irregulars, though the campaign involved significant destruction, including the 1687 explosion of the Parthenon in Athens when Venetian bombardment ignited an Ottoman powder store within the structure.[4] The war's conclusion came with the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz, which formalized Venetian sovereignty over the Morea, the Ionian Islands including Cephalonia, and other Aegean outposts, establishing the short-lived Kingdom of the Morea as a Venetian colonial administration focused on fortification and trade revival.[2] These gains, however, proved temporary, as Ottoman forces reconquered the Morea in the 1714–1718 war, highlighting the limits of Venice's overextension amid declining naval dominance.[1]

Geopolitical and Strategic Prelude

Broader Context of the Great Turkish War

The failure of the Ottoman siege of Vienna on September 12, 1683, marked a pivotal reversal, compelling the empire to redirect substantial military resources to defend its northern frontiers in Hungary and the Balkans against advancing Habsburg forces. This defeat, involving an Ottoman army estimated at 150,000 men under Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha, exposed vulnerabilities in Ottoman logistics and command, leading to heavy casualties and the loss of initiative in Central Europe.[5] Consequently, the bulk of Ottoman field armies and elite janissary units became committed to countering Austrian offensives, such as the Habsburg reconquest of much of Hungary by 1699, thereby straining imperial capacities and limiting reinforcements to distant provinces like the Morea.[6] In response to Ottoman setbacks, Pope Innocent XI orchestrated the formation of the Holy League in March 1684 through the Treaty of Linz and related pacts, forging a coalition comprising the Habsburg Monarchy (Holy Roman Empire), the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under King John III Sobieski, and the Republic of Venice, with later adherence by Russia.[5] This alliance aimed to exploit Ottoman overextension by mounting coordinated assaults across multiple fronts, from the Danube to the Adriatic and Black Sea, effectively transforming isolated conflicts into a unified campaign against Ottoman dominance in Europe.[6] Venice's participation, formalized in June 1684, positioned the Morean War as a southern theater of this broader struggle, where naval superiority and opportunistic land operations could capitalize on the empire's divided attention. Ottoman commitments to the Hungarian theater—where annual campaigns required tens of thousands of troops to repel Habsburg incursions—left the Morea garrisoned primarily by local sipahi cavalry and irregular forces under provincial beys, totaling approximately 10,000 men dispersed across fortresses rather than concentrated for field defense.[7] This peripheral under-resourcing reflected the empire's prioritization of core continental threats over maritime fringes, enabling Venetian expeditions to achieve rapid gains despite numerical parity in some engagements.[8] The resulting causal dynamic underscored how the Holy League's multi-front pressure eroded Ottoman cohesion, facilitating peripheral conquests without necessitating direct northern diversions.

Venetian Motivations and Entry into Conflict

The Republic of Venice had endured a protracted rivalry with the Ottoman Empire, culminating in the loss of Crete in 1669 following the exhaustive Cretan War (1645–1669), which strained Venetian resources and exposed vulnerabilities in its eastern Mediterranean holdings.[2] This defeat heightened Venetian ambitions to reclaim influence in the region, viewing the Morea (Peloponnese) as a strategic buffer to shield its Ionian Islands possessions and vital trade routes from Ottoman naval incursions.[9] The Ottoman failure at the Siege of Vienna in 1683 presented a rare opportunity, as the empire's forces were overstretched across multiple fronts in the Great Turkish War, prompting Venice to pursue expansionist goals under the guise of defensive imperatives and historical grievances.[10] Economic imperatives further fueled Venetian interest in the Morea, a fertile region producing key commodities such as grain for provisioning fleets, silk for textile industries, and currants that underpinned Venice's export economy alongside staples from nearby Ionian outposts.[11] Control over these resources promised to bolster the republic's maritime commerce, which relied on secure access to Levantine markets amid declining overland silk routes.[12] Despite initial neutrality in the post-Vienna Ottoman campaigns, Venetian leaders calculated that Ottoman distractions offered a window for opportunistic conquest, aligning imperial revival with the preservation of economic lifelines threatened by persistent Turkish privateering.[5] On April 25, 1684, upon learning of the formation of the Holy League—an anti-Ottoman coalition orchestrated by Pope Innocent XI including the Holy Roman Empire, Poland-Lithuania, and Russia—Venice acceded and, unusually for its history of reactive engagements, preemptively declared war on the Ottomans.[2] This alliance provided diplomatic cover and papal legitimacy, framing Venetian aggression as a crusade-like defense of Christendom rather than isolated revanchism, though Venice's prior hesitance underscored pragmatic power projection over ideological fervor.[5] The decision reflected a calculated shift from defensive posture to offensive imperialism, leveraging collective European momentum against a distracted foe to target the Morea as a linchpin for renewed Venetian dominance in the Aegean.[13]

Ottoman Vulnerabilities and Pre-War State

By the late 17th century, the Ottoman timar system—wherein provincial revenues supported sipahi cavalry in return for military service—had deteriorated markedly in Balkan provinces like the Morea, supplanted by tax farming (iltizam) and hereditary estates that empowered corrupt local beys. These officials, often prioritizing personal enrichment over imperial duties, alienated sipahis and reduced the system's capacity to mobilize reliable forces, fostering administrative inefficiency and garrison indiscipline.[14] Central authority's erosion allowed such mismanagement to persist, as devşirme elites seized timars for revenue without fulfilling obligations, weakening the cavalry backbone essential for regional defense.[14] The prolonged Cretan War (1645–1669), despite Ottoman triumph, imposed severe fiscal and logistical burdens, with the Morea requisitioned as a staging area that strained local economies through manpower drafts and supply demands. This conflict, costing millions in treasure and thousands of troops annually, diverted resources from provincial upkeep, compounding timar decay by limiting fiscal reforms and reinforcements to Balkan garrisons already plagued by low pay and corruption.[14] Resulting economic pressures, including disrupted agriculture and trade, further eroded loyalty among Muslim settlers and officials, leaving the Peloponnese vulnerable to unrest without adequate recovery by 1684. Pre-existing Greek resistance, independent of external instigation, manifested in klephts—Christian bandits fleeing Ottoman taxes, vendettas, or conscription—who conducted raids on tax collectors and Muslim villages, symbolizing defiance against central exactions. Armatoloi, irregular Christian militias nominally hired by Ottomans to guard passes against klephts, frequently overlapped with rebels in allegiance, defecting amid shared grievances and providing illusory control over rugged terrains.[15] In the Morea, such dynamics perpetuated low-level insurgency, sapping garrison effectiveness without coordinated rebellion. The Maniots in southern Peloponnese upheld de facto autonomy, leveraging clan-based warfare and mountainous isolation to resist subjugation, offering sporadic tribute while repelling Ottoman incursions through the 17th century. Ottoman authorities, deterred by high conquest costs and Maniot ferocity, tolerated this semi-independent polity rather than enforce direct rule, highlighting provincial overextension.[16]

Preparations and Initial Mobilization

Venetian Military Reforms and Alliances

In preparation for the Morean War, Venice adapted its military structure for amphibious expeditionary operations, emphasizing naval transport, siege engineering, and mercenary augmentation rather than mass conscription or crusading zeal. Drawing from Francesco Morosini's extensive command experience during the Cretan War (1645–1669), where Ottoman fortifications had demanded sustained artillery barrages, the Republic prioritized procurement of heavy siege guns, including cannons and mortars, to breach Peloponnesian strongholds efficiently.[17] This focus addressed prior deficiencies in landward firepower, enabling targeted assaults over prolonged attrition. The Venetian fleet, comprising galleys and sailing ships, was expanded to ferry troops and supplies across the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, with papal financial aid from Innocent XI underwriting construction and maintenance as part of broader anti-Ottoman efforts within the Holy League.[18] Morosini, appointed Captain-General da Mar e da Terra by the Senate on April 1684, assembled an initial force of roughly 8,000–10,000 personnel, predominantly mercenaries from German principalities like Saxony and Brunswick, alongside French contingents and Greek levies from Venetian-held Ionian islands.[19] This composition underscored Venice's pragmatic reliance on paid professionals, as its urban populace yielded few native soldiers for overseas campaigns.[20] Strategic alliances supplemented these reforms, with Morosini negotiating pacts with Morean chieftains, notably the fiercely independent Maniots, who were promised local autonomy and tax exemptions for aiding Venetian incursions. These overtures, rooted in Morosini's prior contacts during Cretan operations, aimed to harness irregular guerrilla forces against Ottoman garrisons; however, empirical outcomes revealed constrained fidelity, as Maniot leaders hesitated without ironclad guarantees, occasionally demanding hostages yet providing sporadic rather than steadfast cooperation.[21] Such arrangements highlighted the limits of ideological appeals, favoring transactional incentives amid entrenched regional rivalries.

Ottoman Defensive Posture in the Morea

The Ottoman Empire, stretched thin by the ongoing Great Turkish War against the Holy League following the failed Siege of Vienna in 1683, prioritized a defensive stance in the Morea, focusing on fortress garrisons rather than proactive field armies. Key coastal strongholds such as Navarino, Coron, and Modon—long-established Ottoman bastions from prior conquests—received urgent reinforcements, including elite janissary units dispatched from Istanbul to bolster their defenses against anticipated Venetian amphibious assaults. These ports, vital for controlling maritime access to the Peloponnese, housed garrisons numbering in the thousands by early 1685, underscoring the emphasis on static, fortified resistance over mobile operations.[22] To supplement regular forces, the Sublime Porte appointed Ismail Pasha as serasker (commander-in-chief) of the Morea, tasking him with organizing local defenses; in spring 1685, he mobilized approximately 10,000 troops, drawing on Albanian sipahis (cavalry) and indigenous militias to patrol inland routes and suppress potential Greek unrest. This irregular warfare approach leveraged the rugged terrain and ethnic loyalties, compensating for the scarcity of central troops diverted to European fronts. However, systemic overextension led to intelligence lapses, with delayed awareness of Venetian fleet movements allowing Francesco Morosini's expedition to land unopposed at Zakynthos on 19 August 1684. Rural Ottoman commanders implemented scorched-earth measures, evacuating villages and destroying crops to deprive invaders of forage and intelligence, tactics that exacerbated Venetian supply shortages amid the peninsula's depopulation and desertions during the 1685 campaign onset. Such resilience through asymmetry prolonged resistance despite conventional vulnerabilities, as evidenced by the prolonged sieges of fortified positions.[23]

Venetian Offensive Phase (1684–1688)

Early Operations in Western Greece and Ionia (1684)

The Venetian fleet, commanded by Francesco Morosini, departed from Venice on 10 June 1684, arriving at Corfu to prepare for operations against Ottoman-held territories in the Ionian region. Leveraging naval superiority, Morosini first targeted Lefkada (Santa Maura), which had been under Ottoman control since 1479; the siege commenced on 21 July and concluded successfully on 6 August after 16 days of bombardment and assaults, with the garrison surrendering due to the intensity of Venetian artillery fire from galleys and shore batteries. This recapture secured a key base for further amphibious operations, though supply lines remained vulnerable to seasonal winds and the need for constant resupply from Venetian possessions like Cephalonia.[24][25] Following the fall of Lefkada, Morosini dispatched forces, aided by local Greek irregulars, to raid the Acarnanian mainland opposite the island, testing Ottoman defenses in western Greece. These probes encountered minimal resistance, as Ottoman garrisons withdrew to inland strongholds, allowing Venetian troops to overrun much of the coastal area with low casualties—estimated at fewer than 200 killed or wounded across the initial landings—while disrupting Ottoman supply routes. Concurrently, Habsburg advances in Dalmatia, including raids into Ottoman Slavonia, created a diversionary effect, drawing Ottoman reinforcements northward and exposing Ionian positions to Venetian exploitation.[26] The campaign culminated in the assault on Preveza, where Venetian forces landed on 21 September and besieged the fortress; after eight days of heavy cannonade, the castle surrendered on 29 September, yielding 1,200 Ottoman prisoners and significant artillery stores. Vonitsa fell shortly thereafter to a detachment under Venetian captain Delladecima, eliminating the last major Ottoman coastal bastions in the region by late September. These minor territorial gains, achieved through coordinated sea-land maneuvers rather than pitched battles, highlighted Ottoman vulnerabilities post their 1683 defeat at Vienna but also underscored Venetian logistical strains, including reliance on fragile wooden bridges for crossing lagoons and the challenge of sustaining 4,000–5,000 troops amid malaria-prone marshes. The operations inflicted negligible strategic losses on the Ottomans yet provided Morosini with fortified anchors for the subsequent Peloponnesian offensive, confirming the efficacy of naval dominance in peripheral theaters.[25][26]

Systematic Conquest of the Peloponnese (1685–1687)

Venetian forces under Francesco Morosini initiated the conquest of the Peloponnese in 1685 with the siege of Coron (Koroni), a key Ottoman fortress on the southwestern coast. On 25 June, approximately 8,100 Venetian troops landed and began trench works and bombardment from land and sea, targeting the citadel defended by around 3,000 Ottoman soldiers.[27] [28] The fortress capitulated on 11 August after 49 days of sustained artillery fire, marking the first major Venetian success in the peninsula due to superior siege tactics exploiting Ottoman defensive vulnerabilities.[2] [24] Concurrently, Maniot locals—fiercely independent Greek irregulars from the southern peninsula—expelled Ottoman garrisons from strongholds like Zarnata, Kelefa, and Passava through coordinated raids and betrayals, facilitated by Venetian overtures and Ottoman distraction in the broader Great Turkish War.[2] This internal uprising, culminating in the Venetian victory at the Battle of Kalamata, secured the Mani Peninsula by late 1685 without major pitched battles, highlighting the efficacy of Venetian alliances with disaffected Greek elements for intelligence and sabotage over direct assaults.[2] In 1686, operations advanced methodically northward. Navarino surrendered in June following a brief siege, undermined by Venetian naval blockade and artillery dominance that prevented Ottoman reinforcements.[2] [24] Modon (Methoni) fell in July after similar bombardment tactics overwhelmed its defenses, with the garrison yielding to avoid total destruction.[2] Venetian troops then landed at Tolo and besieged Nauplia, the regional Ottoman administrative center; despite a relief effort by Ismail Pasha repelled with minimal losses, the fortress capitulated in November after prolonged shelling that breached walls and induced surrender among the depleted defenders.[2] By 1687, Venetian control over the Peloponnese mainland neared completion with the capture of Patras in July, achieved through combined land assault and naval support that isolated the city and compelled Ottoman capitulation.[24] [2] Across these campaigns, thousands of Ottoman troops surrendered, often with terms allowing evacuation but resulting in significant prisoner hauls that strained Venetian logistics while demonstrating the tactical superiority of methodical sieges over risky field engagements against numerically inferior but entrenched foes.[2] Local Greek irregulars continued providing critical intelligence on garrison weaknesses and supply routes, amplifying Venetian efficacy amid Ottoman operational disarray.[27]

Expansion to Athens and Negroponte Attempts (1687–1688)

In September 1687, following successes in the Peloponnese, Venetian commander Francesco Morosini advanced on Athens to exploit Ottoman disarray, besieging the city and its Acropolis garrison.[29] The operation involved positioning artillery on nearby hills such as the Pnyx and Areopagus to bombard fortified positions held by approximately 800 Ottoman troops.[30] On September 26, 1687, a Venetian mortar round directly struck the Parthenon, which Ottoman forces had repurposed as a gunpowder storage facility containing up to 1,000 barrels of explosives, triggering a catastrophic detonation that collapsed the roof, shattered much of the cella walls, and killed around 300 defenders.[29][30] The blast scattered Venetian shell fragments across the site, later confirmed by 19th-century archaeological excavations as evidence of the bombardment's role in the damage.[31] Despite the cultural loss to a millennia-old monument—already altered under Byzantine and Ottoman uses—the explosion facilitated the Acropolis's surrender on September 28, allowing brief Venetian occupation of Athens until April 1688.[32] Emboldened yet overextended, Morosini—elected Doge in 1688—shifted to Negroponte (modern Chalkis on Euboea), a key Ottoman stronghold, landing with a mercenary-heavy force in July and initiating a siege against reinforced fortifications manned by several thousand troops.[2] The four-month effort faltered amid inadequate blockade enforcement, outbreaks of disease, supply shortages from elongated lines, and relentless Ottoman sorties, resulting in over 6,000 Venetian casualties and retreat by October without capturing the island.[2] These campaigns underscored the strategic hubris of Venetian expansionism: while initial momentum from Morean victories enabled opportunistic strikes, the lack of sustainable logistics and local support exposed the fragility of expeditionary operations against resilient Ottoman defenses, prompting withdrawal and minimal net territorial gains beyond the peninsula.[10]

Parallel Actions in Dalmatia

In parallel with the main offensive in the Morea, Venetian forces in Dalmatia launched operations to harass Ottoman positions and divert imperial resources northward, coordinating loosely with Habsburg allies advancing from the Croatian hinterland to form a pincer on Ottoman-held territories. Early raids targeted inland strongholds, including unsuccessful sieges of Sinj in October 1684 and March–April 1685, which nonetheless compelled Ottoman garrisons to reinforce defenses and disrupted supply lines.[2] These actions exploited Venice's established coastal bases in Venetian Dalmatia, employing a mix of professional troops, local Morlach irregulars, and naval support to conduct hit-and-run assaults around Knin and other frontier forts, aiming to stretch Ottoman commitments across fragmented fronts rather than achieve immediate large-scale conquests.[20] Under Provveditore Generale da Mar Girolamo Cornaro, Venetian forces achieved key successes in 1687–1688, capturing the coastal fortress of Herceg Novi (Castelnuovo) after a month-long siege from 1 September to 30 September 1687, securing a strategic Adriatic port and denying the Ottomans a naval staging point. This was followed by the seizure of Knin fortress on 11 September 1688 after a twelve-day siege, extending Venetian control into the Dalmatian interior and linking with Habsburg gains to the north.[33][34] These limited territorial advances, while not transformative, tied down Ottoman troops in defensive postures—estimated in the low thousands across garrisons—and contributed to overall attrition by compelling reinforcements from Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby indirectly supporting the Peloponnesian campaign through multi-theater pressure. However, the operations remained secondary in scale, with Venice prioritizing the Morea and regaining some Dalmatian holdings only temporarily before Ottoman counteroffensives.[35]

Ottoman Resurgence and Counteroffensives (1688–1696)

Rise of Local Irregular Forces and Gerakaris

As Venetian forces consolidated control over much of the Morea following their systematic conquests by 1687, Ottoman authorities, constrained by commitments in the Great Turkish War against the Holy League, increasingly relied on local irregular forces to mount asymmetric resistance rather than large-scale regular army deployments. These klephts—mountain bandits and semi-autonomous fighters, often of Greek or Albanian origin—harassed Venetian outposts through guerrilla tactics, exploiting terrain familiarity to avoid direct confrontations and erode occupier morale. Such forces, though fragmented and opportunistic, symbolized persistent Ottoman-aligned defiance, countering perceptions of unresisted provincial collapse by demonstrating localized agency in sustaining low-level conflict.[27] Prominent among these irregular leaders was Limberakis Gerakaris, a Maniot klepht born around 1644, whose career as a pirate and raider positioned him as an effective Ottoman proxy. Imprisoned in Constantinople for prior depredations, Gerakaris was released in 1688 at the behest of Ottoman commanders desperate for native expertise against Venetian incursions into Mani; he was granted a force of approximately 3,000 men and tasked with disrupting enemy logistics. From 1688 to 1692, his bands executed hit-and-run raids on Venetian garrisons and supply convoys in the Peloponnese, leveraging mobility and local knowledge to seize minor forts and compel resource diversion, thereby impeding full Venetian pacification without committing to pitched battles.[27][2] In recognition of his utility, the Ottomans temporarily appointed Gerakaris as bey of Mani around 1690, formalizing his command over irregulars in the rugged southern peninsula and enabling coordinated harassment that tied down Venetian troops. His operations exemplified causal effectiveness of decentralized resistance: by targeting isolated posts and foraging parties, Gerakaris's forces inflicted cumulative attrition, fostering Ottoman hopes of eventual reversal amid broader imperial strains. Albanian irregulars, recruited from frontier regions and integrated into these efforts, contributed to morale sustenance through similar skirmishes, though their role remained auxiliary to Gerakaris's core activities in the Morea.[27][2] Gerakaris's influence waned by 1696, precipitated by internal betrayals among his followers and his own shifting allegiances, culminating in defection to Venetian service—prompting his imprisonment by the Republic for excessive brutality toward captives and allies alike. This episode underscored the precariousness of irregular alliances, reliant on personal loyalties over institutional control, yet it highlighted how such figures prolonged Ottoman resilience in the Morea, forestalling complete Venetian entrenchment until formal counteroffensives.[2]

Land Recaptures in Albania and Montenegro

In early 1690, as part of the Ottoman resurgence during the Morean War, imperial forces initiated counteroffensives on the periphery, targeting Venetian gains in Albania where rugged mountainous terrain and limited supply lines hindered the republic's ability to consolidate control. The Venetians had briefly seized key coastal positions including Kaninë (ancient Kanina) and Vlorë (Valona) through amphibious operations supported by their Ionian fleet, but these holdings proved tenuous due to overextension and local resistance. Ottoman troops, leveraging amphibious reinforcement from their remaining Adriatic squadrons, recaptured Vlorë by mid-March 1691 and swiftly regained northern Epirus, restoring control over strategic ports essential for regional supply routes.[2] Concurrent operations extended to Montenegro, where Venetian incursions from Dalmatia aimed to exploit Orthodox discontent but encountered fierce local opposition in the craggy highlands around Cetinje. Montenegrin chieftains, despite nominal suzerainty under the Ottoman Porte, pragmatically coordinated with imperial irregulars to repel these advances, prioritizing defense of their autonomy against Catholic Venetian garrisons over any irredentist appeals to shared faith with Greek coreligionists in the Morea. This religious pragmatism underscored the absence of unified Orthodox solidarity against the Ottomans, as peripheral Slavic and Albanian communities viewed Venetian occupation—marked by forced conversions and heavy taxation—as equally burdensome, favoring tactical alliances with Muslim overlords accustomed to millet-based governance. The terrain's narrow passes and fortified monasteries further amplified defensive advantages, enabling small forces to inflict disproportionate casualties on Venetian columns.[36] By 1692, these peripheral campaigns devolved into stalemate, with Ottomans securely holding Albanian and Montenegrin highlands while Venice retained footholds in the Ionian lowlands but lacked the manpower for decisive pushes inland. Ottoman commanders exploited geographic chokepoints, such as the Albanian Alps and Montenegrin karst plateaus, to maintain irregular warfare that bled Venetian resources without risking open-field battles. This phase highlighted causal dynamics of terrain in sustaining Ottoman resilience, as fortified elevations neutralized Venice's artillery superiority and amphibious mobility, ultimately confining the republic's ambitions to naval dominance rather than continental expansion.[2]

Failed Invasions and Stalemates (1690–1696)

Following the Venetian consolidation of the Morea by 1690, Ottoman forces mounted limited counteroffensives to reclaim the peninsula, but these efforts were constrained by the empire's broader commitments in the Great Turkish War against the Holy League coalition, including Habsburg advances in Hungary that diverted substantial troops northward. In 1692, the Ottoman-aligned Maniot pirate leader Limberakis Gerakaris launched an invasion of the Peloponnese from bases in Boeotia, capturing Corinth and initiating sieges of Acrocorinth and Argos, yet these operations faltered due to inadequate supply lines and Venetian reinforcements.[27][37] Gerakaris's forces probed Venetian defenses at key coastal strongholds, including Nauplia, but were repelled amid logistical breakdowns exacerbated by the Ottomans' need to reinforce fronts elsewhere, such as against Austrian incursions and preliminary Russian maneuvers threatening Black Sea supply routes via the Crimean Khanate. General Otto von Steinau, commanding Venetian-German contingents, decisively defeated the invaders near Thebes, forcing a retreat and preventing deeper penetration into the Morea.[27] These failures highlighted the Ottomans' overextension, as Holy League pressures precluded the mass mobilization required for a sustained reconquest.[38] Venetian forces, under commanders like Steinau, focused on fortifying positions such as Nauplia and Monemvasia, repulsing further raids through scorched-earth tactics and naval interdiction that disrupted Ottoman provisioning. By 1694–1696, the theater devolved into attritional skirmishes and localized standoffs, with both sides suffering heavy non-combat losses primarily from plague and dysentery outbreaks in encampments, outstripping battlefield fatalities. This mutual depletion, compounded by famine in contested areas, fostered temporary truces in peripheral zones like western Greece, marking a shift to defensive stalemate without resolving control of the Morea.[27][39]

Venetian Dominance in the Ionian and Aegean Seas

The Venetian navy achieved marked superiority in the Ionian and Aegean Seas from 1684 onward, primarily due to numerical and organizational advantages over the dispersed Ottoman fleet, which numbered around 40 galleys in typical deployments but was further diluted by the empire's multi-front engagements in the Great Turkish War. Venetian armadas, commanded by Francesco Morosini starting in 1685, routinely mustered 38 or more galleys supplemented by galleasses and auxiliary vessels, enabling effective patrols and amphibious support for continental campaigns.[21] This asymmetry facilitated secure convoys from Dalmatian and Ionian bases like Corfu, sustaining over 10,000 troops and crew in key expeditions without significant interruption.[27] Control of sea lanes imposed a de facto blockade on Ottoman reinforcements to the Morea, intercepting supply convoys and restricting the empire to sporadic, small-scale naval efforts that failed to relieve besieged garrisons.[1] By dominating trade routes, Venetian forces starved Ottoman logistics, compelling reliance on vulnerable overland paths through Albania and Montenegro, where intercepted shipments empirically demonstrated the blockade's efficacy in prolonging Venetian land gains. Raids into the Aegean, such as the 1694 operation against Chios, exemplified this dominance, with Venetian squadrons disrupting Ottoman provisioning hubs and temporarily seizing the island to sever eastern supply lines.[1] Auxiliary privateers, including Greek corsairs and allied vessels from the Papal States and Tuscany integrated into the main fleet, amplified raiding operations and convoy disruptions, compensating for any gaps in regular galley deployments.[40] These forces, leveraging Venetian shipbuilding expertise in maneuverable galleys, ensured sustained pressure on Ottoman maritime traffic, directly correlating with the prolongation of Venetian offensives ashore through 1688.

Ottoman Naval Responses and Privateering

The Ottoman Empire, preoccupied with major land campaigns against the Holy League on multiple fronts during the Great Turkish War, adopted a strategy of naval restraint, avoiding decisive fleet engagements in favor of asymmetric harassment through privateers and allied corsairs. This approach leveraged irregular forces to disrupt Venetian supply lines and commerce in the Aegean and Ionian Seas without committing the main fleet, which was needed to support continental operations. Key to these efforts was the integration of North African corsairs, including contingents from Algiers under figures like Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha, who rose from privateer origins to command Ottoman squadrons and contributed to limited but effective raids against Venetian shipping around 1686. Privateering activities intensified in the later phases of the war, particularly through local Greek irregulars aligned with Ottoman interests. Limberakis Gerakaris, a Maniot pirate initially operating independently, received Ottoman commission as Bey of Mani in 1686, enabling him to lead guerrilla-style naval raids that targeted Venetian convoys in the Ionian region and along the Peloponnesian coast. These operations, often involving small, fast vessels suited for hit-and-run tactics, compelled Venice to divert resources to convoy escorts and fortifications, thereby elevating logistical costs and straining the republic's overextended naval commitments. Gerakaris's forces, numbering in the hundreds and exploiting familiarity with local waters, achieved sporadic successes in capturing merchant prizes and interrupting resupply efforts to Morean garrisons.[41] While the Ottoman regular navy under Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha engaged in occasional fleet actions—such as the September 1695 victory at Zeytinburnu near the Dardanelles, where Venetian squadrons suffered heavy losses—the emphasis remained on corsair auxiliaries from Barbary regencies for sustained Aegean harassment. These privateers, operating under imperial sanction, focused on commerce raiding rather than territorial conquest, reflecting a causal prioritization of preserving fleet integrity amid broader strategic pressures. The approach yielded no reversal of Venetian sea dominance but imposed incremental attrition, contributing to the republic's decision to negotiate at Karlowitz by highlighting the unsustainability of prolonged maritime supremacy.[42]

Path to Peace and Armistice

Diplomatic Maneuvering and Treaty Negotiations

The Ottoman Empire's catastrophic defeat at the Battle of Zenta on September 11, 1697, inflicted over 20,000 casualties on its forces and destroyed much of its supply train, decisively undermining its capacity to sustain multi-front warfare against the Holy League. This Habsburg triumph under Prince Eugene of Savoy prompted Sultan Mustafa II to authorize envoys for preliminary armistice discussions in late 1697, marking a pivot from offensive ambitions to defensive diplomacy aimed at preserving core territories. Venice, as a League member, benefited indirectly from this reversal, as Ottoman resources diverted to Hungarian fronts had already stalled major Morean counteroffensives by 1696; however, Venetian diplomats emphasized their de facto control over the Peloponnese to extract concessions, framing the Morea as a non-negotiable fait accompli secured through seven years of grueling conquests.[7] Negotiations formalized at the Congress of Karlowitz, convened in November 1698 near the Austrian-Ottoman frontier, involved sequential bilateral talks mediated by English and Dutch envoys to prevent coalition fractures. Venetian representative Carlo Ruzzini, supported by technical experts, pressed for maximal retention of wartime gains by presenting pre-drawn maps delineating Morean borders, contrasting Ottoman reliance on verbal claims and historical precedents. Amid League-wide demands—Austria seeking Hungary, Poland Podolia—Venice traded peripheral Aegean occupations, including islands like Lemnos and Tenedos seized in 1690s naval actions, for Ottoman acknowledgment of Morean sovereignty; this quid pro quo reflected pragmatic calculus, as holding distant islands strained Venetian logistics without offsetting the strategic value of the mainland peninsula for Mediterranean trade routes.[43][44] The congress's multilateral dynamics exposed tensions, with Venetian envoys wary of Austrian dominance potentially sidelining peripheral interests; Ruzzini coordinated discreetly with Polish counterparts to counter Ottoman divide-and-conquer tactics, such as offering Venice favorable terms if it decoupled from Habsburg claims. By January 1699, war exhaustion and Ottoman fiscal strain—exacerbated by Zenta's loss of artillery and elite troops—compelled acquiescence to Venetian core demands, though not without protracted haggling over Dalmatian enclaves. This outcome underscored realist bargaining, where Venice's Morean foothold translated military tenacity into diplomatic leverage, albeit at the cost of forgoing unsustainable insular outposts.

Treaty of Karlowitz (1699)

The Treaty of Karlowitz, concluded on 26 January 1699, formalized the Ottoman Empire's cessions to Venice following the latter's conquests in the Morean War, as part of broader settlements ending the Great Turkish War against the Holy League.[45] Venice secured permanent control over the Morea peninsula (Peloponnese), including the island of Aegina, alongside confirmations of prior holdings like Cephalonia and other Ionian islands, representing a significant expansion of approximately 21,000 square kilometers in southern Greece.[46] In Dalmatia, Venetian acquisitions included inland extensions such as the town of Imotski and its surrounding district, bolstering coastal fortifications against Ottoman incursions.[47] The Ottomans retained key central Greek territories, including Negroponte (Euboea) and the Attica region around Athens, limiting Venice's gains to peripheral zones despite extensive Greek irregular support during the conflict.[48] The Venetian-Ottoman accord established a 25-year truce rather than indefinite peace, allowing both parties to regroup amid unresolved hostilities elsewhere in the Mediterranean.[49] This provisional nature underscored the treaty's role in pausing rather than resolving underlying power imbalances, with Ottoman negotiators conceding under pressure from battlefield defeats like Zenta in 1697. No provisions addressed Greek autonomy or independence, treating local revolts as auxiliary to Venetian territorial aims and revealing the pragmatic limits of Holy League alliances, where Orthodox populations served as manpower without sovereign guarantees.[50] These cessions empirically shifted control over vital naval bases and agricultural lands, enabling Venice to project power into the Aegean while exposing Ottoman vulnerabilities in European holdings; maps of the period delineate the Morea's transfer as a clear demarcation, with Venetian frontiers advancing southward from the Gulf of Patras to Cape Matapan. The resulting territorial hemorrhage contributed causally to Ottoman administrative turmoil, as elite purges and fiscal strains from war indemnities deferred systemic military reforms for decades, prioritizing internal stabilization over rapid reconquest.[49]

Immediate Aftermath

Venetian Occupation and Administration of the Morea

Following the conquest of the Morea in 1687 under Francesco Morosini, Venice established the Kingdom of the Morea as a colonial province divided into four main regions—Romania, Achaia, Laconia, and Messenia—subdivided into 25 territories, governed by a Provveditore Generale da Mar combining military and civil authority, alongside provincial governors and local rectors. Morosini initiated early administrative reforms, including the creation of 16 comunita (municipal councils) modeled on those in the Ionian Islands, granting limited self-governance to select Greek communities for handling local justice, markets, policing, and sanitation, with charters issued as incentives for urban repopulation (e.g., Navarino's 1687 charter limited to 60 families and privileges like tax exemptions on rebuilt properties). Extensive fortification projects were undertaken during this period, including upgrades to key strongholds like the New Fortress at Navarino, though structural weaknesses persisted, such as inadequate walls requiring only 24 soldiers for garrisoning by 1703. These efforts aimed at defensive consolidation but reflected a top-down imposition prioritizing Venetian security over local needs.[51] Taxation policies emphasized revenue extraction to fund occupation costs, abolishing certain Ottoman personal levies like harac and avariz while retaining and escalating the agricultural tithe (decima) to 12.5% by 1704, supplemented by indirect duties (dazi) on trade and monopolies (appalti) auctioned for goods such as salt, fish, and spirits—e.g., Navarino's tithe fetched 1,590 reali in 1700 auctions, rising to 3,687.5 reali by 1705 amid venal bidding. Export restrictions on staples like wine and cereals until 1704 exacerbated cash shortages in a pastoral economy, fostering rural disaffection and brigandage rather than reinvigorating commerce; coastal undercultivation persisted as peasants fled inland or northward, undermining repopulation drives. Limited port enhancements, such as maintaining Navarino Bay's facilities, prioritized naval utility over trade, yielding negligible commercial revival despite the region's potential in olives and livestock.[51] Integration efforts faltered due to systemic favoritism toward Venetian officials and imported settlers from places like Chios, who received rent-free land grants while locals faced sharecropping burdens (up to one-third harvests) and competition for communal privileges, alienating rural Greek elites who lacked an urban mercantile tradition compatible with Venetian models. Without comprehensive cadastres, land distribution devolved into chaos, with public domains neglected or usurped, and policies failed to adapt to Ottoman-era socioeconomic patterns, such as relative Orthodox autonomy, leading to persistent peasant flight and elite non-cooperation. Demographic gains—e.g., Messenia's population rising from 86,000 in 1689 to 250,000 peninsula-wide by 1709—stemmed more from immigration than loyalty, underscoring governance as extractive colonialism that prioritized fiscal returns over sustainable allegiance, culminating in vulnerability to Ottoman reconquest.[51]

Demographic and Economic Consequences

The Morean War inflicted severe demographic losses on the Peloponnese, with warfare, famine, and mass flight contributing to widespread depopulation. Venetian authorities conducted the first post-conquest census in 1689, recording 86,468 inhabitants across the region excluding the semi-autonomous Mani peninsula and Corinthia.[52] This figure reflected a sharp decline from pre-war Ottoman estimates, such as traveler Evliya Çelebi's 1668 account of approximately 279,000 in comparable areas, though exact comparability is limited by methodological differences in Ottoman surveys focusing on taxable households rather than total heads.[52] Combat devastation, crop failures exacerbating famine, and disease claimed numerous lives, while the Muslim population—estimated at 20-30% of residents—largely fled to Ottoman-held territories amid fears of reprisals or enslavement, with reports of targeted killings during Venetian advances further accelerating the exodus.[53] To counter the labor shortage, Venetian governors pursued resettlement, granting tax exemptions, land allotments, and privileges to Catholic colonists from Dalmatia, Albania, and Italian territories, alongside incentives for returning Orthodox Greeks. By 1700, Proveditor General Francesco Grimani's detailed survey documented ongoing colonization efforts, which increased settlement in coastal and fertile zones but struggled against local Orthodox resentment toward Catholic proselytizing and heavy taxation.[54] Klepht bands—irregular fighters in rugged interior regions like Mani—preserved a resilient Orthodox demographic core, evading full control and sustaining cultural continuity amid the upheaval, while sporadic returns of Ottoman loyalists occurred under amnesty promises but remained marginal due to persistent insecurity.[51] Economically, the conflict ravaged the Peloponnese's agrarian base, destroying olive groves, vineyards, and irrigation systems essential for exports of olive oil, wine, and currants, which underpinned Ottoman-era prosperity. Venetian rule introduced state monopolies on silk, leather, and surviving agricultural trade, channeling revenues to Venice through controlled ports like Patras and Koroni, yielding short-term fiscal gains for the republic despite local burdens.[55] However, recovery faltered amid depopulation-driven labor scarcity, disrupted supply chains, and resistance to Venetian fiscal exactions, leaving the region in crisis; agricultural reinvigoration attempts via seed distributions and infrastructure repairs achieved limited success, as insecurity deterred investment and perpetuated subsistence-level output.[51]

Long-Term Legacy and Assessments

Strategic Outcomes and Venetian Gains

The Morean War culminated in Venice's acquisition of the Morea peninsula through the Treaty of Karlowitz on January 26, 1699, establishing a strategic foothold that temporarily reversed centuries of Ottoman expansion in the eastern Mediterranean. This gain positioned the Morea as a vital naval base, bolstering Venetian dominance over the Ionian and Adriatic Seas by facilitating control of key maritime routes and deterring Ottoman incursions toward Venetian Dalmatia and the Italian mainland.[20] The territory's ports, such as Navarino and Coron, enhanced logistical support for Venetian fleets, contributing to improved regional security amid ongoing threats from Barbary corsairs and residual Ottoman naval activity. Despite these advantages, the victory came at an immense financial cost, with expenditures straining Venice's public finances and necessitating measures like the aggregation of new patrician families to bolster resources. The war's success elevated Venetian prestige in Europe, portraying the Republic as a capable leader within the Holy League coalition formed in 1684, which demonstrated the viability of unified Christian efforts against Ottoman power and influenced subsequent anti-Ottoman diplomacy.[56] [5] However, the strategic balance proved ephemeral; Ottoman forces reconquered the Morea by 1718 in the subsequent war, underscoring the Empire's underlying resilience through superior manpower mobilization and rapid recovery from earlier defeats.[40] Venetian overextension, compounded by inadequate auxiliary support and naval limitations against Ottoman galleys, highlighted the temporary nature of these gains in the broader context of enduring Ottoman military capacity.[40]

Criticisms of Venetian Rule and Local Realities

Venetian administration in the Morea treated the local Greek population primarily as subjects to be taxed and mobilized for defense, rather than as allies in a shared liberation from Ottoman rule, leading to widespread disillusionment. Policies such as restricting agricultural exports and imposing heavy cash taxes—commuted from labor services but still burdensome on pastoral and viticultural economies—exacerbated economic hardship, with up to 30% of villages deserted by 1688 due to insecurity and migration. Venetian officials, often venal and incompetent, favored immigrant settlers from places like Chios with preferential land concessions, displacing native cultivators and fostering resentment; for instance, by 1696, around 340 Chiots had received grants in Messenia alone, while locals were relegated to exploitative sharecropping retaining only a third of harvests.[51] This opportunism prioritized short-term revenue over integration, contributing to persistent brigandage and piracy that undermined security.[51] Religious policies further alienated Greeks by curtailing Orthodox autonomy, including the conversion of mosques into Catholic churches and disruption of ecclesiastical ties to Constantinople, which bred suspicion toward Venetian Catholic oversight. Unlike Ottoman allowances for Orthodox self-governance, Venetian rule suppressed Christian practices perceived as threats, rendering officials and priests unpopular among locals who viewed the system as less tolerant.[57] [51] During the conquest phase of the Morean War, Venetian forces under Francesco Morosini perpetrated sackings that mirrored Ottoman reprisals in brutality, such as the 1687 bombardment of Athens where an explosion in the Parthenon—used as an Ottoman powder magazine—devastated the structure amid looting and civilian casualties, highlighting reciprocal atrocities rather than benevolent liberation. Contemporary traveler accounts, including Joseph Pitton de Tournefort's observations during his 1700-1702 voyage, documented ongoing unrest through descriptions of poverty, instability, famine, and plague under Venetian control, underscoring local realities of disillusionment that facilitated minimal resistance during the Ottoman reconquest of 1715, completed in just 101 days. Greeks' preference for Ottoman rule stemmed from its relative religious tolerance and lower interference, as evidenced by post-reconquest policies granting tax exemptions and church repairs, contrasting with Venetian economic disasters and suppression.[57] [58]

Historical Debates on Impact and Ottoman Resilience

Scholars have long debated the extent to which Venetian control of the Morea from 1699 to 1718 constituted a cultural or economic "renaissance" for the region, with some early interpretations highlighting administrative reforms and trade revival, contrasted against evidence of heavy taxation and exploitation that alienated local populations. Venetian efforts to reorganize land tenure and promote commerce, such as exporting Malvasia wine, yielded short-term gains but imposed fiscal burdens exceeding Ottoman precedents, fostering resentment among Greek Orthodox communities and undermining loyalty. This perspective aligns with causal analyses attributing the ephemeral nature of Venetian gains to internal mismanagement rather than inherent Ottoman weakness, as local agency—evident in sporadic uprisings and collaboration with reconquering forces—eroded colonial stability.[59] Ottoman resilience manifested in rapid recovery through targeted military reorganization under Sultan Ahmed III (r. 1703–1730), who leveraged victories like the 1711 Treaty of the Pruth to rebuild imperial authority and mobilize resources for the 1714–1718 reconquest. Grand Vizier Damat Ali Pasha's campaigns exploited Venetian overextension, deploying reformed janissary units and provincial levies to recapture key fortresses like Nauplia by 1715, demonstrating adaptive logistics and fiscal extraction capabilities that countered narratives of terminal decline. Historiographical emphasis on these reforms privileges empirical records of troop mobilization—numbering over 60,000 in the Morea theater—over deterministic "sick man" tropes, revealing how Ottoman centralization temporarily reversed Karlowitz (1699) losses without broader structural collapse.[60][61] Regarding proto-nationalism, while Greek irregular fighters gained tactical experience against Ottoman forces during the war, scholarly consensus post-2000 rejects causal links to later independence movements, attributing any emergent identities to localized clan dynamics rather than unified Hellenic consciousness. Recent historiography shifts focus from great-power binaries to local agency, such as Maniot autonomy in resisting both Venetian governors and Ottoman reprisals, underscoring hybrid accommodations over revolutionary seeds; this approach critiques older nationalist readings for retrojecting 1821 events onto 17th-century contingencies. Ottoman archival evidence further illustrates resilience via post-reconquest kanunnames (codes) that integrated local elites, stabilizing the Morea until the Orlov Revolt of 1770.[57]

References

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