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National Development and Reform Commission of the
People's Republic of China
中华人民共和国国家发展和改革委员会
Logo of the National Development and Reform Commission
Agency overview
FormedNovember 1952; 73 years ago (1952-11)
Preceding agencies
  • State Planning Commission (1952–1998)
  • State Development Planning Commission (1998–2003)
TypeConstituent Department of the State Council (cabinet-level)
JurisdictionGovernment of China
Headquarters38 Yuetan South Street, Xicheng District, Beijing
Minister responsible
Parent agencyState Council
Child agency
Websiteen.ndrc.gov.cn Edit this at Wikidata
National Development and Reform Commission
Simplified Chinese国家发展和改革委员会
Traditional Chinese國家發展和改革委員會
Literal meaningState Development and Reform Commission
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinGuójiā Fāzhǎn hé Gǎigé Wěiyuánhuì
Commonly abbreviated as
Simplified Chinese发改委
Traditional Chinese發改委
Literal meaningDevelop-Reform-Commission
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinFāgǎiwěi
Politics of China
Leadership
Leadership generations
Succession of power
Party and state leaders
Orders of precedence
Related systems
Communist Party
History
National People's Congress (14th)
State representative
Executive organ
Military organ
Supervisory organ
Judicial organs
United front
Historical parties:
Propaganda
Cross-strait relations
Foreign relations
Related topics
flag China portal

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the third-ranked executive department of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, which functions as a macroeconomic management agency. Established as the State Planning Commission, the NDRC has broad administrative and planning control over the economy of mainland China, and has a reputation of being the "mini-state council".[1]

History

[edit]

The body was first established in November 1952 as the State Planning Commission of the Central People's Government. It was modeled after Gosplan.[2]: 109  Gao Gang was its first director.[2]: 109  In 1954, it was transformed to the State Planning Commission of the People's Republic of China. The NDRC's functions are to study and formulate policies for economic and social development, maintain the balance of economic development, and to guide restructuring of the economic system of mainland China.[3]

In March 1998, the commission was renamed into the State Development Planning Commission. It was renamed again in March 2003 to its current name, the National Development and Reform Commission.[citation needed]

In 2005, the NDRC issued a circular economy-focused policy document requiring maximization of recycling and reuse of wastewater, exhaust gas, and water residue generated during mining and smelting.[4]: 12 

In 2008, the NDRC issued a set of policies designed to further development the economies of central regions of China, consistent with the Hu-Wen administration's efforts to balance regional development.[5]: 217 

In 2016, the NDRC and Alibaba Group signed an agreement to promote rural e-commerce development.[6]: 129 

In 2017, the NDRC announced the creation of China's national carbon emissions trading system.[7]: 76 

Prior to 2018, it was also responsible for enforcing China's antitrust law, but this function has been transferred to the State Administration for Market Regulation as part of the deepening the reform of the Party and state institutions. In February 2015, the NDRC completed an investigation into Qualcomm, finding that violated the Anti-Monopoly Law by imposing unreasonable requirements for patent licensing.[8] Qualcomm was fined the equivalent of US$975 million.[8] Also in 2018, the NDRC's climate policymaking functions were transferred to the newly created Ministry of Ecology and Environment.[9]: 95 

On 19 December 2020, the NDRC published rules for reviewing foreign investment on national security grounds.[10][11] The rules allow government agencies "to preview, deny and punish foreign investment activities in areas that are deemed as important to national security."[11] In October 2021, the NDRC published rules restricting private capital in "news-gathering, editing, broadcasting, and distribution."[12]

On 4 September 2023, the NDRC announced it established the Private Economy Development Bureau in order monitor the country's private economy, as well as establish regular communication with private businesses.[13]

Functions

[edit]

The NDRC is China's main macroeconomic control institution,[14]: 102  as well as the top organization in the State Council in matters related to economic policymaking. It oversees the planning system in China, including producing the Chinese Communist Party's five-year plans.[15] The NDRC has responsibilities over economic targets, price policies, market policies, supply-side structural reform, overseas investment, domestic investment policy, regional development strategies, industrial development strategies, major infrastructure projects, consumption policy, innovation-driven development, scientific and technological infrastructure, high-tech industries, social development, basic public services and social development.[15] NDRC's responsibility for large infrastructure is intended to prevent the economy from becoming too hot or cold, as well as to address China's overcapacity in production for sectors like aluminum, iron, steel, and energy.[14]: 106 

The NDRC works with other departments to formulate policies, including drafting laws and regulations.[16]: 39  It monitors Chinese businesses' outbound foreign direct investment to ensure they do not invest in blacklisted projects.[17]: 80  The NDRC must approve sensitive projects, including projects in countries that do not recognize the People's Republic of China, projects in countries experiencing civil war or other major domestic difficulties, or projects involving sensitive subject matter like cross-border water issues or weapons production.[17]: 80  The NDRC maintains the Negative List for Market Access, which identifies the economic sectors which cannot receive private investment.[18]: 194 

The NDRC works with the National Health Commission to research demographic trends and formulate policies on population.[15] It promotes sustainable development strategies.[16]: 39  The NDRC is involved in the foreign aid process through coordinating aid to other countries for climate cooperation.[17]: 73  The NDRC is also one of the main government agencies responsible for data collection for the Chinese Social Credit System.[19] The NDRC's Social Development Division has a planning role in cultural industries including sports, tourism, and mass media.[20]: 100 

The NDRC manages the General Offices several leading groups, including the National Defense Mobilization Commission, the State Council Leading Group for Western Development, and the State Council Leading Group for the Revitalization of Old Industrial Bases in Northeast China; all of these are led by the premier.[15] It also hosts the General Offices of the State Council Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, the Leading Group for Coordinated Development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region, the Leading Group for Promoting the Development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, the Leading Group for Promoting the Development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, and the Leading Group for Promoting Comprehensive Deepening of Reform and Opening in Hainan; these are led by the first-ranking vice premier, with the NDRC chairman usually being the Office director.[15]

Structure

[edit]

The National Development and Reform Commission has the following structure:[21][22][23]

List of ministers

[edit]

Officially, the candidate for the chairperson of the NDRC is nominated by the premier of the State Council, who is then approved by the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee and appointed by the president.[24] The commission has been chaired by Zheng Shanjie since March 2023.

No. Name Office Took office Left office Premier
1 Gao Gang Chairman of the
Central People's Government State Planning Commission		 November 1952 August 1954 Independent of the Premier Zhou Enlai
2 Li Fuchun Chairperson of the
State Planning Commission		 September 1954 January 1975 Zhou Enlai
3 Yu Qiuli January 1975 August 1980 Zhou Enlai
Hua Guofeng
4 Yao Yilin August 1980 June 1983 Zhao Ziyang
5 Song Ping June 1983 June 1987
6 Yao Yilin June 1987 December 1989 Zhao Ziyang
Li Peng
7 Zou Jiahua December 1989 March 1993 Li Peng
8 Chen Jinhua March 1993 March 1998
9 Zeng Peiyan Chairperson of the
State Development Planning Commission		 March 1998 March 2003 Zhu Rongji
10 Ma Kai Chairperson of the National Development and Reform Commission March 2003 March 2008 Wen Jiabao
11 Zhang Ping March 2008 16 March 2013
12 Xu Shaoshi 16 March 2013 24 February 2017 Li Keqiang
13 He Lifeng 24 February 2017 12 March 2023
14 Zheng Shanjie 12 March 2023 Incumbent Li Qiang

Internal organization

[edit]
  • General Office
  • Policy Research Office
  • Development Strategy and Planning Department
  • National Economic Affairs Department
  • Economic Operation Regulation Bureau
  • Department of System Reform
  • Fixed Asset Investment Department
  • Private Economic Development Bureau
  • Department of Foreign Investment and Overseas Investment (Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Office)
  • Department of Regional Coordinated Development (Office of the Central Leading Group for Regional Coordinated Development)
  • Regional Development Division
  • Department of Regional Openness (Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Construction of the Belt and Road Initiative)
  • Rural Economy Department
  • Department of Infrastructure Development (Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt)
  • Low-altitude Economic Development Department
  • Department of Industrial Development
  • Department of Innovation and High Technology Development
  • Department of Resources Conservation and Environmental Protection
  • Social Development Department
  • Employment, Income Distribution and Consumption Department
  • Economic and Trade Department
  • Department of Finance, Banking and Credit Construction
  • Price Department
  • Regulatory Department
  • International Cooperation Department
  • Personnel Department
  • Department of Economic and Defense Coordination Development
  • Evaluation and Supervision Department
  • Party Committee
  • Retired Cadres Bureau

Bureaus under the NDRC

[edit]

Directly affiliated institutions

[edit]
  • State Information Center (National E-Government Extranet Management Center)
  • China Macroeconomic Research Institute
  • Office Service Center
  • Infrastructure Property Management Center
  • Training Center (Publicity Center)
  • Price Certification Center
  • Research Center for Coordinated Development of Economy and Defense
  • National Investment Project Review Center
  • Price Monitoring Center
  • International Cooperation Center
  • Center for Reform and Development of Cities and Small Towns
  • Price and Cost Research Center
  • Belt and Road Initiative Promotion Center
  • Innovation-Driven Development Center (Digital Economy Research and Development Center)
  • National Energy Conservation Center (National Development and Reform * Commission Energy Conservation Information Dissemination Center)
  • National Geospatial Information Center
  • National Public Credit Information Center
  • Business Environment Development Promotion Center
  • Xi Jinping Economic Thought Research Center
  • China Development and Reform Press
  • China Economic and Business Magazine
  • Editorial Department of Macroeconomic Management
  • Editorial Department of China Economic and Trade Guide
  • National Development and Reform Commission Macroeconomics Magazine

Advisory and deliberative bodies

[edit]
  • Academic Committee

Responsible social groups

[edit]

Directly affiliated enterprise units

[edit]
  • China Planning Publishing House Co., Ltd.
  • China Market Publishing Co., Ltd.

Leadership

[edit]
Main article: Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission

Officially, the candidate for the chairperson of the NDRC is nominated by the premier of the State Council, who is then approved by the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee and appointed by the president.[24] The commission has been chaired by Zheng Shanjie since March 2023.

Minister in charge of the National Development and Reform Commission
  1. Zheng Shanjie
Vice-ministers
  1. Mu Hong - Minister level, Deputy General Office chief of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms
  2. Zhang Yong - Minister level
  3. Ning Jizhe - Minister level[3]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

National Development and Reform Commission

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from Grokipedia
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is a ministerial-level department under the State Council of the People's Republic of China, responsible for formulating and implementing strategies, policies, and plans for national economic and social development while coordinating major issues in economic reform. Established in 2003 as a successor to the State Planning Commission through the merger of several economic planning bodies, the NDRC serves as the central macroeconomic management agency, overseeing the drafting of five-year plans, regulating prices for key commodities, and approving major infrastructure and investment projects exceeding specified thresholds. Its functions extend to balancing aggregate economic demand and supply, guiding industrial restructuring, promoting urban-rural development, and advancing ecological civilization initiatives, including energy policy and carbon emission controls. The agency plays a pivotal role in initiatives like the Belt and Road, where it co-formulates guidelines for overseas economic engagement, though its centralized approval processes have drawn criticism for administrative delays and potential biases toward state-owned enterprises, contributing to inefficiencies in a transitioning economy. Despite periodic restructurings aimed at devolving some powers, the NDRC retains significant influence over resource allocation and policy coordination, reflecting China's hybrid system of state-directed market development.

Historical Background

Origins in Central Planning

The State Planning Commission, the direct institutional precursor to the National Development and Reform Commission, was established on November 14, 1952, by the Central People's Government of the as the central agency for economic and management. Modeled on the Soviet Union's , it was tasked with formulating national economic plans, allocating resources, setting production quotas, and coordinating industrial development in a command framework. Initial leadership included as chairman, reflecting the early emphasis on rapid industrialization aligned with Soviet aid and expertise following the 1950 Sino-Soviet , Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. In 1953, the Commission spearheaded the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), which prioritized , , and agriculture collectivization, drawing over 150 Soviet technical experts and securing approximately US$1.4 billion in Soviet loans for 156 key projects. The plan targeted a 58% increase in industrial output, with state-owned enterprises comprising 90% of production capacity, enforcing mandatory targets across sectors like (aiming for 5.35 million tons annually by 1957) and . By 1954, the Commission was subordinated to the newly formed State Council, solidifying its role in vertical command structures that extended planning directives to provincial and enterprise levels, often overriding market signals in favor of ideological and political priorities. Central planning under the Commission intensified during the Second Five-Year Plan (1958–1962), coinciding with the , where it coordinated mass mobilization for backyard furnaces and communal farming, resulting in output targets like 10.7 million tons of steel in 1958—far exceeding feasible capacities and contributing to economic disruptions. Despite periodic decentralizations, such as those attempted in 1957–1958 to empower local authorities, the core mechanism remained top-down allocation, with the Commission controlling 80–90% of key investments and prices until the late 1970s. This era entrenched the Commission's authority in a system prioritizing and over consumer goods, laying the administrative foundations later adapted into reform-era bodies.

Post-1978 Reforms and Reorganization

Following the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the in December 1978, which initiated the policy of reform and opening up, the State Planning Commission (SPC)—the direct institutional predecessor to the National Development and Reform Commission—retained its core mandate for drafting national economic plans but adapted to emphasize indicative rather than mandatory targets in response to decollectivization in and incentives for state-owned enterprises. This shift involved reducing centralized quotas for industrial output and allowing local governments and firms greater discretion in production decisions, though the SPC continued to control allocations of key resources like energy and raw materials through the remainder of the 1980s. In May 1982, the State Council established the State Commission for Restructuring the (also known as the Economic System Reform Commission) as a dedicated body to oversee experimental reforms, including price and enterprise autonomy pilots, thereby separating systemic reform coordination from the SPC's operational planning duties. Chaired initially by Deputy Premier , this commission facilitated dual-track pricing mechanisms—whereby planned prices coexisted with market prices—and enterprise contracting systems, which devolved profit retention to managers while the SPC focused on macroeconomic balances. These changes reflected a pragmatic evolution, as excessive risked and shortages, prompting periodic recentralization of planning controls in 1988 and 1989. The brought accelerated institutional streamlining amid the transition to a "" enshrined at the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992. In March 1998, during Premier Zhu Rongji's comprehensive government reorganization, the SPC was renamed the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC), signaling a pivot from command-style planning to strategic development guidance, with reduced emphasis on annual quotas and greater integration of market signals in five-year plans. The SDPC absorbed some functions from the State Economic and Trade Commission, enhancing its oversight of foreign investment approvals and sectoral policies, while devolving routine approvals to lower levels to curb bureaucratic bottlenecks. Culminating these adaptations, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was formally established on March 17, 2003, through the merger of the SDPC, the State Council Office for Restructuring the Economic System (successor to the 1982 reform commission), and select divisions from the State Economic and Trade Commission and Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. This consolidation, approved by the Tenth National People's Congress, centralized macroeconomic policy formulation, investment project vetting, and reform implementation under one entity reporting directly to the State Council, positioning the NDRC as a "super-ministry" with veto power over large-scale infrastructure and pricing decisions to support sustained growth amid WTO accession. The reorganization aimed to resolve fragmented authority that had hindered efficiency, though it preserved the agency's expansive scope, which critics later noted could stifle market competition.

Key Institutional Changes in the 2000s and 2010s

In March 2003, the (NDRC) was established through the reorganization of the State Development Planning Commission, incorporating functions from the State Council Office for Restructuring the Economic System and select responsibilities from the State Economic and Trade Commission, thereby expanding its scope to integrate macroeconomic planning with structural economic reforms. This restructuring, approved by the 10th National People's Congress, positioned the NDRC as a "super-ministry" overseeing broad economic coordination across 28 ministries and agencies. During the 2008 State Council administrative reforms, the NDRC's mandate was refocused on macroeconomic regulation and aggregate planning, with microeconomic interventions and routine project approvals largely delegated to line ministries and provincial governments to reduce administrative bottlenecks. Concurrently, in response to the global financial crisis, the NDRC coordinated the RMB 4 trillion (approximately US$586 billion) stimulus package, temporarily centralizing oversight of major and investment projects. In the 2010s, administrative streamlining accelerated, with the NDRC delegating approval authority for numerous fixed-asset investment projects, including many foreign-invested initiatives exceeding RMB 300 million, to provincial NDRC branches and the Ministry of Commerce starting in 2010. The November 2013 Third Plenum of the 18th further curtailed the NDRC's influence by emphasizing the market's "decisive" role in , reducing its pricing controls and project vetting powers while centralizing strategic decisions under new Party-led small groups. Premier Li Keqiang's March 2013 commitment to eliminate about one-third of the approximately 1,700 administrative approval items directly targeted the NDRC's expansive gatekeeping role, promoting in operational approvals to foster . These shifts marked a partial retreat from the NDRC's post-2003 dominance, aligning with broader efforts to mitigate over-centralization in planning.

Core Functions and Powers

Macroeconomic Coordination and Planning

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) serves as China's primary agency for coordinating macroeconomic policies, formulating national economic and social development strategies, and ensuring balanced growth across sectors. It monitors economic aggregates such as GDP growth, , , and trade balances, while adjusting policies to maintain stability and optimize . This role stems from its mandate to integrate fiscal, monetary, and industrial policies under a unified framework, often described as providing strategic guidelines for the national economy. Central to its planning function is the drafting and implementation of five-year plans, which outline medium-term objectives for economic restructuring, technological advancement, and social development. For instance, the NDRC led the formulation of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), emphasizing innovation-driven growth and strategies to bolster domestic markets amid external pressures. It is currently preparing the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), prioritizing "new quality " such as advanced and self-reliant technologies to counter geopolitical challenges. These plans guide , setting quantitative targets like annual GDP growth rates and sectoral contributions, with the NDRC coordinating input from ministries and local governments. In macroeconomic coordination, the NDRC analyzes trends and intervenes to prevent imbalances, such as overcapacity in certain industries or regional disparities. It convenes inter-ministerial mechanisms to align policies, for example, synchronizing monetary easing from the with fiscal expansions during downturns. In 2024, amid sluggish post-pandemic recovery, the NDRC advocated expanding policy space through market-oriented tools like targeted subsidies and infrastructure bonds, aiming to stabilize growth at around 5% while managing debt risks. This approach reflects a shift from rigid command to more flexible, data-driven adjustments, though state control remains dominant in strategic sectors. The agency's planning extends to long-range visions, such as the 2035 objectives integrated into recent five-year frameworks, focusing on high-quality development metrics like and environmental . Performance is tracked via annual reports submitted to the , where the NDRC assesses plan fulfillment—for the 14th Plan, it reported progress in rural revitalization and green transitions but highlighted needs for consumption boosts. Critics from international observers note that while effective in rapid mobilization, this top-down coordination can distort markets through administrative quotas, leading to inefficiencies like excess in state-favored projects. Nonetheless, empirical outcomes, such as China's sustained GDP expansion averaging over 6% in the 2010s, underscore the system's capacity for scale-oriented coordination.

Investment Project Approvals and Oversight

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) exercises central authority over the approval of major fixed-asset investment projects in , focusing on those that support national economic strategies, utilize public funds, or span restricted sectors such as , , and resources. It formulates and maintains the catalog delineating projects subject to approval, while coordinating with sectoral ministries to feasibility, environmental impact, and alignment with macroeconomic plans. This role stems from the NDRC's mandate to manage the overall scale of societal fixed-asset investments and establish targets, preventing overcapacity and directing resources toward priority areas. Pursuant to the 2004 State Council Decision on Reforming the System, the NDRC transitioned from comprehensive pre-approval of all projects to a framework emphasizing enterprise autonomy, wherein investors prepare feasibility studies and local development and reform commissions handle routine approvals, escalating strategic or high-value cases to the central NDRC. The NDRC's Department of specifically reviews major projects, recommends approvals for government-financed initiatives, and optimizes central allocations toward urgent and development tasks. Reforms under this system have included delegating powers to lower levels, implementing negative lists for , and streamlining procedures to foster private , including through public-private partnerships (PPPs) with targeted policy support. For foreign-invested projects involving , approvals or filings depend on sector and scale, with the NDRC assessing and economic fit before proceeding to other clearances. Oversight extends across the project lifecycle, encompassing post-approval monitoring, performance audits, and adjustments to ensure compliance with approved plans and evolving priorities. The NDRC intensifies over central budgetary s, verifying fund usage and outcomes, while coordinating macroeconomic responses to investment trends. In practice, this has involved approving batches of strategic projects; for instance, in 2025, the NDRC greenlit eight fixed-asset initiatives valued at 377.1 billion yuan, contributing to a first-quarter total of 573.7 billion yuan amid efforts to stabilize growth. For outbound investments, the NDRC applies differentiated procedures: sensitive projects or non-sensitive ones exceeding 300 million USD require prior approval to verify policy compliance and risk, while smaller non-sensitive cases undergo filing with subsequent reporting on implementation. This mechanism, refined in measures, prohibits investments in diplomatically isolated regions or unstable zones, reinforcing national oversight amid global expansion.

Price Setting, Resource Allocation, and Sectoral Regulation

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) exercises authority over price setting through its Department of Price, which monitors and forecasts price fluctuations, establishes control targets, and formulates policy recommendations to stabilize markets. This department promotes reforms toward market-determined pricing while retaining government intervention for essential commodities and services, such as tariffs, , and public utilities, where it directly sets or approves rates to balance supply-demand dynamics and prevent volatility. For instance, in refining mechanisms, the NDRC advanced market-based reforms for on-grid power from renewable sources and improved source-side pricing as outlined in its 2025 report to the . Recent actions include issuing measures in October 2025 to curb disorderly low-price competition through cost investigations and inspections, targeting sectors prone to . Additionally, a draft revision to the Price Law in July 2025 clarified criteria for low-price dumping, defining it as sustained sales below production costs to enhance regulatory enforcement. In resource allocation, the NDRC coordinates national strategies to ensure efficient distribution of factors like land, labor, capital, and environmental resources, emphasizing a transition to market-driven mechanisms while maintaining oversight for strategic priorities. It promotes unified frameworks for quota allocation and trading, as evidenced by initiatives in June 2025 to accelerate reforms in resource and environmental factor markets, including carbon emissions and water rights trading to optimize efficiency. Earlier efforts, such as the January 2022 guidelines, focused on market-based allocation of production factors to support unified national markets and reduce administrative barriers. The 2024 NDRC report underscored the market's decisive role in resource allocation, with government interventions limited to correcting market failures in critical areas like energy and infrastructure. For sectoral regulation, the NDRC formulates and enforces policies in key industries, including and , to align development with macroeconomic goals. In the sector, it oversees power market operations, issuing rules effective July 2024 that define market participants, transaction types, and penalties for non-compliance to foster while ensuring supply . It also shapes energy pricing and industrial policies, such as those promoting high-tech industrialization and renewable integration. In telecommunications, the NDRC collaborates with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology to regulate (BTS) prices and charges, managing and costs to support network expansion. These regulatory functions extend to monitoring sectoral imbalances, with interventions like price controls on to mitigate costs, as analyzed in studies showing potential system-wide savings from targeted . Overall, NDRC's approach prioritizes state-guided reforms to enhance competitiveness without fully relinquishing control in strategic domains.

Organizational Framework

Internal Bureaus and Specialized Departments

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) maintains an internal organizational structure comprising 26 functional departments, bureaus, and offices that execute its responsibilities in macroeconomic coordination, planning, investment oversight, and sectoral policy. These units, as delineated in official State Council regulations, include general administrative bodies, policy research offices, and specialized divisions focused on economic operations, reforms, investments, regional strategies, and industry-specific regulations. The structure emphasizes centralized control over key economic levers, with departments often coordinating across sectors to align with national five-year plans and development goals. Key internal bureaus and departments encompass:
  • General Office (办公厅): Serves as the central hub for administrative coordination, document handling, and operational support across NDRC activities.
  • Policy Research Office (政研室): Drafts major policy documents, conducts research on critical economic and social issues, and supports strategic decision-making.
  • Department of Development Planning (规划司): Formulates national economic and social development strategies, medium- and long-term plans, and annual targets, while coordinating unified planning systems.
  • Department of National (综合司): Oversees macroeconomic analysis, comprehensive economic policies, and coordination of major national economic affairs.
  • Bureau of Economic Operations Adjustment (运行局): Monitors economic performance, adjusts operations to stabilize growth, and addresses short-term imbalances in .
  • Department of System (体改司): Coordinates economic structural reforms, promotes opening-up policies, and guides institutional changes to enhance market mechanisms.
  • Department of Fixed Assets (投资司): Reviews and approves major projects, regulates fixed asset s, and ensures alignment with national priorities.
  • Bureau of Private Economy (民营局): Promotes development of private enterprises, coordinates policies for non-public sector growth, and facilitates private in strategic areas.
  • Department of Foreign Capital and Foreign (外资司): Manages foreign approvals, guides utilization of foreign capital, and coordinates -related economic policies.
  • Regional Economy Department (区域司): Develops and implements plans, coordinates inter-regional economic strategies, and addresses disparities across provinces.
Specialized departments further include those for rural economy (农经司), basic industries, , transportation, high-technology development, and price supervision, each tasked with sector-specific planning, regulation, and to support overall economic objectives. This decentralized yet hierarchically integrated setup allows the NDRC to exert influence over diverse economic domains while maintaining alignment with central directives from the State Council and leadership. As of 2023 institutional reforms, the core departmental framework remained largely intact, with emphases on integrating and innovation coordination where relevant.

Affiliated Institutions and Advisory Bodies

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) oversees several directly affiliated public institutions that provide specialized research, information management, and policy support functions. These include the Academy of Macroeconomic Research, which conducts studies on national economic trends, development strategies, and reform policies to inform NDRC decision-making. The National Information Center, established as a public institution under NDRC, manages the national e-government extranet, processes economic and social data, and supports information systems for policy formulation and implementation. Additionally, the Xi Jinping Economic Thought Research Center focuses on theoretical research and dissemination of economic policies aligned with central leadership directives. Other affiliated entities encompass sector-specific research arms, such as the Energy Research Institute, which analyzes , supply security, and strategies under NDRC guidance. These institutions operate as non-profit public units, funded primarily through government budgets, and contribute to NDRC's macroeconomic coordination by producing reports and forecasts used in five-year plans and annual adjustments. For advisory functions, NDRC maintains a system of external consulting mechanisms, particularly for evaluations. Under regulations like the Investment Ordinance, NDRC selects qualified institutions via public tendering to provide expert assessments on feasibility, risks, and compliance across sectors such as , , and . As of 2022, this included 37 firms for 19 professional categories, with examples like China International Consulting Co. Ltd. for agricultural and , and China and Hydroelectric Consulting Group Co. Ltd. for water resources. These advisory bodies are not permanently affiliated but are delegated tasks on a basis, with NDRC covering fees to ensure scientific decision-making while mitigating biases in self-assessment by proponents. This framework, revised periodically, emphasizes independence and expertise, though selections prioritize state-aligned entities capable of aligning with national priorities.

Subordinate Enterprises and Social Organizations

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) oversees a limited number of directly affiliated public institutions, primarily research and information centers that provide analytical support for macroeconomic policy formulation, , and ideological studies, rather than commercial enterprises. These units operate as state institutions (事业单位) under the NDRC's administrative guidance, focusing on advisory roles aligned with national objectives. Unlike sector-specific ministries that manage state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the NDRC does not directly control profit-oriented subordinate enterprises; its influence over SOEs occurs indirectly through investment approvals and sectoral regulations. Key affiliated institutions include the Academy of Macroeconomic Research (宏观经济研究院), established to conduct studies on national economic trends, development strategies, and , producing reports that inform NDRC's five-year plans and reform policies. This institute, with roots tracing to the 1980s State Planning Commission era, employs economists to model growth scenarios and evaluate policy impacts, such as efficiencies. The State Information Center (国家信息中心), also directly subordinate, manages national economic databases, networks, and analytics for development planning, including the administration of the National E-Government Extranet since its inception in 1986 to support information-driven . It processes real-time economic indicators and facilitates inter-agency , contributing to NDRC's oversight of projects and resource distribution. Additionally, the Xi Jinping Economic Thought Research Center (习近平经济思想研究中心), established more recently to systematize and propagate economic principles associated with China's leadership, conducts theoretical research on high-quality development, , and strategies, directly aiding NDRC's alignment of plans with central directives as of 2023. These centers collectively enhance the NDRC's capacity for evidence-based policymaking but have faced critiques for potential prioritization of over independent empirical analysis in their outputs. Regarding social organizations, the NDRC does not maintain a broad portfolio of registered non-governmental entities; instead, its affiliated units function within the state apparatus, with limited external societal engagement beyond policy dissemination. No verifiable records indicate direct subordination of independent social groups or NGOs, reflecting the centralized structure where such bodies require government sponsorship for registration and operations in .

Leadership and Governance

Directors and Ministerial Leadership

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is led by a Chairman, equivalent to a minister in rank, who directs the agency's macroeconomic planning, investment oversight, and policy coordination functions under the State Council. The Chairman is appointed by the Premier and confirmed by the Standing Committee of the , typically serving terms aligned with National Congress sessions, and is concurrently the Secretary of the NDRC's Leading Party Members' Group, ensuring alignment with directives.
NameTermKey Notes
Ma KaiMarch 2003 – March 2008Oversaw initial integration of predecessor agencies including the State Planning Commission; focused on sustaining post-WTO economic growth amid global integration.
Zhang PingMarch 2008 – March 2013Emphasized urbanization and domestic demand expansion during the global financial crisis response; coordinated stimulus measures totaling 4 trillion yuan in 2008.
Xu ShaoshiMarch 2013 – February 2017Prioritized structural reforms under the 12th Five-Year Plan, including capacity cuts in overcapacity sectors like steel and coal; advanced Belt and Road Initiative planning.
He LifengFebruary 2017 – March 2023Directed supply-side reforms and high-quality development strategies; key role in dual circulation economic paradigm amid U.S.-China trade tensions.
Zheng ShanjieMarch 2023 – presentFocuses on stabilizing growth post-COVID, expanding domestic demand, and advancing new productive forces; coordinated 2024 economic targets including 5% GDP growth aim.
Vice Chairmen, numbering around 7–10 at deputy ministerial level, support the Chairman by heading specialized departments; for instance, as of June 2025, Zhou Haibing serves as a vice minister overseeing relevant portfolios, succeeding Zhao Chenxin. These leaders are selected for technical expertise in or , often with prior provincial or sectoral experience, reflecting the NDRC's technocratic orientation. The leadership structure underscores centralized control, with the Chairman reporting directly to the and influencing cross-ministerial decisions through inter-agency coordination.

Decision-Making Processes and CCP Influence

The National Development and Reform Commission's (NDRC) processes involve formulating national economic strategies, coordinating macroeconomic policies, and reviewing major through its specialized departments and bureaus. Proposals for medium- and long-term plans, annual targets, and approvals originate from internal analysis by functional bureaus, such as those handling , pricing, or sectoral development, which assess feasibility, , and alignment with national priorities. These are then escalated to commission leadership for deliberation, often via executive meetings where criteria like economic impact, environmental sustainability, and strategic significance determine outcomes; for instance, central-level approval is required for non-governmental exceeding RMB 300 million in key sectors or with cross-provincial implications. While reforms since 2004 have decentralized routine approvals to provincial NDRC branches and enterprises, the central NDRC retains power over high-stakes decisions to enforce uniformity. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exerts dominant influence over NDRC operations through its internal Party Committee, which operates parallel to the administrative structure and ensures all decisions conform to CCP directives. Established as the leading organ within the NDRC, the Party Committee—chaired by the commission's director—prioritizes political loyalty, ideological education, and implementation of resolutions from the CCP Central Committee, including Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. This committee convenes regularly to review major policies before administrative approval, embedding CCP oversight in processes like five-year plan drafting, where NDRC inputs are subordinated to Politburo guidance from events such as the Central Economic Work Conference. Under Xi Jinping's centralization since 2012, CCP mechanisms have further subordinated NDRC autonomy, shifting key economic functions to Party-led bodies like the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, which vets NDRC proposals for alignment with state control priorities over market-driven outcomes. This has manifested in directives overriding technocratic assessments, such as prioritizing state-owned enterprise funding and industrial policies despite evidence of inefficiencies, as CCP influence channels resources toward political goals like self-reliance in technology. NDRC annual reports explicitly credit CCP leadership for policy successes, underscoring the commission's role as an executor rather than independent arbiter.

Major Policy Initiatives

Role in Five-Year Plans

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) serves as the central authority for formulating China's Five-Year Plans, which outline national economic and social development strategies, targets, and policies over five-year periods. As the successor to the State Planning Commission, the NDRC coordinates the drafting process under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party's , integrating input from ministries, provincial governments, and expert consultations to establish quantitative goals such as GDP growth rates, energy intensity reductions, and sectoral priorities. For instance, in the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025), the NDRC emphasized high-quality development, including innovation-driven growth and carbon emission reductions of 18% per unit of GDP, while unifying national, sectoral, and regional planning systems. The formulation phase involves the NDRC leading strategic research and policy recommendations, often drawing on data from affiliated think tanks and economic analyses to align plans with long-term visions like achieving socialist modernization by 2035. This process includes setting binding targets for resource allocation, infrastructure investment, and industrial upgrading, with the NDRC submitting draft outlines for approval by the . In preparation for the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030), announced in October 2025, the NDRC has coordinated sector-specific and provincial plans, prioritizing a modernized industrial system and emerging industries such as advanced manufacturing. NDRC head Zheng Shanjie highlighted efforts to cultivate strategic sectors amid economic challenges, reflecting the agency's role in adapting plans to domestic and global conditions. Implementation oversight falls to the NDRC, which monitors progress through annual plans, adjusts policies via inter-ministerial coordination, and enforces compliance with targets, including approvals and tied to plan objectives. During the 14th Five-Year Plan, the NDRC issued action plans for and rural revitalization, ensuring alignment with broader goals like reducing by 13.5%. This role extends to evaluating mid-term outcomes and recommending , such as boosting in key projects to meet plan milestones by 2025. The NDRC's authority in this domain underscores its position as the macroeconomic planner, though actual outcomes depend on execution by local governments and state-owned enterprises.

Recent Economic Strategies (2010s–2025)

In the , the NDRC shifted focus toward supply-side structural reforms to address overcapacity and structural imbalances, initiating efforts in late to cut excess industrial capacity, reduce inventory, deleverage corporate debt, lower enterprise costs, and bolster weak economic links. These reforms targeted sectors like and , where the NDRC coordinated capacity reductions exceeding 150 million tons of and 800 million tons of by 2017, aiming to rebalance supply with demand amid slowing growth post-. The NDRC's Bureau of Economic Operations Adjustment played a central role in monitoring and implementing these measures, integrating them into the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) to foster . Concurrently, the NDRC co-developed the initiative in 2015 with the Ministry of Science and Technology, outlining a ten-year plan to elevate China's to global leadership through advancements in ten key sectors including , , and new materials. The strategy set ambitious targets, such as achieving 70% domestic content for core components and materials by 2025, supported by state subsidies and R&D investments totaling hundreds of billions of yuan to reduce reliance on foreign technology. Implementation involved NDRC-led coordination for industrial upgrading, though external frictions prompted a de-emphasis on the plan's branding by 2018 while core subsidies persisted. The Belt and Road Initiative, formally announced in 2013, saw the NDRC as a primary architect, issuing guiding opinions in 2015 to promote infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation, and financial integration across over 150 countries via six economic corridors and maritime routes. By 2025, NDRC-facilitated projects had mobilized over $1 trillion in investments, focusing on energy, transport, and digital infrastructure to secure resource access and export markets, with principles of consultation, contribution, and shared benefits emphasized in official frameworks. Entering the 2020s, the NDRC integrated the strategy into the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025), announced in 2020 to prioritize domestic economic loops while maintaining international openness amid geopolitical tensions and disruptions. This approach, coordinated by the NDRC, aimed to expand the internal market—projected to contribute over 35 yuan in economic increment by 2025—through consumption upgrades, urban-rural integration, and , with domestic circulation as the mainstay. In 2024–2025, NDRC policies emphasized proactive macro regulation, including fiscal stimuli equivalent to 1.6% of GDP in 2025, to stabilize foreign and upgrade industries like high-tech .

Economic Impact

Contributions to Growth and Development

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has coordinated macroeconomic strategies and approvals that supported China's expansion, a key driver of economic output from the early onward. By overseeing the allocation of resources to transportation, , and urban projects, the NDRC enabled the buildup of foundational assets that lowered transaction costs and integrated regional markets, contributing to average annual GDP growth exceeding 9% between 2000 and 2010. For instance, in the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), NDRC-led initiatives emphasized supply-side reforms and innovation-driven development, which aligned with increased R&D expenditures reaching 2.64% of GDP by 2023, fostering technological upgrades in sectors. In recent years, the NDRC has prioritized "high-quality" projects to sustain momentum amid slowing growth, approving 1,459 initiatives funded by 800 billion yuan in 2025 for areas including River ecological restoration and transportation hubs, which aim to enhance efficiency and resilience. Similarly, the rollout of approximately 3 trillion yuan in premium projects across , , and digital in 2025 is projected to stimulate domestic demand and counteract external pressures, building on prior patterns where such state-directed investments have amplified fixed-asset formation as a share of GDP. These efforts, embedded in the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025), have included "new infrastructure" like and data centers, which empirical studies link to improved sustainable economic performance by modernizing supply chains. The NDRC's involvement in the has further extended domestic growth models abroad, with sustainable projects enhancing global connectivity and securing supply chains for Chinese exports, thereby supporting net external demand contributions averaging 0.77 percentage points to annual GDP growth in the early . While these outcomes reflect coordinated rather than isolated causation—given concurrent market liberalization—the NDRC's gatekeeping on major investments has demonstrably channeled capital toward high-multiplier assets, aiding China's transition from export reliance to balanced development.

Evidence of Misallocation and Inefficiencies

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has overseen investment strategies that contributed to substantial resource misallocation, exemplified by an estimated $6.8 trillion in wasted capital from 2009 to 2013, primarily in underutilized and projects. This figure, derived from an internal NDRC analysis, highlights inefficiencies in centrally directed spending, where rapid project approvals prioritized short-term growth targets over demand assessment, resulting in "ghost cities" such as those in Ordos and New District, featuring vast empty apartment blocks and highways. In the energy sector, NDRC's pricing and subsidy policies have driven capital misallocation, as seen in the industry where fixed on-grid tariffs of 1.15 yuan per kWh set in 2011 incentivized excessive deployment of solar plants in suboptimal locations, leading to curtailment rates exceeding 20% in some regions by 2016 due to grid constraints and overcapacity. Similarly, distortions in factor markets under NDRC-guided five-year plans have favored state-owned enterprises (SOEs), crowding out private innovation and exacerbating productivity losses estimated at 10-20% of in . Infrastructure financing mechanisms promoted by NDRC, including local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), have fueled accumulation, with LGFV liabilities reaching 60 trillion yuan by 2022, much tied to NDRC-approved projects yielding low returns, such as lines operating below capacity. These patterns reflect broader central planning flaws, where administrative allocation suppresses market signals, contributing to fiscal gaps and resource shifts toward low-productivity sectors like over high-value services.

Criticisms and Controversies

Critiques of Central Planning and Interventionism

Critics of central planning argue that the National Development and Reform Commission's (NDRC) extensive role in directing through Five-Year Plans and project approvals distorts market signals, leading to persistent inefficiencies in capital and labor distribution. Empirical studies using Chinese firm-level data demonstrate that government industrial policies, often formulated and enforced by the NDRC, favor state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and select sectors, resulting in resource misallocation that reduces by up to 10-15% in affected industries. For instance, SOEs receive disproportionate credit and subsidies despite lower productivity and profitability compared to private firms, as evidenced by analyses of listed companies where correlates with higher but diminished returns. This interventionism manifests in overinvestment in and heavy industries, producing "ghost cities" and underutilized assets. Between 2008 and 2020, NDRC-approved projects contributed to an estimated 20 trillion yuan in expenditures on half-finished mega-projects, including unused lines and ports, exacerbating local government debt now exceeding 100 trillion yuan. Such outcomes stem from top-down targets prioritizing GDP growth over viability, ignoring local and price mechanisms, which central planners like the NDRC cannot fully anticipate due to information asymmetries inherent in dispersed economies. Sector-specific failures further illustrate these critiques, such as in where NDRC mandates for capacity led to grid curtailment rates exceeding 20% in some provinces by 2015, as installations outpaced transmission infrastructure and market absorption. Similarly, industrial policies promoting overcapacity in and solar panels, coordinated via NDRC guidelines, flooded global markets, prompting tariffs from trading partners and domestic inefficiencies estimated to waste 5-10% of GDP annually through excess inventory and idle plants. These patterns reflect a causal chain where political directives override economic , fostering in approval processes and stifling private , as firms allocate resources to comply with quotas rather than consumer needs. While NDRC defenders cite aggregate growth under , econometric evidence attributes much of China's slowdown since 2010—averaging 1-2% annual decline—to such distortions, with misallocation accounting for over half the gap between potential and realized output. Independent analyses, drawing from firm surveys and input-output , underscore that decentralizing approvals and reducing SOE privileges could boost , yet NDRC's entrenched authority perpetuates these issues amid slowing growth to 4-5% in 2024-2025.

Industrial Policy and Trade Disputes

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) formulates comprehensive industrial policies to prioritize strategic sectors, including advanced manufacturing, new materials, and high-tech industries, through coordination of national planning and resource allocation. These policies integrate subsidies, low-interest loans from state banks, and investment directives, often embedded in five-year plans, to achieve targets like 70% domestic content in core components by 2025 under initiatives aligned with manufacturing upgrades. Such state-directed support has fostered rapid capacity expansion but generated global overproduction, with China's share of global manufacturing output exceeding 30% by 2023, distorting prices and export competitiveness. These interventions have precipitated major trade disputes, as foreign governments argue they violate (WTO) rules on subsidies and fair competition. The , citing NDRC-orchestrated subsidies enabling below-cost exports, imposed tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, targeting $370 billion in Chinese goods from 2018 onward, including , aluminum, and solar products where overcapacity led to dumping margins up to 250%. In the (EV) sector, U.S. tariffs reached 100% on Chinese EVs by 2024, reflecting concerns over $230 billion in cumulative subsidies from 2009-2023 that propelled China's 60% global . The European Union has similarly challenged NDRC-supported policies, launching anti-subsidy probes into Chinese EVs in 2023 that uncovered state aid exceeding €2 billion annually, culminating in provisional duties of 17-38% on imports in July 2024 to counter predatory pricing. Overcapacity in solar supply chains, where China controls 80% of polysilicon production amid NDRC-guided expansions, has drawn EU and U.S. complaints of market flooding, with Beijing's 2025 capacity reduction pledges viewed skeptically as insufficient to address root distortions from "herd behavior" in state-backed investments. WTO litigation underscores these tensions, with China defending 29 of 53 disputes since accession in 2001 against challenges to its interventionist measures, including export restraints and local content requirements tied to industrial planning. Critics, including U.S. and officials, contend that NDRC policies exemplify non-market practices—subsidies decoupled from profitability signals—that erode global industries, evidenced by factory closures in Europe and job losses in U.S. hubs. Chinese authorities counter that such support accelerates technological catch-up without breaching commitments, attributing disputes to ; however, empirical data on subsidized overinvestment, such as EV battery capacity idling at 50% utilization in 2024, bolsters foreign claims of systemic inefficiencies and trade harm. Despite bilateral deals like the 2020 U.S.- Phase One agreement mandating subsidy transparency, enforcement remains elusive, perpetuating tariffs and decoupling efforts.

Domestic Failures in Resource Management and Debt Accumulation

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has played a pivotal role in approving and coordinating large-scale infrastructure projects, which have often resulted in inefficient and escalating local government . Through its oversight of plans and project approvals exceeding certain thresholds, the NDRC has facilitated financing via local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), enabling municipalities to borrow heavily for initiatives aimed at meeting GDP growth targets. This mechanism has contributed to hidden debts, with local government liabilities linked to such projects estimated to form a substantial portion of China's overall local burden, which reached levels prompting central interventions like debt swaps and bond issuances. For example, post-2008 stimulus policies under NDRC guidance spurred widespread expansion, including highways and urban developments, but many assets remain underutilized, tying up capital in low-return s. Resource misallocation has been exacerbated by NDRC-directed overinvestment in sectors like transportation and energy, leading to excess capacity and wasted public funds. High-speed rail (HSR) projects, routinely approved by the NDRC, exemplify this: China constructed the world's largest HSR network, spanning over 40,000 kilometers by 2023, yet numerous lines operate at low occupancy rates, with some routes generating insufficient revenue to service debts accrued through state-backed borrowing. Similarly, in energy planning, NDRC policies have promoted rapid scaling of renewable installations, such as wind farms, but implementation gaps—including grid integration failures and curtailment rates exceeding 10% in some regions—have rendered significant capacity idle, squandering resources on underproductive assets. These outcomes stem from top-down quotas that prioritize quantitative targets over market viability, distorting capital flows and inflating environmental and fiscal costs. Debt accumulation intensified as local governments pursued NDRC-endorsed and industrial projects, often bypassing rigorous cost-benefit assessments in favor of political imperatives. By 2024, China's overall had risen by 77.4 percentage points since 2014, with overinvestment cited as a key driver, as uneconomic projects saddled LGFVs with unsustainable burdens estimated in the tens of s of yuan. Efforts to mitigate this, such as NDRC-coordinated bond quotas—raised to 3.9 yuan for special-purpose bonds in 2025—have merely refinanced existing debts rather than addressing root inefficiencies, perpetuating a cycle of resource diversion from productive uses. Critics argue this reflects systemic flaws in centralized , where NDRC approvals incentivize quantity over quality, fostering "" developments like unoccupied new districts that consume land, materials, and funds without commensurate economic returns.

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  110. https://merics.org/en/report/beyond-overcapacity-chinese-style-modernization-and-clash-economic-models
  111. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3267080/former-ndrc-official-calls-improved-dialogue-between-china-and-west
  112. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%2520Report%2520on%2520China%27s%2520WTO%2520Compliance%2520%28Final%29.pdf
  113. https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/china-orders-local-governments-cut-exposure-public-private-projects-debt-risks-2023-11-14/
  114. https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2024/06/14/chinas-debt-fueled-infrastructure-development-faces-a-day-of-reckoning/
  115. https://eh4s.eu/publication/reevaluating-the-china-model-the-carbon-emission-burden-of-chinas-infrastructure-overinvestment
  116. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/08/using-chinas-central-government-balance-sheet-to-clean-up-local-government-debt-is-a-bad-idea?lang=en
  117. https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28080/chapter/212110580
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