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Sumner Welles
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Benjamin Sumner Welles III (October 14, 1892 – September 24, 1961) was an American government official and diplomat. He was a major foreign policy adviser to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and served as Under Secretary of State from 1936 to 1943, during Roosevelt's presidency.

Key Information

Born in New York City to a wealthy, well-connected political family, Welles graduated from Harvard College in 1914. He entered the Foreign Service at the advice of Franklin Roosevelt, who was a family friend. Welles was excited by Woodrow Wilson's ideas about how American principles could reorder the international system based on liberal democracy, free-trade capitalism, international law, a league of nations, and an end to colonialism.[1]

Welles specialized in Latin American diplomatic affairs and served several posts in Washington and in the field. President Calvin Coolidge distrusted Welles because of his divorce, and dismissed him from the foreign service. Welles left public service for some years, and wrote a book on the history of the Dominican Republic.[2]

When Roosevelt was elected president in 1932, he put Welles in charge of Latin American affairs as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. Welles became heavily involved in negotiations that removed Cuban president Gerardo Machado from power and replaced him with rival Carlos Manuel de Céspedes y Quesada. He was later promoted to Under Secretary of State, in which role he continued to be active in Latin American issues, but also expanded into European affairs as World War II began in Europe in 1939. In 1940, he issued the Welles Declaration which condemned Soviet occupation of the Baltic states and proved to be a minor point of contention among the Soviets and their Western allies once the U.S. entered the war in 1941. Welles used American power and his senior position to intrude into the domestic affairs of other countries, especially choosing leaders who supported American policies. After the fall of France, he downgraded French affairs because they no longer were a major power. Roosevelt relied on Welles much more than on the official Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who became the enemy of Welles.[3]

Welles was forced out of government service by Secretary Hull after his enemies began to spread word of a 1943 incident in which he had propositioned two male railroad porters for sex.[4] Returning to private life, he continued to write books on foreign relations and became an advisor to media organizations. He was a target of the House Un-American Activities Committee during the post-war "red scare", though he was never formally sanctioned. He died in New Jersey in 1961, survived by his third wife and two children from his first marriage.

Early life

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Benjamin Sumner Welles III was born on October 14, 1892, in New York City to Benjamin Sumner Welles Jr. and Frances Wyeth Swan.[5] His elder sister was Emily Frances Welles, who married Harry Pelham Robbins.[6] He preferred to be called "Sumner" after his famous relative Charles Sumner, a leading Senator from Massachusetts during the American Civil War and Reconstruction. His family was wealthy and was connected to the era's most prominent families. He was a grandnephew of Caroline Schermerhorn Astor, known as "the Mrs. Astor". Among his ancestors were Thomas Welles,[7] a colonial Governor of Connecticut, and Increase Sumner, Governor of Massachusetts from 1797 to 1799.[8] Although the two men were occasionally mistaken for cousins, Welles was no relation to director Orson Welles.[9]

The Welles family was also connected to the Roosevelts. His first cousin once removed Helen Schermerhorn Astor married James Roosevelt Roosevelt, half-brother of future President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR). At the age of 10, Welles was entered in Miss Kearny's Day School for Boys in New York City. In September 1904, he entered Groton School in Massachusetts, where he remained for six years. There he roomed with Hall Roosevelt, the brother of Eleanor Roosevelt.[5] In March 1905 at the age of 12 Welles served as a page at Franklin D. Roosevelt's wedding to Eleanor.

Welles attended Harvard College where he studied "economics, Iberian literature and culture",[10] and graduated after three years in 1914.[11]

Diplomatic career

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After graduating from Harvard, Welles followed the advice of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and joined the U.S. Foreign Service. A New York Times profile described him while he joined the foreign service: "Tall, slender, blond, and always correctly tailored, he concealed a natural shyness under an appearance of dignified firmness. Although intolerant of inefficiency, he brought to bear unusual tact and a self-imposed patience."[12] He secured an assignment to Tokyo, where he served in the embassy as third secretary only briefly.[12]

Latin America

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Welles soon became a specialist in Latin American affairs. He served in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1919 and became fluent in Spanish.[12] In 1921, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes appointed him to head the Division of Latin American Affairs.[12]

In March 1922, Welles briefly resigned from the State Department.[12] He was unsympathetic to the view held by American diplomacy that military might was meant to protect the overseas interests of U.S. business.[13] Hughes brought him back the next year as a special commissioner to the Dominican Republic. His particular assignment was to oversee the withdrawal of U.S. forces and to negotiate protection for overseas investors in the Dominican Republic's debt.[12] Welles remained in that post for three years and his work was accomplished after his departure in a 1924 treaty.[12]

In 1924, U.S. President Calvin Coolidge sent Welles to act as mediator between disputing parties in Honduras. The country had lacked a legitimate government since the election of 1923 failed to produce a majority for any candidate and the legislature had failed to exercise its power to appoint a new president. Negotiations managed by Welles from April 23 to 28 produced an interim government under General Vicente Tosta, who promised to appoint a cabinet representing all factions and to schedule a presidential election as soon as possible in which he would not be a candidate. Negotiations ended with the signing of an agreement aboard the USS Milwaukee in the port of Amapala.[12][14][15][16]

Years out of government service

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Miss Mathilde Townsend, John Singer Sargent, 1907

Coolidge, however, disapproved of Welles's 1925 marriage to Mathilde Scott Townsend, who had only recently divorced the President's friend, Senator Peter Gerry of Rhode Island. He promptly ended Welles's diplomatic career.[17][13]

Welles then retired to his estate at Oxon Hill, Maryland.[12] He devoted himself to writing and his two-volume history of the Dominican Republic, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844–1924 appeared in 1928.[18] Time described the work as "a ponderous, lifeless, two-volume work which was technically a history of Santo Domingo, actually a careful indictment of U.S. foreign policy in the Hemisphere".[10] James Reston summarized its thesis: "we should keep in our own back yard and stop claiming rights for ourselves that we denied to other sovereign States".[13]

He served as an unofficial adviser to Dominican President Horacio Vásquez.[12]

During the presidential election of 1932, Welles provided foreign policy expertise to the Roosevelt campaign.[12] He was a major contributor to the campaign as well.[10]

Cuba

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Welles, holding hat at left, greeting Cuba's Fulgencio Batista at Union Station, Washington, D.C., on November 10, 1938

In April 1933, FDR appointed Welles Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs,[12] but when a revolution in Cuba against President Gerardo Machado left its government divided and uncertain, he became instead the President's special envoy to Cuba. He arrived in Havana in May 1933.[12] His mission was to negotiate a settlement so that the U.S. could avoid intervening as U.S. law, namely the Platt Amendment of 1901, required.[12]

Welles speaking in a newsreel report on the Panama conference
September 18, 1939

His instructions were to mediate "in any form most suitable" an end to the Cuban situation. Welles promised Machado a new commercial treaty to relieve economic distress if Machado reached a political settlement with his opponents, Colonel Dr. Cosme de la Torriente, from the Nationalist Union; Joaquín Martínez Sáenz, for ABC; Nicasio Silveira, for the Revolutionary Radical Cellular Organization; and Dr. Manuel Dorta-Duque, representing the delegation of the University of Havana.[19] Machado believed the U.S. would help him survive politically. Welles promised the opponents of Machado's government a change of government and participation in the subsequent administration, if they joined the mediation process and supported an orderly transfer of power. One crucial step was persuading Machado to issue an amnesty for political prisoners so that the opposition leaders could appear in public.[12] Machado soon lost faith in Welles and denounced U.S. interference as a colonialist adventure. Welles' mediation process conferred political legitimacy on sectors of the opposition that participated and allowed the U.S. to assess their viability as long-term political allies. Unable to influence Machado, Welles met with Rafael Guas Inclan, president of the Chamber of Representatives, at the home of newspaper publisher Alfredo Hornedo, and requested that he initiate impeachment proceedings against the president. When Guas harshly rebuffed him,[20] Welles then negotiated an end to his presidency, with support from General Alberto Herrera, Colonels Julio Sanguily, Rafael del Castillo, and Erasmo Delgado after threatening U.S. intervention under the Platt Amendment and the restructuring of the Cuban army high command.[21]

In 1937, FDR promoted Welles to Under Secretary, and the Senate promptly confirmed the appointment. Indicative of ongoing rivalries within the State Department, Robert Walton Moore, an ally of Secretary of State Hull was appointed the department's Counselor at the same time, a position equal in rank to that of Under Secretary.[22]

1939 hand signed issued passport by under Secretary of State Sumner Welles

World War II

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In the week following Kristallnacht, in November 1938, the British government offered to give the major part of its quota of 65,000 British citizens eligible for emigration to the United States to Jews fleeing Hitler. Under-Secretary Welles opposed this idea, as he later recounted:[23]

I reminded the Ambassador that the President stated there was no intention on the part of his government to increase the quota for German nationals. I added that it was my strong impression that the responsible leaders among American Jews would be the first to urge that no change in the present quota for German Jews be made ... The influential Sam Rosenman, one of the "responsible" Jewish leaders sent Roosevelt a memorandum telling him that an "increase of quotas is wholly inadvisable. It will merely produce a 'Jewish problem' in the countries increasing the quota."

Welles headed the American delegation to the 21-nation Pan American conference that met in Panama in September 1939. He said the conference had been planned in earlier hemispheric meetings in Buenos Aires and Lima and he emphasized the need for consultation on economic issues to "cushion the shock of the dislocation of inter-American commerce arising from the war" in Europe.[24]

In February and March 1940 Welles visited Vatican City,[25] Italy, Germany, and France; (he visited President Albert Lebrun on March 7) and England to receive and discuss German peacemaking proposals. Hitler feared that the purpose of his visits was to drive a wedge between Germany and Italy.[26]

Soviet occupation of the Baltics

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On July 23, 1940, following the principles of the Stimson Doctrine, Welles issued a statement that became known as the Welles Declaration. In the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939, Germany agreed to allow the Soviet Union to occupy and annex the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Welles condemned those actions and refused to recognize the legitimacy of Soviet rule in those countries. More than 50 countries later followed the U.S. in this position.

The declaration was a source of contention during the subsequent alliance between the Americans, the British, and the Soviets, but Welles persistently defended the declaration.[27] In a discussion with the media, he asserted that the Soviets had maneuvered to give "an odor of legality to acts of aggression for purposes of the record."[28][29]

In a 1942 memorandum describing his conversations with British Ambassador Lord Halifax, Welles stated that he would have preferred to characterize the plebiscites supporting the annexations as "faked."[30] In April 1942, he wrote that the annexation was "not only indefensible from every moral standpoint, but likewise extraordinarily stupid." He believed any concession on the Baltic issue would set a precedent that would lead to additional border struggles in eastern Poland and elsewhere.[31]

Rivalries

[edit]
Cordell Hull
Secretary of State, 1933–1944

A New York Times profile described Welles in 1941: "Tall and erect, never without his cane, ... he has enough dignity to be Viceroy of India and ... enough influence in this critical era to make his ideas, principles, and dreams count."[13]

He appeared on the cover of Time on August 11, 1941,[32] and in that issue Time assessed Welles's role within Hull's Department of State:[10]

Sumner Welles is one of the very few career men ever to become Under Secretary of State, and as matters now stand may eventually become Secretary ... Grave, saintly Mr. Hull, never an expert at paper-shuffling, has long left the actual administration of the Department to his chief aide, Sumner Welles. And Cordell Hull may choose not to retire. But even if Welles never becomes Secretary, he will still hold his present power: through Presidential choice, his own ability, background and natural stamina, he is the chief administrative officer of U.S. foreign policy.

Roosevelt was always close to Welles and made him the central figure in the State Department, much to the chagrin of secretary Cordell Hull, who could not be removed because he had a powerful political base.[33]

The clash became more public in mid-1943, when Time reported "a flare-up of long-smoldering hates and jealousies in the State Department".[34] After Welles was forced out of office, journalists noted that two men who shared "aims and goals" were at odds because of a "clash of temperament and ambitions".[35]

Resignation

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Welles was a closeted bisexual.[36] In September 1940, Welles accompanied Roosevelt to the funeral of former Speaker of the House William B. Bankhead in Huntsville, Alabama. While returning to Washington by train, Welles – who was drunk and under the influence of barbiturates – solicited sex from two male African-American Pullman car porters.[37] Cordell Hull dispatched his confidant, former Ambassador William Bullitt, to provide details of the incident to Republican Senator Owen Brewster of Maine. Brewster, in turn, gave the information to journalist Arthur Krock, a Roosevelt critic; and to Senators Styles Bridges and Burton K. Wheeler. When FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover would not release the file on Welles, Brewster threatened to initiate a senatorial investigation into the incident. (In 1995, Deke DeLoach told C-SPAN's Brian Lamb on Booknotes that file cabinets behind J. Edgar Hoover's secretary Helen Gandy contained two-and-a-half drawers of files, including information about "an undersecretary of state who had committed a homosexual act."[38]) Roosevelt was embittered by the attack on his friend, believing they were ruining a good man, but he was obliged to accept Welles's resignation in 1943. Roosevelt particularly blamed Bullitt; his son Elliott Roosevelt wrote that President Roosevelt believed that Bullitt had bribed the porters to entrap Welles.[39]

In August 1943, reports that Welles had resigned as Under-Secretary of State circulated for more than a week. The press reported it as fact on August 24, despite the lack of an official announcement. Writing in The New York Times, Arthur Krock said that opinion in Washington saw Welles's departure as an attempt to end factionalism in the State Department: "The long-existing struggle disorganized the department, bred Hull and Welles factions among its officials, confused those having business with the department and finally produced pressure on the President to eliminate the causes." Despite the "personal fondness" of the President and his wife for Welles, he continued, the President sided with Hull because supporting a subordinate would promote revolts in other government agencies, Hull was politically connected and popular with Congress, and the Senate, he was told, would not support Welles for Secretary of State or any other office. Krock added a cryptic explanation: "Other incidents arising made the disagreements between the two men even more personal. It was those which aroused the Senate to opposition to Mr. Welles that was reported to the President."[40]

The U.S. still awaits a clarification of its foreign policy and the forced resignation of Sumner Welles made an already murky issue even more obscure.

Time, September 6, 1943

While Welles vacationed in Bar Harbor, Maine,[41] "where he held to diplomatically correct silence",[42] speculation continued for another month without official word from the White House or the State Department. Observers continued to focus on the Hull–Welles relationship and believed that Hull forced the President to choose between them to end "departmental cleavage".[43] Others read the situation politically and blamed FDR's "appeasement of Southern Democrats".[42] Without confirming his resignation or speaking on the record, Welles indicated he would accept any new assignment the President proposed.[43] Finally, on September 26, 1943, the President announced the resignation of Welles and the appointment of Edward R. Stettinius as the new Under-Secretary of State. He accepted Welles's resignation with regret and explained that Welles was prompted to leave government service because of "his wife's poor health". Welles's letter of resignation was not made public as was customary and one report concluded, "The facts of this situation remained obscure tonight."[44] Time summarized the reaction of the press: "Its endorsement of Sumner Welles was surprisingly widespread, its condemnation of Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull surprisingly severe."[42] It also described the resignation's impact: "In dropping Sumner Welles [Hull] had dropped the chief architect of the US's Good Neighbor Policy in South America, an opponent of those who would do business with Fascists on the basis of expediency, a known and respected advocate of U.S. cooperation in international affairs. The U.S. still awaits a clarification of its foreign policy and the forced resignation of Sumner Welles made an already murky issue even more obscure."[42]

Later years

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Welles made his first public appearance following his resignation in October 1943. Speaking to the Foreign Policy Association, he sketched his views of the postwar world, including American participation in a world organization with military capability. He also proposed the creation of regional organizations. He also called on the President to express his opinions and help shape public opinion, praising him at length as "rightly regarded throughout the world as the paladin of the forces of liberal democracy" without once mentioning Hull.[45]

Continuing his career-long focus on Latin America, he said that "if we are to achieve our own security every nation of the Western Hemisphere must also obtain the same ample measure of assurance as ourselves in the world of the future." He also foresaw the end to colonialism as a guiding principle of the new world order:[46]

Can the peaceful, the stable, and the free world for which we hope be created if it is envisioned from the outset as half slave and half free?—if hundreds of millions of human beings are told that they are destined to remain indefinitely under alien subjection? New and powerful nationalistic forces are breaking into life throughout the earth, and in particular in the vast regions of Africa, of the Near East, and of the Far East. Must not these forces, unless they are to be permitted to start new and devastating inundations, be canalized through the channels of liberty into the great stream of constructive and cooperative human endeavor?

In 1944, Welles lent his name to a fundraising campaign by the United Jewish Appeal to bring Jewish refugees from the Balkans to Palestine.[47]

Confidential expose, March 3, 1956

The same year, he wrote The Time for Decision. His proposals for the war's end included modifications in Germany's borders to transfer East Prussia to Poland and to extend Germany's eastern border to include German-speaking populations farther east. Then, he suggested dividing Germany into three states, all of which would be included in a new European customs union. A politically divided Germany would be integrated to an economically cohesive Europe. He also "favoured the transfer of populations to bring ethnic distributions into conformity with international boundaries."[48] With the public engaged in the debate over America's postwar role, The Time for Decision sold half a million copies.[49]

Welles became a prominent commentator and author on foreign affairs. In 1945, he joined the American Broadcasting Company to guide the organization of the "Sumner Welles Peace Forum," a series of four radio broadcasts providing expert commentary on the San Francisco Conference, which wrote the founding document of the United Nations.[50] He undertook a project to edit a series of volumes on foreign relations for Harvard University Press.[51]

In 1948, Welles wrote We Need Not Fail, a short book that first presented a history and evaluated the competing claims to Palestine. He argued that American policy should insist on the fulfillment of the 1947 promise of the United Nations General Assembly to establish two independent states within an economic union and policed by a United Nations force. He criticized American officials whose obsession with the Soviets required submission to Arab and oil interests. Enforcing the decision of the United Nations was his overarching concern because it was an opportunity to establish the organization's role on the international stage that no other interest could trump.[52]

Later that year, the American Jewish Congress presented Welles with a citation that praised his "courageous championing of the cause of Israel among the nations of the world."[53]

On December 7, 1948, Welles appeared before HCUA as part of its investigation into allegations between Whittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss (part of the Hiss Case).[54] Later that month (and after the death of his friend Laurence Duggan), he suffered a serious heart attack.[55]

In April 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy repeatedly charged that the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), an organization that fostered the study of the Far East and the Pacific, was a communist front.[56] Welles was a member of the American branch of the IPR.

He remained always in the public eye. For example, his departure on the Île de France for Europe was noted even as he declined to comment on charges made by McCarthy about communists in the State Department.[57]

He sold his estate outside Washington in 1952, when Oxon Hill Manor became the home of a "huge collection of Americana."[58]

In 1956, Confidential, a scandal magazine, published a report of the 1940 Pullman incident and linked it to his resignation from the State Department, along with additional instances of inappropriate sexual behavior or drunkenness. Welles had explained the 1940 incident to his family as nothing more than drunken conversation with the train staff.[59] His son Benjamin Welles wrote of the incident in his father's biography as drunken advances to several porters at about 4 a.m. that were rejected and then reported to government and railway officials.[60]

Personal life

[edit]
External videos
video icon Presentation by Benjamin Welles on Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist – A Biography, January 26, 1998, C-SPAN
Welles home, the Townsend Mansion, taken in 2010

On April 14, 1915, Sumner Welles married Esther "Hope" Slater of Boston, the sister of a Harvard roommate, in Webster, Massachusetts.[61] She came from a similarly prominent family that owned a textile empire based in Massachusetts.[62] She was descended from industrialist Samuel Slater and granddaughter of the Boston painter William Morris Hunt. Welles and his wife had two sons: Benjamin Welles (1916–2002), a foreign correspondent for The New York Times, later his father's biographer,[60] and Arnold Welles (1918–2002)[citation needed]

In 1923, Slater obtained a divorce from Welles in Paris "on grounds of abandonment and refusal to live with his wife".[61]

Welles occasionally gained public notice for his art dealings. In 1925, for example, he sold a collection of Japanese screens that had been on exhibit at the Metropolitan Museum of Art for several years.[63]

Mathilde Townsend,
second wife of Sumner Welles

On June 27, 1925, Welles married Mathilde Scott Townsend (1885–1949), "a noted international beauty" whose portrait had been painted by John Singer Sargent, in upstate New York.[61][17][64] Until World War II, the Welleses lived on Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, D.C., in the landmark Townsend Mansion, which later became the home of the Cosmos Club.[65] Mathilde died of peritonitis in 1949 while vacationing in Switzerland with Welles.[17]

Welles spent the bulk of his time a few miles outside of Washington in the Maryland countryside at a 49-room "country cottage" known as Oxon Hill Manor designed for him by Jules Henri de Sibour and built on a 245-acre property in 1929.[66][67] He entertained foreign dignitaries and diplomats there and hosted informal meetings of senior officials. FDR used the site as an occasional escape from the city as well.[66]

On January 8, 1952, Welles married Harriette Appleton Post, a childhood friend (and a granddaughter of architect George B. Post, designer of the New York Stock Exchange) who had previously married and divorced twice, and had resumed the use of her maiden name, in New York City at the bride's home on Fifth Avenue.[68]

He died on September 24, 1961, at age 68 in Bernardsville, New Jersey.[69] He is buried in Rock Creek Cemetery in Washington, D.C.[70]

Legacy

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The biography written by his son Benjamin Welles concludes:

Sumner Welles made four major contributions to the Roosevelt era. He conceived and carried out the Good Neighbor policy, arguably the all-time, high-water mark in U.S.–Latin American relations. With Roosevelt, Churchill and Alexander Cadogan, he wrote the Atlantic Charter, the cornerstone of the United Nations. In mid–World War II, at FDR's direction, he drafted the original UN Charter. And during and after the war, he threw his support behind a national homeland for the Jews: Israel. The Good Neighbor policy and the Atlantic Charter are largely memories. The United Nations and Israel endure.[71]

Winston Churchill, who made the phrase "No comment" famous, cited Welles as his source for the cryptic response.[72]

Welles's papers are held by the National Archives at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York.[73]

The street adjacent to the current Embassy of the United States in Riga, Latvia, was named after Sumner Welles (as Samnera Velsa iela) in 2012.[74]

Works

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  • The Time for Decision (Harper & Brothers, 1944)
  • An Intelligent American's Guide to the Peace (Dryden, 1945), OCLC 458932390
  • Where Are We Heading (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946)
  • We Need Not Fail (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948)
  • Seven Major Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper 1951), OCLC 562152843
  • Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844–1924 (reprint: Arno Press, 1972), ISBN 0-405-04596-4

References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Benjamin Sumner Welles (October 14, 1892 – September 24, 1961) was an American diplomat who rose to become Under Secretary of State from 1937 to 1943, serving as a principal advisor to President .
Educated at and , Welles entered the U.S. Foreign Service in 1915 and held early postings in and elsewhere before resigning in 1922 over disagreements with interventionist policies in . Recalled under Roosevelt, he served as of State in 1933 and briefly as to , where he mediated the revolution against President , facilitating U.S. recognition of the subsequent regime under .
Welles is credited with architecting the Good Neighbor Policy, which emphasized non-intervention and multilateral cooperation with Latin American nations, marking a shift from prior U.S. and achieving peak hemispheric relations during his tenure. He led the 1940 Welles Mission to to gauge prospects for peace amid , contributed to drafting the Atlantic Charter, and directed early U.S. postwar planning that laid groundwork for the . His influence waned due to rivalries, particularly with , and culminated in his 1943 resignation after allegations emerged of homosexual advances toward male railroad porters during a drunken 1940 incident, which opponents leveraged to force his exit despite Roosevelt's initial reluctance.

Early Life

Family Background and Education

Benjamin Sumner Welles was born on October 14, 1892, in , into an affluent family descended from early American merchants and prominent Colonial lineages. His father, Benjamin Sumner Welles Jr. (1857–1935), was a Harvard-educated philanthropist and member of New York and high society, while his mother, Frances Wyeth Swan (1863–1911), came from a well-to-do background; the household employed multiple servants, reflecting the family's wealth and social status. Welles grew up in privileged circumstances, with access to private tutors and extensive travel, fostering early exposure to elite networks that later influenced his diplomatic path. Welles received his early education at elite preparatory institutions, entering in September 1904 and graduating in June 1910, where former President personally presented his diploma as a guest of honor. He then attended , completing his degree in three years in 1914 with studies focused on , Iberian literature, and culture—subjects that aligned with his future interests in Latin American affairs. This trajectory mirrored that of contemporaries like , underscoring the interconnected elite circles of the era's preparatory and education.

Diplomatic Career

Initial Postings and Latin American Focus (1915–1922)

Welles joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1915 at age 23, following his graduation from in 1914, with his initial posting as third secretary at the American embassy in , , under Ambassador George W. Guthrie. During , he oversaw the monitoring of Japanese authorities' treatment of German diplomatic personnel and internees held in , ensuring compliance with international standards amid U.S. neutrality concerns prior to entering the war. In 1917, as the U.S. shifted focus amid global conflict, Welles was transferred to , Argentina, serving as second secretary under Frederick J. Hasbrouck until 1919. In Buenos Aires, Welles handled consular and diplomatic duties during a period of heightened U.S. interest in South American stability, including trade relations and countering German influence in the Southern Cone amid wartime shipping disruptions. His work there marked the beginning of his specialization in Latin American affairs, where he developed proficiency in Spanish and gained practical experience in regional diplomacy. Returning to Washington in 1919, he was appointed assistant chief of the State Department's Division of Latin American Affairs, advancing to chief in 1921. As chief of the division through early 1922, Welles managed routine diplomatic correspondence, treaty negotiations, and policy coordination for the , emphasizing economic ties and non-intervention principles amid post-World War I reconstruction. His tenure involved addressing border disputes, such as those between and , and promoting U.S. commercial interests without overt military involvement, reflecting the era's shift from . Welles resigned from the position on March 15, 1922, amid personal circumstances that led to his temporary withdrawal from government service. This early phase established his reputation as a meticulous administrator focused on pragmatic engagement with , distinct from more interventionist predecessors.

Withdrawal from Government Service (1922–1933)

In March 1922, Welles resigned from his position as chief of the Latin American Affairs Division in the U.S. State Department, citing fundamental disagreements with the prevailing U.S. of deploying military force to safeguard American business interests abroad, particularly in . This stance reflected his broader critique of interventionist approaches inherited from the Wilson era, which he viewed as counterproductive to long-term hemispheric stability. Following his resignation, Welles transitioned to private pursuits, including efforts to establish a career in banking, while maintaining informal involvement in international affairs. On June 27, 1925, he married Mathilde Scott Townsend (1885–1949), a prominent , heiress to a Washington, D.C., fortune, and former wife of U.S. Senator Peter Goelet Gerry; the union, conducted in a private ceremony in , connected Welles to influential East Coast networks but produced no children. During the late 1920s, Welles engaged with non-governmental organizations, becoming a member of the Foundation and the , where he contributed to discussions on global order amid the era's isolationist trends. By 1927, he had forged a close advisory relationship with , then , exchanging correspondence on diplomatic matters and positioning himself as an informal consultant on Latin American issues. This period of relative political inactivity—often described as limbo—allowed Welles to cultivate expertise outside official channels, though he refrained from public partisanship until Roosevelt's 1932 presidential campaign, for which he provided targeted guidance on platforms.

Reappointment under Roosevelt: Good Neighbor Policy and Cuba (1933–1937)

![Fulgencio Batista in 1938][float-right] In March 1933, following Franklin D. Roosevelt's inauguration, Sumner Welles was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, tasked with reshaping U.S. policy toward the region. Amid deteriorating conditions in Cuba under President Gerardo Machado, Roosevelt nominated Welles as Ambassador to Cuba on April 22, 1933, a role he assumed briefly to mediate the crisis. Welles arrived in Havana on May 29, 1933, aiming to broker a peaceful transition amid strikes, protests, and opposition demands for Machado's ouster amid economic turmoil from the Great Depression. Welles' mediation efforts focused on persuading Machado to resign voluntarily while preserving constitutional order, though he employed U.S. leverage, including implicit threats of military intervention under the Platt Amendment, to pressure compliance. Machado resigned on August 12, 1933, paving the way for a provisional government under Carlos Manuel de Céspedes y Quesada, which Welles helped install to stabilize the island and avert communist influence or total anarchy. However, on September 4, 1933, a sergeants' revolt led by Fulgencio Batista overthrew Céspedes, installing Ramón Grau San Martín as president; the U.S. withheld recognition of Grau's radical regime due to concerns over its instability and policies like nullifying the Platt Amendment unilaterally. Welles negotiated with Batista and other factions, facilitating Grau's replacement by Carlos Mendieta in January 1934, after which the U.S. extended recognition on January 23, 1934, restoring order while abrogating the Platt Amendment later that year as a Good Neighbor gesture. Welles' Cuba mission exemplified the tensions in Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, which he architected to replace interventionism with multilateral cooperation and non-interference rhetoric, redefining the Monroe Doctrine to emphasize hemispheric solidarity over unilateral action. Proclaimed by Roosevelt at the December 1933 Pan-American Conference in Montevideo, the policy renounced U.S. rights to intervene in Latin American affairs, a principle Welles advanced through diplomatic channels despite the pragmatic U.S. influence exerted in Cuba to safeguard economic interests and prevent radical upheaval. Returning to his Assistant Secretary post after the Cuba stabilization, Welles oversaw policy implementation from 1933 to 1937, promoting trade reciprocity, cultural exchanges, and conflict mediation in the region, such as early efforts toward resolving the Chaco War, to build goodwill and counter European influence. Critics, including some Latin American nationalists, viewed the Cuba mediation as veiled imperialism contradicting non-intervention pledges, highlighting the policy's balance between idealism and U.S. hegemony maintenance.

Under Secretary of State and Pre-War Diplomacy (1937–1940)

President nominated Sumner Welles as Under Secretary of State on May 20, 1937, with confirmation following and Welles assuming duties on May 21. In this role, Welles oversaw much of the State Department's operations amid Secretary Cordell Hull's recurring health issues, effectively directing U.S. initiatives during a period of rising international tensions. His influence extended to advocating a 1937 peace proposal, later termed the Welles Plan, which envisioned U.S.-led multilateral conferences for , economic cooperation, and measures to prevent escalation toward global war. With the European war commencing in September 1939, Welles prioritized hemispheric solidarity. He headed the U.S. delegation to the Inter-American Neutrality Meeting of Foreign Ministers in from September 23 to October 3, 1939, where participants adopted the Declaration of Panama on October 3. This agreement proclaimed a 300-mile-wide maritime belt around the as a neutrality zone, barring belligerent naval operations and affirming consultation among American republics on threats to regional security. Welles's most prominent pre-war endeavor was a special mission to Europe in February and March 1940, dispatched by Roosevelt to evaluate wartime conditions and prospects for American mediation. Departing early February, Welles sequentially visited (meeting in around February 12), Germany (conferring with and in from February 15 to 20), France (discussing with Premier Édouard Daladier in Paris around February 23), and Britain (engaging Prime Minister in London in early March). Instructed solely to gather factual assessments without negotiating commitments, Welles reported upon return that irreconcilable aims—particularly Nazi Germany's insistence on total victory and territorial conquests—precluded feasible U.S. intervention for peace. This mission underscored the limits of neutral diplomacy amid aggressive expansionism, informing Roosevelt's subsequent shift toward support for the Allies.

World War II Engagements (1940–1943)

In February 1940, President dispatched Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles on a fact-finding mission to amid the early stages of , with instructions to evaluate conditions in belligerent capitals and ascertain prospects for negotiated without formal commitments. Welles departed Washington on February 11, arriving first in on February 25 for discussions with Italian dictator , who expressed conditional interest in mediation but emphasized Axis dominance; he then proceeded to for talks with French Premier , for a meeting with and Foreign Minister , who dismissed peace overtures, and finally on for consultations with British . The mission concluded that Axis leaders showed no genuine intent for settlement, highlighting the futility of immediate diplomacy and underscoring the urgency of bolstering Allied resistance to avert further U.S. entanglement. Welles subsequently championed measures to aid Britain and its allies without direct belligerency, including advocacy for the Act, enacted on March 11, 1941, which authorized the President to supply war materials valued at up to $7 billion initially to nations resisting aggression. As acting during Cordell Hull's absences, Welles signed the Master Agreement with the on February 23, 1942, formalizing reciprocal aid provisions and extending similar pacts to other recipients like by March 3. In August 1941, he accompanied Roosevelt to the Atlantic Conference at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, where joint principles with formed the Atlantic Charter on August 14, articulating goals such as no territorial aggrandizement, , and global economic cooperation—principles Welles viewed as antithetical to and foundational to postwar order. From 1941 onward, Welles oversaw the State Department's postwar planning division, initiating systematic studies as early as 1939 to reconcile war aims with a durable , including proposals for a federated organization to supplant the League of Nations' failures. His efforts produced memoranda envisioning regional blocs under a global council, economic reconstruction via U.S. loans, and mechanisms, though constrained by military priorities and interdepartmental rivalries; by January 1943, he advised Roosevelt on cohesion, urging adherence to principles amid Soviet territorial demands. These initiatives positioned Welles as a key architect of U.S. visions for a post-1945 world, influencing subsequent and conferences despite his September 1943 resignation.

Internal Rivalries and State Department Dynamics

Sumner Welles's appointment as Under Secretary of State on May 18, 1937, intensified existing tensions within the department, particularly with Secretary , who viewed Welles's rapid rise and close advisory role to President Roosevelt with suspicion. Roosevelt frequently bypassed Hull in favor of Welles for key foreign policy decisions, leveraging Welles's expertise in and broader diplomatic initiatives, which exacerbated Hull's resentment as he grappled with health issues including . This dynamic led to Hull feeling supplanted, with Welles effectively handling much of the department's substantive work on international affairs. The State Department became factionalized along lines of loyalty to Hull versus Welles, creating a "house divided against itself" where subordinates plotted against one another, undermining efficiency and coordination. Hull accused Welles of circumventing his authority, as detailed in Hull's memoirs, where he portrayed Welles as undermining departmental hierarchy by directly influencing Roosevelt. Roosevelt's tendency to favor both men alternately fueled the rivalry, with Welles leading initiatives like the 1940 European peace mission without full consultation, further straining relations. Personal animosity peaked during engagements, where Welles's advocacy for proactive diplomacy clashed with Hull's more cautious approach, resulting in crossed wires and internal conflicts reported by department experts in August 1943. These rivalries hampered the department's ability to present unified policy recommendations to the president, contributing to broader inefficiencies amid escalating global crises from to . Hull's threats of unless Welles was removed underscored the depth of the feud, though Roosevelt initially resisted to maintain Welles's influence on postwar planning and alliance-building efforts. The persistent discord reflected deeper structural issues in the department's leadership, where personal ambitions and differing visions for U.S. foreign engagement—Welles's emphasis on versus Hull's focus on reciprocal trade—exacerbated divisions without resolution until Welles's eventual departure.

Resignation

The 1940 Train Incident

On the night of September 17–18, 1940, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, while intoxicated aboard the presidential train returning from the funeral of House Speaker William B. Bankhead in Jasper, Alabama, to Washington, D.C., propositioned multiple Black Pullman porters for sexual acts. Welles offered sums ranging from $15 to $100 and invited porters, including John Stone and Alexander Dickson, to his compartment; Stone refused after Welles partially undressed him. The porters reported the advances to Southern Railway management, which considered pursuing legal action against Welles. A similar incident occurred approximately one week later on a train from Washington to , where Welles again solicited porters while under the influence of alcohol. These events exploited the racial and class hierarchies of the Jim Crow era, as the porters—predominantly African American men in subservient roles—faced potential retaliation for refusal, including job loss or accusations of impropriety that could endanger their livelihoods. The U.S. Secret Service became aware of the Alabama incident by January 1941, prompting an FBI inquiry documented in internal reports, though no criminal charges were filed at the time. President , informed of the matter, initially suppressed the details to protect Welles, a close advisor and architect of key foreign policies, prioritizing his diplomatic expertise over immediate repercussions. However, rivals within the State Department, including former ambassador William C. Bullitt, learned of the propositions and leveraged them in a sustained campaign against Welles, amplifying rumors through political channels and FBI memos. , harboring personal animosity toward Welles, cited the incident among other grievances in pressing Roosevelt for his subordinate's removal, though the full scandal's exposure was delayed until 1943. The porters' accounts, preserved in railway and federal records, underscore the incident's basis in direct witness testimony rather than unsubstantiated gossip.

Aftermath and Forced Departure (1943)

In the summer of 1943, the 1940 train incident involving Welles was revived by his rivals within the State Department, particularly former Ambassador William Bullitt, who leaked details of the alleged misconduct to Republican Senator . Brewster, an opponent of the Roosevelt administration, threatened to initiate a investigation into the matter unless Welles was removed from office. This escalation provided ammunition for , who had long harbored personal and professional animosities toward Welles and viewed him as a threat to his authority. Hull confronted President Roosevelt in August 1943, demanding Welles' dismissal and threatening his own if Welles remained in the administration. Roosevelt, prioritizing departmental stability and Hull's seniority during wartime, acceded to the pressure despite his personal regard for Welles. On August 28, 1943, Welles submitted his , citing deteriorating health as the official reason, though the underlying cause was the resurfaced scandal and internal power struggles. The formally announced Welles' resignation on September 25, 1943, and appointed Edward R. Stettinius Jr. as the new Under effective October 1. Public discourse speculated on policy divergences, particularly with Latin American allies who admired Welles' approach, but administration insiders recognized the scandal's role in his ouster. Hull's memoirs later claimed Roosevelt decided independently, but contemporary accounts and historical analyses attribute the decision primarily to Hull's ultimatum.

Later Career and Decline

Post-Government Activities and Writings

Following his resignation from the Under Secretary of State position on , 1943, Welles withdrew from active government service and pursued private advocacy for internationalist objectives, including support for the creation of the and the progressive termination of European colonial administrations. These efforts reflected his longstanding commitment to multilateral institutions capable of enforcing , though he held no formal roles in postwar diplomatic negotiations. Welles channeled much of his post-government energy into authorship, producing works that critiqued wartime decisions and proposed frameworks for enduring peace. His 1946 book Where Are We Heading?, published by Harper & Brothers, examined prospective trajectories for global stability amid emerging superpower rivalries and the need for reformed international governance. In 1948, he released We Need Not Fail through Houghton Mifflin Company, a concise analysis advocating partition of into separate Jewish and Arab states as a pragmatic resolution to regional conflict, drawing on his prior diplomatic experience in the . Welles's final major publication, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (1950, Harper & Brothers), defended seven pivotal U.S. choices under President Roosevelt—including the 1937 proposal for an international peace conference and responses to Axis aggression—as necessary steps toward victory and postwar order, countering contemporary criticisms of administration strategies. These texts, grounded in his insider perspective, emphasized great-power cooperation and as causal prerequisites for avoiding future wars, while attributing policy shortcomings to domestic rather than executive overreach. By the early 1950s, declining health curtailed further public engagements and writings.

Final Years and Death

Following his resignation from the Under Secretary of State position on September 30, 1943, Welles retired from active government service and turned to writing and commentary on . He authored The Time for Decision (), which advocated for a postwar order based on , , and the dismantling of colonial empires to prevent future conflicts. Subsequent works included Where Are We Heading? (1946), which critiqued emerging tensions and urged U.S.-Soviet cooperation; We Need Not Fail (1948), emphasizing multilateral institutions; and Seven Decisions That Shaped History (1950), analyzing pivotal diplomatic moments. Welles remained an outspoken proponent of internationalism, publicly supporting the creation of the and the principle of trusteeship for former colonies to facilitate . His advocacy reflected a consistent belief in supranational mechanisms to enforce peace, though he grew critical of rigid anti-communist policies in the late . Personally, he endured the loss of his second wife, Mathilde Townsend Welles, who died of on July 26, 1949, during a trip to . In his final years, Welles's health deteriorated due to chronic heart conditions—he had experienced multiple minor heart attacks during his tenure in —and complications from , which exacerbated his physical decline. He died on September 24, 1961, at age 68, at his third wife's family estate in . Welles was interred at in Washington, D.C.

Personal Life

Marriages and Immediate Family

Sumner Welles married three times, with his unions reflecting connections to prominent American families. His first marriage was to Esther "Hope" Slater, the sister of a Harvard classmate and descendant of industrialist , on April 14, 1915, in . The couple had two sons: Benjamin, born in 1916, and Arnold, born in 1918. They divorced prior to 1925. Welles's second marriage, to Mathilde Scott Townsend—previously the wife of U.S. Senator Peter Goelet Gerry from whom she divorced earlier in 1925—occurred on June 27, 1925, in New York. Townsend, a and heiress whose portrait was painted by , brought no additional children to the marriage, which lasted until her death on October 16, 1949. This union elevated Welles's social standing but contributed to his dismissal from by President Coolidge amid perceptions of scandal. His third marriage was to Harriette Appleton Post, a childhood acquaintance and granddaughter of , on January 8, 1952. This marriage produced no children and endured until Welles's death. Welles's immediate family thus consisted primarily of his two sons from the first marriage, with no other offspring recorded.

Private Conduct and Health Issues

In September 1940, Welles engaged in a scandalous incident of private misconduct while traveling by train from to , accompanying President after attending the funeral of House Speaker William Bankhead. Intoxicated, Welles made repeated sexual propositions to at least two African American Pullman porters, soliciting despite their refusals; the porters reported the advances to railroad superiors, who documented the event but initially suppressed it due to Welles' high position. This behavior reflected Welles' , which was discreetly known in elite diplomatic circles but became a liability when leaked by rivals such as William Bullitt, fueling demands for his removal from office. Welles' alcoholism exacerbated such indiscretions, as he frequently attributed lapses in judgment to excessive drinking, a pattern evident in the train episode and persisting post-resignation. His son Benjamin Welles, in drawing on family records, described how alcohol ravaged his father's later years, contributing to personal decline amid professional isolation. Health complications compounded these issues, including equilibrium disturbances and circulatory problems stemming from alcohol-related incidents, which impaired Welles' mobility and vitality in his final decade. On December 7, 1948, shortly after testifying before the regarding the case, he suffered a heart attack. Welles died on September 24, 1961, at age 68, following a brief illness at his wife's family home in .

Works and Ideas

Major Publications

Sumner Welles authored several influential works on , Latin American history, and postwar international order, drawing from his extensive government experience. His writings emphasized pragmatic realism in , often critiquing and advocating for structured global cooperation without idealistic overreach. Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924, published in two volumes by Payson & Clarke in 1928, provided a comprehensive historical of Dominican politics and U.S. interventions, arguing that American occupation had stabilized the nation but required careful withdrawal to avoid chaos. The book, based on during Welles's tenure as in the from 1922 to 1925, influenced U.S. policy debates on hemispheric relations and was praised for its detailed documentation of fiscal reforms and political instability. The Time for Decision, released by Harper & Brothers in 1944, became a national bestseller with over 500,000 copies sold in its first year, outlining the need for decisive U.S. leadership against Axis powers and proposing a postwar framework centered on regional federations rather than a universal league. Welles drew on his 1940 European mission and State Department role to detail behind-the-scenes negotiations, including the Good Neighbor Policy's successes in Latin America and failures in appeasing aggressors, while warning against premature disarmament. In Where Are We Heading?, published by Harper in 1946, Welles reflected on emerging tensions, critiquing Soviet expansionism and urging Western unity through economic aid and defensive alliances over vague . The work extended themes from his earlier writings, incorporating insights from UN founding conferences he helped shape. Welles also edited An Intelligent American's Guide to the Peace (Dryden Press, 1945), compiling essays from experts on reconstruction, with his introduction advocating pragmatic in trade and to counter totalitarian ideologies. These publications collectively positioned Welles as a bridge between Wilsonian internationalism and hard-nosed realism, though critics noted his optimism about hemispheric solidarity overlooked internal Latin American divisions.

Diplomatic Philosophy and Policy Views

Welles championed the Good Neighbor Policy as a cornerstone of U.S. diplomacy toward , emphasizing non-intervention, mutual respect, and economic cooperation over coercive measures like military occupations that had characterized earlier U.S. approaches under the . This shift, implemented from 1933 onward, involved withdrawing U.S. Marines from in 1933 and in 1934, abrogating the Platt Amendment's intervention clause with in 1934, and promoting multilateral forums such as the in in 1936 to foster hemispheric solidarity without unilateral dominance. Welles viewed this policy not merely as pragmatic restraint but as a principled rejection of , arguing it safeguarded U.S. security by building voluntary alliances against external threats like . In broader foreign policy, Welles rejected , advocating active U.S. engagement in global affairs to prevent the recurrence of world wars through mechanisms. He criticized emerging postwar tendencies in as shortsighted, insisting that American withdrawal from international responsibilities would invite chaos and undermine national interests. Influenced by his experiences in interwar , Welles favored and economic tools over , promoting paternalistic that prioritized , elite-level talks, and support for weaker nations' to achieve stability. Welles's postwar vision, detailed in his 1944 book The Time for Decision, envisioned a global order blending expanded hemispheric cooperation with a reformed international body akin to an enhanced , centered on U.S. leadership to enforce peace, dismantle colonial empires, and promote economic . He argued for the "" as foundational—freedom of speech, worship, from want, and from fear—requiring supranational institutions to mediate disputes and foster trade, while opposing spheres of influence that perpetuated great-power rivalries. This framework reflected his belief in causal links between unresolved aggressions, like those in , and global conflict, urging preemptive rather than reactive isolation.

Legacy

Key Diplomatic Achievements

As of State for Latin American Affairs from May 1933 to 1937, Welles spearheaded the implementation of the Good Neighbor Policy, which marked a shift from prior U.S. doctrines permitting intervention to one emphasizing non-interference, multilateral cooperation, and economic partnerships with Latin American nations. This approach facilitated the withdrawal of U.S. Marines from in 1934 and in 1933, reducing regional resentments built from earlier occupations. In August 1933, Welles mediated the Cuban crisis by negotiating the resignation of President on August 12, averting a potential U.S. landing and paving the way for a provisional government under , which stabilized the island amid revolutionary unrest. His efforts in exemplified the policy's practical application, prioritizing diplomatic pressure over force to resolve internal upheavals. Welles delivered the opening address at the Seventh International Conference of American States in , , from December 3 to 26, 1933, where the U.S. delegation, under his influence, endorsed the principle of non-intervention in Article 8 of the convention on rights and duties of states, codifying the Good Neighbor renunciation of interference in hemispheric affairs. This conference advanced multilateral mechanisms for , strengthening inter-American solidarity against external threats. During as Under from 1937 to 1943, Welles undertook a fact-finding mission to from February to March 1940, visiting , , , and Britain to assess prospects for peace amid the Phony War; though it yielded no mediation breakthroughs, it informed U.S. policy on avoiding entanglement while preparing for potential involvement. On July 23, 1940, he issued the Welles Declaration condemning the Soviet Union's in June 1940, affirming non-recognition of territorial changes effected by force and signaling U.S. opposition to totalitarian expansions. Welles contributed to postwar planning by advocating for an international organization to maintain peace, influencing early concepts that evolved into the United Nations; his 1943 proposals emphasized collective security and economic cooperation, drawing from Good Neighbor multilateralism to counter isolationist sentiments. These efforts helped lay groundwork for U.S. leadership in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944, though executed after his resignation.

Criticisms and Shortcomings

Welles' tenure as Under Secretary of State concluded in September 1943 amid a personal scandal that exposed vulnerabilities in his character and judgment. During a train journey from Washington to New York on September 16, 1940, Welles, inebriated, allegedly propositioned two railroad porters for sexual acts, offering them money and threatening their jobs when rebuffed; the porters reported the incident to superiors, prompting an investigation suppressed at President Roosevelt's behest until leaks and internal rivalries forced Welles' resignation three years later. The episode, rooted in Welles' —which carried severe social and legal stigma in the era—underscored how private indiscretions intersected with public service, eroding departmental morale and fueling antagonism from Cordell Hull, who had long resented Welles' influence over Latin . Chronic exacerbated Welles' shortcomings, impairing his reliability and contributing directly to the 1940 incident as well as broader patterns of erratic behavior. Biographies document his heavy drinking as a persistent issue from , leading to blackouts, dependency, and decisions that alienated colleagues; this , combined with adulterous affairs during his marriages, reflected a lack of self-discipline atypical for a career of his stature. Such personal frailties not only precipitated his downfall but also invited exploitation by political adversaries, as Hull and others leveraged rumors to diminish his standing within the State Department. In diplomatic practice, Welles exhibited overconfidence in negotiation with authoritarian regimes, as evident in his February–March 1940 mission to , , , and Britain, where he probed for peace terms with Hitler and Mussolini despite prior appeasement failures like . The trip, intended to gauge postwar settlement possibilities, produced no breakthroughs and was critiqued contemporaneously as quixotic, diverting attention from imminent U.S. preparedness needs while signaling misplaced American openness to compromise with expansionist powers. Similarly, his advocacy for accommodating Soviet ambitions post-World War II overlooked entrenched ideological conflicts, assuming workable arrangements that postwar realities—such as Eastern European occupations—belied. Welles' execution of the Good Neighbor Policy, while advancing non-interventionist rhetoric, faltered in crisis management; his 1933 mediation in Cuba, aimed at stabilizing the post-Machado revolution, inadvertently empowered Sergeant Fulgencio Batista's military faction, sidelining the elected government of Ramón Grau San Martín and paving the way for prolonged authoritarian rule rather than democratic consolidation. In Argentina during World War II, Welles' strategy of selective economic pressure to enforce neutrality alignment collapsed by 1943, as domestic resistance and Axis sympathies persisted, exposing the limits of his persuasive diplomacy absent firmer leverage. These instances highlight a recurring shortfall: an elitist faith in personal rapport over structural incentives, which yielded mixed results in hemispheric relations.

Modern Reassessments

In contemporary , Sumner Welles is increasingly recognized for his intellectual contributions to U.S. architecture, particularly his advocacy for multilateral institutions and frameworks during . Patrick E. 's 2003 analysis portrays Welles as a committed Wilsonian internationalist who directed the State Department's postwar planning from to , proposing international trusteeships for colonial territories and cooperative mechanisms to prevent future aggression, ideas that presaged elements of the Charter despite his premature resignation curtailing direct implementation. emphasizes Welles' efforts to balance realism with , including cautious engagement with the to secure Eastern European , though limited by domestic and bureaucratic rivalries. Reassessments also credit Welles with operationalizing the Good Neighbor Policy in , shifting from interventionism to cooperative diplomacy that stabilized hemispheric relations amid rising global threats; a 2025 commemoration of his Welles Declaration—condemning the Soviet annexation of the on July 23, 1940—affirms its enduring relevance as a principled stand for non-aggression and sovereignty, influencing post-Cold War evaluations of U.S. consistency against expansionism. However, diplomatic scholars critique his occasional naivety toward totalitarian regimes, as seen in the 1940 Welles Mission's fact-finding tour of , where initial optimism about negotiated peace underestimated Axis intransigence. The 1943 scandal precipitating Welles' resignation—alleged drunken sexual advances on African American railroad porters—continues to overshadow his record, with diplomatic historians often sidelining him in favor of less controversial figures. Queer history scholarship engages his closeted but rejects uncritical , as Joseph A. Parkes argues in , highlighting how Welles' actions reflected elite power imbalances involving race and class rather than proto-LGBTQ+ , thus complicating efforts to recast him as a marginalized trailblazer amid his privileged, non-out status and era-specific prejudices. This nuanced view, echoed in James Kirchick's examination of Washington's sexual undercurrents, frames Welles' downfall as emblematic of mid-20th-century hypocrisies in governance, yet underscores how personal vulnerabilities undermined institutional trust without negating his policy innovations.

References

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