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FN-6
FN-6
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FN-6 (Chinese: 飞弩-6; pinyin: Fēi Nú-6; lit. 'Flying Crossbow-6'; NATO reporting name: CH-SA-10)[1] is a third-generation passive infrared homing (IR) man portable air defence system (MANPADS) built by Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST) of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC).[2] Developed from the HN-5 missile, the FN-6 missile is an export-oriented product and one of China's most advanced shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile offered on the international market. Specially designed to engage low-flying targets, it has a range of 6 km (3.7 mi) and a maximum altitude of 3.8 km (2.4 mi). The missile has been exported to Malaysia, Cambodia, Sudan, Pakistan, and Peru, and a variant was incorporated into People's Liberation Army (PLA) service as the HN-6 (Chinese: 红樱-6). Based on FN-6, China has several other MANPADS and other vehicle-based short-range air defence systems.

Key Information

Development

[edit]
FN-16 (front) and QW-2 (back)

The weapon was specifically designed to be used against targets flying at low and very low altitudes.[3] The FN-6 was developed in parallel with the Qian Wei (QW) missile series. FN-6, or FeiNu-6, is the export name given to the export version derived from this system, and it is known as HongYing-6 (Chinese: 红缨; pinyin: hóng yīng; lit. 'red tassel') in the PLA.[4][5] The training simulator of FN-6 is not developed by the contractor of the missile system, but instead, the simulator is developed by PLA itself after the missile was purchased, and the general designer of the training simulator of FN-6 is Liu Weixing (Chinese: 刘卫星).[citation needed] The training simulator of FN-6 is also used for later versions of MANPADS developed from FN-6.[citation needed]

Export sales of the weapon are the responsibility of China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation, a state-owned trading company responsible for representing the domestic defense production industry in air defense-related products.[6]

Design

[edit]
rocket mortar and rear control fins of the FN-16

According to Jane's, the FN-6 is a third-generation, passive infrared,[3] man-portable air defense system (MANPADS). It is equipped with a digital infrared seeker with a strong resistance to flares, solar heat, and heat from the ground. The pyramid-shaped nose of the missile houses the four-unit infrared seeker. The handle of the launcher houses the batteries and cooling system. An IFF antenna and an optional clip-on optical sight are fitted onto the launcher.[3][5]

The missile is capable of an all-aspect attack and has a 70% single-shot hit probability.[citation needed] It can engage targets maneuvering at up to 4G.[3] FN-6 MANPADS can be equipped with night vision equipment, and it can also be equipped with IFF systems. Two types were shown to the public, one of which is similar in appearance to AN/PPX-1 IFF of FIM-92 Stinger, while the other IFF system is a Yagi-Uda antenna configuration.

The complete FN-6 missile system weighs 16 kg (35 lb). The missile is 1.495 m (4.90 ft) in length, and has a diameter of 0.072 m (0.24 ft). The weight of the missile is 10.77 kg (23.7 lb). It uses a single-stage solid rocket motor, and can obtain a maximum speed of 360 m/s (1,200 ft/s) when flying head-on, and 300 m/s (980 ft/s) when tail chasing. The missile's operating range is from 500 m (1,600 ft) to 6 km (3.7 mi), and its operating altitude is from 15 m (49 ft) to 3.5 km (2.2 mi).[5]

Further developments

[edit]

FN-6A

[edit]

FN-6A is the vehicle-mounted version of FN-6, first revealed to the public in 2005. The system is based on a Dongfeng EQ2050, weighing 4.6 tons in total. A one-man turret is sandwiched between two quadruple launchers, and the electro-optical fire control system (FCS) with IR, laser, and TV sensors. Contrary to the common arrangements on similar systems, the FCS of FN-6A is mounted under the launchers. Due to space limitations, the FCS is distributed between two places, one portion under one launcher and the other portion in the opposite launcher across the turret. A 12.7 mm heavy machine gun is added for additional protection. The vehicle is operated by a two-man crew, one driver and one weapon system operator. Communication gear and land navigation gear are standard. The modular design of the system enables other subsystems to be incorporated easily, such as IFF. The auxiliary power unit provides enough power for the system to operate continuously for more than 8 hours.

The FCS of the FN-6A can lock on to a target 10 km (6.2 mi) away, and the reaction time is less than 5 seconds. Each vehicle can fight independently, but can be integrated with others to fight as a coherent unit by incorporating a command vehicle that is also based on the same vehicle chassis. The command vehicle provides a light, solid-state passive phased array radar to increase situational awareness and can direct up to 8 launching vehicles simultaneously. A command vehicle and 8 launching vehicles form an air defense company when fighting as a coherent unit, and this in turn can be integrated into larger air defense networks. Alternatively, the launching vehicle can be directly integrated into larger air defense networks without the need for the command vehicle.

Each launching vehicle needs a support vehicle for resupply, and the support vehicle is also based on Dongfeng EQ2050 to reduce logistic costs. Each supply vehicle carries 24 missiles, and reloading each missile takes less than a minute. Similar to the M1097 Avenger, each launcher is designed so that each missile can also be removed and fired by a soldier manually, like a regular MANPAD. Although effective against supersonic aircraft, for UAVs and missiles, the maximum target speed is limited to 300 meters per second.

FB-6A

[edit]

FN-6A did not enter mass production and served only in very limited numbers in Chinese forces, mainly for trial purposes. In the subsequent Zhuhai Airshows, followed by its original debut, FN-6A is replaced by its successor FB-6A, which did see greater numbers in service with Chinese forces. The general designer of the FB-6A system is Mr. Wei Zhigang (卫志刚), rumored also to be the general designer of FN-6A, the predecessor of FB-6A.[7] The main difference between FN-6A and its successor FB-6A is that the SAM system is broken down into two portions in the latter, as opposed to a single unit in the former: FB-6A SAM system consists of two vehicles, one carrying the engagement radar, while the other carrying the missile.[8][9] The search/engagement radar of FB-6A is planar array, and can be folded down in transit, but the developer has not revealed whether the radar itself is a phased array or not.[10] However, the developer did claim that both the mechanically scanned planar array and the electronically scanned passive phased array are both available upon the customer's request, but it's not clear which one is in service with Chinese forces.

The missile launching platform of FB-6A differs from its predecessor in that both the 12.7 mm heavy machine (HMG) for self-protection and the electro-optical fire control sight on that of FN-6A are removed, but a backup operator console is incorporated with bulletproof glass added between the launchers, though the FB-6A system can be operated with the vehicle. Although the 12.7 mm HMG no longer comes as standard equipment for the FB-6A, it can be added as an option and can be changed to other machine guns. The total numbers of missiles carried by the launching vehicle of FB-6A remains the same as FN-6A, which is eight.[11]

An upgraded version FB-6C, was unveiled at the 2016 Zhuhai Airshow.[12] In March 2024 the Namibian Army displayed the FB-6A System in Windhoek as part of its independence celebrations.[13]

FN-16

[edit]

At the 7th Zhuhai Airshow held at the end of 2008, China revealed a new addition to the FN series, FN-16. The FN-16 is an improvement of the earlier FN-6, with better all-aspect attack capability and better resistance against electronic countermeasures. Another major improvement is in its seeker, which in addition to the original IR guidance, UV guidance is also incorporated,[14] a practice adopted in the later version of FIM-92 Stinger. Like its predecessor, FN-6, FN-16 can also be fitted with both IFF systems used on FN-6, and just like FN-6, FN-16 is re-designated as FY-16 (Fei Ying = 飞鹰, meaning Flying Eagle) when equipped with IFFs. The missile system is designed to counter fighter-bombers, attack aircraft, and helicopters. UAV, cruise missile etc.[14]

  • Specifications:[14]
    • Length: ≤1,600 mm
    • Diameter: 72 mm
    • Weight: ≤11.5 kg (missile)
    • Range: 500 m to 6000 m
    • Altitude: 10 m to 4000 m
    • Overload: ≥18 g
    • Guidance System: Infrared homing/Ultraviolet dual-spectrum seeker

HN-6

[edit]

HN-6 is a further development of FN-16 in Chinese military service. HN-6 utilizes fire control systems (FCS) of earlier FN-6 and FN-16 MANPADS, but a new FCS sight of unknown designation has also been developed.[15]

In addition to improved performance over the original FN-6/16 MANPADS, HN-6 incorporates a protective cap over the seeker of the missile, offering better protection against the environmental elements.[16] Based on the photos and video clips of PLA training, this protective cap needs to be manually removed before firing the missile.[17]

HN-6 can also be incorporated into a portable tripod firing station similar to that of RBS 70 and Mistral. A seat is attached to the lightweight tripod firing stand that can be folded for transportation and storage, and the operator is protected by a bulletproof glass shield.[18]

Operational history

[edit]

Syrian Civil War

[edit]

The combat debut of the FN-6 came during the 2013 phase of the Syrian civil war.[19] By March 2013, two Syrian Air Force Mil Mi-8 or Mi-17 were shot down.[20]

The New York Times reported that Qatar supplied the Syrian rebels, possibly through purchase from the Sudanese inventory, with the FN-6 and that several units have now fallen into the hands of ISIS. However, spray paint had been used to obscure serial numbers in an effort to impede tracking of the weapon's supply chain.[21]

The Global Times, states that, though Chinese-made missiles have downed aircraft in the past, the Syrian war "is the first time such a success has been recorded on video." The news outlet further raises the possibility of this improving the sales and image of Chinese defense products abroad.[20] However, The New York Times reported that rebels have complained the missile's performance, such as failings to fire or lock on and two premature explosions while firing, which killed two rebels and wounded four more.[21]

On 18 August 2013, the first recorded kill of a fixed-wing aircraft took place when a team from the Islamic Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami brigade downed a SyAAF MiG-21 over Latakia province. The jet's pilot was filmed parachuting but his fate is not known. This downing is also the FN-6's first jet kill.[22]

ISIL in Iraq

[edit]

In the aftermath of the 2014 ISIL offensive in Iraq, on 3 October, an FN-6 allegedly supplied by Qatar was used by the militant group to shoot down an Iraqi Army Mil Mi-35 attack helicopter near Baiji.[23] It also may have been used to destroy a Bell 407 scout helicopter in the same area on 8 October, killing both pilots.[24]

Myanmar Civil War

[edit]

On 16 January 2024, a Myanmar Air Force FTC-2000G light fighter was shot down by a Kachin Independence Army FN-6 missile in Shan State. Both pilots were killed.[25]

Variants

[edit]
FN-6
original MANPADS variant
FN-6A
vehicle-mounted air defense system that mounts 8 FN-6 missiles.
FB-6A
vehicle-mounted air defense system with separate radar and missile vehicles.
FB-6C
improved FB-6A
FN-16
improved MANPADS variant based on FN-6
NH-6
improved MANPADS variant based on FN-16
PGZ-04A
Four FN-6 missiles are mounted on the upgraded Type 95 SPAAA.[26]

Operators

[edit]
Map with FN-6 operators in blue
  • Bangladesh: Bangladesh Army uses FN16 variant.[27]
  • Cameroon[citation needed]
  • Cambodia: On 25 June 2009, the National Television of Cambodia (TVK) showed Cambodian soldiers with FN-6 and FN-16 missiles to be deployed near the Thai-Cambodian border in the 2008 Cambodian-Thai stand-off.[citation needed]
  • China: The FN-6 has been taken into service with the PLAGF and PLAAF.[5] In PLAAF, the FN-6 is deployed in various ground-to-air missile units to provide extra layer of air defence, and to protect high value weaponry from enemy's low-fly aircraft or weapons. In many PLAAF live firing exercise, FN-6s were seen to participate in action.[28]
  •  Kurdistan - used by The Peshmerga[29]
  • Ghana: 100 FN-6 missiles delivered on 2016.[27]
  • Malaysia: The CNPMIEC offered to sell FN-6 missiles to Malaysia for purchasing the KSA-1A medium range surface-to-air missiles.[30] In May 2004, a memorandum of understanding was signed with Malaysia for the transfer of technology of the FN-6.[31]
  • Namibia: First spotted in Namibian service in 2016, confirmed in August 2018. 50 speculated to be in service.[32]
  • Pakistan: 806 FN-6 delivered between 2010 and 2016. 1,191 FN-16 delivered between 2018 and 2021.[33][34]
  • Peru: A small batch of FN-6 missiles was acquired by the Peruvian Navy in July 2009 for US$1.1 million[35]
  • Qatar[36]
  • Sudan: displayed at Sudan's Independence Day military parade of 2007.[4][37] Produced as the "Nayzak".[38]
  • Syria: Captured from rebel groups.[39]

Non-state actors

[edit]

See also

[edit]

Reference list

[edit]
  1. ^ The International Institute for Strategic Studies (15 February 2023). "6 Asia". The Military Balance 2023. London: Routledge.
  2. ^ "FN-6 MANPAD missile". Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology.
  3. ^ a b c d "FN-6 (China), Man-portable surface-to-air missile systems". Jane's Information Group. Archived from the original on 5 December 2009. Retrieved 30 December 2008.
  4. ^ a b Andrei Chang (28 March 2008). "China ships more advanced weapons to Sudan". UPI Asia. Archived from the original on 12 October 2012. Retrieved 30 December 2008.
  5. ^ a b c d "HongYing-6 (FN-6) Man-Portable Surface-to-Air Missile". Sinodefence. 21 December 2007. Archived from the original on 10 May 2006. Retrieved 30 December 2008.
  6. ^ The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century. Routledge. 2012. p. 54.
  7. ^ "FB-6A designer". Archived from the original on 24 December 2013. Retrieved 18 November 2012.
  8. ^ "FB-6A SAM". Archived from the original on 20 May 2013. Retrieved 18 November 2012.
  9. ^ "FB-6A ADS". Archived from the original on 17 November 2012. Retrieved 18 November 2012.
  10. ^ "FB-6A". Archived from the original on 20 May 2013.
  11. ^ "FB-6A Mobile SAM". Archived from the original on 28 September 2013. Retrieved 18 November 2012.
  12. ^ "Zhuhai in 2016. Air defense equipment | Saidpvo". 5 November 2016. Archived from the original on 11 July 2018. Retrieved 10 November 2018.
  13. ^ "Namibian Army showcases the FB-6A Short Range Air Defence System #Military #namibia". YouTube. 25 March 2025.
  14. ^ a b c "FN-16" (PDF).
  15. ^ "HN-6 FCS sight". Archived from the original on 20 May 2013. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
  16. ^ "HN-6". Archived from the original on 21 September 2013. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
  17. ^ Hongying-6 Archived 21 September 2013 at the Wayback Machine
  18. ^ "Hongying-6 SAM". Archived from the original on 13 April 2014. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
  19. ^ Chivers, C.J. (24 July 2013). "The Risky Missile Systems That Syria's Rebels Believe They Need". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 22 February 2014. Retrieved 30 August 2013.
  20. ^ a b Agence France-Presse (14 March 2013). "Rebels use China missiles to shoot down Syrian army helicopters". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 29 August 2018. Retrieved 28 August 2018.
  21. ^ a b Chivers, C. J.; Schmitt, Eric (12 August 2013). "Arms Shipments Seen From Sudan to Syria Rebels". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 29 September 2018. Retrieved 26 February 2017.
  22. ^ Binnie, Jeremy (18 August 2013). "Hardline Islamists down Syrian jet with Chinese MANPADS". janes.com. Archived from the original on 3 December 2013. Retrieved 22 November 2013.
  23. ^ Gibbons-Neff, Thomas (10 October 2014). "Islamic State's shootdown of an Iraqi helicopter amplifies fears of shoulder-fired missiles". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 6 October 2018. Retrieved 28 August 2018.
  24. ^ Semple, Kirk; Al-Jawoshy, Omar (8 October 2014). "ISIS Militants Shoot Down Iraqi Helicopter, Killing 2". The New York Times.
  25. ^ "ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 349973". aviation-safety.net. 17 January 2024. Retrieved 17 January 2024..
  26. ^ "PGZ-95". weaponsystems.
  27. ^ a b "Trade-Register-1971-2020.rft". Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Archived from the original on 14 April 2010. Retrieved 17 July 2021.
  28. ^ "FN-6 Man-portable surface-to-air missile systems in PLAAF". Archived from the original on 9 October 2015. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  29. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies (February 2016). The Military Balance 2016. Vol. 116. Routledge. p. 492. ISBN 9781857438352.
  30. ^ "Malaysia to purchase Chinese missiles". Daily Express. 21 July 2004. Archived from the original on 3 August 2004. Retrieved 30 December 2008.
  31. ^ Nick Leong (21 July 2004). "China offers to transfer missile technology". The Star. Archived from the original on 11 October 2012. Retrieved 30 December 2008.
  32. ^ "Namibia operating FN-6 missiles". DefenceWeb. 30 August 2018. Archived from the original on 30 August 2018. Retrieved 2 September 2018.
  33. ^ SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. "Transfers and licensed production of major conventional weapons". Retrieved 16 April 2024.
  34. ^ "Pakistan's MoDP reveals orders for MANPADSs and other weapon systems in 2017–18". Jane's 360. 8 October 2019. Retrieved 8 October 2019.
  35. ^ "Perú: Adquisición de misiles MANPADS". Alejo Marchessini. Defensa.com. 27 July 2009. Archived from the original on 1 May 2018. Retrieved 11 September 2009.
  36. ^ Mitzer, Stijn; Oliemans, Joost (6 March 2021). "Qatar's Purchase of BP-12A SRBMs: A Guppy Sprouts Teeth". Oryx Blog.
  37. ^ "Idex Abu 2017". Archived from the original on 23 January 2018. Retrieved 23 January 2018.
  38. ^ Zen Adra (7 May 2018). "Homs rebels hand over air defense systems as per agreement with Syrian Army [+ Photos]". Al-Masdar News. Archived from the original on 21 July 2018. Retrieved 21 July 2018.
  39. ^ C. J. Chivers; Eric Schmitt (12 August 2013). "Arms Shipments Seen From Sudan to Syria Rebels". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 13 August 2013. Retrieved 13 August 2013.
  40. ^ Mitzer, Stijn; Oliemans, Joost. "Vehicles and equipment captured by the Islamic State inside Syria until November 2014". Oryx Blog.
  41. ^ "Kachin Independence Army Claims Downing Of Tatmadaw Mi-35 Attack Helicopter". 3 May 2021.
  42. ^ "Myanmar's Generals Make a Show of Displeasure at China's Arming of Rebels". The Irrawaddy. 26 November 2019.
  43. ^ Davis, Anthony (28 November 2019). "China's mobile missiles on the loose in Myanmar". Asia Times.
  44. ^ "United Wa State Army military parade showcases ongoing modernisation". Janes. 23 April 2019. Archived from the original on 15 February 2021. Retrieved 15 February 2021.
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The FN-6, also known as the Flying Crossbow-6, is a third-generation (MANPADS) featuring passive guidance, developed by China's Academy of Spaceflight Technology to provide with short-range surface-to-air capabilities against low-flying . Introduced as a successor to earlier systems like the , the FN-6 employs a motor propelling a 72 mm to speeds approaching 600 m/s, enabling engagement ranges from 500 to 6,000 meters and altitudes up to 3,500 meters. Its seeker supports all-aspect attacks and incorporates countermeasures resistance against decoys and jamming, with a reported single-shot hit probability of around 70% against maneuvering targets up to 4 g. The system weighs 10.77 kg for the alone, or 16 kg with the disposable launcher and gripstock, allowing operation by a single soldier after visual and lock-on. Adopted by the and Air Force for air defense roles, the FN-6 has also been exported to nations such as , , , , and , enhancing their capabilities against aerial threats in asymmetric conflicts.

Development

Inception and design requirements

The FN-6, domestically designated Hongying-6, originated from development efforts by the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology in the 1990s, aimed at replacing the outdated series of man-portable air-defense systems. Finalized in 1999 and publicly introduced in 2000, the project sought to deliver a third-generation passive infrared-homing with capabilities surpassing the first-generation , which suffered from rear-aspect-only engagement limitations and high susceptibility to basic countermeasures like flares. Primary design requirements focused on enabling attack profiles, enhanced resistance to decoys and jamming, and maintained portability for use against low-altitude and helicopters in contested environments. These upgrades were driven by the need to counter evolving aerial threats in regional conflicts, where earlier Chinese MANPADS proved inadequate against maneuverable targets employing defensive aids. The system's seeker was specified for omni-directional targeting without reliance on forward-hemisphere restrictions, prioritizing reliability in cluttered electromagnetic conditions over the HN-5's simpler, uncooled detector . From inception, the FN-6 was oriented toward export markets, with requirements emphasizing compatibility with international standards to rival systems like the American , including in the seeker for improved discrimination against countermeasures. This export emphasis, alongside parallel domestic programs like the QW series, reflected strategic goals of technology maturation through competitive sales, though production remained under state-controlled entities for dual military-commercial application.

Testing and initial deployment

The FN-6 underwent evaluation testing during the 1990s, where it demonstrated all-aspect (360-degree) engagement capabilities against low-flying aircraft and helicopters, as well as resistance to infrared decoys through its cooled, two-color passive infrared seeker designed to discriminate against flares and solar interference. These tests confirmed the system's ability to engage targets from any angle without rear-aspect restrictions, a advancement over prior Chinese MANPADS like the HN-5, with reported single-shot hit probabilities exceeding 70% in controlled scenarios against maneuvering targets. The system achieved operational certification and entered service with the (PLA) and in the mid-1990s, following finalization of its design around 1999 as part of China's push for third-generation MANPADS. Initial integration occurred in divisional air defense units, providing portable short-range protection for and forward operating bases, with the FN-6 supplementing vehicle-mounted variants for enhanced mobility. Export certifications followed domestic adoption, with the first major international offer documented in May 2004 to as part of a package including medium-range systems, leading to confirmed sales to countries including , , and by the mid-2000s. Early deployments highlighted the need for operator familiarization with the digital seeker and uncaging procedures, but these were addressed via PLA-standardized training protocols emphasizing rapid acquisition and operations.

Design Features

Missile guidance and seeker technology

The FN-6 utilizes a third-generation passive (IR) homing , incorporating a digital IR seeker housed in a pyramid-shaped for enhanced aerodynamic stability and protection. This seeker design supports all-aspect engagement of aerial targets, including head-on, side, and rear approaches, distinguishing it from earlier rear-aspect-limited systems. Advanced within the seeker enables real-time target discrimination by analyzing signatures, thereby improving rejection of countermeasures such as flares, solar interference, and ground clutter. This processing capability allows the missile to maintain lock-on through environmental distractions and basic jamming attempts, with reported effectiveness against simulated scenarios in developmental evaluations. Unlike second-generation reticle-scanning seekers, which rely on simpler modulation patterns vulnerable to saturation, the FN-6's imaging-like IR detection provides superior clutter rejection via pixel-level signature matching. The system's guidance supports operation post-launch, with the seeker capable of autonomous target reacquisition in dynamic scenarios, though operator identification remains required prior to firing for reduced false engagements. Overall, these features position the FN-6's seeker as comparable to Western counterparts like the Block I in countermeasure resistance, based on shared third-generation principles of digital IR focal plane processing.

Launcher system and ergonomics

The FN-6 employs a reusable gripstock launcher that integrates the primary sighting unit, , and cooling apparatus for the missile's seeker, with the handle specifically housing the batteries and cooling system to maintain seeker functionality during operation. The gripstock design features a distinctive box-shaped front end, distinguishing it from earlier systems and aiding in stable shouldering for firing. Total system weight, comprising the missile and gripstock with integrated mechanical sight, measures approximately 16 kg, balancing man-portability with the structural demands of seeker cooling and electronics integration. This configuration supports deployment by a single operator in roles, with the tube designed for straightforward attachment to the gripstock. Ergonomic features prioritize rapid , including selectable mechanical or optical aiming devices adaptable to conditions, alongside an optional clip-on optical sight for precision tracking. An IFF interrogator antenna can be fitted to the launcher for friend-or-foe discrimination, reducing risks of inadvertent engagements, while compatibility with equipment enables operations in low-visibility environments. These elements collectively enhance operator reliability under field stresses, though the system's weight imposes limits on prolonged unaided carriage compared to lighter Western counterparts.

Propulsion, warhead, and countermeasures resistance

The FN-6 missile utilizes a dual-thrust motor system, comprising an initial boost phase via a tandem-mounted ejection and boost motor that is jettisoned shortly after launch, transitioning to a sustainer motor for . This configuration provides high initial acceleration followed by sustained thrust, enabling maximum speeds exceeding 600 m/s (approximately Mach 1.8 at ) against approaching targets. The consists of a high-explosive fragmentation charge with a proximity fuse, optimized to detonate at a predetermined distance from the target, dispersing shrapnel to inflict structural damage and crew incapacitation on low-flying , helicopters, and . Resistance to countermeasures is integrated into the 's seeker through multi-spectrum detection capabilities, multiple detectors, and onboard target recognition algorithms that discriminate authentic engine heat signatures from decoys, flares, solar glare, and terrestrial heat sources, thereby maintaining lock-on efficacy in environments with electronic warfare interference. This digital processing enhances all-aspect engagement reliability against jamming attempts.

Technical Specifications

Range, altitude, and speed parameters

The features an effective horizontal engagement range of 500 to 5,500 meters, enabling interception of low-altitude threats within typical tactical engagement envelopes. Some assessments extend the maximum range to 6,000 meters under optimal conditions. Engagement altitudes span from a minimum of 15 meters—sufficient to clear ground clutter and terrain masking—to a maximum of 3,500 to 3,800 meters, prioritizing low- to medium-altitude , helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The attains flight speeds of up to 360 meters per second in head-on pursuits and 300 meters per second in tail-chase modes, powered by a single-stage solid rocket motor. It is capable of engaging from all aspects, including targets maneuvering at up to 4 g, though effectiveness against slower-profile threats like cruise missiles or UAVs is specified up to 300 meters per second. This performance suits intercepts of helicopters and low-flying jets operating below 400 meters per second in visual-range conditions up to 4,000 meters altitude.

Weight, dimensions, and operational constraints

The FN-6 weighs 17 kg in its ready-to-fire configuration, including the and integrated launch tube. The component alone weighs 10.77 kg.
ParameterSpecification
Missile length1.495 m
length1.70 m
Missile diameter71 mm
Fin span0.18 m
The system's reaction time, from to missile launch, is 5 seconds, enabling rapid deployment by a single operator in field conditions. Its disposable launch tube design imposes a key operational constraint: each unit supports only a single shot, requiring operators to carry multiple loaded systems for sustained engagements, which increases logistical demands on weight and storage during extended patrols. The missile's onboard battery activates upon launch, but launcher electronics rely on separate power sources with undefined endurance limits in prolonged operations, potentially restricting continuous readiness without resupply.

Variants and Derivatives

FN-6A

The FN-6A represents a vehicle-mounted adaptation of the baseline FN-6 , transitioning the missile from infantry-carried deployment to integration on light tactical vehicles for enhanced mobility and firepower in roles. First publicly revealed in 2005, the FN-6A employs a HMMWV-equivalent with a total system weight of approximately 4.6 tons, allowing operation by a reduced compared to dismounted configurations. This variant equips the vehicle with two quadruple launchers accommodating eight FN-6 missiles in ready-to-fire canisters, facilitating rapid engagement sequences against low-altitude threats such as helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft at ranges up to 6 kilometers. The mounting configuration supports semi-static deployments for point defense of convoys, forward operating bases, or temporary positions, prioritizing volume of fire over individual portability while retaining the core infrared-homing guidance of the parent missile. Developed primarily for export markets, the FN-6A addresses demands from militaries requiring affordable, vehicle-integrated solutions for layered air defense without the logistical overhead of heavier radar-guided systems. It incorporates basic fire control interfaces compatible with vehicle power and sighting optics, enabling operator-assisted targeting to extend effective engagement envelopes in networked or command-linked scenarios, though specific integration details remain proprietary to the manufacturer.

FN-16

The FN-16 represents an upgraded iteration of the , incorporating enhancements in seeker technology and mechanisms for improved performance against low-altitude threats. Developed by the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology, it features a dual-band (IR) and (UV) homing seeker that enables quasi-imaging guidance, enhancing and discrimination capabilities. This seeker design provides resistance to decoys and electronic countermeasures, allowing engagement of , helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles across all aspects. Equipped with a laser proximity fuse combined with an impact fuse, the FN-16 achieves reliable detonation against maneuvering targets, reducing false alarms through advanced . The system's effective engagement range extends to 6 kilometers, with an interception altitude between 10 and 4,000 meters, maintaining portability for single-operator use while supporting operations. These upgrades distinguish the FN-16 from its predecessor by prioritizing countermeasures resistance and seeker sensitivity for modern aerial threats. Primarily deployed within the , the FN-16 has seen limited export, reflecting its status as a more advanced domestic system compared to the baseline FN-6 offered internationally. Its integration focuses on enhancing for units against low-signature and countermeasure-equipped targets.

Other variants (FB-6A, HN-6)

The FB-6A constitutes a ground-launched, vehicle-mounted adaptation of the for in fixed or semi-mobile configurations. It deploys FN-6 interceptors via a dual-vehicle setup, including a command post with for and a firing unit housing multiple launchers, enabling integrated detection, fire control, and against low-altitude threats. This configuration prioritizes networked operations over individual portability, supporting defenses for ground forces or static assets. The HN-6 (initially designated HY-6) functions as the primary domestic variant of the for Chinese service, maintaining the core passive seeker and all-aspect engagement capabilities while adapting fire control systems from FN-6 lineage for enhanced operational reliability. It builds incrementally on the QW-series MANPADS architecture, succeeding the with improved seeker resistance to countermeasures and reduced susceptibility to decoys, though retaining similar man-portable ergonomics for use.

Operational History

Use by state militaries

The FN-6 MANPADS has been adopted by multiple state militaries for , equipping units with capabilities to engage low-flying such as helicopters and fixed-wing jets at altitudes up to 3,500 meters. Developed by in the late 1990s, it entered operational service with the (PLA) Ground Force and around 2005, forming a core element of divisional and regimental air defense batteries. In PLA service, the system supports and airborne troops, enabling rapid deployment against aerial incursions in potential or border scenarios, though no confirmed combat deployments by PLA forces have been documented. Export variants have proliferated to allied and customer states, including , , , , , and , where they integrate into national air defense networks alongside legacy systems like the Soviet SA-7. These operators employ the FN-6 primarily for territorial and counter-air operations in asymmetric environments, with reported acquisitions dating from the early 2000s; for instance, integrated it into its army's air defense regiments by the mid-2000s to bolster frontier defenses. Sudanese forces received deliveries around 2006, utilizing the missile in internal security roles amid regional instability. While in active inventory across these militaries, verifiable combat applications by state actors remain scarce, with available evidence pointing to routine training firings and static defense postures rather than kinetic engagements. This contrasts with proliferation risks observed in export destinations, where diversions to non-state groups have occurred, but state usage adheres to conventional doctrines emphasizing infrared-homing intercepts of unarmored .

Chinese People's Liberation Army

The (PLA) employs the FN-6, domestically designated Hongying-6 (HN-6), as a core component of its man-portable air-defense systems, having entered service in the late following development finalized in 1999. This third-generation infrared-homing missile replaced the earlier series, providing ground forces with enhanced engagement capabilities against low-flying aircraft at ranges up to 6 km and altitudes up to 3.5 km. The system is standard issue across PLA Army infantry and mechanized units, integrated into divisional air defense structures where each mechanized infantry division maintains approximately 108 HN-6 launchers for operational readiness. Deployment emphasizes protection of forward troops and key assets from aerial threats, including helicopters and aircraft, within the PLA's layered air defense doctrine that combines MANPADS with vehicle-mounted systems. PLA forces routinely train with the FN-6/HN-6 in exercises simulating scenarios, such as those observed in live-fire drills where infantrymen engage mock targets to validate seeker performance and battery life. No verified instances of employment by PLA units exist, as major conflicts involving Chinese ground forces post-adoption—such as border skirmishes—have not featured significant low-altitude air threats necessitating MANPADS activation. Variants like the FN-6A have seen limited PLA adoption for specialized roles, though the baseline model remains predominant in force structure. The system's proliferation within the PLA underscores China's focus on indigenous missile technology, with ongoing upgrades addressing infrared countermeasures resistance observed in exported uses elsewhere.

Middle Eastern conflicts ( and )

The Syrian Arab Army acquired FN-6 MANPADS as part of its pre-civil war air defense inventory, with evidence indicating Chinese-origin systems were integrated into state forces' holdings. These weapons were stored at installations, but by early 2013, opposition groups had looted significant quantities amid the escalating conflict, marking the FN-6's combat debut in the region through rebel employment rather than sustained state operational use. Rebel factions, including groups such as Al-Asala Watanmya and Durou al-Thawra, subsequently fired FN-6 missiles at Syrian government aircraft, achieving confirmed shootdowns of at least two or Mi-17 helicopters by March 2013. Video footage from opposition sources captured additional engagements, such as hits on hovering helicopters, demonstrating the system's effectiveness in low-altitude intercepts despite limited training among non-state users. Supply chains traced to intermediaries like and facilitated rebel access, bypassing direct state control after initial captures. In , no verified instances of FN-6 deployment by Iraqi state security forces during conflicts against insurgent groups have been documented, with available evidence pointing instead to captures by non-state actors from regional stockpiles. The Iraqi military's air defense relied primarily on legacy Soviet-era systems, without integration of Chinese FN-6 variants reported in open-source analyses. This absence underscores the FN-6's limited proliferation to Iraqi government arsenals compared to neighboring .

Use by non-state actors

The FN-6 has been acquired and employed by non-state actors primarily through battlefield captures from state arsenals, illicit smuggling networks, or diversion from external suppliers intended for allied proxies. Such proliferation raises concerns over threats to low-flying and civilian aviation, as these groups lack the training and maintenance protocols of state militaries. Documented uses highlight the system's appeal due to its guidance and resistance to basic countermeasures, though operational effectiveness varies with user proficiency. In the and associated Iraqi operations, FN-6 units initially reached rebel factions via shipments from Gulf states like , which procured them for anti-Assad forces but saw diversions to extremists. The captured multiple FN-6 launchers from Syrian government stocks or rival insurgents, deploying them against and Iraqi aircraft. On , 2014, fighters used an FN-6 to down an Iraqi Army Mi-35 helicopter near , as evidenced by militant-released footage showing the launch and wreckage; this marked one of the earliest confirmed non-state uses against fixed-wing or rotary assets in the conflict. Analysts note that while possessed fewer than a dozen such advanced systems by late 2014, their presence complicated missions until forces neutralized stockpiles through targeted strikes. In Myanmar's ongoing civil war, ethnic insurgent groups including the () and have integrated FN-6 systems into their arsenals, likely sourced from cross-border gray markets or captured from junta forces supplied by . These weapons have neutralized government air assets, eroding regime air superiority in contested regions. On January 16, 2024, operators fired an FN-6 at low altitude to destroy a FTC-2000G light combat aircraft over , with debris analysis confirming the missile's seeker impact. Earlier, in September 2024, forces downed a Mi-17 transport using a similar FN-6 engagement during operations in northern , demonstrating tactical adaptation to engage hovering targets despite the system's design for faster-moving threats. Such incidents underscore the FN-6's role in , where limited numbers—estimated at dozens across rebel holdings—amplify psychological and operational effects against a numerically superior . Beyond these theaters, sporadic FN-6 sightings among non-state actors in other insurgencies remain unconfirmed or anecdotal, with no verified combat deployments reported in conflicts like those in or as of 2025. Proliferation risks persist via illicit trade routes, as evidenced by seizures of FN-6 components in Southeast Asian black markets, though state export controls and end-user agreements have curbed wider diffusion compared to older Soviet-era MANPADS.

Myanmar Civil War

In the Myanmar civil war, which escalated following the February 2021 military coup, non-state actors including ethnic armed organizations have deployed FN-6 man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to counter the Myanmar Air Force's reliance on aerial strikes and troop transport helicopters. These systems, acquired through illicit channels amid porous borders with , represent a shift in insurgent capabilities, enabling rebels to challenge the junta's air superiority previously uncontested by advanced portable anti-aircraft weapons. The (KIA), operating in northern , has been a primary user, with footage and claims documenting FN-6 launches against junta aircraft. A confirmed engagement occurred on January 3, 2024, when fighters used an FN-6 to down a Mi-17 transport helicopter near Nahpaw village in , killing all five crew members aboard. The released video evidence of the missile launch and wreckage, marking one of the earliest verified uses of the FN-6 by anti-junta forces in the post-coup phase. This incident followed earlier seizures by forces in 2019 of FN-6 units from ethnic rebel caches, indicating pre-existing proliferation among groups like the and possibly the . In June 2025, resistance forces in claimed to have shot down a Chinese-made FTC-2000G light using a shoulder-launched , with reports attributing the weapon to an FN-6 based on visual similarities and operational patterns. The incident, if verified, highlights the FN-6's role in broader rebel efforts that have downed at least nine other junta aircraft since 2021, including helicopters and jets, though specific weapon attribution remains unconfirmed by independent observers for this event. Such uses underscore the system's empirical effectiveness against low-flying targets in rugged terrain but also raise concerns over uncontrolled proliferation, as the FN-6's infrared-homing guidance has proven reliable in ambushes despite junta countermeasures like flares.

Other insurgencies

The FN-6 MANPADS saw limited deployment by Syrian rebel factions during the , with transfers reportedly originating from Qatari stockpiles acquired from Chinese exports around 2012-2013. Rebels, including elements aligned with the , employed the system against Syrian Arab Air Force ; a notable instance occurred on 25 February 2013, when an FN-6 downed a near Menagh Air Base close to the Turkish border. Further uses included attempts against regime and Russian rotary-wing assets, such as a reported shootdown of a Russian Mi-35 helicopter by rebels in 2021, though operational reliability drew criticism from fighters for occasional malfunctions during firing. The (IS) acquired FN-6 systems, likely through battlefield captures from Iraqi government stocks or diverted rebel supplies in , integrating them into operations across and by mid-2014. IS militants demonstrated the weapon's use in a propaganda video from October 2014, depicting the downing of an Iraqi helicopter near Baiji using an FN-6, highlighting its role in contesting low-altitude air operations amid coalition airstrikes. This incident underscored proliferation risks, as IS's possession of third-generation infrared-guided MANPADS like the FN-6 raised concerns over potential threats to civilian , though no such attacks materialized. IS inventories reportedly included limited numbers of FN-6 launchers, often paired with captured munitions, but sustained use was constrained by shortages and countermeasures like flares deployed by targeted .

Combat Performance

Confirmed kills and empirical effectiveness

The FN-6 has recorded multiple confirmed aerial victories in asymmetric conflicts, primarily against helicopters and low-altitude operated by state forces. In the , insurgents employed the system to down a and a MiG-21 fighter jet, showcasing its ability to engage maneuvering targets at operational altitudes. Similarly, in during operations against the , militants used FN-6 missiles to shoot down an Iraqi Mi-35 near in October 2014, with visual evidence from ISIS-released footage confirming the launch and impact. These successes highlight the missile's guidance, effective against targets performing evasive maneuvers up to 4g. In Myanmar's ongoing civil war, non-state actors including the achieved verified kills with the FN-6. On 3 January 2024, forces downed a Myanmar Air Force Mi-17 transport in Waimaw Township, , resulting in the loss of all seven aboard. Additionally, on 16 January 2024, another FTC-2000G light attack aircraft was shot down by FN-6 fire in , killing both pilots during an engagement against rebel positions. These incidents, occurring against junta aircraft with basic countermeasures, underscore the system's reliability in jungle and mountainous terrain where launch opportunities are fleeting. Empirical assessments of FN-6 derive from manufacturer corroborated by outcomes, with a claimed hit probability of 70% against non-maneuvering targets at ranges up to 6 km. Open-source analyses note its superiority over earlier Chinese MANPADS like the , attributed to an upgraded digital seeker with multi-spectrum detection and target recognition algorithms that enhance decoy rejection, including resistance to flares and jamming. data from rebel operations—where operators often lack formal training—suggests real-world effectiveness hinges on factors such as target aspect ( engagement capability), environmental conditions (e.g., minimal atmospheric interference), and shooter proficiency, with successes against modern platforms like the FTC-2000G indicating robust despite potential countermeasures.

Limitations, failures, and countermeasures

The FN-6's seeker, while designed with digital for improved discrimination, exhibits a reported single-shot hit probability of around 70% against maneuvering targets, reflecting limitations in tracking accuracy during high-speed or evasive flight profiles exceeding the missile's engagement envelope. This figure, derived from manufacturer specifications and echoed in defense analyses, underscores reliability gaps in cluttered airborne environments where ground clutter or multiple heat sources can degrade lock-on effectiveness, particularly for less-experienced operators. Operational deployments have highlighted logistical constraints inherent to the system's single-use, disposable design, which limits sustained fire in extended conflicts and amplifies dependency on operator proficiency for rapid acquisition and launch under stress. In use, such as insurgencies, inadequate training has contributed to reduced hit rates, as evidenced by broader MANPADS patterns where proficiency lapses lead to procedural errors like premature venting or failed ignitions. Prolonged engagements further strain battery life and readiness, rendering the FN-6 less viable against persistent aerial threats without resupply chains. Aircraft countermeasures effectively exploit these vulnerabilities, with advanced flare dispensers and directed countermeasures (DIRCM) capable of seducing or overwhelming the seeker's capabilities, even against third-generation systems like the FN-6. Tactical adaptations, including high-g maneuvers, masking at low altitudes below 150 meters, or speeds surpassing 540 km/h, further reduce engagement success by pushing targets outside the missile's effective range of 500-6,000 meters and altitude ceiling of 3,500 meters. Electronic jamming, though less emphasized for passive IR systems, can indirectly disrupt launch cues via integrated battlefield ECM, as noted in assessments of similar Chinese MANPADS in .

Operators and Proliferation

State operators

The FN-6 man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) is primarily operated by the (PLA) of , where it serves as a key component of for ground forces and air units, integrated alongside indigenous systems like the QW series since the system's development in the mid-1990s and public unveiling around 1999. The PLA employs the FN-6 for its all-aspect capability and resistance to countermeasures, positioning it as a lightweight, portable option for and vehicle-mounted air defense roles. Exports of the FN-6 to state militaries have focused on developing nations seeking affordable alternatives to systems like the U.S. or Russian , with verified adopters including , which acquired 896 units in 2021 to bolster its border and low-altitude defense capabilities. Sudan integrated the FN-6 into its armed forces in the early 2000s, enhancing protection against aerial threats in conflict-prone regions. and received deliveries starting in the late 1990s and early 2000s, respectively, incorporating the system into their army air defense units for jungle and archipelago operations. adopted the FN-6 around the same period to modernize its infantry anti-aircraft inventory amid regional tensions. Namibia disclosed its acquisition of the upgraded FN-6A variant during Heroes' Day celebrations in August 2018, with the system publicly displayed again in March 2025 during air defense exercises, reflecting its role in the Namibian Defence Force's efforts to counter potential low-flying threats with a non-Western supplier.

Non-state and illicit operators

The (KIA), an ethnic insurgent group in northern , has employed the FN-6 MANPADS against aircraft, including the downing of a Mi-17 on January 3, 2024, in Waingmaw Township and an FTC-2000G fighter on January 16, 2024, in . The (UWSA), another non-state armed group controlling territory near the Chinese border, received FN-6 systems as early as 2000, integrating them with radar for air defense around its capital. Allied groups such as the have also acquired FN-6 units, contributing to escalated airspace threats during the ongoing civil conflict. People's Defense Forces (PDFs), loosely affiliated civilian militias formed in opposition to the 2021 Myanmar coup, have sought FN-6 acquisitions through black-market channels and incentives, with the offering rewards valued at $75,000–$90,000 per system in 2022 to defectors providing such weapons. These transfers, often unexplained in origin, enable low-intensity operators to challenge fixed-wing and rotary assets, as evidenced by reported seizures and uses in Shan and Kachin regions. In , FN-6 MANPADS reached opposition militias via covert smuggling routes, including Qatari shipments through documented in 2016 and Sudanese transshipments noted in 2013, allowing rebels to achieve confirmed intercepts against regime forces. A 2024 Small Arms Survey report highlighted deliveries of several dozen units to Syrian non-state actors, underscoring persistent diversion risks in Middle Eastern conflicts. Broader illicit proliferation of FN-6 series systems has been reported since at least 2022, with complete units appearing in black-market networks supplying non-state actors across , , , and , heightening vulnerabilities for low-altitude air operations in . These diversions, facilitated by porous borders and under-regulated exports, amplify threats to civilian and by enabling portable, heat-seeking intercepts effective up to 6 km range.

Export history and proliferation risks

The FN-6 MANPADS has been actively marketed for export by Chinese state-owned defense firms, including Poly Technologies and the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC), since the early 2000s as a third-generation infrared-homing system competitive with Western equivalents like the FIM-92 Stinger but at lower acquisition costs, typically estimated below $100,000 per unit based on comparable Chinese small arms pricing trends. This affordability has driven sales primarily to militaries in developing regions seeking affordable air defense upgrades without stringent end-user restrictions imposed by U.S. or European suppliers. Export volumes remain opaque due to limited transparency in Chinese arms trade reporting, but documented transfers align with China's broader strategy of expanding influence through low-cost weaponry, with initial deals emerging around 2000-2004. Documented diversions of FN-6 systems to non-state actors have occurred via networks and captures, bypassing China's nominal MANPADS export controls established in 2002, which categorize them as light weapons requiring verification of end-users. Arms monitoring groups, including the , have substantiated at least 49 instances since the of advanced Chinese-designed MANPADS, including FN-6 , in possession of or used by illicit groups, often through gray markets or from state stockpiles in conflict zones. Specific routes have funneled systems from into Middle Eastern theaters, with early sightings of FN-6 in Syrian opposition hands by 2013 linked to cross-border illicit trade rather than direct state transfers. These diversions reflect systemic challenges in enforcing post-sale tracking, exacerbated by the system's portability and appeal to non-state buyers seeking passive, capabilities. The proliferation of FN-6 heightens aviation security risks, as empirical incident data from 1975-2019 records over 1,000 fatalities from MANPADS attacks, with modern systems like the FN-6 posing elevated threats due to their resistance to common countermeasures such as flares compared to first-generation models. Unlike bulkier Soviet-era SA-7s, which dominate historical black-market flows but suffer higher failure rates in diverse environments, FN-6 diversions amplify concerns over low-altitude targeting of commercial flights, with monitoring reports noting a rise in advanced MANPADS seizures tied to terrorist networks by 2022. While no FN-6-specific shootdowns are publicly confirmed as of 2025, the system's empirical effectiveness in military contexts—evidenced by non-state uses in —suggests potential for severe escalation if controls weaken further, underscoring the need for enhanced international marking and recovery protocols.

References

  1. https://www.[globalsecurity.org](/page/GlobalSecurity.org)/military/world//fn-6-specs.htm
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