Hubbry Logo
People's DailyPeople's DailyMain
Open search
People's Daily
Community hub
People's Daily
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
People's Daily
People's Daily
People's Daily
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

The People's Daily (Chinese: 人民日报; pinyin: Rénmín Rìbào) is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It provides direct information on the policies and viewpoints of the CCP in multiple languages. It is the largest newspaper in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Key Information

History

[edit]

The paper was established on 15 June 1948 and was first published in Pingshan County, Hebei.[1]: 86  It was formed from the merger of the Jin-Cha-Ji Daily and the newspapers of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu base area.[1]: 86  On 15 March 1949, its office was moved to Beijing, and the original People's Daily Beijing edition was renamed Beijing Liberation Daily. The newspaper ceased publication on 31 July 1949, with a total of 406 issues published. Since the newspaper was the official newspaper of the North China Central Bureau of the CCP, it was historically known as the North China People's Daily or the People's Daily North China Edition. At the same time, in order to indicate that the newspaper was published in Pingshan County, Hebei, it was also called the People's Daily Pingshan Edition. On 1 August 1949, the People's Daily was officially changed from the official newspaper of the North China Bureau of the CCP to the official newspaper of the CCP Central Committee.[2]

Ever since its founding, the People's Daily has been under direct control of the CCP's top leadership. Deng Tuo and Wu Lengxi served as editor-in-chief from 1948 to 1958 and 1958–1966, respectively, but the paper was in fact controlled by Mao Zedong's personal secretary Hu Qiaomu.[3][better source needed]

At the start of the Cultural Revolution, many news media executives were overthrown, and Wu Lengxi replaced Deng Tuo as editor-in-chief. Faced with the ever-changing political situation, the People's Daily was still at a loss as to what to do. On the afternoon of 31 May 1966, Chen Boda led a working group to "carry out a small coup" at the People's Daily, seizing power from Wu Lengxi and the editorial board. Afterwards, the People's Daily and Red Flag were led by a working group headed by Chen Boda, the head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. On 1 June, the People's Daily printed an editorial called Sweep Away All Cow Demons and Snake Spirits, seeking support for the Cultural Revolution and the moving against "rightist". During this period, the two papers and the People's Liberation Army Daily became part of what was known as the Two Newspapers and One Journal, becoming three most influential media during the Cultural Revolution.[4]

During the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, the People's Daily editorial of 26 April, which condemned "unlawful parades and demonstrations," marked a significant moment in the newspaper's history.[5] The editorial increased tension between the government and protesters, and top CCP leaders argued about whether to revise it. An article that compiles the most important editorials was released by the People's Daily during the student movement.[citation needed]

An analysis of the wording of all the issues of the People's Daily from 1995 to 2000 was used in the writing of The First Series of Standardized Forms of Words with Non-standardized Variant Forms.[6]: 3  In March 2018, People's Daily won the Third National Top 100 Newspapers in China.[7][8]

Content

[edit]

The People's Daily is published by the People's Daily Press, a ministerial-level institution. The agency is also responsible for the publication of the nationalist tabloid Global Times.[9][10] The newspaper is published worldwide in four editions:[11]

  • Mainland China Edition: Mainly for readers in mainland China
  • Hong Kong Edition: Mainly for readers in Hong Kong
  • Overseas Edition: Mainly for readers outside mainland China and Hong Kong
  • Tibetan version: mainly for Tibetan readers in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Tibetan-populated areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, Qinghai, Gansu and other provinces of China.

The Mainland Edition is the domestic edition, and the name of the edition is not clearly stated. The Mainland Edition initially had 4 pages, and later developed to 24 pages from Monday to Friday, 12 pages on Saturday and Sunday, and 8 pages on holidays. From 2019, it started to have 20 pages on weekdays and 8 pages on weekends and holidays, and have been printed in full color. In addition, the People's Daily Publishing House issues reduced-print bound volumes of the People's Daily, one volume every half month, 24 volumes per year, and the content and layout are basically the same as the original newspaper.[11]

The People's Daily maintains a unit called People's Data that conducts overseas social media data collection and analysis for police, judicial authorities, CCP organizations.[12][13] People's Data also has data sharing agreements in place with various companies such as DiDi and Temu's parent company Pinduoduo.[12] In 2022, the People's Daily launched a commercial software service called Renmin Shenjiao (People's Proofreader) that provides outsourced content censorship.[14] The People's Daily also provides artificial intelligence companies in China with training data that CCP leaders consider permissible.[15] In 2024, the People's Daily released a large language model-based tool called Easy Write.[16]

Overseas edition

[edit]

The overseas edition of the People's Daily was first published on 1 July 1985, and was originally published in traditional Chinese characters. After 1 July 1992, it was changed to simplified Chinese characters.[citation needed] Haiwainet is the website of the overseas edition of the People's Daily.[17] In February 2014, the People's Daily Overseas Edition launched the WeChat public account "XiaKeDao".[18]

In March 2018, BBC News pointed out that Haiwainet was the real body of All American Television, located in Pasadena, California, United States[19] and that Haiwainet's American channel and All American Television were "one institution with two names".[20] However, Haiwainet denied the allegations and stated that it "had no relationship with All American Television"[21] and also had no relationship with the station's executive director Zhang Huijun.[22] Subsequently, the Seattle-based All American Television Corporation (AAT Television Corporation) also issued a statement saying that it had no relationship with All American Television.[23]

Internet

[edit]

The People's Daily also maintains a multilingual internet presence; and established the People's Daily Online in 1997.[24] The website of People's Daily includes content in Arabic, French, Russian, Spanish, Japanese and English. In comparison to the original Chinese version, the foreign-language version offers less in-depth discussion of domestic policies and affairs and more editorials about China's foreign policies and motives.[25][26] The People's Daily in recent years has been expanding on overseas social media platforms. It has millions of followers on its Facebook page and its accounts on Instagram, Twitter and YouTube. An unusually high proportion of its followers are virtually inactive and are likely to be fake users, according to a study by the Committee to Protect Journalists.[27] The People's Daily also maintains agreements with foreign newspapers to republish its content.[28]

Editorial style

[edit]

The newspaper is the official "mouthpiece" (Chinese: 喉舌; lit. 'throat tongue') of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.[29] It is often viewed as most representative of the mainstream perspective of China's government and the CCP leadership's priorities.[30]: 77 [31]: 12–13 

A large number of articles devoted to a political figure, idea, or geographic focus is often taken as a sign that the mentioned official or subject is rising.[32][33] Editorials in the People's Daily are regarded both by foreign observers and Chinese readers as authoritative statements of official government policy. Distinction is made between editorials, commentaries, and opinions. Although all must be government approved, they differ sharply on the amount of official authoritativeness they contain by design – from the top. For example, although an opinion piece is unlikely to contain views opposed to those of the government, it may express a viewpoint, or it may contain a debate that is under consideration and reflect only the opinions of the writer: an editorial trial balloon to assess internal public opinion.[34] By contrast, an official editorial, which is rather infrequent, means that the government has reached a final decision on an issue.[34]

Writing practices

[edit]

The People's Daily employs "writing task groups" (Chinese: 写作小组; pinyin: xiězuò xiǎozǔ) of various staff to compose editorial pieces to signal the significance of certain pieces or their relationship to the official views of the CCP.[35] These groups are published under "signatures" (i.e., pen names: 署名 shǔmíng) that may correspond with the topic and weight of a piece, and what specific government or CCP body is backing it, often with homophonous references to their purpose.[36][37]

Selected notable People's Daily pen names
Pen name Etymology/symbolism Usage Example articles Ref
Ren Zhongping 任仲平 From 人民日报重要评论 Rénmín Rìbào zhòngyào pínglùn
'important People's Daily commentary' 		Used to represent the view of the People's Daily as an organization. "Hong Kong scores brilliant achievements after return", June 2017
"Keeping original aspiration, CPC creates glorious achievements", September 2019 		[38][35]
Zhong Sheng 钟声 Homophone of 中声 Zhōng shēng
'voice of China' 		Commentary on major international affairs by editors and staff. "U.S. practice to claim compensation for COVID-19 outbreak a shame for human civilization", May 2020 [36][39]
Guo Jiping 国纪平 From 有关国际的重要评论 yǒuguān guójì de zhòngyào pínglùn
'important commentary on international [matters]' 		According to China Daily, Guo Jiping is "used for People's Daily editorials meant to outline China's stance and viewpoints on major international issues."[40] Guo Jiping articles are rarer and generally longer than Zhong Sheng articles. "Losing no time in progressing – grasping the historic opportunity for common development", December 2019 [39]
Guo Ping 国平 Unclear. Guó means 'country' and píng 'peace, calm'. Píng is also the last character in Xi Jinping's name. Articles that focus on Xi Jinping and his political thought. "在改革中更好掌握当代中国命运: 六论习近平总书记治国理政新思想新成就" ('Better Grasp Contemporary China's Destiny during Reform: On the New Thought and New Achievements of Xi Jinping in Governing the Country'), February 2016 [41]
Zhong Zuwen 仲祖文 From 中共中央组织部文章 Zhōnggòng Zhōngyāng Zǔzhībù wénzhāng
'articles from the Central Party Organization Department' 		Pieces from the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party, covering topics related to the Party principles and ideology. "Moral standards for officials' personal life necessary", July 2010 [35][41]
Zheng Qingyuan 郑青原 Taken from the saying 正本清源 zhèngběn qīngyuán
'clarify matters and get to the bottom of things'. 		Used to comment on political reform, particularly in attacking Western-style liberal democracy.[42] A writer from the Beijing Morning Post (now part of The Beijing News) speculated that it represented the Politburo in an article that was taken down within a day in China. "China to promote reform with greater resolve, courage", October 2010 [35]
Tang Xiaowen 唐晓文 Similar to 党校文 dǎngxiào wén
'Party School writing' 		Central Party School editorials written during the Cultural Revolution by a group under the leadership of Kang Sheng. "孔子是'全民教育家'吗?" ('Is Confucius really an 'educator for the entire people'?'), September 1973 [43]
Yue Ping 岳平 (historical) For special guest commentator 特约评论员 tèyuē pínglùnyuán Used from March 1978 to December 1985 to republish select articles from the internal Party periodical Theoretical Trends (理论动态) under the direction of Hu Yaobang. "实践是检验真理的唯一标准" ('Actual Practice is the Sole Criterion for Judging Truth'), May 1978 (originally published in Guangming Daily) [44]

Reactions

[edit]
Further information: COVID-19 misinformation by China and Persecution of Uyghurs in China § Denial of abuses

During the AIDS epidemic, the People's Daily downplayed the epidemic domestically while "presenting AIDS as a relatively innocuous social problem for the country."[45]

A 2013 study of the People's Daily coverage of the 2002–2004 SARS outbreak reported that it "regurgitated triumph and optimism" and framed the outbreak as an "opportunity to showcase China's scientific achievements, and the strength of national spirits, as well as the wise leadership of the party and effective measures to protect the lives of ordinary citizens."[46]

In February 2020, the People's Daily published an article stating that the novel coronavirus "did not necessarily originate in China."[47] In March 2020, the online insert of the People's Daily, distributed by The Daily Telegraph, published an article stating that Traditional Chinese medicine "helps fight coronavirus."[48] In May 2020, the People's Daily stated that the novel coronavirus had "multiple origins."[49] In November 2020, the People's Daily published a claim that COVID-19 was "imported" into China.[50][51][52][53] In January 2021, the People's Daily inaccurately attributed deaths in Norway to the Pfizer–BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine.[54]

In 2020, the United States Department of State designated the People's Daily a foreign mission, thereby requiring it to disclose more information about its operations in the U.S.[55][56][57][58]

In 2021, ProPublica and The New York Times reported that the People's Daily was part of a coordinated state propaganda campaign to deny human rights abuses in Xinjiang.[59]

In 2023, the People's Daily sparked a backlash on Chinese social media for exhorting citizens to not complain about their own poverty or boredom.[60] In 2025, the People's Daily published an op-ed piece by LeBron James that he denied writing.[61][62][63]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

People's Daily

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

The People's Daily is the official of the of the (CCP), established on June 15, 1948, in Xibaipo, Province, and functioning as the party's primary propaganda organ for articulating official policies, ideology, and directives. Originally launched in prototype form in 1946 during the , it relocated to after the CCP's victory in 1949 and has since maintained daily publication in print and digital formats, with historical circulation peaking at around 3 million copies in the late before declining amid the shift to online media. As the CCP's flagship publication, the People's Daily sets the agenda for in , coordinating messaging across outlets and serving as a direct channel for top communications, often through editorials that signal shifts or enforce ideological discipline. Its content prioritizes party narratives over independent reporting, including campaigns promoting socialist values, economic achievements under CCP rule, and critiques of perceived threats like Western influence, which has drawn international scrutiny for advancing Beijing's global propaganda efforts. Notable for its role in historical events such as endorsing the in the 1960s and more recently softening digital propaganda with "positive energy" themes on platforms like , the paper embodies the CCP's centralized control over information, where yields to serving as a tool for domestic cohesion and foreign advocacy.

History

Founding and Pre-1949 Operations

The People's Daily was established on June 15, 1948, in Li Village, Pingshan County, Hebei Province, under the directive of the (CCP) Central Committee. This founding occurred amid the intensifying , with the CCP seeking a unified central organ to disseminate its policies and mobilize support in liberated areas controlled by its forces. The newspaper emerged from the consolidation of regional CCP publications, including the Jin-Cha-Ji Daily, to centralize propaganda efforts previously fragmented across party outlets like the Liberation Daily. Prior to 1949, operations were constrained by the wartime context, with the editorial team comprising party cadres and journalists who had converged in Pingshan during the first half of 1948. Publication occurred irregularly, often using or basic due to scarce resources and mobility requirements, as the newspaper accompanied advancing (PLA) units in their campaigns against Nationalist forces. Initial circulation was limited to several thousand copies per issue, distributed primarily within CCP base areas to report military developments, advocate policies, and criticize the government's corruption and military setbacks. As PLA offensives progressed, the People's Daily relocated multiple times, shifting from Pingshan westward to sites like Xibaipo by late 1948, where it continued serving as a tool for ideological mobilization and internal party communication. Content emphasized first-hand accounts of battlefield successes, such as encirclement campaigns, and theoretical pieces aligned with Mao Zedong's strategic directives, aiming to shape in favor of communist victory. These pre-1949 activities laid the groundwork for its expansion into a national mouthpiece following the CCP's consolidation of power.

Post-1949 Establishment and Mao Era

Following the proclamation of the on October 1, 1949, the People's Daily transitioned from its wartime origins to become the authoritative voice of the Chinese Communist Party's , systematically conveying Mao Zedong's directives and state policies to the populace. Its editorial operations had relocated to in March 1949, positioning the newspaper at the political center and facilitating nationwide distribution as the party consolidated power. Throughout the Mao era (1949–1976), the publication operated under strict party oversight, embodying the dictum of "politicians running the newspapers," where content prioritized ideological conformity over independent reporting. It disseminated key campaigns, including the (1958–1962), promoting collectivization, backyard steel production, and exaggerated production reports that masked underlying economic disruptions. Editorials served as official guides to policy implementation, with the paper's influence amplified by its status as the primary medium for Mao's writings and speeches. Circulation grew from modest wartime levels to millions by the late 1970s, underscoring the party's media expansion efforts, though precise mid-era figures remain limited in accessible records. In the (1966–1976), the People's Daily intensified its role as a instrument, publishing inflammatory pieces such as the July 1966 "" editorial authored under Mao's influence, which targeted party officials and spurred Red Guard mobilizations. This period marked heightened editorial volatility, with content shifting to denounce "capitalist roaders" and enforce Maoist orthodoxy, contributing to purges and societal chaos without acknowledgment of excesses in its pages. The newspaper's unwavering alignment with Mao's personal directives, often bypassing formal editorial hierarchies, exemplified its function as an extension of leadership rather than a journalistic entity.

Cultural Revolution and Ideological Campaigns

During the from 1966 to 1976, the People's Daily functioned as the central propaganda organ of the (CCP), amplifying Mao Zedong's calls for ideological purification and class struggle while directing attacks against high-ranking officials deemed revisionist. Under Mao's directive that "politicians run the newspapers," the outlet prioritized political mobilization over factual reporting, publishing editorials, quotes from Mao's works, and revolutionary content to rally and the masses against the "" (old ideas, culture, customs, and habits). This role extended to sub-campaigns, where abrupt shifts in rhetoric—such as from exaltation to condemnation—mirrored Mao's tactical pivots, contributing to widespread purges and social upheaval estimated to have caused between 400,000 and 1.5 million deaths. A pivotal moment occurred on May 16, 1966, when the People's Daily ran the editorial "Sweep Away All Monsters and Demons," exhorting readers to eradicate bourgeois influences within party institutions and igniting early Red Guard fervor in and beyond. This was followed by the front-page publication on August 1, 1966, of Mao's "Bombard the Headquarters—My First ," which implicitly criticized CCP Chairman and other leaders for suppressing revolutionary elements, accelerating factional violence. The newspaper then spearheaded the denunciation of , labeling him a "traitor," "Khrushchevite revisionist," and "capitalist roader" in serial articles and editorials from late 1966 onward, portraying his policies as betrayals of Maoist principles; these attacks facilitated Liu's , , and death under torture in November 1969. In subsequent ideological drives, such as the 1967 "" power seizures in —endorsed via People's Daily commentary as models for nationwide —the paper disseminated directives for workers' councils and rebel factions to overthrow local authorities. It also promoted cultural outputs like revolutionary songs and model operas glorifying , with daily features reinforcing Mao Zedong Thought as the sole guide amid school closures and . By 1971, following 's death in a plane crash, the People's Daily pivoted to the "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius" campaign, publishing extensive editorials framing Lin's as feudalistic and anti-Maoist, thus absolving Mao of prior endorsements while sustaining perpetual struggle. The People's Daily's output during this era exemplified Mao-era propaganda's absolutism, with content oscillating sharply to align with leadership purges—extolling figures like until his fall—while marginalizing empirical critique in favor of doctrinal enforcement. Circulation surged to over 5 million copies daily by the early , ensuring directives reached factories, communes, and military units, though internal factionalism briefly disrupted publication in amid Beijing's rebel takeovers. Post-Mao assessments, including CCP resolutions, have critiqued this phase for enabling , yet the newspaper's archives reveal its instrumental role in enforcing ideological conformity over institutional stability.

Deng Xiaoping Reforms and Modernization

The era marked a profound shift for People's Daily, transitioning from the Maoist emphasis on continuous revolution and class struggle to promoting pragmatic economic reforms and modernization as the core of socialist construction. Following consolidation of power after the Third Plenum of the 11th of the on December 18, 1978, the newspaper's editorial line aligned with directive to "emancipate the mind, , and unite as one in looking to the future," prioritizing empirical outcomes over dogmatic adherence to past directives. This change enabled People's Daily to critique excesses of the while rehabilitating purged cadres and condemning the , whose trial concluded in January 1981 with convictions for persecuting over 700,000 people. Central to this ideological pivot was People's Daily's involvement in the 1978 "Truth Criterion Controversy," where it initially published articles defending orthodox against the essay "Practice Is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth," first appearing in Guangming Daily on , 1978. By mid-1978, under pressure from Deng's reformers, the newspaper reversed course, endorsing practice as the ultimate test of policy validity and explicitly criticizing Hua Guofeng's "" slogan—which demanded unwavering support for whatever Mao had decided or instructed—as a barrier to correcting past errors. This endorsement, reflected in subsequent editorials, facilitated the repudiation of ultra-leftist policies and laid the groundwork for market-oriented experiments, with People's Daily framing them as consistent with Marxism-Leninism adapted to Chinese conditions. In promoting the —agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense—People's Daily disseminated official narratives on rural decollectivization via the , implemented nationwide by 1983, which boosted agricultural output by incentivizing individual production quotas. The paper highlighted urban industrial reforms, including price decontrols and enterprise autonomy, and the creation of Special Economic Zones in 1980, such as , where foreign investment surged from negligible levels to over $1 billion annually by 1985. Coverage emphasized measurable gains, like GDP growth averaging approximately 10% yearly from 1978 to 1992, while downplaying setbacks such as rural income disparities. Deng's 1992 Southern Tour, from January 18 to February 21, represented a late-era resurgence, with People's Daily publishing transcripts of his speeches urging bolder market mechanisms and declaring that "development is the absolute principle," countering conservative retrenchment after the 1989 events. These reports, serialized in the newspaper, spurred renewed acceleration, framing reforms as essential for national strength amid global . Throughout the period, while People's Daily adopted a more fact-oriented style—assessing media "falsehood, exaggeration, and empty talk" for —its role as the CCP's authoritative voice ensured alignment with party directives, often presenting optimistic data without independent verification.

Xi Jinping Era and Recent Adaptations (2012–Present)

Since assumed the leadership of the in November 2012, People's Daily has markedly intensified its dissemination of his personal ideology, known as on for a New Era, which was enshrined in the party's constitution at the 19th National Congress in October 2017. The newspaper's front pages evolved to feature more scripted, government-authored content, reflecting a decade-long trend toward centralized that emphasizes Xi's directives on governance, anti-corruption, and national rejuvenation. In the 18 months following his ascension, Xi's name appeared 4,725 times in the publication, a frequency unmatched by any leader since , underscoring the paper's role as a primary vehicle for personalizing party authority. This era saw People's Daily adapt its editorial practices to align explicitly with Xi's 2016 directive that all media must serve the party's agenda, transforming the outlet into a dedicated apparatus; for instance, on December 26, 2015, 11 of the 12 front-page headlines referenced Xi directly. Coverage expanded to promote specific facets of , including dedicated campaigns for its study in areas like culture (as reiterated by senior officials in January 2025) and economy (emphasized in May 2025), often through front-page editorials and theoretical expositions. The paper's propagation of these ideas has been instrumental in ideological consolidation, with analyses indicating sustained dominance of Xi-related narratives through 2025, countering perceptions of dilution despite occasional reductions in mention volume. In terms of operational adaptations, People's Daily enhanced its digital infrastructure to extend official narratives globally, leveraging platforms like People's Daily Online (en.people.cn) for multilingual dissemination of Xi's policies on , such as building a "human community with a shared future," as highlighted in September 2023 articles. This shift aligns with broader state efforts under Xi to integrate digital tools into , including AI-driven content strategies invoked in sessions since 2018, though the paper's core remains print-centric for domestic signaling. By October 2025, coverage of events like the 20th Central Committee plenum continued to frame reforms through Xi's lens, prioritizing themes of institutional modernization and military strengthening. These changes have reinforced the publication's function as the party's authoritative voice, with empirical tracking showing no substantive deviation from Xi-era as of early 2025.

Organizational Structure and Control

Affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party

The People's Daily functions as the official newspaper of the of the (CCP), serving as its primary organ for public communication. Established on June 15, 1948, in Xibaipo, Province, it has operated under direct CCP oversight since , with its content mandated to align with party directives and ideological priorities. This affiliation positions it as the party's authoritative voice, disseminating resolutions, policies, and interpretations of Marxist-Leninist thought adapted to Chinese conditions. Control over the newspaper resides with the CCP , which appoints its and senior leadership from among high-ranking party cadres, ensuring fidelity to central authority rather than journalistic independence. Unlike commercial media, the People's Daily receives no as its core mission; funding derives from CCP allocations and state budgets, reinforcing its role as a non-profit propaganda instrument. The publication's print edition falls exclusively under management, while its online platform, People's Daily Online, incorporates commercial partnerships but maintains editorial subordination to party guidelines. This structural tie to the CCP distinguishes the People's Daily from other Chinese media, which may report to provincial party committees or the CCP's Publicity Department; the newspaper's prominence stems from its proximity to the Standing Committee, where key articles often signal or foreshadow major policy shifts. U.S. government assessments have classified it among PRC entities effectively controlled by the CCP, highlighting its function in advancing party narratives domestically and abroad. Empirical analysis of its output reveals consistent prioritization of CCP legitimacy over empirical scrutiny, with deviations from the party line historically resulting in purges or reassignments of editorial staff.

Editorial Hierarchy and Decision-Making

The editorial hierarchy of the People's Daily is designed to maintain strict alignment with the directives of the (CCP) , under which the newspaper operates directly as its official organ. At the apex sits the president (shezhang), who oversees overall operations, followed by the (zongbianji) and deputy editors, all appointed by CCP and functioning as high-ranking party cadres rather than independent journalists. The (bianji weiyuanhui), comprising the , deputy editors, and heads of key departments such as commentary and news, holds ultimate authority over content formulation but operates within a framework of party supervision. Decision-making follows a "command communication" model, characterized by top-down instructions from CCP leaders and the Central Propaganda Department, which directly supervises editors to ensure ideological conformity. , in particular, are crafted in the commentary department under senior editors who debate drafts internally but must adhere to party mandates; for instance, pivotal pieces like the April 26, 1989, on student protests were dictated for nationwide reprinting by provincial party committees. High-level intervention is routine, with members or general secretaries reviewing and censoring key drafts on-site, as occurred during sensitive political events in the . This process prioritizes propagation of official narratives over empirical verification or diverse viewpoints, reflecting the newspaper's role as a "mouthpiece" for party ideology rather than autonomous reporting. Departmental heads manage specialized sections—such as news coordination, domestic affairs, and international reporting—but escalate major decisions to the , where party loyalty determines outcomes. Under leaders like , this hierarchy has intensified centralization, with editorials serving as signals of policy shifts endorsed at the highest echelons, underscoring the absence of . Historical precedents, including Mao Zedong's personal oversight in the – and Deng Xiaoping's influence on reforms, illustrate continuity in party dominance over journalistic autonomy.

Relationship with Propaganda Department

The People's Daily, as the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, operates under the ideological oversight of the CCP's Central Propaganda Department (also known as the Publicity Department), which ensures alignment with Party directives on content and framing. The department issues daily editorial notices to media outlets, including guidelines on permissible topics, narrative emphases, and prohibitions on sensitive issues such as political dissent or historical events challenging CCP legitimacy; these directives, often disseminated via internal bulletins or telegrams, compel the People's Daily to prioritize official narratives over independent reporting. Leaked collections of such guidance, verified by independent monitors, reveal patterns where the department mandates specific coverage angles for domestic crises, policy announcements, and international affairs, with the People's Daily frequently serving as the primary vehicle for disseminating these unified messages to set the tone for other state media. The department's influence extends to personnel and structural control, with the People's Daily's —including its —effectively headed by or drawn from CCP propaganda apparatus, reinforcing the Mao-era of "politicians running the newspapers" that prioritizes ideological over journalistic autonomy. This is facilitated through the National Press and Publication Administration (NPPA), a subordinate body under the Central Propaganda Department, which regulates print media licensing and compliance; in 2023, the NPPA oversaw 2,405 registered newspapers, including the People's Daily's print edition, enforcing content reviews and pre-publication approvals for politically salient material. Empirical analyses of leaked directives demonstrate causal links between departmental instructions and People's Daily output, such as amplified promotion of government-authored articles on economic achievements or , comprising a growing share of front-page content amid tightened controls since 2012. While the People's Daily retains formal autonomy under the , this relationship embodies the CCP's centralized system, where deviations risk cadre demotions or editorial purges, as evidenced by historical interventions in media during ideological campaigns.

Content Characteristics

Policy Dissemination and Official Narratives

The People's Daily serves as the authoritative organ for disseminating (CCP) policies, functioning as its official mouthpiece to propagate theories, guidelines, and directives directly from the . This role ensures that policy announcements and interpretations reach Party cadres, government officials, and the public in a unified manner, often through front-page editorials that carry implicit or explicit signals of leadership intent. For instance, editorials have historically outlined economic strategies, such as the October 14, 2025, piece detailing an optimistic framework for industrial transformation amid CCP priorities. In the Xi Jinping era, the newspaper has emphasized the leader's personal involvement in policy formulation, as seen in its coverage of the 14th Five-Year Plan's successor, where it reported on October 25, 2025, that Xi "personally headed" the drafting team and oversaw key revisions. Such reporting constructs narratives of centralized decision-making and ideological continuity, aligning media output with campaigns like drives or national rejuvenation themes. During public health crises, it has shaped official accounts to bolster domestic legitimacy, for example, framing responses in 2020 as triumphs of Party governance while minimizing early accountability. The publication's editorial hierarchy integrates with CCP propaganda mechanisms, ensuring content reflects approved narratives rather than independent analysis, with deviations rare and swiftly corrected. This dissemination extends to international audiences via multilingual editions, promoting policies like the as mutual benefits, though analyses note selective emphasis on CCP-favorable outcomes. Quantitative impact includes millions of daily readers and digital shares, amplifying policy adherence across ecosystems.

Coverage of Domestic Affairs

The People's Daily prioritizes coverage of domestic affairs that aligns with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) directives, emphasizing achievements in economic development, social stability, and policy implementation while framing challenges as resolvable through Party leadership. This approach serves to disseminate official narratives, such as portraying China's governance model as superior, including through reports on the "Two Sessions" annual meetings as exemplars of "democracy with Chinese characteristics" involving grassroots committees. Economic and poverty alleviation stories form a core focus, with frequent articles crediting CCP policies for lifting 770 million rural residents out of since 1978's and opening-up, representing about 75% of global reductions in that period. For instance, coverage highlights targeted measures like resource utilization and technology adoption under Xi Jinping's initiatives, culminating in the 2020 declaration of absolute eradication affecting 98.99 million people through precise identification and relocation programs. These reports often contrast China's model against global poverty persistence, positioning it as a template for developing nations without acknowledging methodological critiques of poverty thresholds or limitations in independent audits. In addressing domestic crises, the newspaper adheres to state-approved framing, promoting narratives of effective governance while minimizing or omitting dissenting events. During the COVID-19 pandemic, it propagated the success of zero-COVID policies, attributing low mortality to centralized control and public compliance, with editorials in early 2020 underscoring Party mobilization over initial outbreak delays or public hardships. Coverage of protests, such as those against lockdowns in 2022, was absent or reframed post-policy reversal to emphasize adaptive leadership rather than unrest causation. Historical events like the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident receive no critical retrospective; instead, domestic stability is routinely asserted via editorials claiming China as one of the world's safest nations amid perceived external threats. Anti-corruption drives and infrastructure projects, such as expansions or ecological campaigns, are depicted as triumphs of intra-Party rectification, with quantitative claims like relocating millions for poverty relief tied directly to Xi-era directives. This selective emphasis reduces space for independent , prioritizing ideological alignment over investigative reporting, as evidenced by reduced foreign during periods of domestic political consolidation to amplify internal successes.

International and Foreign Policy Reporting

People's Daily's international reporting functions as an extension of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) diplomatic apparatus, prioritizing the articulation and reinforcement of Beijing's strategic priorities over independent analysis. Coverage emphasizes China's "peaceful rise," under CCP leadership, and opposition to perceived hegemonism, particularly from the , while downplaying internal contradictions or failures in foreign engagements. A study of over one million articles from to 2022 found that foreign news selection and framing in People's Daily increasingly reflects domestic political needs, with editorial control tightening to align narratives with CCP campaigns on global issues. In U.S.-China relations, the outlet consistently portrays American actions as sources of global instability, accusing Washington of strategic misjudgment and ideological exportation that undermines mutual interests. For instance, following the escalation of tariffs on $200 billion in Chinese goods, People's Daily commentaries framed the trade friction as U.S. aggression driven by , urging rational dialogue while rejecting competition as the defining paradigm. Similarly, in September 2023, it argued that defining bilateral ties solely as rivalry was a "serious mistake," advocating instead for competition within bounds of mutual respect, though attributing tensions primarily to U.S. policy flaws. Coverage ahead of Trump's 2025 inauguration stressed tackling "growing pains" through common ground, while critiquing U.S. "" on issues like technology and . The (BRI) receives prominent, affirmative treatment as a cornerstone of China's global outreach, with articles highlighting economic benefits and cooperative successes to counter debt-trap narratives. On the BRI's 10th anniversary in October 2023, People's Daily cited World Bank estimates projecting $1.6 trillion in annual global gains by 2030, attributing 1.3% of that to enhanced trade and investment flows. Reports in 2025 emphasized "high-quality" cooperation, such as infrastructure connectivity and , framing BRI as a model for equitable partnerships that foster sustainable progress among over 150 participating countries. Critiques of Western foreign policies form a recurring theme, depicting them as hypocritical and biased, often contrasting them with China's purported commitment to non-interference. People's Daily has lambasted U.S. interventions as exporting turmoil, as in a 2016 editorial labeling America the "source of turmoil" for ideological meddling in non-Western states. It frequently accuses Western media of anti-China prejudice, such as in 2021 rebukes of fabricated reports that manipulate global opinion against Beijing's diplomacy. This framing extends to public opinion shaping, where People's Daily's annual sentiment analyses on internet discourse inform CCP adjustments to foreign policy messaging, prioritizing narratives that rally domestic support for assertive stances like "wolf warrior" diplomacy.

Editorial Practices and Style

Writing Conventions and Language Use

The writing conventions of People's Daily emphasize formal structure, ideological alignment, and rhetorical precision to align with directives, featuring standardized article formats that prioritize official announcements in lead paragraphs followed by supportive elaboration. Articles typically employ to assert agency in portraying state actions and achievements, such as in headlines like "Xi replies to letters from U.S. mayors," which underscore leadership initiative rather than passive reporting. This convention reinforces a of proactive and national strength, avoiding passive constructions that might dilute emphasis on party-led progress. Language use is characterized by predominant positivity, with discourse analysis of headlines showing a sentiment score of 60.2, including 104 positive instances out of 247 analyzed, focusing on terms evoking "," "unity," and "" to promote China's global image. Ideological terminology, such as "" and references to party thought systems, is mandatory, ensuring semantic consistency with CCP orthodoxy while eschewing Western individualistic or critical phrasing. Quotation of authoritative figures occurs frequently—32 instances in sampled Olympic coverage—to lend official endorsement, as in citing officials praising event organization. Evaluative language arouses positive emotions toward state policies, often through strict, formal wording that minimizes ambiguity or negativity. In practice, these conventions extend to avoidance of speculative or dissenting tones, with articles structured to integrate party slogans seamlessly and maintain narrative control, as seen in epidemic reporting where formal phrasing highlights coordinated responses without questioning . Digital adaptations retain core formality but incorporate emotional for , softening overt while preserving functions. Overall, the style privileges causal attribution to party , using precise, non-colloquial Mandarin to sustain credibility as the CCP's authoritative voice.

Fact-Checking and Source Verification Processes

The and source verification processes at People's Daily are integrated into the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) centralized editorial control, emphasizing alignment with official ideology over autonomous journalistic standards. Articles are reviewed through multiple layers of party oversight, including input from the CCP Central Propaganda Department, to ensure content reflects approved narratives rather than subjecting claims to external empirical testing or adversarial verification. This hierarchical approval mechanism, which prioritizes doctrinal consistency, effectively substitutes for independent , as deviations from party lines are precluded prior to . Sources for reporting are predominantly drawn from state-sanctioned channels such as , government press briefings, and CCP internal directives, with minimal incorporation of non-official or foreign-origin data unless reframed to support Beijing's positions. Verification entails cross-referencing against these authoritative party outputs, often involving pseudonymously attributed pieces crafted by CCP-affiliated writers to maintain uniformity. Independent sourcing, such as on-the-ground investigations contradicting official accounts, is rare and typically suppressed through pre-publication , as state media outlets like People's Daily operate under mandates to "take the standpoint of the ." This approach yields high internal consistency in propagating CCP viewpoints but has drawn criticism from international observers for systemic biases, including the omission or distortion of dissenting evidence on issues like or economic data. Reports from organizations monitoring global media freedoms highlight instances where People's Daily coverage aligns verbatim with party scripts during crises, such as the 1989 Tiananmen events or origins, underscoring verification as a tool for narrative enforcement rather than truth elucidation. Credible external analyses, including those from non-partisan think tanks, note that while People's Daily maintains factual accuracy on routine domestic statistics when sourced officially, its processes lack transparency and mechanisms typical of liberal journalistic norms, rendering it unreliable for contested topics without corroboration from diverse, unaligned sources.

Adaptation to Digital Media Formats

People's Daily Online, the digital extension of the newspaper, was formally launched on January 1, 1997, providing round-the-clock news dissemination across more than 40 channels and over 25,000 specialized topics in languages including Simplified Chinese, Traditional Chinese, English, Japanese, French, Spanish, Russian, and . This adaptation enabled the transition from print to web-based formats, incorporating services such as e-news subscriptions, free accounts, and online data retrieval, while establishing mirror sites in and the to broaden . The English edition followed on January 14, 1998, further supporting multilingual outreach. By February 2010, People's Daily integrated capabilities, aligning with China's burgeoning landscape to facilitate real-time information sharing and user engagement. Mobile adaptation accelerated with the release of apps like People's Daily Online Plus and the English-language app on October 15, 2017, offering features such as video content, voice broadcasting, and personalized news feeds. These platforms extended reach through integration with domestic services like and international ones including , (now X), and , amassing over 190 million followers by 2020. The organization's digital evolution included public listing on the in 2012 under code 603000, funding further infrastructure like the State Key Laboratory of Communication Content Cognition for advanced . This supported expansion into multimedia formats, including videos and interactive forums such as the "Strong Nation Forum," yielding over 940 million readers across websites, apps, and social channels by 2020. Such measures reflect a strategic shift to leverage digital tools for content diversification and audience interaction while maintaining centralized editorial control.

Propaganda and Ideological Functions

Role as CCP Mouthpiece

The People's Daily serves as the principal organ of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, functioning explicitly as its "mouthpiece" (喉舌) to articulate and propagate the party's official ideology, policies, and directives. Established on June 15, 1948, in Pingshan, Hebei, during the Chinese Civil War, it has since 1949 been headquartered in Beijing and directly supervised by the CCP's Central Propaganda Department, ensuring alignment with the leadership's views rather than independent journalistic standards. This role positions it as the authoritative channel for announcing key decisions, such as full texts of speeches by General Secretary Xi Jinping, which are typically published on its front page before dissemination elsewhere, thereby setting the narrative tone for all state media. In practice, the newspaper's content is curated to reflect the CCP's ideological priorities, including Marxist-Leninist principles adapted to "," and it prioritizes party loyalty over empirical reporting or diverse viewpoints. For instance, during the (1966–1976), it amplified Mao Zedong's directives, such as the "May 16 Notification" of 1966, which mobilized mass campaigns against perceived internal enemies, demonstrating its utility in mobilizing public sentiment in service of party goals. Post-1978 reforms under saw it evolve to endorse while maintaining strict political orthodoxy, but under Xi since 2012, it has intensified emphasis on "," with editorials reinforcing centralized control and anti-corruption drives as existential to regime stability. Critics, including analyses from media watchdogs, describe its operations as propaganda-oriented, where editorial decisions originate from CCP hierarchies to guide and suppress deviations, rather than from journalistic verification. This is evident in its consistent framing of events to affirm party narratives, such as portraying economic policies as unqualified successes despite data indicating challenges like exceeding 20% in mid-2023. While CCP-affiliated sources portray this as fulfilling a "supervisory" over , independent observers note systemic incentives for , rendering it a tool for ideological conformity over truth-seeking inquiry.

Orchestration of Media Campaigns

The People's Daily orchestrates media campaigns by publishing authoritative leading articles (社论) and editorials that define the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) official on pivotal domestic and international issues, compelling other to replicate and expand upon them for unified propagation. This mechanism, rooted in the newspaper's status as the CCP Central Committee's organ, ensures disciplined alignment across outlets, from national broadcasters like to provincial dailies, minimizing deviations and maximizing reach. During the 19th CCP National Congress on October 18, 2017, the People's Daily's front-page layout prominently featured Xi Jinping's report, establishing his ideological centrality and dictating the tone for subsequent coverage in over 2,000 state-run newspapers, which echoed phrases like "" in thousands of follow-up pieces. Similarly, in drives, such as the 2024 emphasis on "high-quality development," leading articles introduce jargon that permeates media directives, coordinating campaigns to frame state initiatives as triumphs amid challenges like exceeding 17% in mid-2023. In the digital domain, the People's Daily leverages its "Central Kitchen" (中央厨房) system, launched around 2016, to mass-produce content—including scripts, visuals, and hashtags—for syndication across , Douyin, and affiliated apps, enabling rapid scaling of campaigns like the 2021 nationalist response to the Xinjiang cotton boycott. On March 26, 2021, a People's Daily post using #I_Support_Xinjiang_Cotton garnered over 1 billion views, spurring and influencers to flood platforms with aligned content, countering Western sanctions by portraying them as economic sabotage. This coordination extends to , as seen in narratives from early 2020, where editorials shifted from initial suppression to "positive energy" mobilization, directing outlets to highlight recovery metrics like 95% vaccination coverage by late 2021 while downplaying origins debates. Such orchestration enforces ideological conformity through implicit and explicit directives from the CCP's Propaganda Department, with non-adherence risking cadre repercussions; for example, in 2013's "public opinion struggle" series, People's Daily compiled statements from 31 provincial propaganda chiefs, standardizing anti-Western framing that persists in ongoing influence operations.

Suppression of Dissenting Views

The People's Daily, as the official organ of the (CCP), has consistently framed dissenting movements and opinions as existential threats to social stability and party authority, thereby legitimizing state suppression through inflammatory editorials and commentaries that rally public and institutional opposition. This role extends beyond omission of alternative viewpoints—standard in state-controlled media—to active denunciation, where the newspaper sets the narrative tone for nationwide and enforcement campaigns, often directing other outlets to align or face repercussions. A pivotal instance occurred during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, when the People's Daily published a front-page editorial on April 26 titled "It Is Necessary to Take Strong Measures to Quell the Counterrevolutionary Rebellion." The piece characterized student-led demonstrations mourning Hu Yaobang's death as orchestrated "turmoil" aimed at negating CCP leadership and the socialist system, escalating government rhetoric from dialogue to confrontation and paving the way for the June military crackdown. This editorial, approved at high CCP levels, not only suppressed sympathetic coverage within but also signaled to the need for decisive action against perceived rebellion. In the suppression of , the People's Daily spearheaded propaganda efforts following the group's 1999 protests. A November 26 commentary titled "Exposing and Fighting to the End" urged nationwide mobilization against the movement, portraying it as a undermining and calling for its eradication through exposure and legal measures. Earlier forums organized under CCP auspices, amplified by the newspaper, labeled leader Li Hongzhi's teachings as feudal , justifying mass arrests, re-education camps, and media blackouts that persist today. These efforts contributed to the detention of an estimated 70 million practitioners by government counts in the 1990s, with ongoing transnational monitoring of adherents. During the 2019 Hong Kong protests against the extradition bill, the People's Daily published multiple commentaries equating demonstrators with terrorists and foreign agents, declaring "no room for compromise" on issues and demanding an end to "illegal and violent" acts. Articles such as "Radical Protesters No Different Than Terrorists" (August 31, 2019) and "Instigating Violence Is Doomed to Fail" (December 2, 2019) dismissed grievances over autonomy as "color revolution" plots, aligning with Beijing's imposition of the National Security Law in 2020, which curtailed dissent and led to over 10,000 arrests by 2023. This narrative suppressed local and international scrutiny by framing as biased interference. More recently, the People's Daily has integrated AI tools for preemptive , enhancing its capacity to filter dissenting content across digital platforms while promoting anti-"" campaigns that vilify interpretations challenging CCP historical orthodoxy, such as queries into the Great Famine or . These mechanisms ensure that internal critiques, from labor unrest to policy failures, receive no platform, reinforcing a monopoly on truth that attributes to the CCP's prioritization of regime preservation over open discourse.

Digital Expansion and Global Reach

Online Platforms and Social Media

People's Daily maintains a significant presence on digital platforms, with People's Daily Online serving as its primary portal since its launch in the late , offering real-time news, commentary, and multimedia content aligned with (CCP) directives. The site, available in Chinese and English versions at people.com.cn and en.people.cn respectively, facilitates rapid dissemination of official narratives to both domestic and international audiences, often prioritizing state-approved viewpoints over independent verification. On Chinese social media, People's Daily operates prominent accounts on and public accounts, which function as tools for agenda-setting and guidance. Its Weibo account, with millions of followers, has been analyzed for employing "softening" tactics during crises like the , shifting from rigid ideological messaging to emotional appeals, distraction techniques, and responsive engagement to maintain legitimacy amid public scrutiny. These platforms enable real-time interaction within censored domestic ecosystems, where content is curated to reinforce CCP unity and suppress dissent, as evidenced by coordinated campaigns amplifying government achievements. Internationally, People's Daily runs over 50 accounts across platforms including X (formerly Twitter), , VK, and Line, accumulating approximately 190 million followers as of mid-2020, though exact current figures remain opaque due to varying platform metrics and state control over reporting. These overseas efforts, part of the CCP's "telling China's story" initiative, focus on targeted to shape global perceptions, with X accounts like @PDChina prioritizing one-way projection over genuine dialogue, often mirroring domestic patterns in content selection. Analyses indicate these channels contribute to broader influence operations, using algorithms and AI for content optimization to amplify pro-China messaging while countering adversarial reports on issues like or territorial disputes.

International Editions and Multilingual Outreach

People's Daily maintains international editions primarily through its online platform, People's Daily Online, which disseminates content in multiple foreign languages to extend the Chinese Communist Party's beyond domestic audiences. The English-language edition launched on January 14, 1998, translating key articles from the print version and focusing on China's policies, economy, and foreign relations to target global readers. This digital expansion marked an early step in multilingual outreach, aligning with state directives to "tell China's story well" internationally. Subsequent efforts broadened language coverage via iterative launches of new versions. By September 1, 2021, the platform offered content in 12 foreign languages, including English, Japanese, French, Spanish, Russian, , Korean, German, , Italian, and , following additions like Swahili to reach African audiences. On November 24, 2022, Thai, Malay, and Greek versions were introduced, expanding to 15 languages such as those plus Indonesian and Dutch, aimed at , Europe, and Muslim-majority regions. The People's Daily Online Plus mobile application further supported this on October 26, 2023, by integrating 15 foreign language channels for enhanced accessibility. As of April 11, 2025, People's Daily Online provided services in 18 foreign languages, incorporating recent additions like Vietnamese, , and to engage South and Southeast Asian populations, alongside established ones including English, French, Russian, , Spanish, Japanese, Korean, German, , Italian, Dutch, Greek, Thai, , Hausa, and Indonesian. These versions prioritize official viewpoints on topics like projects and bilateral , often featuring less analytical depth than the Chinese original to adapt to international sensibilities. The outreach complements print overseas editions in simplified Chinese for communities but emphasizes digital formats for broader, cost-effective global dissemination.

Technological Integration and Surveillance Ties

The People's Daily has developed and operates the mobile application, launched in January 2019 by its digital arm in collaboration with the Central Department, which mandates usage among members to track engagement with ideological content on . The app requires real-name registration linked to national ID systems, collects user data on study time, quiz performance, and content interaction—generating scores that influence party evaluations, promotions, and potentially metrics—effectively blending dissemination with behavioral . By mid-2019, it had amassed over 100 million users, with daily active users exceeding 20 million, enabling granular monitoring of loyalty and compliance through gamified metrics and AI-driven recommendations. Integration extends to big data analytics via the People's Daily Public Opinion Data Center, established in 2013, which aggregates user data from its platforms and shares commercial and behavioral insights with government agencies, including public security organs, to support stability maintenance and predictive policing. This center facilitates real-time sentiment analysis on domestic and overseas data, bypassing certain firewall restrictions for the outlet's units, and has been documented in procurement bids as providing datasets to police for threat assessment. Such capabilities align with broader state surveillance infrastructure, where app-collected data feeds into unified databases for cross-referencing with facial recognition and location tracking systems. The outlet routinely promotes surveillance-enabling technologies in its reporting, including 2017 endorsements of AI-driven facial recognition networks capable of scanning crowds and matching against criminal databases in real-time, and applications for public security enhancement. These articles, while framed as advancements in , underscore the People's Daily's in normalizing mass ; for instance, it has advocated for expansions since 2017 pilots, emphasizing data integration from apps and cameras to enforce behavioral compliance, with over 53 measures outlined in 2025 guidelines for nationwide rollout. Independent analyses highlight how this integration sustains authoritarian control, as user data from state media platforms like those of the People's Daily contributes to a symbiotic AI-surveillance rather than neutral technological progress.

Influence and Societal Impact

Domestic Opinion Shaping

The People's Daily functions as the central organ for disseminating (CCP) directives, thereby setting the agenda for domestic media coverage and guiding public discourse on key internal issues such as , social stability, and ideological conformity. As the most authoritative state newspaper, its editorials and front-page articles establish the official narrative that other outlets must align with, ensuring a unified messaging framework across China's tightly controlled media landscape. This agenda-setting role extends to promoting narratives of national rejuvenation under , with empirical studies showing its influence on subsequent coverage in commercial and party-affiliated media. In practice, the newspaper shapes opinion through campaigns emphasizing "positive energy" and , such as exhortations to embrace poverty alleviation efforts and avoid personal grievances, as seen in a 2023 article that urged citizens to reframe economic hardships as opportunities for resilience, sparking limited online backlash despite . Its print circulation stands at approximately 3 million copies daily, supplemented by extensive digital reach via platforms like , where content has shifted toward softer, emotionally resonant propaganda to foster public buy-in rather than overt coercion. The People's Daily Online Public Opinion Monitoring Center further analyzes trends to refine these efforts, publishing quarterly reports that evaluate official accounts' effectiveness in aligning sentiment with party goals. Critically, this opinion-shaping operates within a of monopoly, where dissenting views are preemptively marginalized, enabling causal reinforcement of CCP legitimacy through repetitive exposure to state-approved interpretations of events like drives or rural revitalization. While academic analyses from Western institutions highlight its role in emotional valence—portraying the as a benevolent guide—domestic efficacy relies on the absence of counter-narratives, as evidenced by synchronized media echoes during policy pivots. State media's planting of government-authored articles in newspapers has grown over the past decade, with People's Daily exemplifying this trend to embed ideological content seamlessly into everyday reading.

Effects on Global Perceptions of China

The People's Daily, as the primary organ of the , disseminates narratives that emphasize 's economic achievements, technological advancements, and global leadership, aiming to cultivate favorable international views through its international editions and affiliated outlets like Xinhua. These efforts portray initiatives such as the Belt and Road as mutually beneficial cooperation, countering Western critiques of debt traps or geopolitical expansion. In regions with limited access to diverse media, this state-controlled messaging has demonstrably shifted opinions toward viewing the "China model" of as effective for growth and stability, with experimental studies showing persuasion rates up to 20-30% higher among exposed audiences compared to controls. Empirical data indicates varying impacts by geography: in and , exposure to Chinese state media, including People's Daily-sourced content via platforms like CGTN, correlates with more positive assessments of 's influence, with surveys revealing approval rates for 's global role exceeding 60% in some nations, attributed to emphasis on infrastructure aid and non-interference policies. Conversely, in high-income democracies like those in and , where scrutiny is prevalent, such narratives often reinforce skepticism, contributing to unfavorable views of hovering around 70-80% in Research polls from 2020-2025, as audiences perceive the content as overt amid reports of discrepancies. This regional disparity underscores the outlet's limited penetration in information-pluralistic environments, where algorithmic amplification on amplifies but does not fully offset distrust. Critics, including analyses from think tanks, argue that People's Daily's role in synchronized campaigns—such as framing U.S. policies as hegemonic while highlighting China's "win-win" diplomacy—exacerbates polarized global discourse, potentially eroding trust in multilateral institutions by promoting autocratic as viable alternatives. Longitudinal surveys, however, show no uniform decline in democratic support attributable solely to Chinese media; instead, effects are mediated by local economic ties, with nations receiving significant Chinese investment exhibiting 10-15% higher favorability scores. Overall, while the publication bolsters perceptions among aligned or developing-world audiences, its state-directed content frequently amplifies rather than broadly reshaping entrenched Western narratives.

Metrics of Reach and Engagement

The People's Daily maintains a reported daily of approximately 3 million copies, positioning it among the world's largest newspapers by distribution volume. This figure encompasses both domestic and international editions, though independent audits of exact print runs remain limited due to the publication's state-operated nature. Digitally, People's Daily Online reports reaching over 940 million readers across its websites, mobile applications, and integrated platforms, based on self-assessed metrics from 2020 that include page views and unique users within and abroad. The platform's primary domain, people.cn, generates substantial traffic, with revenue from online operations estimated at around CNY 2.2 billion in recent years, reflecting high domestic engagement driven by mandatory subscriptions in government and party institutions. On , the outlet operates more than 50 accounts on international platforms, accumulating approximately 190 million followers as of , facilitating global dissemination of content in multiple languages. Domestic platforms like and amplify reach further, though specific follower counts and interaction rates—such as likes, shares, or comments—are not publicly detailed in independent analyses, with engagement often aligned to state-directed campaigns rather than organic user interest. Overall, these metrics underscore a vast but centrally orchestrated audience, spanning 210 countries and regions with claims of 258 million daily readers across channels.

Controversies and Criticisms

Involvement in Censorship and Information Control

The People's Daily, as the official newspaper of the (CCP), serves as a primary instrument for enforcing ideological and suppressing narratives deemed contrary to party doctrine, often through editorials and commentaries that justify restrictive measures on speech and media. Under the direct oversight of the CCP's Central Department, which issues daily directives on approved topics and prohibited content, the outlet aligns its reporting to exclude dissenting views, effectively amplifying state control over public discourse. This role extends to advocating for among journalists and platforms, as evidenced by a May 2005 article urging Chinese media to enhance internal restraints and authorities to intensify oversight of online content to prevent "harmful" information dissemination. A pivotal historical example occurred on April 26, 1989, when the People's Daily published a front-page editorial labeling ongoing student-led protests in Beijing as "turmoil" orchestrated by a small group intent on overthrowing the party, thereby framing legitimate dissent as existential threats and signaling the need for resolute suppression. This piece, approved at high levels within the CCP leadership, escalated tensions leading to the Tiananmen Square crackdown on June 4, 1989, by shifting public and internal party opinion against negotiation in favor of force, with the editorial's language influencing subsequent media blackouts and arrests of protesters and journalists. In contemporary contexts, the People's Daily has participated in coordinated efforts to marginalize alternative viewpoints on sensitive issues, such as during the , where on April 11, 2022, it joined other state outlets in publishing synchronized articles praising CCP leader Xi Jinping's handling of the crisis while broader censorship suppressed citizen reports of lockdown hardships and policy failures. Similarly, the outlet has endorsed crackdowns on "rumors" and "negative energy" online, aligning with regulations that penalize unapproved discussions of topics like in or protests, thereby reinforcing the Great Firewall's blocking of foreign sites and domestic self-regulation by tech firms. These actions, while not directly operating technical filters, cultivate an environment where deviation from official narratives risks professional or legal repercussions, as seen in the detention of former People's Daily reporters for independent reporting.

Instances of Misinformation and Bias

The April 26, 1989, front-page editorial in People's Daily, titled "It Is Necessary to Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against Turmoil," described ongoing student-led protests in as a "planned conspiracy and turmoil" orchestrated to undermine leadership and the socialist system, despite the demonstrations initially focusing on corruption and political reform following Hu Yaobang's death. This framing, approved at high levels within the party, escalated tensions and contributed to the hardening of official response, leading to widespread protests against the newspaper itself on April 27. Following the military crackdown, People's Daily and outlets consistently denied reports of mass casualties in , portraying the events as a necessary suppression of " rebellion" with minimal violence confined to peripheral areas, a that persists in official Chinese despite eyewitness accounts and diplomatic cables estimating hundreds to thousands of deaths. In coverage of , People's Daily has systematically rejected evidence of mass internment and forced labor targeting and other Muslim minorities, labeling international reports as "fabricated lies" and portraying facilities as voluntary vocational training centers promoting stability and prosperity. This stance contradicts documentation from multiple sources, including , leaked government files, and survivor testimonies detailing over 1,000 detention sites holding up to 1 million people for ideological indoctrination and surveillance, with policies amounting to per assessments. Such reporting aligns with party directives to counter "Western smears," prioritizing narrative control over empirical verification from independent observers. During the , People's Daily amplified unsubstantiated claims tracing the virus's origins to the U.S. Army's laboratory, suggesting a deliberate leak while dismissing investigations into the as politicized attacks. This deflection occurred amid suppressed domestic data on early cases and delayed global alerts, contributing to a pattern of promoting alternative theories to shift blame, as noted in analyses of coordinated efforts that hindered transparent origin tracing. Broader bias manifests in People's Daily's role as the CCP's primary mouthpiece, where editorial content routinely glorifies leaders like and frames foreign criticism—such as on or territorial disputes—as hegemonic interference, often employing confrontational rhetoric akin to "" diplomacy without acknowledging domestic policy failures or alternative viewpoints. This systemic alignment with party ideology, rather than journalistic independence, has led to omissions of critical events like the Cultural Revolution's excesses or ongoing , fostering a domestic while projecting curated narratives internationally.

Backlash and International Repercussions

In June 2020, the designated the U.S. operations of the People's Daily, along with affiliates like and , as foreign missions under the Foreign Missions Act. This required the outlets to disclose details on their staffing, property, and funding, reflecting concerns over opaque Chinese government influence in American media landscapes. U.S. officials cited the People's Daily's role as the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party's , arguing it advances Beijing's political objectives rather than journalistic independence, with Hai Tian Development USA specifically acting as its distributor. The move elicited sharp rebuke from Chinese authorities, who labeled it political interference and a violation of press freedom, prompting retaliatory expulsions of American journalists from . Internationally, it amplified perceptions of the People's Daily as a tool for state , particularly in coverage of global issues like U.S.-China trade tensions, where series such as the 2013 "Dishonest Americans" portrayed American business practices as duplicitous, drawing criticism for one-sided narratives. This designation extended prior Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) requirements for distributors like and Hai Tian, mandating transparency on foreign principal activities since at least 1996. Broader repercussions included heightened scrutiny in allied nations; for instance, similar transparency demands emerged in and amid debates on foreign influence, though not always targeting the People's Daily directly. Reports from U.S. bodies have since linked Chinese , including the People's Daily, to coordinated efforts on topics like the origins and territorial disputes, fostering distrust among foreign policymakers and reducing its credibility in international forums. These actions underscore causal tensions from the outlet's integration with CCP directives, prioritizing official lines over empirical verification, as evidenced by discrepancies in its reporting versus independent accounts from regions like .

References

  1. https://www.berkshirepublishing.com/ecph-china/2018/01/10/ipeoples-dailyi/
  2. https://lingua-sinica.org/dispatch/peoples-daily/
  3. http://en.people.cn/english/199806/29/about.htm
  4. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/b16d55696dd0586724f434539e9c4334/the-chinese-media-more-autonomous-and-diverse-within-limits.pdf
  5. https://chinamediaproject.org/2025/01/06/the-many-faces-of-the-peoples-daily/
  6. https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/08/peoples-daily/
  7. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping
  8. https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-megaphone
  9. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10013709/
  10. https://chinamediaproject.org/2024/05/07/mouthpieces-go-quiet/
  11. http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0615/c90000-9472067.html
  12. https://dokumen.pub/a-history-of-journalism-in-china-1nbsped-9789814339162-9789814332316.html
  13. https://peoplesdaily.pdnews.cn/peoplesPage
  14. https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/whos-who.htm
  15. https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/41871/9780472901791.pdf
  16. https://thechinaproject.com/2021/01/13/bombard-the-headquarters/
  17. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/johs.12478
  18. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-culturalrevolution-idUSKCN0Y80BZ
  19. https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/politicians-run-the-newspapers/
  20. http://www.frankdikotter.com/books/the-cultural-revolution/from-the-preface.html
  21. https://multimedia.scmp.com/cultural-revolution/
  22. https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/from-red-guards-to-thinking-individuals-chinas-youth-in-the-cultural-revolution/
  23. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/world/asia/cultural-revolution-peoples-daily-commentary.html
  24. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/deng-xiaoping/1978/110.htm
  25. https://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0722/072266.html
  26. http://www.china.org.cn/2008-01/19/content_1240036.htm
  27. http://en.people.cn/english/199812/14/head.htm
  28. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/article-12132021124444.html
  29. https://en.people.cn/n/2014/0814/c90785-8769496.html
  30. https://en.people.cn/200201/18/eng20020118_88932.shtml
  31. https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2408260122
  32. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1561414/xi-jinping-most-mentioned-peoples-daily-mao-researchers-find
  33. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/world/asia/china-media-policy-xi-jinping.html
  34. http://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0106/c90000-20262181.html
  35. https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0507/c90000-20311186.html
  36. https://chinamediaproject.org/2023/11/22/chinas-press-under-xi-jinping-thought/
  37. https://en.people.cn/n3/2023/0907/c90000-20068845.html
  38. https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/1003/c90000-20373770.html
  39. http://en.people.cn/n3/2025/1024/c90000-20381139.html
  40. http://en.people.cn/n3/2025/1023/c90000-20381124.html
  41. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-Communist-Party
  42. https://www.scmp.com/topics/peoples-daily
  43. https://2017-2021.state.gov/designation-of-additional-prc-propaganda-outlets-as-foreign-missions/
  44. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/command-communication-the-politics-of-editorial-formulation-in-the-peoples-daily/DA9116B78E8898F0C63C7726488E7D53
  45. https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/chinas-domestic-politics-and-editorial-control-over-foreign-news-coverage
  46. https://rsf.org/en/country/china
  47. http://www.cecc.gov/prior-restraints
  48. https://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth/
  49. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-024-03059-5
  50. http://en.people.cn/english/zhuanti/Zhuanti_83.html
  51. https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/14/china-peoples-daily-editorials-zhong-caiwen/
  52. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3330329/chinese-president-xi-jinping-puts-personal-stamp-5-year-plan
  53. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-winners-and-losers-from-chinas-next-five-year-plan/
  54. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-023-09865-z
  55. https://3gimbals.com/insights/chinas-information-operations-strategy-controlling-narratives-and-shaping-global-perceptions/
  56. https://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0316/c90000-9829309.html
  57. https://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0325/c90000-9832567.html
  58. http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0726/c90000-9600918.html
  59. https://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0227/c90785-9822824.html
  60. https://amro-asia.org/an-exemplary-journey-in-eradicating-poverty/
  61. https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/pandemics-propaganda-how-chinese-state-media-creates-and-propagates-ccp-coronavirus-narratives/
  62. https://www.cfr.org/article/tiananmen-covid-modern-chinas-protests-photos
  63. https://www.quora.com/Can-information-from-Chinese-government-media-outlets-such-as-Xinhua-News-Agency-and-Peoples-Daily-be-trusted-when-it-comes-to-domestic-affairs-in-China-such-as-protests
  64. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4963110
  65. http://en.people.cn/102775/415360/
  66. https://en.people.cn/n3/2023/0918/c90000-20072968.html
  67. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3295395/china-us-need-tackle-growing-pains-together-peoples-daily-says-ahead-trump-20
  68. https://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0620/c90000-10111762.html
  69. https://en.people.cn/n3/2023/1012/c90000-20082514.html
  70. https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0429/c90000-20309015.html
  71. http://en.iwep.org.cn/publications/publications_World_Openness_Report/World_Openness_Report_Publications_and_Releases/202411/W020241113451354343617.pdf
  72. https://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0919/c90780-9116349.html
  73. https://en.people.cn/n3/2021/1018/c90000-9908330.html
  74. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2022/05/20/how-public-opinion-shapes-chinas-foreign-policy/
  75. https://journals.umcs.pl/nh/article/view/16850
  76. https://wgyxy.hznu.edu.cn/upload/resources/file/2022/03/24/7705712.pdf
  77. https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation?paperid=123039
  78. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13017881
  79. https://freedomhouse.org/article/china-commits-another-5-years-xi-jinpings-information-policies
  80. https://airpowerasia.com/2020/07/30/chinese-communist-party-control-over-media-a-comprehensive-assessment/
  81. http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/peoples-daily-editorial-calls-on-news-media-to-strengthen
  82. http://en.people.cn/other/about.shtml
  83. http://en.people.cn/102840/7560415.html
  84. https://peoplesdaily.pdnews.cn/aboutPeopleDaily
  85. http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/0729/c90000-9716018.html
  86. https://www.ewadirect.com/proceedings/lnep/article/view/13535
  87. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/decoding-chinese-politics
  88. https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/ownership-and-control-chinese-media
  89. http://hongkongfp.com/2016/06/21/under-xi-the-media-has-turned-from-a-mouthpiece-of-masses-to-the-partys-parrot/
  90. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-media/on-front-page-of-chinas-flagship-paper-xi-gets-mao-like-prominence-idUSKBN1CV11X/
  91. https://thechinaproject.com/2023/08/11/how-to-read-the-peoples-daily-qa-with-manoj-kewalramani/
  92. https://www.thewirechina.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Manoj-Kewalramani-on-Reading-the-Peoples-Daily-Daily.pdf
  93. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2024/01/11/a-guide-to-the-chinese-communist-partys-economic-jargon
  94. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/735298
  95. https://freedomhouse.org/article/ccp-hand-behind-chinas-xinjiang-cotton-backlash
  96. https://chinamediaproject.org/2013/09/24/parsing-chinas-public-opinion-struggle/
  97. https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/50c.pdf
  98. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/tiananmen-square
  99. https://chinamediaproject.org/2023/06/02/how-a-massacre-shaped-chinas-media/
  100. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/Censorship_Practices_of_the_Peoples_Republic_of_China.pdf
  101. https://www.tsquare.tv/chronology/April26ed.html
  102. https://thechinaproject.com/2021/04/28/april-26-1989-a-government-editorial-seals-the-fate-of-beijings-student-protesters/
  103. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000324331.pdf
  104. http://en.people.cn/english/199911/26/print19991126A105.html
  105. http://en.people.cn/english/199910/30/print19991030B101.html
  106. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3038198/peoples-daily-says-no-room-compromise-hong-kong-protesters
  107. http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0831/c90000-9611121.html
  108. http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/1202/c90000-9637349.html
  109. https://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0831/c90000-9611121.html
  110. https://www.dw.com/en/hong-kong-how-chinese-media-are-reporting-the-crisis/a-51313412
  111. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3227876/why-chinese-entities-are-turning-peoples-daily-censorship-ai-avoid-political-mines
  112. https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-net/2021
  113. https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1049671/full
  114. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/368871592_The_softening_of_Chinese_digital_propaganda_Evidence_from_the_People%27s_Daily_Weibo_account_during_the_pandemic
  115. https://www.linkedin.com/company/peoplecn
  116. https://chinamediaproject.org/2021/01/18/chinas-telling-twitter-story/
  117. https://jamestown.org/program/ai-powered-propaganda-and-the-ccps-plans-for-next-generation-thought-management/
  118. https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/1-key-for-1-lock-chinese-communist-party-strategy-targeted-propaganda
  119. http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/1015/c90000-9279926.html
  120. http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0901/c90000-9890769.html
  121. http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/1124/c90000-10175757.html
  122. http://en.people.cn/n3/2023/1027/c90000-20089955.html
  123. http://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0411/c98649-20300684.html
  124. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/06/how-to-cheat-at-xi-jinping-thought/
  125. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-02/china-wants-to-make-the-communist-party-cool-again/10828154
  126. https://jamestown.org/program/the-ccps-renewed-focus-on-ideological-conditioning-part-2-the-new-five-year-plan-for-training-party-cadres/
  127. https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/the-chinese-communist-party-ccp-a-quest-for-data-control
  128. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-harvests-masses-of-data-on-western-targets-documents-show/2021/12/31/3981ce9c-538e-11ec-8927-c396fa861a71_story.html
  129. https://shannonbrandao.substack.com/p/beijing-is-harvesting-data-from-popular
  130. http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/1017/c90000-9280772.html
  131. http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/1120/c90000-9294587.html
  132. https://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0102/c90000-9161857.html
  133. https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0403/c90000-20297464.html
  134. https://bigdatachina.csis.org/the-ai-surveillance-symbiosis-in-china/
  135. https://www.npr.org/2021/01/05/953515627/facial-recognition-and-beyond-journalist-ventures-inside-chinas-surveillance-sta
  136. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/download/2257/1133
  137. https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political-science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2025.1599347/full
  138. https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/2021-03/Authoritarian%2520Participatory%2520Persuasion%25202.0-%2520Netizens%2520as%2520Thought%2520Work%2520Collaborators%2520in%2520China.pdf
  139. https://online.ucpress.edu/as/article/63/4/611/196152/Official-Media-as-Emotional-ValvesHow-Official
  140. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11929391/
  141. https://freedomhouse.org/report/beijing-global-media-influence/2022/authoritarian-expansion-power-democratic-resilience
  142. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12887
  143. https://bigdatachina.csis.org/chinese-state-media-abroad-more-effective-than-expected/
  144. https://www.economist.com/china/2023/02/16/chinese-propaganda-is-surprisingly-effective-abroad
  145. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/07/15/international-views-of-china-turn-slightly-more-positive/
  146. https://hrf.org/latest/beyond-borders-chinas-grip-on-global-media/
  147. https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/political-demonstration-effects-autocratic-advantage-propaganda-decreases-public-support-for-democracy/
  148. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/not-so-neatly-divided-global-public-opinion-china
  149. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/how-china-uses-news-media-weapon-its-propaganda-war-against-west
  150. https://pressgazette.co.uk/media-audience-and-business-data/media_metrics/biggest-newspapers-world-circulation/
  151. https://rocketreach.co/peoples-daily-profile_b446f610faeadf77
  152. http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/peoples-daily-continues-call-for-increased-regulation-of-the
  153. https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/peoples-daily-editorial-fanned-flames-of-1989-protest/
  154. https://freedomhouse.org/report/china-media-bulletin/2025/covid-19-lockdowns-censored-xi-jinping-propaganda-netizens-ip
  155. https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/08/10/race-bottom/corporate-complicity-chinese-internet-censorship
  156. https://freedomhouse.org/report/china-media-bulletin/2020/new-disinformation-tactics-coronavirus-censorship-activist-arrests
  157. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/02/china-end-denial-about-tiananmen-massacre
  158. https://en.people.cn/n3/2019/1230/c90000-9644591.html
  159. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/06/china-draconian-repression-of-muslims-in-xinjiang-amounts-to-crimes-against-humanity/
  160. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-xinjiangs-re-education-camps/
  161. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-54277430
  162. https://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0630/c90000-9866759.html
  163. https://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0804/c90000-9880024.html
  164. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/25/world/asia/china-coronavirus-covid-conspiracy-theory.html
  165. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2884217/misleading-a-pandemic-the-viral-effects-of-chinese-propaganda-and-the-coronavir/
  166. https://chinamediaproject.org/2021/08/08/growling-back-at-the-west/
  167. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/01/china-acknowledge-tiananmen-massacre
  168. https://2017-2021.state.gov/designation-of-additional-chinese-media-entities-as-foreign-missions/
  169. https://2017-2021.state.gov/senior-state-department-officials-on-the-office-of-foreign-missions-designation-of-chinese-media-entities-as-foreign-missions/
  170. https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/18/us-chinese-media-foreign-missions-115882
  171. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/world/asia/china-media-trump.html
  172. https://www.businessinsider.com/peoples-daily-runs-dishonest-americans-series-2013-5
  173. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-07/Chinas_Foreign_Missions_in_the_United_States.pdf
  174. https://chinamediaproject.org/2023/10/05/reading-chinas-propaganda-counter-attack/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.