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Lin Biao
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Key Information
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Lin Biao (Chinese: 林彪; 5 December 1907 – 13 September 1971) was a Chinese politician and Marshal of the People's Republic of China who was pivotal in the Communist victory during the Chinese Civil War, especially in Northeast China from 1946 to 1949. Lin was the general who commanded the decisive Liaoshen and Pingjin campaigns, in which he co-led the Manchurian Field Army to victory and led the People's Liberation Army into Beijing. He crossed the Yangtze River in 1949, decisively defeated the Kuomintang and took control of the coastal provinces in Southeast China. He ranked second among the Ten Marshals. Zhu De and Peng Dehuai were considered senior to Lin, and Lin ranked directly ahead of He Long and Liu Bocheng.
Lin abstained from taking an active role in politics after the war ceased in 1949. He led a section of the government's civil bureaucracy as one of the co-serving Vice Premiers of the People's Republic of China from 1954 onwards, becoming First Vice Premier from 1964. Lin became more active in politics when named one of the co-serving Vice Chairmen of the Chinese Communist Party in 1958. He held the three responsibilities of Vice Premier, Vice Chairman and Minister of National Defense from 1959 onwards. To date, Lin is the longest serving Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of China. Lin became instrumental in creating the foundations for Mao Zedong's cult of personality in the early 1960s, and was rewarded for his service in the Cultural Revolution by being named Mao's designated successor as the sole Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, from 1966 until his death.
Lin died on 13 September 1971, when a Hawker Siddeley Trident he was aboard crashed in Öndörkhaan in Mongolia. The exact events of this "Lin Biao incident" have been a source of speculation ever since. The Chinese government's official explanation is that Lin and his family attempted to flee following a botched coup against Mao. Others have argued that they fled out of fear they would be purged, as Lin's relationship with other Communist Party leaders had soured in the final few years of his life. Following Lin's death, he was officially condemned as a traitor by the Communist Party. Since the late 1970s, Lin and the wife of Mao, Jiang Qing, have been labeled the two major "counter-revolutionary forces" of the Cultural Revolution, receiving official blame from the Chinese government for the worst excesses of that period.
Revolutionary
[edit]Youth
[edit]
Lin Biao was the son of a prosperous merchant family in Huanggang, Hubei.[1] His name at birth was "Lin Yurong".[2] Lin's father opened a small handicrafts factory in the mid-late 1910s, but was forced to close the factory due to "heavy taxes imposed by local militarists". After closing the factory, Lin's father worked as a purser aboard a river steamship. Lin entered primary school in 1917,[3] and moved to Shanghai in 1919 to continue his education.[2] As a child, Lin was much more interested in participating in student movements than in pursuing his formal education.[4] Lin transferred to Wuchang Gongjin High School (武昌共进中学) at 15.[5] Lin joined a satellite organization of the Communist Youth League before he graduated high school in 1925. Later in 1925 he participated in the May Thirtieth Movement and enrolled in the newly established Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy in Guangzhou.[1]
As a young cadet, Lin admired the personality of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who was then the principal of the academy.[4] At Whampoa, Lin also studied under Zhou Enlai, who was eight years older than Lin. Lin had no contact with Zhou after their time in Whampoa, until they met again in Yan'an in the late 1930s.[6] Lin's relationship with Zhou was never especially close, but they rarely opposed each other directly.[7]
After graduating from Whampoa in 1926, Lin was assigned to a regiment commanded by Ye Ting. Less than a year after graduating from Whampoa, he was assigned to the Northern Expedition, where he rose from deputy platoon leader to battalion commander within a few months. During this time Lin joined the Communist Party.[1] By 1927 Lin was a colonel.
When he was twenty, Lin married a girl[clarification needed] from the countryside with the family name "Ong". This marriage was arranged by Lin's parents, and the couple never became close. When Lin left the Kuomintang to become a communist revolutionary, Ong did not accompany Lin, and their marriage effectively ended.[4]
Chinese Civil War
[edit]After the Kuomintang-Communist split, Lin's commander, Ye Ting, joined forces with He Long and participated in the Nanchang Uprising on 1 August 1927.[2][8] During the campaign Lin worked as a company commander under a regiment led by Chen Yi.[9] Following the failure of the revolt, Lin escaped to the remote Communist base areas, and joined Mao Zedong and Zhu De in the Jiangxi–Fujian Soviet in 1928.[10]: 141 After joining forces with Mao, Lin became one of Mao's closest supporters.[7]
Lin became one of the most senior military field commanders within the Jiangxi Soviet. He commanded the First Army Group, and achieved a degree of power comparable to that of Peng Dehuai, who commanded the Third Army Group. According to Comintern representative Otto Braun, Lin was "politically ... a blank sheet on which Mao could write as he pleased" during this period. After Mao was removed from power in 1932 by his rivals (the 28 Bolsheviks), Lin frequently attended strategic meetings in Mao's name and openly attacked the plans of Mao's enemies.[11]
Within the Jiangxi Soviet, Lin's First Army Group was the best-equipped and arguably most successful force within the Red Army. Lin's First Army became known for its mobility, and for its ability to execute successful flanking maneuvers. Between 1930 and 1933, Lin's forces captured twice the number of prisoners of war and military equipment as the Third and Fifth Army Groups combined. The successes of Lin's forces are due partially to the division of labour within the Red Army: Lin's forces were more offensive and unorthodox than other groups, allowing Lin to capitalize on other Red Army commanders' successes.[12]
During the Communists' defense against Chiang's 1933–34 Fifth Encirclement Campaign, Lin advocated a strategy of protracted guerilla warfare, and opposed the positional warfare advocated by Braun and his supporters. Lin believed that the best way to destroy enemy soldiers was not to pursue them or defend strategic points, but to weaken the enemy through feints, ambushes, encirclements, and surprise attacks. Lin's views generally conformed with the tactics advocated by Mao.[13]
After Chiang's forces successfully occupied several strategic locations within the Jiangxi Soviet, in 1934, Lin was one of the first Red Army commanders to publicly advocate the abandonment of the Jiangxi Soviet, but he was opposed by most Red Army commanders, especially Braun and Peng Dehuai.[14] After the Communists finally resolved to abandon their base, later in 1934, Lin continued his position as one of the most successful commanders in the Red Army during the Long March. Under the direction of Mao and Zhou, the Red Army finally arrived at the remote Communist base of Yan'an, Shaanxi, in December 1936.
Lin and Peng Dehuai were generally considered the Red Army's best battlefield commanders,[10]: 141 and were not rivals during the Long March. Both of them had supported Mao's rise to de facto leadership at the Zunyi Conference in January 1935. Lin may have become privately dissatisfied with Mao's strategy of constant evasion by the end of the Long March, but continued to support Mao publicly.[15]
The American journalist Edgar Snow met Lin Biao in the Communist base of Shaanxi in 1936,[16] and wrote about Lin in his book, Red Star Over China. Snow's account focused more on the role of Peng than Lin, evidently having had long conversations with, and devoting two whole chapters to, Peng (more than any other individual apart from Mao). Though he said of Lin:
Lin Biao did not present the bluff, lusty face of Peng Dehuai. He was ten years younger, rather slight, oval-faced, dark, handsome. Peng talked with his men. Lin kept his distance. To many he seemed shy and reserved. There are no stories reflecting warmth and affection for his men. His fellow Red Army commanders respected Lin, but when he spoke, it was all business ...
The contrast between Mao's top field commanders could hardly have been more sharp, but on the Long March they worked well together, Lin specializing in feints, masked strategy, surprises, ambushes, flank attacks, pounces from the rear, and stratagems. Peng met the enemy head-on in frontal assaults and fought with such fury that again and again he wiped them out. Peng did not believe a battle well fought unless he managed to replenish—and more than replenish—any losses by seizure of enemy guns and converting prisoners of war to new and loyal recruits to the Red Army.[17]
With Mao Zedong, Lin Biao shared the distinction of being one of the few Red commanders never wounded. Engaged on the front in more than a hundred battles, in field command for more than 10 years, exposed to every hardship that his men have known, with a reward of $100,000 on his head, he miraculously remained unhurt and in good health.
In 1932, Lin Biao was given command of the 1st Red Army Corps, which then numbered about 20,000 rifles. It became the most dreaded section of the Red Army. Chiefly due to Lin's extraordinary talent as a tactician, it destroyed, defeated or outmanoeuvered every Government force sent against it and was never broken in battle ....
Like many able Red commanders, Lin has never been outside China, speaks and reads no language but Chinese. Before the age of 30, however, he has already won recognition beyond Red circles. His articles in the Chinese Reds' military magazines ... have been republished, studied and criticised in Nanking (Nanjing) military journals, and also in Japan and Soviet Russia.[18]
Within a year of Snow's reporting, Lin was seriously wounded.[19] A Red Army soldier shot him by mistake.[20]: 33
Lin and Mao generally had a close personal relationship,[21] but some accounts claim that Lin sometimes made disparaging comments about Mao in private, and that Lin's support of Mao was largely for the pursuit of power.[22] After arriving in Yan'an, Lin became the principal of the newly founded Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. In 1937, Lin married one of the students there, a girl named Liu Ximin, who had earned the nickname "University Flower".[23]
Chinese-Janpanes War (1931–1945)
[edit]
In August 1937, Lin was named commander-in-chief of the 115th Division of the Communist 8th Route Army[2] and ordered to aid Yan Xishan's forces in repelling the Japanese invasion of Shanxi. In this capacity, Lin orchestrated the ambush at Pingxingguan in September 1937, which was one of the few battlefield successes for the Chinese in the early period of the Second Sino-Japanese War (known in China as the "War of Resistance Against Japan").

In 1938, while he was still leading Chinese forces in Shanxi, Japanese soldiers who had joined the Communists and were serving under Lin's command presented Lin with a Japanese uniform and katana, which they had captured in battle. Lin then put the uniform and katana on, jumped onto a horse, and rode away from the army. While riding, Lin was spotted alone by a sharpshooter in Yan's army. The soldier was surprised to see a Japanese officer riding a horse in the desolate hills alone. He took aim at Lin and severely injured him.[24] The bullet grazed Lin's head, penetrating deep enough to leave a permanent impression on his skull.[25] After being shot in the head, Lin fell from his horse and injured his back.[24]
Recovering from his wounds and ill with tuberculosis, Lin left for Moscow at the end of 1938, where he served as the representative of the Chinese Communist Party to the Executive Committee of the Communist International. He remained in Moscow until February 1942, working on Comintern affairs and writing for its publication.[2] Lin was accompanied by his wife, Liu Ximin, but their relationship deteriorated in Moscow, and Lin eventually returned to Yan'an without her.[24]
While in Moscow, Lin became infatuated with Zhou Enlai's adopted daughter, Sun Weishi, who was studying in Moscow from 1938 to 1946.[26] Before returning to China, in 1942, Lin proposed to Sun and promised to divorce his wife, from whom Lin had become estranged. Sun was not able to accept Lin's proposal, but promised to consider marrying Lin after completing her studies. Lin divorced Liu Ximin after returning to China, and married another woman, Ye Qun, in 1943. The relationship between Sun and Ye was notably bad.[27] After returning to Yan'an, Lin was involved in troop training and indoctrination assignments.
Liaoshen Campaign
[edit]

Lin was absent for most of the fighting during World War II, but was elected the sixth-ranking Central Committee member in 1945 based on his earlier battlefield reputation.[19] After the Japanese surrender, the Communists moved large numbers of troops to Manchuria (Northeast China), and Lin Biao relocated to Manchuria to command the new "Communist Northeast Military District". The Soviets transferred captured Japanese military equipment to the Communists, making Lin's army one of the most well-equipped Communist forces in China. By the time that units from the Kuomintang (Nationalists) were able to arrive in the major cities of Manchuria, Lin's forces were already in firm control of most of the countryside and surrounding areas.[28]
By the end of 1945, Lin had 280,000 troops in Manchuria under his command,[29] but according to Kuomintang estimates only 100,000 of these were regular forces with access to adequate equipment. The KMT also estimated that Lin also had access to 100,000 irregular auxiliaries, whose membership was drawn mainly from unemployed factory workers. Lin avoided decisive confrontations throughout 1945, and he was able to preserve the strength of his army despite criticism from his peers in the Party and the PLA.[30]
For the sake of bargaining with the Kuomintang in peace negotiations in 1946, Mao ordered Lin to assemble his army to take and defend key cities, which was against the previous strategy of the Red Army. Lin disagreed with this position, but was ordered by Mao to draw the KMT into a decisive battle and "not give an inch of land" around Siping, Jilin. On 15 April, Lin orchestrated an ambush and forced KMT forces there to withdraw with heavy casualties. When the local KMT commander, Du Yuming, launched a counterattack on 18 April, Mao ordered the troops there to hold the city indefinitely. The fighting continued until Mao finally allowed Lin to withdraw on 19 May, which Lin did immediately, barely saving his army from encirclement and destruction.[31]
Du pursued Lin's forces to the south bank of the Songhua River, where they halted due to Du's concerns about his army becoming overextended. According to Communist sources, Lin's army lost 15,000 soldiers in the fighting and withdrawal, but Nationalist sources claim that 25,000 soldiers also deserted or surrendered, and that Lin's force of 100,000 irregular auxiliaries suffered from mass desertion during the retreat. On 10 June, the two forces agreed to a ceasefire brokered by George Marshall, and fighting temporarily ceased. Mao ordered Lin to counterattack that winter, but Lin refused, replying that his forces were exhausted and not logistically prepared to do so.[32]
When Du led the majority of his forces to attack Communist forces on the Korean border in January 1947, Lin finally ordered 20,000 of his soldiers to cross the Songhua River, where they staged guerrilla raids, ambushed relief forces, attacked isolated garrisons, and avoided decisive confrontations with strong units Du sent to defeat them. While they did so, they looted large quantities of supplies and destroyed the infrastructure of the KMT-held territories that they passed through, including bridges, railroads, fortifications, electrical lines, and boats. When Du sent his forces back south, they were ambushed and defeated. When Du requested reinforcements from Chiang Kai-shek, his request was rejected.[33]
On 8 April, Lin moved his headquarters from Harbin to Shuangcheng in order to be closer to the front. On 5 May, he held a conference with his subordinates and announced that his armies would change tactics, engage in a large-scale counterattack, and seek to defeat Du's forces in a decisive battle. On 8 May, Lin launched the first of his "three great campaigns", the Summer Offensive, intending to engage a large garrison at Huaide while a second force positioned itself to ambush the force that would predictably be sent to relieve it. On 17 May, they won a major victory and forced the survivors to retreat to Changchun and Siping. By the end of May 1947, Lin's forces had taken control of most of the countryside (everything except for the rail lines and several major cities), infiltrated and destroyed most KMT forces in Manchuria, and re-established contact with isolated Communist forces in southern Liaoning province.[34]
After the victory of the Summer Offensive, Lin's forces gained the initiative and Kuomintang defensive strategy became static and reactionary. Lin ordered his forces to besiege Siping, but they suffered very high casualties and made little progress, partially due to the defenders' strong entrenched position and air support, and due to the attackers' poor artillery support (Lin only had seventy pieces of artillery around Siping). Lin's forces broke into the city twice and engaged in street-to-street fighting, but were driven back both times with heavy casualties. By 19 June, Lin's assault troops had become increasingly exhausted, and Lin began to rotate them to prevent them from becoming completely ineffective. On 24 June, Nationalist reinforcements arrived from the south to lift the siege. Lin recognized that he did not have enough manpower left to defeat them, and on 1 July, he ordered his forces to retreat back to the north of the Songhua River.[35]
The Communists suffered over 30,000 losses at Siping, and may have suffered a desertion rate of over 20% during the withdrawal, while the Nationalist garrison at Siping fell from 20,000 to slightly over 3,000 before the siege was broken. Lin volunteered to write a self-criticism after the defeat. He also criticized his commander at Siping, Li Tianyou, for demonstrating poor tactics and for lacking "revolutionary spirit". Despite the army's setbacks he reorganized the army, combining surviving regiments and raising local militia forces to the status of regular units. By the fall of 1947, he had 510,000 soldiers under his command, approximately equal to Nationalist forces in the region.[36]
Before Du's replacement, Chen Cheng, could cross north and begin an offensive, Lin moved his army south and began the Autumn Offensive, in which his forces destroyed rail lines and other infrastructure, attacked isolated Nationalist units, and attempted to provoke and ambush strong Nationalist forces. Chen's forces responded to the campaign by withdrawing into their city garrisons. The Communists were not able to provoke a decisive confrontation, and the Autumn Offensive ended in a stalemate.[37]
Chen's forces remained static and reactionary, at the end of 1947, Lin led his armies back south in his final Liaoshen Campaign, the Winter Offensive. His initial plan was to repeat the goal of his last offensive, to besiege Jilin City and ambush its relief force, but after reviewing Kuomintang troop dispositions he determined that southern Manchuria would be an easier target. On 15 December, Lin's forces attacked Fakui, Zhangwu, and Xinlitun. Chen sent reinforcements to relieve Fakui, and when the Communist ambush failed, Lin ordered his forces to withdraw and join in the siege of Zhangwu. When Chen did not intervene and the town fell on 28 December, Lin assumed the main part of the campaign was over and he dispersed his forces to rest and attack secondary targets.[38]
Chen saw Lin's withdrawal as an opportunity to seize the offensive. He ordered his forces to attack targets in northern Liaoning on 1 January 1948, and on 3 January, Lin successfully encircled the isolated Nationalist 5th Corps. Its commander, Chen Linda, realized that he was being surrounded and requested reinforcements, but Chen Cheng only responded that he would "allow" Chen Linda to withdraw. The attempted breakout failed, and the 5th Corps was destroyed on 7 January. After this defeat, Chen Cheng was replaced with Wei Lihuang ten days later, but Wei was not able to prevent the Communists from capturing Liaoyang on 6 February, destroying the 54th division, and severing an important railroad that linked Wei's forces from their ports on the Bohai Sea.[39]
Lin continued his advance, defeating all garrisons in western Manchuria or inducing them to defect by late February. On 26 February Lin reorganized his forces as the Northeastern Field Army and began preparations to return and take Siping, whose garrison had been transferred elsewhere by Chen Cheng and never re-strengthened. Lin began the general assault on the city on 13 March, and took the town one day later. The capture of Siping ended Lin's Winter Offensive. The KMT nearly lost all of Manchuria by the end of the campaign and suffered 156,000 casualties, most of which survived as prisoners of war that were indoctrinated and recruited into Lin's forces. By the end of winter 1948 the Kuomintang had lost all of its territory in the Northeast, except for Changchun, Shenyang, and an area connecting the rail line from Beiping to those cities.[40]
Following Lin's Winter campaign, Mao wanted him to attack targets farther south, but Lin disagreed because he did not want to leave a strong enemy at his back, and he believed the defeat of a strong city would force Chiang to abandon the Northeast. By 25 May 1948, the Northeastern Field Army had completely encircled Changchun, including its airfield, and for the rest of the siege the Nationalist commander, Zheng Dongguo, depended entirely on supplies airdropped into the city. On 19 May, Lin submitted a report to Mao in which he expected heavy casualties. By 20 July the siege was at a stalemate, and Lin deferred to Mao, allowing some of his army to attack Jinzhou farther south, beginning the Liaoshen Campaign. When Chiang airlifted reinforcements to defend Jinzhou, Lin ordered his army to abandon the siege and return to Changchun, but Mao disagreed and overruled him, and Lin was ordered to engage the defenders in a decisive confrontation. On 14 October, the Northeast Field Army began its assault on Jinzhou with 250,000 men and the bulk of Lin's artillery and armor. After nearly 24 hours of fighting, Lin's forces were victorious, suffering 24,000 casualties but capturing the enemy commander, Fan Hanjie, and 90,000 enemy soldiers.[41]
After hearing the news about the defeat at Jinzhou, a KMT army from Yunnan and its commander, Zeng Zesheng, defected and abandoned its position on the outskirts of Changchun on 14 October. This doomed the remaining Nationalist forces in the city, and Zheng Dongguo was forced to surrender two days later. Chiang ordered the 9th army of 110,000 men under General Liao Yaoxiang to travel west and retake Jinzhou, but Lin directed nearly all of his forces to stop them, and they began to encircle the relief unit on 21 October. After a week of fighting, the Nationalist army was destroyed on 28 October. Remaining KMT garrisons in the Northeast attempted to break out of the region and flee south, but most were unsuccessful. After Changchun, the only major KMT garrison in the Northeast was Shenyang, where 140,000 KMT soldiers were eventually forced to surrender. By the end of 1948 all of Northeast China was under Communist control.[42]
Defeating the Kuomintang
[edit]After taking control of the Manchurian provinces, Lin then swept into North China. Forces under Lin were responsible for winning two of the three major military victories responsible for the defeat of the Kuomintang. Lin suffered from ongoing periods of serious illness throughout the campaign.[19] Following the victory in Manchuria, Lin commanded over a million soldiers, encircling Chiang's main forces in northern China during the Pingjin Campaign, taking Beijing and Tianjin within a period of two months. Tianjin was taken by force, and on 22 January 1949 General Fu Zuoyi and his army of 400,000 men agreed to surrender Beijing without a battle, and the PLA occupied the city on 31 January. The Pingjin Campaign saw Lin remove a total of approximately 520,000 enemy troops from the enemy's battle lines. Many of those who surrendered later joined the PLA.[43]
After taking Beijing, the Communists attempted to negotiate for the surrender of the remaining KMT forces. When these negotiations failed, Lin resumed his attacks on the KMT in the southeast. After taking Beijing, Lin's army numbered 1.5 million soldiers. He crossed the Yangtze River in the Spring of 1949 and decisively defeated the defending KMT army stationed in central China during the Yangtze River Crossing Campaign. Lin's armies continued to defeat KMT armies farther south, finally occupying all KMT positions on mainland China by the end of 1949. The last position occupied by Lin's forces was the tropical island of Hainan.[44]
Lin Biao was considered one of the Communists' most brilliant generals after the founding of the People's Republic of China, in 1949. Lin was the youngest of the "Ten Marshals" named in 1955, a title that recognized Lin's substantial military contributions.[19]
Politician
[edit]Illness
[edit]Lin Biao continued to suffer from poor health after 1949, and chose to avoid high-profile military and political positions. His status led him to be appointed to a number of high-profile positions throughout most of the 1950s, but these were largely honorary and carried few responsibilities. He generally delegated or neglected many of the formal political responsibilities that he was assigned, usually citing his poor health.[19]
After Lin's injury in 1938, he suffered from ongoing physical and mental health problems. A theory holds that his lifelong health problems may have resulted from the injury.[20]: 33–34 His exact medical condition is not well understood, partially because his medical records have never been publicly released. Dr. Li Zhisui, then one of Mao's personal physicians, believed that Lin suffered from neurasthenia and hypochondria. He became ill whenever he perspired, and suffered from phobias about water, wind, cold,[45] light, and noise.[4] He was said to become nervous at the sight of rivers and oceans in traditional Chinese paintings, and suffered from diarrhea, which could be triggered by the sound of running water.[45] Li's account of Lin's condition is notably different from the official Chinese version.
In another study, Lin is described as having symptoms similar to those seen in patients of schizoid personality disorder. Lin's personality traits including his aloofness, lack of interest in social relationships, secretiveness, and emotional coldness he exhibited during the Cultural Revolution; indeed, all of these were symptoms very similar to those seen in individuals who suffer from schizoid personality disorder. The challenge of Lin's personality problems in conjunction with the turbulent political climate of the Cultural Revolution impacted his overall ability to govern his position.[46]
Lin suffered from excessive headaches, and spent much of his free time consulting Chinese medical texts and preparing traditional Chinese medicines for himself. He suffered from insomnia, and often took sleeping pills.[47] He ate simple meals, did not smoke, and did not drink alcohol.[45] As his condition progressed, his fear of water led to a general refusal to either bathe or eat fruit. Because of his fear of wind and light, his office was gloomy and lacked any ventilation. Some accounts have suggested that Lin became a drug addict, either to opium[4] or morphine.
As early as 1953, Soviet doctors diagnosed Lin as suffering from manic depression. Lin's wife, Ye Qun, rejected this diagnosis, but it was later confirmed by Chinese doctors. Lin's fragile health made him vulnerable, passive, and easily manipulated by other political figures, notably Ye Qun herself.[45]
Lin's complaints got worse with time and age. In the years before his death, the fiancée of Lin's son reported that Lin became extremely distant and socially and politically detached, even to the extent that he never read books or newspapers. His passivity made him difficult to connect with at any meaningful level: "usually he just sat there, blankly". In Lin's rare periods of activity, he used his time mostly to complain about, and seek treatment for his large variety of medical issues.[48]
Alliance with Mao
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Lin, like most of the Politburo, initially held serious reservations about China's entry into the Korean War, citing the devastation that would result if the "imperialists" (Americans) detonated an atomic bomb in Korea or China. Lin later declined to lead forces in Korea, citing his ill health.[49] In early October 1950, Peng Dehuai was named commander of the Chinese forces bound for Korea, and Lin went to the Soviet Union for medical treatment. Lin flew to the Soviet Union with Zhou Enlai and participated in negotiations with Joseph Stalin concerning Soviet support for China's intervention, indicating that Mao retained his trust in Lin. Due partially to his periods of ill health and physical rehabilitation in the Soviet Union, Lin was slow to rise to power. In the early 1950s Lin was one of five major leaders given responsibility for civil and military affairs, controlling a jurisdiction in central China. In 1953 he was visited by Gao Gang, and was later suspected of supporting him.[50] In 1955 Lin was named to the Politburo.[19]
In February 1958 Peng Dehuai, then China's Defense Minister, gave a speech for the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Red Army in which he suggested increasing the military cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. Mao wanted to distance China from the Soviet Union, and began grooming Lin Biao as a viable successor to Peng.[51] In 1958 Lin joined the Politburo Standing Committee[52] and became one of China's Vice-chairmen. After the 1959 Lushan Conference, at which Peng criticized Mao's disastrous Great Leap Forward, Peng was arrested and removed from all government positions.[19] Privately, Lin agreed with Peng and was strongly opposed to Peng being purged, but Lin's fear of being purged himself kept him from publicly opposing Mao's efforts to purge Peng,[53] and Lin publicly condemned Peng as a "careerist, a conspiracist, and a hypocrite".[54] Under Mao's direction, Peng was disgraced and put under indefinite house arrest.[53] Lin became the senior leader most publicly supportive of Mao following the Great Leap Forward,[55] during which Mao's economic policies caused an artificial famine in which tens of millions of people starved to death.[56] For example, Lin publicly defended Mao during the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in 1962.[57]
Lin initially refused to replace Peng, but eventually accepted the position at the insistence of Mao Zedong. As Defense Minister, Lin's command of the PLA was second only to Mao, but he deferred many of his responsibilities to subordinates. The most important figures to whom Lin deferred the day-to-day operations of China's armed forces were Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff, and He Long, the Central Military Vice-chairman.[19]

As Defense Minister, Lin's policies differed from those of his predecessor. Lin attempted to reform China's armed forces based on political criteria: he abolished all signs and privileges of rank, purged members considered sympathetic to the USSR, directed soldiers to work part-time as industrial and agricultural workers, and indoctrinated the armed forces in Mao Zedong Thought.[58] Lin's system of indoctrination made it clear the Party was in command of China's armed forces, and Lin ensured that the army's political commissars enjoyed great power and status in order to see that his directives were followed.[52] Lin implemented these reforms in order to please Mao, but privately was concerned that they would weaken the PLA (which they did).[59] Mao strongly approved of these reforms,[19] and conscientiously promoted Lin to a series of high positions.[60]
Lin used his position as Minister of Defense to flatter Mao by promoting Mao's cult of personality.[61] Lin devised and ran a number of national Maoist propaganda campaigns based on the PLA, the most successful of which was the "learn from Lei Feng" campaign, which Lin began in 1963.[62] Because he was the person most responsible for directing the "learn from Lei Feng" campaign, Lin may have directed the forging of Lei Feng's Diary, upon which the propaganda campaign was based.[61]
Because of Lin's fragile health, Ye Qun controlled many aspects of Lin's public life during the 1960s, including who would see Lin and what others would know about him. Mao encouraged Ye to act on Lin's behalf, giving her an unusual amount of power and responsibility. In 1965 Mao asked Ye to publicly criticize Lin's chief of staff, Luo Ruiqing, on Lin's behalf, even though Ye did not yet hold any high political position. When Lin discovered that Ye had done so (after Luo was purged), he was angry at Ye, but powerless to alter Luo's disgrace.[63]
Lin often read speeches prepared by others, and allowed his name to be placed on articles that he did not write, as long as these materials supported Mao. One of the most famous articles published in Lin's name[64] was the 20,000-word pamphlet on revolution in developing countries, Long Live the Victory of the People's War!, which was released in 1965.[65]: 100 This article made Lin one of China's leading interpreters of Mao's political theories. The article likened the "emerging forces" of the poor in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to the "rural areas of the world", while the affluent countries of the West were likened to the "cities of the world". Eventually the "cities" would be encircled by revolutions in the "rural areas", following theories prevalent in Mao Zedong Thought.[52] Lin made no promise that China would fight other people's wars, and foreign revolutionaries were advised to depend mainly on "self-reliance".
Lin worked closely with Mao, promoting Mao's cult of personality. Lin directed the compilation of some of Chairman Mao's writings into a handbook, the Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, which became known as the Little Red Book.[66] Lin Biao's military reforms and the success of the 1962 Sino-Indian War impressed Mao. A propaganda campaign called "learn from the People's Liberation Army" followed. In 1966, this campaign widened into the Cultural Revolution.
Cultural Revolution
[edit]Rise to prominence
[edit]Lin's support impressed Mao, who continued to promote Lin to higher political offices. After Mao's second-in-command, President Liu Shaoqi, was denounced as a "capitalist roader" in 1966, Lin Biao emerged as the most likely candidate to replace Liu as Mao's successor. Lin attempted to avoid this promotion, but accepted it on Mao's insistence.[19]
Privately, Lin opposed the purging of Liu and Deng Xiaoping, on the grounds that they were "good comrades", but was not able to publicly oppose Mao's condemnation of them. Lin privately admired Liu, and once told his daughter that Liu had "a better understanding of theory than Mao". Zhou Enlai was also considered for the position of vice-chairman, but Zhou successfully withdrew from the nomination, leaving Lin the only candidate.[67]
Lin also seriously attempted to withdraw from the nomination, but was not able to do so because Mao had made Lin's appointment a decision of the Central Committee, so rejecting the position would violate Party procedure and would risk ending Lin's political career. Lin was not present at the conference where it was decided to name him vice chairman. After Lin was named, he met with Mao and begged him personally not to name him to the position, but Mao criticized him, comparing Lin to the Ming emperor Shizong, who devoted so much of his time to the search for longevity medicines that he neglected his government responsibilities.[68] In 1966 all other candidates for the position were removed, and Lin accepted the position as sole Vice-chairman, replacing Liu Shaoqi as Mao's unofficial successor.[60] After his appointment, Lin again attempted to submit a formal written request to Mao, asking Mao to rescind Lin's appointment to the position of vice-chairman, but Mao again rejected this request. When Lin received the rejection letter, he was so angry that he tore the letter up and threw it in the garbage.[68]
Because there was no way to avoid becoming Mao's second-in-command, Lin attempted to protect himself from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution by giving absolute support to Mao and doing very little else. Lin avoided expressing any opinion, or making any decision on any matter, until Mao's own opinions and positions on that matter were clear, after which Lin would adhere as closely to Mao's direction as possible. Lin made sure that, whenever he and Mao were scheduled to appear in the same place, Lin would always arrive earlier than Mao, waiting to greet the chairman. Lin attempted to make all observers believe that he was Mao's closest follower,[69] always appearing beside Mao in all of Mao's public appearances with a copy of Mao's Little Red Book.[70] When he was informed that the public's image of Lin was that he was "Mao's best student", Lin was pleased, and stated: "I don't have any talent. What I know, I learned from Mao."[69]
Activities
[edit]
Because Lin had no real interest in the position of vice-chairman, he did little other than whatever he believed would ingratiate himself to Mao. Privately, Lin had no interest in promoting the Cultural Revolution, and attended government meetings only when Mao demanded that he do so. Those colleagues closest to Lin noted that Lin avoided talking about the Cultural Revolution in any context other than public speeches, and when pressed would only make very brief and ambiguous statements. After 1966, Lin made no phone calls, received few visitors, secluded himself from his colleagues, and gained a reputation as being "reticent and mysterious". He did not take an active role in government, but allowed his secretaries to read short summaries of selected documents for half an hour in the morning and half an hour in the afternoon. This was generally insufficient to fulfill the responsibilities of vice-chairman,[59] and he left most important work and family duties to his wife, Ye Qun.
Lin's passivity was part of a calculated plan to survive the Cultural Revolution alive and well. When Lin perceived that his longtime subordinate, Tao Zhu, was in danger of being purged in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Lin sent a letter to warn Tao, advising Tao to be "passive, passive, and passive again". Tao probably did not understand Lin's advice, and was subsequently purged in 1967.[59] In his relationship with Mao, Lin adopted a policy of "three 'nos': no responsibility; no suggestions; no crime".[71]
Following the lead of Mao, in 1966 Lin directed Red Guards in Beijing to "smash those persons in power who are traveling the capitalist road, the bourgeoisie reactionary authorities, and all royalists of the bourgeoisie, and to forcibly destroy the "four olds": old culture, old ideas, old customs, and old habits.[72] In August 1966 Lin publicly called for a "three-month turmoil" within the PLA, and on October 6 Lin's Central Military Commission issued an urgent instruction that all military academies and institutes were to dismiss their classes and allow their students to become fully involved in the Cultural Revolution. Following the orders of this directive, officers and commissars were expelled from their positions, and some were beaten to death.[73] Students at Chinese military academies followed Lin's instructions to rebel against their senior officers, breaking into the offices of Lin's National Commission for Defense Science to abduct one of the department's directors, and claiming Lin's deputy chief of staff, Li Tianyu, whom students accused of disciplining them.[72] The students "overthrew" General Xiao Hua, the head of the PLA's Political Department since the previous July, and went on to purge 40 other top officers working under him in the Political Department, most of whom died in prison.[73]

Lin continued to support the Red Guards until May 1967, when Mao accepted Zhou Enlai's appeals to moderate their radical activity through military intervention.[72] Lin moderated some of the most radical activity within the PLA; but, from 1967 to 1969, 80,000 officers were purged, 1,169 of whom died from torture, starvation, or execution. Research programs were cancelled and the number of military academies across China shrank by two-thirds. Many defensive fortifications were destroyed, and regular training within the PLA ceased.[73]
After 1966, Lin's few personal political initiatives were efforts to moderate the radical nature of the Cultural Revolution. Privately, he expressed unhappiness with the Cultural Revolution, but was unable to avoid playing a high-profile role due to the expectations of Mao, China's unpredictable political environment, and the manipulations of his wife and son, Ye Qun and Lin Liguo.[19] After 1966, Lin, like Liu before him, attempted to build his own base of support so that he could better position himself for the inevitable, unpredictable political situation that would occur following the death of Mao.[74] Lin's few proactive attempts to direct the Cultural Revolution were attempts to protect Red Guards and his political allies from political persecution, and to mediate the attempts of Jiang Qing and her followers to radicalize China's political climate.[53] In May 1967, Lin's follower, Chen Boda, saved Zhou Enlai from being persecuted by Red Guards by convincing them that Zhou was Lin's follower and supporter. Zhou repaid Lin's assistance by giving him excessive public praise three months later, in August, but was forced to write a formal apology to Lin after Lin complained to Mao that such praise was inappropriate.[75]

Lin and Jiang cooperated at the outset of the Cultural Revolution, but their relationship began to deteriorate in 1968 as Jiang frequently attempted to interfere in Chinese military affairs, which Lin found intolerable.[76] By 1970 Lin and Ye were very unfriendly with Jiang Qing: Lin referred to her as a "long-nosed pit viper".[53] From 1968 until his death in 1971, Lin and his supporters disagreed with Zhou Enlai and his followers over the issue of China's relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union. Lin believed that both superpowers were equally threatening to China, and that they were colluding to thwart China's interests. Zhou Enlai believed that China should become closer to the United States in order to mitigate the threat posed by the Soviet military. Lin was supported by Jiang Qing in his opposition to pursuing a relationship with the United States, but was not able to permanently disrupt Zhou's efforts to contact the American officials.[77]
Lin Biao, as Defense Minister, was responsible for the Chinese response to the Zhenbao Island incident of March 1969, a battle with the Soviet Union over Damansky Island along the Amur River. Lin issued a report labeling the Soviet Union a "chauvinist" and "social imperialist" power, and issuing orders warning Chinese troops to be wary of an impending Soviet attack. Lin's followers attempted to use the hysteria generated by the incident in an effort to deepen the power that they had gained during the Cultural Revolution, disregarding and acting against the interests of Zhou Enlai and his supporters.[78]
Height of power and eventual downfall
[edit]
Lin officially became China's second-in-charge in April 1969, following the first plenary session of the 9th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin's position as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms and successor" was recognized when the Party constitution was formally revised to reflect Lin's future succession.[79] At the 9th Central Committee, Lin's faction was unquestionably dominant within the Politburo. Of the Politburo's twenty-one full members, Lin counted on the support of six members: the generals Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, his wife Ye Qun; and Chen Boda, an ambitious ideologue. Lin's support surpassed the number of members aligned with Jiang Qing, and far surpassed those aligned with Zhou Enlai. Because over 45% of the Central Committee were members of the army, Lin's supporters dominated the Politburo, and Lin's power was second only to Mao's.[80]
The group of Lin Biao-supporting military leaders known as the "Lin Biao clique" were at the forefront of expanding China's defense capacity.[81]: 152 The Lin Biao clique sought to create major industrial complexes in China's hinterlands and therefore strongly supported the Third Front campaign.[81]: 152 With the influence of the Lin Biao clique, the budgetary share of national defense during this period exceeded its share during the Korean War (40% for the former, compared to 33% for the latter).[81]: 152 By 1971, China built enough subterranean civil defense infrastructure to shelter 60% of its urban population.[81]: 152
During the second plenary session of the 9th Central Committee, held in Lushan from August to September 1970, Mao became uncomfortable with Lin's growing power in the military, and began to maneuver against Lin by undermining his supporters and attacking some of Lin's suggestions at the conference, such as the inclusion of Mao's role as a "genius" in developing Marxism–Leninism into the new state constitution. Lin's supporters also attacked Zhang Chunqiao, a close Mao's ally for opposing such veneration. At the Second Plenum, Lin advocated that Chairman Mao take up the ceremonial position of President, which had not been filled in since the removal of Liu Shaoqi, but Mao dismissed this appeal, suspecting Lin of using it to increase his own power and kick him upstairs.[79] Mao did not attack Lin directly, but showed his displeasure by attacking Lin's ally, Chen Boda, who was quickly disgraced. Lin kept his position, but the events of the Lushan Conference revealed a growing distrust between Lin and Mao.[82]
Because Lin was one of the most influential figures in promoting Mao's personality cult, he began to be criticized within the Party for its excesses later in 1970.[19] After 1970, some factions within the Army, and those led by Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing, began to distance themselves from Lin.[79] In order to limit Lin's growing power, Mao approved Zhou's efforts to rehabilitate a number of civilian officials who had been purged during the first years of the Cultural Revolution, and supported Zhou's efforts to improve China's relationship with the United States.[83]
A serious rift developed between Mao and Lin. Mao was displeased with comments that Lin had made about his wife, Jiang Qing, at the Lushan Conference. Generals loyal to Lin refused to accept Mao's criticism of them, and Mao began to question whether Lin continued to follow him unconditionally.[70] Mao wanted Lin to make a self-criticism, but Lin stayed away from Beijing and resisted doing so. Ye Qun made a self-criticism, but it was rejected by Mao as not genuine. Zhou Enlai attempted to mediate between Mao and Lin, but by 1971 Lin had become extremely reclusive and difficult to talk with at any level, and Zhou's mediation failed. In July 1971 Mao decided to remove Lin and his supporters. Zhou again attempted to moderate Mao's resolution to act against Lin, but failed.[84]
"Lin Biao incident" and death
[edit]Lin died when an aircraft carrying him and several members of his family crashed in Mongolia at 2:30 am on 13 September 1971[85], allegedly after attempting to assassinate Mao and defect to the Soviet Union. Following Lin's death, there has been widespread skepticism in the West concerning the official Chinese explanation, while forensic investigation conducted by the USSR (which recovered the bodies following the crash) has confirmed that Lin was among those who died in the crash.[7]
The official narrative from the Chinese government is that Lin Biao had launched a failed coup against Mao, known as "Project 571". In Chinese, "5-7-1" (Chinese: 五七一; pinyin: wǔqīyī), is a homophone for "armed uprising" (Chinese: 武起义; pinyin: wǔqǐyì).[82] After realizing it had failed, Lin Biao and associates attempted to flee to the Soviet Union and boarded a prearranged Trident 1-E (registered as CAAC B-256), piloted by Pan Jingyin, the deputy commander of the PLAAF 34th division. The aircraft did not take aboard enough fuel before taking off, ran out of fuel, and crashed near Öndörkhaan in Mongolia on 13 September 1971.[86] Everyone on board, eight men and one woman, were killed.[48]
An alternative theory posits that Lin Liguo, who was aware of the increasing hostility expressed towards his father in Mao's speeches, was the originator of the coup plan, which would involve an attack on Mao's train.[20]: 35 Summarizing different narratives, journalist Jonathan Chatwin describes this as the most widely believed theory.[20]: 35
According to one account, Zhou Enlai asked Mao if Lin's plane should be shot down, and Mao replied, "Rain has to fall, girls have to marry, these things are immutable; let them go".[20]: 35
However, the exact circumstances surrounding Lin's death remain unclear, owing to a lack of surviving evidence. Many of the original government records relevant to Lin's death were destroyed.[7] Because of the destruction of government documentation related to Lin's death, the Chinese government has relied on alleged confessions of purged officials close to Lin to corroborate the official narrative, but non-Chinese scholars generally regard these confessions as unreliable.[70]
Ever since 1971, scholars outside of China have been skeptical of the government's official explanation of the circumstances surrounding Lin's death. Skeptics assert the official narrative does not sufficiently explain why Lin, one of Mao's closest supporters and one of the most successful Communist generals, would suddenly attempt a poorly planned, abortive coup. The government narrative also does not sufficiently explain how and why Lin's aircraft crashed. Skeptics have claimed Lin's decision to flee to the Soviet Union was illogical, on the grounds the United States or Taiwan would have been safer destinations.[70] Western historians have contended Lin did not have either the intention or the ability to usurp Mao's place within the government or the Party.[86] Chatwin notes that the coup's military naivety was inconsistent with Lin's astuteness in military matters.[20]: 35 There are multiple theories that attempt to explain his flight and death.[87][88]
The Chinese government has no interest in re-evaluating its narrative on Lin Biao's death. Non-Chinese scholars interpreted China's reluctance to consider contradictory evidence of its "official" history as the result of a desire to avoid exploring any issue that may lead to criticism of Mao Zedong or a re-evaluation of the Cultural Revolution in general, which may distract China from pursuing economic growth.[25] The pilot of the plane, Pan Jingyin was subsequently posthumously given the honorary title of “Revolutionary Martyr" by the Chinese government.[89]
A six-month investigation by Western scholars in 1994 examined evidence in Russia, Mongolia, mainland China, the United States, and Taiwan, and came to a number of conclusions, some of which were contrary to the official Chinese version of events. The study confirmed Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Lin Liguo were all killed in the crash. Lin's aircraft was travelling away from the Soviet Union at the time of its crash, making the exact sequence of events before Lin's death more confusing, and casting doubt on the possibility that Lin was attempting to seek asylum in the USSR. Lin's wife and son may have forced Lin to board the aircraft against his will. Several senior leaders within the Communist Party hierarchy knew Lin and his family would flee, but chose not to attempt to stop their flight. According to this study, Lin had attempted to contact the Kuomintang in Taiwan on two separate occasions shortly before his death.[88]
In 1971, a Soviet forensic investigation was not able to determine the cause of the crash, but hypothesized the pilot misjudged his altitude while intentionally flying low to evade radar. Judging from the fires that burned after the crash, the Soviets estimated the aircraft had enough fuel to fly to the Soviet cities of Irkutsk or Chita. All of the work and its results were kept secret from the public: outside of the investigative team, only KGB chairman Yuri Andropov and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev were informed. The report remained classified until the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War.[90]
Legacy
[edit]
Lin Biao was survived by Doudou and one other daughter.[19] All military officials identified as being close to Lin or his family (most of China's high military command) were purged within weeks of Lin's disappearance.[86] On 14 September, Zhou announced to the Politburo that four of the highest-ranking military officials in China were immediately suspended from duty and ordered to submit self-criticisms admitting their associations with Lin. This announcement was quickly followed by the arrest of ninety-three people suspected of being close to Lin,[91] and within a month of Lin's disappearance over 1,000 senior Chinese military officials were purged.[70] The official purge of Lin's supporters continued until it was closed by the 10th Central Committee in August 1973.[92] The incident marked the end of the myth within the Party that Mao had always been absolutely correct.[86] The National Day celebrations on 1 October 1971, were cancelled.
The news of Lin's death was announced to all Communist Party officials in mid-October 1971, and to the Chinese public in November. The news was publicly received with shock and confusion. Mao Zedong was especially disturbed by the incident: his health deteriorated, and he became depressed. At the end of 1971, he became seriously ill; he suffered a stroke in January 1972, received emergency medical treatment, and his health remained unstable. Mao became nostalgic about some of his revolutionary comrades whose purging Lin had supported, and backed Zhou Enlai's efforts to conduct a widespread rehabilitation of veteran revolutionaries, and to correct some of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution (which he blamed on Lin Biao).[93] In the aftermath of the purge of Lin's supporters, Zhou Enlai replaced Lin as the second most powerful man in China, and Jiang Qing and her followers were never able to displace him. Without the support of Lin, Jiang was unable to prevent Zhou's efforts to improve China's relationship with the United States, or to rehabilitate cadres who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution.[94] The clause in the Party constitution indicating that Lin was Mao's successor was not officially amended until the 10th Central Committee in August 1973.[92]
The position of the Chinese government on Lin and the circumstances of his death changed several times over the decade following 1971. For over a year, the Party first attempted to cover up the details of Lin's death. The government then began to issue partial details of the event, followed by an anti-Lin Biao propaganda campaign. After Mao's death, in 1976, the government confirmed its condemnation of Lin and generally ceased any dialogue concerning Lin's place in history.[95] Throughout the 1970s, high-ranking leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, including Hua Guofeng, spread the story to foreign delegates that Lin had conspired with the KGB to assassinate Mao.[96]
In 1973 Jiang Qing, Mao's fourth wife and a former political ally of Lin's, started the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, aimed at using Lin's scarred image to attack Zhou Enlai. Much of this propaganda campaign involved the creative falsification of history, including (false) details about how Lin had opposed Mao's leadership and tactics throughout his career.[97] Lin's name became involved in Jiang's propaganda campaign after flashcards, made by Ye Qun to record Lin's thoughts, were discovered in Lin's residence following his death. Some of these flashcards recorded opinions critical of Mao. According to Lin's writings, Mao "will fabricate 'your' opinion first, then he will change 'your' opinion – which is not actually yours, but his fabrication. I should be careful of this standard trick." Another critical comment of Lin's states that Mao "worships himself and has a blind faith in himself. He worships himself to such an extent that all accomplishments are attributed to him, but all mistakes are made by others".[67] Lin's private criticisms of Mao were directly contradictory of the public image cultivated by Lin, who publicly stated following the Great Leap Forward that all mistakes of the past were the result of deviating from Mao's instructions.[98]
Like many major proponents of the Cultural Revolution, Lin's image was manipulated after Mao's death in 1976, and many negative aspects of the Cultural Revolution were blamed on Lin. After October 1976, those in power also blamed Mao's supporters, the so-called Gang of Four. In 1980, the Chinese government held a series of "special trials" to identify those most responsible for the Cultural Revolution. In 1981, the government released their verdict: that Lin Biao must be held, along with Jiang Qing, as one of the two major "counter-revolutionary cliques" responsible for the excesses of the late 1960s.[86] According to the official Party verdict, Lin and Jiang were singled out for blame because they led intra-Party cliques which took advantage of Mao's "mistakes" to advance their own political goals, engaging in "criminal activity" for their own self-benefit.[60] Among the "crimes" he was charged with was the ouster of China's head of state, President Liu Shaoqi. Lin was found to be primarily responsible for using "false evidence" to orchestrate a "political frame-up" of Liu.[99] Lin has been officially remembered as one of the greatest villains of modern China since then. Lin was never politically rehabilitated, so the charges against him continue to stand.[86]
For several decades, Lin's name and image were censored within China, but in recent years a balanced image of Lin has reappeared in popular culture: surviving aides and family members have published memoirs about their experience with Lin; scholars have explored most surviving evidence relevant to his life and death, and have gained exposure within the official Chinese media; movies set before 1949 have made reference to Lin; and Lin's name has re-appeared in Chinese history textbooks, recognizing his contributions to the victory of the Red Army.[95] Within modern China, Lin is regarded as one of the Red Army's best military strategists. In 2007, a big portrait of Lin was added to the Chinese Military Museum in Beijing, included in a display of the "Ten Marshals", a group considered to be the founders of China's armed forces.
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ a b c Leung 69
- ^ a b c d e Lazitch and Drachkovitch 265–267
- ^ Lin 164
- ^ a b c d e Lee 170
- ^ 林 彪--资料中心--中国共产党新闻网. People.com.cn (in Chinese (China)). Archived from the original on 7 March 2018.
15岁转入武昌共进中学
- ^ Barnonin and Yu 240
- ^ a b c d Mackerras, McMillen, and Watson. 140
- ^ Leung 70
- ^ Barnouin and Yu 242
- ^ a b Hammond, Ken (2023). China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future. New York, NY: 1804 Books. ISBN 9781736850084.
- ^ Hu Chi-hsi 253
- ^ Hu Chi-hsi 263
- ^ Hu Chi-hsi 257–260
- ^ Hu Chi-hsi 264
- ^ Salisbury 188
- ^ Hu Chi-hsi 267
- ^ Salisbury 191–192
- ^ Snow 135
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- ^ Snow 84
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- ^ Lee 170–171
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- ^ a b Hannam and Lawrence 4
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- ^ Leung 70–71
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- ^ Barnouin and Yu 116
- ^ Tanner (2013) 207
- ^ a b c d Qiu The Culture of Power. 145
- ^ Luna, Adrian. "Bringing the Inside Out: Health, Personality, Politics, and the Tragedy of Lin Biao" VDM Verlag, January 2008.
- ^ Hannam and Lawrence 2–3
- ^ a b Hannam and Lawrence 2
- ^ Barnouin and Yu 142–143, 145
- ^ Barnouin and Yu 164, 166
- ^ Domes 82
- ^ a b c Lee 172
- ^ a b c d Hu Xingdou 1
- ^ Barnouin and Yu 183
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- ^ Yang. Section I
- ^ He, Henry (2016). Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People's Republic of China. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-315-50043-0.
- ^ Snow. "Biographical Notes".
- ^ a b c Qiu The Culture of Power 80
- ^ a b c Qiu The Culture of Power. 15
- ^ a b Tanner (2009) 522
- ^ Ebrey 442
- ^ Qiu The Culture of Power. 149
- ^ Teiwes and Sun 5
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- ^ Han
- ^ a b Qiu The Culture of Power. 78
- ^ a b Qiu The Culture of Power. 78–79
- ^ a b Qiu The Culture of Power. 79–80
- ^ a b c d e Qiu Distorting History
- ^ Hu Xingdou 2
- ^ a b c Barnouin and Yu 226, 229
- ^ a b c China at War 136
- ^ Robinson 1081
- ^ Barnouin and Yu 236–237, 241–243
- ^ Barnouin and Yu 272
- ^ Ross 268
- ^ Uhalley and Qiu 389
- ^ a b c Uhalley and Qiu 388
- ^ Ross 269–270
- ^ a b c d Meyskens, Covell F. (2020). Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108784788. ISBN 978-1-108-78478-8. OCLC 1145096137. S2CID 218936313.
- ^ a b He 248
- ^ Ross 270–272
- ^ Qiu The Culture of Power. 134–135
- ^ "The Lin Biao Incident | History Today".
- ^ a b c d e f He 249
- ^ Ross 265
- ^ a b Hannam and Lawrence 1
- ^ Short, Philip (1999). Mao: A Life. London: Hodder & Stoughton. ISBN 0-340-75198-3.
- ^ Hannam and Lawrence 3–4
- ^ Barnouin and Yu 275
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- ^ Ross 275–276
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- ^ North 2
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- Uhalley Jr., Stephen, and Qiu Jin. "The Lin Biao Incident: More Than Twenty Years Later". Pacific Affairs. Vol. 66, No. 3, Autumn, 1993. pp. 386–398.
- Yang Jisheng. "The Fatal Politics of the PRC's Great Leap Famine: the preface to Tombstone". Journal of Contemporary China. Vol.19, Issue 66. pp. 755–776. 26 July 2010.
- Yao Ming-Le. "The Conspiracy and Death of Lin Biao: How Mao's Successor Plotted and Failed- An Inside Account of the Most Bizarre and Mysterious Event in the History of Modern China". Alfred A. Knopf. 1983. ISBN 978-0-39452-543-3.
- Zhang Langlang. "Sun Weishi's Story" (in Chinese). The Collected Works of Zhang Langlang. Boxun News Network. Retrieved on 19 November 2011.
External links
[edit]- Long Live the Victory of People's War! A Maoist propaganda pamphlet written by Lin which preceded the Cultural Revolution.
- Video Adaptation of Lin Biao's Long Live The Victory of People's War! (1965)
- The Lin Biao Reference Archive
Lin Biao
View on GrokipediaEarly Life and Education
Family Background and Childhood
Lin Biao was born Lin Yurong on December 5, 1907, in Huanggang, Hubei Province, into a family of modest means, with his father involved in small-scale landholding or local commerce during the chaotic Warlord Era.[6][7] As the second of four sons, Lin's early environment reflected the socioeconomic strains of rural central China, where traditional agrarian pursuits intersected with emerging political unrest.[1] His family's limited resources underscored the broader challenges faced by provincial households amid imperial decline and factional strife, fostering an atmosphere conducive to Lin's later revolutionary inclinations.[6] Lin received his initial education at a village primary school near Huanggang, where he displayed intellectual promise despite rudimentary facilities.[7] In 1921, at age 14, he advanced to middle school in Wuchang, the provincial hub, immersing himself in a curriculum influenced by modernizing reforms and the residual fervor of the 1919 May Fourth Movement.[1] There, exposure to nationalist and socialist ideologies—circulated through student networks and clandestine readings—ignited his engagement with radical politics, marking a pivotal shift from parochial village life toward organized activism.[6] By his mid-teens, Lin had begun participating in extracurricular debates and protests, aligning with peers disillusioned by warlord dominance and foreign encroachments.[7]Entry into Revolutionary Activities
Lin Biao, born in December 1907 in Huanggang, Hubei province, received his early education in Wuhan, where he engaged in student politics and protests against the Beiyang government during the early 1920s.[1] These activities reflected growing unrest among Chinese youth amid warlord rule, economic hardship, and foreign influence, drawing Lin toward radical nationalist and socialist ideas prevalent in urban centers like Wuhan.[1] In 1925, at age 17, Lin formally entered organized revolutionary circles by joining the Socialist Youth League, a communist-affiliated organization that served as a recruitment ground for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[8] This step aligned him with the burgeoning communist movement, which emphasized anti-imperialism and class struggle, amid the broader Northern Expedition and United Front between the Kuomintang and communists. Following the 1927 KMT-CCP split, Lin participated in the Nanchang Uprising on August 1 and the subsequent struggles to establish the Jinggangshan base area alongside Zhu De's forces.[9][10] His involvement in the Youth League positioned him for further radicalization, culminating in his decision to pursue military training as a means to advance revolutionary goals.[8]Military Training at Whampoa
In 1925, Lin Biao traveled from Hunan to Guangzhou to enroll in the Whampoa Military Academy (also known as Huangpu), entering during its fourth term amid the academy's early expansion to train officers for the National Revolutionary Army.[9] The institution, founded in June 1924 with Soviet advisory support and under Chiang Kai-shek's superintendency, emphasized accelerated programs combining military drills, tactics, weaponry handling, and physical endurance to rapidly produce disciplined cadres capable of supporting the First United Front's unification efforts against warlords.[11][12] Lin's admission followed his prior engagement in the Communist Youth League and student activism tied to the May Thirtieth Movement, positioning him among recruits drawn to the academy's revolutionary aura despite its Nationalist orientation.[1] At Whampoa, Lin received intensive instruction in infantry maneuvers, artillery basics, and command principles, supplemented by political education that highlighted anti-imperialist nationalism and class struggle, with Communist elements prominent due to party penetration in the curriculum.[13] He formally joined the Chinese Communist Party during this period, aligning with underground networks amid the academy's ideological tensions.[9] Notable among his mentors was Zhou Enlai, a political commissar who influenced cadets toward Marxist-Leninist views while navigating the KMT-CCP alliance.[10] The training's brevity—typically six to twelve months—reflected wartime urgency, fostering Lin's foundational skills in mobile warfare that later defined his command style, though specific personal performance records from this phase remain sparse in available accounts.[11] By mid-1926, Lin had completed the program and received his commission as a second lieutenant, deploying soon after to the Northern Expedition forces just as campaigns escalated in July.[6] This brief but formative exposure at Whampoa equipped him with tactical proficiency and party loyalty, setting the stage for his shift to Communist-led units following the 1927 KMT-CCP rupture.[1]Pre-1949 Military Career
Second Sino-Japanese War Engagements
In August 1937, following the Xi'an Incident and the formation of the Second United Front, Lin Biao was appointed commander of the 115th Division within the newly reorganized Eighth Route Army, the Communist armed forces operating under nominal Nationalist oversight to resist Japanese invasion.[6] The division, comprising around 15,000 troops, was tasked with guerrilla operations in northern China, particularly Shanxi Province, to harass Japanese supply lines and disrupt advances.[14] Lin's most prominent action occurred during the Battle of Pingxingguan from September 25 to 27, 1937, where his division ambushed elements of the Japanese 5th Division advancing through Pingxing Pass in Shanxi.[15] Positioning forces along narrow mountain passes, Lin's troops, including regiments from the 343rd and 344th Brigades, attacked a Japanese logistical column of approximately 4,000 men and 80-100 vehicles, destroying over 1,000 Japanese soldiers, capturing 100 rifles, dozens of machine guns, and significant ammunition while sustaining about 400 casualties.[16][14] This tactical victory, leveraging terrain for encirclement and cutting off reinforcements, marked the first major Communist success against Japanese forces and boosted morale amid broader Nationalist setbacks, though it involved no direct assault on the main Japanese column at the pass itself.[17] Severely wounded by shrapnel during the engagement, Lin was evacuated to Yan'an for extended recovery, limiting his field command thereafter.[18] His 115th Division continued sporadic guerrilla raids in northeast Shanxi and Hebei, focusing on hit-and-run tactics against Japanese garrisons and rail lines, but Lin's direct involvement remained minimal for the war's duration due to health issues and strategic shifts toward base-area consolidation.[19] These operations emphasized mobile warfare over conventional battles, aligning with Mao Zedong's protracted war doctrine, though overall Communist contributions were secondary to Nationalist fronts in scale and resources.[6]Chinese Civil War Strategies
Lin Biao assumed command of Communist forces in Northeast China in August 1945, inheriting a region contested after Soviet occupation and withdrawal, where Nationalist armies under Du Yuming held superior positions south of the Songhua River. Facing numerical and logistical disadvantages, Lin implemented a strategy of protracted active defense, prioritizing force preservation and expansion over immediate confrontation; by May 1946, after defeats at Siping, he ordered a general retreat north of the Songhua to Harbin, enabling recruitment, training, and stockpiling of captured Japanese equipment. This approach allowed the Northeast Democratic United Army to grow from approximately 100,000 troops in mid-1946 to over 700,000 by mid-1948, emphasizing political indoctrination to secure defections and local support.[20][21] Between winter 1946 and spring 1947, Lin directed the "Three Expeditions South of the River and Four Defenses of Linjiang," a series of limited offensives and defensive stands that tested tactical innovations transitioning from guerrilla warfare to conventional operations. These actions involved concentrating superior forces at decisive points for annihilation battles, integrating infantry assaults with artillery and captured tanks, while avoiding prolonged attrition; for instance, in defending Linjiang, forces repelled Nationalist attacks through coordinated counterattacks, inflicting heavy casualties and capturing equipment. Lin's principles stressed maneuver over static defense, small-unit coordination to encircle isolated enemy units, and minimizing own losses by rejecting mass human-wave assaults in favor of fire support and flanking maneuvers, principles derived from post-Siping analyses and applied to erode Nationalist strength incrementally. This phase eliminated over 100,000 enemy troops, securing a foothold south of the river and validating Mao Zedong's broader doctrine of annihilation through local superiority.[20][22] By summer 1947, with enhanced capabilities, Lin shifted to offensive operations, launching the Summer and Autumn Offensives that captured cities like Jilin and Harbin's outskirts, further isolating Nationalist garrisons through encirclement and starvation tactics. The culmination came in the Liaoshen Campaign (September 12 to November 2, 1948), where Lin executed a multi-pronged strategy to divide and destroy approximately 470,000 Nationalist troops: prioritizing the assault on Jinzhou (October 14–16) to sever Liaodong from Liaoxi despite initial Mao directives favoring other targets, followed by the surrender of besieged Changchun and the storming of Shenyang (Mukden). This maneuver warfare exploited Nationalist overextension, achieving total victory with minimal Communist losses through rapid concentration of 700,000 troops and political defections. Subsequently, in the Pingjin Campaign (November 1948–January 1949), Lin coordinated with Nie Rongzhen's forces to encircle Beijing and Tianjin, annihilating or capturing over 500,000 enemies while negotiating a peaceful liberation of Beijing to preserve its cultural sites. These strategies, rooted in cautious force concentration and annihilation over hasty advances, secured Communist dominance in the Northeast, providing a strategic base for nationwide offensives.[23][24][22]Major Campaigns and Victories
During the Long March (1934–1935), Lin Biao commanded the First Army Corps, which formed the vanguard of the Red Army's First Front Army, playing a key role in breakthroughs such as at Lazikou Pass that enabled the Communist forces to evade Nationalist encirclements and reach Yan'an in Shaanxi Province.[25] Lin Biao's first notable victory came during the Second Sino-Japanese War at the Battle of Pingxingguan on September 25, 1937, where his 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army ambushed a Japanese supply convoy and rear-guard units of the Imperial Japanese Army's 5th Division near Datong in Shanxi Province.[16] The engagement involved approximately 6,000 Chinese troops exploiting mountainous terrain to destroy over 100 Japanese trucks and inflict around 1,000 enemy casualties while sustaining roughly 400 losses themselves, marking the Communists' earliest significant success against Japanese forces and boosting Eighth Route Army morale despite limited strategic impact on the broader front.[16][26] Following World War II, Lin Biao assumed command of Communist forces in Northeast China (Manchuria) in 1946, reorganizing them into the Northeast Democratic United Army (later renamed Northeast Field Army in January 1948), which grew from defensive guerrilla operations to offensive maneuvers against Nationalist (Kuomintang) garrisons amid Soviet withdrawal and U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek's troops.[25] By mid-1947, his winter offensive captured Siping after intense fighting, contributing to over 156,000 Nationalist casualties and nearly expelling them from Manchuria north of the Songhua River, though Lin paused major advances due to supply strains and health issues.[9] This set the stage for decisive 1948 campaigns that secured Communist dominance in the region. The Liaoshen Campaign, launched September 12, 1948, under Lin's direct command, targeted Nationalist-held cities across Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces with over 700,000 troops encircling isolated garrisons.[27] Key breakthroughs included the rapid capture of Jinzhou on October 15 after heavy artillery barrages and infantry assaults, severing Nationalist supply lines and prompting the surrender of Changchun's defenders in late October; this culminated in the fall of Shenyang (Mukden) on November 2 following urban combat, yielding approximately 470,000 Nationalist prisoners or defections and eliminating their main Manchurian forces without major Communist counterattacks.[28] The victory shifted the Civil War's balance, providing Lin's army with captured equipment and enabling southward advances. Subsequently, the Pingjin Campaign from November 29, 1948, to January 31, 1949, saw Lin Biao's 1 million-strong forces, coordinated with Nie Rongzhen's North China Field Army, isolate and besiege Nationalist units around Beiping (Beijing) and Tianjin.[29] After securing Tianjin through assault on January 14-15, 1949, which neutralized 130,000 defenders, Lin orchestrated a peaceful liberation of Beiping on January 31 via negotiation with Fu Zuoyi's 200,000 troops, avoiding destruction of the ancient city while removing about 520,000 enemies from combat effectiveness through surrender or reorganization.[29] These operations, emphasizing encirclement over direct confrontation, exemplified Lin's attrition strategy and paved the way for Communist control of northern China.[6]Early People's Republic Roles
Administrative and Party Positions
Following the proclamation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, Lin Biao was appointed commander of the Central China Military Region (later redesignated Central South China Military Region), tasked with securing and administering the recently liberated central and southern territories including Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Jiangxi provinces.[10] This role encompassed both military consolidation and initial civilian governance, as regional military commands doubled as provisional administrative authorities during the transitional period before the 1954 constitution formalized central structures. Lin directed operations to suppress remnant Nationalist forces and integrate local economies into the national framework, leveraging his field army's recent victories in the Huaihai and Hainan campaigns. Concurrently, Lin served as first secretary of the Central-South Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), overseeing party organization, land reform implementation, and ideological mobilization across the six-province region. This dual military-political command aligned with the CCP's early governance model, where top generals like Lin held integrated authority to expedite reconstruction amid ongoing civil war remnants and economic dislocation. By 1952, as administrative councils were streamlined, Lin retained oversight of regional party affairs while focusing on national integration efforts. In September 1954, following the inaugural session of the National People's Congress and adoption of the PRC constitution, Lin was elected one of six vice premiers of the State Council, ranking second after Premier Zhou Enlai and responsible for defense-related portfolios within the cabinet.[30][31] He was also appointed vice chairman of the newly formed National Defense Commission, advising on military policy amid the Korean War armistice and Sino-Soviet alliance dynamics. These central positions marked Lin's shift from regional to national stature, though his active involvement diminished in the mid-1950s due to recurring health complications. Throughout, Lin maintained membership in the CCP Central Committee, elected at the 8th Party Congress in September 1956, where he joined the Politburo as a full member.Health Issues and Seclusion
Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Lin Biao experienced a marked decline in health that prompted his withdrawal from active public and political engagement throughout much of the 1950s.[1] Suspected tuberculosis contributed to his frailty, rendering him physically unsuited for frontline duties; as a result, he declined command of Chinese forces in the Korean War upon its outbreak in October 1950, despite his stature as a senior military leader.[6] This condition, combined with his characteristically gaunt and diminutive physique, confined him to limited activity, even as he retained formal titles within the party and military hierarchy.[6] Lin's seclusion was exacerbated by a array of phobias and psychosomatic symptoms, including intense aversions to water, light, wind, cold, and even glass objects or fans, which led him to avoid bathing (opting instead for damp towels) and to shun outdoor exposure or unconditioned environments.[1][32] He reportedly endured chronic insomnia, frequent diarrhea possibly linked to anxiety-induced irritable bowel issues, and hyperhidrosis that intensified during social interactions, often limiting meetings to under 30 minutes and prompting reliance on air-conditioned spaces or narcotic injections for endurance.[32] Accounts describe him as emotionally detached and socially phobic, exhibiting schizoid traits such as disinterest in interpersonal relations and a preference for isolation at his Maojiawan residence, where access was tightly controlled and delegates like Luo Ruiqing were frequently turned away under pretexts of illness.[32] During this period of obscurity, Lin made rare public appearances and delegated substantial responsibilities—including family and political affairs—to his wife, Ye Qun, who effectively managed communications and decisions on his behalf.[32] His detachment extended to key events, such as avoiding conferences on purges or military crises, reflecting not only physical limitations but also a reactive rather than proactive stance in governance.[32] Mao Zedong inquired about Lin's condition during the 1959 Lushan Conference, highlighting the extent of his withdrawal, though Lin remained largely nominal in his roles until later rehabilitation efforts.[32]Rehabilitation and Re-emergence
Following prolonged seclusion due to severe health issues, including neuralgia, insomnia, and phobias exacerbated by war injuries, Lin Biao gradually re-entered public life in the late 1950s.[1] His recovery aligned with internal party shifts, particularly after the 1959 Lushan Conference where Peng Dehuai was dismissed for criticizing Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward policies.[33] In September 1959, Lin Biao was appointed Minister of National Defense, succeeding Peng Dehuai, a position that marked his formal rehabilitation and elevation within the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy.[25] This appointment, endorsed by Mao, positioned Lin to oversee the People's Liberation Army (PLA), where he initiated reforms emphasizing political loyalty to Mao's ideology over professional military expertise.[34] As Defense Minister, Lin Biao purged elements perceived as pro-Soviet or insufficiently aligned with Maoist principles, consolidating control over the military apparatus.[19] By 1960, he had re-emerged as a key architect of the PLA's ideological transformation, promoting the study of Mao's writings and integrating guerrilla warfare doctrines into training, which enhanced his stature ahead of the Cultural Revolution.[35]Political Rise Under Mao
Alignment with Mao Zedong
Lin Biao's alignment with Mao Zedong intensified after the Lushan Conference in July–August 1959, where Peng Dehuai's criticism of the Great Leap Forward's policies prompted Mao to purge him from leadership positions.[36] Lin, who had maintained a low profile due to health issues during the 1950s, was appointed Minister of Defense in September 1959, succeeding Peng, and leveraged this role to demonstrate unwavering support for Mao's directives.[19] As defense minister, Lin initiated a comprehensive campaign of political indoctrination within the People's Liberation Army (PLA), transforming it into a vehicle for propagating Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology for military strategy and operations.[19] [1] This alignment manifested in Lin's public endorsements and writings that elevated Mao's military theories, portraying them as infallible and superior to Soviet models. In speeches and directives, Lin emphasized studying Mao's works as essential for PLA loyalty and effectiveness, stating that "Mao Tse-tung's thought is the compass for the Chinese revolution."[1] By 1960, under Lin's oversight, the PLA conducted widespread "learning sessions" on Mao's writings, integrating them into training regimens and promoting the idea that Mao's guerrilla tactics represented the pinnacle of revolutionary warfare.[10] Lin's efforts contrasted with earlier military leaders' reliance on conventional Soviet-influenced doctrines, aligning the PLA more closely with Mao's emphasis on political mobilization over material superiority.[6] Lin's promotion of Mao Zedong Thought extended beyond the military; he advocated for its universal application in party and societal contexts, which bolstered his political ascent. In 1966, Lin authored the foreword to the second edition of Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (the "Little Red Book"), declaring it "the true treasure of our Party" and urging its creative application to guide China's socialist construction.[37] This text, disseminated in millions of copies under Lin's endorsement, became a cornerstone of ideological conformity, with Lin positioning Mao's thought as Marxism-Leninism adapted to Chinese conditions and destined for global victory.[37] Through these actions, Lin not only rehabilitated his own standing but also helped consolidate Mao's authority amid internal party challenges, setting the stage for his designation as Mao's closest comrade-in-arms.[6]Promotion of Mao's Ideology
As Minister of National Defense from 1959, Lin Biao institutionalized the study of Mao Zedong Thought within the People's Liberation Army, mandating daily political education sessions focused on Mao's writings to foster ideological loyalty among troops.[38] He oversaw the compilation of selected quotations from Mao's works, which evolved into the widely distributed Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, requiring every soldier to possess and memorize passages as a core component of military discipline.[39] In the foreword to the second edition of the Quotations, penned on December 16, 1966, Lin exalted Mao Zedong Thought as "the most powerful weapon" against imperialism and revisionism, likening it to a "spiritual atom bomb" capable of ensuring victory for oppressed peoples worldwide by arming them against adversaries of infinite power.[37] This endorsement framed Mao's ideas not merely as adapted Marxism-Leninism for China but as universally applicable truth transcending national boundaries, a claim Lin reinforced by citing Mao's strategic genius in revolutionary warfare.[37] Lin's public speeches amplified this promotion, particularly as the Cultural Revolution unfolded. On October 1, 1966, during the 17th anniversary celebrations of the People's Republic of China, he declared the need to transform the nation into "a great school of Mao Zedong's thought," emphasizing its role in building socialism and combating bourgeois influences.[40] In a November 3, 1966, address to revolutionary teachers and students in Peking, Lin hailed Mao's thought as the foundation for the Cultural Revolution's success, urging masses to wield it against "monsters and demons" undermining the party.[41] These orations positioned Mao Zedong Thought as the decisive force for ideological purification, with Lin portraying adherence to it as essential for proletarian victory.[40] By 1969, at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Lin's report underscored Mao's personal initiation and leadership of the Cultural Revolution as a profound application of his thought, crediting it with eradicating capitalist roaders and solidifying proletarian dictatorship.[42] Through such advocacy, Lin elevated Mao Zedong Thought to constitutional status in the party, where it was enshrined as the guiding ideology, reflecting his instrumental role in cultivating its dominance across military, party, and societal spheres.[42]Military Reforms and Purges
Upon assuming the role of Minister of National Defense in September 1959, following the dismissal of Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Conference for criticizing the Great Leap Forward, Lin Biao initiated a series of reforms to align the People's Liberation Army (PLA) more closely with Mao Zedong's ideological directives.[43] These efforts emphasized "politics in command," subordinating technical and professional military training to political indoctrination and loyalty to Mao's thought.[38] Lin promoted the "Four Firsts" doctrine, articulated on September 12, 1960, at a Military Commission meeting, which prioritized humans over weapons, political work over routine tasks, ideological education over technical skills, and living revolutionary ideas over rigid dogma.[44] This framework aimed to foster a "revolutionary army" capable of people's war, drawing on Mao's guerrilla strategies rather than conventional Soviet-style professionalism.[45] Lin's reforms extended to structural changes, including enhanced roles for political commissars to oversee commanders and ensure ideological purity, alongside campaigns for soldiers to study Mao's writings daily.[46] In 1965, he advocated the abolition of military ranks—previously reintroduced in 1955—to eliminate hierarchical distinctions and promote egalitarianism, a move approved that year to reinforce the PLA's proletarian character.[47] These measures transformed the PLA into a model for civilian sectors, with Lin positioning it as a vanguard for Maoist mobilization, though they arguably weakened professional expertise by de-emphasizing modern warfare training in favor of mass political campaigns.[48] Parallel to reforms, Lin oversaw purges to eliminate perceived disloyalty. Immediately after his appointment, he targeted Peng Dehuai's allies, including Chief of Staff Huang Kecheng, dismissed in September 1959 for alleged ties to Peng's "anti-party" clique.[49] By 1965, Lin orchestrated the purge of General Luo Ruiqing, then Chief of Staff and public security head, accusing him of Soviet sympathies, over-reliance on professional military doctrine, and undermining political work—charges Lin used to frame Luo as prioritizing "guns over politics."[50] Luo's ouster involved fabricated evidence of espionage and was part of a broader campaign removing hundreds of officers seen as insufficiently aligned with Maoist orthodoxy, consolidating Lin's control over the PLA's leadership.[51] These actions, while securing Lin's position as Mao's favored military figure, reflected deeper tensions between ideological fervor and operational readiness, with purges extending into the mid-1960s to preempt any rival power centers within the army.[52]Involvement in the Cultural Revolution
Initial Endorsement and Mobilization
Lin Biao offered immediate public support for the Cultural Revolution shortly after its initiation through Mao Zedong's May 16, 1966, notification targeting "revisionist" elements in the Chinese Communist Party. As Mao's close ally and Minister of National Defense, Lin leveraged his position to endorse the campaign's aims of purging bourgeois influences from Party and state institutions.[39] In a speech on May 1, 1966, at a Peking rally, Lin urged schoolchildren to criticize officials swayed by bourgeois ideology, framing such actions as essential to defending Mao's revolutionary line.[53] This early rhetoric aligned Lin with Mao's escalating critique of figures like Peng Zhen and Liu Shaoqi, whom Mao accused of suppressing revolutionary fervor. Lin's endorsement intensified during the 11th Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in August 1966, where he was elevated to Vice Chairman and positioned as Mao's successor in the Party constitution. There, Lin praised Mao's leadership and advocated for the "great proletarian cultural revolution" as a means to combat capitalist roaders within the Party apparatus.[54] For mobilization, Lin directed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to propagate Mao Zedong Thought and support revolutionary activities. In September 1966, his speeches at mass rallies in Beijing exhorted Red Guards and students to "bombard the headquarters"—a reference to Mao's August 5 big-character poster—and to dismantle the Four Olds: old ideas, culture, customs, and habits.[55][56] On September 3, 1966, Lin addressed gatherings of revolutionary youth, calling for unrelenting struggle against revisionist authorities and mobilizing them to seize power from local Party committees.[7] His September 15 speech at a rally welcoming Red Guard delegations from across China further galvanized participants, declaring the Cultural Revolution a "great revolution" requiring total commitment to Mao's directives and vowing to "carry it out well" through mass action.[57] Under Lin's guidance, PLA political departments issued directives to units, emphasizing study of Mao's works and assistance to worker-peasant-soldier teams in factories and schools, thereby channeling military resources into ideological mobilization and early Red Guard formations. This integration of PLA support helped transform initial student protests into nationwide upheaval by late 1966.[58]Role in Propaganda and Cult of Personality
Lin Biao significantly contributed to the propagation of Mao Zedong Thought through military channels during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, mandating its study within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as the paramount ideological guide.[38] He oversaw the compilation of Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, known as the Little Red Book, which became a cornerstone of mass indoctrination, with over a billion copies distributed by the late 1960s.[59] In his foreword to the second edition of the Little Red Book, dated December 16, 1966, Lin described Mao's writings as a "spiritual atom bomb" capable of ensuring victory in people's war against imperialism, urging every soldier and civilian to internalize them as an "extremely important political weapon."[37] This endorsement elevated the text to ritualistic status, recited in PLA units and Red Guard assemblies, fostering adulation of Mao as an infallible leader whose thought represented the pinnacle of Marxist-Leninist development.[60] Lin delivered key speeches amplifying Mao's cult, such as at the August 18, 1966, mass rally in Tiananmen Square, where he proclaimed Mao Zedong Thought as the "compass" for the Cultural Revolution, directing millions of Red Guards to combat revisionism through unwavering loyalty to Mao's directives.[61] These addresses, broadcast widely, intertwined military discipline with ideological fervor, portraying Mao as a quasi-divine figure whose genius transcended conventional strategy, thereby institutionalizing sycophantic propaganda within party and societal structures.[62] Through such efforts, Lin's propaganda initiatives transformed Mao's personal authority into a pervasive cult, evident in ubiquitous imagery, slogans like "Long live Chairman Mao," and mandatory loyalty displays, which permeated education, media, and daily life from 1966 onward.[6] Post-incident assessments by Chinese authorities attributed excesses of this cult partly to Lin's machinations, though contemporaneous evidence confirms his proactive role in its amplification to consolidate Mao's dominance amid factional strife.[3]Peak Influence as Heir Apparent
Lin Biao's authority culminated at the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, convened from April 1 to 24, 1969, where delegates formally enshrined him in the party constitution as Mao Zedong's successor with the provision: "Comrade Lin Biao is Comrade Mao Zedong's close comrade-in-arms and successor."[63] In his report to the congress on April 1, Lin emphasized Mao Zedong Thought as the "acme of Marxism-Leninism," crediting it for the party's victories and framing ongoing revolution as essential to combat revisionism.[42] This endorsement aligned Lin closely with Mao's ideological campaigns, positioning him as the paramount defender of the Cultural Revolution's radical objectives.[64] At the First Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee immediately following the congress, Lin was elected vice chairman of the Central Committee, second only to Mao, while retaining his roles as defense minister and first vice premier.[65] The People's Liberation Army (PLA), under Lin's command, dominated the new Central Committee, with military representatives comprising a substantial portion of its membership, reflecting the armed forces' expanded political sway amid the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.[66] Lin's control over the PLA enabled him to deploy troops for maintaining order, suppressing factional violence, and backing Mao loyalists, thereby consolidating power through martial authority in a period when civilian party structures had weakened.[67] This phase marked Lin's zenith as heir apparent, with his stature amplifying the cult of personality around Mao; official propaganda frequently paired their names, and Lin's writings, such as prefaces to Mao's Selected Works, reinforced the chairman's infallible leadership.[42] By late 1969, Lin's influence extended to foreign policy signals, as the PLA's border clashes with the Soviet Union underscored military preparedness under his direction, aligning with Mao's strategic priorities.[29] However, underlying frictions with Mao over issues like constitutional provisions for leadership succession began to surface, though Lin's formal preeminence remained unchallenged until 1970.[68]The Lin Biao Incident
Antecedents and Internal Tensions
By late 1969, following the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party where Lin Biao was formally designated as Mao Zedong's successor and close comrade-in-arms, underlying frictions began to surface within the leadership, culminating in the deterioration of Lin's relationship with Mao starting in 1970, primarily driven by Mao's growing unease over Lin's consolidation of military authority through the People's Liberation Army (PLA).[69] Lin, as Minister of National Defense, had leveraged the Cultural Revolution's chaos to elevate PLA influence, including declaring martial law amid Sino-Soviet border clashes in spring 1969 to eliminate rivals, which amplified perceptions of the army's dominance under his command.[69] These strains erupted at the Lushan Conference, held from August 23 to September 6, 1970, during the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee, where Lin supported Chen Boda's proposal for a "genius theory" praising Mao's unique abilities and advocated for reinstating the position of State Chairman in a draft constitution explicitly for Mao, framing it as a means to formalize Mao's supremacy.[69] Mao interpreted this as a "sudden attack" and "conspiracy" by Lin's faction to constrain his flexibility and hasten succession arrangements, leading him to denounce the proposal, purge Chen Boda for excessive flattery of Mao as a "genius," and target Lin's inner circle—known as the "five big generals" (Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, and Ye Qun, Lin's wife)—for fostering factionalism and challenging party norms.[69] This marked the first public rift, with Mao privately questioning the slogan "founded by Mao, guided by Lin" as overly elevating Lin's role.[69] Lin Biao, increasingly reclusive due to chronic health issues including neurasthenia and fear of assassination, adopted a passive stance, delegating influence to Ye Qun and their son Lin Liguo, a air force officer whose radical "small fleet" group harbored ambitions amid perceived threats to the family.[69] Mao, wary of military overreach echoing historical precedents like Peng Dehuai's 1959 criticism during the earlier Lushan Conference, intensified efforts to dilute Lin's control by reorganizing PLA commands and promoting non-Lin loyalists.[69] Tensions peaked during Mao's southern inspection tour from August 15 to September 12, 1971, including speeches in Wuhan, Changsha, and Nanchang where he explicitly attacked Lin for seeking the chairmanship and plotting a coup, rallied provincial leaders against Lin's "ultra-left" tendencies, criticized the vice-chairman's clique for personalism, and enacted personnel shifts such as appointing Hua Guofeng to head the Guangzhou Military Region on August 27, signaling a deliberate purge of Lin's network.[69][70] These moves, conveyed back to Beijing, provoked alarm within Lin's household, with Lin Liguo's alleged "Project 571" outline—critiquing Mao's rule as feudal fascist and proposing assassination tactics—emerging as a desperate countermeasure amid fears of imminent downfall, though its direct authorship by Lin remains disputed among historians.[69][70] The official Chinese Communist Party narrative, propagated post-incident, attributes primary agency to Lin Liguo's faction, but academic analyses emphasize Mao's proactive destabilization as the causal trigger for the escalating impasse.[70]Alleged Coup Planning
The Chinese government accused Lin Biao of masterminding a coup d'état against Mao Zedong, codenamed Project 571—homophonous in Chinese with "armed uprising"—primarily through plans drafted by his son, Lin Liguo, who effectively controlled the People's Liberation Army Air Force.[3] The "Outline of Project 571," discovered in Lin Liguo's office shortly after the September 13, 1971, plane crash, portrayed Mao as a tyrannical "B-52" (code for a heavy bomber symbolizing destructive power) whose policies during the Cultural Revolution had caused widespread suffering and economic ruin.[69] It criticized Mao's "fickleness and cruelty," arguing that his rule fostered feudal fascism and that only his removal could enable reforms, including decentralization of power and mitigation of radical excesses—ideas that eerily presaged post-Mao economic shifts in the 1980s.[69] The outline proposed multiple assassination methods targeting Mao during his southern inspection tour in late 1970 and early 1971, including derailing his train with explosives, using flame-throwers or grenades against his vehicle, poisoning his food or water supply, or bombing his residence.[69] These operations were to be executed by small teams of air force loyalists under Lin Liguo's command, with contingency plans for a broader military seizure if initial attempts succeeded, such as establishing a rival power base in Guangzhou under Lin Biao's nominal leadership.[3] Official accounts claimed several attempts failed due to Mao's security measures and the plotters' incompetence, prompting a desperate flight attempt on September 12-13, 1971, involving Lin Biao, his wife Ye Qun, Lin Liguo, and aides aboard a Trident jet.[3] Lin Biao's personal involvement remains contested, as the document's authorship is attributed to Lin Liguo and associates like Yu Xinye and Chen Liyun, with no direct evidence of the elder Lin's active participation; contemporaries described him as reclusive and physically frail from chronic illnesses, possibly phobias, rendering him unlikely to orchestrate intricate plots.[69] The outline's harsh denunciations of Mao, including predictions of his regime's collapse without a coup, suggest motivations driven by factional tensions and fears of purge, yet its post-crash discovery and lack of an original manuscript have fueled scholarly skepticism about potential fabrication or exaggeration by Mao's allies, such as Zhou Enlai, to consolidate power amid PLA unrest.[69] Nonetheless, the plan's exposure via internal investigations and confessions from surviving plotters, including air force officers, formed the basis for the Communist Party's posthumous condemnation of Lin Biao as a traitor.[3]Attempted Flight and Crash
On the night of September 12–13, 1971, Lin Biao, along with his wife Ye Qun, son Lin Liguo, and several associates including personal aides and military personnel, boarded a Hawker Siddeley HS-121 Trident 1E jet at Shanhaiguan Airport near Qinhuangdao, Hebei Province.[5] The aircraft departed without clearance from air traffic control around 2:25 a.m., initially heading southeast before turning northwest toward the Mongolian border and the Soviet Union.[71] Flight records and radar tracking indicated the plane flew at low altitude, evading detection, with an estimated eight to nine people aboard, though exact manifests remain disputed due to the absence of recovered flight logs.[32] The Trident crashed at approximately 2:30 a.m. local time near Öndörkhaan in eastern Mongolia's Khentii Province, after exhausting its fuel supply during an attempted diversion or emergency landing.[4] Eyewitness testimonies from local Mongolian herders reported seeing the aircraft trailing fire and smoke prior to impact, with the wreckage burning intensely upon hitting the ground, leaving little intact beyond charred remains and scattered debris over a 200-meter area.[71] No distress signals were transmitted, and the lack of a functional black box or voice recorder—standard for the model but unrecovered—has fueled speculation about mechanical failure, sabotage, or pilot error amid insufficient fuel for the intended route.[32] Soviet and Mongolian authorities investigated the site on September 13, confirming the identities of Lin Biao, Ye Qun, Lin Liguo, and five others through dental records, personal effects, and documents found amid the remains, including Lin's military ID and Communist Party membership card.[72] Autopsies indicated death by impact and fire, with no evidence of gunfire or explosion prior to the crash, though the Chinese government rejected foreign forensic access, relying instead on relayed summaries.[71] U.S. intelligence corroborated the crash and fatalities by early November 1971 through intercepted communications and satellite imagery, aligning with the physical evidence but independent of Beijing's coup-attempt narrative.[4]Death and Official Aftermath
Investigation Findings
The Chinese government's official investigation into the September 13, 1971, plane crash in Öndörkhaan, Mongolia, concluded that the Hawker Siddeley Trident 1E aircraft, carrying Lin Biao, his wife Ye Qun, son Lin Liguo, and six others, crashed due to fuel exhaustion after an unauthorized takeoff from Shanhaiguan Airport.[73] Prosecutors during the 1980-1981 trial of the Gang of Four detailed that the flight crew, lacking sufficient fuel for a nonstop journey to the Soviet Union, attempted an emergency landing in Mongolia but failed, leading to the aircraft stalling, striking the ground at low altitude, and exploding on impact.[73] Eyewitness accounts from Mongolian herders reported the plane circling erratically before crashing and igniting in a fireball, consistent with fuel-starved engines and post-impact fire.[69] Forensic examination by a joint Chinese-Mongolian team identified the nine victims through physical characteristics, documents recovered from the wreckage, and autopsies revealing death by blunt force trauma and burns, with no evidence of gunshot wounds or pre-crash violence suggesting sabotage or shoot-down.[5] Lin Biao's body was distinguished by his known medical history of tuberculosis scars and dental work, while Ye Qun and Lin Liguo were matched via personal effects and features.[74] The investigation recovered flight logs and manifests confirming the passengers' presence, though the flight data recorder was either destroyed in the fire or not located, limiting technical analysis of cockpit actions.[69] These findings, disseminated through internal CCP reports and later public trials, framed the incident as self-inflicted by the fugitives, with no mechanical failure attributed to external interference; however, the reliance on coerced confessions from associates for contextual details raised questions about interpretive biases in the broader narrative, despite the crash site's physical evidence appearing independently verifiable.[72] Mongolian authorities cooperated by securing the site and providing initial reports denying a distress call or forced landing request, aligning with the Chinese assessment of an illicit flight evading detection.[74]Political Purges Following the Incident
In the immediate aftermath of the September 13, 1971, plane crash that killed Lin Biao, Mao Zedong ordered a sweeping purge of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) high command to eliminate perceived loyalists and consolidate control. This action targeted senior officers seen as part of Lin's faction, resulting in the removal of thousands of military personnel, including executions of key figures, as Mao sought to neutralize any residual threats from the military establishment.[3] The purge reflected Mao's paranoia toward potential rivals, drawing parallels to earlier Stalinist tactics, and marked a decisive reassertion of his authority over the PLA following Lin's elevation as heir apparent.[3] Prominent victims included Huang Yongsheng, chief of the PLA General Staff; Wu Faxian, commander of the Air Force; Li Zuopeng, political commissar of the Navy; and Qiu Huizuo, director of the General Logistics Department, all close allies who had risen under Lin's patronage during the Cultural Revolution. These individuals were arrested in late September and October 1971, accused of complicity in Lin's alleged coup plot, with trials and investigations extending into subsequent years; for instance, Qiu Huizuo received a 16-year prison sentence. Over 1,000 supporters of Lin across the military were systematically removed, disrupting the PLA's command structure and prompting a shift toward depoliticization and emphasis on professionalization to prevent future factional challenges to civilian leadership.[19][66] The purges extended beyond the top echelons to mid-level officers and units affiliated with Lin's networks, particularly in air and logistics branches, fostering an atmosphere of fear that curtailed the military's independent political role until the mid-1970s.[3] This campaign not only dismantled Lin's influence but also facilitated Mao's rehabilitation of select moderates, such as Zhou Enlai, while reinforcing the centrality of personal loyalty in CCP-military relations.[3] By early 1972, the PLA's involvement in civilian governance had diminished, with reforms aimed at restoring operational discipline over ideological mobilization.[66]Family Involvement and Consequences
Lin Biao's son, Lin Liguo, served as deputy director of the People's Liberation Army Air Force Operations Department and played a central role in drafting the "Outline of Project 571" in March 1971, a document outlining an armed coup against Mao Zedong, including assassination plans and establishment of a new regime if the plot succeeded.[75][76] The plan, authored by Lin Liguo and associates like Chen Liyun, Wang Weiguo, and Jiang Tengjiao, critiqued Mao's leadership as feudal fascist and proposed "armed uprising" as the only solution.[77] Lin Liguo's "joint fleet" group in Shanghai developed these schemes amid escalating tensions.[78] Lin Biao's wife, Ye Qun, actively supported her son's initiatives and exerted influence over family decisions, including coercing Lin Biao to board the escape flight despite his initial resistance.[74] On September 12, 1971, Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Lin Liguo departed Beidaihe in a haste, boarding a PLAAF Hawker Siddeley Trident aircraft bound for the Soviet Union; the plane crashed in Mongolia early on September 13, 1971, killing all nine aboard, including the three family members, due to fuel exhaustion after an aborted landing attempt.[74][5] Lin Biao's daughter Lin Liheng (also known as Doudou) opposed the family's actions; on September 7, 1971, she alerted military guards to the impending flight after learning of Lin Liguo's plans from him directly, contributing to the plot's exposure.[74][69] Despite her whistleblowing, Lin Liheng faced severe repercussions due to familial ties, including detention by the Chinese Communist Party following the incident, a suicide attempt, over a year in custody, and release only in 1975 after which she worked at a military academy.[79] Lin Biao was survived by two daughters, including Lin Liheng and another from his first marriage, Lin Xiaolin, who avoided direct involvement but endured political stigma and restrictions in the aftermath, with the family's legacy officially condemned as traitorous, leading to erasure of Lin Biao's prior honors and purges extending to relatives.[80] The deceased family members were posthumously vilified in official narratives as counter-revolutionaries, amplifying the incident's role in shifting Cultural Revolution dynamics.[5]Controversies and Alternative Interpretations
Doubts on the Coup Narrative
Historians Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun have challenged the official Chinese Communist Party narrative that Lin Biao actively orchestrated a coup against Mao Zedong, arguing instead that any plotting was confined to a minor faction led by Lin's son, Lin Liguo, with Lin Biao himself uninvolved due to his severe health decline, including debilitating phobias and physical frailties that rendered him politically passive and reclusive by 1971.[81] They portray Lin not as an ambitious plotter but as a reluctant participant in the Cultural Revolution's power struggles, trapped by loyalty oaths and Mao's unpredictable purges, lacking both motive and capacity for treason after his formal designation as Mao's successor in the 1969 constitution.[82] The key document cited as evidence, the "Project 571" outline detailing an alleged assassination scheme, originates from Lin Liguo's circle rather than Lin Biao directly, with its contents resting on solitary testimonies like that of Li Weixin, obtained amid post-crash interrogations prone to coercion in the ensuing political crackdowns.[71][32] Doubts about its authenticity persist, as no independent corroboration links Lin Biao to its authorship or endorsement, and its discovery timing—post-flight—suggests potential retroactive fabrication to justify the rapid condemnation of Lin's network.[83] Jin Qiu, leveraging insider perspectives from air force circles including her father Wu Faxian, further disputes the coup framework, positing the September 13, 1971, events as an escalation of family intrigues and elite miscommunications rather than premeditated rebellion, given Lin Biao's lifelong deference to Mao and the illogical pivot to Soviet defection absent prior anti-Mao actions.[84] This view aligns with observations of Lin's minimal engagement in late-stage politics, where his endorsements of Mao remained public even as tensions simmered, implying the narrative served Mao's consolidation of control amid factional threats rather than reflecting empirical disloyalty.[84]Theories of Mao's Involvement
Theories attributing Mao Zedong's involvement in the Lin Biao incident typically focus on indirect orchestration through political maneuvering rather than direct sabotage of the September 13, 1971, plane crash. Following the Lushan Conference in August 1970, where Lin Biao's ally Chen Boda proposed institutionalizing Mao's authority in ways perceived as limiting Mao's flexibility, Mao interpreted this as a bid for unchecked military dominance by Lin, prompting Mao to mobilize opposition within the Communist Party leadership.[74][85] Historians argue this shift marked Mao's deliberate effort to undermine Lin's position as designated successor, escalating suspicions that culminated in Lin's flight.[35] Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun contend in their analysis that Mao's growing distrust, fueled by Lin's health-related withdrawal and inability to restrain radical elements around him such as his son Lin Liguo, created a dynamic where Mao viewed Lin as a potential threat despite Lin's nominal loyalty during the Cultural Revolution.[86] They reject claims of a fully fledged coup plotted by Lin himself, instead portraying Mao's strategic purges and public criticisms as instrumental in provoking the preemptive escape attempt, though without evidence of Mao intending the fatal outcome.[87] This perspective emphasizes Mao's pattern of eliminating perceived rivals through psychological pressure and factional intrigue, as seen in prior campaigns against figures like Liu Shaoqi.[69] Speculative theories extending to direct complicity, such as orders for the plane's interception or fuel depletion, circulate in dissident accounts but lack forensic substantiation from the crash investigation in Mongolia, where the aircraft struck terrain near Öndörkhaan after running out of fuel.[74] These claims often stem from interpretations of Mao's control over air defenses and the rapid post-crash narrative framing Lin as a traitor, yet they remain unverified amid the opacity of Chinese archives.[88] Teiwes and Sun's archival-based work, drawing on internal Party documents, underscores that while Mao benefited politically from Lin's elimination—consolidating power ahead of foreign policy pivots like Sino-U.S. rapprochement—the incident arose from miscalculations rather than a meticulously planned assassination.[89] Official Chinese historiography dismisses such theories as counterrevolutionary fabrications, attributing the crash solely to Lin's failed defection.[90]Modern Historical Debates
Scholars have increasingly questioned the official People's Republic of China (PRC) narrative that Lin Biao actively orchestrated a coup d'état against Mao Zedong in September 1971, portraying him instead as a figure ensnared by the volatile politics of the Cultural Revolution. In their 1996 analysis, Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun contend that the so-called "Project 571" coup outline—detailing an assassination plot—was primarily the initiative of Lin's son, Lin Liguo, and a small circle of air force officers, rather than a directive from Lin Biao himself, who remained politically inert, physically frail from chronic illnesses, and ideologically committed to Mao's leadership until the end.[91] They base this on declassified Chinese documents and internal party communications, arguing that Lin's "involvement" stemmed from familial loyalty and fear of impending purges amid Mao's shifting alliances, not personal ambition for power.[86] This revisionist perspective challenges the PRC's post-incident portrayal of Lin as a "revisionist" traitor, emphasizing instead the causal role of Mao's paranoia and the Cultural Revolution's incentive structures, which rewarded radicalism but punished perceived disloyalty. Teiwes and Sun highlight that Lin's earlier promotion as Mao's designated successor in the 1969 PRC Constitution was a tactical expedient during the Cultural Revolution's chaos, not a stable power transfer, and that by 1970–1971, Mao had grown wary of Lin's military influence, evidenced by directives sidelining PLA figures at the Lushan Conference in August 1970.[92] Similarly, Jin Qiu's 1999 study underscores the improbability of Lin—a strategist behind key victories like the Liaoshen Campaign in 1948—botching a coup given his control over the People's Liberation Army, attributing the incident to intra-elite tensions exacerbated by Mao's health decline and succession maneuvering.[84] Debates persist over the plane crash on September 13, 1971, near Öndörkhaan, Mongolia, where Lin, his wife [Ye Qun](/page/Ye Qun), Lin Liguo, and five others perished. Official PRC accounts claim the overloaded Trident jet, lacking clearance and fuel for a Soviet route, crashed due to pilot error or sabotage by its occupants fleeing to the Soviet Union or Taiwan. However, investigations by Mongolian authorities and Soviet forensic experts, including autopsies on September 14, 1971, found no signs of gunfire, explosives, or mechanical sabotage, attributing the crash to fuel exhaustion after a low-altitude flight evading radar, with the aircraft carrying approximately 6 tons of luggage exceeding design limits.[69] Some analysts, drawing on Lin Liheng's 1980s testimony—Lin Biao's daughter who alerted authorities on September 12—speculate the flight was an impulsive escape prompted by coup exposure and Mao's retaliation, rather than a premeditated defection, though her account has been scrutinized for inconsistencies under interrogation.[74] Contemporary scholarship cautions against PRC sources from the 1971–1976 period, which served to legitimize Mao's purges of over 1,000 PLA officers, as they reflect post-hoc rationalizations amid the Gang of Four's influence. Western historians, with access to émigré memoirs and limited archival releases under Deng Xiaoping, advocate a "tragic inevitability" model: Lin's rise and fall as emblematic of Maoist system's instability, where loyalty oaths like the 1966 "loyalty dance" masked underlying factionalism. No peer-reviewed evidence supports theories of Mao directly ordering the crash, though Mao's September 1971 meetings with allies like Zhou Enlai suggest preemptive consolidation against Lin's network. These debates underscore ongoing archival inaccessibility in China, limiting definitive causal attributions.[3]Legacy and Assessments
Military Accomplishments
Lin Biao joined the National Revolutionary Army at Whampoa Military Academy in 1925 and participated in the Northern Expedition, aligning with Communist forces by 1927. During the Jiangxi Soviet period from 1931 to 1934, he commanded the 1st Army Group of the Red Army, defending against five Nationalist encirclement campaigns through guerrilla tactics and mobile warfare.[10] In the Long March of 1934–1935, Lin's forces covered over 6,000 miles, engaging in defensive actions that contributed to the survival of approximately 8,000 of the original 86,000 participants, earning him a reputation for tactical acumen.[7] As commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Lin orchestrated the ambush at Pingxingguan Pass on September 25, 1937, where his troops destroyed a Japanese supply convoy, inflicting around 1,000 casualties on the Imperial Japanese Army in one of the early Communist victories against Japan, though he was severely wounded shortly after.[93][14] Post-World War II, Lin assumed command of the Northeast People's Liberation Army in 1946, reorganizing it into the Northeast Field Army by January 1948 with over 700,000 troops. He directed the Liaoshen Campaign from September 12 to November 2, 1948, encircling and annihilating approximately 470,000 Nationalist troops in Manchuria, securing the region's strategic rail hub of Shenyang and decisively shifting the Chinese Civil War's momentum toward the Communists.[24] Following this, Lin's forces advanced in the Pingjin Campaign from November 1948 to January 22, 1949, capturing Tianjin and Beijing with minimal destruction, eliminating over 500,000 Nationalist soldiers and consolidating control over northern China. His Fourth Field Army then crossed the Yangtze River in April 1949, seizing Nanjing on April 23 and advancing southward to occupy Hainan Island by May 1950, contributing to the Communists' nationwide victory.[10][7] Lin declined Mao Zedong's request to command Chinese forces in the Korean War in 1950, citing health issues, and played no direct operational role, with Peng Dehuai leading the People's Volunteer Army instead. In 1955, he was awarded the rank of Marshal of the People's Republic of China, one of ten conferred, recognizing his Civil War contributions.[1][94]Criticisms of Political Actions
Lin Biao's political actions during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) have drawn criticism for exacerbating ideological extremism and enabling widespread purges through his influence over the People's Liberation Army (PLA). As Minister of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Lin prioritized the propagation of Mao Zedong Thought, authoring the foreword to the 1964 edition of Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (the "Little Red Book") and mandating its intensive study within the PLA, where it became the primary text for political education, often comprising up to 99% of reading time. This effort transformed the military into a ideological vanguard, embedding Mao's directives as unquestionable dogma and contributing to a personality cult that critics contend promoted blind obedience, suppressed dissent, and laid the groundwork for the Cultural Revolution's factional violence and anarchy.[95][3] Lin's oversight of the PLA facilitated its intervention in civilian power struggles, including the suppression of Red Guard factions and the ousting of "revisionist" leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, whose purge in 1966–1967 involved military enforcement of attacks on party institutions. While Lin issued directives like the January 1967 "Eight Points" nominally to curb excessive violence, PLA units under his command often aligned with conservative factions, resulting in brutal crackdowns that led to thousands of deaths during the "January Storm" seizures of power in cities like Shanghai and Wuhan. Official CCP assessments post-1971, such as those in Central Committee documents, condemned these actions as ultra-leftist adventurism that destabilized governance, though such narratives reflect the party's need to scapegoat Lin to preserve Mao's legacy amid the era's estimated 1–2 million deaths from purges and conflict.[3][32] Further reproach centers on Lin's consolidation of power via the politicization of the PLA, sidelining professional military training in favor of loyalty tests and Maoist indoctrination, which weakened operational readiness—as evidenced by opposition to modernization efforts like those advocated by Chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing, purged in 1965 partly under Lin's influence. In spring 1969, amid Sino-Soviet border clashes, Lin declared martial law through "Order Number One," using the crisis to eliminate internal rivals and entrench military control over society, actions decried as opportunistic authoritarianism that prioritized factional survival over national stability. Scholarly analyses, drawing on memoirs of aides like Zhang Yunsheng, qualify Lin's agency as limited and reactive—often delegated to his wife Ye Qun—yet affirm that his position amplified the Cultural Revolution's coercive mechanisms, fostering a climate where ideological conformity trumped empirical military or political reasoning.[3][32]Long-Term Impact on Chinese Communism
The Lin Biao incident of September 13, 1971, precipitated widespread disillusionment among participants in the Cultural Revolution, including educated youth who had fervently supported Mao Zedong's radical campaigns, as the apparent betrayal by Mao's designated successor exposed contradictions in the movement's ideological foundations.[96] [97] This erosion of faith in ultra-leftist fervor marked a pivotal shift, initiating China's recovery from the political chaos and economic stagnation of the late Cultural Revolution period by 1971–1972, as the incident underscored the risks of unchecked personal loyalty and factional intrigue within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The event triggered extensive purges within the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Mao's institutional base during the Cultural Revolution, with investigations targeting over 1,000 senior officers associated with Lin's network and the removal of cadres who had risen under his influence in the early 1960s.[3] These actions diminished the PLA's political dominance, which had peaked under Lin's vice chairmanship, and instilled a lasting caution against military involvement in party leadership, contributing to the professionalization of the armed forces and stricter civilian oversight in subsequent decades.[98] In the post-Mao era, the incident facilitated cadre rehabilitations at county and prefectural levels, dethroning Mao-era elites tied to Lin's radicalism and clearing space for pragmatic leaders, including Deng Xiaoping's return to power in 1973 following his prior purge.[99] By the CCP's 1981 Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party, Lin was officially condemned alongside the Gang of Four as a counter-revolutionary force, providing ideological justification for abandoning continuous revolution in favor of economic reforms and opening up, which prioritized stability and development over ideological purity.[100] This reframing highlighted the perils of succession crises rooted in personalistic rule, influencing the party's adoption of collective leadership norms to mitigate factional risks.[101]References
- https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/Lin_Biao
