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Silkworm (missile)
Silkworm (missile)
Silkworm (missile)
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The SY (Chinese: 上游; pinyin: Shàngyóu; lit. 'Upstream'), and HY (Chinese: 海鹰; pinyin: Hǎiyīng; lit. 'Sea Eagle') series were early anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) developed by the People's Republic of China from the Soviet P-15 Termit missile. They entered service in the late 1960s[2] and remained the main ASCMs deployed by the People's Liberation Army Navy through the 1980s. The missiles were used by the PRC and export customers to develop land-attack missiles.[3]

Key Information

The name Silkworm is popularly used for the entire SY and HY family. As a NATO reporting name, it applies only to the land-based variant of the HY-1.[4]

Development

[edit]
HY-2 missile
HY-3 missile

Chinese preparations were underway before receiving the first P-15s and related technical data from the Soviets in 1959. On 8 October 1956, the Fifth Academy was founded - with Qian Xuesen as director - to pursue missile development. In March 1958 a cruise missile test site was selected at Liaoxi in Liaoning.[2]

In November 1960, the first successful missile test was conducted after the withdrawal of Soviet advisors in September, due to the Sino-Soviet split. The P-15 was copied to become the SY-1. In October 1963, production started at the Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company. In 1965, the first successful test occurred. In August 1967, production was approved. The SY-1 entered service by the end of the decade.[2]

The SY-1 was developed into the improved HY-1. In December 1968, the HY-1 was successfully tested, and entered service in 1974.[5]

Operational history

[edit]

Iran–Iraq War

[edit]

The Silkworm gained fame in the 1980s when it was used by both sides in the Iran–Iraq War. Both countries were supplied by China. In 1987, Iran launched a number of Silkworm missiles from the Faw Peninsula, striking the American-owned, Liberian-flagged tanker Sungari and the U.S.-flagged tanker Sea Isle City in October 1987.[6] Five other missiles struck areas in Kuwait earlier in the year.[7]

In October 1987, Kuwait's Sea Island offshore oil terminal was hit by an Iranian Silkworm, which was observed to have originated from the Faw peninsula. The attack prompted Kuwait to deploy a Hawk missile battery on Failaka Island to protect the terminal.[8] In December 1987, another Iranian Silkworm was fired at the terminal, but it struck a decoy barge instead.[9]

Prior to these attacks the missile's range was thought to be less than 80 kilometres (50 mi), but these attacks proved that the range exceeded 100 kilometres (62 mi) with Kuwaiti military observers seeing that the missiles originated from the area and tracking them on radar along with US satellite imagery of the launch sites.[10]

Persian Gulf War

[edit]

On February 25, 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, a shore-based Iraqi launcher fired two Silkworm missiles at the USS Missouri which was in company with the USS Jarrett and HMS Gloucester. A Sea Dart missile from HMS Gloucester shot down one Silkworm and the other missed, crashing into the ocean.[11] Royal Air Force officers subsequently recovered an HY-2 missile at Umm Qasr in southern Iraq. It is currently displayed at the Royal Air Force Museum Midlands.[12]

Iraq War

[edit]

During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iraq used the Silkworm (HY-2 Seersucker) as a surface to surface missile, by firing at least two of them at the coalition positions in Kuwait.[13]

Blockade of Yemen

[edit]

On 12 October 2016, during the Blockade of Yemen, two Silkworm missiles were fired from the Houthi-controlled port of Al Hudaydah at the destroyer USS Mason operating in the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Both impacted the sea, possibly due to the countermeasures.[14][15]

Variants

[edit]

SY series

[edit]
SY-1
License produced version of the P-15 Termit.[2] NATO reporting name CSS-N-1 Scrubbrush.[1]
SY-2[1]
NATO reporting names CSS-N-5 Sabot. The SY-2 is a significant redesign of the SY-1 missile and is no longer a copy of the P-15. The missile has a longer airframe and is powered by a solid propellant rocket motor, instead of the liquid propellant design from the Styx. The SY-2 otherwise shares launchers and support equipment with the SY-1 (P-15), however, and eventually replaced the old missiles on unmodernized Jianghu class frigates.[16]
SY-2A
An improved SY-2 with a longer range.[16]
FL-2
The export version of the SY-2.[16]

HY series

[edit]
HY-1
NATO reporting names CSS-N-2 Safflower (ship-based) and CSSC-2 Silkworm (land-based.)[1]
HY-2
NATO reporting names CSS-N-3 Seersucker (ship-based) and CSSC-3 Seersucker (land-based.)[1]
HY-3
Unsuccessful supersonic variant.[17]
HY-4
Powered by a WP-11 turbojet, a reverse-engineered Teledyne-Ryan J69-T-41A.[18] Used for LACM development.[19] NATO reporting name Sadsack.[20]
HY-41
An improved HY-4.[21]
C-201
An export version of the HY-2.[17]
C-301
An export version of the HY-3.[22]
C-201W
An export version of the HY-4.[17]
XM-41
An export version of the HY-41.[21]

Further development

[edit]
YJ-6
Anti-ship missile developed from the HY-2.
YJ-63
Air-launched LACM sharing visual characteristics of the HY-2, HY-4, and YJ-6. 200 km range.[18]
AG-1
Longer-ranged variant of the HY-2 developed by North Korea.[23]

Operators

[edit]
 China
 Iran
Iraq
 North Korea

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Silkworm (missile)

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from Grokipedia
The Silkworm missile refers to the HY-1 and HY-2 series of Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles, with the NATO reporting name specifically applied to the land-based HY-1 variant, though popularly encompassing the improved HY-2 as well; these weapons were developed by the People's Republic of China through reverse-engineering of the Soviet P-15 Termit (SS-N-2 Styx) missile acquired in the early 1960s amid the Sino-Soviet split. The HY-1 entered service in the late 1960s as a coastal defense system, while the HY-2, introduced in the 1970s, featured enhancements such as extended range and improved propulsion using a liquid-fuel rocket booster paired with a turbojet sustainer engine. The HY-2 measures approximately 7.3 meters in length, with a launch weight of around 3,000 kilograms, a maximum range of 95 kilometers, and a 500-kilogram high-explosive ; it employs basic inertial guidance updated by for sea-skimming flight, followed by active terminal homing, but suffers from limited accuracy with a exceeding 100 meters, rendering single launches ineffective against defended targets. Capable of launches from land batteries, surface vessels, or , the missile's subsonic speed (Mach 0.75-0.9) and cross-section made it vulnerable to electronic warfare and interception systems prevalent by the 1980s. Widely proliferated through Chinese exports starting in the 1970s to nations including , , and , the Silkworm achieved limited combat employment during the Iran-Iraq War's Tanker Phase and Iraq's 1991 Scud campaign, where launches against naval and shore targets demonstrated marginal success marred by misses, duds, and defensive countermeasures, underscoring its role as an early, low-cost asymmetric deterrent rather than a precision strike weapon. Despite subsequent upgrades and derivatives in recipient states, the baseline design's obsolescence relative to modern integrated air defenses has confined its defining characteristics to historical proliferation risks and the foundational evolution of Chinese missile technology.

Development

Origins from Soviet technology

The development of the Silkworm missile series began with Chinese acquisition of Soviet (: SS-N-2 ) anti-ship technology in the late 1950s, amid broader Sino-Soviet military cooperation before the 1960 split. This transfer provided with design blueprints and likely missile samples, forming the basis for indigenous production rather than full-scale exports of complete systems. Chinese engineers at Factory 320 ( Aircraft Factory) initiated disassembly and adaptation efforts, focusing on replicating the P-15's core liquid-fuel propulsion and radar-guided airframe for coastal defense applications. The initial Chinese variant, designated SY-1 (CSS-N-1 Scrubbrush), emerged as a near-direct copy of the P-15, with preliminary factory testing completed in 1964 and the first flight test conducted in 1965. These milestones marked China's entry into anti-ship production, though the SY-1 retained many original Soviet components due to limited domestic capabilities at the time. Efforts emphasized shore-based to counter naval threats in the , establishing a foundational platform for subsequent iterations without significant modifications to the baseline design. Progress stalled during the (1966–1976), a period of political upheaval that purged technical experts, disrupted industrial coordination, and prioritized ideological campaigns over military R&D, thereby postponing SY-1 operational deployment until the mid-1970s. This internal chaos compounded challenges from the earlier , limiting sustained testing and serial production despite initial prototypes. Restoration of specialized teams post-1976 enabled resumption, but the decade-long interruption underscored vulnerabilities in China's nascent missile sector reliant on foreign-derived technology.

Chinese production and early testing

Following the , China initiated reverse engineering of the Soviet () in the early , utilizing available samples to develop indigenous production capabilities. The initial variant, designated SY-1 (CSS-N-1 Scrubbrush), underwent factory tests in August 1964, demonstrating basic flight and guidance functionality derived from the Soviet design. However, early iterations faced reliability challenges inherent to the rapid adaptation of foreign technology, including inconsistencies in propulsion stability and seeker performance under varied sea conditions. By the late 1960s, the SY-1 had entered limited service as China's first domestically produced , primarily for coastal defense applications. To address shortcomings in range and structural integrity, development shifted toward the improved HY-1 (CSS-N-2 ) variant around 1970, incorporating enhancements to the and liquid-fuel rocket motor for better stability and extended operational reach. Final design testing for the HY-1 achieved six hits out of seven firings in 1970, indicating hit probabilities exceeding 70% under controlled conditions, though real-world factors like target maneuvering would reduce effectiveness. The HY-1 was certified for production and entered service in 1974, marking the maturation of China's early program. Integration efforts under Project 021 focused on adapting the missiles for Type 021-class fast attack craft, which were indigenous copies of Soviet Osa-class boats, enabling tube-launched SY-1 deployments. Parallel work incorporated elevating launchers for HY-1 coastal batteries, overcoming logistical hurdles in transporter-erector alignment and battery mobility to support layered shoreline defense. These advancements laid the groundwork for operational deployment, despite persistent limitations in accuracy compared to later systems.

Major upgrades and export adaptations

The HY-2 variant, introduced in 1975, featured a stretched compared to the earlier HY-1, extending the missile's range to approximately 95 kilometers while maintaining liquid-fueled propulsion and guidance. This addressed limitations in the Soviet-derived P-15 design by increasing fuel capacity through a longer , enabling greater standoff distances for coastal defense roles. Export adaptations under the C-201 designation simplified certain electronics and seeker components to enhance reliability in environments with limited , prioritizing robustness over cutting-edge precision for recipient nations deploying in asymmetric conflicts. These modifications included hardened systems less susceptible to environmental interference, facilitating integration onto basic launch platforms without requiring advanced . In the , the HY-2G upgrade incorporated a high-precision radio , reducing sea-skimming altitude to 30–50 meters during level flight to evade detection and improve terminal-phase survivability against defenses. This enhancement, distinct from domestic inertial refinements, focused on export viability by boosting penetration against modern naval countermeasures while retaining compatibility with legacy systems.

Design and technical specifications

Airframe, propulsion, and flight profile


The Silkworm missile employs a robust, cylindrical optimized for subsonic anti-ship operations, featuring a streamlined that integrates fuel tanks, engine components, and structural reinforcements for withstanding launch stresses and sea-skimming dynamics. Standard dimensions across early variants include a body length of approximately 5.8 meters, a of 0.76 meters, and a of 2.4 meters with folding wings and tail surfaces for aerodynamic stability and control during cruise. Launch weights typically range from 2,100 to 2,300 kilograms, reflecting the inclusion of propellants and onboard systems that prioritize simplicity and reliability over . Propulsion consists of a tandem configuration: an underbody solid-propellant booster rocket provides initial for launch and to flight speed, separating shortly after ignition, while the main stage utilizes a liquid rocket engine fueled by storable hypergolic propellants, such as (UDMH) and inhibited (IRFNA). This setup delivers sustained for the majority of the trajectory, achieving speeds up to Mach 0.9, but imposes inherent limitations on agility due to binary burn phases without variable or extended loiter capability. The hypergolic nature ensures reliable ignition without external oxidizers, though it contributes to risks over time from residual propellants. The operational flight profile commences with booster-driven ascent, transitioning to sustainer for a mid-profile climb to cruising altitudes of 100 to 300 meters, which balances fuel efficiency and extension. Terminal descent shifts to a sea-skimming envelope at 10 to 50 meters above the wave tops, exploiting low observables for terminal approach while the fixed-thrust dictates a predictable, ballistic-influenced path with minimal evasive potential. This profile, constrained by the airframe's inertial stability and envelope, supports ranges up to 40 to 80 kilometers in baseline configurations, emphasizing volume fire over precision maneuvering.

Guidance systems and accuracy limitations

The base (HY-2) missile utilizes an seeker employing for , activating after the missile reaches the target area via pre-programmed inertial navigation. This seeker acquires surface targets within a detection range of 10-20 kilometers, depending on target cross-section and environmental conditions. Mid-course flight lacks real-time corrections or datalink updates in standard models, relying solely on initial and inertial inputs to direct the missile toward a designated search zone, which introduces cumulative errors from drift and inaccuracies over the full 80-100 kilometer range. The conical scan mechanism offers limited resistance to electronic warfare, rendering the system prone to deception by , infrared decoys, and broadband jamming, as it depends on unrefined without monopulse or frequency-agile features found in later iterations. Reported hit probabilities under controlled test conditions range from 70% to 90% against representative , reflecting inherent seeker resolution constraints and sensitivity to clutter rather than sub-10-meter precision. These limitations are compounded in configurations, where suboptimal crew proficiency in targeting and launch sequencing has been observed to degrade practical effectiveness beyond laboratory benchmarks.

Warhead, range, and launch platforms

The Silkworm missile (HY series) carries a high-explosive weighing approximately 500 kg, configured as a or fragmentation type optimized for anti-ship effects, enabling penetration of armored hulls and subsequent detonation to cause structural failure or fires. This capacity supports the destruction of destroyer-sized warships or significant damage to larger vessels and tankers through blast and shrapnel effects. Operational range for standard variants spans 35 to 150 km, influenced by fuel load, booster configuration, and sea-skimming flight altitude of 30-50 to minimize cross-section and extend effective standoff distance. Earlier HY-1 models achieve shorter reaches around 40-80 km, while upgraded HY-2 configurations extend to 95-130 km under optimal conditions. Launch platforms emphasize versatility across surface domains, with the HY-2 primarily deployed from mobile coastal trucks or fixed shore batteries for rapid repositioning and concealed firing. The SY-1 variant adapts for shipboard launch from surface combatants, integrating with naval fire control systems on destroyers and frigates. Certain HY-2 derivatives support air-launch from , leveraging altitude for initial boost and increased effective range over water.

Variants

Domestic Chinese series (SY and HY)

The SY-1 (NATO: CSS-N-1 Scrubbrush) represented China's first domestically produced anti-ship , directly replicating the Soviet design acquired in the late 1950s. Development commenced in the early at Aircraft Factory (Factory 320), with the missile entering () service in the late following approval for production. It achieved a maximum range of 40 kilometers, powered by a liquid-fuelled , and relied on radio-command guidance with active terminal homing, limiting its deployment to small missile boats suited for near-shore interception. The SY-1's limitations, including vulnerability to electronic countermeasures and modest accuracy, prompted its gradual phase-out by the in favor of enhanced variants, though it formed the foundational technology for subsequent coastal batteries. The HY-1 (NATO: CSS-N-2 Safflower), or Hai Ying-1 (""), emerged as an indigenous upgrade to the SY-1 in the early , incorporating refinements to the and seeker for better reliability during PLAN testing phases. Production of the HY series began in 1974, with the HY-1 retaining a comparable 40-50 kilometer range but introducing minor aerodynamic tweaks and improved inertial navigation to address SY-1 shortcomings in rough sea states. Primarily land-based for coastal defense, it supported PLAN exercises but saw limited serial deployment due to ongoing developmental hurdles amid the . Progressing to the HY-2 (NATO: CSSC-3 Seersucker) by the late 1970s, China extended the missile's fuselage for additional fuel, boosting range to 80-95 kilometers while maintaining subsonic speed (Mach 0.8) and a 500-kilogram high-explosive warhead. Serial production ramped up around 1978, enabling widespread integration into mobile coastal defense units and Type 051 destroyer launchers, with enhancements like a more precise radio altimeter allowing low-altitude skimming (under 20 meters) to evade radar detection. Later HY-2 subvariants, such as the HY-2A and HY-2G, refined terminal guidance—shifting from infrared to active radar in some models—and penetration capabilities, solidifying the series' role in PLAN anti-access strategies until superseded by supersonic YJ-series missiles in the 1980s and 1990s. These iterations emphasized evolutionary range and survivability gains over radical redesign, prioritizing mass deployment for littoral deterrence.

Export and reverse-engineered versions

The C-201 served as the primary export designation for the HY-2 Silkworm missile, supplied to and during the 1980s amid the Iran-Iraq War, with adaptations including television-guided terminal seekers in variants like the HY-2C to enhance precision against maritime targets despite environmental challenges such as radar clutter. These exports featured a baseline range of approximately 95 km and retained the liquid-fueled propulsion of the domestic HY-2, but incorporated seeker modifications for better terminal accuracy in export configurations. North Korea acquired around 200 HY-2 missiles from between 1976 and 1982, reverse-engineering them into the KN-01 anti-ship , which extended the operational range to 160 km through stretching and enhancements while maintaining the core inertial midcourse and active radar . The KN-01 adaptations prioritized coastal defense roles, with improved allowing for the increased standoff distance without altering the 500 kg warhead. Iraq designated its imported HY-2 missiles as and pursued local modifications for expanded ground-attack capabilities, incorporating inertial navigation upgrades around 1991 to enable surface-to-surface strikes by reducing reliance on homing vulnerable to electronic warfare. These changes involved integrating commercial inertial components for midcourse stability, though accuracy remained limited compared to purpose-built land-attack systems due to the missile's original maritime optimization.

Derivative developments in operator nations

Iran reverse-engineered imported HY-2 missiles into extended-range variants like the Ghader during the 2000s, incorporating inertial navigation systems (INS) and GPS for improved accuracy and a range exceeding 200 km. The Ghader, suitable for coastal and naval launch platforms, underwent initial testing in naval exercises on January 7, 2006. These modifications addressed the original HY-2's limitations in guidance reliability and sea-skimming precision, enabling better performance against maneuvering naval targets despite persistent vulnerabilities to electronic countermeasures. In , Houthi forces adapted simplified clones of HY-2-derived systems, supplied through Iranian channels, for asymmetric maritime strikes in the . These involved mobile truck-mounted launchers and rudimentary coastal batteries to target commercial and naval shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, prioritizing low-cost, high-volume fire over precision. Such adaptations emphasized through dispersion and rather than technological sophistication, reflecting resource constraints in prolonged irregular conflict. While the HY-2 achieved obsolescence in Chinese service by the early 2000s—superseded by the more advanced turbojet-powered YJ-8 and supersonic for superior speed, range, and evasion capabilities—proliferated derivatives endured in secondary operators' inventories. These sustained forms, often with minimal upgrades, highlight the missile's proliferation resilience despite outdated core design against modern defenses.

Operators and proliferation

Primary state operators

The developed and initially deployed the HY-2 Silkworm as its primary anti-ship , entering service with the in the late 1960s and serving as the mainstay through the 1980s before being phased out in frontline units by more advanced systems like the YJ-8 series in the post-1990s era. Iran acquired HY-2 Silkworm missiles from starting in 1987 during the latter stages of the , with estimates indicating an inventory of approximately 100 missiles deployed on 8 to 10 mobile launchers, including positions on islands such as and Farsi Island to cover the . North Korea operates the KN-01, a reverse-engineered variant of derived from Soviet SS-N-2 imports (around 150 missiles acquired between 1967 and the 1970s) and Chinese HY-2 technology, with subsequent domestic upgrades extending range to 180-300 km, though current stock levels are not publicly detailed. maintained an operational inventory of HY-2 Silkworms until the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, during which remaining stocks were expended in attacks on targets, resulting in depletion and no verified state-held reserves thereafter.

Non-state and proxy uses

Houthi rebels in , operating as an Iran-backed proxy force, have deployed variants of (HY-2) against maritime targets amid the ongoing civil war and confrontations. On October 9, 2016, the group launched one such missile from shore near the Bab al-Mandab Strait toward the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Mason, which intercepted it using electronic countermeasures, resulting in no damage or casualties. Three days later, on , another variant was fired at the same vessel but fell harmlessly into the water short of its target. These incidents marked early documented non-state uses of Silkworm-derived systems, likely sourced through Iranian supply chains or captured from Yemeni government arsenals tracing back to Iraqi or Iranian transfers during prior conflicts. Hezbollah, another Iranian proxy militia, has been linked to potential Silkworm transfers, with unverified reports from 2006 alleging direct provision of the missiles or their components during the Lebanon War. While employed Iranian-supplied C-802 anti-ship missiles—described in contemporary analyses as variants evolving from Chinese technology—to strike the Israeli corvette INS Hanit on July 14, 2006, killing four sailors, the precise role of baseline HY-2 systems remains unsubstantiated beyond speculation of technology sharing. Such proxy arming underscores proliferation risks, as non-state actors adapt state-origin weapons for asymmetric naval denial without formal acquisition channels. Broader unauthorized diversions pose ongoing threats, though empirical non-state black-market acquisitions in the lack confirmation in declassified or open-source records, with most smuggling efforts documented as state-directed, such as late-1980s shipments intercepted en route to . Proxy uses amplify these vulnerabilities, enabling militias to extend Iranian influence via deniable coastal threats, as evidenced by Houthi firings prompting U.S. retaliatory strikes on Yemeni radar sites on October 12, 2016.

Export history and strategic transfers

China emerged as the primary exporter of the HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missile series during the 1970s and 1980s, leveraging reverse-engineered Soviet technology to supply allies and generate revenue amid international arms embargoes following events like the and later . Initial exports included approximately 200 HY-2 missiles delivered to between 1976 and 1982, enabling Beijing to offset domestic economic pressures through hard currency sales and technology dissemination to ideologically aligned states. The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) intensified demand, prompting to sell HY-2 missiles to both belligerents as a pragmatic strategy to maximize profits without favoring one side, despite geopolitical tensions with the . received its first shipment of HY-2 missiles in the summer of 1986, followed by a successful test-fire in February 1987, with transactions often structured as deals involving Iranian to circumvent financial constraints and U.S. sanctions. similarly acquired variants, reflecting 's opportunistic approach to regional conflicts where Western suppliers were restricted. These transfers totaled hundreds of units across the , bolstering coastal defense capabilities for buyers while providing with strategic leverage against U.S. influence in the Gulf. U.S. diplomatic efforts in late 1986 sought to halt these sales, citing risks to Persian Gulf shipping, but China proceeded until announcing a suspension of Silkworm exports in November 1987 amid mounting pressure. Post-Cold War proliferation controls, including the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), constrained direct HY-2 exports by categorizing key components, yet evasion persisted through indirect channels. North Korea reverse-engineered the HY-2 into the KN-01, while Iran developed derivatives like the Ghadir, allowing technology proliferation without overt Chinese involvement and undermining MTCR effectiveness for sub-300 km range cruise missiles.

Operational history

Iran–Iraq War deployments

Iraq acquired the HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles from China in the early 1980s, deploying them from coastal batteries to target Iranian oil export facilities and shipping during the Tanker War phase of the conflict, which intensified from 1984 onward. These launches aimed to disrupt Iran's oil revenues, with documented strikes on Kharg Island terminals contributing to repeated damage and fires, though precise launch counts remain limited in open sources due to wartime secrecy. Iran received its initial batch of approximately 40 HY-2 Silkworms from China in 1986–1987, positioning launchers on the occupied Iraqi Faw Peninsula to extend reach into the Persian Gulf. Beginning in September 1987, Iran conducted at least 10–15 launches primarily against neutral-flagged tankers, including Kuwaiti and Saudi vessels reflagged under U.S. protection to counter Iraqi attacks. Notable incidents included a September 4, 1987, missile striking Kuwait's coast near oil facilities, causing no casualties but signaling intent, and an October 16, 1987, hit on the U.S.-flagged tanker Sea Isle City, which damaged the wheelhouse and quarters, injured 17 crew (blinding the captain), and spilled oil without sinking the vessel. These attacks inflicted hull breaches, fires, and spills totaling thousands of barrels but achieved few sinkings, reflecting the missile's inaccuracy against maneuvering targets and the resilience of supertankers. Despite technical limitations such as poor guidance leading to misses or near-shore impacts, the deployments by both belligerents demonstrated effective area-denial capabilities, deterring unescorted merchant traffic and complicating naval operations by superior third-party forces in the Gulf. Iraq's earlier and more frequent overall shipping strikes (over 280 by late 1987) integrated Silkworms sporadically with air and other missile attacks, while Iran's later adoption escalated neutral targeting, prompting U.S. retaliatory operations like Nimble Archer on October 19, 1987, against Iranian platforms in response to the Sea Isle City incident. The missiles' psychological impact outweighed direct physical destruction, reinforcing mutual economic attrition without decisive naval engagements.

Persian Gulf tanker conflicts

In the latter stages of the , known as the Tanker War, escalated its use of HY-2 Silkworm missiles against neutral and Kuwaiti-registered tankers in the , particularly following the U.S. initiation of in July 1987, which involved reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers for U.S. Navy protection to counter Iranian mining and attacks on shipping. On September 4, 1987, conducted its first documented Silkworm launch in the conflict, with the missile impacting the Kuwaiti coastline near the port of Mina al-Ahmadi, demonstrating 's intent to disrupt exports supporting . This marked the introduction of shore-launched Silkworms into 's asymmetric campaign against reflagged vessels, which viewed as extensions of U.S. and Kuwaiti support for . The attacks intensified in October 1987, with Iran firing Silkworms from positions including the occupied Iraqi al-Faw Peninsula. On October 15, a Silkworm struck the Liberian-flagged tanker Sungari, owned by a U.S. company, while it was anchored off Kuwait. The following day, October 16, another Silkworm—believed launched from Iran's mainland—hit the U.S.-flagged tanker Sea Isle City in Kuwaiti territorial waters near Shuaiba, injuring 18 crew members, including the captain, and causing significant structural damage but no fatalities. These strikes targeted unescorted or lightly protected vessels awaiting loading, heightening tensions and prompting U.S. retaliatory actions such as Operation Nimble Archer on October 19, which destroyed two Iranian oil platforms used for surveillance and potential missile operations. Iraq, having acquired Silkworm variants earlier, shifted toward air-launched employment by to counter Iranian naval threats and port facilities during the same tanker escalation period. Iraqi Tu-16 Badger bombers began deploying HY-2 missiles against Iranian oil terminals and approaching vessels, including strikes on and other Gulf ports to interdict Iran's oil exports and force resource diversion. This adaptation represented a doctrinal pivot for from defensive coastal batteries to offensive standoff strikes, leveraging the missile's range to target shipping lanes without exposing ground launchers to Iranian counterfire. Such uses extended the Silkworm's role beyond Iranian shore defenses, contributing to the mutual attrition of merchant and naval assets in the Gulf throughout 1987–1988.

1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War

During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq employed its HY-2 Silkworm missiles primarily in an anti-ship role against Coalition naval forces in the Persian Gulf. On February 25, 1991, Iraqi forces launched two HY-2 missiles targeting the battleship USS Missouri, marking the first confirmed combat use of these weapons in the conflict. One missile was intercepted by two Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles fired from the British destroyer HMS Gloucester approximately 30 seconds before impact, demonstrating the effectiveness of Coalition air defense systems against the radar-guided cruise missile. The second missile was diverted into the sea by countermeasures including infrared flares and chaff deployed from USS Missouri, with no damage to Coalition vessels. Iraq maintained several HY-2 launchers along the coast, including in occupied Kuwait, but subsequent Coalition airstrikes destroyed many sites and prevented further effective launches. In the 2003 Iraq War, Iraqi forces repurposed remaining HY-2 Silkworms for surface-to-surface strikes against ground positions in , adapting the anti-ship weapon for inland ballistic-like trajectories despite its inherent design limitations. At least two, and possibly up to five, such missiles were fired early in the invasion, but all failed to achieve hits due to inaccuracies in the outdated inertial and radar guidance systems when employed against land targets defended by advanced electronic warfare and interceptors. One intact HY-2 was recovered by forces post-launch, providing on Iraqi modifications attempted to extend range and reliability, though these proved insufficient against modern countermeasures. The limited firings highlighted the Silkworm's obsolescence, with its 1950s-era technology vulnerable to jamming and , yielding zero confirmed successes in either conflict.

Post-2003 uses including Yemen blockade

In October 2016, during the Saudi-led coalition's enforcement of a naval on Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports, rebels launched variants of the Silkworm (HY-2) anti-ship at U.S. warships supporting coalition operations in the southern . On October 9, an initial missile was fired toward the guided-missile destroyer USS Mason off the coast near Houthi-held territory, prompting defensive countermeasures but causing no damage or casualties. This was followed on October 12 by two additional launches from the port of Al Hudaydah targeting the same vessel, with the missiles either intercepted by the ship's SM-2 defenses or falling harmlessly into the water. U.S. officials attributed the attacks to Iran-backed Houthi forces, noting the Silkworm's characteristics matched known Iranian-supplied coastal defense systems. These firings represented a direct challenge to the , which had restricted maritime access to since March to interdict arms shipments to the Houthis, though the strikes focused on rather than commercial targets. No verified Silkworm variant launches against commercial vessels occurred in the –2023 period, with Houthi anti-shipping efforts shifting toward ballistic missiles, drones, and newer Iranian-derived cruise missiles like the Noor in later incidents. Iranian involvement was inferred from the missile type's proliferation path—Iran reverse-engineered the in the —and Tehran's documented provision of weaponry to proxies, though direct supply evidence for these specific launches remained circumstantial. The attacks underscored the Silkworm's enduring role in low-tech despite its obsolescence against modern naval defenses, as all projectiles failed to inflict damage amid heightened coalition vigilance. No further confirmed Silkworm uses by Houthis were reported post-2016, reflecting a pivot to proliferated Iranian upgrades better suited to contested waters like the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Combat performance and assessments

Empirical success rates and intercepts

During the Iran–Iraq War's tanker phase, ian forces launched a limited number of HY-2 Silkworm missiles against merchant shipping, achieving sporadic hits despite the weapon's inaccuracies. On 4 September 1987, one Silkworm fired from the struck the Kuwaiti coast near a loading terminal, causing no ship damage. On 16 October 1987, another successfully impacted the reflagged Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City off Mina al-Ahmadi, penetrating the engine room, igniting fires, and injuring 18 crew members. These represent at least two confirmed launches with one hit and one miss, though additional undocumented firings occurred amid 's constrained inventory of approximately 50–100 imported missiles. The missile's 500 kg high-explosive enhanced its practical impact, enabling damage to from near-misses via and shrapnel, as evidenced by structural breaches and secondary fires in the Sea Isle City incident even without direct engine hits. Overall empirical hit ratios against maneuvering tankers appear low, around 20–30% based on declassified assessments of sparse Gulf engagements, with misses attributable to inertial navigation errors over extended ranges. In the 1991 , Iraqi HY-2 launches yielded zero successes due to effective intercepts. On 25 February 1991, HMS Gloucester fired two surface-to-air missiles to destroy one incoming Silkworm approximately 30 seconds from impact. A second Silkworm targeting USS Missouri was deflected short of the battleship by deployed and infrared flares, disrupting its radar seeker. These outcomes highlight successful hard-kill (SAM) and soft-kill (deception) countermeasures against the missile's subsonic speed and predictable trajectory.

Technical limitations and countermeasures

The HY-2 Silkworm missile's radar-guided variants are particularly vulnerable to electronic countermeasures (ECM), including jamming that disrupts its active radar seeker during the terminal phase, as well as infrared decoys that can mislead its guidance in updated models. Its subsonic speed, typically around Mach 0.75, and relatively high-altitude cruise profile—often exceeding 50 meters—render it predictable and susceptible to interception by surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as the British Sea Dart system, which can engage targets at extended ranges with sufficient warning time derived from radar detection of the missile's launch or inbound trajectory. Post-combat analyses of coastal defense cruise missiles like the HY-2 emphasize that their lack of low-observable features and fixed flight paths allow defenders to employ chaff, flares, and directed energy countermeasures effectively once detected, limiting the missile's penetration against alerted naval forces. Operator proficiency significantly impacts the Silkworm's (CEP), with ideal conditions yielding accuracies of approximately 100 meters, but real-world deployments in militaries with limited training—common in third-world contexts—often degrade performance to CEPs exceeding 200 meters due to errors in targeting data input, launcher alignment, and environmental compensation. Maintenance challenges, including degradation of the missile's inertial navigation and systems from poor storage or aging components, further amplify these inaccuracies, as evidenced in assessments of exported systems where non-expert operators fail to calibrate for or wind effects. Iranian reverse-engineered variants, such as the Saeqeh (HY-2 derivative), incorporate seeker improvements and potentially better resistance to some ECM through hybrid guidance, yet these upgrades do not address the inherent subsonic profile, which caps terminal maneuverability and exposes the to modern close-in weapon systems (CIWS) like or advanced SAMs during extended exposure times. The persistence of high-altitude segments in even modified designs facilitates early detection by shipborne radars, underscoring that core aerodynamic limitations constrain effectiveness against networked defenses despite incremental enhancements.

Strategic impact and deterrence value

The deployment of missiles by during the 1980s Tanker War demonstrated their capacity to impose costs on superior naval powers, as Iranian launches targeted neutral shipping to coerce Gulf states into reducing support for , thereby disrupting oil flows through the without direct confrontation with major fleets. This asymmetric threat elevated risks for international commerce, prompting the to initiate in July 1987 to reflag and escort Kuwaiti tankers, yet the persistent Silkworm danger contributed to U.S. restraint in escalation, as evidenced by deliberations over retaliation following specific strikes like the , 1987, hit on the Sea Isle City, where decision-makers weighed broader regional stability against immediate reprisals. Such dynamics underscored the missile's role in complicating interventionist strategies, forcing adversaries to allocate resources to defensive measures rather than offensive dominance. Proliferation of the Silkworm to states like Iran and Iraq extended anti-access/area-denial capabilities to actors with limited blue-water navies, empirically challenging U.S. carrier strike group operations by introducing credible shore-based threats to sea lanes, as observed in the Persian Gulf where the missile's coastal launch sites heightened vulnerabilities for task forces operating within 100-150 km ranges. This democratization of standoff anti-ship weaponry shifted naval planning toward layered defenses and standoff tactics, with analyses noting that even outdated systems like the HY-2 forced operational dispersions and increased reliance on air superiority to neutralize batteries preemptively, thereby validating the missile's deterrent utility against power projection in contested littorals despite its subsonic speed and inertial guidance limitations. The Silkworm's enduring legacy lies in seeding derivative programs, particularly Iran's indigenous adaptations that form the backbone of its asymmetric arsenal, sustaining a credible deterrent against naval incursions into the Gulf by maintaining the potential for saturation attacks on high-value targets like carriers or amphibious groups. Until the mid-1990s, Iran's reliance on imported Silkworms underscored their strategic value in preserving survival amid sanctions and isolation, enabling persistent threats to chokepoints that deter routine patrols and influence alliance calculations, as the mere possession imposed hedging behaviors on states and external guarantors. This causal chain—from export to localized evolution—highlights how the platform's affordability and amplified weaker powers' leverage, prioritizing volume over precision to achieve area-denial effects that persist in modern threat assessments.

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