Hubbry Logo
Tuz KhurmatuTuz KhurmatuMain
Open search
Tuz Khurmatu
Community hub
Tuz Khurmatu
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Contribute something
Tuz Khurmatu
Tuz Khurmatu
Tuz Khurmatu
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Tuz Khurmatu (Arabic: طوزخورماتو, Turkish: Tuzhurmatu,[1][2] Kurdish: دووز خورماتوو, romanized: Dûz Xurmatû,[3][4] also spelled as Tuz Khurma and Tuz Khormato) is the central city of Tooz District in Saladin Governorate, Iraq, located 55 miles (89 km) south of Kirkuk. Its inhabitants are predominantly Shia Turkmen, with a minority of Arabs and Sunni Kurds.[5][6][7]

Key Information

Etymology

[edit]

The name of the city is in the local Iraqi Turkmen dialect, meaning salt and dates.[8][9]

History

[edit]
A U.S. Army Soldier and a Turkish Air Force member transport an Iraqi child to safety during a multinational humanitarian airlift effort on Kirkuk Air Base, Iraq, July 8, 2007. The victim was hurt in an attack in Tuz Khurmatu.

Naphtha, oil and asphalt was found in the town in the 18th century.[10]

The city was populated by both Kurds and Turkmens in the 19th century, during the era of Ottoman Iraq. Claudius Rich visited the town in 1820 and stated that the town had a population of 50,000. In 1882 Major General Gerard visited the town and stated that the town had a bazaar, 300 houses, 100 regulars and 30 zaptiyehs.[11]

John Gordon Lorimer visited Tuz Khurmatu in 1912, stating that the town consists of about 600 houses and around 3,000 inhabitants, and that some 20 households are Jews, with the rest being Turks who have been settled here from old.[12]

The town was captured by United Kingdom in May 1918 and were met with joy from the locals. The local Hamawand tribe would offer their assistance to secure the area.[13]

In 1925, Tuz Khurmatu’s population was entirely Turkmen, except for some Jewish families (35 out of 405 families).[14]

40% of the population was Kurdish in the 1947 census.[15]

In 1991, Tooz District was separated from Kirkuk Governorate and attached to Saladin Governorate for Arabization purposes. The population of the town was 75,737 the subsequent year, and decreased to 51,998 in 1987.[16] The town participated in the 1991 Iraqi uprising before being suppressed by the Ba'athist Iraqi army.[17]

Operation Iraqi Freedom

[edit]
  • On June 2, 2005, at least 12 people were killed and at least 40 wounded in an explosion targeting a restaurant.[18]
  • On June 23, 2005, a car bomb detonated by remote control hit an Iraqi police patrol, killing one policeman and wounding 7 civilians.[19]
  • On September 20, 2005, insurgents detonated a car bomb targeting Shiite worshippers as they were exiting the Hussainiyat al-Rasoul al-Azam mosque, killing at least 10 and wounding 21 others.[20]
  • On March 14, 2007, a suicide bomber struck a market and killing 8 and wounding 25.[21]

Operation New Dawn

[edit]
  • On September 7, 2010, the first US casualties after President Barack Obama declared an end to US combat operations took place near the city when Iraqi insurgents killed 2 US military personnel.[22]

Post-U.S. withdrawal and Iraqi Civil War

[edit]
  • On October 27, 2012, a car bombing next to a building owned by a Shi'ite endowment killed two civilians and injured ten others.[23]
  • On December 17, 2012, two consecutive car bombings hit a residential area near the city's General Hospital, killing 11 civilians and injuring 45 others. The attacks were part of a country-wide wave of violence that killed almost 100 people in a single day.[24]
  • On January 16, 2013, a suicide car bombing at the offices of the Kurdistan Democratic Party killed 5 and injured 40 others.[25][26]
  • On January 23, 2013, a suicide bomber blew himself up during a funeral for a politician's relative in the city, killing 42 and leaving 75 others wounded.[27][28]
  • In November 2015, the town experienced clashes between the Kurdish Peshmerga and Shia Popular Mobilization Forces that claimed 11 lives, wounded over 20 people, and damaged over 200 houses through arson committed by both sides.[29] A truce was reached soon after.[30][31]
  • On November 28, 2015, an IS suicide bomber bombed a town checkpoint, killing 6.[32]

See also

[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Tuz Khurmatu.

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Tuz Khurmatu

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Tuz Khurmatu is a and the administrative center of Tuz in Salah al-Din Governorate, northern , positioned along the strategic route connecting and , approximately 75 kilometers south of . The area encompasses diverse terrain including agricultural lands and has historically served as a multi-ethnic settlement point for and migration. The district's population, estimated at 80,000 to 100,000, reflects a complex ethnic mosaic dominated by Shia Turkmen in the central town, with significant communities of Sunni , Sunni and Shia , and Sunni Turkmen, shaped by patterns of settlement, displacement, and conflict over decades. Classified as part of Iraq's disputed territories contested between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government, Tuz Khurmatu has endured recurrent violence, including inter-communal clashes involving , , and local militias, resulting in population movements and fortified divisions such as concrete walls erected for security. These tensions trace to policies of demographic engineering under prior regimes, including campaigns that altered local compositions, followed by post-2003 power struggles and exploitation by insurgent groups like , underscoring the district's role in broader Iraqi sectarian and territorial disputes without resolution despite federal administrative control.

Geography and Environment

Location and Topography

Tuz Khurmatu serves as the administrative center of Tooz District in , , positioned at approximately 34°53′N 44°38′E. The town lies roughly 89 kilometers south of and 175 kilometers north of , placing it adjacent to the administrative boundary with . This positioning situates Tuz Khurmatu within the disputed territories referenced in Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, which mandates normalization processes for regions like parts of affected by prior administrative shifts. The topography of Tuz Khurmatu consists primarily of flat, low-lying plains typical of the Mesopotamian region, with average elevations around 170 meters above across . Minor variations occur due to proximity to undulating terrain in adjacent areas, enhancing its role along historical routes linking northern oil-rich zones, such as those near , to central .

Climate and Natural Resources

Tuz Khurmatu experiences a semi-arid climate typical of central Iraq, marked by hot, dry summers and short, mild winters with sporadic rainfall. Average annual temperatures hover around 27.5°C, with summer highs frequently surpassing 40°C—reaching up to 44°C in August—and winter lows rarely dropping below 5°C. Precipitation is limited, averaging 274 mm annually based on data from 1991 to 2014, concentrated mainly between November and April, which underscores the region's aridity and dependence on seasonal water sources. Geologically, the area is endowed with evaporitic formations, including salt domes and layers from the Miocene Fatha Formation, which contribute to subsurface salt plugs formed by tectonic pressure on beds. These features, reflected in the toponym "Tuz" meaning salt, include rock salt outcrops and associated saline , influencing local chemistry and . The proximity to the River provides essential surface water for , mitigating the effects of low rainfall on the alluvial plains. Environmental pressures exacerbate vulnerabilities, including recurrent dust storms during dry seasons that degrade air quality and erode , alongside chronic and rising in rivers and aquifers due to and upstream damming. These factors heighten risks of and , straining natural resource in the district.

Demographics

Ethnic and Religious Composition

Tuz Khurmatu is characterized by a multi-ethnic population, with Turkmen forming the predominant group according to multiple reports and local claims, estimated at 60-70% in assessments from Turkmen advocacy sources. Arabs and Kurds constitute significant minorities, with proportions varying across estimates—Arabs around 10-25% and Kurds 20-25%—reflecting the absence of a recent uncontested census in the disputed area. Smaller communities, including Christians and other minorities, exist but represent negligible shares based on available demographic surveys. Religiously, the district is overwhelmingly , with dominant due to the majority Turkmen affiliation, comprising the bulk of residents per IOM displacement tracking data on returnee households. Sunni form minorities among , , and a subset of Turkmen, accounting for over half of surveyed households in some reintegration contexts as Sunni . Sectarian divisions within ethnic groups, such as Shia and Sunni Turkmen, further diversify the religious landscape, though predominance holds across broader estimates. Disputes over composition persist, with Turkmen asserting an indigenous majority rooted in foundational settlement, referencing pre-existing numerical strength in adjacent areas, and highlighting integrated communities; these claims underscore source variability, as official Iraqi statistics for province remain contested and outdated. Empirical data from NGOs like IOM prioritize surveyed displacement profiles, which may skew toward vulnerable Sunni groups, while analyses describe balanced tri-ethnic mixes without quantified dominance.

Population Dynamics and Displacement

The population dynamics of Tuz Khurmatu have been characterized by sharp fluctuations driven by ethnic clashes and security deteriorations, particularly since the 2014-2017 crisis period. In October , amid the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict over disputed territories, nearly 35,000 civilians—predominantly —fled the district following indiscriminate shelling, , and that destroyed hundreds of homes and businesses. This exodus contributed to a broader displacement wave from mixed areas, exacerbating prior movements triggered by incursions and local skirmishes, though failed to fully occupy Tuz Khurmatu itself. Returns began post-2018 following the Iraqi federal forces' consolidation of control, but progress has been uneven due to ongoing security risks and property disputes. By late 2023, the return rate for those originally displaced from the district reached 65%, implying that over 33,000 individuals—approximately 35% of the total displaced cohort—remain outside Tuz Khurmatu, often in camps or urban host communities in the or elsewhere in . These partial returns have not fully reversed demographic shifts, with the Kurdish proportion reportedly declining to around 30% amid sustained out-migration. As of December 2023, Tuz Khurmatu hosts 17,646 internally displaced persons (IDPs), the highest IDP concentration in Salah al-Din Governorate, reflecting its role as both a source and destination for displacement. The district also accommodates a significant , ranking fifth in the governorate for reintegration efforts, though challenges like damaged and presence hinder full stabilization. Preparations for Iraq's 2024 national census have heightened anxieties over population fluxes, with Kurdish and Turkmen communities voicing fears of undercounting minorities due to absentee IDPs and unresolved returns, potentially skewing data in this disputed area. Such concerns stem from historical manipulations in prior censuses and the lack of agreed mechanisms for verifying displaced populations, complicating efforts to reflect true residency patterns.

Etymology and Historical Naming

Origins of the Name

The name Tuz Khurmatu originates from the dialect, with "Tuz" deriving from the Turkish word for "salt," a reference to the abundant salt deposits, domes, and historical activities in the surrounding . "Khurmatu" is interpreted as relating to "khurma," meaning dates in Turkmen and related Turkic-Persian linguistic influences, likely alluding to local cultivation or trade in the area's fertile plains, though some sources extend it to include berries as a secondary . An alternative philological reading in renders the name as "salt pits" (ṭawz khurmatū), emphasizing the geological salt features rather than agricultural elements, though this lacks the dual specificity of the Turkmen etymology. The term's Turkic roots align with the demographic presence of Turkmen communities in the district since at least the Ottoman period, when such place names reflected resource-based in administrative divisions. Early attestations appear in Ottoman records from the 19th century, often under phonetic variants such as Tūz Khūrmātū or Tooz, preserving the core elements amid scribal transliterations from Turkic to Arabic script. These variations underscore the name's stability as a descriptor of local natural resources, without evidence of pre-Ottoman mythological or non-linguistic derivations in verifiable historical linguistics.

Linguistic and Cultural Interpretations

The name Tuz Khurmatu is interpreted within linguistic traditions as deriving from dialectal terms denoting natural resources central to the region's : tuz signifying "salt," khurma meaning "dates," and in some accounts, an additional element for "berries" or local fruits, collectively evoking the area's saline deposits and fertile orchards. This breakdown aligns with Ottoman-era administrative records and local Turkmen , which portray the name as a functional descriptor of environmental features that sustained early settlements through extraction and . Turkmen cultural narratives emphasize the name's indigenous character to affirm long-standing ties to the land, with claims of foundational settlement dating to approximately 800 years ago by Turkmen groups engaged in salt harvesting and date trading along routes linking central to . This interpretation serves to highlight a heritage of resource-based self-sufficiency, where salt's preservative qualities underpinned local exchange networks predating modern industrialization, though archaeological for such specifics remains sparse and tied to broader Mesopotamian patterns rather than site-exclusive folklore. Kurdish perspectives, by contrast, tend to contextualize the locale within pre-Turkmen continuity of ancient Near Eastern habitations, viewing the name's adoption as a later overlay on enduring settlement layers without proposing alternative etymological deconstructions, thereby prioritizing geographic-historical claims over linguistic dissection. The name's multicultural resonance influences contemporary identity assertions, as Turkmen advocates invoke its Turkic roots to counter external narratives of transience, while post-20th-century administrative integrations have retained the form with minimal alteration, reflecting pragmatic continuity amid demographic shifts. This linguistic persistence underscores debates over cultural primacy, where interpretive emphasis on salt-derived symbolizes resilience in arid-zone adaptations, distinct from unsubstantiated mythic elements.

History

Pre-Modern Foundations

Tuz Khurmatu developed as a settlement in the medieval period, drawn by its prominent saline springs and deposits, which facilitated early resource extraction and trade along regional routes between and Kifri. Ottoman-era records from the describe it as a modest village known for these natural features, with salt production central to local economy and nomenclature—"tuz" denoting salt in Turkish—reflecting Turkmen linguistic influence amid the area's geological attractions. Turkmen oral traditions maintain that their forebears established the town around 800 years ago, positioning it as a hub for salt-related commerce in a landscape of mixed ethnic cohabitation, including who shared the territory through medieval migrations and activities. Historical accounts confirm pre-Ottoman roots in resource-based settlement patterns, though archaeological documentation remains sparse, prioritizing textual references to networks over unsubstantiated claims. Under Ottoman administration from the onward, Tuz Khurmatu operated as a nahiye within the , governed at a local level with oversight from larger centers, and populated primarily by Turkmen and Kurdish communities engaged in and minor resource trades. Turkmen influx during this era reinforced non-Arab majorities, with the area playing a peripheral role in imperial conflicts, focused instead on internal stability and connectivity to naphtha springs that drew occasional European expeditions by the early 1800s. This ethnic balance persisted into the late , distinct from subsequent demographic shifts.

Baathist Era and Arabization Policies

During the Ba'athist regime under , Tuz Khurmatu was subjected to administrative reconfiguration as part of broader efforts aimed at altering the ethnic composition of oil-rich northern . On , 1976, Republican 41 detached Tuz Khurmatu from and reassigned it to Salah ad-Din province, a move designed to dilute Kurdish territorial claims by separating predominantly Turkmen areas from the disputed region and placing administration under Arab-dominated central control from . This separation facilitated targeted demographic engineering, including the forced relocation of and Turkmen from mixed areas like Tuz Khurmatu, where non-Arabs faced , property confiscation, and denial of residency rights through mechanisms such as "nationality correction" programs that reclassified ethnic identities to favor . Arabization policies intensified in the late 1970s and 1980s, involving incentives for settlers from central and southern , such as free irrigated land, , and cash payments of up to 10,000 Iraqi dinars per family to relocate to northern districts including Tuz Khurmatu and . These measures, coupled with the invalidation of non- property deeds and the of farmland for redistribution to lessees, aimed to create an plurality in previously diverse areas; in province, which encompassed Tuz prior to 1976, such policies displaced tens of thousands of and Turkmen, replacing them with families and shifting local demographics toward majorities in urban and rural pockets. Tuz Khurmatu, with its significant Turkmen population, experienced similar pressures, including restrictions on non- business ownership and services, though enforcement varied due to the area's mixed Shia Turkmen-- composition and resistance from local communities who maintained cultural and economic footholds despite relocations. The of 1988 further entrenched these efforts, with Tuz Khurmatu serving as a staging base for the Third Anfal offensive launched on , targeting nearby Kurdish populations in the Germian region; Iraqi forces, including army units and pro-government Kurdish militias (jahsh), operated from Tuz to conduct village razings, chemical attacks, and mass displacements that spilled over into surrounding mixed areas. While Anfal primarily exterminated rural Kurdish resistors—killing approximately 100,000 and destroying thousands of villages—it complemented by clearing land for Arab settlement and preventing non-Arab returns, with indirect effects on Tuz Khurmatu's locals through proximity to operations and heightened repression of suspected sympathizers among and Turkmen. Despite these coercive tactics, empirical outcomes in Tuz Khurmatu showed incomplete demographic dominance, as Turkmen and Kurdish resistance—through evasion, underground networks, and communal solidarity—limited the shift to full Arab plurality, preserving a contested ethnic balance amid ongoing Ba'athist controls.

1991 Uprisings and Early Conflicts

The erupted in March following Iraq's defeat in the , with Kurdish-led rebels, including forces, seizing control of several northern cities, including the strategically located Tuz Khurmatu on the Baghdad-Kirkuk road. Tuz Khurmatu, a predominantly Turkmen town with mixed Arab and Kurdish populations, fell to the rebels between March 10 and 12, coordinated by fighters who recognized its importance for controlling key supply routes. Iraqi government forces launched a counteroffensive from three directions, employing , gunships, and missiles (including 105mm, 130mm, and 155mm calibers), overwhelming the defenders armed with mortars, RPGs, and captured tanks. The mounted a fierce two-week defense, but Iraqi aircraft deployed and munitions, causing significant civilian casualties during the , which damaged approximately one-quarter of the town's houses. By mid-March, the town was retaken by Iraqi forces, marking a government victory in this phase of the northern uprising. Reprisals followed the recapture, with Iraqi troops demolishing homes in neighborhoods like Jumhouriyya and conducting arrests of residents suspected of rebel sympathies. On April 1, Iraqi soldiers opened fire with automatic rifles on civilians in Tuz Khurmatu, killing scores in a targeted suppression of lingering unrest. Amid the fighting, approximately 85-90% of the population fled to nearby mountains around March 17, with some children drowning while crossing a river during the exodus; around 500 elderly individuals were later expelled by authorities. The failure of the uprising in Tuz Khurmatu contributed to the broader collapse of the Kurdish revolt, triggering massive displacements across northern and prompting international intervention, including the establishment of safe havens and no-fly zones in April 1991 that facilitated eventual Kurdish autonomy in adjacent areas, though Tuz Khurmatu remained under control.

Post-2003 Invasion and U.S.-Led Operations

Following the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003, Tuz Khurmatu was secured by Kurdish forces in coordination with American troops during April 2003 advances in northern , reversing Ba'athist control without major ground combat in the town itself. This joint effort placed units as the primary local security presence under (CPA) oversight, enabling Kurdish administrative influence in the disputed district amid the broader Operation Iraqi Freedom. U.S. forces established Bernstein and repurposed Tuz Khurmatu as key installations, hosting several hundred soldiers from the 25th Division's brigades between 2004 and 2010 for patrols, reconnaissance, and operations. These units, including elements of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment and 3rd , conducted raids detaining insurgents and seizing weapons caches in the surrounding Salah al-Din and border areas, targeting networks exploiting ethnic divisions. By 2008-2010, under Operation New Dawn, U.S. advisory roles supported transitioning Iraqi security forces while addressing (IED) threats and attacks on bases, though casualties included U.S. personnel from non-combat incidents like vehicle accidents. The CPA's interim governance from 2003 to 2004 intensified multi-ethnic frictions, as expansions—viewed by and Turkmen as demographic overreach—clashed with local resistance to perceived Kurdish favoritism in appointments and . tribes and Turkmen groups formed early militias in response to the power vacuum, precursors to later , amid sporadic clashes over checkpoints and land disputes that U.S. mediators attempted to contain through tribal engagements. These tensions, rooted in competing claims to the oil-rich , persisted into the U.S. drawdown phase, with transitions to Iraqi control by 2011 leaving unresolved territorial ambiguities.

ISIS Occupation and Liberation

In mid-2014, as the (ISIS) rapidly expanded following the collapse of in northern , the group exploited longstanding ethnic divisions in Tuz Khurmatu—a town with a mixed population of Turkmen, , , and Shia Muslims—to launch incursions and attacks from surrounding territories under its control, such as and areas in Salah ad-Din Governorate. Although ISIS did not establish full territorial occupation over Tuz Khurmatu itself, its fighters conducted raids, massacres, and targeted killings, particularly against Shia Turkmen communities, killing dozens in sectarian attacks that aimed to terrorize and displace non-Sunni populations. For instance, on March 23, 2016, ISIS militants massacred 40 Shia residents from Tuz Khurmatu and nearby villages, reflecting the group's broader strategy of executions and forced conversions to in contested areas. Kurdish forces responded to the ISIS advance by extending operations into disputed territories south of , including Tuz Khurmatu, filling the security vacuum left by retreating Iraqi troops and preventing deeper ISIS penetration; this move secured the town as a frontline base against the group's offensives from 2014 onward. (PMF), including Shia militia units, also joined anti-ISIS efforts in the region, conducting joint operations with Peshmerga and Iraqi federal forces to repel attacks and clear ISIS cells from villages around Tuz Khurmatu, though coordination was strained by competing ethnic loyalties. Battles intensified in 2016–2017, with ISIS launching multiple assaults on Peshmerga positions, resulting in heavy casualties; for example, Iraqi and Kurdish forces repelled ISIS incursions in June 2017, killing scores of militants amid ongoing skirmishes that displaced thousands of civilians. By early 2018, declared the ISIS threat to Tuz Khurmatu effectively neutralized through sustained operations, though sleeper cells persisted in conducting sporadic attacks. Post-ISIS, Iranian-backed PMF factions, such as those under the Northern Axis led by figures loyal to Tehran, entrenched their presence in the town, displacing some influence and reshaping local power dynamics in favor of Shia militias amid the vacuum left by defeated ISIS forces. This shift exacerbated intercommunal tensions, as PMF units asserted control over key areas previously contested with Kurdish forces, prioritizing militia patronage networks over unified .

Post-ISIS Clashes and Power Shifts

Following the territorial gains against in 2017, Tuz Khurmatu experienced intensified clashes as Iraqi federal forces sought to reassert control over disputed areas held by Kurdish units after the Kurdistan Region's independence referendum on September 25, 2017. Heavy fighting erupted in the town on 16, 2017, pitting Iraqi army units alongside (PMF) against fighters, resulting in the rapid withdrawal of Kurdish forces and the establishment of Iraqi dominance by October 20. These confrontations caused at least 10 civilian deaths from indiscriminate and gunfire, with both sides exchanging blame for initiating hostilities. The clashes triggered mass displacement, with estimates of 20,000 to 40,000 fleeing the town amid reports of , , and targeted destruction of Kurdish properties by advancing Iraqi forces and affiliated PMF militias. documented over 200 homes and businesses burned or looted in Kurdish neighborhoods, based on satellite imagery and witness accounts, while corroborated civilian casualties from crossfire in the multi-ethnic district. This shift marked a reversal of control established during the anti-ISIS campaign, consolidating federal authority but exacerbating ethnic tensions in a district long contested by , Turkmen, and . Post-clash power dynamics favored PMF units, particularly Shia Turkmen and factions within the Northern Axis, which assumed security roles under nominal Iraqi oversight. These groups, including those led by figures aligned with Iranian-backed networks such as affiliates, extended influence through checkpoints and patrols, drawing criticisms for prioritizing sectarian interests over unified state control. Analysts noted Iranian ties via arms supplies and command structures, enabling these militias to marginalize remaining presence and enforce compliance among local populations. To mitigate ongoing risks of intercommunal violence, Iraqi authorities reinforced concrete blast walls and barriers segregating Kurdish, Turkmen, and neighborhoods, a measure that intensified physical divisions in the town's layout by late 2017. These fortifications, extending several kilometers, aimed to contain flare-ups but effectively entrenched ethnic enclaves, limiting mobility and fostering a siege-like environment in vulnerable areas.

Developments from 2018 to Present

In the years following intensified post-ISIS clashes, Tuz Khurmatu experienced limited stabilization through security measures, including fortified walls dividing ethnic enclaves to curb violence, though intercommunal tensions persisted amid demographic shifts favoring Arab and Shia-majority control via (PMF) presence. Iraqi President Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid stated in April 2024 that the 's disputes required resolution in accordance with the Iraqi constitution, highlighting the need for legal mechanisms to address territorial and administrative ambiguities. Negotiations for forming a unified administration advanced, with local leaders reporting an imminent agreement in March 2024 emphasizing coexistence over ethnic divisions, potentially integrating representatives from Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen communities. Security challenges from remnants endured, exemplified by an August 2024 ambush on a PMF checkpoint that killed one fighter, underscoring vulnerabilities in rural and border areas. Iraqi joint forces countered with operations killing seven militants in the district in June 2024, as part of broader efforts to dismantle sleeper cells exploiting post-conflict vacuums. A landmine explosion in September 2024, attributed to ordnance, injured a soldier, illustrating lingering explosive threats. The November 2024 national census amplified Kurdish apprehensions over undercounting due to ongoing displacement, with authorities urging thousands of exiled families to return temporarily for enumeration to reflect pre-conflict demographics. An assessment in December 2024 identified limited return prospects for displaced in urban areas, citing security risks and property disputes as barriers, while noting partial improvements like better and access. The Iraqi condemned a November 2024 terrorist attack in the district, reaffirming commitments to eradicate such threats and bolster national stability. In September 2024, the announced intentions to reestablish presence in Tuz Khurmatu after a seven-year absence, signaling potential shifts in local power dynamics.

Economy

Oil and Gas Exploitation

Tuz Khurmatu lies in close proximity to the oil fields, which constitute the primary hub for northern Iraq's extraction, with production historically exceeding 1 million barrels per day before territorial disputes reduced output. The town's strategic location has positioned it near pipelines linking to export routes, including those extending toward , though maintenance and security challenges persist due to its placement in contested border areas between federal Iraqi forces and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Control over these assets remains divided, with (PMF) holding southern sections of Tuz Khurmatu and KRG influencing northern approaches, leading to frequent standoffs that delay infrastructure upgrades and exploration. In October 2025, Iraq's North Oil Company activated a technical service contract with to enhance recovery from four Kirkuk fields—Baba, Avana, Khurmala, and Jambas—aiming to boost extraction rates through advanced drilling and gas reinjection, but implementation faces hurdles from unresolved revenue-sharing disputes with the KRG. Local exploitation in Tuz Khurmatu itself is minimal, lacking major dedicated fields, yet spillover effects from operations provide potential indirect benefits; however, claims of in federal and regional revenue distribution have resulted in scant economic trickle-down for residents, with funds largely centralized in amid allegations of mismanagement. PMF-KRG frictions, exemplified by 2017 federal seizures of Tuz Khurmatu during the Kirkuk reclamation, exacerbate these issues, prioritizing militia influence over transparent development. Regional security threats further impede reliable exploitation, as evidenced by drone strikes on nearby energy infrastructure; for instance, a February 2025 attack on the Khor Mor gas field in Sulaymaniyah province disrupted associated gas supplies that support Kirkuk-area processing, while July 2025 assaults on fields like Sarsang halted up to 200,000 barrels per day of Kurdistan production, signaling broader vulnerabilities for pipelines traversing disputed zones near Tuz Khurmatu. These incidents, linked to Iran-aligned militias defying federal directives, underscore how external sabotage exploits local power vacuums, deterring investment and limiting gas flaring capture or new drilling in the Tuz vicinity. Despite federal oil ministry announcements of progress in Kirkuk contracts, persistent intercommunal tensions and militia autonomy hinder equitable revenue allocation and infrastructure resilience.

Agriculture and Local Industries

Agriculture in Tuz Khurmatu district primarily consists of rain-fed and irrigated cultivation of and , the dominant crops, with production varying spatially due to and water availability. Yields are constrained by the region's , necessitating from local sources such as the River tributaries, though inconsistent water supply limits output. Saline soils, prevalent in the Plain encompassing Tuz Khurmatu, exacerbate agricultural challenges through partial salinization, particularly in historically irrigated areas where leaching has been inadequate, reducing crop productivity and requiring salt-tolerant varieties for viable farming. stems from natural salt domes underlying the area—reflected in the town's name, derived from "tuz" meaning salt—and compounded by in poorly drained fields, leading to accumulation that inhibits root growth and nutrient uptake in and . Local industries remain limited to small-scale salt extraction from surface deposits and domes, alongside rudimentary processing and trade in agricultural goods, though operations are frequently interrupted by infrastructural damage from recurrent clashes. rates in the district hover around 30-40%, driven by conflict-induced disruptions to farming and extraction activities, fostering dependence on remittances from urban centers or abroad and for internally displaced persons (IDPs), who constitute a significant portion of the population reliant on external support.

Government and Administration

Disputed Territorial Status

Article 140 of Iraq's 2005 Constitution mandates a process of normalization to reverse Ba'athist-era demographic changes, followed by a and , to determine the administrative affiliation of disputed territories, with implementation required by 31 December 2007. Tuz Khurmatu, the only district in Salah ad-Din Governorate designated for this procedure due to its history of and mixed Kurdish, Turkmen, and populations, remains unresolved, perpetuating legal ambiguity over its status. The federal government in upholds Tuz Khurmatu's integration within Salah ad-Din Governorate, consolidating control after Iraqi forces, supported by Popular Mobilization Units, retook the district from Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on 16 October 2017, in response to the KRG's 25 independence referendum that included disputed areas. The KRG, however, asserts historical rights predating , claiming the area as part of the based on Kurdish-majority demographics in earlier periods and viewing federal reclamation as a reversal of post-2003 administrative expansions. The Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has repeatedly urged and to pursue dialogue for resolving disputed internal boundaries like Tuz Khurmatu through constitutional mechanisms, as outlined in reports profiling persistent competing claims and stalled Article 140 processes, though lacking enforcement authority to compel action.

Local Governance Structures

Tuz Khurmatu district operates under the administrative framework of Salah al-Din Governorate, with local governance centered on a district council intended to reflect the area's multi-ethnic composition of , , and Turkmen. The council typically includes seats allocated across these groups, such as configurations with seven members each from the three communities or smaller bodies with , though actual implementation often favors Shia-majority factions due to on-ground power dynamics. In May 2024, the Salah al-Din Provincial Council formalized the distribution of district administrative positions, granting the largest share to Shia Arabs, followed by Turkmen, with receiving a limited allocation consistent with their single seat in the 15-member provincial council—approximately 7% representation. This skewed apportionment stems from the dominant influence of (PMF) units, particularly Shia Turkmen brigades like those in the Northern Axis, which control key areas and integrate militia loyalists into bureaucratic roles, overriding ethnic quotas. Operational challenges persist, including widespread in and service delivery, exacerbated by PMF interference that prioritizes militia-affiliated networks over formal institutions. Local PMF commanders, tied to national Shia political entities, frequently dictate appointments and budgets, leading to inefficiencies and favoritism that undermine council efficacy. In a notable development, a Kurdish engineer, Hiwa Ghalib Majid, was appointed acting mayor in April 2025 by the Salah al-Din governor, signaling potential adjustments amid ongoing negotiations but not altering the broader militia dominance.

Ethnic Conflicts and Security Issues

Intercommunal Grievances and Claims

The Turkmen community in Tuz Khurmatu maintains that their ancestors established and built the town approximately 800 years ago, asserting indigenous roots predating significant or Kurdish presence. They further claim that post-2003 Kurdish political and military influence, particularly through the (PUK), imposed domination, including unresolved land expropriations where Turkmen filed over 4,900 compensation claims by 2014-2015 without restitution. Kurdish representatives counter that Tuz Khurmatu was historically a Kurdish-majority area before mid-20th-century Ba'athist policies systematically reversed this through forced displacements and resettlement of , altering the ethnic composition via state-orchestrated demographic engineering rather than organic migration. Following the 2017 Iraqi forces' retaking of disputed areas, have characterized subsequent expulsions and restrictions on their return as deliberate by (PMF) units dominated by Shi'a Turkmen and , aimed at consolidating non-Kurdish control. Arab residents, largely settled during the Ba'ath era as part of broader integration and development initiatives in northern , assert their presence reflects legitimate economic and administrative ties to the land, now threatened by exclusionary demands from Kurdish and Turkmen groups seeking to reverse prior state policies through retroactive ethnic homogenization. These competing narratives lack empirical consensus, with historical demographic data obscured by regime-driven manipulations—such as Ba'athist and post-2003 partisan reallocations—rather than verifiable natural population movements, complicating neutral adjudication. Sources advancing Kurdish claims often originate from regional advocacy outlets with incentives to highlight past victimization, while Turkmen assertions appear in community-focused reports potentially overlooking pre-2003 intergroup tensions.

Major Clashes and Violence

In January 2016, clashes escalated between Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Shiite militias in Tuz Khurmatu after initial exchanges of fire, with Peshmerga shelling militia-held areas using heavy weapons that killed and injured civilians. Peshmerga operations also involved mass arrests of Arabs suspected of ties, including documented cases of and extrajudicial killings that displaced Arab families. In April 2016, renewed fighting broke out between and Shiite forces, including (PMF) affiliates, resulting in multiple fatalities among combatants and civilians despite subsequent agreements to withdraw forces and enforce a . Both sides accused the other of initiating mortar and attacks on residential zones. October saw the most severe violence when Iraqi federal forces, backed by PMF units comprising Arab and Turkmen militias, clashed with retreating following the recapture of disputed areas after the Kurdish independence referendum. Indiscriminate shelling and gunfire from PMF positions killed at least 11 , while counterfire contributed to the chaos; tens of thousands of residents, predominantly , fled amid widespread , , and targeted destruction of over 200 Kurdish homes and businesses by PMF elements. Iraqi forces subsequently permitted unchecked of abandoned properties for a day before intervening.

Physical Barriers and Segregation

In Tuz Khurmatu, concrete barriers and walls, erected primarily between 2014 and 2016, delineate ethnic enclaves inhabited by , Shiite Turkmen, and , fragmenting the urban landscape into segregated zones. These structures, initially installed to shield neighborhoods from incursions and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices during the group's territorial advances, evolved into permanent dividers amid recurring intercommunal clashes. By 2018, the barriers spanned multiple districts, with iron fences and gates further isolating Turkmen-majority areas from Kurdish ones, restricting resident mobility to designated checkpoints manned by local militias. The proliferation of these fortifications has transformed Tuz Khurmatu into what observers describe as a "city of walls," confining populations to ethnically homogeneous "ghettos" and exacerbating isolation. Residents report severe limitations on daily activities, such as accessing markets or medical services across lines, with walls blocking streets and creating parallel service infrastructures like separate schools and clinics in divided sectors. While these measures have demonstrably curtailed large-scale bombings—reducing explosive incidents in walled areas compared to pre-2014 levels—they perpetuate segregation, hindering and social cohesion by institutionalizing mistrust. Critics argue that the barriers, though born of necessity against threats, now entrench divisions without addressing underlying grievances, fostering a cycle of dependency on militia-controlled access points. Efforts to dismantle select barriers, such as those in Turkmen neighborhoods proposed in 2017 demilitarization talks, have stalled amid security concerns, leaving the city partitioned as of 2024 reports. This physical segregation underscores the long-term security trade-offs in multi-ethnic disputed territories, where fortifications mitigate immediate violence but impede normalization.

Ongoing Security Challenges

Despite the physical segregation measures implemented in Tuz Khurmatu, remnants continue to pose a significant threat through sporadic attacks on . On , 2024, militants targeted a (PMF) checkpoint in the district, resulting in the death of one PMF member. In June 2024, Iraqi forces conducted operations eliminating seven militants in the area, highlighting ongoing efforts amid persistent hideouts. Additionally, a landmine explosion on November 17, 2024, near the village of Palkana killed three members of a joint Peshmerga-i army patrol, underscoring the risk of improvised explosive devices in rural peripheries. These incidents reflect a broader uptick in activity across , with the group claiming 153 attacks in and from January to June 2024 alone. Militia rivalries and overlapping security presences further complicate stabilization, as competing PMF factions and joint forces navigate ethnic enclaves. The district's militia-saturated environment, including PMF units aligned with various Shia political entities, fosters intra-PMF tensions that occasionally spill into localized clashes, deterring coordinated anti-ISIS operations. Such dynamics exacerbate vulnerabilities in disputed border zones, where Kurdish and federal forces maintain parallel patrols, limiting unified control. Efforts at repopulation since 2023 have faced persistent tensions, hindering full returns despite some progress. As of December 2023, Tuz Khurmatu hosted over 17,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) alongside a significant returnee population, yet revenge acts and clashes have impeded broader reintegration in certain sub-districts. While a decrease in violence contributed to modest improvements by mid-2024, underlying ethnic grievances and security vacuums continue to restrict sustainable returns, particularly for minority groups in contested villages. Drug trafficking routes traversing the district amplify , serving as a revenue stream for criminal networks and insurgents. Reports indicate clandestine production facilities operating in Tuz Khurmatu and nearby , with positioned at the nexus of regional methamphetamine and captagon flows as per UNODC analysis of 2019–2023 trends. These activities exploit conflict-altered smuggling paths, funding non-state actors and eroding local amid weak .

References

  1. https://iraqdtm.iom.int/files/HHReintegration/20241092720485_IOM_DTM_DS_Progress_Tuz.pdf
  2. https://gppi.net/2017/08/16/iraq-after-isil-tuz
  3. https://pk.toponavi.com/101929
  4. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/4/18/iraq-the-separating-walls-of-tuz-khurmatu
  5. https://www.distancefromto.net/between/Baghdad/Tuz%2BKhurma
  6. https://iraqdtm.iom.int/files/DurableSolutions/202412233553183_PROSPECTS%2520FOR%2520RESOLVING%2520DISPLACEMENT%2520IN%2520AREAS%2520IF%2520LIMITED%2520AND%2520NO%2520RETURN%2520IN%2520TUZ%2520KHURMATU.pdf
  7. https://channel8.com/english/news/46940
  8. https://en-au.topographic-map.com/map-8sxw14/Saladin-Governorate/
  9. https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-kurds-turkmen-20180311-story.html
  10. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338867407_District_of_Tuz_Khurmatu_Study_in_Regional_geography
  11. https://weatherandclimate.com/iraq/saladin/tuz-khurmatu
  12. https://igj-iraq.org/igj/index.php/igj/article/view/65
  13. https://iasj.rdd.edu.iq/journals/uploads/2025/08/28/1e4e7473c4988ef467cf8c29371a9d9d.pdf
  14. https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation?paperid=18755
  15. https://iraqdtm.iom.int/files/Climate/2025564739543_Climate_ET_Mar_2025.pdf
  16. https://ethnogeopolitics.org/wp-content/uploads/ForumofEGPVol12Nos1-2ShethJerjis-DarkEraTurkmenTuzKhurmatuDistrict2003-2017_pp74-156.pdf
  17. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/dark-era-turkmen-tuz-khurmatu-district-under-kurdish-parties-jerjis-kxrze
  18. https://minorityrights.org/communities/turkmen/
  19. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/10/iraq-fresh-evidence-that-tens-of-thousands-forced-to-flee-tuz-khurmatu-amid-indiscriminate-attacks-lootings-and-arson/
  20. https://zoomnews.info/en/50419/
  21. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/071020243
  22. https://thearabweekly.com/iraqs-tuz-khurmatu-town-rich-history-and-conflict
  23. https://mark-horner.com/index.php?location=tuz_khurmatu
  24. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/394500673_The_Dark_Era_of_the_Turkmen_of_Tuz_Khurmatu_District_under_the_Protection_of_the_Kurdish_Parties_and_the_Peshmerga
  25. https://trackstick.com/tuz-khurmatu-iraq/
  26. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390089740_History_of_Kirkuk_from_the_Beginning_of_the_Nineteenth_Century_until_Becoming_Part_of_the_Iraqi_Monarchy_in_1925
  27. http://www.turkmen.nl/1A_Others/Part_I.pdf
  28. https://archive.org/download/personalnarrativ02ainsuoft/personalnarrativ02ainsuoft.pdf
  29. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7b/A_personal_narrative_of_the_Euphrates_expedition_%2528IA_cu31924082478235%2529.pdf
  30. https://dckurd.org/2017/12/19/tuz-khurmatu-a-town-that-once-suffered-under-iraqs-arabization-is-now-is-under-irans-mercy/
  31. https://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/dbt_derivate_00041348/rasoul.pdf
  32. https://dokumen.pub/the-shia-of-samarra-the-heritage-and-politics-of-a-community-in-iraq-9780755609284-9781848857797.html
  33. https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/08/02/claims-conflict/reversing-ethnic-cleansing-northern-iraq
  34. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFAL5.htm
  35. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm
  36. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/005/[1991](/page/1991)/en/
  37. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tuz-khurmatu.htm
  38. https://www.dvidshub.net/news/27363/forward-operating-base-bernstein-home-away-home
  39. https://www.dvidshub.net/news/537662/coalition-forces-meet-with-successes-capture-insurgents-weapons
  40. https://www.loc.gov/collections/veterans-history-project-collection/serving-our-voices/impact-of-service/ptsd-a-lasting-impact-of-war/item/afc2001001.83113/
  41. https://www.25thida.org/soldier-support/war-on-terrorism-memorial/
  42. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/iraq/194-reviving-un-mediation-iraqs-disputed-internal-boundaries
  43. https://gppi.net/assets/Gaston_Derzsi-Horvath_Iraq_After_ISIL.pdf
  44. https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100100/3/DIBsReport.pdf
  45. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/2/13/iraqs-turkmen-mobilise-for-a-post-isil-future
  46. https://enablingpeace.org/timeline-of-attacks-on-taza-khurmatu/
  47. https://www.state.gov/report/custom/20144065c1/
  48. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/13/iraq-ethnic-fighting-endangers-civilians
  49. https://thearabweekly.com/iraqi-government-forces-repel-multiple-isis-attacks
  50. https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/07022018
  51. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq-new-special-groups/
  52. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/5/8/iran-backed-pmfs-are-destabilising-iraqs-disputed-regions
  53. https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/its-too-early-to-pop-champagne-in-baghdad-the-micro-politics-of-territorial-control-in-iraq/
  54. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/20/iraq-fighting-disputed-territories-kills-civilians
  55. https://www.presidency.iq/EN/Details.aspx?id=4856
  56. https://www.kirkuknow.com/en/news/70053
  57. https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/ISIS-attacks-PMF-in-Tuz-Khurmatu-one-casualty-reported
  58. https://www.basnews.com/en/babat/852066
  59. https://thenewregion.com/posts/873
  60. https://presidency.iq/en/Details.aspx?id=5247
  61. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/090920241
  62. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/22/kurds-bitter-defeat-iraq-reclaims-kirkuk
  63. https://www.rudaw.net/english/business/02102025
  64. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/archive/iraqi-forces-seize-tuz-khurmatu-amid-kirkuk-operation/324
  65. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/no-surrender-white-flags-group-rises-new-threat-northern-iraq
  66. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/02/drone-attack-targets-gas-field-in-northern-iraq.php
  67. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/drone-attack-halts-sarsang-oil-output-iraqi-kurdistan-ministry-says-2025-07-15/
  68. https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/071625-drone-strikes-shut-in-nearly-three-quarters-of-iraqi-kurdistans-crude-production
  69. https://migrationletters.com/index.php/ml/article/view/5580
  70. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229937076_SALINE_SOILS_IN_THE_KIRKUK_PLAIN_NORTHERN_IRAQ
  71. https://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/user_upload/SDG_Iraq_v17_web_2.pdf
  72. https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/lamani_final.pdf
  73. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW69_final.pdf
  74. https://www.kirkuknow.com/en/news/70183
  75. https://dckurd.org/2018/01/16/kurdistans-weekly-brief-january-16-2018/
  76. https://kirkuknow.com/en/news/70183
  77. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/170420252
  78. https://gppi.net/2019/02/18/at-the-tip-of-the-spear
  79. https://diyaruna.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_di/features/2021/11/05/feature-02
  80. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/18225.pdf
  81. https://en.tjwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/The-New-Ethnic-Cleansing-of-the-Disputed-Territories.pdf
  82. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/kurds-shiites-agree-to-withdraw-forces-from-north-iraq-town-after-clashes-idUSKCN0XO2F9/
  83. https://www.mtv.com.lb/News/Articles/589642/Kurds-and-Shiites-clash-in-northern-Iraq-despite-ceasefire
  84. https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/251120161
  85. https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/788261.pdf
  86. https://thenewregion.com/posts/1142/landmine-explosion-kills-three-members-of-joint-peshmerga-iraqi-army-force-in-salahaddin
  87. https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3840981/defeat-isis-mission-in-iraq-and-syria-for-january-june-2024/
  88. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/CTC-SENTINEL-042025.pdf
  89. https://iraq.un.org/en/download/163667/272844
  90. https://www.menahra.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Assessment-2024.pdf
  91. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Iraq/Iraq_regional_dynamics_report_2024.pdf
  92. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2025-International-Narcotics-Control-Strategy-Volume-1-Accessible.pdf
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
Contribute something
User Avatar
No comments yet.