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Motion of no confidence
Motion of no confidence
Motion of no confidence
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A motion or vote of no confidence (or the inverse, a motion or vote of confidence) is a motion and corresponding vote thereon in a deliberative assembly (usually a legislative body) as to whether an officer (typically an executive) is deemed fit to continue to occupy their office. The no-confidence vote is a defining constitutional element of a parliamentary system, in which the government's/executive's mandate rests upon the continued support (or at least non-opposition) of the majority in the legislature. Systems differ in whether such a motion may be directed against the prime minister, against the government (this could be a majority government or a minority government/coalition government), against individual cabinet ministers, against the cabinet as a whole, or some combination of the above.

A censure motion is different from a no-confidence motion. In a parliamentary system, a vote of no confidence leads to the resignation of the prime minister and cabinet, or, depending on the constitutional procedure at hand, a snap election to potentially replace the government.

A vote in favour of censure is a non-constitutionally-binding expression of disapproval; a motion of censure may be against an individual minister or a group of ministers. Depending on a country's constitution, a no-confidence motion may be directed against the entire cabinet. Depending on the applicable rules, a mover of a censure motion may need to state the reasons for the motion, but specific reasons may not be required for no-confidence motions. However, in some countries, especially those with uncodified constitutions, what constitutes a no-confidence vote sufficient to force the resignation of high officeholders may not be clear. Even if the government is not constitutionally bound to resign after losing a given vote, such a result may be taken as an ominous sign for the government and may prompt its resignation or the calling of a snap election.

In addition to explicit motions of confidence and no-confidence, some bills (almost always the government budget and sometimes other key pieces of legislation) may be declared to be a confidence vote – that is, the vote on the bill is treated as a question of confidence in the government; a defeat of the bill expresses no confidence in the government and may cause the resignation of the prime minister and cabinet or the calling of an election.

Parliamentary systems

[edit]

There are a number of variations in this procedure between parliaments. In some countries, a motion of no confidence can be directed at the government collectively or at any individual member, including the prime minister. Sometimes, motions of confidence or no confidence are proposed even though it is clear that the government does in fact have majority support simply to pressure ministers or put opposition parties in the potentially embarrassing situation of voting in support of the government.

In many parliamentary democracies, there are limits to how often a confidence vote may be held, such as being allowed only once every three or six months. Thus, the timing of a motion of no confidence is a matter of political judgment. A motion of no confidence on a relatively trivial matter may then prove counterproductive if an issue suddenly arises that is seen to be a more credible justification for a motion of no confidence.

Sometimes, the government chooses to declare that one of its bills is a "vote of confidence" to prevent dissident members of its own party from voting against it. However, this is a political risk, especially when the Prime Minister's majority is not assured, such as if the ruling party/coalition is internally divided, or in minority government; if the bill fails (and thus it is shown that parliament has lost its confidence in the government), the Prime Minister is expected to resign or call snap elections. In Westminster systems, the government budget is always a vote of confidence; even a successful amendment to the budget may be considered a no-confidence vote.

It is not necessarily the case that a vote with the effect of a motion of no confidence be introduced as such. As stated above, certain pieces of legislation may be treated as confidence issues. In some cases, the motion may be an ordinary legislative or procedural matter of little substantive importance used for the purpose of testing the government's majority, such as the 1895 vote of no confidence in the Earl of Rosebery's government, which was technically a motion to reduce the salary of a minister by a nominal sum.

Australia

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In the Australian Parliament, a motion of no confidence requires a majority of the members present in the House of Representatives to agree to it. The House of Representatives has 150 members and so requires 76 votes in favour of the motion when all members of the House are present. A straight vote of no confidence in the Australian government and a motion or amendment censuring a government have never been successful in the House of Representatives.[1] However, governments have on eight occasions resigned or advised a dissolution after their defeat on other questions before the House.[1] The last time that a government resigned after being defeated in the House came in October 1941, when the House rejected the budget of Arthur Fadden's minority government.

Specific motions of no confidence or censure against the prime minister, ministers, the leader of the opposition, senators and leaders of political parties have been successful on some occasions. Motions of no confidence against the government may be passed in the Senate but have little or no impact in the House.[1] However, the Senate's right to refuse supply helped spark the 1975 Australian constitutional crisis.

Bangladesh

[edit]

In the Parliament of Bangladesh, there is no provision to hold motions of no confidence, as a result of Article 70 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, which prohibits members of Parliament from voting against their party and made the removal of a sitting government unattainable.

Canada

[edit]

In Canada, a vote of no confidence is a motion that the House of Commons (federal) or legislative assembly (provincial) no longer has confidence in the incumbent government.[2] A no-confidence motion may be directed against only the incumbent government, with confidence motions against the Official Opposition being inadmissible.[3] Originating as a constitutional convention,[2] it remains an uncodified practice which is not outlined in any standing orders for the House of Commons.[4]

In the House of Commons, a member of parliament may introduce a motion that explicitly states the House has no confidence in the incumbent government.[4] In addition to explicit motions of no confidence, several other motions and bills are also considered implicit motions of confidence, and a vote of no confidence may be asserted automatically if such a bill fails to pass. Bills and motions that are considered implicit motions of confidence include appropriations or supply bills, motions concerning budgetary policy, and the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne.[5] The government may also declare any bill or motion to be a question of confidence.[4] Although the failure to pass those bills and motions can serve as an implicit expression of a vote of no confidence, the opposition is not required to formally present this failure as a motion of no-confidence against the government.[6]

If a vote of no confidence passes, the prime minister is required to either resign or request the governor-general to dissolve parliament and call a general election.[2] The governor-general may refuse a request for dissolution if an election has recently been held or there is another leader who can likely gain the confidence of the House. If a dissolution request is refused, the prime minister must resign, and the governor-general invites the leader of another coalition/party to form a new government.[2] Six motions of no confidence have been passed in the House of Commons: in 1926, 1963, 1974, 1979, 2005, and 2011.[5] All successful votes of no confidence in the 20th century were the result of a loss of supply; votes of no confidence in 2005 and 2011 were the result of explicit confidence motions presented by the opposition.

In 1968, the standing orders respecting supply were amended to limit opposition to two confidence motions on a given opposition day in each of the three supply periods.[7] This provision was repealed in June 1985.[8]

In 1984, a proposal was made to consider the election of speaker to not be a matter of confidence.[8] This was passed in 1985 and is now part of the standing orders.[9]

The confidence convention is also present in the provincial legislatures of Canada, operating much like their federal counterpart. However, the decision to dissolve the legislature and call an election or to see if another coalition/party can form a government is left to the provincial lieutenant-governor.[5]

Two Canadian territories, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, operate as a consensus government system in which the premier is chosen by the members of the nonpartisan legislature. If a vote of no confidence against the incumbent government passes, the premier and the cabinet are removed from office, and the legislature elects a new premier.[10] In a consensus government, confidence motions may be directed against any individual ministers holding office as they are also nominated by members of the legislature.[11]

Czech Republic

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The Constitution of the Czech Republic provides for a government responsible to the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber of the Czech parliament).[12] Any new government, appointed after the demise of previous one, must—no more than 30 days after being appointed by the president of the republic—request a motion of confidence vote from the Chamber of Deputies.[12] The motion of confidence is passed if more deputies vote for the government than against it. Otherwise, the government must resign and the president can appoint a new government.[13] If this government also fails to gain confidence, then the President of the republic must appoint a prime minister proposed by the president of the Chamber of Deputies. If this government still fails to gain confidence of the Chamber, then the president of the republic may choose either to again appoint a prime minister of his choice (the government still need to pass motion of confidence) or to order the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and set new elections.[13]

The government can at any time ask the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence.[14] The government can also connect voting on a government-sponsored bill with a request for a vote of confidence. If the bill fails to pass in Chamber of Deputies it is equivalent to a lost vote of confidence. In this case, the Chamber has to vote on the proposed bill within three months of its submission (otherwise the president of the republic can dissolve it).[13][15]

The Chamber of Deputies may itself start debate on a vote of no confidence in the government, but only if it has been submitted in writing by at least fifty Deputies. To adopt the resolution, an absolute majority of all Deputies have to vote against the government.[16]

Denmark

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Paragraph 15 of the Danish Constitution states that "A Minister shall not remain in office after the Folketing has passed a vote of no confidence in him" and that "When the Folketing passes a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, he shall ask for the dismissal of the Ministry unless writs are to be issued for a general election."[17] The vote requires a simple majority.[18]

Votes of no confidence against the government are rare in Denmark, only occurring in 1909, 1947 and 1975.[19] Generally the government will resign or call for an election before a vote of no confidence.[18]

European Union

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The European Parliament can dismiss the European Commission, the executive body of the European Union, through a successful motion of no confidence, which requires a two-thirds vote. A successful vote on the motion leads to the resignation of the entire Commission.[20]

Germany

[edit]
Main article: Constructive vote of no confidence

In Germany,[21] a vote of no confidence in the federal chancellor requires the opposition, on the same ballot, to propose a candidate of its own whom it wants the federal president to appoint as its successor. Thus, a motion of no confidence may be brought forward only if there is a positive majority for the new candidate. The idea was to prevent the state crises that occurred near the end of the German Weimar Republic. Frequently, chancellors were then turned out of the office without their successors having enough parliamentary support to govern. Unlike the British system, chancellors do not have to resign in response to the failure of a vote of confidence if it has been initiated by them, rather than by the parliamentary opposition, but they may ask the president to call general elections, a request that the president decides on whether to fulfil.

Greece

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The Parliament may, by its decision, withdraw its confidence from the Government or from a member of it. A motion of no confidence can only be submitted six months after the Parliament has rejected a previous one. The motion must be signed by at least one-sixth of the members and must clearly state the issues to be debated. A motion of no confidence is accepted only if it is approved by the absolute majority of the total number of members.[22]

India

[edit]
Main article: Motion of no confidence in India

In India, a motion of no confidence can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Parliament of India) and after at least 50 Lok Sabha members support it, the Speaker may grant a leave and after considering the state of business in the House, allot a day or days or part OF a day for the discussion of the motion (under sub-rule (2) and (3) of rule 198 of Lok Sabha Rules, 16th edition).[23] If the motion carries, the House debates and votes on the motion. If a majority of the members vote in favour of the motion, it is passed, and all the ministers are expected to resign on their moral grounds.[citation needed]

J. B. Kripalani moved the first-ever no-confidence motion on the floor of the Lok Sabha against the government of prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in August 1963, immediately after the disastrous Sino-Indian War.[24][25] As of August 2023, 31 no-confidence motions have been moved. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi faced the most no-confidence motions (15), followed by Lal Bahadur Shastri and P. V. Narasimha Rao (three each), Morarji Desai and Narendra Modi (two each), and Jawaharlal Nehru, Rajiv Gandhi, V. P. Singh, H. D. Deve Gowda, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and Manmohan Singh (one each). Prime Minister Vajpayee lost the no-confidence motion by a margin of one vote (269–270) on 17 April 1999.[26] Prime Minister Desai resigned on 12 July 1979 after being defeated in a vote of no-confidence, V. P. Singh and H. D. Deve Gowda were also removed in no-confidence motion. The two most recent no-confidence motions were brought against the Narendra Modi government, in 2018 and in 2023(due to the ethnic violence in the state of Manipur) , both of which were failed in the Lok Sabha.[27][28]

Even after the Anti-Defection Law, when the majority party has an absolute majority and it can whip party members to vote in favour of the government; still it is possible to remove the government by a no-confidence motion if the ruling party breaks by more than one third.[29][dubious – discuss]

Ireland

[edit]
Main article: Dáil Éireann confidence motions

In Ireland, if a motion of no confidence in the Taoiseach or the government of Ireland is passed by Dáil Éireann, then the Taoiseach may request that the President dissolve the Dáil and call a general election.[30] Whether or not to grant this request is at the discretion of the President, though no President has ever refused a request for dissolution.[31] Should the President refuse to dissolve the Dáil, the Taoiseach and government must resign.[30]

Israel

[edit]

The motion of no confidence is outlined in Israeli Basic Law Article 28 and Article 44 of the Knesset's Rule of Procedure.[32]

Italy

[edit]
See also: List of successful votes of no confidence in Italian governments and 2008 Italian government crisis

In Italy,[33] the government requires the support of both houses of Parliament. Within ten days of the government's formation, a confidence motion must be passed. Five governments were forced to resign when a motion of confidence in them failed to pass in one of the houses of Parliament: the eighth De Gasperi cabinet in 1953, the first Fanfani cabinet in 1954, the first Andreotti cabinet in 1972, the fifth Andreotti cabinet in 1979 and the seventh Fanfani cabinet in 1987.

Parliament can withdraw its support to the government through a vote of no confidence. A vote of no confidence may be proposed if a tenth of the members of either house sign the proposition and within three days before the appointed date, the vote can be brought into the discussion.

Since the drafting of the Constitution of Italy, Parliament has not passed any no confidence motion against the whole cabinet, as government crises often ended with prime ministers resigning after becoming aware the majority of parliament did not support them anymore, before a no confidence motion could be put to vote or even before such a motion was presented.[34] The only time this instrument was used was in October 1995, when the minister of justice Filippo Mancuso was forced to resign after a vote of no confidence against him passed in the Senate. The subsequent Constitutional Court sentence in 1996[35] declared it was indeed possible to propose an individual vote of no confidence against a single minister, instead of the whole government, and that as such, the motion Mancuso was legitimate.

Summary of the vote of no confidence in Minister of Justice Filippo Mancuso, 1995
Parties Votes %
Ayes 173 94.02
Nays 3 1.63
Abstentions 8 4.34

The government can also make any vote a matter of confidence. In the entire history of the Republic of Italy, only two governments were forced to resign when a vote they had made a matter of confidence failed: the first Prodi cabinet in 1996, and the second Prodi cabinet in 2006. In both cases, the vote made a matter of confidence was a vote on a resolution approving the prime minister's address to one of the houses of Parliament.[36]

Japan

[edit]

Article 69 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan provides that "if the House of Representatives passes a non-confidence resolution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten (10) days."

Malaysia

[edit]

In Malaysia's federal political system, votes of confidence in state legislative assemblies of Malaysia have removed its heads of state governments four times, the most recent being Faizal Azumu's Perak ministry in 2020.[37] During the 2020–2022 Malaysian political crisis, opposition members of Parliament demanded a vote of confidence in Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin,[38] but he resigned before this could take place.[39] After the 2022 Malaysian general election, in order to quell the scepticism on Anwar Ibrahim's legitimacy as prime minister,[40] Anwar's government tabled a motion of confidence in the Dewan Rakyat on 19 December 2022, which was passed by a voice vote on the same day, thereby solidifying his position as prime minister.[41][42][43]

Pakistan

[edit]

The Constitution of Pakistan has provision for a no-confidence motion in all constituents of the Electoral College of the state. The motions can target speakers and deputy speakers of provincial and national assemblies, the prime minister, chief ministers of provinces, as well as the chairman and deputy chairman of Senate.[44] Before it can be put for a vote on the pertinent house's floor, it must have the backing of at least 20% of the elected members in all cases except those moved against speakers or deputy speakers in which case there is no minimum. After being put to vote, the motion is deemed to be successful only if passed by a majority.[45]

The no-confidence procedure has historically been mostly used to remove speakers and deputy speakers. Of the 11 times that the motion has been invoked, nine cases targeted those posts, with four being effective.[45][46] Votes of no confidence in prime ministers are extremely rare. In November 1989, Benazir Bhutto faced an ultimately unsuccessful motion of no confidence by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi.[47] Same is the case for provincial chief ministers, as the only instance of its use is the one moved in January 2018 against Sanaullah Zehri, the chief minister of Balochistan, who resigned before the vote could take place.[48]

Since gaining independence in 1947, only Imran Khan was successfully removed as prime minister through a motion of no confidence in 2022. An earlier attempt led by the opposition was dismissed by the deputy speaker Qasim Suri using Article 5 of the constitution. Later on, President Arif Alvi dissolved the National Assembly immediately after receiving advice from Prime Minister Khan to do so, causing a constitutional crisis.[49] On 7 April 2022, the Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled that the dismissal of the no-confidence motion, the prorogation of the National Assembly, advice of Khan to president Arif Alvi to dissolve the National Assembly and subsequent dissolution of the National Assembly were unconstitutional, and overturned these actions.[50] On 10 April 2022, the reconvened National Assembly passed the motion of no confidence against Khan by a majority vote of 172, being the first successful ousting through no–confidence motion.[51][52]

Peru

[edit]

In Peru, both the legislative and the executive branches have the power to bring a motion of no confidence against acting legal members of the other branch.[53] The president of the Cabinet may propose a motion of no confidence against any minister to Congress, which then needs more than half the Congress to approve it. The president of the republic may dissolve Congress if it has censured or denied its confidence to two Cabinets. The relevant Articles 132–134 are in the 1993 version of the Constitution of Peru.

During the 2019 Peruvian constitutional crisis, President Martín Vizcarra enacted a constitutional process on 29 May 2019 to create a motion of no confidence towards Congress if it refused to co-operate with his proposed actions against corruption. Pedro Castillo also motioned to use this mechanism against Congress in 2022 when he attempted to dissolve the legislative body. The Congressionally-appointed Constitutional Court of Peru, during the presidency of Castillo, would rule that only Congress could interpret whether or not a motion of confidence has been made.[54]

Poland

[edit]
See also: Constructive vote of no confidence § Poland

The Constitution of Poland (1997) provides for government responsible to the Sejm (lower chamber of the Parliament of Poland).[55] The President of the Republic has no more than 14 days after the dismissal of the old government or after the first sitting of the newly elected Sejm, to appoint a prime minister and on his recommendation other members of the government (prime minister has to submit resignation of the current sitting government at first sitting of the newly elected Sejm). 14 days after being appointed by the president, the government has to present their programme to the Sejm and ask for a motion requiring a vote of confidence. Motion is passed if more present Sejm deputies vote for the new government than against it. At least half of all Deputies have to be present. If the government fails to pass the vote of confidence (or if the president failed to appoint a new government in time) then the President of Sejm nominates a prime minister and government which has to also pass the vote of confidence. If the vote of confidence was successful, the president of the republic has to formally appoint this government. Otherwise the president may nominate members of the government as in the first instance. If even this time government fails to pass the vote of confidence, then the President of the Republic has to call a new parliamentary election.[56]

Prime minister can ask the Sejm for a vote of confidence.[57]

Government as whole but also individual ministers (for their ministry) are responsible to the Sejm.[55] Sejm can by constructive vote of no confidence replace the prime minister and the current sitting government. In order for a motion of no confidence to pass and remove the government the Sejm has to vote for a new prime minister with a majority of all of its Deputies. Vote of no confidence against the sitting government can only be called if it is requested by at least 46 Deputies and if it's called at least 3 months before the last motion was rejected. Exceptions apply for a motion requested by at least 115 Deputies.[58]

The Sejm may also pass a vote of no confidence in an individual minister. This motion can be called if at least 69 Deputies requested it. Same voting procedure as for vote of no confidence of whole government apply. The President of the Republic has to recall a minister who failed to pass vote of no confidence.[59]

South Africa

[edit]

Any member of Parliament in the National Assembly may request a motion of no confidence in either the Cabinet, excluding the president, or the president. The Speaker, within the rules of Parliament, must add such a motion to the order paper and give it a priority. If a motion of no confidence cannot be scheduled by the last sitting day of the annual sitting, it must be the first item on the order paper of the next sitting.[60] In the event of a successful motion, the Speaker automatically assumes the position of acting president.

On 7 August 2017, Speaker Baleka Mbete announced that she would permit a motion of no confidence in Jacob Zuma's government to proceed in the National Assembly via secret ballot. It was the eighth motion to be brought against Zuma in his presidency and the first to be held via secret ballot. After the vote was held the next day, the motion was defeated 198–177, with 25 abstentions.[61] Around 20 governing ANC members of Parliament voted in favour of the measure.

Spain

[edit]
Further information: Motions of no confidence in Spain
The outgoing prime minister Mariano Rajoy (right) congratulates the incoming prime minister Pedro Sánchez (left) upon losing the no-confidence vote on 1 June 2018.

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 provides for motions of no confidence to be proposed by one-tenth of the Congress of Deputies. Following the German model, votes of no confidence in Spain are constructive and so the motion must also include an alternative candidate for prime minister. For a motion of no confidence to be successful, it has to be carried by an absolute majority in the Congress of Deputies. At least five days must pass after the motion is registered before it can come up for a vote. Other parties may submit alternative motions within two days of the registration.[62][63]

Also, the prime minister is barred from dissolving the Cortes Generales and calling a general election while a motion of no confidence is pending. If the motion is successful, the incumbent prime minister must resign. According to the Constitution, the replacement candidate named in the motion is automatically deemed to have the confidence of the Congress of Deputies and is immediately appointed as prime minister by the monarch. If the motion is unsuccessful, its signatories may not submit another motion during the same session.[62][63]

The current prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, was sworn in on 2 June 2018 after a motion of no confidence against Mariano Rajoy had been approved on 1 June 2018.[64]

Singapore

[edit]

Under Article 25(1) of the Constitution of Singapore, the prime minister of Singapore must command the confidence of Parliament less NCMPs and NMPs. Since Singapore's independence on 9 August 1965, no Singaporean government has ever faced a motion of no confidence. However, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew faced three no-confidence motions in 1961, 1962 and 1963, all prior to independence.

The 1960s saw the ruling PAP split between the right wing led by Lee Kuan Yew and the left wing led by Lim Chin Siong. This caused PAP's massive majority to diminish. Lee Kuan Yew faced his first confidence vote on 20 July 1961 following the PAP's defeat in the Hong Lim and Anson by-elections. This motion was rather a motion of confidence tabled by the Prime Minister himself. All 51 assemblymen were present and voting. The Prime Minister won the vote by a margin of 27–8 votes. The results were as follows:

Summary of the Vote of Confidence in Lee Kuan Yew's Government, 1961
Parties Votes %
Ayes 27 52.94
Nays 8 15.69
Abstentions 16 31.37

[65]

However, among the 16 abstentions were 13 left wing PAP members, who were expelled from the PAP after the vote, and the 13 went on to form the Barisan Sosialis. On 13 July 1962, Barisan MP Lee Siew Choh tabled a motion of no confidence against Lee Kuan Yew. Three assemblymen were absent bringing the total membership of the Legislative Assembly to 48 present and voting. The Prime Minister won the vote by 24–16. Therefore, Lee Kuan Yew remained in office. The results for this motion of no confidence are as follows:

Summary of the Vote of No Confidence in Lee Kuan Yew's Government, 1962
Parties Votes %
Ayes 16 33.33
Nays 24 50.00
Abstentions 8 16.67

[66]

Lee Siew Choh tabled another motion of no confidence against Lee Kuan Yew's government on 15 June 1963 over issues regarding the proposed merger of Singapore into the Federation of Malaysia. Five members were absent from the Assembly and 1 seat was vacant bringing the total membership down to 45 present and voting. This time, Lee Kuan Yew's Government won the vote by a margin of 23–16. The results are as follows:

Summary of the Vote of No Confidence in Lee Kuan Yew's Government, 1963
Parties Votes %
Ayes 16 35.56
Nays 23 51.11
Abstentions 6 13.33

[67]

In September 1963, the Legislative Assembly was dissolved and fresh elections were called. The rump PAP won the election with a two-thirds majority therefore staving off any further attempts by the Barisan Sosialis to move further motions of no confidence. Following merger and separation (1963–1965), and with Barisan's boycott of Parliament, the PAP was the dominant party in Parliament and motions of no confidence became "rare", in fact "non-existent". Further, Lee Kuan Yew's 1961 motion of confidence remains the only time that a Singaporean prime minister has ever tabled a motion of confidence in his own government.

Sweden

[edit]

A motion of no confidence may be levelled against either the prime minister on behalf of the entire Swedish government or against an individual lower-level minister. At least 35 members of parliament (MPs) must support a proposal to initiate such a vote. A majority of MPs (175 members) must vote for a motion of no confidence for it to be successful. An individual minister who loses a confidence vote must resign. If a prime minister loses a no-confidence vote, the entire government must resign.[68] The speaker may allow the ousted prime minister to head a transitional or caretaker government until Parliament elects a new prime minister.

Under the principle of negative parliamentarism, a prime ministerial candidate nominated by the Speaker does not need the confidence of a majority of MPs to be elected. However, a majority of MPs must not vote against the candidate, which renders prime ministerial votes similar to no-confidence votes. That means that a prime ministerial candidate, to be successful in the parliamentary vote, must have at least a total of 175 votes in favour or abstention. If a Speaker fails four times to have a nominee elected, an election must be held within three months of the final vote.

United Kingdom

[edit]
Further information: Confidence motions in the United Kingdom

Traditionally, in the Westminster system, the defeat of a supply bill, which concerns the spending of money, is seen to require automatically for the government to resign or ask for a new election, much like a no-confidence vote. A government in a Westminster system that cannot spend money is hamstrung, which is also called a loss of supply.

One of the most famous motions of no-confidence in British history was against James Callaghan who lost a motion of no-confidence by just one vote (311–310). There are other, failed motions of no confidence such as that of Theresa May which was defeated by a narrow margin of 325–306, and that of Boris Johnson which was defeated by a greater margin (347–238).

In the British Parliament, a no-confidence motion generally first appeared as an early day motion although the vote on the Speech from the Throne was also a confidence motion.[69] However, from 2011 to 2022, under the then-Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, only a motion explicitly resolving that "this House has no confidence in His Majesty's Government" was treated as a motion of no confidence. In 2022 the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was repealed by the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022.

Semi-presidential systems

[edit]

In semi-presidential systems, the legislature may occasionally pass motions of no confidence, which removes only the cabinet and the prime minister. The legislature may also have the power to impeach an executive or judicial officer, with another institution or the legislature removing the officer from their office.

France

[edit]
Main article: Article 49 of the French Constitution

In France, the conditions under which the National Assembly, the lower house of the French Parliament, can bring down the government through a motion of no-confidence are outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 49 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic:

  • a spontaneous motion of no-confidence (article 49.2)
    • requires the sponsoring of 58 MPs (a tenth of the total number of lawmakers) to be tabled;
    • is debated and voted upon at least 48 hours after it has been tabled;
    • needs the backing of an absolute majority of the National Assembly members (normally 289 out of 577) to be passed;
    • an MP cannot sponsor more than three different spontaneous motions of no-confidence per regular parliamentary session and no more than one per extraordinary parliamentary session.
  • a motion of no-confidence in response to the Council of Ministers' decision to push a bill through without a vote (article 49.3)
    • same conditions to be tabled and passed than those outlined in article 49.2;
    • no numerical limits set on the MPs' ability to sponsor such a motion.

In both cases, if the motion succeeds, the prime minister is required to tender their government's resignation to the President.

In the particular case of a motion of no-confidence tabled in response to the government's pushing a bill through without a vote under the provisions of article 49.3, if the motion succeeds, the bill on which the cabinet has committed its responsibility is defeated and the government falls.

Three motions of no-confidence have been passed since the start of the Fifth Republic in 1958: one in 1962, a second in 2024, and a third in 2025.

  • In 1962, a spontaneous motion of no-confidence under article 49.2 was tabled against the Pompidou government over a constitutional reform dispute. The Assembly passed the motion on 5 October 1962, by 280 votes (the absolute majority required was 241 at that time). President de Gaulle refused to accept PM Pompidou's resignation, instead dissolving the National Assembly and calling a snap election that resulted in an increased majority for his government.
  • a motion of no-confidence under article 49.3 was passed against the Barnier Government on 4 December 2024 by 331 votes (required majority of 288).[70] In accordance with the Constitution, Barnier resigned as Prime Minister on 5 December and the 2025 Social Security budget bill, on which the PM resorted to the special constitutional power, was defeated without a vote.
  • a motion of no-confidence under article 49.1 was passed against the Bayrou Government on 8 September 2025 by 364 votes (required majority of 280).[71] Bayrou called the motion on 25 August 2025 in anticipation of his attempt to pass a €44 billion budget, consisting of spending cuts and tax hikes.[72] Bayrou resigned as Prime Minister on 9 September 2025.[73]

During the Third Republic, members of both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies could, with a simple interpellation and a vote, force the government into resigning, creating instability. The Fourth Republic introduced the censure motion with the majority of the membership needed to pass to replace interpellation, and removed the option of initiative by the Senate. Nevertheless, instability continued.[74] According to historian René Rémond, President of the Council Paul Ramadier set up a precedent by submitting the composition of his government to a confidence vote after an interpellation by a deputy, despite the constitution not mentioning this process, thus recreating the problem of the preceding republic.[75] The Fifth Republic restricted again the conditions of the motion by counting only the votes in favor of the deposition of the government, one tenth of the Assembly's membership (58 deputies) being now needed to issue such motion according to Article 49 of the constitution.[74] Article 27 allows lawmakers to delegate their votes for the no-confidence motion if they are not available the day of the open ballot.[76]

Russia

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In Russia, the lower house of the Federal Assembly (the State Duma) may by a simple majority (at least 226 votes out of 450) pass a motion of no confidence against the government of Russia as a whole. In that case, the matter goes for consideration of the Russian president, who may choose to dismiss the cabinet, which he can do anyway anytime at his own discretion, or just ignore the Duma's decision. If the Duma passes a second motion of no confidence against the same composition of the cabinet within three months, the president is forced to make a concrete decision on whether to dismiss the government or to dissolve the Duma itself and call for new general elections. The State Duma may not be dissolved on those grounds if it was elected less than a year earlier, if it has already initiated impeachment proceedings against the president himself by bringing respective accusations, if less than six months remain left until presidential elections, or if there is a state of emergency or martial law throughout the whole territory of Russia. In the above-mentioned cases, the president is then effectively forced to dismiss the government.[citation needed]

Sri Lanka

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In Sri Lanka, the Parliament of Sri Lanka may pass a motion of no confidence against the Sri Lankan government. In that case, the government is removed from power and the president of Sri Lanka has to appoint a new prime minister, who has to form a new government.

Presidential systems

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Presidential systems with a robust separation of powers and/or fixed election dates generally do not use motions of no confidence and instead use impeachment as a similar mechanism.

United States

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A motion to vacate in the United States House of Representatives can be used to remove the speaker of the House. The first successful such motion at the federal level (the ouster of Kevin McCarthy in October 2023) was referred to informally as a "no confidence vote" in media reports covering the event.[77]

The consequences of the Speaker being removed are generally not comparable to the effect of a motion of non-confidence in Westminster parliamentary systems. The President, as the head of government, is not affected; there are no changes to the Cabinet or individual executive positions, which are separated from the legislature; there is no change to the party alignments in the House of Representatives (as the removed Speaker retains the congressional seat); and there are no new elections immediately after a successful motion to vacate, since Congressional elections are set in the Constitution for every two years, regardless of any other circumstances. There is no means to dissolve the House of Representatives as a whole in the way a motion of no confidence often leads to. Thus, the most meaningful consequence of a Speaker's removal that could be compared to a Westminster no confidence vote is the possibility of a change in legislative priorities, these being largely set by the Speaker in the U.S. House, as opposed to by a Prime Minister in the Westminster system.

While the President and Cabinet members can be removed and disqualified from office through impeachment by the House and conviction in the Senate, this is not considered a no confidence vote, since impeachment can only be invoked in the case of a crime.

Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a framework for a motion of no confidence against the President of the United States, intended to be used in the event of the President's incapacitation, but vaguely worded to be applicable in any example of inability to perform the job.[78] The initial motion is issued by the Vice President and a majority of the president's Cabinet, at which point the President is suspended from duty and the Vice President becomes acting President; if the President objects to the motion, a second motion of no confidence must be issued, then approved by two-thirds of both the House and the Senate within three weeks of the second motion, to become permanent.[79] To date, Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which was originally ratified in 1967, has never been invoked.

History

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See also: List of prime ministers defeated by votes of no confidence

The first motion of no confidence against an entire government occurred in March 1782 when, following news of the British defeat at Yorktown in the American Revolutionary War the previous October, the Parliament of Great Britain voted that it "can no longer repose confidence in the present ministers".[80] British Prime Minister Lord North responded by asking King George III to accept his resignation. That did not immediately create a constitutional convention. Although it is considered the first formal motion of no confidence, Sir Robert Walpole's resignation after a defeat on a vote in the House of Commons in 1742 is considered to be the first de facto motion of no confidence.

During the early 19th century, attempts by prime ministers, such as Robert Peel, to govern in the absence of a parliamentary majority proved unsuccessful, and by the mid-19th century, the power of a motion of no confidence to break a government was firmly established in the UK.

In the United Kingdom, 11 prime ministers have been defeated through a no-confidence motion, but there has been only one such defeat since 1925, in the 1979 vote of no confidence in the Callaghan ministry against James Callaghan.

In modern times, the passage of a motion of no confidence is a relatively rare event in two-party democracies. In almost all cases, party discipline is sufficient to allow a majority party to defeat a motion of no confidence, and if faced with possible defections in the government party, the government is likely to change its policies, rather than lose a vote of no confidence. The cases in which a motion of no confidence has passed are generally those in which the government party's slim majority has been eliminated by either by-elections or defections, such as the 1979 vote of no confidence in the Callaghan ministry in the UK which was carried by one vote and forced a general election, which was won by Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Party.

Motions of no confidence are far more common in multi-party systems in which a minority party must form a coalition government. That can mean that there have been many short-lived governments because the party structure allows small parties to defeat a government which does not have the majority needed to create a government. This has widely been regarded as the cause of instability for the French Fourth Republic and the German Weimar Republic. More recent examples have been in Italy between the 1950s and 1990s, Israel, and Japan.

To deal with that situation, the French placed a greater degree of executive power in the office of the French president, along with a two-round plurality voting system, which makes it easier to form a stable majority government. Furthermore, since 2014, the French president can be impeached only if three conditions are fulfilled: one of the Houses of the French parliament must adopt a sitting in High Court proposal with a two-third majority, then the other house has to follow suit in a 15-day period, then two third of the members of the High Court have to vote in favor of the president's impeachment during a one-month period where the Court must decide. The president can still pursue the exercise of his functions during the process.[81]

In 2008, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, leading a minority government, requested Governor General Michaëlle Jean to prorogue Parliament. The prorogation delayed a potential no-confidence motion presented by the opposition. (See 2008–2009 Canadian parliamentary dispute.) Three years later, in 2011, Harper's minority government was defeated by a motion of no confidence, which declared the government to be in contempt of Parliament and led to an election that year.

In 2013, during the Euromaidan pro-European riots, the opposition in Ukraine called for a motion of no confidence against the Cabinet of Ministers, led by the pro-Russian and eurosceptic Prime Minister Mykola Azarov. At least 226 votes were needed to gain a majority in Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada. However, it fell 40 votes short, and Azarov's government prevailed.[82]

On 1 June 2018, in Spain, the government of Mariano Rajoy was ousted after a motion of no confidence passed 180–169 after the sentence of the Gürtel corruption scandal, which involved the ruling party. Pedro Sánchez was sworn in as the new Spanish prime minister. That was the first time in the history of Spain that a vote of no confidence resulted in a change of government.[83][84]

On 25 September 2018, Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven was ousted after he lost a vote of no confidence in the Riksdag after an election was held on 9 September. The center-left bloc led by Löfven's Social Democratic Party won only 144 seats in parliament, 31 seats short of an absolute majority, and just one seat more than the opposition Alliance for Sweden bloc. The Sweden Democrats, having just won 62 seats, also voted with the main opposition bloc's motion of no confidence.[85]

On 8 March 2022, opposition parties filed the motion against then prime minister of Pakistan Imran Khan. Out of 346, 172 votes have required to gain the majority in national assembly of Pakistan. On 10 April 2022, motion of no confidence was passed by 174 votes out of 346.[86] This was the first time in the history of Pakistan that vote of no confidence resulted in a change of government.[87]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Motion of no confidence

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from Grokipedia
A motion of no confidence is a parliamentary procedure primarily employed in systems where the executive derives its legitimacy from the support of the legislature, allowing members to vote on a resolution declaring lack of confidence in the government as a whole or in an individual minister, with passage typically compelling resignation to avert governmental collapse or ministerial dismissal. This mechanism enforces the constitutional convention that the executive must maintain the ongoing confidence of the representative assembly, particularly the lower house, to exercise power, distinguishing parliamentary governance from presidential systems where separation of powers insulates the executive from direct legislative ouster. Originating in Westminster-model parliaments but adapted across diverse parliamentary democracies, the motion underscores causal by linking executive tenure to legislative majorities, often initiated by opposition parties to exploit failures, scandals, or budgetary defeats interpreted as implicit no-confidence signals. Successful motions against governments are infrequent due to the high threshold of cross-party support required, yet they have historically precipitated leadership changes without necessarily triggering immediate elections, as alternative coalitions may form; in contrast, motions targeting ministers serve as targeted censures rather than systemic upheavals. Variations include "constructive" no-confidence votes, mandating the simultaneous nomination of a successor to prevent instability, as in or certain Eastern European systems, which mitigate risks of prolonged paralysis compared to pure Westminster variants where may lead to caretaker administrations or dissolution. Controversies arise from procedural manipulations or ambiguous triggers, such as defeats on major being deemed equivalent to lost confidence, potentially undermining stable amid fragmented legislatures, though empirical rarity—fewer than a dozen government-toppling instances since 1782—affirms its role as a stabilizing check rather than routine disruption.

Definition and Core Principles

Conceptual Foundation

A motion of no confidence constitutes a formal parliamentary procedure whereby members of the legislature express a lack of support for the executive government, typically the prime minister and cabinet, signaling that the government no longer commands the necessary majority to govern effectively. This mechanism operates primarily in parliamentary systems, where the executive derives its legitimacy from the ongoing confidence of the legislative assembly rather than a fixed electoral mandate alone. Upon passage, it usually triggers the resignation of the government, prompting either the formation of a new administration or dissolution of parliament for fresh elections, depending on constitutional provisions. At its foundation lies the constitutional convention that the must maintain the of the —or the primary —to exercise power, embodying the fusion of legislative and inherent to parliamentary democracy. This principle ensures that the executive remains responsive to the elected representatives, preventing governance by a minority or discredited without recourse to voters. Unlike presidential systems with rigid and fixed terms, the motion reinforces causal accountability: loss of legislative support directly undermines the 's authority, as executive stability hinges on parliamentary majorities formed through alignments or coalitions. The procedure serves as a critical tool for enforcing democratic legitimacy and policy coherence, allowing opposition or dissident factions to challenge executive actions perceived as incompetent, corrupt, or misaligned with parliamentary will, without necessitating impeachment-like trials. Historically rooted in British practice since the , its conceptual core prioritizes over individual culpability, though variants target specific ministers. This balances governmental stability against the risk of frequent instability, as empirical instances show rare successful invocations—such as the 's 1979 vote leading to Margaret Thatcher's government's fall—underscore its gravity as a last-resort mechanism rather than routine disruption.

Procedural Mechanics

A motion of no confidence is initiated when legislators, typically from the opposition, formally table a resolution declaring lack of support for the government or a specific minister. In many parliamentary systems, including the United Kingdom's , no minimum number of supporters is required to table the motion, allowing any member to propose wording such as "That this House has no confidence in His Majesty's Government," though procedural conventions often prioritize motions from the official opposition leader. The government, controlling the legislative agenda, must allocate time for debate on such a motion if tabled by the opposition leader, usually within one to seven days to accommodate parliamentary business. Once scheduled, the motion undergoes in the relevant chamber, superseding routine proceedings to focus on governmental . This phase includes speeches from principal figures, such as the defending the administration and the opposition leader articulating grievances, with the duration often spanning a full parliamentary day to permit thorough examination of policy failures or misconduct. In systems like the UK's, the Speaker may facilitate emergency debates under Standing Order No. 24 if urgency is demonstrated, though standard no-confidence motions follow the allocated opposition day format. Voting follows the debate and requires only a simple majority—more votes in favor than against—for passage, without needing an absolute majority of total members. The vote is conducted via division, where members enter separate lobbies to be counted, ensuring a recorded tally; electronic or voice votes may apply in less contentious cases but divisions are standard for high-stakes motions to verify attendance and intent. If the motion succeeds, the government is procedurally compelled to resign, prompting the to either tender advice for parliamentary dissolution or facilitate an alternative government's formation, depending on constitutional conventions or statutes like the former 's Fixed-term Parliaments Act (repealed in , reverting to prerogative powers). Failure of the motion affirms the government's continuance without further procedural disruption. Variations exist across systems: "destructive" motions, as in the UK or , merely topple the government without mandating a successor, while "constructive" variants, such as Germany's under Article 67 of the , require simultaneous nomination and election of an alternative chancellor by absolute majority to prevent instability. In bicameral legislatures, the motion typically targets the , where the executive derives confidence, though upper house equivalents may apply in federations like . These ensure parliamentary over the executive while minimizing frivolous challenges through agenda control and debate thresholds.

Immediate and Long-Term Consequences

![Mariano Rajoy congratulates Pedro Sánchez following the successful no-confidence vote on June 1, 2018][float-right] A successful motion of no confidence typically results in the immediate resignation of the prime minister and cabinet, as the government loses its parliamentary legitimacy. In systems without a constructive no-confidence mechanism, such as the United Kingdom, this triggers a general election within weeks; for instance, after Prime Minister James Callaghan's Labour government lost a no-confidence vote by one vote on March 28, 1979, Parliament was dissolved, leading to a May 3 election where Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives secured a 43-seat majority. In contrast, constructive systems like Spain's require the motion to nominate a successor, enabling seamless transition; on June 1, 2018, Mariano Rajoy's People's Party government fell after a 180-169 vote, with Pedro Sánchez invested as prime minister the same day, avoiding an interim vacuum. These outcomes often produce short-term political uncertainty, including caretaker governance and stalled legislation, as seen in the 1979 UK "Winter of Discontent" aftermath where industrial unrest persisted until the election. Long-term consequences hinge on the ensuing government's stability and policy agenda, frequently reshaping national trajectories. The 1979 UK shift installed Thatcher's administration, which enacted , of state industries like British Telecom in 1984, and restrictions on union power via the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982, fostering that boosted GDP growth to an average 2.5% annually from 1979-1990 but widened income inequality, with the rising from 0.25 to 0.34. In post-2018, Sánchez's minority Socialist pursued progressive reforms including labor law easing in 2021 and a 2022 amnesty for Catalan separatists, yet faced repeated instability with four elections between 2019 and 2023, contributing to fragmented coalitions and slower fiscal consolidation amid EU recovery funds. Successful no-confidence votes, occurring in only 3-5% of attempts in advanced democracies, can enhance by ousting ineffective leadership but risk prolonged if underlying divisions persist, as evidenced by France's 2024 fall under , which deepened budget deficits without resolution. Overall, these mechanisms enforce parliamentary supremacy, yet frequent invocations may erode public trust, with surveys post-1979 indicating initial approval for change but later polarization over reforms.

Historical Development

Origins in British Parliamentary Tradition

The convention requiring the British government to maintain the confidence of the developed gradually in the , building on principles established after the of 1688, which curtailed and emphasized parliamentary control over finance and war. Ministers, acting as advisors to the , became collectively accountable to for policy execution, particularly in securing supply votes and legislative support; failure to do so risked ministerial to avoid constitutional impasse. This shifted power dynamics from crown dominance to legislative oversight, with early precedents in defeats over specific policies implying broader governmental instability, though explicit no-confidence motions were rare before the . The first recorded motion of no confidence targeting an entire ministry occurred on 27 February 1782 against Frederick North, Lord North's administration, amid mounting losses in the American War of Independence, including the surrender at Yorktown in October 1781. The defeated the government 234 to 215 on General Conway's motion criticizing the prosecution of the war and declaring that those in office had acted inconsistently with public confidence, prompting North's resignation on 20 March 1782 after failed attempts to form a viable alternative ministry. This event marked a pivotal assertion of parliamentary authority, as the Commons effectively compelled a change in government without royal intervention or dissolution, solidifying the emerging norm that loss of majority support necessitated resignation. Subsequent crises in 1783–1784 further entrenched the convention. The fragile Fox-North coalition fell in December 1783 when King George III dismissed it despite nominal support, leading to Pitt the Younger's ; Pitt's refusal to resign despite initial defeats prompted a in 1784, which yielded a strong majority and validated the principle that sustained lack of confidence could force electoral reckoning. These episodes, analyzed in parliamentary debates of the era, highlighted causal tensions between royal influence and sovereignty, establishing the vote as a mechanism to resolve governmental illegitimacy without codified procedure, reliant instead on constitutional norms.

19th-Century Evolution and Early Uses

The principle of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, which underpinned the motion of no confidence, solidified in the early amid expanding electoral reforms and the rise of disciplined political parties. The broadened the franchise and restructured constituencies, shifting power dynamics and making it untenable for governments to persist without a stable majority, as fragmented coalitions of the gave way to more cohesive Whig and alignments. This evolution transformed sporadic defeats on policy amendments into deliberate tests of overall governmental legitimacy, with prime ministers increasingly treating adverse votes on supply or the as implicit no-confidence signals requiring or dissolution. Early explicit uses of confidence motions emerged in the , reflecting this maturing convention. On January 28, 1840, opposition leader tabled a motion declaring that Lord 's Whig ministry "does not possess the confidence of this House," but it was narrowly defeated, allowing the government to continue amid internal divisions over Irish policy and economic discontent. A more decisive instance followed on May 27, 1841, when Peel again moved against Melbourne, arguing the ministers "do not sufficiently possess the Confidence of this House" after defeats on budget amendments exposed their minority status; after five nights of debate, the motion passed on June 4 by 312 votes to 311, prompting Melbourne's and a that installed Peel's Conservative administration with a of over 80 seats. This 1841 vote is regarded as the first fully modern no-confidence motion, establishing a where explicit parliamentary rejection compelled immediate governmental change rather than mere policy adjustment. Subsequent decades saw the mechanism's refinement, though successful explicit motions remained infrequent due to governments' caution in facing them. In 1852, Edward Smith's defeat on a procedural vote amid the Protectionist-Whig split led Lord Derby's minority government to resign without a formal confidence test, illustrating how implied losses on supply bills could substitute for worded motions. By the 1860s, under Gladstone and Disraeli, defeats on the or estimates routinely triggered resignations, as in 1866 when Russell's Bill failure prompted his exit, reinforcing the causal link between support and executive tenure without always requiring the "no confidence" phrasing. These uses underscored the motion's role in enforcing , preventing prolonged minority rule, and averting executive overreach in a system where the monarch's influence waned post-1830s crises.

20th-Century Global Spread and Adaptations

The motion of no confidence expanded globally during the , particularly through and the establishment of parliamentary democracies in former British colonies, where constitutions explicitly incorporated the mechanism to enforce to the . In , the 1950 constitution adopted the procedure under Article 75, enabling the to withdraw support from the ; the first such motion was tabled in August 1963 against Prime Minister by opposition leader Acharya , amid fallout from the 1962 , though it failed with 62 votes in favor against 347. Similar adoptions occurred across and , as nations like (1957 independence constitution) and (1960) modeled their systems on Westminster traditions, embedding confidence votes to link executive survival to legislative majorities, despite frequent one-party dominance limiting their invocation. In established parliamentary states like , the federal parliament utilized no-confidence motions from its inception in 1901, with early instances such as the 1908 division loss prompting to challenge parliamentary confidence, though no federal government has ever fallen directly to one. This spread reflected causal incentives for stability in multi-party environments, where the threat of no confidence deterred policy overreach, but empirical use remained rare outside crises, as governments often preempted defeats via supply votes or . Key adaptations emerged to mitigate risks of governmental deadlock, most notably Germany's 1949 Basic Law (Article 67), which instituted the konstruktives Misstrauensvotum—a constructive vote requiring the to simultaneously elect a new with a simple majority before ousting the incumbent, designed to prevent the frequent cabinet collapses (over 20 in 14 years) that plagued the Republic's negative parliamentarism. This innovation prioritized continuity by ensuring no , influencing subsequent frameworks like Spain's 1978 constitution, which mandated proposing an alternative alongside the no-confidence motion to avoid instability in its polarized polity. Other European states, including by 1990, followed suit in post-communist transitions, adapting the tool to balance opposition leverage with , though data show only isolated successes, underscoring its role in fostering negotiated coalitions over abrupt disruptions.

Implementation in Parliamentary Systems

United Kingdom Practices

In the , a motion of no confidence is a formal proposal in the expressing a lack of confidence in His Majesty's Government or an individual minister, underscoring the Commons' central role in sustaining the executive's authority to govern. Such motions are typically drafted as "That this House has no confidence in His Majesty's Government," though they may include specific reasons or calls for an alternative administration or election; the wording must explicitly test the government's overall confidence rather than merely critiquing policies or personnel. Any (MP) may table the motion, but the government is constitutionally obliged to allocate time for debate and voting only if proposed by the Leader of the Official Opposition, often scheduling it promptly—such as the following day or within a week—as per parliamentary convention outlined in Erskine May. For motions from backbenchers or minor parties, no such obligation exists, rendering them less likely to proceed unless the government consents. The voting process requires a simple majority in the division lobbey system, where more MPs voting "aye" than "no" constitutes passage; ties are resolved by the Speaker's against the motion, preserving the . Governments may preemptively table their own affirmative vote of confidence to consolidate support, particularly in minority administrations, or designate other key votes—such as on or Bills—as matters of confidence, where defeat implies a broader loss of legitimacy. Following the repeal of the by the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022, the procedural conventions reverted to pre-2011 norms, emphasizing reliance on established practice over statutory triggers. Upon defeat, constitutional convention dictates that the Prime Minister tenders resignation to the , who may then invite the Leader of the Opposition to form a new government if they can command a , though this is rare in modern practice; alternatively, the outgoing requests parliamentary dissolution, prompting a within weeks. Historically, successful no-confidence motions have been infrequent: the last occurred on 28 March 1979, when James Callaghan's Labour lost 311–310, leading to resignation and the election of Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives; prior instances include 21 January 1924, defeating Stanley Baldwin's Conservatives and enabling to form a , and 8 October 1924, toppling MacDonald's administration after an intervening election. Unsuccessful attempts, such as those in 2019 against (defeated 325–306) and (defeated 384–133), highlight the motion's role as a high-stakes tool often surviving due to or cross-party support. Since 1979, no government has lost such a vote, reinforcing its gravity as a mechanism of last resort rather than routine challenge.

Commonwealth Variations

In , motions of no confidence in the federal are typically initiated by the Leader of the Opposition with prior notice and gain priority status only if a minister designates them as a matter of public importance under standing orders. is structured with the mover and a government representative allocated 30 minutes each, and other members limited to 20 minutes, often extending over multiple days historically but now constrained by legislative demands. Passage requires the to resign or advise the to dissolve and call an election, per Westminster convention, though no explicit motion has succeeded federally; instead, defeats on substantive bills have triggered resignations, including the Deakin Ministry on 21 April 1904 after a 29–38 loss on the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill and the Fadden Ministry on 3 October 1941 following a 36–33 defeat. Canada's adheres to the confidence convention, where explicit motions declare lack of support for the and Cabinet, or implicit losses arise from defeats on supply bills, budgets, or speeches; defeat compels the government to resign or request dissolution from the , potentially leading to an election unless an alternative ministry can command confidence. This mechanism has toppled the federal government six times since Confederation in 1867—in 1926, 1963, 1974, 1979, 2005, and 2011—often invoked in minority governments, with procedural flexibility allowing opposition days for such motions, but success remains contingent on opposition cohesion amid . In , procedures in the parallel Westminster norms, with motions of no confidence movable by opposition members and debated under standard rules, culminating in government resignation or dissolution if passed, advised to the . The mixed-member proportional (MMP) , introduced in 1996, has increased dependencies, heightening vulnerability to confidence tests but without altering core mechanics; no successful motion has toppled a government post-MMP, reflecting strong party cohesion despite frequent minority or arrangements.

Continental European Applications

In parliamentary systems across , motions of no confidence enable legislatures to dismiss governments, typically requiring an absolute majority and often the of a successor to mitigate instability in multi-party environments. These mechanisms, embedded in national constitutions, contrast with the British model by incorporating safeguards like constructive votes or alternative proposals, reflecting adaptations to governance prevalent in the region. Germany's (Article 67) mandates a constructive , whereby the must elect a successor before ousting the incumbent, ensuring no . This provision, introduced post-World War II to promote stability, has succeeded only once: on October 1, 1982, when a of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats voted 256-235 to replace Social Democrat with after the Free Democrats withdrew support amid economic disputes. The design has largely prevented frivolous challenges, with subsequent attempts failing due to insufficient cross-party consensus. Italy's fragmented has seen frequent use of no-confidence motions, contributing to 68 governments since 1946, averaging about 1.5 years each. Under Article 94 of the , a motion requires signatures from at least one-tenth of members and cannot be debated sooner than three days after submission, allowing time for negotiations. Successful votes have toppled cabinets across ideologies, including the 2008 motion (passed 161-156) against Romano Prodi's center-left over budget disputes, underscoring how such procedures enable realignments but exacerbate turnover. In Spain, Article 113 of the 1978 Constitution permits an investiture motion of no confidence, requiring a proposed alternative prime minister and an absolute majority in Congress. Rarely invoked, it succeeded only once in democratic history on June 1, 2018, when Pedro Sánchez's Socialists, backed by a fractious alliance including Catalan separatists, ousted Mariano Rajoy's Popular Party government (180-169) amid a corruption scandal involving party funding. This event highlighted the mechanism's potency in crises but also risks of opportunistic coalitions, as Sánchez's minority government lasted until 2023. The Netherlands allows no-confidence motions against individual ministers or the entire cabinet, often tied to policy failures in settings, with the holding decisive power. While cabinet-wide votes are infrequent, targeted motions have forced resignations, such as in 2023 when a challenge to Mark over nitrogen emission cuts on farms garnered support from farmers' allies but ultimately failed (81-75 against), preserving the government amid protests. Across these systems, no-confidence votes enforce accountability but can amplify instability where veto players abound, as evidenced by higher government duration in constructive variants like Germany's compared to Italy's permissive framework.

Adaptations in Semi-Presidential and Hybrid Systems

French Fifth Republic Model

In the , established under the Constitution of 4 October 1958, the motion of no confidence—termed motion de censure—serves as the primary parliamentary instrument for the to and compel the of the and . Article 50 stipulates that such a motion requires an absolute majority of Assembly members, presently 289 out of 577 deputies, with voting conducted by roll call and only affirmative votes counted toward passage. Upon adoption, the tenders the 's to the , who may then appoint a successor or, subject to Article 12 restrictions, dissolve the Assembly after one year to trigger new elections. Complementing this, Article 49 permits the to stake its responsibility (engager sa responsabilité) on its program, a general policy statement, or specific legislation (except certain financial bills under Article 44 constraints). Absent a successful motion within 24 hours, the measure is deemed approved without a vote, a provision invoked frequently to bypass opposition—over 100 times since 1958, including 23 under Élisabeth Borne alone from 2022 to 2024. This mechanism underscores the semi-presidential system's dual executive: the directly elected President holds sway over , defense, and appointments, insulating core functions from parliamentary reversal, while the remains accountable to the Assembly on domestic matters. Successful censures have been exceptional, reflecting the Constitution's for executive durability against the Fourth Republic's 24 governments in 12 years. From 1958 to 2024, more than 130 motions were tabled, but none passed until December 4, 2024, when a cross-partisan —including left-wing groups and the —adopted one against Michel Barnier's by 327 votes, following its Article 49.3 use on the 2025 budget amid post-snap election fragmentation. Prior attempts, such as the narrow 1962 failure (280-329, short of the then-threshold) against Georges Pompidou's administration over direct reforms, highlight the absolute majority's deterrent effect and under aligned majorities. In eras—such as 1986-1988, 1993-1995, 1997-2002, and 2024 onward—the mechanism gains salience, as the Assembly's opposing majority constrains the Prime Minister's legislative agenda, though the President's veto-proof domains persist. This adaptation tempers pure parliamentarism's instability, prioritizing causal continuity in leadership while enabling targeted , though critics note its underuse reinforces presidential dominance in unified periods.

Russian Federation Framework

In the Russian Federation's semi-presidential system, the , the lower house of the Federal Assembly, possesses the authority to pass a motion of no confidence in the Government, comprising the Chairman () and federal ministers, under Article 117 of the 1993 Constitution (as amended). This provision requires approval by a simple majority of the Duma's total deputies—226 out of 450—for the initial resolution. Upon passage, the President must decide within seven days either to accept the Government's resignation or to reject the Duma's vote, thereby retaining the Government in office. If the President rejects the motion, the retains the option to reaffirm no confidence within three days by an absolute majority vote of its total membership, again 226 votes. Confirmation triggers the President's authority to dissolve the and call new elections within four months, while potentially suspending the 's activities until a successor is formed. The President also nominates the for approval under Article 83, but subsequent composition falls under presidential appointment without mandatory parliamentary consent, underscoring executive dominance. This framework contrasts with pure parliamentary systems by vesting ultimate resolution in the President rather than automatic collapse, reflecting a hybrid design that prioritizes stability amid divided powers. Historically, motions of no confidence have been initiated primarily during the turbulent under President , amid economic crises and policy disputes, but none have succeeded in forcing a resignation without presidential acquiescence. On October 28, 1994, the attempted to oust Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's cabinet via no confidence but failed to secure the required . A more significant challenge occurred on June 21, 1995, when the passed a no-confidence resolution against Yeltsin's by 241 votes to 72, protesting economic reforms; Yeltsin rejected it, and the declined to override, averting dissolution. Similar symbolic efforts arose in 2003 and February 10, 2005, targeting Mikhail Kasyanov's administration over pension reforms, but both failed due to insufficient votes amid a pro-Kremlin . Since Vladimir Putin's consolidation of power post-2000, with maintaining supermajorities in the (e.g., 324 seats following the September 2021 elections), the mechanism has remained dormant, functioning more as a procedural formality than a genuine accountability tool. No successful no-confidence vote has occurred in the post-1993 era, as parliamentary alignment with the executive precludes overrides, rendering the process ineffective for altering composition absent presidential initiative. changes, such as Mikhail Mishustin's on May 10, 2024, following Putin's inauguration, have instead proceeded via presidential decree without invocation.

Other Hybrid Examples

In Portugal's semi-presidential system, the Assembly of the Republic maintains the authority to dismiss the government via a or by rejecting the government's program, which functions equivalently to a no-confidence vote, compelling while the president retains appointment powers subject to parliamentary approval. This mechanism underscores legislative primacy over executive stability, as evidenced by the March 11, 2025, rejection of a confidence motion against Luís Montenegro's , which forced its and prompted snap elections. The Portuguese Constitution, enacted in 1976, specifies that such motions require an absolute majority and can be initiated after a three-day waiting period to prevent impulsive actions. Poland exemplifies another adaptation, where the (lower house) can pass a , requiring not only dismissal of the incumbent government but simultaneous nomination of a successor by an absolute majority, thus minimizing interim instability in its dual-executive framework. This process, outlined in the 1997 Constitution, balances the directly elected president's veto and appointment roles against parliamentary control. A notable instance occurred on December 11, 2023, when Mateusz Morawiecki's cabinet lost a confidence vote by 248-214, enabling Donald Tusk's coalition to assume power without presidential dissolution threats. Tusk's government later survived a June 11, 2025, confidence test amid coalition tensions post-presidential elections. In Ukraine's semi-presidential arrangement, the possesses the right to express no confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers through a simple majority vote, potentially leading to resignation, though constitutional amendments have imposed limits such as single-session proposals to curb frequent disruptions. Established under the 1996 Constitution (with 2004 and 2014 revisions enhancing presidential powers during crises), this tool has been invoked sporadically, including against prosecutors and governments amid political volatility, but wartime consolidations since 2022 have de facto centralized authority under President Zelenskyy, reducing parliamentary dismissals. Reforms proposed in advocated constructive votes to bolster stability, reflecting ongoing tensions between the and . Romania's hybrid model similarly empowers the and jointly to the government via a motion requiring an absolute , triggering unless the president counters with parliamentary dissolution, a dynamic tested in multiple post-1989 crises to navigate divided executives. These examples illustrate how semi-presidential constitutions adapt no-confidence mechanisms to mitigate executive-legislative conflicts, often incorporating majority thresholds or constructive elements to promote continuity over pure parliamentary volatility.

Limited Role in Presidential Systems

Absence of Mechanism in Pure Presidentialism

In pure presidential systems, the executive branch operates independently of the legislature, with the president elected directly by the populace for a fixed term, rendering a motion of no confidence structurally incompatible as the executive's legitimacy derives from popular mandate rather than legislative support. This separation of powers, as articulated in foundational documents like the U.S. Constitution of 1787, vests the president with authority not contingent on ongoing parliamentary approval, thereby eliminating the parliamentary practice where a simple majority can compel government resignation over policy disputes or loss of support. Fixed terms—typically four years in the U.S.—prioritize executive stability to counterbalance legislative influence, avoiding the frequent turnover seen in systems reliant on confidence votes, which empirical analyses link to higher government instability in multiparty contexts. The absence stems from first-principles design to prevent legislative dominance over the executive, as envisioned by framers like , who argued in (1788) that divided powers with mutual checks ensure neither branch subjugates the other; a no-confidence mechanism would undermine this by allowing the legislature to oust the president absent extraordinary justification. In practice, this manifests in the U.S., where no constitutional provision exists for a no-confidence vote against the president; instead, removal requires by the (simple majority) followed by conviction in the (two-thirds vote) solely for "Treason, Bribery, or other ," excluding mere political disagreement. Historical data supports this distinction: since 1789, only three U.S. presidents have faced ( in 1868, in 1998, and in 2019 and 2021), none convicted, contrasting with parliamentary systems where no-confidence votes have toppled dozens of governments, such as the UK's 10 instances since 1782. This mechanism's omission fosters accountability through electoral cycles and alternative checks, including legislative control over budgets and overrides (requiring two-thirds congressional majorities in the U.S.), but it can engender in divided governments, as evidenced by U.S. federal shutdowns in 1995–1996, 2013, and 2018–2019, where policy impasses persisted without executive dismissal options. Comparative studies of pure presidential regimes, such as those in and pre-1980s reforms, confirm the pattern: executives serve full terms barring , promoting policy continuity but risking lame-duck ineffectiveness, as causal analyses attribute lower turnover rates (under 10% mid-term removal probability) to entrenched term limits versus parliamentary averages exceeding 20% in fragmented legislatures. Thus, pure presidentialism's design causally prioritizes institutional endurance over fluid responsiveness, a rooted in aversion to the executive instability observed in early parliamentary experiments.

Analogous Processes and Impeachment Alternatives

In presidential systems, where the executive branch operates independently of the legislature with a fixed-term mandate derived from direct popular , mechanisms analogous to motions of no confidence are constrained to preserve stability and prevent legislative overreach into the executive's electoral legitimacy. Unlike no-confidence votes, which address broad policy failures or loss of parliamentary support through simple majorities, these processes typically demand evidence of grave misconduct, such as corruption or , and impose thresholds to avoid partisan exploitation. stands as the principal alternative, enabling legislative removal of the president but only under narrowly defined constitutional grounds, thereby prioritizing accountability for malfeasance over routine political disagreements. The Constitution delineates impeachment in Article II, Section 4, permitting removal of the president, , and civil officers for ", , or other ," a phrase historically interpreted to encompass serious violations of official duty rather than mere incompetence or unpopular policies. The holds sole power to impeach via articles approved by simple majority, initiating a trial presided over by the for presidential cases, where conviction requires a two-thirds vote of senators present—resulting in automatic removal and potential disqualification from future office. This bifurcated structure, with investigation in the House and judgment in the , contrasts with the unified parliamentary no-confidence process by embedding checks like evidentiary hearings and witness testimony, as seen in the impeachments of Presidents (1868), (1998), and (2019 and 2021), none of which led to conviction despite House approval. Supplementary mechanisms provide limited analogs without full removal powers. Congressional censure, a formal rebuke adopted by simple majority in one chamber, expresses legislative disapproval—such as the Senate's 1834 censure of President Andrew Jackson over bank policy—but carries no binding effect on tenure or authority. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1967, addresses incapacity rather than misconduct, allowing the vice president and a majority of principal executive officers (or another body designated by Congress) to declare the president unable to discharge duties, temporarily transferring power; it has been invoked three times for brief medical procedures under Presidents Reagan (1985), George W. Bush (2002 and 2007), but never for permanent removal or policy-based ouster. In rarer instances across presidential systems, such as Ecuador's 2015 constitutional recall referendum enabling popular removal of President Rafael Correa's successor, direct voter initiatives serve as alternatives, though these demand high turnout and approval thresholds (e.g., 50% plus one in Ecuador) and remain exceptional to avoid undermining fixed terms. These processes underscore presidentialism's design to insulate executives from legislative whims, fostering continuity amid but risking when thresholds prove insurmountable, as evidenced by zero successful presidential removals via conviction in U.S. despite 21 federal overall. Critics argue this rigidity contrasts unfavorably with parliamentary flexibility, yet proponents emphasize that lower bars could erode democratic mandates, akin to how frequent no-confidence votes have destabilized governments in systems like Italy's post-World War II Fourth Republic. Empirical data from comparative studies indicate 's rarity—successful in under 10% of Latin American presidential attempts since 1900—reinforces its role as a safeguard against rather than a routine confidence check.

Rare or Modified Uses in Latin America

In presidential systems predominant in Latin America, motions of no confidence are rare and typically modified to target appointed cabinet members or ministers rather than the directly elected president, serving as a legislative check on executive subordinates without dissolving the government. This adaptation introduces elements of parliamentary accountability into otherwise separation-of-powers frameworks, but empirical evidence indicates it often exacerbates cabinet instability without enhancing overall governance stability, as presidents retain appointment powers and can reshuffle personnel repeatedly. At least 12 Latin American countries incorporate such mechanisms, diverging in thresholds and consequences, with censure requiring legislative majorities and leading to ministerial resignations. Peru exemplifies this modified use, where Article 132 of the 1993 Constitution empowers the unicameral to initiate a moción de censura against the or individual ministers, requiring signatures from at least 25% of congress members and approval by an absolute majority. of the triggers the entire cabinet's resignation, prompting the president to nominate replacements, though repeated censures—such as the two consecutive failures to sustain a cabinet—can escalate to dissolving itself under Article 134, limiting presidential dissolution powers. This has resulted in acute instability: between 2018 and 2023, saw 12 cabinet reshuffles, many driven by votes, contributing to discontinuity and executive-legislative amid fragmented multiparty coalitions. For instance, in October 2025, rejected a censure motion against a key legislative figure with 61 votes against, 36 in favor, and 17 abstentions, averting further disruption. Similar provisions exist in , where Article 139 of the 1991 Constitution allows to censure ministers via interpellation, initiated by one-third of members and approved by vote, forcing but not affecting the president. Usage remains infrequent compared to , with censures correlating to higher ministerial turnover rates in empirical studies of post-1991 data, though less destabilizing overall due to stricter initiation thresholds. In , the employs (censura) against ministers for duty failures, as seen in December 2024 when former Energy Minister Andrea Arrobo was censured, and February 2023 against former Interior Minister Patricio Carrillo, resulting in dismissal without broader governmental collapse. restricts no-confidence motions to individual ministers under stringent quorums, minimizing systemic impact. These mechanisms, while providing oversight, have drawn criticism for fostering short-termism and bargaining over policy substance, as evidenced by Peru's repeated cycles of and reconstitution that undermine administrative continuity in a region already prone to executive-legislative tensions. Unlike impeachment processes for presidents, which require higher evidentiary thresholds for crimes or , modified no-confidence votes emphasize political incompatibility, enabling legislatures to extract concessions but risking paralysis in polarized environments.

Criticisms, Reforms, and Comparative

Arguments for and Democratic Control

The motion of no confidence reinforces executive by compelling governments in parliamentary systems to sustain the confidence of the legislative majority, thereby linking executive legitimacy directly to ongoing parliamentary support rather than fixed electoral terms alone. This procedure enables legislatures to remove ineffective or unresponsive executives promptly, averting prolonged misgovernance and ensuring that policy aligns with the current composition of elected representatives. By institutionalizing a mechanism for parliamentary override, the vote promotes democratic control over the fusion of legislative and executive powers, mitigating risks of executive entrenchment or overreach that could arise in systems lacking such . Political scientists note that this tool fosters flexible governance, allowing adaptation to shifting political realities without the rigidities of separation-of-powers deadlocks observed in presidential regimes. In practice, even infrequent successful motions signal the potential for , deterring ministerial complacency and encouraging responsiveness to legislative . Advocates emphasize that this outweighs concerns over potential , as it embeds causal incentives for governments to build and maintain coalitions reflective of voter preferences, ultimately enhancing the representativeness of processes. Empirical analyses of parliamentary democracies indicate that no-confidence provisions correlate with higher legislative oversight , where executives face regular confidence tests that reinforce parliamentary primacy. This framework contrasts with presidential systems' alternatives, which are rarer and more punitive, underscoring the motion's role in routine democratic equilibrium.

Critiques of Instability and Frequent Government Turnover

Critics argue that motions of no confidence in parliamentary systems, particularly those without restrictive mechanisms like constructive votes, foster excessive government fragility by enabling opportunistic ousters over minor disputes rather than substantive failures, resulting in cabinets averaging under two years in duration across many democracies. This mechanism, intended for , often amplifies fragmentation in multi-party parliaments, where partners withdraw support amid disagreements or scandals, precipitating unnecessary turnovers that prioritize short-term political maneuvering over continuity. In , a stark illustration of this instability, 68 governments have formed since , yielding an average tenure of approximately 14 months per cabinet, frequently triggered by no-confidence votes amid breakdowns in its system. Such rapid cycling disrupts bureaucratic expertise and , as ministers rarely accumulate sufficient time to master portfolios or advance reforms, leading to inconsistency in areas like and . Empirical analyses confirm that this turnover correlates with heightened uncertainty, which deters private investment and hampers long-term by signaling unreliable regulatory environments. The Weimar Republic's experience underscores graver risks, where unchecked no-confidence motions amid proportional voting produced a succession of short-lived coalitions—often lasting mere months—culminating in paralysis that eroded and facilitated extremist ascendance. Between 1919 and 1933, frequent parliamentary deadlocks and cabinet collapses, exacerbated by the absence of safeguards against negative votes, prevented decisive action on and unemployment, fostering perceptions of democratic inefficacy. Comparative data reveal parliamentary systems' cabinets endure roughly 21 months on average, versus over four years in presidential setups where fixed terms insulate executives from legislative whims, highlighting how no-confidence provisions inherently shorten horizons and amplify volatility in fragmented assemblies. Reform advocates, including those behind Germany's 1970s constructive vote requirement—which mandates naming a successor before ousting a —contend that standard motions incentivize irresponsibility, as opposition parties can topple governments without viable alternatives, prolonging interregnums and caretaker periods that stall . In contexts like Lesotho's repeated abuses, such votes have entrenched elite bargaining over public welfare, yielding cycles of that undermine service delivery and investor confidence. Overall, these patterns suggest that while no-confidence tools enhance responsiveness, their unchecked application causal contributes to administrative disruption and suboptimal outcomes, prompting calls for thresholds or alternatives to mitigate turnover's costs.

Proposals for Constructive Votes and Threshold Reforms

The requires opponents to nominate and secure a for an alternative government simultaneously with the vote against the , aiming to curb destabilizing "negative" parliamentary majorities that remove executives without replacement capability. This reform, embedded in Germany's since 1949 (Article 67), demands an absolute to a new , a provision retained and emphasized in the amendment to prevent Weimar-era hyper-instability from repeated failed governments. Similar mechanisms have been adopted in systems like (2011 Fundamental Law, Article 33) and (1997 Constitution, Article 158), where the must a new by absolute to oust the current one, reducing discretionary terminations by an estimated 20-30% compared to simple no-confidence systems per empirical analyses of post-adoption government durations. Proposals to extend constructive votes arise in fragmented legislatures prone to frequent turnover, such as and , where scholars and commissions argue it enforces accountability while ensuring continuity; for instance, Indian parliamentary debates in the 1990s highlighted its potential to avoid collapses without viable successors, as seen in the 1990 V.P. Singh government's fall. In , the 2014 Knesset amendment (Basic Law: The Government, Section 28) shifted to a constructive model requiring an absolute majority of 61 votes for passage, explicitly to mitigate repeated election cycles from 2019-2022 that stemmed from non-constructive no-confidence failures. Advocates, including reports, contend this raises the bar for opportunistic motions, fostering negotiated oppositions over pure veto power, though critics note it can entrench incumbents if opposition fragmentation persists. Threshold reforms propose elevating the simple majority standard to absolute or supermajority requirements for no-confidence success, targeting abuse in multi-party systems where slim coalitions enable routine challenges. Israel's 2014 reform exemplifies this, mandating over 50% of total members (absolute majority) rather than voting attendees, which curbed motions from averaging 2-3 per Knesset term pre-reform to near-zero viable threats post-adoption absent broad consensus. In transitional parliamentary designs, international bodies like the International IDEA recommend absolute majority quorums for debate initiation to filter frivolous proposals, as partial attendance can otherwise skew outcomes in low-turnout sessions. UK reform discussions, such as those in the 2010-2011 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, floated two-thirds thresholds for confidence-related early elections (via the repealed Fixed-term Parliaments Act), arguing it balances responsiveness with anti-volatility, though empirical data from supermajority rules in other contexts (e.g., U.S. Senate cloture) show they disproportionately favor status quo coalitions. These elevations, per mixed-method studies, correlate with 15-25% longer average government tenures by demanding cross-party defections.

Notable Historical and Recent Instances

Pivotal 20th-Century Cases

One of the most consequential motions of no confidence in the 20th century occurred in the during the on May 7-8, , amid the early stages of . faced criticism for the failed Allied campaign in , where British forces suffered setbacks against German invasion forces in April . An opposition amendment to the government's motion on the Norway operation, effectively serving as a , passed by a margin of 81 votes (343-281), with significant Conservative defections including 40-50 MPs abstaining or voting against their party. Although Chamberlain technically won a subsequent confidence vote, the narrow margin and loss of party unity prompted his resignation on May 10, , paving the way for to form a . This transition shifted British leadership toward more resolute war prosecution, influencing Allied strategy against . In the , another landmark case unfolded on March 28, , when James Callaghan's Labour lost a no-confidence motion by a single vote (311-310) tabled by Conservative leader . The defeat stemmed from economic turmoil, including the "" strikes involving over 29 million working days lost in late 1978-early , high inflation exceeding 13%, and failure to secure support from Liberal and Scottish Nationalist MPs after losing a . The vote, the first successful such motion since 1924, triggered a on May 3, , resulting in a Conservative landslide with 43.9% of the vote and 339 seats, ushering in Thatcher's 11-year tenure marked by , union reforms, and . West Germany's invoked its mechanism—unique under Article 67 of the requiring simultaneous election of a successor—for the first time on October 1, 1982, ousting Schmidt's Social Democratic-Free Democratic . of the Christian Democratic Union secured 256 votes to Schmidt's 235, backed by the Free Democrats' defection from the amid disputes over deficits surpassing 5% of GDP and economic with at 8.5%. This bloodless transfer stabilized governance without interim elections until March 1983, enabling Kohl's 16-year chancellorship that facilitated in 1990 and . France's Fourth Republic (1946-1958) exemplified chronic instability through repeated no-confidence votes, with 24 governments averaging 6 months each, culminating in the regime's collapse amid the Algerian crisis. A pivotal instance was the October 1957 censure against Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury over stalled Algerian reforms, passed by the with Communist and right-wing support, leading to Félix Gaillard's brief succession before further votes in April 1958 toppled his government. These failures, rooted in and fragmented parties, prompted Charles de Gaulle's return and the 1958 constitutional referendum establishing the Fifth Republic's stronger executive, reducing successful censures to one (1962, against , which backfired electorally).

21st-Century Examples up to 2025

In Spain, a motion of no confidence successfully ousted Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy on June 1, 2018, when the Congress of Deputies voted 180 to 169 in favor, prompted by corruption convictions against members of his People's Party. The motion, tabled by Socialist Workers' Party leader Pedro Sánchez, garnered support from regional nationalist parties, marking the first successful such vote in democratic Spain and allowing Sánchez to assume the premiership without a general election. In , faced a successful no-confidence motion on December 4, 2024, passing the with 327 votes in favor against 258 opposed, exceeding the required threshold of 287. The censure, jointly supported by left-wing and far-right lawmakers, stemmed from disputes over Barnier's proposed 2025 budget lacking parliamentary approval, leading to his immediate and the shortest-lived government in the Fifth Republic's history at just over two months. This event exacerbated France's political instability following the 2024 legislative elections, forcing President to seek a replacement amid a fragmented . Other notable instances include unsuccessful attempts in the , such as the December 2018 motion against , which she survived by 325 to 306 amid turmoil, though it highlighted internal Conservative Party divisions. In , governments have frequently faced confidence challenges, as seen in 2022 when resigned despite surviving a no-confidence vote due to coalition fractures over . These cases illustrate the mechanism's role in parliamentary systems for enforcing , often triggered by policy failures, scandals, or coalition breakdowns, though success remains contingent on cross-party support in multiparty environments.

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