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Perfect competition
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In economics, specifically general equilibrium theory, a perfect market, also known as an atomistic market, is defined by several idealizing conditions, collectively called perfect competition, or atomistic competition. In theoretical models where conditions of perfect competition hold, it has been demonstrated that a market will reach an equilibrium in which the quantity supplied for every product or service, including labor, equals the quantity demanded at the current price. This equilibrium would be a Pareto optimum.[1]

Perfect competition provides both allocative efficiency and productive efficiency:

  • Such markets are allocatively efficient, as output will always occur where marginal cost is equal to average revenue i.e. price (MC = AR). In perfect competition, any profit-maximizing producer faces a market price equal to its marginal cost (P = MC). This implies that a factor's price equals the factor's marginal revenue product. It allows for derivation of the supply curve on which the neoclassical approach is based. This is also the reason why a monopoly does not have a supply curve. The abandonment of price taking creates considerable difficulties for the demonstration of a general equilibrium except under other, very specific conditions such as that of monopolistic competition.
  • In the short-run, perfectly competitive markets are not necessarily productively efficient, as output will not always occur where marginal cost is equal to average cost (MC = AC). However, in the long-run, productive efficiency occurs as new firms enter the industry. Competition reduces price and cost to the minimum of the long run average costs. At this point, price equals both the marginal cost and the average total cost for each good (P = MC = AC).

The theory of perfect competition has its roots in late-19th century economic thought. Léon Walras[2] gave the first rigorous definition of perfect competition and derived some of its main results. In the 1950s, the theory was further formalized by Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu.[3]

Imperfect competition was a theory created to explain the more realistic kind of market interaction that lies in between perfect competition and a monopoly. Edward Chamberlin wrote "Monopolistic Competition" in 1933 as "a challenge to the traditional viewpoint that competition and monopolies are alternatives and that individual prices are to be explained in either terms of one or the other" (Dewey,88.) In this book, and for much of his career, he "analyzed firms that do not produce identical goods, but goods that are close substitutes for one another" (Sandmo,300.)

Another key player in understanding imperfect competition is Joan Robinson, who published her book "The Economics of Imperfect Competition" the same year Chamberlain published his. While Chamberlain focused much of his work on product development, Robinson focused heavily on price formation and discrimination (Sandmo,303.) The act of price discrimination under imperfect competition implies that the seller would sell their goods at different prices depending on the characteristic of the buyer to increase revenue (Robinson,204.) Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlain came to many of the same conclusions regarding imperfect competition while still adding a bit of their twist to the theory. Despite their similarities or disagreements about who discovered the idea, both were extremely helpful in allowing firms to understand better how to center their goods around the wants of the consumer to achieve the highest amount of revenue possible.

Real markets are never perfect. Those economists who believe in perfect competition as a useful approximation to real markets may classify those as ranging from close-to-perfect to very imperfect. The real estate market is an example of a very imperfect market. In such markets, the theory of the second best proves that if one optimality condition in an economic model cannot be satisfied, it is possible that the next-best solution involves changing other variables away from the values that would otherwise be optimal.[4]

In modern conditions, the theory of perfect competition has been modified from a quantitative assessment of competitors to a more natural atomic balance (equilibrium) in the market. There may be many competitors in the market, but if there is hidden collusion between them, the competition will not be maximally perfect. But if the principle of atomic balance operates in the market, then even between two equal forces perfect competition may arise. If we try to artificially increase the number of competitors and to reduce honest local big business to small size, we will open the way for unscrupulous monopolies from outside.[5]

Idealizing conditions of perfect competition

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The definition of perfect competition is when the following conditions all hold:[6]

  • A large number of sellers and buyers – A large number of consumers with the willingness and ability to buy the product at a certain price, and a large number of producers with the willingness and ability to supply the product at a certain price. As a result, individuals are unable to significantly influence prices.[7] One requirement for this is non-increasing returns to scale (including network effects), ensuring that a monopoly doesn't push out competitors.
  • Homogeneous products: The products are perfect substitutes for each other (i.e., the qualities and characteristics of a market good or service do not vary between different suppliers).
  • Utility maximizing participants: Rational buyers always attempt to maximize their economic utility and sellers attempt to maximize their profit.
  • Perfect information: All consumers and producers know all prices of products and utilities they would get from owning each product.[8]
  • Zero transaction costs: Buyers and sellers do not incur costs in making an exchange of goods. This includes no barriers to entry or exit (no sunk costs) and perfect factor mobility where the factors of production are perfectly mobile and costlessly, allowing workers to freely move between firms and other adjustments to changing market conditions.[8]
  • No externalities: Costs or benefits of an activity do not affect third parties. This criterion also excludes any government intervention.
  • Well defined property rights: These determine what may be sold, as well as what rights are conferred on the buyer.

While no real market is perfect, many markets are considered to be near enough to perfect for predictions from economic theory to be reasonably accurate. It has been proven that if the above conditions hold, that every participant will be a price taker and will not have market power to set prices, and all sellers will operate such that their marginal costs equal their marginal revenue.

There are many instances in which there exist "similar" products that are close substitutes (such as butter and margarine), which are relatively easily interchangeable, so that a rise in the price of one good will cause a significant shift to the consumption of the close substitute. If the cost of changing a firm's manufacturing process to produce the substitute is also relatively "immaterial" in relationship to the firm's overall profit and cost, this is sufficient to ensure that an economic situation isn't significantly different from a perfectly competitive economic market.[9]

Normal profit

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In a perfect market the sellers operate at zero economic surplus: sellers make a level of return on investment known as normal profits.

Normal profit is a component of (implicit) costs and not a component of business profit at all. It represents all the opportunity cost, as the time that the owner spends running the firm could be spent on running a different firm. The enterprise component of normal profit is thus the profit that a business owner considers necessary to make running the business worth while: that is, it is comparable to the next best amount the entrepreneur could earn doing another job.[10] Particularly if enterprise is not included as a factor of production, it can also be viewed a return to capital for investors including the entrepreneur, equivalent to the return the capital owner could have expected (in a safe investment), plus compensation for risk.[11] In other words, the cost of normal profit varies both within and across industries; it is commensurate with the riskiness associated with each type of investment, as per the risk–return spectrum.

In circumstances of perfect competition, only normal profits arise when the long run economic equilibrium is reached; there is no incentive for firms to either enter or leave the industry.[12]

In competitive and contestable markets

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Only in the short run can a firm in a perfectly competitive market make an economic profit.

Economic profit does not occur in perfect competition in long run equilibrium; if it did, there would be an incentive for new firms to enter the industry, aided by a lack of barriers to entry until there was no longer any economic profit.[11] As new firms enter the industry, they increase the supply of the product available in the market, and these new firms are forced to charge a lower price to entice consumers to buy the additional supply these new firms are supplying as the firms all compete for customers (See "Persistence" in the Monopoly Profit discussion).[13][14][15][16] Incumbent firms within the industry face losing their existing customers to the new firms entering the industry, and are therefore forced to lower their prices to match the lower prices set by the new firms. New firms will continue to enter the industry until the price of the product is lowered to the point that it is the same as the average cost of producing the product, and all of the economic profit disappears.[13][14] When this happens, economic agents outside of the industry find no advantage to forming new firms that enter into the industry, the supply of the product stops increasing, and the price charged for the product stabilizes, settling into an equilibrium.[13][14][15]

The same is likewise true of the long run equilibria of monopolistically competitive industries and, more generally, any market which is held to be contestable. Normally, a firm that introduces a differentiated product can initially secure a temporary market power for a short while (See "Persistence" in Monopoly Profit). At this stage, the initial price the consumer must pay for the product is high, and the demand for, as well as the availability of the product in the market, will be limited. In the long run, however, when the profitability of the product is well established, and because there are few barriers to entry,[13][14][15] the number of firms that produce this product will increase until the available supply of the product eventually becomes relatively large, the price of the product shrinks down to the level of the average cost of producing the product. When this finally occurs, all monopoly profit associated with producing and selling the product disappears, and the initial monopoly turns into a competitive industry.[13][14][15] In the case of contestable markets, the cycle is often ended with the departure of the former "hit and run" entrants to the market, returning the industry to its previous state, just with a lower price and no economic profit for the incumbent firms.

Profit can, however, occur in competitive and contestable markets in the short run, as firms jostle for market position. Once risk is accounted for, long-lasting economic profit in a competitive market is thus viewed as the result of constant cost-cutting and performance improvement ahead of industry competitors, allowing costs to be below the market-set price.

In non-competitive markets

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A monopolist can set a price in excess of costs, making an economic profit. The above diagram shows a monopolist (only one firm in the market) that obtains a (monopoly) economic profit. An oligopoly usually has economic profit also, but operates in a market with more than just one firm (they must share available demand at the market price).

Economic profit is, however, much more prevalent in uncompetitive markets such as in a perfect monopoly or oligopoly situation. In these scenarios, individual firms have some element of market power: Though monopolists are constrained by consumer demand, they are not price takers, but instead either price-setters or quantity setters. This allows the firm to set a price that is higher than that which would be found in a similar but more competitive industry, allowing them economic profit in both the long and short run.[13][14]

The existence of economic profits in the long run depends on the prevalence of barriers to entry: these stop other firms from entering into the industry and sapping away profits,[16] as they would in a more competitive market. In cases where barriers are present, but more than one firm, firms can collude to limit production, thereby restricting supply in order to ensure that the price of the product remains high enough for all firms in the industry to achieve an economic profit.[13][16][17]

However, some economists, for instance Steve Keen, a professor at the University of Western Sydney, argue that even an infinitesimal amount of market power can allow a firm to produce a profit and that the absence of economic profit in an industry, or even merely that some production occurs at a loss, in and of itself constitutes a barrier to entry.

In a single-goods case, a positive economic profit happens when the firm's average cost is less than the price of the product or service at the profit-maximizing output. The economic profit is equal to the quantity of output multiplied by the difference between the average cost and the price.

Government intervention

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Often, governments will try to intervene in uncompetitive markets to make them more competitive. Antitrust (US) or competition (elsewhere) laws were created to prevent powerful firms from using their economic power to artificially create the barriers to entry they need to protect their economic profits.[14][15][16] This includes the use of predatory pricing toward smaller competitors.[13][16][17] For example, in the United States, Microsoft Corporation was initially convicted of breaking Anti-Trust Law and engaging in anti-competitive behavior in order to form one such barrier in United States v. Microsoft; after a successful appeal on technical grounds, Microsoft agreed to a settlement with the Department of Justice in which they were faced with stringent oversight procedures and explicit requirements[18] designed to prevent this predatory behaviour. With lower barriers, new firms can enter the market again, making the long run equilibrium more like that of a competitive industry, with no economic profit for firms.

In a regulated industry, the government examines firms' marginal cost structure and allows them to charge a price that is no greater than this marginal cost. This does not necessarily ensure zero Economic profit for the firm, but eliminates a "Pure Monopoly" Profit.

If a government feels it is impractical to have a competitive market – such as in the case of a natural monopoly – it will sometimes try to regulate the existing uncompetitive market by controlling the price firms charge for their product.[14][15] For example, the old AT&T (regulated) monopoly, which existed before the courts ordered its breakup, had to get government approval to raise its prices. The government examined the monopoly's costs to determine whether the monopoly should be able raise its price, and could reject the monopoly's application for a higher price if the cost did not justify it. Although a regulated firm will not have an economic profit as large as it would in an unregulated situation, it can still make profits well above a competitive firm in a truly competitive market.[15]

Results

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In the short run, it is possible for an individual firm to make an economic profit. This situation is shown in this diagram, as the price or average revenue, denoted by , is above the average cost denoted by .
However, in the long run, economic profit cannot be sustained. The arrival of new firms or expansion of existing firms (if returns to scale are constant) in the market causes the (horizontal) demand curve of each individual firm to shift downward, bringing down at the same time the price, the average revenue and marginal revenue curve. The outcome is that, in the long run, the firm will make only normal profit (zero economic profit). Its horizontal demand curve will touch its average total cost curve at its lowest point. (See cost curve.)

In a perfectly competitive market, the demand curve facing a firm is perfectly elastic.

As mentioned above, the perfect competition model, if interpreted as applying also to short-period or very-short-period behaviour, is approximated only by markets of homogeneous products produced and purchased by very many sellers and buyers, usually organized markets for agricultural products or raw materials. In real-world markets, assumptions such as perfect information cannot be verified and are only approximated in organized double-auction markets where most agents wait and observe the behaviour of prices before deciding to exchange (but in the long-period interpretation perfect information is not necessary, the analysis only aims at determining the average around which market prices gravitate, and for gravitation to operate one does not need perfect information).

In the absence of externalities and public goods, perfectly competitive equilibria are Pareto-efficient, i.e. no improvement in the utility of a consumer is possible without a worsening of the utility of some other consumer. This is called the First Theorem of Welfare Economics. The basic reason is that no productive factor with a non-zero marginal product is left unutilized, and the units of each factor are so allocated as to yield the same indirect marginal utility in all uses, a basic efficiency condition (if this indirect marginal utility were higher in one use than in other ones, a Pareto improvement could be achieved by transferring a small amount of the factor to the use where it yields a higher marginal utility).

A simple proof assuming differentiable utility functions and production functions is the following. Let be the 'price' (the rental) of a certain factor , let and be its marginal product in the production of goods and , and let and be these goods' prices. In equilibrium these prices must equal the respective marginal costs and ; remember that marginal cost equals factor 'price' divided by factor marginal productivity (because increasing the production of good by one very small unit through an increase of the employment of factor requires increasing the factor employment by and thus increasing the cost by , and through the condition of cost minimization that marginal products must be proportional to factor 'prices' it can be shown that the cost increase is the same if the output increase is obtained by optimally varying all factors). Optimal factor employment by a price-taking firm requires equality of factor rental and factor marginal revenue product, , so we obtain , .

Now choose any consumer purchasing both goods, and measure his utility in such units that in equilibrium his marginal utility of money (the increase in utility due to the last unit of money spent on each good), , is 1. Then , . The indirect marginal utility of the factor is the increase in the utility of our consumer achieved by an increase in the employment of the factor by one (very small) unit; this increase in utility through allocating the small increase in factor utilization to good is , and through allocating it to good it is again. With our choice of units the marginal utility of the amount of the factor consumed directly by the optimizing consumer is again w, so the amount supplied of the factor too satisfies the condition of optimal allocation.

Monopoly violates this optimal allocation condition, because in a monopolized industry market price is above marginal cost, and this means that factors are underutilized in the monopolized industry, they have a higher indirect marginal utility than in their uses in competitive industries. Of course, this theorem is considered irrelevant by economists who do not believe that general equilibrium theory correctly predicts the functioning of market economies; but it is given great importance by neoclassical economists and it is the theoretical reason given by them for combating monopolies and for antitrust legislation.

Profit

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In contrast to a monopoly or oligopoly, in perfect competition it is impossible for a firm to earn economic profit in the long run, which is to say that a firm cannot make any more money than is necessary to cover its economic costs. In order not to misinterpret this zero-long-run-profits thesis, it must be remembered that the term 'profit' is used in different ways:

  • Neoclassical theory defines profit as what is left of revenue after all costs have been subtracted; including normal interest on capital plus the normal excess over it required to cover risk, and normal salary for managerial activity. This means that profit is calculated after the actors are compensated for their opportunity costs.[19]
  • Classical economists on the contrary define profit as what is left after subtracting costs except interest and risk coverage. Thus, the classical approach does not account for opportunity costs.[19]

Thus, if one leaves aside risk coverage for simplicity, the neoclassical zero-long-run-profit thesis would be re-expressed in classical parlance as profits coinciding with interest in the long period (i.e. the rate of profit tending to coincide with the rate of interest). Profits in the classical meaning do not necessarily disappear in the long period but tend to normal profit. With this terminology, if a firm is earning abnormal profit in the short term, this will act as a trigger for other firms to enter the market. As other firms enter the market, the market supply curve will shift out, causing prices to fall. Existing firms will react to this lower price by adjusting their capital stock downward.[20] This adjustment will cause their marginal cost to shift to the left causing the market supply curve to shift inward.[20] However, the net effect of entry by new firms and adjustment by existing firms will be to shift the supply curve outward.[20] The market price will be driven down until all firms are earning normal profit only.[21]

It is important to note that perfect competition is a sufficient condition for allocative and productive efficiency, but it is not a necessary condition. Laboratory experiments in which participants have significant price setting power and little or no information about their counterparts consistently produce efficient results given the proper trading institutions.[22]

Shutdown point

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In the short run, a firm operating at a loss [ (revenue less than total cost) or (price less than unit cost)] must decide whether to continue to operate or temporarily shut down.[23] The shutdown rule states "in the short run a firm should continue to operate if price exceeds average variable costs".[24] Restated, the rule is that for a firm to continue producing in the short run it must earn sufficient revenue to cover its variable costs.[25] The rationale for the rule is straightforward: By shutting down a firm avoids all variable costs.[26] However, the firm must still pay fixed costs.[27] Because fixed costs must be paid regardless of whether a firm operates they should not be considered in deciding whether to produce or shut down. Thus in determining whether to shut down a firm should compare total revenue to total variable costs () rather than total costs (). If the revenue the firm is receiving is greater than its total variable cost (), then the firm is covering all variable costs and there is additional revenue ("contribution"), which can be applied to fixed costs. (The size of the fixed costs is irrelevant as it is a sunk cost. The same consideration is used whether fixed costs are one dollar or one million dollars.) On the other hand, if then the firm is not covering its production costs and it should immediately shut down. The rule is conventionally stated in terms of price (average revenue) and average variable costs. The rules are equivalent (if one divides both sides of inequality by gives ). If the firm decides to operate, the firm will continue to produce where marginal revenue equals marginal costs because these conditions insure not only profit maximization (loss minimization) but also maximum contribution.

Another way to state the rule is that a firm should compare the profits from operating to those realized if it shut down and select the option that produces the greater profit.[28][29] A firm that is shut down is generating zero revenue and incurring no variable costs. However, the firm still has to pay fixed cost. So the firm's profit equals fixed costs or .[30] An operating firm is generating revenue, incurring variable costs and paying fixed costs. The operating firm's profit is . The firm should continue to operate if , which simplified is .[31][32] The difference between revenue, , and variable costs, , is the contribution to fixed costs and any contribution is better than none. Thus, if then firm should operate. If the firm should shut down.

A decision to shut down means that the firm is temporarily suspending production. It does not mean that the firm is going out of business (exiting the industry).[33] If market conditions improve, and prices increase, the firm can resume production. Shutting down is a short-run decision. A firm that has shut down is not producing. The firm still retains its capital assets; however, the firm cannot leave the industry or avoid its fixed costs in the short run. Exit is a long-term decision. A firm that has exited an industry has avoided all commitments and freed all capital for use in more profitable enterprises.[34]

However, a firm cannot continue to incur losses indefinitely. In the long run, the firm will have to earn sufficient revenue to cover all its expenses and must decide whether to continue in business or to leave the industry and pursue profits elsewhere. The long-run decision is based on the relationship of the price and long-run average costs. If then the firm will not exit the industry. If , then the firm will exit the industry. These comparisons will be made after the firm has made the necessary and feasible long-term adjustments. In the long run a firm operates where marginal revenue equals long-run marginal costs.[35]

Short-run supply curve

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The short-run () supply curve for a perfectly competitive firm is the marginal cost () curve at and above the shutdown point. Portions of the marginal cost curve below the shutdown point are not part of the supply curve because the firm is not producing any positive quantity in that range. Technically the supply curve is a discontinuous function composed of the segment of the curve at and above minimum of the average variable cost curve and a segment that runs on the vertical axis from the origin to but not including a point at the height of the minimum average variable cost.[36]

Criticisms

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The use of the assumption of perfect competition as the foundation of price theory for product markets is often criticized as representing all agents as passive, thus removing the active attempts to increase one's welfare or profits by price undercutting, product design, advertising, innovation, activities that – the critics argue – characterize most industries and markets. These criticisms point to the frequent lack of realism of the assumptions of product homogeneity and impossibility to differentiate it, but apart from this, the accusation of passivity appears correct only for short-period or very-short-period analyses, in long-period analyses the inability of price to diverge from the natural or long-period price is due to active reactions of entry or exit.

Some economists have a different kind of criticism concerning perfect competition model. They are not criticizing the price taker assumption because it makes economic agents too "passive", but because it then raises the question of who sets the prices. Indeed, if everyone is price taker, there is the need for a benevolent planner who gives and sets the prices, in other word, there is a need for a "price maker". Therefore, it makes the perfect competition model appropriate not to describe a decentralized "market" economy but a centralized one. This in turn means that such kind of model has more to do with communism than capitalism.[37]

Another frequent criticism is that it is often not true that in the short run differences between supply and demand cause changes in price; especially in manufacturing, the more common behaviour is alteration of production without nearly any alteration of price.[38]

The critics of the assumption of perfect competition in product markets seldom question the basic neoclassical view of the working of market economies for this reason. The Austrian School insists strongly on this criticism, and yet the neoclassical view of the working of market economies as fundamentally efficient, reflecting consumer choices and assigning to each agent his contribution to social welfare, is esteemed to be fundamentally correct.[39] Some non-neoclassical schools, like Post-Keynesians, reject the neoclassical approach to value and distribution, but not because of their rejection of perfect competition as a reasonable approximation to the working of most product markets; the reasons for rejection of the neoclassical 'vision' are different views of the determinants of income distribution and of aggregated demand.[40]

In particular, the rejection of perfect competition does not generally entail the rejection of free competition as characterizing most product markets; indeed it has been argued[41] that competition is stronger nowadays than in 19th century capitalism, owing to the increasing capacity of big conglomerate firms to enter any industry: therefore the classical idea of a tendency toward a uniform rate of return on investment in all industries owing to free entry is even more valid today; and the reason why General Motors, Exxon or Nestlé do not enter the computers or pharmaceutical industries is not insurmountable barriers to entry but rather that the rate of return in the latter industries is already sufficiently in line with the average rate of return elsewhere as not to justify entry. On this few economists, it would seem, would disagree, even among the neoclassical ones. Thus when the issue is normal, or long-period, product prices, differences on the validity of the perfect competition assumption do not appear to imply important differences on the existence or not of a tendency of rates of return toward uniformity as long as entry is possible, and what is found fundamentally lacking in the perfect competition model is the absence of marketing expenses and innovation as causes of costs that do enter normal average cost.

The issue is different with respect to factor markets. Here the acceptance or denial of perfect competition in labour markets does make a big difference to the view of the working of market economies. One must distinguish neoclassical from non-neoclassical economists. For the former, absence of perfect competition in labour markets, e.g. due to the existence of trade unions, impedes the smooth working of competition, which if left free to operate would cause a decrease of wages as long as there were unemployment, and would finally ensure the full employment of labour: labour unemployment is due to absence of perfect competition in labour markets. Most non-neoclassical economists deny that a full flexibility of wages would ensure the full employment of labour and find a stickiness of wages an indispensable component of a market economy, without which the economy would lack the regularity and persistence indispensable to its smooth working. This was, for example, John Maynard Keynes's opinion.

Particularly radical is the view of the Sraffian school on this issue: the labour demand curve cannot be determined hence a level of wages ensuring the equality between supply and demand for labour does not exist, and economics should resume the viewpoint of the classical economists, according to whom competition in labour markets does not and cannot mean indefinite price flexibility as long as supply and demand are unequal, it only means a tendency to equality of wages for similar work, but the level of wages is necessarily determined by complex sociopolitical elements; custom, feelings of justice, informal allegiances to classes, as well as overt coalitions such as trade unions, far from being impediments to a smooth working of labour markets that would be able to determine wages even without these elements, are on the contrary indispensable because without them there would be no way to determine wages.[42]

Equilibrium in perfect competition

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Equilibrium in perfect competition is the point where market demands will be equal to market supply. A firm's price will be determined at this point. In the short run, equilibrium will be affected by demand. In the long run, both demand and supply of a product will affect the equilibrium in perfect competition. A firm will receive only normal profit in the long run at the equilibrium point.[43]

As it is well known, requirements for a firm's cost-curve under perfect competition is for the slope to move upwards after a certain amount is produced. This amount is small enough to leave a sufficiently large number of firms in the field (for any given total outputs in the industry) for the conditions of perfect competition to be preserved. For the short-run, the supply of some factors are assumed to be fixed and as the price of the other factors are given, costs per unit must necessarily rise after a certain point. From a theoretical point of view, given the assumptions that there will be a tendency for continuous growth in size for firms, long-period static equilibrium alongside perfect competition may be incompatible.[44]

See also

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References

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Perfect competition is a theoretical model in depicting an idealized where numerous small firms and buyers interact, none of whom can influence the market , resulting in firms acting as price takers. This structure assumes homogeneous products, perfect information available to all participants, free entry and exit for firms with no barriers or sunk costs, and negligible transaction costs, ensuring that resources flow efficiently without artificial restrictions. In such markets, equilibrium occurs where price equals for each firm, fostering both —where resources are allocated to produce goods valued by consumers at their production cost—and , as firms operate at minimum in the long run due to competitive pressures eroding any supernormal profits. The model serves as a benchmark for evaluating real-world market performance, highlighting how deviations like or information asymmetries lead to inefficiencies such as . Despite its analytical value, perfect competition is rarely observed empirically, as real markets typically feature , entry barriers, imperfect information, or strategic behaviors that prevent the strict conditions from holding; agricultural commodities like occasionally approximate it under certain conditions, but even these deviate due to factors like interventions or transportation costs. Critics argue the model's assumptions overlook dynamic processes like driven by temporary monopolies, yet it underscores the causal link between intense and resource optimization absent in less competitive structures.

Core Assumptions and Model Foundations

Defining Characteristics of Perfect Competition

Perfect competition is a theoretical in which no individual buyer or seller possesses sufficient to influence the prevailing , resulting in firms acting as price takers who must accept the market-determined . This condition arises from the presence of a large number of both buyers and sellers, each representing a negligible fraction of the total market, such that the actions of any single participant have no discernible impact on market outcomes. A second core characteristic is the homogeneity of products offered by all firms, ensuring that goods or services are identical in quality, features, and performance, thereby eliminating buyer preferences based on seller-specific attributes and preventing differentiation-driven pricing power. This uniformity implies perfect substitutability among suppliers' outputs, as consumers view products from different firms as interchangeable without regard to source. Perfect information is another defining feature, whereby all market participants—buyers and sellers alike—possess complete, costless, and symmetric knowledge of current prices, product characteristics, available technologies, and resource inputs across the market. Such transparency eliminates informational asymmetries that could otherwise allow for strategic withholding or manipulation, ensuring efficient decision-making and rapid arbitrage of any discrepancies. Finally, free entry and exit of firms underpin the model, with no barriers such as legal restrictions, significant sunk costs, or that would prevent new entrants from joining the market or incumbents from departing in response to profit opportunities or losses. This mobility extends to resources, allowing to shift seamlessly between uses without frictions, facilitating long-term adjustments toward equilibrium. In practice, these characteristics collectively yield a benchmark for , though real-world markets rarely satisfy all conditions simultaneously.

Assumptions of Perfect Information, Mobility, and Homogeneity

In the model of perfect competition, the assumption of product homogeneity posits that all firms produce identical goods or services, rendering consumers indifferent among suppliers based solely on rather than perceived differences or branding. This eliminates , ensuring that no single firm can exert through unique attributes, as exemplified by commodities like agricultural where a from any producer is interchangeable. Perfect information requires that all buyers and sellers possess complete, symmetric knowledge of market prices, product characteristics, available technologies, and prevailing conditions, with such data accessible at negligible cost. This symmetry prevents informational asymmetries that could distort , enabling every participant to respond instantaneously to market signals and transact at equilibrium prices determined by aggregate supply and . Perfect mobility of factors assumes that inputs such as labor and capital can relocate freely across firms and industries without barriers or transaction costs, particularly in the long run, resulting in uniform factor prices for all producers. This frictionless movement facilitates efficient , as factors flow toward higher-return uses, underpinning the model's predictions of entry, exit, and long-run equilibrium adjustments.

Rationale as a Theoretical Benchmark

Perfect competition serves as a theoretical benchmark in because its idealized assumptions yield outcomes of allocative and , providing a standard against which real-world market imperfections can be measured. Under these conditions, firms produce at the minimum of their long-run curve where price equals , ensuring resources are allocated to their highest-valued uses without . This equilibrium state maximizes social welfare by equating and surplus in a Pareto-efficient manner, as no reallocation could improve one party's welfare without harming another. The model's rationale lies in its role as a normative ideal for and , highlighting the costs of deviations such as or . For instance, in monopoly or , prices exceed , leading to underproduction and welfare losses estimated in empirical studies at up to 5-10% of GDP in affected sectors; perfect competition eliminates such inefficiencies through price-taking behavior and free entry. Economists use it to quantify these gaps, as seen in analyses of antitrust interventions where competitive approximations correlate with lower prices and higher output. Although rarely observed empirically due to assumptions like and product homogeneity, the benchmark's value persists in causal assessments of market dynamics, informing regulatory frameworks that aim to approximate its efficiencies. Real-world approximations, such as agricultural markets in the mid-20th century, demonstrated near-zero long-run profits and output close to efficient levels, underscoring the model's for understanding adjustment processes over time. This framework avoids overreliance on flawed real-world data by deriving outcomes from first-principles logic of supply, demand, and incentives.

Firm Behavior and Decision-Making

Price-Taking Behavior and

In perfect competition, individual firms operate as takers because the market consists of a large number of small firms producing homogeneous products, rendering any single firm's output negligible relative to total supply and thus unable to influence the equilibrium . This price-taking behavior stems from the absence of , where firms must accept the prevailing market determined by and . The facing each firm is perfectly elastic and horizontal at the market , reflecting unlimited potential at that price without affecting it. Firms maximize profits by selecting the output quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, as this condition ensures that the additional revenue from selling one more unit precisely covers the additional cost of production. In this market structure, marginal revenue coincides with the market price due to the horizontal demand curve, so the profit-maximizing rule simplifies to producing where price equals marginal cost (P = MC). This equilibrium point occurs beyond the point of diminishing marginal returns, where the marginal cost curve is upward-sloping, allowing firms to adjust output efficiently in response to price signals. Profit levels depend on the relationship between and at this output level: positive economic profits arise if P > ATC, zero if P = ATC, and losses if P < ATC, though firms continue operating in the short run if P ≥ AVC to cover variable costs and contribute to fixed costs. This decision rule aligns with causal incentives, as deviations from P = MC would reduce profits by either underproducing (forgoing profitable units) or overproducing (incurring costs exceeding revenue). Empirical models of competitive industries, such as agriculture, illustrate this behavior, where producers respond to price fluctuations by adjusting quantities without attempting to set prices.

Marginal Cost and Revenue Analysis

In perfect competition, firms are price takers due to the large number of sellers and identical products, facing a horizontal demand curve at the prevailing market price PP. This implies that the firm can sell any quantity without affecting the price, so marginal revenue (MR), the additional revenue from selling one more unit, equals PP. Average revenue (AR), total revenue divided by quantity sold, also equals PP, making MR = AR = PP. Profit maximization requires the firm to produce where marginal cost (MC), the additional cost of producing one more unit, equals MR. Since MR = PP, this condition simplifies to MC = PP. At this output level, the incremental cost matches the incremental revenue, ensuring no further profitable adjustments; producing beyond this point would add more to costs than revenue, while producing less would forego profitable opportunities. This equilibrium derives from the first-order condition for maximizing profit π=TRTC\pi = TR - TC, where dπdq=MRMC=0\frac{d\pi}{dq} = MR - MC = 0, assuming a rising MC curve for the second-order condition to hold as a maximum. In the short run, the firm produces if PP \geq average variable cost (AVC) at this quantity to cover variable costs; otherwise, it shuts down to minimize losses. The MC curve above AVC thus serves as the firm's short-run supply curve.

Entry, Exit, and Adjustment Dynamics

In perfect competition, positive economic profits in the short run, where price exceeds average total cost (P > ATC), signal opportunities for expansion or new firm entry, as resources can be reallocated without barriers. This entry increases the number of firms, shifting the market supply curve rightward and lowering the equilibrium price until it equals the minimum average total cost, eliminating supernormal profits. The process assumes costless and frictionless mobility of factors, allowing entrants to replicate technologies and achieve identical cost structures. Conversely, short-run losses occur when price falls below average total cost (P < ATC), prompting marginal firms to shut down temporarily or exit permanently in the long run, as they cannot cover variable costs or total costs including opportunity expenses. Exit reduces the number of firms, shifting the market supply curve leftward, which raises the equilibrium price until surviving firms again earn zero economic profits at the minimum ATC. Zero economic profits here denote normal returns sufficient to cover all explicit and implicit costs, leaving no incentive for further adjustment. These dynamics yield a long-run market equilibrium where price equals marginal cost, minimum long-run average cost, and marginal revenue (P = MC = LRAC_min), with firms producing at efficient scale and the industry output determined by demand intersecting the long-run supply curve. In constant-cost industries, where input prices remain unchanged despite output expansion, the long-run supply curve is horizontal at the minimum ATC, reflecting unlimited scalability without cost escalation. Increasing-cost industries feature an upward-sloping long-run supply due to rising input prices from resource competition, while decreasing-cost cases exhibit downward slopes from economies of scale or external effects, though the core entry-exit mechanism persists to enforce zero profits. This adjustment ensures allocative efficiency, as resources flow to their highest-value uses without persistent rents.

Equilibrium Outcomes

Short-Run Equilibrium and Supply Responses

In perfect competition, the short-run equilibrium for an individual firm is achieved by producing the output quantity where marginal cost equals the market price, which coincides with marginal revenue given the firm's price-taking status. This condition holds because the firm's demand curve is perfectly elastic at the prevailing market price, making marginal revenue constant and equal to price. Firms cease production in the short run if price falls below average variable cost, as continuing operations would increase losses beyond those from fixed costs alone; thus, the shutdown point is at the minimum of the average variable cost curve. The short-run supply curve for a single firm derives from its marginal cost curve, specifically the segment lying above the average variable cost curve, reflecting the quantities it willingly supplies at various prices to cover variable costs and contribute to fixed costs when profitable. At prices below this threshold, supply is zero. The industry short-run supply curve emerges as the horizontal summation of all firms' individual supply curves, assuming a fixed number of firms due to short-run immobility of capital and entry barriers. Market equilibrium in the short run occurs at the intersection of the industry supply and demand curves, establishing the uniform price that all firms face. Shifts in demand prompt immediate supply responses: an increase in demand raises price, prompting existing firms to expand output along their marginal cost curves toward higher production levels, potentially yielding positive economic profits if price exceeds average total cost. Conversely, a demand decrease lowers price, reducing output and possibly incurring losses, though firms remain operational if price covers average variable cost. These adjustments highlight the short run's fixed factor constraints, contrasting with long-run dynamics.

Long-Run Equilibrium and Normal Profits

In perfect competition, the long-run equilibrium emerges through the process of free entry and exit of firms, which adjusts the market supply until economic profits are driven to zero across all firms. If short-run economic profits are positive, the price exceeds the minimum average total cost (ATC), incentivizing new firms to enter the market, thereby shifting the industry supply curve rightward and lowering the equilibrium price until it equals the minimum ATC. Conversely, if firms incur losses because price falls below minimum ATC, exit occurs, reducing supply, raising price, and restoring zero economic profit. This adjustment assumes constant input costs, resulting in a horizontal long-run industry supply curve at the price corresponding to the minimum long-run ATC for representative firms. Zero economic profit, often termed normal profit, signifies that total revenue exactly covers all explicit and implicit costs, including opportunity costs of capital and entrepreneurship, leaving no incentive for further entry or exit. At this equilibrium, each firm produces at the output level where price equals marginal cost (MC) and minimum ATC, achieving productive efficiency as firms operate at their lowest possible average cost per unit. The market quantity supplied equals demand at this price, with the number of firms adjusting endogenously to meet total demand without altering the equilibrium price under constant-cost conditions. This equilibrium reflects the benchmark of perfect competition where resources are allocated such that no firm can improve profits by altering output, and the industry sustains itself indefinitely without supernormal gains or unsustainable losses. Empirical approximations, such as agricultural commodity markets, illustrate near-zero long-run profits due to these dynamics, though real-world frictions like barriers or scale effects may deviate from the ideal.

Shutdown and Break-Even Points

In the short run, a perfectly competitive firm faces a shutdown decision when the market price falls below its minimum average variable cost (AVC). At this point, known as the shutdown point, the firm ceases production because revenues cannot cover variable costs, making total losses equal to fixed costs alone, which is preferable to operating and incurring greater losses. The shutdown point coincides with the output level where the marginal cost (MC) curve intersects the minimum of the AVC curve, as the price-taking firm equates price to MC for output decisions but only if price exceeds or equals this threshold. If price lies between the shutdown point and the break-even point—specifically, above minimum AVC but below minimum average total cost (ATC)—the firm continues operating in the short run, covering all variable costs and part of fixed costs, thereby minimizing losses compared to shutdown. This decision rests on the causal logic that variable costs, such as labor and materials, must be paid only if production occurs, whereas fixed costs like plant leases persist regardless. The break-even point occurs where price equals minimum ATC, enabling the firm to cover all economic costs, including opportunity costs of capital and entrepreneurship, resulting in zero economic profit (normal profit covering implicit returns). This point is at the output where MC intersects minimum ATC, and in long-run equilibrium under perfect competition, market adjustments drive price to this level through entry and exit. If price exceeds minimum ATC, the firm earns positive economic profits, attracting entry; if below but above shutdown, short-run losses prompt scrutiny but not immediate exit, as sunk fixed costs influence long-run decisions differently. These points derive from cost minimization and profit maximization under price-taking behavior, assuming rational firms respond to marginal incentives without market power.

Efficiency and Welfare Implications

Allocative and Productive Efficiency

In perfect competition, allocative efficiency is achieved when the price of a good equals its marginal cost (P = MC), ensuring that resources are directed toward their most valued uses as the marginal benefit to consumers matches the marginal opportunity cost of production. This condition holds because firms in perfect competition are price takers, setting output where marginal revenue (equal to price) equals marginal cost, thereby aligning individual firm decisions with social optimality in equilibrium. At the market level, the equilibrium quantity occurs where the demand curve (reflecting marginal benefit) intersects the supply curve (reflecting marginal cost), preventing under- or over-production relative to societal welfare. Productive efficiency requires that goods be produced at the lowest possible average total cost (ATC), minimizing resource waste per unit of output. In the long run under perfect competition, free entry and exit drive economic profits to zero, compelling surviving firms to operate at the minimum point of their long-run ATC curve, as any inefficiency would erode profits and invite competitive pressures. This outcome contrasts with short-run scenarios where firms may produce above minimum ATC due to positive or negative profits, but long-run adjustments ensure cost minimization across the industry. Perfect competition uniquely attains both efficiencies simultaneously in long-run equilibrium, where P = MC = minimum ATC, maximizing output without excess capacity or misallocation—conditions unattainable in structures with barriers to entry or market power. Empirical approximations, such as agricultural commodity markets, demonstrate near-achievement of these efficiencies when transaction costs are low and information is symmetric, though real-world frictions like regulation can deviate outcomes.

Pareto Optimality and Deadweight Loss Absence

In the framework of general equilibrium theory, a competitive equilibrium under perfect competition achieves Pareto optimality, meaning no reallocation of resources can improve the welfare of one individual without reducing that of another. This result follows from the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, which holds that, given assumptions of complete markets, perfect information, convex preferences, and no externalities, any equilibrium allocation in a perfectly competitive economy is Pareto efficient. The theorem underscores that decentralized price-taking behavior by firms and consumers leads to an outcome where marginal rates of substitution equal marginal rates of transformation across goods, ensuring resources are allocated to equate private and social marginal benefits and costs. In partial equilibrium analysis of a single market, perfect competition ensures allocative efficiency by setting price equal to marginal cost (P = MC) at the equilibrium quantity, where supply intersects demand. This condition maximizes total social surplus—the sum of consumer and producer surplus—as the marginal benefit to consumers (reflected in the demand curve) precisely matches the marginal cost of production (reflected in the supply curve). Any deviation from this quantity would reduce net surplus, confirming the Pareto-superior nature of the equilibrium relative to other feasible allocations without transfers. Consequently, perfect competition eliminates deadweight loss (DWL), the inefficiency arising from under- or over-production relative to the socially optimal level. DWL represents foregone surplus from transactions that could occur but do not, often visualized as the triangular area between supply and demand curves beyond the equilibrium point. In competitive equilibrium, production occurs exactly at the point maximizing surplus, leaving no such unexploited gains; all potential mutually beneficial trades are realized through price signals and free entry/exit. This absence holds in both short-run and long-run equilibria, provided the market assumptions persist, contrasting sharply with market power structures where P > MC generates persistent DWL. Empirical approximations in highly competitive sectors, such as certain agricultural commodities, align with this theoretical prediction by exhibiting near-maximal surplus capture.

Comparison to Imperfect Market Structures

Imperfect market structures, including monopoly, , and , deviate from perfect competition by granting firms , enabling prices to exceed and generating . In perfect competition, equilibrium occurs where price equals , ensuring as resources are allocated to their highest-valued uses without surplus loss. By contrast, monopolies restrict output to where equals , yielding price above and a triangle that captures the net welfare reduction from underproduction. Productive efficiency, defined as production at minimum average , is realized in the long-run equilibrium of perfect competition due to free entry and exit driving profits to zero at the cost minimum. Monopolies, shielded by barriers, often operate with supernormal profits but may not minimize , forgoing productive efficiency. Monopolistic competition features and downward-sloping demand curves, leading to excess capacity where firms produce below the , even after entry erodes economic profits to zero. Oligopolies, characterized by few interdependent firms, can sustain higher prices through or strategic barriers, amplifying beyond monopolistic levels in some cases, though outcomes vary with game-theoretic interactions like Cournot or Bertrand models. Unlike perfect competition's Pareto-optimal outcome with maximized total surplus, imperfect structures redistribute surplus toward producers while shrinking the overall pie via inefficiency.
Market StructureAllocative Efficiency (P=MC)Productive Efficiency (Min ATC)Presence of Deadweight Loss
Perfect CompetitionYesYes (long run)No
MonopolyNoNoYes
Monopolistic CompetitionNoNo (excess capacity)Yes
OligopolyTypically NoVaries, often NoYes

Historical Development

Origins in Classical and Neoclassical Economics

The concept of perfect competition emerged from classical economists' emphasis on rivalry and free markets as mechanisms for resource allocation, though without the formalized static equilibrium later developed by neoclassicals. Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1776), described competition as an "invisible hand" guiding self-interested individuals toward societal benefits, with markets featuring numerous participants engaging in independent actions, sufficient rivals to prevent monopoly pricing, and knowledge of market conditions enabling efficient outcomes. Smith viewed competition not as a static state but as a dynamic process fostering division of labor and productivity growth through expanding markets, critiquing restrictions like guilds that stifled entry. David Ricardo extended this in On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), analyzing competition's role in determining rents, wages, and profits under free trade and mobility of labor and capital, where excess profits attract entrants until returns normalize, aligning prices with costs. Classical thinkers thus privileged competition's corrective forces against inefficiencies, laying groundwork for later models by assuming rational agents and market freedom drive convergence to natural prices. Neoclassical economics formalized perfect competition as an idealized equilibrium benchmark during the marginal revolution of the late 19th century. Léon Walras, in Éléments d'économie politique pure (1874), provided the first rigorous mathematical definition, modeling an economy with innumerable price-taking agents, homogeneous goods, perfect information, and a tâtonnement process adjusting prices to clear all markets simultaneously in general equilibrium. Walras's framework assumed no transaction costs or barriers, yielding Pareto-efficient outcomes where supply equals demand across interdependent markets, distinguishing it from classical dynamics by focusing on static coordination under perfect foresight. Alfred Marshall, in Principles of Economics (1890), complemented this with partial equilibrium analysis, depicting competitive industries where firms are small relative to the market, producing homogeneous outputs at marginal cost equaling price, with free entry ensuring long-run zero economic profits. Marshall's supply-demand scissors integrated time dimensions—short-run fixed factors yielding supernormal profits, long-run adjustments eroding them—building on classical rivalry but embedding it in utility maximization and marginal productivity. This contrasted with classical views by treating perfect competition as a hypothetical ideal for welfare rather than empirical description, enabling derivations of properties like allocative optimality. While classicals like Smith and observed competition's tendency toward uniformity in rates of return, neoclassicals quantified it through equilibrium conditions, influencing subsequent theory despite debates over assumption realism. The model's origins reflect a shift from process-oriented to outcome-focused stasis, prioritizing deductive rigor over historical contingency.

Key Theoretical Contributions

Léon Walras laid foundational groundwork for perfect competition within his outlined in Éléments d'économie politique pure (1874), positing an economy of price-taking agents where competitive bidding by numerous traders ensures without strategic behavior, though he did not explicitly term it "perfect competition." further developed the model through partial equilibrium analysis in Principles of Economics (1890), describing competitive markets with many small firms producing homogeneous goods, where firms act as price takers, marginal cost equals price at equilibrium, and industry supply derives from aggregating firm-level curves above average variable cost. Marshall's framework emphasized short-run and long-run adjustments, with free entry driving zero economic profits in the long run under constant . Frank Knight provided the most explicit and comprehensive formulation in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921), defining perfect competition as requiring not only infinite buyers and sellers with homogeneous products and perfect mobility but also perfect knowledge, negligible transaction costs, and static conditions to eliminate , thereby isolating pure exchange and production efficiency. Knight distinguished this ideal from empirical competition, arguing it serves as a benchmark for analyzing profits arising from rather than market imperfections. Subsequent refinements in the mid-20th century, notably by and , integrated perfect competition into axiomatic general equilibrium models, proving the existence and uniqueness of equilibria under assumptions of , complete markets, and price-taking behavior, as detailed in their 1954 paper and Debreu's Theory of Value (1959). These contributions underscored the model's role in demonstrating as an outcome of decentralized competitive processes.

Evolution in 20th-Century Economic Thought

In the early , the term "perfect competition" entered widespread use through Frank Knight's 1921 analysis in Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, where it described an idealized static equilibrium with numerous price-taking agents, homogeneous goods, free entry and exit, and , serving to isolate the effects of on entrepreneurial profits. This formulation shifted emphasis from classical dynamic rivalry toward a neoclassical equilibrium benchmark, building on partial equilibrium tools from Alfred Marshall's late-19th-century work while formalizing conditions for pricing and zero long-run economic profits. The 1930s marked a refinement amid challenges, as theories of monopolistic and by (1933) and (1933) highlighted and strategic behavior in real markets, prompting neoclassical economists to defend perfect competition as a limiting case for welfare comparisons rather than a literal description. These developments integrated the model into broader microeconomic synthesis, underscoring its implications for efficiency under assumptions of rational maximization and no externalities, even as partial equilibrium gave way to more comprehensive general equilibrium frameworks. Mid-century advancements, particularly Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu's 1954 proof of equilibrium existence, embedded perfect competition within by demonstrating that, under convex technologies, complete contingent markets, and atomistic agents, competitive outcomes yield Pareto-efficient allocations via decentralized price signals. This mathematical rigor, extending Walrasian ideas, established the First Welfare Theorem—equating competitive equilibria with Pareto optimality—and positioned the model as a foundational tool for analyzing market failures and interventions, influencing postwar policy debates on antitrust and resource distribution. By the late , George Stigler's historical reevaluation framed perfect competition not as unattainable stasis but as an approximation achieved through rivalrous processes like entry and information dissemination, reinforcing its enduring role in neoclassical thought despite empirical deviations. These evolutions transformed the model from a descriptive ideal into a normative standard for evaluating deviations in concentration, barriers, and outcomes, with ongoing refinements incorporating elements while preserving core assumptions of flexibility and profit dissipation.

Empirical Approximations and Evidence

Real-World Markets Approaching Perfect Competition

Agricultural commodity markets, such as those for and corn, approximate perfect competition through the presence of numerous small-scale producers offering standardized products that are traded on centralized exchanges, enabling participants to act as price takers. In these markets, supply responds to global price signals, with farmers adjusting planting decisions based on prior harvests; for instance, U.S. corn production reached 15.1 billion bushels in 2023, distributed among over 350,000 farms averaging 1,400 acres each, minimizing individual influence on prices set by futures markets like the . However, government subsidies and weather-dependent supply introduce deviations from ideal conditions. Large, liquid stock exchanges, including the , exhibit traits nearing perfect competition for individual equities with high trading volumes, where millions of shares of identical stock units are bought and sold daily by diverse participants unable to sway prevailing prices. In 2023, the NYSE facilitated over 1.5 trillion shares traded across thousands of listings, with electronic order matching ensuring rapid and low transaction costs relative to trade size, fostering price-taking behavior among retail and institutional investors alike. Barriers like persist, yet the homogeneity of shares and informational efficiency via feeds align closely with theoretical benchmarks. Foreign exchange markets, handling $7.5 trillion in daily turnover as of , approach perfect competition through global, decentralized trading of standardized currency pairs by countless banks, corporations, and speculators, with electronic platforms providing near-instantaneous quotes and minimal entry costs for qualified participants. This structure promotes homogeneous pricing across 24-hour operations, as no single entity dominates turnover— the top five currencies account for 88% of trades, but dispersed prevents price control. Empirical analyses confirm high competitiveness, with bid-ask spreads averaging 1-2 pips for major pairs, reflecting efficient information incorporation. Seasonal variations and interventions represent key imperfections.

Empirical Studies on Competitive Outcomes

Empirical analyses of markets approximating perfect competition often focus on outcomes such as prices equaling marginal costs, absence of persistent supernormal profits, and allocative efficiency, using metrics like price-cost markups and experimental interventions. In fragmented sectors with low entry barriers, studies estimate markups (price over marginal cost) near unity, indicating competitive pricing; for instance, a 2024 cross-industry analysis tested perfect competition by computing price-to-marginal-cost ratios, finding values close to 1 in highly competitive settings like certain commodity trades, where deviations above 1 signal market power. Similarly, production-function-based markup estimations in U.S. manufacturing subsectors reveal low average markups (around 1.1-1.2) in periods of intense rivalry, consistent with marginal cost pricing under competitive pressure. Agricultural markets, frequently cited as empirical approximations due to numerous producers and homogeneous outputs, yield mixed evidence on competitive outcomes. A 2022 study of Japanese farm-level data from 2007-2016 found near-perfect , with firms producing at marginal cost equals , achieving static but resulting in razor-thin profits that stifle and dynamic entry. In contrast, experimental evidence from Kenyan maize trader markets, where randomized subsidies were allocated to test pass-through, showed traders capturing 70-80% of benefits rather than fully competing them away, implying oligopsonistic markups and inefficient allocation despite apparent fragmentation. U.S. fresh wholesale markets exhibit competitive markups in upstream segments, with econometric models of prices and costs indicating minimal deviations from pricing, though downstream retail consolidation introduces power. Contestable market frameworks, where low entry/exit costs enforce competitive behavior even with few incumbents, provide additional evidence of efficient outcomes without full structural perfect competition. Empirical tests in transportation industries, such as trucking in the , documented hit-and-run entry constraining incumbent markups, leading to 20-30% price declines and capacity expansions aligning with efficiency. A 2021 analysis of markets confirmed contestability predictions, with potential entry preventing profit dissipation and maintaining industry efficiency without expanding firm numbers. However, broader tests across industries reveal inconsistencies, such as persistent concentration correlating with efficiency losses, suggesting barriers often prevent ideal contestability. Overall, while long-run economic profits approach zero in such approximations—evidenced by profit rate equalization tendencies in competitive —systematic deviations persist due to asymmetries and scale effects, underscoring the model's as a benchmark rather than frequent reality.

Factors Impeding Realization (Including Government-Induced Barriers)

Barriers to entry and exit constitute primary impediments to perfect competition, as they restrict the free flow of firms into and out of markets, preventing the long-run adjustment toward zero economic profits. Natural barriers arise from , where high fixed costs—such as those in capital-intensive industries like production or airlines—favor larger incumbents and deter new entrants unable to achieve similar cost efficiencies immediately. Artificial barriers, including patents and copyrights, grant temporary exclusive rights, enabling supernormal profits but fragmenting the assumption of homogeneous products available to numerous sellers. Product differentiation further erodes the homogeneity required for perfect competition, as firms invest in branding, quality variations, or to create perceived uniqueness, allowing price-setting power rather than pure price-taking behavior. information, including asymmetric between buyers and sellers or search costs, introduces transaction frictions that real-world markets cannot eliminate, leading to suboptimal and persistent markups over marginal costs. Strategic behaviors, such as or capacity hoarding by dominant players, can also suppress competition, even absent formal . Government-induced barriers often exacerbate these issues through regulations designed ostensibly for public safety or but frequently influenced by incumbent lobbying, raising entry costs disproportionately for smaller or newer firms. Examples include requirements, which mandate s for services like or hair braiding, effectively creating cartels that limit supply and elevate prices; in one documented case, a state imposed solely after pressure from established firms. Sector-specific regulations in banking, , and utilities demand extensive compliance, with licensing fees and procedural hurdles shown empirically to reduce new firm entry rates by increasing upfront burdens. Subsidies to entrenched industries, tariffs on imports, and laws further entrench positions, distorting incentives away from competitive equilibrium; for instance, agricultural subsidies in the and have sustained oligopolistic structures despite commodity homogeneity. Empirical studies confirm that regulatory density correlates with diminished , as measured by lower business formation rates and higher concentration ratios in affected sectors. A cross-industry found that the volume of regulations and associated fees negatively impacts entry, particularly harming small firms and impeding dynamic . While some interventions address externalities like environmental damage, evidence indicates that overregulation—often captured by interest groups—generates deadweight losses exceeding benefits, underscoring how policy can inadvertently perpetuate .

Criticisms and Theoretical Challenges

Unrealism of Assumptions in Practice

The assumptions underlying perfect competition—such as an infinite number of infinitesimal buyers and sellers with no individual , product homogeneity, , zero and exit, and perfect factor mobility—deviate substantially from observable market conditions. Empirical analyses consistently reveal and pricing power in most industries, where price-to-marginal-cost ratios exceed unity, indicating non-competitive outcomes. For instance, a 2024 study examining U.S. firm-level data found average markups rising from approximately 1.1 in the to over 1.6 by the 2010s, driven by sector-specific imperfections rather than the zero-profit equilibrium predicted under perfect competition. Barriers to entry, both natural and artificial, prevent the free influx of firms necessary for competitive discipline. Natural barriers include economies of scale and high capital requirements, as in automobile manufacturing where startup costs can exceed billions of dollars, deterring new entrants and allowing incumbents to maintain supra-normal profits. Legal barriers, such as patents and regulatory approvals, further entrench positions; in pharmaceuticals, FDA processes and R&D investments averaging $2.6 billion per drug approved in 2014 create insurmountable hurdles for smaller players, leading to oligopolistic structures rather than atomistic competition. Product differentiation undermines homogeneity, with firms leveraging branding, quality variations, and innovation to segment demand. In consumer goods, entities like Coca-Cola command premiums through perceived uniqueness, enabling price-setting absent in the model; global grain trading exemplifies this, dominated by four firms (Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill, and Dreyfus) handling 70-90% of trade volumes despite commodity-like products. Imperfect information exacerbates these issues, as agents face search costs, asymmetric knowledge, and in complex economies. Consumers cannot costlessly compare all options, particularly in services or high-tech sectors; even in utilities, where comparison sites exist, full transparency eludes participants, fostering opportunities for opportunistic pricing. Factor markets similarly exhibit rigidities, with labor mobility constrained by skills mismatches and geographic factors, preventing the instantaneous resource reallocation assumed. methodologies for assessing intensity confirm these deviations across industries, using metrics like Lerner indices that rarely approach zero.

Critiques from Heterodox Schools (e.g., Austrian Economics)

Austrian economists, such as Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Israel Kirzner, fundamentally reject the neoclassical model of perfect competition as a misleading depiction of market dynamics, arguing that it conflates competition with a static equilibrium state devoid of entrepreneurial action and knowledge discovery. In their view, the model's assumptions of perfect information, instantaneous adjustment, and price-taking behavior eliminate the very rivalry and uncertainty that characterize real markets, rendering it irrelevant for understanding competitive processes. Mises, in Human Action (1949), describes competition as "catallactic rivalry" among entrepreneurs pursuing profits through superior foresight, not a passive equilibrium where firms lack incentives to innovate or differentiate. This contrasts with perfect competition's portrayal of firms as identical minimizers in a fully adjusted state, which Mises contends ignores the temporal structure of production and human action under uncertainty. Hayek extended this critique by emphasizing the knowledge problem: perfect competition presupposes omniscient actors with complete, costlessly available information, yet real serves as a "discovery procedure" to coordinate dispersed, that no central planner or model can replicate. In essays like "The Meaning of " (posthumously compiled), argues that the model's equilibrium eliminates active rivalry, as all opportunities for gain are exhausted, making it "the absence of all change" rather than a benchmark for . He further notes that such assumptions lead to misguided antitrust policies favoring "perfect" conditions over the dynamic benefits of imperfect, evolving markets. Kirzner, building on these foundations in Competition and Entrepreneurship (1973), redefines as an entrepreneurial alertness to profit opportunities amid ignorance, not the neoclassical end-state of zero profits and infinite elasticity. He critiques the model for viewing as absent in equilibrium—firms merely respond to prices without discovering new values—while real involves active challenging of market signals through and . Austrians collectively warn that idealizing perfect justifies interventions like breaking up firms to enforce price-taking, distorting the self-correcting market process that generates efficiency through trial-and-error, as evidenced by historical cases of regulatory overreach stifling . These perspectives prioritize process over outcome, asserting that markets approximate optimality not through idealized symmetry but via decentralized , a claim supported by observations of clusters in unregulated sectors like early 20th-century production.

Responses and Defenses of the Model's Utility

Defenders of the perfect competition model emphasize its role as a theoretical benchmark for evaluating market , rather than a literal description of real-world conditions. In long-run equilibrium, the model predicts , where price equals , ensuring resources are directed toward their highest-valued uses, and , where firms operate at minimum average total cost, maximizing output from given inputs. This framework achieves Pareto optimality, a state where no reallocation can improve one agent's welfare without harming another, providing a normative standard for . Milton Friedman, in his 1953 essay "The Methodology of Positive Economics," argued that economic models should be assessed by their predictive accuracy, not the realism of their assumptions, using perfect competition as an example of an "" that approximates sufficient elasticity of in many contexts to yield reliable forecasts. He noted that criticisms focusing on the model's abstractions—such as homogeneous goods or infinite buyers and sellers—miss its instrumental value in explaining phenomena like price determination under competitive pressures, where deviations from assumptions still allow for effective application through judgment. This approach counters charges of unrealism by prioritizing empirical validation over descriptive fidelity, as evidenced by the model's success in predicting outcomes in or financial markets with low . The model's utility extends to , serving as a for identifying inefficiencies in imperfect markets, such as monopolistic pricing above , which reduces consumer surplus and total welfare. Empirical approximations, like exchanges, demonstrate that closer adherence to competitive conditions correlates with outcomes nearer to the model's predictions, informing antitrust efforts to reduce barriers and enhance . Heterodox critiques, including those from Austrian economists highlighting entrepreneurial discovery absent in the model, are addressed by proponents who view perfect competition not as a of dynamic processes but as a static limit illustrating the gains from and entry, which real-world policies have empirically validated through increased and lower prices. Thus, the model retains analytical power by delineating causal mechanisms of , even if full realization remains theoretical.

Policy Implications and Applications

Use as a Benchmark in Antitrust and Regulation

In antitrust enforcement, the perfect competition model provides a normative benchmark for assessing and potential welfare losses, where firms price at , ensuring and maximal consumer surplus without . U.S. authorities, including the Department of Justice (DOJ) and (FTC), evaluate conduct under statutes like the Sherman Act by comparing observed or projected outcomes to this ideal, intervening when actions such as or exclusionary practices enable supracompetitive pricing or output restriction. For example, monopolization claims under Section 2 require demonstrating substantial , defined as the ability to control prices or exclude rivals in ways that deviate from competitive equilibria. Merger reviews similarly invoke perfect competition principles through in the DOJ and FTC's Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which presume anticompetitive effects if post-merger concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), exceeds thresholds signaling reduced rivalry—such as an HHI above 1,800 post-merger with a change greater than 100, indicating likely akin to rather than competitive dispersion. These presumptions stem from economic models where high concentration correlates with pricing above , as in perfect competition's zero-profit, price-taking equilibrium; the 2023 guidelines extend this to vertical and labor markets, scrutinizing efficiencies only if they offset presumed harms to competitive benchmarks. Empirical application appears in cases like the DOJ's challenge to the 2011 AT&T-T-Mobile merger, blocked due to projected HHI increases exceeding 1,000 in mobile wireless markets, which would have elevated prices beyond competitive levels estimated via econometric simulations. In economic regulation, particularly for industries with natural monopolies like utilities or , perfect competition serves as a reference for rate-setting to mimic efficient outcomes unattainable through actual entry. Regulators often impose pricing or incentive-based mechanisms, such as price caps, to approximate the pricing of perfect competition while covering fixed costs, preventing monopoly rents; for instance, post-1996 Telecommunications Act reforms in the U.S. aimed to foster competitive entry in local markets, using unbundling requirements benchmarked against hypothetical competitive access prices derived from cost models. This approach draws from , where deviations—evident in pre-regulation markups averaging 20-50% above costs in sectors like —justify intervention to restore nearer-competitive efficiency, though critics note that rigid can stifle dynamic incentives absent in the static perfect competition model.

Risks of Government Intervention Creating Distortions

Government interventions, such as subsidies, taxes, and regulatory barriers, often intended to address market imperfections or pursue equity objectives, can generate economic distortions by altering price signals and resource allocation in markets approximating perfect competition. These actions disrupt the equilibrium where price equals marginal cost, leading to deadweight losses—net welfare reductions from unproduced or overproduced goods. For instance, subsidies encourage overproduction beyond the efficient quantity, as producers respond to artificial incentives rather than consumer demand, resulting in excess supply and misallocated resources. Price controls, including floors like s or ceilings on rents, exemplify distortions by creating surpluses or shortages that prevent . Empirical analyses indicate that such interventions reduce employment or housing availability, with deadweight losses arising from forgone transactions; for example, hikes above equilibrium levels lead to among low-skilled workers, as firms hire fewer units of labor than optimal. Regulatory , such as licensing requirements or laws, protect incumbents and stifle , elevating prices and reducing output below competitive levels. Studies show these government-imposed hurdles correlate with higher concentration and inefficiencies, particularly in sectors like and transportation, where interventions exacerbate rather than mitigate failures. In labor markets, mandates distort relative prices, prompting firms to substitute away from regulated inputs, as evidenced by reduced hiring following expansions. Rent-seeking behaviors amplify these risks, as firms lobby for favorable interventions, diverting resources from productive uses and entrenching distortions. Comprehensive reviews of policy impacts reveal that government efforts to correct market failures frequently underperform free-market outcomes due to informational asymmetries and political incentives, yielding persistent inefficiencies. Deregulation episodes, conversely, demonstrate reversals of such losses, underscoring the causal link between intervention and distortion.

Evidence from Deregulation and Market Liberalization

The removed federal controls on routes and fares in the U.S. sector, enabling easier entry for new carriers and fostering rivalry among incumbents. Following implementation, the number of certified airlines surged from fewer than a dozen major carriers to over 100 by the early , with low-cost entrants like expanding access to previously underserved routes. Real average fares declined by approximately 50% in inflation-adjusted terms over the subsequent decades, driven by intensified price competition that pressured carriers toward marginal cost pricing in many markets. Passenger enplanements more than doubled from 204 million in 1978 to over 500 million by 1990, reflecting efficiency gains and broader market participation approximating conditions of numerous sellers and buyer responsiveness. In the trucking industry, the dismantled restrictions on entry, pricing, and routing, substantially lowering barriers that had previously limited the number of interstate operators to around 10,000 licensed firms. Post-deregulation, the number of for-hire carriers expanded rapidly, with entry rates increasing by over 50% in the first few years, leading to rate reductions of 20-30% on many hauls by 1985 as eroded supra-competitive margins. Service innovations, such as just-in-time delivery and specialized freight options, proliferated, enhancing and aligning prices more closely with costs in a landscape of fragmented suppliers. These shifts demonstrated how can induce firm behavior akin to price-taking in homogeneous product markets, with empirical studies confirming improvements and surplus gains exceeding $20 billion annually by the mid-1990s. Similar patterns emerged in railroads following the of 1980, which relaxed rate regulations and allowed confidential contracting, reversing decades of decline under prior oversight. Track mileage abandonment decreased, traffic volumes rebounded by 50% from 1980 to 2000, and rates fell by about 30% in competitive corridors, as mergers consolidated into fewer but more vigorous competitors serving shippers with output-responsive pricing. Across these transport sectors, empirically correlated with heightened contestability—low sunk costs enabling potential entry threats—which sustained competitive discipline even amid some consolidation, yielding outcomes like reduced and resource reallocation toward higher-value uses. While not attaining textbook perfect competition due to residual scale economies, these liberalizations provided robust of causal links between barrier removal and intensified rivalry, lower prices, and efficiency approximating the model's predictions.

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