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Anthony Kennedy
Anthony Kennedy
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Anthony McLeod Kennedy (born July 23, 1936) is an American attorney and jurist who served as an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1988 until his retirement in 2018. He was nominated to the court in 1987 by President Ronald Reagan, and sworn in on February 18, 1988. After the retirement of Sandra Day O'Connor in 2006, he was considered the swing vote on many of the Roberts Court's 5–4 decisions.

Key Information

Born in Sacramento, California, Kennedy took over his father's legal practice in Sacramento after graduating from Stanford University and Harvard Law School. Kennedy became a U.S. federal judge in 1975 when President Gerald Ford appointed him to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In November 1987, after two failed attempts at nominating a successor to Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., President Reagan nominated Kennedy to the Supreme Court. Kennedy won unanimous confirmation from the United States Senate in February 1988. Following the death of Antonin Scalia in February 2016, Kennedy became the senior associate justice of the court. Kennedy retired during the presidency of Donald Trump and was succeeded by his former law clerk, Brett Kavanaugh. Following O'Connor's death in 2023, Kennedy is the oldest living former Supreme Court justice.

Kennedy authored the majority opinion in several important cases—including Boumediene v. Bush, Citizens United v. FEC, and four major gay rights cases: Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas, United States v. Windsor, and Obergefell v. Hodges. He also co-authored the controlling opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey along with Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and David Souter.

Early life and education

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Kennedy was born and raised in a Catholic family in Sacramento, California.[1] His ancestry was mainly Irish, with some Scottish, German, and English ancestry as well.[2] He was the son of Anthony J. Kennedy (1902–1963), an attorney with a reputation for influence in the California State Legislature, and Gladys (née McLeod; 1904–1981), who participated in many local civic activities.[3] As a boy, Kennedy came into contact with prominent politicians of the day, such as California Governor and future Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren. As a young man, Kennedy served as a page in the California State Senate. Kennedy attended C. K. McClatchy High School, where he was an honors student and graduated in 1954.[4][5]

Following in his mother's footsteps, Kennedy enrolled at Stanford University where he developed an interest in constitutional law. After spending his senior year at the London School of Economics, Kennedy graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Stanford in 1958 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science.[6] Kennedy then attended Harvard Law School, graduating in 1961 with a Bachelor of Laws, cum laude.[7]

Early career

[edit]

Kennedy was in private practice in San Francisco from 1961 to 1963. In 1963, following his father's death, he took over his father's Sacramento practice, which he operated until 1975.[4] From 1965 to 1988, he was a professor of constitutional law at McGeorge School of Law, at the University of the Pacific.[6]

During Kennedy's time as a California law professor and attorney, he helped California Governor Ronald Reagan draft a state tax proposal.[4]

Kennedy served as a private first class in the California Army National Guard from 1961 to 1962 during the Cold War. He was on the board of the Federal Judicial Center from 1987 to 1988. He also served on two committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States: the Advisory Panel on Financial Disclosure Reports and Judicial Activities (subsequently renamed the Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct) from 1979 to 1987, and the Committee on Pacific Territories from 1979 to 1990, which he chaired from 1982 to 1990.[8]

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

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On March 3, 1975, upon Reagan's recommendation,[4] President Gerald Ford nominated Kennedy to the seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that had been vacated by Charles Merton Merrill. Kennedy was unanimously confirmed by the U.S. Senate on March 20 and received his commission on March 24, 1975.[9]

Supreme Court of the United States

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Nomination and confirmation

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In July 1987, President Ronald Reagan nominated Robert Bork to the Supreme Court seat vacated by Lewis F. Powell Jr., who had announced his retirement in late June.[10] However, he was rejected 42–58 by the Senate on October 23.[11] The president's next nominee, Douglas Ginsburg,[12][13] withdrew his name from consideration on November 7 after admitting to marijuana use,[14] and Senate Judiciary Committee member Patrick Leahy said that if Reagan's next nominee was unacceptable to Senate Democrats,[a] they would refuse hearings for any candidate until after the 1988 presidential election.[16]

President Reagan and Kennedy meeting in the Oval Office on November 11, 1987

On November 11, 1987, Reagan nominated Anthony Kennedy to fill Powell's seat. Kennedy was then subjected to an unprecedentedly thorough investigation of his background,[17] which did not uncover any information that would hinder his nomination.

In a Ninth Circuit dissent that Kennedy wrote before joining the Supreme Court, he criticized police for bribing a child into showing them where the child's mother hid drugs. Considering such conduct offensive and destructive of the family, Kennedy wrote that "indifference to personal liberty is but the precursor of the state's hostility to it."[18] Kennedy wrote an article the year before, however, about judicial restraint, and the following excerpt from it was read aloud by Jeffrey Levi, executive director of the National Gay & Lesbian Taskforce, at his confirmation hearing:

One can conclude that certain essential, or fundamental, rights should exist in any just society. It does not follow that each of those essential rights is one that we as judges can enforce under the written Constitution. The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system. Many argue that a just society grants a right to engage in homosexual conduct. If that view is accepted, the Bowers decision in effect says the State of Georgia has the right to make a wrong decision—wrong in the sense that it violates some people's views of rights in a just society. We can extend that slightly to say that Georgia's right to be wrong in matters not specifically controlled by the Constitution is a necessary component of its own political processes. Its citizens have the political liberty to direct the governmental process to make decisions that might be wrong in the ideal sense, subject to correction in the ordinary political process.[19]

Kennedy said about Griswold v. Connecticut, a privacy case about the use of contraceptives, "I really think I would like to draw the line and not talk about the Griswold case so far as its reasoning or its result."[20] He also discussed "a zone of liberty, a zone of protection, a line that's drawn where the individual can tell the Government, 'Beyond this line you may not go.'"[21][22]

His hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee began on December 14,[23][24] and lasted just three consecutive days.[25] When the Senate voted on Kennedy's nomination, he received bipartisan support. Maureen Hoch of PBS wrote that he "virtually sailed through the confirmation process and was widely viewed by conservatives and liberals alike as balanced and fair".[26] The U.S. Senate confirmed him on February 3, 1988, by a vote of 97 to 0; he is the most recent Supreme Court justice to be confirmed by a unanimous vote.[22][27] Absent from the vote were three Democrats: Paul Simon and Al Gore were campaigning and Joe Biden was ill.[28] Attorney General Edwin Meese presented Kennedy's commission to the court in a swearing-in ceremony on February 18, 1988.[29]

Tenure and analysis

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Although appointed by a Republican president, Kennedy's decisions did not consistently align with a single ideological bloc and often varied depending on the case.[4] Vanity Fair quoted several former Supreme Court clerks as indicating that they believe Kennedy was often swayed by the opinions of his clerks, including his ruling on Planned Parenthood v. Casey.[30] One clerk stated that "the premise is that he can't think by himself, and that he can be manipulated by someone in his second year of law school". This notion also led the Federalist Society to target Kennedy with more conservative clerks, believing this would make Kennedy more conservative. Two of his former clerks, Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, eventually became Supreme Court justices. Conservative pundit George Will and Georgetown University Law Center professor Randy Barnett have described Kennedy's jurisprudence as "libertarian",[31] although other legal scholars have disagreed.[32][33]

Kennedy issued conservative rulings during most of his tenure, having voted with William Rehnquist as often as any other justice from 1992 to the end of the Rehnquist Court in 2005.[34] In his first term on the Court, Kennedy voted with Rehnquist 92 percent of the time—more than any other justice.[35] Before becoming the median justice on the court in 2006, Kennedy sided with conservatives during close rulings 75 percent of the time.[36] However, Kennedy was also known for siding with the court's liberal justices on high-profile social issues like same-sex marriage and abortion.[37] Kennedy was known as a swing vote on the court,[38][39][40][41] and this reputation became more pronounced after the 2006 retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (who had previously been known as the court's primary swing vote).[42] Kennedy, who was slightly more conservative than former Justice O'Connor was on issues of race, religion, and abortion, intensely disliked being labeled a "swing vote" in public.[43] However, interviews with former clerks indicate that, behind the scenes, he may have appeared undecided on certain cases despite having already formed an opinion.[30]

On the Roberts Court, Kennedy often decided the outcome of cases. In the 2008–2009 term, he was in the majority 92 percent of the time. In the 23 decisions in which the justices split 5–4, Kennedy was in the majority in all but five. Of those 23 decisions, 16 were strictly along ideological lines, and Kennedy joined the conservative wing of the court 11 times; the liberals, five.[44] In the 2010–2011 term, 16 cases were decided by a 5–4 vote; Kennedy joined the majority in 14 of the decisions.[38]

Following the death of Antonin Scalia in February 2016, Kennedy became the Senior Associate Justice of the court and the last appointed by President Reagan.[45] During his last few terms on the court, the justice became critical of administrative law.[46] Kennedy retired from the Supreme Court and made the transition to senior status effective July 31, 2018.[47]

He has the distinction of being the only Supreme Court Justice to have two former clerks of his be appointed to the Supreme Court, Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh.

Conservative criticism

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According to legal reporter Jan Crawford, Kennedy attracted the ire of conservatives when he did not vote with his more conservative colleagues.[48] In 2005, the U.S. House Majority Leader at the time, Tom DeLay, criticized Kennedy for his reliance on international law and for conducting his own Internet research, calling him a judicial activist.[49] According to legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin, some conservatives viewed Kennedy's pro-gay-rights and pro-choice rulings as betrayals.[50] According to Crawford, the "bitter" quality of some movement conservatives' views on Kennedy stems from his eventual rethinking of positions on abortion, religion, and the death penalty (which Kennedy believes cannot be constitutionally applied to juveniles or intellectually disabled people).[48]

A short 2008 law review article by retired lawyer Douglas M. Parker in The Green Bag[51] charged that much of the criticism of Kennedy was based upon "pop psychology" rather than careful analysis of his opinions. Kennedy himself responds to concerns about judicial activism this way: "An activist court is a court that makes a decision you don't like."[52]

Internationalism

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According to The New Yorker staff writer Jeffrey Toobin, starting in 2003, Kennedy became a leading proponent of the use of foreign and international law as an aid to interpreting the United States Constitution.[50] Toobin sees this consideration of foreign law as the biggest factor behind Kennedy's occasional breaking with his most conservative colleagues.[50] The use of foreign law in Supreme Court opinions dates back to at least 1829, though according to Toobin, its use in interpreting the Constitution on "basic questions of individual liberties" began only in the late 1990s.[50]

Defending his use of international law, in 2005 Kennedy told Toobin, "Why should world opinion care that the American Administration wants to bring freedom to oppressed peoples? Is that not because there's some underlying common mutual interest, some underlying common shared idea, some underlying common shared aspiration, underlying unified concept of what human dignity means? I think that's what we're trying to tell the rest of the world, anyway."[50]

A 2008 profile of Kennedy in the Los Angeles Times focused on his internationalist perspective. According to David Savage, Kennedy had become a strong proponent of interpreting the guarantees of liberty and equality in line with modern human rights law: "lawyers and judges have come to believe the basic principles of human rights are common to the peoples of world [sic]."[53]

Jurisprudence

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Abortion

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In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), Kennedy voted to uphold a restriction on abortion for minors that required both parents to be notified about the procedure.

Kennedy co-authored the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), which reaffirmed in principle (though without many details) the Roe v. Wade decision recognizing the right to abortion under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plurality opinion, signed jointly by three justices appointed by Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, ignited a firestorm of criticism from conservatives. Kennedy had stated at least as early as 1989 that, in order to uphold precedent, he might not vote to overturn Roe.[54] According to Court insiders, Kennedy had reportedly considered overturning Roe, but in the end decided to uphold restrictions while affirming the Roe precedent.[55]

In later abortion decisions, it became apparent that Kennedy thought Casey had narrowed Roe and allowed more restrictions. Owing to the Court's altered composition under President Clinton, Kennedy was no longer the fifth vote to strike down abortion restrictions. Hence, O'Connor became the justice who defined the meaning of Casey in subsequent cases, while Kennedy often dissented, expressing his interpretation of Casey as allowing for certain restrictions. For example, Kennedy dissented in the 2000 decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, which struck down laws criminalizing partial-birth abortion.[56]

After the judicial appointments made by President George W. Bush, Kennedy again became the needed fifth vote to strike down abortion restrictions.[neutrality is disputed] Since Kennedy's conception of abortion rights was narrower than O'Connor's, the court became slightly more supportive of abortion restrictions after 2006. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), which held that a federal law criminalizing partial-birth abortion did not violate Casey because it did not impose an "undue burden" upon the exercise of abortion rights. The decision did not expressly overrule Stenberg, although many commentators saw it as having that effect.[57][58]

First amendment rights of contractors

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O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. was a towing company employed under contract by the City of Northlake in northern Illinois. Northlake removed O'Hare from its list on towing companies because the company's owner did not support Northlake's mayoral candidate in his reelection campaign: instead, the owner supported an opposition candidate. The Supreme Court held, in a majority 7–2 opinion written by Kennedy (O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake), that independent contractors such as O'Hare are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as those afforded to government employees. Accordingly, Northlake could not base the towing company's employment on its political affiliations or beliefs unless the city could demonstrate that their political affiliations "had a reasonable and appreciable effect on its job performance". The Court held that Northlake neither attempted nor would it have been able to make such a demonstration. Therefore, Northlake's removal of O'Hare Truck Service from its employment list was unconstitutional.[59]

Free speech

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On May 30, 2006, Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos relating to whether the First Amendment protects statements by public officials pursuant to their duties from employer discipline.[60] Kennedy utilized past precedents in Pickering v. Board of Education to determine whether or not an employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern or in the capacity of his office.[61] Upon the identification that speech was said in an official capacity, Kennedy determined that a government entity, in its role as an employer, had the discretion to impose speech restrictions so long as they had the potential to affect its operations.[62] Kennedy emphasized this point by writing: "when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline".[63]

On June 28, 2012, Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion in United States v. Alvarez declaring the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional.[64] In doing so, Kennedy determined the Act supported a content-based restriction on speech - that being a nondefamatory falsehood of having received a military decoration or medal - and that the government failed to provide a direct causal link between the restriction and a potential injury.[65] Additionally, Kennedy wrote that such a restriction failed to meet the standards of strict scrutiny, with the law acting to "[seek] to control and suppress all false statements on this one subject in almost limitless times and settings".[66][67]

On June 19, 2017, Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Packingham v. North Carolina ruling that a prohibition of sex offenders from social media is a violation of the First Amendment.[68] Kennedy noted that, while the restriction was tailored to suit a government interest in preventing child sex abuse, the law did not pass strict scrutiny nor was it narrowly tailored for that purpose.[69][70][71] The barring of a substantial amount of online expression was therefore unrelated to its stated goal and acted "to foreclose access to social media altogether [and] to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights".[72][73]

Capital punishment

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With the Court's majority in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, Kennedy agreed that the execution of the mentally ill and those under 18 at the time of the crime was unconstitutional. In Kansas v. Marsh, however, Kennedy did not join the dissent, which raised concerns about the administration of capital punishment.

In 2008, Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Kennedy v. Louisiana. The opinion, joined by the court's four more liberal justices, held, "[t]he Eighth Amendment bars Louisiana from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the victim's death." The opinion went on to state that "there is a distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against individual persons, even including child rape, on the other. The latter crimes may be devastating in their harm, as here, but in 'terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public' ... they cannot be compared to murder in their 'severity and irrevocability'."[74] The opinion concluded that in cases of crimes against individuals, "the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim's life was not taken".[75]

Environment

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Kennedy wrote the majority decision in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council (2009), which involved an Alaskan mining company that planned to extract new gold from a mine that had been closed for decades using a technique known as "froth-flotation". This technique would produce approximately 4.5 million tons of "slurry", a thick waste product laced with toxic elements such as lead and mercury. The company intended to dispose of the waste in a nearby lake, which would eventually decrease the depth of the lake by fifty feet and flood the surrounding land with contaminated water. While federal law forbids "[t]he use of any river, lake, stream or ocean as a waste treatment system", Kennedy's decision stated that pollutants are exempt from this law so long as they have "the effect of ... changing the bottom elevation of water". Justice Ginsburg's dissent stated that such a reading of federal law "strains credulity" because it allows "[w]hole categories of regulated industries" to "gain immunity from a variety of pollution-control standards".

Gay rights and homosexuality

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Kennedy's concept of liberty has included protections for sexual orientation. While Kennedy was an appeals-court judge, he wrote a decision in Beller v. Middendorf (9th Cir. 1980) that noted that some homosexual behavior may be constitutionally protected – yet upheld the military's policy of discharging service members on the basis of homosexuality.[76] He later wrote the Supreme Court's opinion in Romer v. Evans (1996), invalidating a provision in the Colorado Constitution excluding homosexuals from any state or local anti-discrimination protections. He wrote the Court's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), which invalidated criminal laws against homosexual sodomy on the basis of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, overturning the Court's previous ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986). In both cases, he sided with the more liberal members of the Court. He wrote that the Court had misread the historical record regarding laws criminalizing homosexual relations in Bowers, stating that further research showed that American anti-sodomy laws had historically been directed at "nonprocreative sexual activity more generally", rather than specifically at homosexual acts. Combined with the fact that such laws had often gone unenforced, the Court saw this as constituting a tradition of avoiding interference with private sexual activity between consenting adults. He also said that the reasoning behind Bowers was not widely accepted in American law (pointing, for example, to the Model Penal Code's recommendations starting in 1955) and that it had been rejected by most other developed Western countries (as in the Wolfenden Report of 1957 and a 1981 decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Case 7525/76, Dudgeon v United Kingdom). As a result, Kennedy stated that there was a jurisprudential basis for thinking that "an integral part of human freedom" is allowing consenting adults to choose to privately engage in sexual activity.[77][78]

In the 2000 case of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, Kennedy voted, with four other justices, to uphold the Boy Scouts of America's organizational right to ban homosexuals from being scoutmasters.[79]

On October 19, 2009, Kennedy temporarily blocked Washington state officials from releasing the names of people who signed petitions calling for a referendum ballot measure that would repeal a gay rights domestic partnership law, but joined the subsequent majority decision in Doe v. Reed, which stated the Washington law permitting signature release was constitutional, but remanded the matter to the lower court to determine whether the release of this particular petition's signatures was constitutional.

In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010), the Court held that a public law college's policy requiring that all student organizations allow any student to join was constitutional. The Christian Legal Society wanted an exemption from the policy because the organization barred students based on religion and sexual orientation. Hastings College of Law refused to grant the exemption. The court found that Hastings' policy was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Kennedy wrote a concurrence joining the majority.

On June 26, 2013, Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act was held unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor. In the majority opinion on this case, Kennedy wrote, "The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment."[80]

Two years later, Kennedy authored the majority ruling in the decision of Obergefell v. Hodges, which holds that same-sex couples must be allowed to marry nationwide.[81][82] The closing paragraph of Kennedy's ruling has been used by many couples in their marriage vows:[83]

No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were.

Gun issues

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On June 26, 2008, Kennedy joined the majority in District of Columbia v. Heller, which struck down the ban on handguns in the District of Columbia. At issue was whether Washington, D.C.'s ban violated the right to "keep and bear arms" by preventing individuals from having guns in their homes. Kennedy sided with the conservatives on the Court, holding that the Second Amendment recognized an individual's right to keep and bear arms. Two years later, in McDonald v. Chicago, Kennedy joined the majority opinion holding that the Second Amendment's protections for the right to keep and bear arms are incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[84]

Habeas corpus

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On June 12, 2008, Kennedy wrote the 5–4 majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush. The case challenged the legality of Lakhdar Boumediene's detention at the Guantanamo Bay military base as well as the constitutionality of the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006. Kennedy was joined by the four more liberal justices in finding that the constitutionally guaranteed right of habeas corpus applies to persons held in Guantanamo Bay and to persons designated as enemy combatants on that territory. They also found that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 failed to provide an adequate substitute for habeas corpus and that the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of that right.[85][86][87][88]

The court also concluded that the detainees are not required to exhaust review procedures in the court of appeals before seeking habeas relief in the district court. In the ruling, Kennedy called the Combatant Status Review Tribunals "inadequate".[85][86][87][88] He explained, "to hold that the political branches may switch the constitution on or off at will would lead to a regime in which they, not this court, 'say what the law is'".[89] The decision struck down section seven of the MCA but left intact the Detainee Treatment Act. In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter stressed the fact that the prisoners involved had been imprisoned for as long as six years.[90]

Religious liberty

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On issues of religion, Kennedy held to a less separationist reading of the Establishment Clause than did his colleague, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,[citation needed] favoring a "Coercion Test" that he detailed in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.[91] Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014), concluding, "The town of Greece does not violate the First Amendment by opening its meetings with prayer that comports with our tradition, and does not coerce participation by nonadherents."[92]

Super PACs

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Justice Kennedy's majority opinion[93] in Citizens United found that the BCRA §203 prohibition of all independent expenditures by corporations and unions violated the First Amendment's protection of free speech. The majority wrote, "If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech."[94]

Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority also noted that because the First Amendment does not distinguish between media and other corporations, these restrictions would allow Congress to suppress political speech in newspapers, books, television, and blogs.[95] The court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), which had held that a state law that prohibited corporations from using treasury money to support or oppose candidates in elections did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also overruled that portion of McConnell v. FEC (2003) that upheld BCRA's restriction of corporate spending on "electioneering communications". The Court's ruling effectively freed corporations and unions to spend money both on "electioneering communications" and to directly advocate for the election or defeat of candidates (although not to contribute directly to candidates or political parties).[96]

On October 25, 2011, Richard L. Hasen wrote that in the 2012 election super PACs "will likely replace political parties as a conduit for large, often secret contributions, allowing an end run around the $2,500 individual contribution limit and the bar on corporate and labor contributions to federal candidates". According to Hasen, the rise of super PACs dates to a sentence in Kennedy's opinion in Citizens United: "We now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption."[97] Kennedy also wrote in his opinion that he was not concerned if higher expenditures by people or corporations were viewed as leading to corruption, stating, "the appearance of influence or access will not cause the electorate to lose faith in this democracy."[98]

Other issues

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On the issue of the limits of free speech, Kennedy joined a majority to protect flag burning in the controversial case of Texas v. Johnson (1989).[99] In his concurrence, Kennedy wrote, "It is poignant but fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt." He took a very broad view of constitutional protection for speech under the First Amendment,[citation needed] invalidating a congressional law prohibiting "virtual" child pornography in Ashcroft v. ACLU (2002).[100]

Kennedy has joined with court majorities in decisions favoring states' rights and invalidating federal and state affirmative action programs. He ruled with the majority on Equal Protection grounds in the controversial 2000 Bush v. Gore case that halted continuing recounts in the 2000 presidential election and ended the legal challenge to the election of President George W. Bush. Although the decision was published without an author, Kennedy wrote the decision.[30] Behind the scenes, colleagues criticized his professionalism in this case, feeling that he inflated the numbers of his majority opinion by deciding, without consulting the dissenting justices, to implicate some of the dissenters as having joined his opinion in part.[30]

In the 2005 Gonzales v. Raich case, he joined the liberal members of the Court (along with conservative Justice Scalia) in permitting the federal government to prohibit the use of medical marijuana, even in states where it is legal.[101] Several weeks later, in the controversial case of Kelo v. City of New London (2005), he joined the four more liberal justices in supporting the local government's power to take private property for economic development through the use of eminent domain.[102]

In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers (2003), Kennedy wrote a partial dissent in which he argued that railroad workers who had contracted asbestosis from their employment should not be entitled to recovery for the emotional pain and suffering from their increased risk of cancer.[103]

In Baze v. Rees, Kennedy played a deciding role in the outcome of lethal injection. Some correspondents believed he would play a larger role, believing more than two judges would dissent.[104]

A December 2011 article in the Huffington Post noted that Kennedy in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) and Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) dissented on an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, where a lab tech who created a forensic report on a case is required to testify at trial if called. His dissents, joined by Roberts, Breyer, and Alito, claimed that the rule would place a burden on understaffed labs. However, in Williams v. Illinois, Kennedy sided with Scalia's interpretation of the amendment.[105]

Public speaking and teaching

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Kennedy called for reform of overcrowded American prisons in a speech before the American Bar Association. He has spent his summers in Salzburg, Austria, where he teaches international and American law at the University of Salzburg for the McGeorge School of Law international program and has attended the large yearly international judges' conference held there.[106]

In 1994, Kennedy ran a series of mock trials of Shakespeare's character Hamlet, for his murder of Polonius. Alan Stone was a psychiatric witness for the prosecution, tasked with fighting against an insanity defense. The juries usually deadlocked.[107]

In 2005, Kennedy received the Golden Plate Award of the American Academy of Achievement presented by Awards Council member Sir Roger Bannister.[108][109][110]

In January 2015, Kennedy recorded a short interview for Historic Mount Vernon about the vital role George Washington had played in the drafting and early interpretation of the Constitution.[111]

Personal life

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On June 23, 1963, Kennedy married Mary Jeanne Davis from Sacramento, California. The Kennedys have three children: Justin, Gregory, and Kristin.[112] Mary Kennedy and the three Kennedy children are all graduates of Stanford.[112]

Mary Kennedy was a third grade teacher at the Golden Empire Elementary School in Sacramento.[113]

Justin Kennedy worked for Goldman Sachs, and then for Deutsche Bank from 1997 to 2009; he became its global head of real estate capital markets. During his time at Deutsche Bank he helped Donald Trump secure a $640 million loan for a Chicago real estate project.[114][115][116][117]

Gregory attended Stanford Law School and was a president of the Stanford Federalist Society.[118] He was an associate at Sullivan & Cromwell in the 1990s, later worked at UBS, and, since October 2016, is the chief operating officer at the investment bank Disruptive Technology Advisers, which works closely with Dropbox, 23andMe, and Peter Thiel's Palantir Technologies.[113][119]

Kennedy is one of 15 Catholics to have served on the Supreme Court (out of a total of 116 justices).[120]

Kennedy released a memoir in 2025 entitled Life, Law & Liberty (ISBN 9781668052747).

See also

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Notes

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References

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Sources

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  • Nowak, John E.; Rotunda, Ronald D. (2012). Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure (5th ed.). Eagan, Minnesota: West Thomson/Reuters. OCLC 798148265.

Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Anthony McLeod Kennedy (born July 23, 1936) is an American jurist who served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1988 to 2018. Nominated by President Ronald Reagan on November 11, 1987, following the failed nominations of Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsburg, Kennedy was confirmed by the U.S. Senate in a unanimous 97–0 vote on February 3, 1988, and sworn in on February 18, 1988. His tenure, spanning three decades, positioned him as a pivotal figure on a frequently divided Court, often casting the deciding vote in 5–4 rulings on matters of individual liberty, federalism, and constitutional interpretation. Born in , to a family of Irish descent with his father a prominent local attorney, Kennedy graduated from with a B.A. in in 1958 after spending his senior year at the London School of Economics; he then earned an LL.B. from in 1961. Admitted to the bar in 1962, he entered private practice in Sacramento, co-founding a firm, and later taught constitutional and contract law as a professor at from 1965 to 1986. In 1975, President appointed him to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where he served until his elevation to the , authoring over 600 opinions noted for their emphasis on and stare decisis. Kennedy authored or joined majority opinions in landmark cases shaping modern jurisprudence, including upholding state abortion regulations while reaffirming Roe v. Wade's core in (1992), striking down sodomy laws in (2003), invalidating state bans on same-sex marriage in (2015), and expanding corporate free speech rights in (2010). His jurisprudence reflected a blend of conservative on issues like federal power and gun rights—concurring in (2008)—with libertarian-leaning protections for personal autonomy and dignity, often prioritizing individual rights against government overreach over strict ideological consistency. Kennedy announced his retirement effective July 31, 2018, citing a desire to ensure the Court's institutional integrity amid shifting political dynamics.

Early Life and Education

Upbringing and Family Influences

Anthony McLeod Kennedy was born on July 23, 1936, in , to Anthony J. Kennedy, a and lobbyist in the , and Gladys McLeod Kennedy, a teacher active in local civic affairs. The family maintained strong Republican ties, with Kennedy's parents embedded in the state's political circles during the mid-20th century. His father, known as "Bud," had risen from dock work in to a prominent role advocating for clients in Sacramento, fostering an environment steeped in legal and governmental matters. Kennedy's upbringing reflected the post-World War II era's emphasis on and institutional stability in California's capital, where his family's proximity to state politics provided early glimpses into . He often accompanied his father on rounds, cultivating an innate appreciation for the interplay of , , and interpersonal influence in . This exposure, amid Sacramento's small-town dynamics and the optimism of America's , instilled a pragmatic orientation toward individual liberties and institutional roles, distinct from ideological extremes. The Kennedy household emphasized discipline and community involvement, with his mother's volunteerism complementing his father's professional networks, which included acquaintances like future . Such familial dynamics prioritized reasoned discourse and public responsibility over partisan fervor, shaping Kennedy's foundational worldview before formal education or career pursuits.

Academic Training

Kennedy earned a degree in from in 1958, after spending his senior year studying abroad at the London School of Economics, an experience that broadened his exposure to international political thought and European intellectual traditions. This period of transatlantic study, amid the post-World War II reconfiguration of global institutions, contributed to his early appreciation for comparative governance structures, though he did not complete a degree at the LSE. Subsequently, Kennedy attended , where he received a degree cum laude in 1961. His legal training at Harvard emphasized rigorous analytical methods foundational to constitutional interpretation, aligning with the institution's emphasis on during an era of evolving civil rights . While specific faculty mentors are not extensively documented in primary accounts, Kennedy's academic performance reflected a strong grounding in legal principles that would inform his later judicial approach.

Pre-Supreme Court Career

Following his admission to the California Bar in 1962, Kennedy commenced private practice in San Francisco from 1961 to 1963 at the firm of Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges. Upon his father's death in 1963, he relocated to Sacramento to assume management of the family law practice, continuing there until 1975. This Sacramento tenure involved general legal work typical of a regional firm, including representation in state-level matters. In 1965, Kennedy began part-time teaching as a professor of constitutional law at McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, a role he maintained until 1988 alongside his practice. His courses emphasized foundational principles of constitutional interpretation, influencing generations of students through lectures on , individual rights, and . This academic engagement provided scholarly depth to his practical experience, fostering his reputation as a rigorous thinker on legal theory. Kennedy also served in advisory capacities to California Governor , notably assisting in the drafting of Proposition 1, a 1973 ballot initiative to impose strict limits on state tax increases and spending growth. Though the measure failed to pass, it underscored Kennedy's alignment with , prioritizing expenditure controls and tax restraint as mechanisms to curb government expansion. Such involvement reflected his early policy-oriented , rooted in toward unchecked growth.

Ninth Circuit Service

Anthony McLeod Kennedy was nominated by President to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 3, 1975, to fill a vacancy created by the elevation of Charles Merrill to . The Senate confirmed his nomination on May 15, 1975, by , and he received his commission on May 30, 1975, becoming the youngest federal appellate judge in the nation at age 38. Kennedy served on the Ninth Circuit for twelve years, handling a substantial caseload that included authoring hundreds of opinions across diverse areas such as , , and administrative matters. His tenure on the circuit, which covers nine western states and is known for its large docket and perceived liberal leanings, positioned him as a leader of the court's conservative minority. Kennedy's judicial approach emphasized , restraint, and deference to state authority in balancing federal and local interests, reflecting a moderate-conservative outlook that earned praise for clarity and efficiency among practitioners. In criminal cases, for instance, he authored at least 144 opinions, often prioritizing procedural fairness while upholding convictions where evidence supported them, as seen in analyses of his pre- work. His decisions frequently addressed and environmental regulations, where he advocated for practical limits on federal overreach; in environmental disputes, Kennedy's rulings on the Ninth Circuit stressed property rights and state prerogatives against expansive agency interpretations, foreshadowing his later concurrence in Rapanos v. United States that refined wetlands jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. These opinions contributed to his for , focusing on case-specific facts rather than broad ideological sweeps, which distinguished him in a circuit often criticized for by conservative observers. During his service, Kennedy also took on special assignments, including sitting by designation on the of early in his tenure, demonstrating his versatility and commitment to judicial duty beyond the Ninth Circuit's routine appeals. His record of measured conservatism, combined with collegiality, built broad respect that facilitated his elevation to the in , bridging his appellate experience with national .

Supreme Court Nomination and Confirmation

Selection Process

The vacancy on the arose following Associate Justice 's announcement of retirement on June 26, 1987, prompting President to seek a conservative replacement aligned with his judicial philosophy. Reagan's initial nominee, Robert H. Bork, a federal appeals court judge known for his originalist views, was selected on July 1, 1987, but faced vehement opposition from Democrats in the , who portrayed him as extreme on issues like and civil rights. The Senate rejected Bork's nomination on October 23, 1987, by a vote of 58 to 42, marking a significant partisan battle. Seeking to avoid further controversy, Reagan nominated Douglas H. Ginsburg on October 30, 1987, a younger judge with recent D.C. Circuit experience, but Ginsburg withdrew his candidacy on November 7, 1987, after disclosures of his past marijuana use surfaced, undermining his viability amid the era's political sensitivities. With Senate Democrats controlling the chamber and public scrutiny intensified, Reagan turned to Anthony M. Kennedy, nominating him on November 11, 1987, as his third choice for the seat. Kennedy, then 51 years old and serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit since his 1975 appointment by President Gerald Ford, was chosen for his extensive federal judicial experience, moderate conservative record, and personal familiarity to Reagan from California legal circles, which promised broader bipartisan appeal. The administration emphasized Kennedy's youth, which suggested potential for decades of service, alongside his Reagan-aligned credentials, including advocacy for and during his appellate tenure. Initial vetting highlighted Kennedy's writings on and , positioning him as a reliable conservative successor to Bork without the polarizing academic baggage. This strategic pivot reflected Reagan's adaptation to Senate dynamics, prioritizing confirmability over ideological purity after two prior failures.

Senate Confirmation

The Senate Judiciary Committee held confirmation hearings for Kennedy from December 14 to 16, 1987, during which he testified for approximately 30 hours over three days, emphasizing a commitment to and deference to legislative processes. Kennedy articulated that judges should enforce laws rather than create them, stating, "Judicial restraint insists that improving the law is the province of the and the legislative process for amending the ," and warned against courts substituting personal values for constitutional text. He advocated narrow rulings confined to the facts at hand, critiquing judicial overreach as "the exercise of raw will" and affirming that the 's text and historical intent should guide interpretation over evolving societal preferences. Regarding precedents, Kennedy expressed respect for stare decisis as ensuring impartiality, though he noted it could yield to overruling if a decision proved unworkable or illogical, without committing to specific outcomes like upholding or reversing Roe v. Wade. He avoided direct endorsements of Roe's reasoning, instead referencing it in prior opinions through balancing tests rather than substantive due process, which drew scrutiny from witnesses like Joseph L. Rauh Jr., who argued Kennedy's record suggested potential erosion of privacy rights protected by such precedents. Supporters, including former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, countered that Kennedy's approach demonstrated principled restraint, not ideological predisposition. Ideological tensions surfaced in debates over Kennedy's Ninth Circuit rulings, such as his rejection of comparable worth claims under Title VII in AFSCME v. Washington, which critics like the viewed as insufficiently protective of women's economic rights, and his deference to military policy in Beller v. Middendorf on gay rights discharges, prompting accusations of insensitivity to . Senators like pressed on , while Joseph Biden inquired about and the Ninth Amendment, to which Kennedy responded that liberty encompassed human dignity but must be restrained by democratic processes. Despite these clashes, opposition remained limited, with witnesses like Paul Bator praising Kennedy's "sober and reflective" temperament as a bulwark against , positioning him as a consensus figure following the contentious Bork . The committee reported the favorably on December 17, 1987, with minimal dissent, leading to on February 3, 1988, by a unanimous 97-0 vote after brief floor debate focused on Kennedy's qualifications and restraint-oriented . No senators voted against, reflecting broad bipartisan approval amid post-Bork fatigue and Kennedy's evasive yet reassuring testimony on avoiding judicial policymaking.

Judicial Philosophy and Approach

Constitutional Interpretation Methods

Kennedy's approach to constitutional interpretation prioritized the text, , and original historical understanding as "intrinsic" sources, while remaining receptive to broader principles of and human dignity that could evolve with societal insights. He viewed the as a document of enduring principles rather than fixed historical artifacts, blending textual fidelity with pragmatic application to protect individual against governmental overreach. This method diverged from the strict of contemporaries like Justice , as Kennedy occasionally invoked evolving standards of decency to resolve tensions between tradition and claims. In his opinions, Kennedy cited in 22 instances to elucidate the framers' intent and structural safeguards, such as and , though these references often served to support broader liberty-oriented reasoning rather than dictate narrow outcomes. He stressed adherence to (stare decisis) as a means of promoting stability and democratic legitimacy, yet was willing to depart when precedents conflicted with core constitutional values. This eclectic methodology reflected a commitment to interpreting the as a liberty-enhancing , informed by first principles but tempered by judicial . Kennedy publicly emphasized judicial humility, cautioning against courts substituting their policy preferences for those of elected branches and advocating restraint unless constitutional text or history clearly compelled intervention. In reflections on his tenure, he underscored the Court's role in upholding democratic processes through measured interpretation rather than expansive . Nonetheless, critics, including conservative scholars, contended that his swing-vote position on the Court led to outcome-determinative reasoning, where methodological consistency yielded to subjective judgments on and equality, fostering perceptions of over principled restraint.

Evolution and Influences

Kennedy's judicial outlook, initially aligned with the Reagan administration's emphasis on , limited federal power, and traditional principles, gradually incorporated stronger libertarian elements prioritizing and autonomy, particularly evident in his opinions from the mid-1990s onward. Appointed in 1988 amid expectations of reinforcing originalist , Kennedy's votes increasingly diverged on social issues, reflecting a preference for case-by-case balancing over strict ideological lines, as seen in his pivotal role in decisions expanding personal freedoms while maintaining support for economic . This evolution positioned him as the Court's , with libertarian tendencies tempering his , though critics from the right viewed it as inconsistent with American constitutional primacy. Extensive international travel and engagement broadened Kennedy's perspective, fostering occasional references to foreign legal norms in assessing evolving standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment. As the first sitting justice to visit and address its judges on the , and through initiatives in the South Pacific promoting , Kennedy gained exposure to global human rights frameworks, including European conventions that influenced his views on and detainee rights. These experiences informed opinions citing international consensus, such as in Roper v. Simmons (2005), where he noted juvenile executions' rejection abroad, drawing sharp rebuke from conservatives who argued such comparativism undermined U.S. sovereignty and . His pre-Supreme Court tenure on the Ninth Circuit, handling cases involving state-federal tensions, reinforced an enduring commitment to principles, even as broader influences nudged his toward greater emphasis on individual protections against government overreach. Unlike direct clerkships with Supreme Court justices, Kennedy's practical legal experience in Sacramento and appellate judging shaped a pragmatic approach, evolving from Reagan-era restraint to a dignity-centered that prioritized over rigid doctrine. This trajectory, while rooted in American , incorporated transnational insights without fully abandoning conservative moorings, as evidenced by consistent support for in disputes.

Key Jurisprudential Contributions

Federalism and Separation of Powers

Kennedy's jurisprudence advanced federalism by imposing limits on congressional authority under the Commerce Clause and prohibiting the federal commandeering of state officials, thereby preserving state sovereignty against encroachments from the national government. In United States v. Lopez (1995), he joined the 5-4 majority invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which criminalized possession of firearms near schools, as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause power because the activity was non-economic and lacked a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In a concurrence joined by Justice O'Connor, Kennedy underscored the historical evolution of Commerce Clause doctrine from the New Deal era, warning that unchecked expansion would erode the federal structure by allowing Congress to regulate virtually any intrastate activity, thus undermining states' traditional police powers and the distinction between national and local concerns. Building on this, Kennedy supported the anti-commandeering principle in Printz v. United States (1997), joining the 5-4 majority that struck down interim provisions of the of 1993 requiring state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on handgun purchasers. The decision held that the Tenth Amendment bars the federal government from conscripting state executives into administering federal regulatory programs, as such coercion disrupts the dual sovereignty inherent in the constitutional design and impairs states' ability to fulfill their own duties. This ruling reinforced by ensuring that federal laws must be implemented through voluntary state cooperation or direct federal mechanisms, rather than mandatory state participation. On , Kennedy authored the in Boumediene v. Bush (2008), extending rights to alien detainees at Guantanamo Bay and invalidating congressional restrictions on federal court over their petitions. Grounded in the Suspension Clause and structural constitutional principles, the decision checked executive wartime detention by affirming the judiciary's in preventing indefinite executive confinement without adequate substitutes for review, thereby maintaining the equilibrium among branches against concentrated power. Kennedy emphasized that the Framers' allocation of powers, including judicial oversight, applies extraterritorially where U.S. control is complete, prioritizing institutional safeguards over plenary executive discretion in national security contexts. Kennedy further bolstered in Bond v. United States (2011), authoring the unanimous opinion granting standing to a state resident challenging her prosecution under a federal chemical weapons repurposed for local crimes, invoking doctrines to argue that ordinary individuals may invoke Tenth limits on overbroad federal laws intruding on state criminal jurisdiction. Similarly, in (2012), his majority opinion partially upheld state immigration enforcement measures against claims, recognizing states' authority to address unauthorized immigration where federal law leaves room for complementary state action, thus preserving in areas of shared concern. These rulings reflect Kennedy's commitment to calibrating federal authority to respect state autonomy and interbranch checks, countering trends toward centralized power.

Free Speech and Campaign Finance

Kennedy consistently advocated for robust First Amendment protections in cases involving political expression, viewing government restrictions on speech as threats to democratic accountability and individual liberty. In (1989), he joined the majority opinion that invalidated a statute criminalizing , holding that burning the American flag during a political protest constituted expressive conduct protected against content-based regulation. The decision emphasized that symbolic speech, even if offensive, cannot be suppressed merely to preserve public sensibilities, prioritizing free expression over symbolic reverence for national icons. In the realm of campaign finance, Kennedy rejected efforts to curtail corporate and union spending on political advocacy, equating such expenditures with core political speech. In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (2007), he authored a plurality opinion declaring unconstitutional, as applied, provisions of the (BCRA) that barred corporations from using general treasury funds for "electioneering communications" close to elections. The ruling distinguished genuine issue ads—those focused on policy rather than explicit candidate advocacy—from express electioneering, arguing that blanket prohibitions stifled public discourse on legislative matters without sufficient evidence of corruption. This approach subordinated concerns about unequal influence to the First Amendment's demand for unfettered political communication. Kennedy's landmark contribution came in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), where he wrote the 5-4 striking down BCRA restrictions on independent corporate expenditures for political broadcasts. The overruled precedents like Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), which had permitted limits on corporate speech to prevent distorting electoral equality, asserting instead that independent spending does not inherently corrupt candidates absent arrangements. Kennedy reasoned that suppressing speech based on the speaker's corporate form or wealth amounted to viewpoint discrimination, undermining the Amendment's purpose of enabling citizens to criticize government through unrestricted advocacy. This framework elevated individual and associational rights to disseminate ideas over regulatory aims to level the political playing field.

Abortion and Reproductive Rights

Kennedy joined Justices and in authoring the controlling plurality opinion in of Southeastern v. Casey (1992), which reaffirmed the "essential holding" of (1973) that a has a to terminate a before , typically around 24 weeks, while replacing the trimester framework with an " for evaluating state regulations. This allowed states greater latitude to impose restrictions, such as a 24-hour waiting period, requirements, and parental notification for minors, provided they did not place a substantial obstacle in the path of a seeking a pre-viability . Kennedy's opinion emphasized respect for through stare decisis to preserve judicial legitimacy, while acknowledging the state's "profound interest in potential life" post-viability, rejecting the notion that the Roe framework required invalidating all post-viability regulations. In Stenberg v. Carhart (2000), Kennedy dissented from the 5-4 majority invalidating Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortions, arguing that the law targeted a specific procedure without unduly burdening the right to choose a pre-viability abortion via alternative methods, and served the state's compelling interest in preserving potential life by prohibiting an inhumane method that involved delivering a living fetus to the point of its skull before destruction. He criticized the majority for overreaching by interpreting the law to cover standard (D&E) procedures, which comprised the vast majority of second-trimester abortions, and insisted that rational deference to legislative findings on medical necessity was appropriate absent clear evidence of burden. Kennedy authored the 5-4 majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart (2007), upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which prohibited (intact D&E) procedures, even when performed pre-viability, as constitutional under the Casey undue burden framework. He reasoned that the ban did not impose a substantial obstacle because safe alternatives like standard D&E remained available, and Congress could rationally conclude the targeted method undermined the state's interest in promoting respect for human life by evoking moral concerns akin to . Kennedy highlighted the ethical dimensions, noting that the procedure could cause women psychological harm from later regret upon viewing medical depictions of the , and critiqued prior judicial overreach in Stenberg for substituting court judgment for legislative fact-finding on medical consensus. This decision marked a departure from strict adherence to viability as an absolute barrier to fetal-protective laws, prioritizing the integrity of the medical profession and potential life interests. Kennedy's votes reflected a consistent emphasis on the viability line as a constitutional boundary for outright bans but permitted targeted regulations advancing state interests in fetal life, particularly for procedures perceived as lacking medical necessity or dignity, without expanding abortion rights beyond Casey's core. In Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016), he joined the 5-3 majority striking down Texas requirements for abortion providers to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals and operate in ambulatory surgical centers, viewing them as undue burdens that significantly reduced clinic availability without commensurate health benefits.

Capital Punishment

Kennedy authored the majority opinion in (2005), a 5-4 decision holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of individuals for crimes committed before the age of 18. The ruling cited a national consensus against juvenile executions—evidenced by statutes in 30 states prohibiting the practice—and emphasized juveniles' reduced culpability due to developmental immaturity, impulsivity, and susceptibility to external pressures, rendering retribution and deterrence less proportionate. Kennedy rejected prior precedents like (1989), arguing that evolving standards of decency had shifted, supported by international norms and scientific insights into adolescent brain development. In (2008), Kennedy again wrote for a 5-4 majority, ruling that the Eighth Amendment bars for the rape of a child when the victim survives. The opinion highlighted the absence of a national consensus, with only six states authorizing such penalties at the time, and warned that expanding death eligibility to non-homicide crimes risked disproportionate retribution and societal brutalization without advancing core penological goals like deterrence. Kennedy underscored human dignity, noting that punishment must calibrate to the offense's gravity, particularly absent intent to cause death. Kennedy's approach to intellectual disability in capital cases evolved. He dissented in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), a 6-3 ruling banning executions of the intellectually disabled for lack of sufficient national consensus. However, in Hall v. Florida (2014), he authored the invalidating Florida's rigid IQ threshold of 70 for exemption under Atkins, requiring courts to account for measurement error, adaptive deficits, and clinical standards from organizations like the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. This ensured more accurate assessments to prevent erroneous executions, aligning with dignity-based Eighth Amendment protections against disproportionate punishment for those with diminished capacities. While upholding the death penalty's constitutionality for aggravated murder in principle, Kennedy joined the majority in (2015), affirming Oklahoma's protocol against an Eighth Amendment challenge, but concurred separately to note its rarity, excessive delays averaging 18 years , and the need for states to explore less painful methods or clemency to minimize suffering. His thus imposed categorical limits on eligibility while preserving the penalty for the most culpable adult offenders, often invoking evolving societal standards and intrinsic human worth over fixed originalist interpretations.

LGBTQ Rights and Sexual Orientation

In Romer v. Evans (1996), Kennedy authored the 6-3 invalidating Amendment 2 to the , a voter-approved measure that barred state and local governments from enacting protections against based on . The Court ruled that the amendment violated the of the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing a broad on a single group—homosexuals—without advancing a legitimate governmental interest, instead reflecting animus toward that class and withdrawing legal protections afforded to others. This decision marked the first time the explicitly struck down a state on grounds of against homosexuals, establishing that such classifications warrant heightened absent rational basis. Kennedy extended this framework in (2003), writing the 6-3 opinion that overturned (1986) and declared unconstitutional state laws criminalizing consensual sodomy between adults of the same sex. Grounded in the , the ruling emphasized substantive liberty protecting intimate personal choices and autonomy in private consensual conduct, rejecting moral disapproval alone as a basis for . By invalidating such statutes in and 13 other states, the decision decriminalized homosexual conduct nationwide, shifting the legal landscape from tolerance of state moral legislation to recognition of privacy rights in . Kennedy's authorship culminated in (2015), a 5-4 decision mandating that states license and recognize same-sex s under the and Equal Protection Clauses. The opinion framed as integral to individual dignity, autonomy, and liberty, extending the fundamental right to opposite-sex unions to same-sex couples and invalidating bans in 13 states plus varying recognition policies elsewhere. While rooted in equality principles from prior precedents like Lawrence, the holding imposed a uniform national standard, overriding democratic enactments such as voter referenda and state laws that had permitted experimentation in policy. Dissents, led by Roberts, contended that the ruling exemplified judicial overreach by resolving a through constitutional fiat rather than deferring to representative processes, thereby diminishing federalism's role in accommodating moral and cultural differences across states.

Religious Liberty

In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), Kennedy joined the majority opinion authored by Justice , holding that the does not require exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religious practices, such as Oregon's on peyote use even for sacramental purposes by members. This 6-3 ruling narrowed protections for religious accommodations, emphasizing that legislatures, not courts, should decide such exemptions, and it prompted congressional enactment of the (RFRA) in 1993 to restore pre-Smith standards. Following RFRA's passage, Kennedy supported its application to protect religious exercise in select contexts. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores (2014), he concurred separately in the 5-4 majority decision, affirming that closely held for-profit corporations could claim RFRA exemptions from the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate if it substantially burdened owners' sincere religious beliefs about abortifacients, provided the government could achieve its interests through less restrictive means. Kennedy stressed that RFRA's protections extended to such entities without undermining women's access to preventive health services, noting the decision's limited scope to closely held firms and the availability of alternative government funding options. Kennedy also vindicated free exercise claims against perceived governmental animus. In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018), he wrote the 7-2 , ruling that 's Civil Rights Commission violated the First Amendment by applying its public accommodations law in a manner exhibiting hostility toward the bakery owner's religious objections to designing a cake for a same-sex wedding, including commissioners' dismissive comments equating such beliefs to or . The decision remanded for reconsideration under neutral criteria, prioritizing religious neutrality over compelled expressive conduct without resolving broader conflicts between anti-discrimination laws and free exercise. Kennedy's establishment clause jurisprudence sought to avoid coercion or endorsement while permitting historical practices. In Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), he concurred in the judgment upholding a town's practice of opening legislative sessions with predominantly Christian prayers, arguing that such invocations, when not coercive or proselytizing, reflected longstanding traditions and should aspire to inclusivity to respect non-adherents, even if occasionally sectarian. Conversely, in cases involving religious displays, Kennedy often favored contextual analysis over per se prohibitions; he concurred in upholding a passive monument on Capitol grounds in Van Orden v. Perry (2005) due to its longstanding, non-proselytizing presence, while joining the majority striking down similar courthouse displays in McCreary County v. ACLU (2005) for evidencing a religious purpose amid prior failed attempts at secular framing. This approach balanced free exercise with disestablishment, permitting accommodations short of governmental favoritism but rejecting broad judicial mandates for religious exemptions from neutral regulations absent specific burdens or animus.

Second Amendment Rights

Justice Kennedy joined the majority in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), a 5-4 decision that recognized the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, including in the home, unconnected to militia service. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, struck down the District of Columbia's ban on handgun possession in the home and its requirement to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock at all times. Kennedy's vote was pivotal as the deciding fifth justice, aligning with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, , and Alito against the dissent's collective rights interpretation tied to militia service. In McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), Kennedy joined the 5-4 majority opinion by Justice Alito, which extended Heller's individual right to the states via selective incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The ruling invalidated Chicago's handgun ban and registration requirements, affirming that self-defense is a central component of the right protected against state infringement. While Justice Thomas concurred separately advocating incorporation via the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Kennedy supported the Due Process approach, emphasizing that longstanding historical traditions inform the Amendment's protections rather than modern policy preferences. Kennedy's positions in these cases contributed to an expansive view of Second Amendment rights, prioritizing original public meaning and historical practice over interest-balancing tests that might justify broad restrictions. This alignment with the Court's conservative bloc marked a departure from prior precedents like (1939), which had emphasized militia-related uses, and reflected Kennedy's willingness to endorse individual autonomy against categorical prohibitions on common arms like handguns. No subsequent Second Amendment cases reached a merits decision during his tenure, leaving Heller and McDonald as the foundational precedents shaped by his support.

Habeas Corpus and Detainee Policies

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), Kennedy joined the 5-3 majority opinion by Justice Stevens, which held that the President lacked inherent authority under the (AUMF) to convene military commissions for Guantanamo detainees without congressional , and that such commissions violated the and the by denying defendants key procedural protections, such as access to evidence and public trials. Kennedy authored a separate , joined in part by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, emphasizing that even assuming congressional via the AUMF, the commissions could not prosecute offenses like conspiracy that were not established violations of the , thereby reinforcing statutory limits on executive wartime tribunals and rejecting expansive interpretations of presidential power in detainee proceedings. Kennedy's approach in detainee cases consistently prioritized constitutional safeguards against indefinite or unchecked executive detention, critiquing arguments that the AUMF granted boundless authority for holding non-citizen enemy combatants without . This stance reflected a view that measures must yield to core separation-of-powers principles, including and judicial checks, rather than deferring uncritically to claims of . The pinnacle of Kennedy's contributions came in (2008), where he authored the 5-4 holding that alien detainees at possessed the constitutional privilege of under the Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9, and that the (MCA) effected an unconstitutional suspension of that writ by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction without providing an adequate substitute for review. The decision rejected the government's position that Guantanamo's location outside U.S. sovereign territory precluded habeas access, determining instead that the base fell under de facto U.S. control and that historical precedents extended the writ to non-citizens challenging executive custody in such contexts. Kennedy underscored that while the AUMF authorized capture and detention of enemy combatants, it did not permit indefinite suspension of habeas without meaningful opportunities to contest detention status, balancing wartime exigencies against the Framers' intent to prevent arbitrary executive imprisonment. In Boumediene, Kennedy further delineated the judiciary's role in evaluating suspension claims, requiring courts to assess the practicality of habeas alternatives like Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which the opinion deemed deficient due to limited evidence disclosure, lack of adversarial proceedings, and inability to order release. This framework curbed overbroad executive interpretations of detention authority post-9/11, mandating that provide robust substitutes before curtailing core judicial remedies, and influenced subsequent detainee releases and policy reforms at Guantanamo.

Environmental and Regulatory Issues

In (2006), Kennedy wrote a pivotal amid a fragmented decision, articulating a "significant " test for jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries; this required evidence of a substantial ecological or hydrological connection to traditionally navigable waters, rejecting the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) broader assertion of authority over isolated or intermittently connected features and thereby protecting property owners from unchecked federal overreach. His framework, which eschewed both the plurality's strict "continuous surface connection" standard and the dissent's expansive view, became the test for subsequent applications, emphasizing case-specific proof of meaningful impact on water quality rather than presumptive regulation. Kennedy joined the 5-4 majority in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007), affirming 's standing to sue the EPA for declining to regulate from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act and holding that such gases qualify as "air pollutants" subject to agency discretion; however, the opinion cautioned by remanding for EPA's reasoned determination without preempting policy judgments or assuming inevitable regulation. This decision deferred to agency expertise on scientific and technical merits while limiting courts to reviewing for arbitrary action, avoiding broader mandates that could flood dockets with speculative climate suits. Kennedy consistently endorsed cost-benefit analysis to constrain regulatory excesses, voting with the majority in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. (2009) to uphold the EPA's use of such balancing in establishing national performance standards for power plant cooling water intake structures under the Clean Water Act, prioritizing flexible, evidence-based rulemaking over rigid cost-blind mandates. Similarly, in Michigan v. EPA (2015), he supported the 5-4 ruling that the agency must consider compliance costs—not merely environmental benefits—before deeming regulation "appropriate and necessary" for hazardous air pollutants from coal-fired power plants, critiquing the EPA's initial disregard of potentially billions in annualized expenses as unreasonable under the Clean Air Act. These positions reflected a pragmatic skepticism of agency assertions unbound by economic reality, particularly where land-use restrictions impinged on without proportionate justification.

Criticisms and Controversies

Assessments from Conservatives

Conservatives have frequently criticized Justice Kennedy for deviating from originalist principles, portraying him as an unreliable ally despite his 1988 nomination by President to bolster the Court's conservative wing. They argue that his role as the pivotal too often resulted in outcomes aligning with liberal priorities on social issues, effectively thwarting conservative efforts to interpret the based on its original public meaning rather than evolving societal norms. In particular, Kennedy faced sharp rebuke for decisions like (2003) and (2015), where conservatives accused him of by imposing policy preferences over textual fidelity. Justice , in his dissent in Lawrence, lambasted the majority opinion—authored by Kennedy—for discarding democratic processes and instead drawing on "foreign moods, fads, or fashions," such as precedents, to invalidate state sodomy laws, thereby undermining U.S. in constitutional interpretation. Similarly, Scalia's dissent in Obergefell decried the ruling as a "judicial Putsch" that bypassed representative government to redefine nationwide, exemplifying Kennedy's willingness to elevate personal notions of above enumerated or historical practice. These critiques extend to Kennedy's broader jurisprudence, with conservative analysts viewing his citations to foreign law in multiple cases as eroding and , fostering a prone to international influences over domestic democratic . Figures like Scalia and commentators in outlets such as have highlighted this pattern as a betrayal of Reagan-era expectations for restrained, originalist judging, rendering Kennedy a doctrinal wildcard whose libertarian-leaning prioritized abstract over conservative .

Assessments from Liberals

Liberals have frequently criticized Justice Kennedy for rulings that advanced corporate interests and principles, arguing these decisions entrenched and undermined progressive priorities. In Citizens United v. FEC (2010), Kennedy authored the 5-4 majority opinion striking down limits on corporate independent expenditures in elections, a decision decried by left-leaning commentators for amplifying and corporate influence over democracy. The , a progressive advocacy group, highlighted this as emblematic of Kennedy's conservative bent, contending it overshadowed his occasional alignment with liberals on social issues. On voting rights, Kennedy joined the 5-4 majority in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), which invalidated the coverage formula under Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, prompting sharp rebukes from liberal justices and activists for enabling states to enact restrictive measures disproportionately affecting minorities. Critics, including those at , portrayed this as Kennedy prioritizing over empirical evidence of ongoing , thereby blocking federal oversight of state election laws. Similarly, in Janus v. AFSCME (2018), Kennedy's vote overruled precedent requiring non-union public employees to pay agency fees, a move lambasted by union advocates and outlets like as a conservative assault on organized labor that weakened workers' bargaining power and collective resources. Regarding abortion, liberals faulted Kennedy for upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act in Gonzales v. Carhart (2007), viewing it as an undue burden on reproductive rights despite his later support for striking Texas clinic regulations in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016). On capital punishment, while Kennedy contributed to narrowing its scope—such as barring executions of juveniles in Roper v. Simmons (2005) and those with intellectual disabilities in Atkins v. Virginia (2002)—progressive critics argued his jurisprudence fell short of broader abolition, as he declined to join dissents challenging lethal injection protocols or the penalty's constitutionality in cases like Glossip v. Gross (2015). Overall, assessments from sources like FiveThirtyEight depict Kennedy not as a true moderate but as an inconsistent swing vote whose pro-business and states'-rights stances reliably thwarted egalitarian reforms.

Broader Debates on Judicial Activism

Kennedy's role as the Supreme Court's frequent swing vote has sparked debates over whether his decisions reflected principled judicial restraint or undue influence on outcomes, with proponents portraying him as a libertarian guardian of individual autonomy against government overreach. Analyses describe his jurisprudence as emphasizing ordered liberty, subjecting government actions impinging on personal freedoms to heightened scrutiny, as seen in cases expanding protections for expressive and intimate conduct. Yet, empirical data counters claims of consistent restraint: over his tenure, Kennedy voted with the majority in 76% of closely divided decisions, far exceeding other justices, and led or tied for the most frequent majority participation in 5-4 rulings across 20 terms. This pattern, documented in Supreme Court databases, suggests his positions often tipped the balance in ideologically split cases, raising questions about whether libertarian rhetoric masked outcome-determinative activism rather than deference to text or precedent. Central to these critiques is the tension between Kennedy's dignity-based framework and textualist methodologies. He advanced a invoking as an integrative constitutional norm, linking and equality to broader societal values of and , often overriding narrower statutory or historical interpretations. Textualists, by contrast, prioritize original public meaning and , viewing dignity appeals as subjective vehicles for judicial policymaking; Kennedy's approach, while defended as evolving constitutional , empirically aligned with liberal majorities in key 5-4 splits, diverging from conservative textualists like Scalia in over 80% of such cases per term averages. Voting alignments from 1990-2018 show this divergence was not random but patterned, with Kennedy's dignity rationale correlating to expansions of , fueling arguments that it prioritized philosophical abstraction over democratic processes or fixed meanings. Kennedy's median ideological position preserved a fragile equilibrium on the Court, enabling cross-ideological coalitions until his retirement effective July 31, , which shifted the median justice rightward upon Brett Kavanaugh's confirmation. Pre-retirement, his votes moderated conservative majorities in approximately 50% of split decisions; post-2018, the Court's direction in analogous cases trended conservatively, as evidenced by reversals or distinctions in prior Kennedy-authored precedents. This transition underscores debates on whether his swing status fostered restraint by diffusing power or enabled activism by amplifying individual influence, with quantitative shifts in decision outcomes post-retirement validating critiques that his tenure institutionalized outcome volatility over institutional predictability.

Post-Retirement Activities and Legacy

Public Engagements and Teaching

Following his retirement from the Supreme Court on July 31, 2018, Anthony Kennedy has delivered public speeches advocating for and the protection of judicial institutions. On November 16, 2018, at the School of Law, he expressed confidence in the Court's functionality despite recent changes, stating that the public would soon recognize the system's effectiveness, and urged rational debate as essential to , noting, "I hope people would look at the court and realize it's not only possible but necessary to democracy to have civil, rational ." In subsequent appearances, Kennedy highlighted threats to . On June 26, 2025, at a forum hosted by the World Jurist Association, he warned that "democracy can die" from efforts undermining judges, emphasizing the need for protections for judicial families and the role of public support in safeguarding the , while avoiding direct partisan references. Kennedy has not assumed a formal academic teaching position post-retirement, though his prior experience as a professor at from 1965 to 1988 informed his interest in civic education. His influence persists indirectly through former law clerks elevated to the Court, including (clerked 1993) and (clerked 1993), marking him as the first justice with two such appointees.

Reflections on the Court and Society

In a interview on October 14, 2025, former Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy identified the lack of as the greatest threat to American , emphasizing that rational discussion and respect for opposing views are essential to counter the divisiveness amplified by echo chambers. He expressed concern over the 's eroding public perception of legitimacy, attributing it partly to the politicized confirmation process and a docket that now relies heavily on emergency orders without full argumentation, contrasting this with the Court's handling of three times more cases during his tenure. Kennedy lamented the coarsening of political discourse during the Trump era, describing it as vulgar and personal, with examples including congressional use of and from former President Trump that he found disappointing for its global implications on democratic norms. In the same October 8, 2025, remarks covered by , he warned that partisanship was "creeping its way into the court," urging justices to resist viewing themselves through a partisan lens and criticizing recent opinions for devolving into attacks on colleagues rather than substantive engagement with reasoning. Reflecting on institutional health amid polarization, Kennedy advocated for structural reforms like enhanced transparency in to empower voters with better information, potentially mitigating money's distorting influence on national divides. He questioned the sustainability of current trends, stating uncertainty about the nation's democratic vitality over the next 250 years, while stressing that the Court must prioritize temperament, moderation, and thorough deliberation over expediency to preserve its role as an apolitical arbiter.

References

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