Hubbry Logo
Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern GaliciaMassacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern GaliciaMain
Open search
Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia
Community hub
Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia
Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia
from Wikipedia

Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
Polish victims of a massacre committed by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the village of Lipniki, Wołyń (Volhynia), 1943
Map
LocationVolhynia
Eastern Galicia
Polesie
Lublin region
Date1943–1945
TargetPoles
Attack type
Massacre, ethnic cleansing, considered a genocide in Poland
Deaths100,000[1]
PerpetratorsOrganization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Mykola Lebed, Roman Shukhevych, Dmytro Klyachkivsky
MotiveAnti-Polonism,[2] Anti-Catholicism,[3] Ukrainisation[4]

The Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (Polish: rzeź wołyńsko-galicyjska, lit.'Volhynian-Galician slaughter'; Ukrainian: Волинсько-Галицька трагедія, romanizedVolynsʹko-Halytsʹka trahediya, lit.'Volhynian-Galician tragedy')[a] were carried out in German-occupied Poland by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), with the support of parts of the local Ukrainian population, against the Polish minority in Volhynia, Eastern Galicia, parts of Polesia, and the Lublin region from 1943 to 1945.[5] The UPA's actions resulted in up to 100,000 Polish deaths.[6][7][8]

The peak of the massacres took place in July and August 1943. These killings were exceptionally brutal, and most of the victims were women and children.[9][4] Other victims of the massacres included several hundred Armenians, Jews, Russians, Czechs, Georgians, and Ukrainians who were part of Polish families or opposed the UPA and impeded the massacres by hiding Polish escapees.[4]

The ethnic cleansing was a Ukrainian attempt to prevent the post-war Polish state from asserting its sovereignty over Ukrainian-majority areas that had been part of the pre-war Polish state.[10][11][4] The decision to force the Polish population to leave areas that the Banderite faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) considered to be Ukrainian took place at a meeting of military referents in the autumn of 1942, and plans were made to liquidate Polish-community leaders and any of the Polish community who resisted.[12] Local UPA commanders in Volhynia began attacking the Polish population, committing massacres in numerous villages.[13]

Encountering resistance, the UPA commander in Volhynia, Dmytro Klyachkivsky ("Klym Savur"), issued an order in June 1943 for the "general physical liquidation of the entire Polish population".[14] The largest wave of attacks took place in July and August 1943, the assaults in Volhynia continuing until the spring of 1944, when the Red Army arrived in Volhynia and the Polish underground, which had organized Polish self-defense, formed the 27th AK Infantry Division.[15] Approximately 50,000–60,000 Poles died as a result of the massacres in Volhynia, while up to 2,000–3,000 Ukrainians died as a result of Polish retaliatory actions.[16][17][18]

At the 3rd OUN Congress in August 1943, Mykola Lebed criticized the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's actions in Volhynia as "banditry". The majority of delegates disagreed with his assessment, and the congress decided to extend the anti-Polish operation into Galicia.[19] However, it took a different course: by the end of 1943, it was limited to killing leaders of the Polish community and exhorting Poles to flee to the west under threat of looming genocide.[20]

In March 1944, the UPA command, headed by Roman Shukhevych, issued an order to drive Poles out of Eastern Galicia, first with warnings and then by raiding villages, murdering men, and burning buildings.[21] A similar order was issued by the UPA commander in Eastern Galicia, Vasyl Sydor ("Shelest").[22] This order was often disobeyed and entire villages were slaughtered.[23] In Eastern Galicia between 1943 and 1946, OUN-B and UPA killed 20,000–25,000 Poles.[24] 1,000–2,000 Ukrainians were killed by the Polish underground.[25]

Some Ukrainian religious authorities, institutions, and leaders protested [when?] the slayings of Polish civilians, but to little effect.[26]

In 2008 Poland's Parliament adopted a resolution calling UPA's crimes against Poles "crimes bearing the hallmarks of genocide." In 2013 it adopted a resolution calling them "ethnic cleansing with the hallmarks of genocide". On 22 July 2016, Poland's Sejm established 11 July as a National Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists against citizens of the Second Polish Republic.[27] This characterization is disputed by Ukraine and by some non-Polish historians, who characterize it instead as ethnic cleansing.[28]

Background

[edit]

Interwar period in Second Polish Republic

[edit]
Map of Wołyń (Volhynia) and Eastern Galicia in 1939

The recreated Polish state covered large territories inhabited by Ukrainians, while the Ukrainian movement failed to achieve independence. According to the Polish census of 1931, in Eastern Galicia, the Ukrainian language was spoken by 52% of the inhabitants, Polish by 40% and Yiddish by 7%. In Wołyn (Volhynia), Ukrainian was spoken by 68% of the inhabitants, Polish by 17%, Yiddish by 10%, German by 2%, Czech by 2% and Russian by 1%.[29][30]

Ukrainian radical nationalism

[edit]

In 1920, exiled Ukrainian officers, mostly former Sich Riflemen and veterans of Polish–Ukrainian War, founded the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), an underground military organization with the goal of continuing the armed struggle for independent Ukraine.[31] As soon as the second half of 1922, UVO organized a wave of sabotage actions and assassination attempts on Polish officials and moderate Ukrainian activists.[32] In 1929, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was formed in Vienna, Austria, and was the result of a union between several radical nationalist and extreme right-wing organisations with UVO.[33] Members of the organization carried out several acts of terror and assassinations in Poland, but it was still rather fringe movement, condemned for its violence by figures from mainstream Ukrainian society such as the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Andriy Sheptytsky.[34] The most popular political party among Ukrainians was in fact the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO), which was opposed to Polish rule but called for peaceful and democratic means to achieve independence from Poland.

By the beginning of the Second World War, the membership of OUN had risen to 20,000 active members, and the number of supporters was many times as many.[35]

Polish policy towards Ukrainian minority

[edit]
Polish census of 1931
Original map showing the distribution of native languages spoken in Poland during the 1931 census.
GUS languages 1931
Media related to Polish census of 1931 – Statistics of Poland at Wikimedia Commons

The policy of the Polish authorities towards the Ukrainian minority was changeable throughout the interwar period, varying between attempts at assimilation, conciliation and a policy of repression.

For example in 1930 terror campaign and civil unrest in the Galician countryside resulted in Polish police exacting a policy of collective responsibility on local Ukrainians in an effort to "pacify" the region.[36] Ukrainian parliamentarians were placed under house arrest to prevent them from participating in elections, with their constituents terrorized into voting for Polish candidates.[36] Beginning in 1937, the Polish government in Volhynia initiated an active campaign to use religion as a tool for Polonization and to convert the Orthodox population to Roman Catholicism.[37] Over 190 Orthodox churches were destroyed and 150 converted to Roman Catholic churches.[38]

On the other hand just before the war, Volhynia was "the site of one of eastern Europe's most ambitious policies of toleration".[39] Through supporting Ukrainian culture and religious autonomy and the Ukrainization of the Orthodox Church, the Sanacja regime wanted to achieve Ukrainian loyalty to the Polish state and to minimise Soviet influences in the borderline region. That approach was gradually abandoned after Józef Piłsudski's death in 1935.[39][40] Practically all government and administrative positions, including the police, were assigned to Poles.[41]

Harsh policies implemented by the Second Polish Republic were often a response to OUN-B violence,[42] but contributed to a further deterioration of relations between the two ethnic groups. Between 1921 and 1938, Polish colonists and war veterans were encouraged to settle in the Volhynian and Galician countryside; their number reached 17,700 in Volhynia in 3,500 new settlements by 1939.[43] Between 1934 and 1938, a series of violent and sometimes-deadly[44] attacks against Ukrainians were carried out in other parts of Poland.[45][page needed] Volhynia was a place of increasingly violent conflict, with Polish police on one side and Western Ukrainian communists supported by many dissatisfied Ukrainian peasants on the other.[citation needed] The communists organized strikes, killed at least 31 suspected police informers in 1935–1936, and assassinated local Ukrainian officials for "collaboration" with the Polish government. The police conducted mass arrests, reported the killing of 18 communists in 1935, and killed at least 31 people in gunfights and during arrest attempts in 1936.[46]

Second World War

[edit]

Ukrainian diversion in September 1939

[edit]

After the first Polish setbacks in the defensive war against Germany, there were acts of diversion, attacks on Polish troops and inhabitants mainly in the areas of Eastern Galicia. The first attacks took place on the night of 12-13 September 1939 in Stryj, and then in every district of mixed ethnicity. This first wave of diversions was not massive and was quickly, often brutally, suppressed by Polish forces.[47] It was only after 17 September that there were anti-Polish incidents on a much larger scale, organized by the OUN and communists, in which some 2,000 Poles were killed in Eastern Galicia and 1,000 in Volhynia.[48] The largest massacres took place in the villages of Sławentyn [pl], Koniuchy and Potutory.[48] According to the OUN, they attacked 183 villages throughout September.[49] In total, several thousand people took part in anti-Polish actions. The Polish side responded with pacifications, in which probably several hundred people were killed.[50]

Soviet occupation of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia

[edit]

In September 1939, Poland was invaded by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The eastern part of Poland was annexed by the Soviet Union; Volhynia and Eastern Galicia were attached to the Ukrainian SSR. After the annexation, the Soviet NKVD started eliminating the predominantly Polish middle and upper classes, including social activists and military leaders. Between 1939 and 1941, 200,000 Poles were deported to Siberia.[51] The deportations and murders deprived the Poles of their community leaders.

During the wartime Soviet occupation, Polish members of the local administration were replaced by Ukrainians and Jews,[52] and the Soviet NKVD subverted the Ukrainian independence movement. All local Ukrainian political parties were abolished. Between 20,000 and 30,000 Ukrainian activists fled to German-occupied territory; most of those who did not escape were arrested. For example, Dmytro Levytsky, head of the UNDO, was arrested along with many of his colleagues, and never heard from again.[53] The elimination by the Soviets of the moderate or liberal political leaders within Ukrainian society allowed the extremist underground OUN to remain the only surviving group with a significant organizational presence among western Ukrainians.[54]

OUN activities 1939–1941

[edit]

In Kraków on 10 February 1940, a revolutionary faction of the OUN emerged, called the OUN-R or, after its leader Stepan Bandera, the OUN-B (Banderites). This was opposed by the current leadership of the organization, so it split, and the old group was called OUN-M after the leader Andriy Melnyk (Melnykites).[55]

On 22 June 1941, the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany; the Soviets quickly withdrew eastward and left Volhynia. The OUN supported Germans, seized about 213 villages and organized diversion in the rear of the Red Army.[56] The OUN-B formed Ukrainian militias that, displaying exceptional cruelty, carried out antisemitic pogroms and massacres of Jews. The biggest pogroms carried out by the Ukrainian nationalists took place in Lviv, resulting in the massacre of 6,000 Polish Jews.[57][58] The involvement of OUN-B is unclear, but at the very least OUN-B propaganda fuelled antisemitism.[59] The vast majority of pogroms carried out by the Banderites occurred in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia.[60][61] Several hundred Poles were also killed at the hands of Ukrainian nationalists at the time, and a group of about a hundred Polish students were murdered in Lviv.[62]

On 30 June 1941, the OUN-B proclaimed the establishment of Ukrainian State in Lviv. In response to the declaration, OUN-B leaders and associates were arrested and imprisoned by the Gestapo (ca. 1500 persons).[63] The OUN-M continued to operate openly, collaborating with the Germans and taking over local administration, but its leaders also began to be arrested and the organisation's influence was curtailed by the Germans in early 1942.[64] Meanwhile, the OUN-B, unwilling and unable to openly resist the Germans, began methodically creating a clandestine organization, engaging in propaganda work, and building weapons stockpiles.[65] It set out to infiltrate the local collaborationist police, from which it received training and weapons. The auxiliary police assisted the German SS in the murder by shooting of approximately 200,000 Volhynian Jews, and their experience both led them to believe the Germans would turn on them next and taught them how to make use of genocidal techniques.[66]

In the Chełm region, 394 Ukrainian community leaders were killed by the Poles on the grounds of collaboration with German authorities.[67]

Polish underground in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia

[edit]

During the Soviet occupation, the Polish underground in the eastern territories collapsed. However, after the Germans took control of the area, the structures of the Home Army (AK) were rebuilt. In Volhynia, an Independent District of the Home Army was established, while in Eastern Galicia the Lwów Area of the Home Army was created. The former numbered around 8,000 sworn soldiers at the end of 1943, while the latter numbered around 27,000 at the beginning of 1944.[68] The Polish forces were preparing to launch an anti-German uprising once the German army disintegrated. From 1943 onwards, the plan was to focus on capturing Lwów and western Volhynia once the Red Army arrived, and a fight against Ukrainian forces was also anticipated.[69]

Due to OUN's collaboration with the Nazis, local Poles generally thought there is no possibility for reconciliation and that Ukrainians ought to be deported to Soviet Ukraine after the war. Such view was shared by the local Home Army command, but the Polish authorities in Warsaw and London took a more moderate stance, discussing the possibility of limited Ukrainian autonomy.[70][71]

Polish-Ukrainian antagonism

[edit]

Both the Polish government-in-exile and the underground state on one side, and the Ukrainian OUN-B on the other, considered the possibility that in the event of mutually exhaustive attrition warfare between Germany and the Soviet Union, the region would become a scene of conflict between Poles and Ukrainians. In early 1943, the Polish underground considered the possibility of rapprochement with Ukrainians, which proved fruitless since neither side was willing to sacrifice their claims.[72]

The field of competition was the occupation administration. As a rule, the Germans preferred Ukrainians and filled administrative positions with them. However, a shortage of suitably qualified people forced the Germans to reach out to Poles, who began to gain the upper hand in lower-level administration during 1942.[73] This process caused unrest in the Ukrainian underground.[74]

Even in the interwar period, the OUN adhered to concepts of integral nationalism in its totalitarian form, which stipulated that a Ukrainian state must be ethnically homogeneous and the only way to defeat the Polish enemy was through the elimination of Poles from Ukrainian territories. From the OUN-B perspective, the Jews had already been annihilated, and the Russians and Germans were only temporarily in Ukraine, but Poles had to be forcefully removed.[75] The OUN-B came to believe that it had to move fast while the Germans still controlled the area in order to pre-empt future Polish efforts to re-establish Poland's prewar borders. The result was that the local OUN-B commanders in Volhynia and Galicia, if not the OUN-B leadership itself, decided that ethnic cleansing of Poles from the area through terror and murder to be necessary.[75]

Only one faction of Ukrainian nationalists, OUN-B under Mykola Lebed and then Roman Shukhevych, was committed to the ethnic cleansing of Volhynia. Taras Bulba-Borovets, the founder of the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army, rejected the idea and condemned the anti-Polish massacres when they started.[76][77] The OUN-M leadership did not believe that such an operation was advantageous in 1943.[75]

Massacres

[edit]

Volhynia

[edit]

Creation of UPA

[edit]

By late 1942, the OUN-B in Volhynia was avoiding conflict with the German authorities and working with them; anti-German resistance was limited to Soviet partisans on the extreme northern edge of Volhynia, small bands of OUN-M fighters, and to a group of guerillas knowns as the UPA or the Polessian Sich, unaffiliated with the OUN-B and led by Taras Bulba-Borovets of the exiled Ukrainian People's Republic.[65] Soviet partisans raided local settlements in search of supplies. Soon Germans began "pacifying" entire villages in Volhynia in retaliation for real or alleged support of Soviet partisans; the raids were often conducted by Ukrainian auxiliary police units under the direct supervision of Germans.[78] One of the best-known examples was the pacification of Obórki, a village in Lutsk County, on 13–14 November 1942.[79][80]

In October 1942, OUN-B decided to form its own partisans, called OUN Military Detachments. Individual units entered active combat in February 1943 (first came the sotnia of Hryhoriy Perehinyak attack on German police station in Volodymyrets on 7 February).[81] At the third OUN-B conference (17–23 February 1943), the decision was made to launch an anti-German uprising in order to liberate as much territory as possible before the arrival of the Red Army. The uprising was to break out first in Volhynia; therefore, the formation of a partisan army called the Ukrainian Liberation Army began there.[82] The uprising broke out in mid-March, with Dmytro Klyachkivsky and Vasyl Ivakhiv leading it, then Klyachkivsky alone after Ivakhiv's death in May that year. It was also at that time that the name Ukrainian Liberation Army was abandoned and the name Ukrainian Insurgent Army, hijacked from Bulba-Borovets, began to be used, thus impersonating it. The base of the new army was made up of Ukrainian policemen, approximately 5,000 of whom deserted en masse between March and April 1943, and men absorbed from Bulba-Borovets and OUN-M units. By July 1943, the UPA had twenty thousand soldiers.[83] According to Timothy Snyder, in their struggle for dominance, OUN-B forces would kill tens of thousands of Ukrainians for supposed links to Melnyk or Bulba-Borovets.[76]

Even before the anti-German uprising began, OUN-B units started attacking Polish villages and murdering Poles. The attacks soon turned into a full-scale extermination campaign, aimed at killing off or driving out the Polish population from areas considered by OUN-B to be Ukrainian. With dominance secured in spring 1943, when the UPA had gained control over the Volhynian countryside from the Germans, the UPA began large-scale operations against the Polish population.[84][page needed][75]

First massacres

[edit]
Dmytro Klachkivsky, commander of UPA units in Volhynia, who ordered the genocide of Poles in the region

Between 1939 and 1943, the share of Polish population in Volhynia had dropped to about 8% (approximately 200,000 inhabitants). Volhynian Poles were dispersed across rural areas, Soviet deportations stripped them of their community leaders, and they had neither own local partisan army nor state power (with exception of the German occupants) to turn to for protection.[85]

On 9 February 1943, a UPA group, commanded by Hryhory Perehyniak, pretended to be Soviet partisans and assaulted the Parośle settlement in Sarny county.[86] It is considered a prelude to the massacres and is recognized as the first mass murder committed by the UPA in the area.[87] Estimates of the number of victims range from 149[88] to 173.[89]

Throughout Volhynia, individuals, often with their families, began to be killed, while in the Kostopol and Sarny counties in the northeastern part of Volhynia, where Ivan Lytvynchuk "Dubovy" was in command, the UPA proceeded to systematically murder Poles.[90] They attacked dozens of villages, the largest massacre of which took place in Lipniki, where one of the first Polish self-defences was established, but despite resistance during the attack on the night of 26–27 March, the "Dubovy" unit murdered 184 people.[90] About 130 people were murdered in Brzezina on 8 April 1943.[91] Then the massacres began to be carried out in the westward located counties, mainly in the Lutsk county.[92] According to Timothy Snyder, in late March and early April 1943, the UPA forces killed 7,000 Polish civilians.[93]

Wave of massacres during Holy Week of 1943

[edit]

The OUN-B and UPA leadership chose Holy Week (18–26 April) as the period for an organised attack on the Polish population, which was to include the western counties of Równo and Krzemieniec, where Petro Oilynyk [uk] "Eney" was in command.[94]

Several villages was attacked, but the most bloody was the massacre of the night of 22–23 April in Janowa Dolina, where UPA unit commanded by Ivan Lytvynchuk "Dubovy" killed 600 people and burned down the entire village.[95] In another massacre, according to the UPA reports, the Polish colonies of Kuty, in the Szumski region, and Nowa Nowica, in the Webski region, were liquidated for co-operation with the Gestapo and the other German authorities.[96] According to Polish sources, the Kuty self-defense unit managed to repel a UPA assault, but at least 53 Poles were murdered. The rest of the inhabitants decided to abandon the village and were escorted by the Germans who arrived at Kuty, alerted by the glow of fire and the sound of gunfire.[97]

The assaults spread throughout the eastern Volhynia, and in some localities Poles managed to organise self-defence units that were able to repel attacks by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, but in most cases the UPA slaughtered and burned Polish villages. In May and June, the purge extended to Petro Olijnyk's subordinate areas of the Rivne and Kremenets districts.[97] Maksym Skorupskyi, one of the UPA commanders, wrote in his diary: "Starting from our action on Kuty, day by day after sunset, the sky was bathing in the glow of conflagration. Polish villages were burning".[97]

Polish proposals for a truce

[edit]

The local Home Army command, under Col. Kazimierz Bąbiński [pl] "Luboń", responded to the attacks by organising local self-defences, of which about 100 were formed by July 1943, in a bid to protect the population and prevent them from fleeing to the cities. It was determined to fight the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), not believing there was any possibility of an agreement, but at the same time it was obliged to carry out the plan of an anti-German general uprising, which ordered it to spare its forces until the Soviet-German front arrived.[98] On the opposite side was the local Government Delegate, Kazimierz Banach [pl] "Jan Linowski", who still believed in the plan agreed with headquarters and Home Army commander General Rowecki to reach an agreement with the Ukrainians, which he had been trying to implement since 1942.[99]

Among local Home Army soldiers, Banach had a reputation as a traitor. Banach attempted to hold talks with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) through the local OUN SB commander Shabatura. Preliminary talks took place on 7 July. For the second round on 10 July, the plenipotentiary of the District Delegation, Zygmunt Rumel "Krzysztof Poręba", and the representative of the Volhynia District of the AK Krzysztof Markiewicz "Czart", together with the coachman Witold Dobrowolski, went. All three were brutally murdered on 10 July 1943 in the village of Kustycze.[100] This event ultimately discredited the stance taken by Banach. A plan was drawn up in the Home Army command to organise a military operation against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) to thwart the next wave of genocidal attacks, which, according to intelligence information, was planned for 20 July.[101]

July wave of massacres

[edit]

The Soviet victories acted as a stimulus for the escalation of massacres in July 1943, when the ethnic cleansing reached its peak.[52] In the 1990s, a citation from an alleged "secret directive" by Dmytro Klyachkivsky (head-commander of the UPA-North) was published by Polish historian Władysław Filar:

We should make a large action of the liquidation of the Polish element. As the German armies withdraw, we should take advantage of this convenient moment for liquidating the entire male population in the age from 16 up to 60 years. We cannot lose this fight, and it is necessary at all costs to weaken Polish forces. Villages and settlements lying next to the massive forests, should disappear from the face of the earth.[102][103]

The Kisielin massacre was a slaughter of Polish worshippers on 11 July 1943 during a Sunday mass.

Full text of the "secret order" was never published and its authenticity is questioned.[104]

The UPA command decided to extend the genocidal action to the western areas of Volhynia, the districts of Horochów, Kowel and Vladimir, an area more densely populated by Poles. The action was to be coordinated to exploit the element of surprise to the maximum. The day after murder of Polish emissaries, 11 July 1943, was the start of the operation and is regarded as the bloodiest day of the massacres,[105] with many reports of UPA units marching from village to village and killing Polish civilians.[106] On that day, UPA units surrounded and attacked 96 Polish villages and settlements located in counties Horochów, and Włodzimierz Wołyński, and 3 in Kowel county. Fifty villages in the first two counties were attacked the following day.[107]

In the Polish village of Gurów, out of 480 inhabitants, only 70 survived; in the settlement of Orzeszyn, the UPA killed 306 out of 340 Poles; in the village of Sadowa out of 600 Polish inhabitants, only 20 survived.[106] In Zagaje 260 Poles was killed.[108] The wave of massacres lasted five days until July 16. The UPA continued the ethnic cleansing, particularly in rural areas, until most Poles had been deported, killed or expelled. The thoroughly-planned actions were conducted by many units and were well-coordinated.[52] In August 1943, the Polish village of Gaj, near Kovel, was burned and some 600 people were massacred, and 438 people were killed, including 246 children, in Ostrówki. In July 1943, a total of 520 Polish villages were attacked, killing 10,000–11,000 Poles. At the same time, the killings in the eastern part of the county continued.[107]

August wave of massacres

[edit]

Another large wave of slaughter of the Polish population took place on 29 and 30 August 1943, this time also covering the Luboml district.[109] The killings continued until mid-September.[110]

During the night of August 30 Ivan Klimchak [uk] "Lysiy" unit surrounded the village of Kąty, where Poles were murdered farm by farm, killing 180–213 people.[111] Then, on August 31, the unit killed 86–87 people in the village of Jankowce.[111] On the same day they surrounded the village of Ostrówek. The population was gathered in the school and church, valuables were taken away. Then the men were killed with blunt tools in three different places. The rest of the population was shot in the cemetery. A total of 476 to 520 people were killed.[111] Another unit entered the village of Wola Ostrowiecka on the morning of 30 August. Children were treated with candy, and a speech was made to the population calling for a joint fight against the Germans, then the entire population was gathered in the school. Men were led outside and killed with axes and blunt tools, then the school, with women and children inside, was set on fire and pelted with grenades.[111] Overall 572–520 people were killed.[111] In total, several hundred Polish villages were attacked in August 1943.

In the eastern part of Volhynia the slaughter of the Polish population continued, the attacks were generally not coordinated, the UPA units attacking those Polish villages that still survived. Many of them had been turned into self-defence points, so the massacres were often preceded by fights, sometimes the defenders managed to repel the UPA units.[112]

In the summer of 1943, in Volhynia, every Pole and every person with Polish roots was facing death at the hands of Ukrainian nationalists. Ukrainians with Polish roots were also killed, as were people from mixed families. Poles could only feel relatively safe in self-defence bases and larger towns.[113] One Polish refugee from Volhynia wrote at the time: "All around dead bodies and potential victims. It smells of corpses from every Pole now. There are living corpses walking around."[114]

Polish self-defence and reprisal

[edit]

After unsuccessful attempts to conclude a truce with the UPA, the Polish underground moved to active defence and offensive actions. On 20 July 1943, decisions were made to form nine partisan units, totalling around a thousand men.[115] Their task was to support Polish self-defences and to attack UPA bases. There was a growing desire among the Polish population to retaliate against the Ukrainians. It is estimated that around 2,000 people were killed in Polish attacks on Ukrainian villages.[116]

The last wave of massacres in Volhynia in the winter of 1943–1944

[edit]

The UPA's command decided to take advantage of the coming Soviet offensive to launch a final liquidation action against the Polish population.[117] It was decided to attack those villages from which German or Hungarian units had already withdrawn and the Soviets had not yet entered.[117] Many partisan units also undertook offensive actions against the Germans, making it impossible for them to protect the civilian population.[118] The attacks began on 7 December with assaults on the villages of Budki Borowskie, Dołhań and Okopy.[119] Most assaults took place right before Christmas. The attacks continued until March. One of the bloodiest massacres took place in Wiśniowiec, in February 1944, when the OUN SB units managed to capture the Monastery of the Discalced Carmelites, which had been attacked several times during 1943.[119] Almost all of the 300–400 Poles hiding there, including monks, were killed, as well as 138 people in neighbouring Wiśniowiec Stary.[120]

Operations of the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the Home Army

[edit]

In January 1944, at the same time as the UPA was carrying out its last wave of massacres of the Polish population, the units of the Home Army in Volhynia embarked on the implementation of Operation Tempest, i.e. an anti-German uprising. To this end, AK units from across Volhynia were to assemble in western Volhynia to form the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division. However, some units, mainly those forming part of self-defences, refused to carry out the order, not wanting to leave the civilian population at the mercy of the UPA.[121] Despite this, the division was formed and managed to capture a part of Volhynia between Kovel and Volodymyr-Volynskyi. Fearful of being surrounded by UPA units, the division began fighting them. From 11 January to 18 March 1944, the division fought sixteen major clashes with the Ukrainians, coming out mostly successful.[122] The Ukrainian population was expelled from the captured villages in the area of Svynaryn forest and its surroundings. Ukrainian sources state that the division's soldiers committed atrocities in some Ukrainian villages, the greatest of which would be the crime in Ochniwka, where, according to Yaroslav Tsaruk (Ukrainian: Ярослав Царук), 166 people were allegedly killed.[123]

After the battles with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the division fought almost exclusively against the Germans, soon withdrawing from Volhynia to the Lublin region.

Reactions of other Ukrainian organisations

[edit]

The killings were opposed by the Ukrainian Central Committee under Volodymyr Kubiyovych. In response, UPA units murdered Ukrainian Central Committee representatives and a Ukrainian Catholic priest who had read an appeal by the Ukrainian Central Committee from his pulpit.[124]

Eastern Galicia

[edit]

Polish-Ukrainian tension in Eastern Galicia

[edit]

The Polish underground stood firm on the integrity of the pre-war borders, but was prepared to make certain concessions to the Ukrainians. At the same time, it was convinced that the OUN, faced with a choice between western Ukraine belonging to the USSR or Poland, would ultimately opt for Poland.[125] However, the OUN rejected these proposals, issuing statements accusing the Polish population of collaboration with the Germans and Soviets. In this atmosphere, and against the backdrop of the ongoing ethnic cleansing of the Polish population in Volhynia, talks between the Polish underground and the OUN Central Provision had been taking place since the summer of 1943 on a possible agreement.[126] The last meeting took place on 8 March 1944.[127]

Decision to carry out anti-Polish action in Eastern Galicia

[edit]
Roman Shukhevych, from mid-1943 the UPA's main commander, gave the order to extend the ethnic cleansing of Poles to Eastern Galicia.

At the 3rd OUN Congress in August 1943, Mykola Lebed and Mykhailo Stepaniak [uk] criticised the UPA's actions in Volhynia as "bandit".[127] The majority of delegates, however, opposed his assessment and opted for transferring the Volhynian actions against Poles into Galicia.[128] It is not clear when the final decision was made, it was probably made by Shuchevych, at that time already the commander of the OUN-B and UPA, after inspecting Volhynia and seeing the effects of the action in the region.[128]

Ethnic cleansing

[edit]

In late 1943 and early 1944, after most Poles in Volhynia had either been murdered or had fled the area, the conflict spread to the neighboring province of Galicia, where most of the population was still Ukrainian, but the Polish presence was strong. Unlike in the case of Volhynia, where Polish villages were usually destroyed and their inhabitants murdered without warning, in eastern Galicia, Poles were sometimes given the choice of fleeing or being killed. An order by a UPA commander in Galicia stated, "Once more I remind you: first call upon Poles to abandon their land and only later liquidate them, not the other way around". The choice of other tactics, combined with better Polish self-defence and a demographic balance more favorable to Poles, resulted in a significantly lower death toll among Poles in Galicia than in Volhynia.[129]

The methods used by Ukrainian nationalists in this area were the same: rounding up and killing all the Polish residents of the villages and then looting the villages and burning them to the ground.[52] On 28 February 1944, in the village of Korosciatyn 135 Poles were murdered;[130] the victims were later counted by a local Roman Catholic priest, Mieczysław Kamiński.[131] Jan Zaleski (father of Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski) who witnessed the massacre, wrote in his diary: "The slaughter lasted almost all night. We heard terrible cries, the roar of cattle burning alive, shooting. It seemed that Antichrist himself began his activity!"[132] Kamiński claimed that in Koropiec, where no Poles were actually murdered, a local Greek Catholic priest, in reference to mixed Polish-Ukrainian families, proclaimed from the pulpit: "Mother, you're suckling an enemy – strangle it."[133] Among the scores of Polish villages whose inhabitants were murdered and all buildings burned are places like Berezowica, near Zbaraz; Ihrowica, near Ternopil; Plotych, near Ternopil; Podkamien, near Brody; and Hanachiv and Hanachivka, near Przemyślany.[134]

Roman Shukhevych, a UPA commander, stated in his order from 25 February 1944: "In view of the success of the Soviet forces it is necessary to speed up the liquidation of the Poles, they must be totally wiped out, their villages burned... only the Polish population must be destroyed".[30]

Bullet marks on the tower of the Podkamień Abbey, where many Poles sought refuge; the abbey was stormed by the UPA on 12 March 1944.

One of the most infamous massacres took place on 28 February 1944 in the Polish village of Huta Pieniacka, with over 1,000 inhabitants. The village had served as a shelter for refugees including Polish Jews[135] as well as a recuperation base for Polish and communist partisans. One AK unit was active there. In the winter of 1944, a Soviet partisan unit numbering 1,000 was stationed in the village for two weeks.[135][136][137] Huta Pieniacka's villagers, although poor, organized a well-fortified and armed self-defense unit, which fought off a Ukrainian and German reconnaissance attack on 23 February 1944.[138][unreliable source?] Two soldiers of the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Galicia (1st Ukrainian) Division of the Waffen-SS were killed and one wounded by the villagers. On February 28, elements of the Ukrainian 14th SS Division from Brody returned with 500–600 men, assisted by a group of civilian nationalists. The killing spree lasted all day. Kazimierz Wojciechowski, the commander of the Polish self-defense unit, was drenched with gasoline and burned alive at the main square. The village was utterly destroyed and all of its occupants killed.[136] The civilians, mostly women and children, were rounded up at a church, divided and locked into barns, which were set on fire.[139] Estimates of casualties in the Huta Pieniacka massacre vary and include 500 (Ukrainian archives),[140] over 1,000 (Tadeusz Piotrowski),[141] and 1,200 (Sol Littman).[142] According to IPN investigation, the crime was committed by the 4th battalion of the Ukrainian 14th SS Division[139] supported by UPA units and local Ukrainian civilians.[143]

A military journal of the Ukrainian 14th SS Division condemned the killing of Poles. In a 2 March 1944 article addressed to the Ukrainian youth, which was written by military leaders, Soviet partisans were blamed for the murders of Poles and Ukrainians, and the authors stated, "If God forbid, among those who committed such inhuman acts, a Ukrainian hand was found, it will be forever excluded from the Ukrainian national community".[144] Some historians deny the role of the Ukrainian 14th SS Division in the killings and attribute them entirely to German units, but others disagree.[145][verification needed] According to Yale historian Timothy Snyder, the Ukrainian 14th SS Division's role in the ethnic cleansing of Poles from western Ukraine was marginal.[146]

The village of Pidkamin (Podkamień), near Brody, was a shelter for Poles, who hid in the monastery of the Dominicans there. Some 2,000 persons, mostly women and children, were living there when the monastery was attacked in mid-March 1944 by the UPA units, which Polish Home Army accounts accused of co-operating with the Ukrainian SS. Over 250 Poles were killed.[135] In the nearby village of Palikrovy, 300 Poles were killed, 20 in Maliniska and 16 in Chernytsia. Armed Ukrainian groups destroyed the monastery and stole all valuables. What remained was the painting of Mary of Pidkamin, which now is kept in St. Wojciech Church in Wrocław. According to Kirichuk, the first attacks on the Poles took place there in August 1943 and were probably the work of the UPA units from Volhynia. In retaliation, Poles killed important Ukrainians, including a Ukrainian doctor from Lviv, called Lastowiecky and a popular football player from Przemyśl, called Wowczyszyn.

By the end of the summer, mass acts of terror aimed at Poles were taking place in Eastern Galicia to force Poles to settle on the western bank of the San River under the slogan "Poles behind the San". Snyder estimates that 25,000 Poles were killed in Galicia alone,[147] and Grzegorz Motyka estimated the number of victims at 30,000–40,000.[8]

The slaughter did not stop after the Red Army entered the areas, with massacres taking place in 1945 in such places as Czerwonogrod (Ukrainian: Irkiv), where 60 Poles were murdered on February 2, 1945,[148][149] the day before they were scheduled to depart for the Recovered Territories.

By Autumn 1944, anti-Polish actions stopped, and terror was used only against those who co-operated with the NKVD, but in late 1944-early 1945, the UPA performed a last massive anti-Polish action in the Ternopil region.[150] On the night of 5–6 February 1945, Ukrainian groups attacked the Polish village of Barysz, near Buchach; 126 Poles were massacred, including women and children. A few days later, on 12–13 February, a local group of OUN under Petro Khamchuk attacked the Polish settlement of Puźniki, killed around 100 people and burned houses. Most of those who survived moved to Niemysłowice near Prudnik, Silesia.[151]

Approximately 150[152]–366 Ukrainian and a few Polish inhabitants of Pawłokoma were killed on 3 March 1945 by a former Polish Home Army unit, aided by Polish self-defense groups from nearby villages. The massacre is believed to be an act of retaliation for earlier alleged murders by UPA of 9 or 11 Poles[153] in Pawłokoma and unspecified number of Poles killed by the UPA in the neighboring villages.

Atrocities

[edit]

Attacks on Poles during the massacres in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia were marked with extreme sadism and brutality. Rape, torture and mutilation were commonplace, with entire villages wiped out as a result. Poles were burned alive, flayed, impaled, crucified, disembowelled, dismembered and beheaded. Women were gang raped and had their breasts sliced off, children were hacked to pieces with axes, babies were impaled on bayonets and pitchforks or bashed against trees.[154][155]

According to a document by the Polish underground, the crimes were atrocious:[155]

In all villages, settlements and colonies, without exception, the Ukrainians carried out the operation of murdering Poles with monstrous cruelty. Women – even pregnant ones – were nailed to the ground with bayonets, children were ripped apart by their legs, others were impaled on pitchforks and thrown over fences, members of intelligentsia were tied with barbed wire and thrown into wells, arms, legs and heads were chopped off with axes, tongues were cut out, ears and noses were cut off, eyes were gouged, genitals were butchered, bellies ripped open and entrails pulled out, heads were smashed with hammers, living children were thrown inside burning houses. The barbaric frenzy reached a point that people were sawed apart alive, women had their breasts severed; others were impaled or beaten to death with sticks. Many people were killed – after a death sentence – by having their hands and feet chopped off, and only then their heads.

According to eyewitness Tadeusz Piotrowski about the fate of his friend's family:[154]

First, they raped his wife. Then, they proceeded to execute her by tying her up to a nearby tree and cutting off her breasts. As she hung there bleeding to death, they began to hurl her two-year-old son against the house wall repeatedly until his spirit left his body. Finally, they shot her two daughters. When their bloody deeds were done and all had perished, they threw the bodies into a deep well in front of the house. Then, they set the house ablaze.

The atrocities were carried out indiscriminately and without restraint. The victims, regardless of their age or gender, were routinely tortured to death. Norman Davies in No Simple Victory gives a short but shocking description of the massacres:

Villages were torched. Roman Catholic priests were axed or crucified. Churches were burned with all their parishioners. Isolated farms were attacked by gangs carrying pitchforks and kitchen knives. Throats were cut. Pregnant women were bayoneted. Children were cut in two. Men were ambushed in the field and led away. The perpetrators could not determine the province's future. But at least they could determine that it would be a future without Poles.[156]

An OUN order from early 1944 stated:

Liquidate all Polish traces. Destroy all walls in the Catholic Church and other Polish prayer houses. Destroy orchards and trees in the courtyards so that there will be no trace that someone lived there.... Pay attention to the fact that when something remains that is Polish, then the Poles will have pretensions to our land".[157]

UPA commander's order of 6 April 1944 stated: "Fight them [the Poles] unmercifully. No one is to be spared, even in case of mixed marriages".[158]

Timothy Snyder describes the murders: "Ukrainian partisans burned homes, shot or forced back inside those who tried to flee, and used sickles and pitchforks to kill those they captured outside. In some cases, beheaded, crucified, dismembered, or disemboweled bodies were displayed, in order to encourage remaining Poles to flee".[84][page needed] The Ukrainian historian Yuryi Kirichuk described the conflict as similar to medieval peasant uprisings.[159]

According to the Polish historian Piotr Łossowski, the method used in most of the attacks was the same. At first, local Poles were assured that nothing would happen to them. Then, at dawn, a village was surrounded by armed members of the UPA, behind whom were peasants with axes, knives, hatchets, hammers, pitchforks, shovels, sickles, scythes, hoes and various other farming tools. All of the Poles who were encountered were murdered; most were killed in their homes but sometimes they were herded into churches or barns which were then set on fire. Many Poles were thrown down wells or killed and then buried in shallow mass graves as well. After a massacre, all goods were looted, including clothes, grain and furniture. The final part of an attack was setting fire to the entire village.[160] All vestiges of Polish existence were eradicated, even abandoned Polish settlements were burned to the ground.[52]

Even though it may be an exaggeration to say that the massacres enjoyed the general support of the Ukrainians, it has been suggested that without wide support from local Ukrainians, they would have been impossible.[84][page needed] The Ukrainian peasants who took part in the killings created their own groups, the SKV or Samoboronni Kushtchovi Viddily (Самооборонні Кущові Відділи, СКВ). Many of their victims who were perceived as Poles, even despite not knowing the Polish language, were murdered by СКВ along with the others.[161]

The violence reached its peak on 11 July 1943 known to many Poles as "Bloody Sunday" when the UPA carried out attacks on 100 Polish villages in Volhynia burning them to the ground and slaughtering some 8,000 Polish men, women and children including patients and nurses at a hospital. These attacks as well as others could have been stopped at anytime by the Germans who in some cases were stationed in garrisons in or near the villages that were attacked. German soldiers however were given orders not to intervene. In some cases individual German soldiers and officers made deals with the UPA to give weapons and other materials to them in exchange for a share of the loot taken from Poles.

Ukrainians in ethnically mixed settlements were offered material incentives to convince them to assist in the attacks on their Polish neighbors or warned by the UPA's security service (Sluzhba Bezbeky) to leave by night, and all remaining inhabitants were murdered at dawn. Many Ukrainians risked and in some cases lost their lives for trying to shelter or warn Poles.[84][page needed][162] Such activities were treated by the UPA as collaboration with the enemy and severely punished.[163] In 2007, the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) published a document, Kresowa Księga Sprawiedliwych 1939–1945. O Ukraińcach ratujących Polaków poddanych eksterminacji przez OUN i UPA ("Borderland's Book of the Righteous. About Ukrainians saving Poles from extermination of OUN and UIA"). The author of the book, IPN's historian Romuald Niedzielko, documented 1341 cases in which Ukrainian civilians helped their Polish neighbours, which caused 384 Ukrainians to be executed by the UPA.[164]

In Polish-Ukrainian families, one common UPA instruction was to kill one's Polish spouse and children born of that marriage. People who refused to carry such an order were often murdered, together with their entire family.[30][165]

According to Ukrainian sources, in October 1943 the Volhynian delegation of the Polish government estimated the number of Polish casualties in Sarny, Kostopol, Równe and Zdołbunów counties to exceed 15,000.[166] Timothy Snyder estimates that in July 1943, the UPA actions resulted in the deaths of at least 40,000 Polish civilians in Volhynia (in March 1944, another 10,000 were killed in Galicia),[167] causing additional 200,000 Poles to flee west before September 1944 and 800,000 afterward.[84][page needed][167]

Self-defence organizations

[edit]

The massacres prompted Poles in April 1943 to begin to organize in self-defence, 100 of such organizations being formed in Volhynia in 1943. Sometimes, self-defence organizations obtained arms from the Germans, but other times, the Germans confiscated their weapons and arrested the leaders. Many of the organizations could not withstand the pressure of the UPA and were destroyed. Only the largest self-defense organizations, which were able to obtain help from the Home Army or Soviet partisans, were able to survive.[168] Kazimierz Bąbiński, commander of the Union for Armed Struggle-Home Army Wołyń in his order to AK partisan units stated:[169]

I forbid the use of the methods utilized by the Ukrainian butchers. We will not burn Ukrainian homesteads nor kill Ukrainian women and children in retaliation. The self-defence network must protect itself from the aggressors or attack the aggressors but leave the peaceful population and their possessions alone.

— "Luboń"

On 20 July 1943, Polish self-defense units were ordered to subordinate themselves to the Home Army's control. Ten days later, the Home Army declared itself in support of an independent Ukrainian state that would encompass non-Polish inhabited areas, and made an appeal to end the civilian bloodshed.[170]

Polish self-defence organizations started to take part in revenge massacres of Ukrainian civilians in the summer of 1943, when Ukrainian villagers who had nothing to do with the massacres suffered at the hands of Polish partisan forces. Evidence includes a letter dated 26 August 1943 to the local Polish self-defence in which the AK commander Kazimierz Bąbiński criticized the burning of neighboring Ukrainian villages, the killing of any Ukrainian who crossed its path and the robbing of Ukrainians of their material possessions.[171] The total number of Ukrainian civilians murdered in Volyn in retaliatory acts by Poles is estimated at 2,000–3,000.[172]

The 27th Home Army Infantry Division was established in January 1944 with the purpose of fighting the UPA and later the German forces.[170]

German involvement

[edit]

While Germans actively encouraged the conflict, they tried not to get directly involved. Special German units formed from the collaborationist Ukrainian and later the Polish auxiliary police were deployed in pacification actions in Volhynia, and some of their crimes were attributed to the Home Army or to the UPA.[citation needed]

According to Yuriy Kirichuk the Germans actively prodded both sides of the conflict against each other.[173] Erich Koch once said: "We have to do everything possible so that a Pole meeting a Ukrainian, would be willing to kill him and conversely, a Ukrainian would be willing to kill a Pole". Kirichuk quotes a German commissioner from Sarny who responded to the Polish complaints: "You want Sikorski, the Ukrainians want Bandera. Fight each other".[173]

The Germans replaced Ukrainian policemen who deserted from the German service with Polish policemen. Around 1,200 local Poles joined the police, mainly out of desire to avenge UPA atrocities and to obtain means to defend themselves.[174] German policy called for the murder of the family of every Ukrainian police officer who deserted and the destruction of the village of any Ukrainian police officer who deserted with his weapons. Those retaliations were carried out using newly recruited Polish policemen. Polish participation in the German police followed UPA attacks on Polish settlements, but it provided Ukrainian nationalists with useful sources of propaganda and was used as a justification for the ethnic cleansing. The OUN-B leader summarized the situation in August 1943 by saying that the German administration "uses Polaks in its destructive actions. In response we destroy them unmercifully".[96] Despite the desertions in March and April 1943, Ukrainian policemen continued to comprise a significant part of the auxiliary police forces and to pacify Polish and other villages under German orders.[175]

On 25 August 1943, the German authorities ordered all Poles to leave the villages and settlements and to move to larger towns.[citation needed]

Soviet partisan units in the area were aware of the massacres. On 25 May 1943, the commander of the Soviet partisan forces of the Rivne area stressed in his report to the headquarters that Ukrainian nationalists did not shoot the Poles but cut them dead with knives and axes, with no consideration for age or gender.[176]

Number of victims

[edit]

According to historian George Liber,

the range of these estimates is very broad and must be treated with considerable caution... It is tempting to split the difference between the high and low estimates or to use the highest number of civilian victims to rationalize claims of ethnic cleansing or genocide...[177]

Polish casualties

[edit]

The death toll among civilians murdered during the Volhynia Massacre is still being researched. At least 10% of ethnic Poles in Volhynia were killed by the UPA, according to Ivan Katchanovski, and thus "Polish casualties comprised about 1% of the prewar population of Poles on territories where the UPA was active and 0.2% of the entire ethnically Polish population in Ukraine and Poland".[178] Łossowski emphasizes that documentation is far from conclusive, as in numerous cases, no survivors were later able to testify.[citation needed]

The Soviet and German invasions of prewar eastern Poland, the UPA massacres, and the postwar Soviet expulsions of Poles contributed to the virtual elimination of a Polish presence in the region. Those who remained left Volhynia, mostly for the neighbouring province of Lublin. After the war, the survivors moved further west to the territories of Lower Silesia. Polish orphans from Volhynia were kept in several orphanages, with the largest of them around Kraków. Several former Polish villages in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia no longer exist, and those that remain are in ruins.[citation needed]

The Institute of National Remembrance estimates that 100,000 Poles were killed by the Ukrainian nationalists (40,000–60,000 victims in Volhynia, 30,000–40,000 in Eastern Galicia and at least 4,000 in Lesser Poland, including up to 2,000 in the Chełm region).[179] For Eastern Galicia, other estimates range between 20,000 and 25,000,[180] 25,000 and 30,000–40,000.[8] In his 2006 general history of WWII, Niall Ferguson gives the total number of Polish victims in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia as between 60,000 and 80,000.[181] G. Rossolinski-Liebe estimated 70,000–100,000.[182] John P. Himka says that "perhaps a hundred thousand" Poles were killed in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia.[6] According to Motyka, from 1943 to 1945 in all territories covered by the conflict, approximately 100,000 Poles were killed.[183] Ivan Katchanovski, a Ukrainian political scientist, writes that, according to Polish and Western estimates, 35,000–60,000 Poles were killed by the UPA in Volhynia alone; he states: "the lower bound of these estimates [35,000] is more reliable than higher estimates which are based on an assumption that the Polish population in the region was several times less likely to perish as a result of Nazi genocidal policies compared to other regions of Poland and compared to the Ukrainian population of Volhynia".[178] Władysław Siemaszko and his daughter Ewa have documented 33,454 Polish victims, 18,208 of whom are known by surname.[184] (in July 2010, Ewa increased the accounts to 38,600 documented victims, 22,113 of whom are known by surname[185]). At the first-ever joint Polish-Ukrainian conference in Podkowa Leśna, organized on June 7–9, 1994, by Karta Centre, and subsequent Polish-Ukrainian historian meetings, with almost 50 Polish and Ukrainian participants, an estimate of 50,000 Polish deaths in Volhynia was settled on,[186] which they considered to be moderate.[citation needed] According to the sociologist Piotrowski, the UPA actions resulted in an estimated number of 68,700 deaths in Wołyń Voivodeship.[187] Per Anders Rudling states that the UPA killed 40,000–70,000 Poles in the area.[30] Some extreme estimates place the number of Polish victims as high as 300,000.[188][verification needed] Also, the numbers include Polonized Armenians killed in the massacres, such as in Kuty.[189] The studies from 2011[clarification needed] quote 91,200 confirmed deaths, 43,987 of which are known by name.[190]

Ukrainian casualties

[edit]

After the initiation of the massacres, Polish self-defense units responded in kind. All conflicts resulted in Poles taking revenge on Ukrainian civilians.[9] A. Rudling estimates Ukrainian casualties which were caused by Polish retribution at 2,000–3,000 in Volhynia.[30] G. Rossolinski-Liebe puts the number of Ukrainians, both OUN-UPA members and civilians, killed by Poles during and after World War II to be 10,000–20,000.[182] According to Kataryna Wolczuk, for all of the areas affected by conflict, the Ukrainian casualties range from 10,000 to 30,000 between 1943 and 1947.[191] According to Motyka, the author of a fundamental monograph about the UPA,[according to whom?][192] estimations of 30,000 Ukrainian casualties are unsupported;[25] his estimates are 2,000–3,000 Ukrainians killed in Volhynia and 10,000–15,000 in all of the territories covered by the conflict in 1943–1947. He states that most of the Ukrainian casualties occurred within the post-war Polish borders (8,000–10,000, including 5,000–6,000 Ukrainians killed in 1944–1947).[25]

The historian Timothy Snyder considers it likely that the UPA killed as many Ukrainians as it killed Poles, because local Ukrainians who did not adhere to its form of nationalism were considered traitors.[9]

Responsibility

[edit]

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), of which the UPA had become the armed wing, promoted the removal, by force if necessary, of non-Ukrainians from the social and economic spheres of a future Ukrainian state.[193]

The OUN adopted in 1929 the Ten Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalists to which all of its members were expected to adhere. They stated, "Do not hesitate to carry out the most dangerous deeds" and "Treat the enemies of your nation with hatred and ruthlessness".[194]

The decision of ethnic cleansing of the area east of the Bug River was taken by the UPA early in 1943. In March 1943, the OUN(B) (specifically Mykola Lebed[195]) imposed a collective death sentence of all Poles living in the former east of the Second Polish Republic, and a few months later, local units of the UPA were instructed to complete the operation soon.[196] The decision to eliminate the territory's Poles determined the course of future events. According to Timothy Snyder, the ethnic cleansing of the Poles was exclusively the work of the extremist Bandera faction of the OUN, rather than its Melnyk faction or other Ukrainian political or religious organizations. Polish investigators claim that the OUN-B central leadership decided in February 1943 to drive all Poles out of Volhynia to obtain an "ethnically pure territory" in the postwar period. Among those who were behind the decision, Polish investigators singled out Dmytro Klyachkivsky, Vasyl Ivakhov, Ivan Lytvynchuk and Petro Oliynyk.[197]

Ethnic violence was exacerbated with the circulation of posters and leaflets inciting the Ukrainian population to murder Poles and "Judeo-Muscovites" alike.[198][199][200]

Taras Bulba-Borovets, the founder of the UPA, criticized the attacks as soon as they began:

The axe and the flail have gone into motion. Whole families are butchered and hanged, and Polish settlements are set on fire. The "hatchet men", to their shame, butcher and hang defenceless women and children.... By such work Ukrainians not only do a favor for the SD [German security service], but also present themselves in the eyes of the world as barbarians. We must take into account that England will surely win this war, and it will treat these "hatchet men" and lynchers and incendiaries as agents in the service of Hitlerite cannibalism, not as honest fighters for their freedom, not as state-builders.[201]

According to prosecutor Piotr Zając, the Polish Institute of National Remembrance in 2003 considered three different versions of the events in its investigation:[202]

  1. The Ukrainians at first planned to chase the Poles out, but events got out of hand over time.
  2. The decision to exterminate the Poles came directly from the OUN-UPA headquarters.
  3. The decision to exterminate the Poles can be attributed to some of the leaders of the OUN-UPA in the course of an internal conflict in the organisation.

The IPN concluded that the second version to be the most likely.[203]

In October 1943 the OUN issued a communication (in Ukrainian only) that condemned the "mutual mass murders" of Ukrainians and Poles.[204]

Reconciliation

[edit]

In 1944–1945, the UPA and Home Army initiated a ceasefire and orders to cease any actions against civilians, and with mediation of Orthodox and Roman Catholic clergy a meeting was arranged between commanders of both formations. The agreement resulted in joint UPA-Home Army operation against NKVD prison in Hrubieszów. By 1948, both organisations largely ceased to exist with its members arrested or escaping to the West.[205]

The question of official acknowledgment of the ethnic cleansing remains a matter of discussion between Polish and Ukrainian historians and political leaders. Efforts are ongoing to bring about reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians regarding the events. The Polish side has made steps towards reconciliation; in 2002 President Aleksander Kwaśniewski expressed regret over the resettlement program, known as Operation Vistula: "The infamous Operation Vistula is a symbol of the abominable deeds perpetrated by the communist authorities against Polish citizens of Ukrainian origin." He stated that the argument that "Operation Vistula was the revenge for the slaughter of Poles by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army" in 1943–1944 to be "fallacious and ethically inadmissible" by invoking "the principle of collective guilt".[206] The Ukrainian government has not yet issued an apology.[207][208]

On 11 July 2003, Presidents Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leonid Kuchma attended a ceremony held in the Volhynian village of Pavlivka (previously known as Poryck),[209] where they unveiled a monument to the reconciliation. The Polish president said that it is unjust to blame the entire Ukrainian nation for these acts of terror: "The Ukrainian nation cannot be blamed for the massacre perpetrated on the Polish population. There are no nations that are guilty.... It is always specific people who bear the responsibility for crimes".[210]

Between 2015 and 2018 a Forum of Polish and Ukrainian Historians was jointly researching archival documents, including new archives declassified by Ukrainian government. Another joint effort resulted in publishing multi-volume book "Poland and Ukraine in the 1930s–1940s: Unknown documents from the secret service archives"[211] first volume of which was published in 1998 and 10th in 2020. The cooperation is led on government level by Institute of National Remembrance (Poland) and Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (HDA SBU).[212]

In 2016 Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko visited Warsaw and paid tribute to the victims at the Volhynia monument.[213]

In 2017, Ukrainian politicians banned the exhumation of the remains of Polish victims in Ukraine killed by the UPA in revenge for Polish demolition of the illegal UPA monument in the village of Hruszowice.[214][215]

In 2018, Polish president Andrzej Duda refused to participate in a joint ceremony commemorating the 75th anniversary of the massacres with the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and instead travelled to Lutsk to hold a separate event.[216][clarification needed]

In May 2023, Ukraine's Rada chairman Ruslan Stefanchuk spoke in front of the Polish Sejm, where he expressed sympathy to the victims of the massacre, their families and descendants and called for reconciliation. Stefanchuk promised continued joint work on explaining the details of the tragedy. The speech was described as Polish minister of foreign affairs Zbigniew Rau as "promising".[217]

In June 2023 archeological excavations started in a former village of Puzhniki in Volhynia by a group of Polish scientists to identify possible mass graves of the massacre victims.[218]

In July 2023, Polish president Andrzej Duda and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky jointly paid tribute to the victims in Lutsk, administrative capital of the Volhynia region, attended a mass in local church on the 80th anniversary of the tragedy.[219] A joint declaration on the need of reconciliation was also signed by heads of Roman Catholic Church in Poland, archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Sviatoslav Shevchuk.[220] Polish Sejm adopted a resolution commemorating the victims, blaming OUN and UPA, praising rescue offered to the Poles by some Ukrainian individuals, calling for reconciliation recognizing guilt of the perpetrators and highlighting the need for exhumations.[221]

On 15 January 2025, Ukrainian president Zelensky and Polish prime minister Donald Tusk reached an agreement to allow exhumations, it also being noted by the Polish deputy prime minister that this impacted Ukraine's joining of the European Union.[222]

Classification as genocide

[edit]

Scholarly consensus

[edit]

UCLA historian Jared McBride, an expert in the region and in the Holocaust, writing in Slavic Review in 2016, said there is a "scholarly consensus that this was a case of ethnic cleansing as opposed to genocide".[28]

Writing in 2004, historian Antony Polonsky, an expert on the Holocaust and Polish Jewish history, said that the "[massacres'] goal was not so much genocide as it was to force the local Polish population to leave."[223]: 290 

Historian Per Anders Rudling wrote in 2006 that the goal of the OUN-UPA was not the extermination of Poles but ethnic cleansing of the region to attain an ethnically homogeneous state. The goal was thus to prevent a repeat of 1918–20, when Poland crushed Ukrainian independence, as the Polish Home Army was attempting to restore the Polish Republic in its pre-1939 borders.[30]

According to a 2010 conference paper by Ivan Katchanovski, the mass killings of Poles in Volhynia by the UPA cannot be classified as a genocide because there is no evidence that the UPA intended to annihilate entire or significant parts of the Polish nation, the UPA action was mostly limited to a relatively small area and the number of Poles killed was quite a small fraction of the prewar Polish population in both the territories in which the UPA operated and of the entire Polish population in Poland and Ukraine.[178]

In 2016, Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, author of a scholarly biography of Bandera, argued that the killings were ethnic cleansing rather than genocide. Rossoliński-Liebe sees "genocide", in this context, as a word that is sometimes used in political attacks on Ukraine.[224]

However, historian Grzegorz Motyka, an expert on Polish-Ukrainian issues, argued in 2021 that "although the anti-Polish action was an ethnic cleansing, it also meets the definition of genocide".[225]

Polish view

[edit]
Memorial OUN-UPA Genocide Victims' Avenue located in the city of Legnica, Poland

The Polish Institute of National Remembrance investigated the crimes committed by the UPA against the Poles in Volhynia, Galicia and prewar Lublin Voivodeship and collected over 10,000 pages of documents and protocols. The massacres were described by the commission's prosecutor, Piotr Zając, as bearing the characteristics of a genocide: "there is no doubt that the crimes committed against the people of Polish nationality have the character of genocide".[226] The Institute of National Remembrance stated:

The Volhynian massacres have all the traits of genocide listed in the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which defines genocide as an act "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such".[227]

Some participants at a conference on the massacres held in 2008 by the Institute used the word "Zagłada", originally applied to the Final Solution, to describe them.[228]

On 15 July 2009, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland unanimously adopted a resolution regarding "the tragic fate of Poles in Eastern Borderlands". The text of the resolution states that July 2009 marks the 66th anniversary "of the beginning of anti-Polish actions by the Organization of Ukrainian nationalists and the UPA on Polish Eastern territories – mass murders characterised by ethnic cleansing with marks of genocide".[229] On 8 July 2016, the Sejm passed a resolution declaring 11 July a National Day of Remembrance of the victims of the Genocide of the Citizens of the Polish Republic committed by Ukrainian Nationalists and formally called the massacres a genocide.[230][231]

A number of Polish authors, especially on the right, have labeled the Volhynia massacres worse than Nazi or Soviet atrocities in terms of their brutality, though not in scale, as so many of the victims were tortured and mutilated.[232]

Ukrainian view

[edit]

In Ukraine, the events are called "Volhynia tragedy".[233][2] Coverage in textbooks may be brief and/or euphemistic.[234] Some Ukrainian historians accept the genocide classification, but argue that it was a "bilateral genocide" and that the Home Army was responsible for crimes against Ukrainian civilians that were equivalent in nature.[232]

Many Ukrainians perceived the 2016 resolution as an "anti-Ukrainian gesture" in the context of Vladimir Putin's attempts to use the Volhynia issue to divide Poland and Ukraine in the context of the Russian–Ukrainian war. In September 2016, the parliament of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada, passed a resolution condemning "the one-sided political assessment of the historical events" in Poland.[232] According to Ukrainian historian Andrii Portnov, the classification as genocide has been strongly supported by Poles who were expelled from the east and by parts of the Polish right-wing politics.

Ukrainian historians called for assessing the massacres in the historical context, pointing out historical repressions against Ukrainian population and forced polonization in pre-war Poland.[217]

Ukrainian historian Yuri Shapoval openly speaks about the "Volhynia Slaughter" and calls for increased recognition of the massacre inside Ukraine, pointing out very complex ethnic composition of these territories, mutual historical resentments and incitement by external parties, Soviets, Germans and Polish government on exile.[211]

[edit]

In 2009, a Polish historical documentary film Było sobie miasteczko... was produced by Adam Kruk for Telewizja Polska which tells the story of the Kisielin massacre.[235]

The massacre of Poles in Volhynia was depicted in the 2016 movie Volhynia, which was directed by the Polish screenwriter and film director Wojciech Smarzowski.

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and were organized campaigns of and targeting the Polish civilian population, conducted primarily by the (UPA) under the direction of the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) from early 1943 through 1945 in the and regions, then under Nazi German occupation during . The UPA's explicit orders, issued by commanders such as , called for the extermination of all Poles in the area regardless of age or gender, motivated by the goal of establishing an ethnically pure by removing Polish inhabitants who might contest territorial claims post-war. These atrocities resulted in the deaths of an estimated 50,000 to Poles, with methods including mass shootings, burnings, and mutilations in over 2,000 documented attacks on villages, often on Sundays during church services to maximize civilian casualties. While Polish self-defense units and retaliations caused several thousand Ukrainian deaths, the scale and intent were asymmetrical, with Ukrainian actions constituting premeditated rather than reciprocal conflict. The events remain controversial, recognized as by Polish authorities and scholars but often reframed in Ukrainian narratives as a mutual or war episode, reflecting ongoing historiographical disputes influenced by national memory politics.

Historical Context

Interwar Polish Rule and Ukrainian Grievances

Following Poland's victory in the Polish-Soviet War and the Treaty of Riga on March 18, 1921, the Second Polish Republic incorporated Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, territories with substantial Ukrainian populations. In Volhynia Voivodeship, the 1931 Polish census recorded Ukrainians as comprising 68-70% of the over 2 million inhabitants, with Poles at 16-17% and Jews around 10%. Eastern Galicia exhibited a similar rural Ukrainian majority, though urban centers like Lwów remained predominantly Polish. Polish governance emphasized national consolidation through , restricting Ukrainian cultural and educational autonomy. In , Ukrainian schools numbered only 11 by 1934, contrasted with 545 Polish ones, limiting access to native-language instruction. Administrative positions favored Poles, and Ukrainian political organizations faced dissolution or surveillance, such as the 1932 breakup of the Sel-Rob peasant union. These measures aimed to integrate the minority but were interpreted by Ukrainian elites as suppression of . Agrarian reforms deepened tensions, privileging Polish military settlers (osadnicy) who received an average of 16.6 hectares of , often expropriated from large estates, while Ukrainian peasants obtained parcels of 2-4 hectares. Approximately 100,000 Polish immigrants bolstered this demographic shift, perceived as that marginalized Ukrainian economic interests. In , comparable land policies and forced integration into Polish cooperatives reinforced grievances over unequal resource distribution. In retaliation for sabotage by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), Polish authorities launched a pacification campaign in from September to November 1930, targeting over 450 Ukrainian settlements with house searches, arrests, and property destruction. This operation, involving army and police units, symbolized repressive state control and provoked widespread Ukrainian protests and boycotts of Polish institutions, including the 1922 elections in Galicia. By the late 1930s, intensified measures, such as the 1938 campaign against Orthodox Ukrainians involving forced conversions, further alienated the population, viewing Polish rule as an existential threat to Ukrainian . These policies, while stabilizing Polish authority, cultivated enduring resentments that nationalist groups exploited for mobilization.

Emergence of Radical Ukrainian Nationalism

The (UVO), founded in 1920 by émigré officers including , marked an early stage in the radicalization of following the collapse of bids in 1917–1921. Composed largely of veterans from the and other units of the army, the UVO operated from bases in and promoted armed insurgency against Polish and Soviet control through sabotage, expropriations, and targeted killings aimed at destabilizing occupation regimes. In 1929, the UVO merged with radical youth groups such as the Group of Ukrainian National Youth and the Ukrainian National Alliance's combat units to form the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in , under Konovalets' overarching Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists. The OUN's ideology centered on integralnist (), which subordinated individual rights to the nation's collective will, rejected democratic pluralism in favor of a single-party authoritarian state, and justified as essential for forging national unity and expelling foreign rulers. This doctrine drew partial inspiration from European authoritarian models, emphasizing militarized elite vanguardism and anti-communist, anti-Polish to reclaim territories like and for a greater Ukraine. The pursuit of ethnic homogeneity underpinned this vision, increasingly framing Poles and other minorities as barriers to Ukrainian sovereignty that required systematic elimination to achieve a pure national state, laying ideological groundwork for later ethnic cleansing efforts during World War II. The OUN's radicalism manifested in escalating violence during the 1930s, including over 60 documented assassinations between 1921 and 1939 targeting Polish officials, Ukrainian moderates, and Soviet agents to intimidate collaborators and assert dominance. Notable actions included the 1931 killing of Polish activist Tadeusz Hołówko and the 1934 of Interior Minister in by OUN operative Hryhorii Maцейko, which prompted Polish authorities to intern thousands of nationalists in the Bereza Kartuska camp. In , where OUN networks were densest, the group infiltrated student and organizations to recruit youth alienated by land reforms and cultural restrictions, fostering a of martyrdom and ; influence in remained weaker but grew through cross-regional emphasizing ethnic homogeneity. Konovalets' by an agent in on May 23, 1938, intensified internal militancy, paving the way for factional splits between the more conspiratorial Andriy Melnyk wing and the activist-oriented faction by 1940. The OUN's growth during the interwar period, drawing on widespread grievances, positioned it to evolve into wartime paramilitary structures, including the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) formed in 1942, which advanced these nationalist objectives through armed ethnic purification campaigns.

Polish Policies Toward Ukrainian Minority

In the , Polish policies toward the Ukrainian minority in and emphasized assimilation and administrative control, reflecting the Second Polish Republic's efforts to consolidate national unity in multiethnic borderlands acquired after . With approximately 5 million comprising 16 percent of Poland's population, policies varied by region: in , where formed 64 percent (about 1.5 million) of the voivodeship's inhabitants per the 1931 census, the approach initially included the "Volhynian experiment" (1930–1938) under Governor Henryk Józewski, which sought limited Ukrainian-Polish coexistence through bilingual administration and cultural concessions, though these were reversed in the late 1930s amid rising nationalism. In , where Ukrainian resistance was stronger, policies were more repressive, including the isolation of Galician from Volhynian counterparts to prevent unified opposition. Land reform and colonization efforts disproportionately favored ethnic Poles, exacerbating economic grievances among Ukrainian peasants. The , implemented via regulations on 23 March 1921, nationalized large estates for redistribution, but Polish military settlers (osadnicy) received an average of 16.6 hectares per parcel, while were allotted only 2–4 hectares, fostering inequality in where constituted 69.8 percent of the in 1931. Between 1921 and 1938, around 17,700 Polish colonists and veterans settled in Volhynian and Galician countrysides, altering local demographics and prioritizing Polish economic dominance. Educational restrictions limited Ukrainian cultural development. The Elementary School Act of 31 1924 curtailed Ukrainian-language instruction, leading to a decline in unilingual Ukrainian schools and their replacement by bilingual Polish-Ukrainian ones in both regions; by 1934 in , only 11 fully Ukrainian schools operated compared to 545 Polish ones. failed to fulfill a 1922 parliamentary promise of a Ukrainian university, and access remained restricted. Repressive measures targeted Ukrainian organizations and escalated in response to nationalist activities. In , the 1930 pacification campaign—triggered by Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) sabotage, including arson— involved military operations from September to November, featuring arrests, beatings, property destruction in over 700 villages, and compulsory quartering of Polish troops in Ukrainian homes, though it spared . Political groups faced dissolution, such as the Ukrainian Sel-Rob peasant party in 1932, while weaker pro-Polish factions were tolerated to fragment Ukrainian unity. Late 1930s actions included the destruction of Orthodox churches in the region to enforce religious .

Prelude to Conflict During

Occupations of and

On September 17, 1939, following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the invaded eastern Poland, rapidly occupying and by the end of the month. These territories, previously part of the Second Polish Republic, were annexed to the , with (Lwów) serving as a key administrative center. authorities implemented policies of , collectivization, and suppression of Polish and Ukrainian nationalist elements, targeting landowners, intellectuals, and . Between 1939 and 1941, the conducted multiple waves of deportations from these regions, primarily affecting ethnic Poles but also and others deemed unreliable, with estimates indicating over 300,000 Poles deported from and alone to labor camps in and . In June 1941, as German forces advanced, the executed between 10,000 and 40,000 political prisoners held in prisons across , including in , , and other sites in and Galicia, to prevent their liberation; victims included Poles, , and . These actions significantly reduced the Polish population and deepened ethnic resentments, as both Poles and suffered under Soviet repression, though Poles were disproportionately targeted as former rulers. The German invasion of the on June 22, 1941, under , led to the rapid occupation of and by forces within weeks. was incorporated into the , a civil administration headed by , while was added to the General Government as Distrikt Galizien in August 1941. Initially, some Ukrainian nationalists, organized under the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), collaborated with the Germans, forming auxiliary police units that participated in anti-Jewish pogroms and the early stages of , which claimed the lives of nearly all of the 1.5 million Jews in Ukraine. German policies favored over Poles in administration and policing to exploit ethnic divisions, but suppressed Ukrainian independence aspirations after the OUN-B's short-lived proclamation of a in on June 30, 1941, leading to the arrest of leaders like . Poles faced systematic persecution as potential saboteurs, with thousands executed or sent to labor camps, further eroding Polish presence in rural areas and creating opportunities for Ukrainian insurgent groups to operate amid the German retreat in 1943-1944. The dual occupations thus intensified pre-existing tensions, with Soviet deportations decimating Polish elites and German favoritism emboldening radical Ukrainian elements.

OUN Factionalism and Preparations for Ethnic Struggle

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) underwent a significant schism in February 1940, dividing into two factions: the more radical OUN-Bandera (OUN-B), led by , which emphasized revolutionary tactics and inspired by , and the OUN-Melnyk (OUN-M), led by Andriy Melnyk, which favored a more hierarchical and collaborative approach with potential allies like . The split, formalized at a conference in April 1941, stemmed from leadership disputes following the 1938 assassination of OUN founder and differing visions for achieving Ukrainian independence amid interwar Polish rule and impending war. OUN-B, dominant in including and , attracted younger militants and prioritized armed over negotiation. During the German occupation starting June 1941, OUN-B attempted to proclaim a in on June 30, 1941, but Bandera and other leaders were arrested by , who viewed Ukrainian nationalists as ; this shifted OUN-B underground, fostering anti-German and anti-Soviet guerrilla preparations. OUN-M, meanwhile, maintained limited with German authorities, highlighting factional divergences in . By early 1943, following the German defeat at Stalingrad in February, OUN-B's Third Conference (February 17–21, 1943) resolved to establish the (UPA) as a unified force under its control, primarily to combat resurgent while pursuing ethnic homogeneity in claimed territories. OUN-B ideologue advocated for the "cleansing" of Poles from by April 1943, framing them as obstacles to a sovereign and potential Soviet collaborators, a view rooted in prewar nationalist grievances over Polish settlement policies. UPA formation in late March 1943, led by , incorporated former trained in German anti-partisan and operations, providing tactical expertise for escalated violence. In , OUN-B regional chief ("Klym Savur") directed initial anti-Polish actions from February 1943, with small-scale attacks on settlements escalating into systematic targeting; by June 1943, he issued a secret oral order for the "physical extermination" of the Polish population in key districts, implemented through UPA detachments like "." A July 1943 OUN-B meeting near Yaroslavychi and Yalovychi, attended by Klyachkivsky, coordinated broader mass operations, reflecting preparations blending ideological purity with pragmatic elimination of rivals amid triple occupation chaos (Soviet 1939–1941, German 1941–1944). These efforts prioritized mobilization via land promises and anti-Polish , setting the stage for ethnic struggle over coexistence. OUN-M exerted minimal influence in , where OUN-B's revolutionary wing dominated UPA ranks, leading to internal purges of Melnykists by mid-1943 and absorption of their detachments. Preparations emphasized units (SB) instructions for "wise" extermination methods, avoiding overt provocation of while neutralizing Polish self-defense potential, as evidenced by summer 1943 directives. This factional dynamic and preemptive targeting reflected OUN-B's causal realism: viewing Polish presence as an existential barrier to , exacerbated by economic collapse and fears of Polish-Soviet alliances.

Polish Underground Resistance and Initial Clashes

The Armia Krajowa (AK), the principal component of the loyal to the in , reestablished clandestine networks in and after the German invasion of the on June 22, 1941, which displaced the prior Soviet occupation. These structures emphasized intelligence operations against German authorities, of supply lines, and arms caching for anticipated anti-occupation warfare, while avoiding direct entanglement in ethnic disputes to preserve resources for confronting the primary occupier. By 1942, AK commands in , under figures such as Kazimierz Bąbiński ("Lubelski"), coordinated district-level activities across Polish-populated areas, though membership remained limited—estimated at several thousand active personnel amid severe German repression. Ukrainian nationalist formations, particularly the OUN-Bandera faction and its nascent UPA units emerging in October 1942, initiated targeted killings of Polish civilians in late 1942 and early 1943, shifting AK priorities toward immediate survival. The February 9, 1943, assault on the Parośla colony—where UPA fighters killed over 173 Poles, including women and children, using axes and firearms—marked one of the earliest documented large-scale incidents, exposing the vulnerability of isolated settlements and compelling local AK elements to improvise defenses. In response, AK instructed affiliated villages to form rudimentary groups, often comprising civilians armed with scavenged rifles, pistols, and limited smuggled explosives; these units numbered in the dozens per cluster by , prioritizing fortification of key hamlets over offensive operations. Initial armed clashes remained asymmetrical and localized, with Polish forces conducting defensive stands rather than reprisals, as AK leadership assessed UPA strength—at up to 5,000-7,000 fighters in by spring 1943—as exceeding their own capabilities for sustained engagement. Examples included skirmishes near Kowel in , where AK patrols repelled scouting parties but suffered casualties due to inferior numbers and weaponry; such encounters typically involved 20-50 combatants per side and aimed at disrupting ambushes rather than territorial control. In , AK units under the Lwów District similarly rallied ad hoc militias following isolated attacks, such as those in January 1943 near , but deferred major actions pending reinforcement from central command. These early responses, though effective in saving isolated groups—e.g., evacuating hundreds from threatened outposts—failed to halt the escalating UPA campaign, as German passivity and Soviet partisan distractions further constrained AK maneuvers.

Execution of the Massacres

Formation and Strategy of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)


The (UPA) was established by the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) on October 14, 1942, as a paramilitary force aimed at achieving Ukrainian independence through armed struggle against occupying powers. Initial units emerged earlier, incorporating existing partisan groups such as those led by in Polissia and during late 1942. , using the pseudonym Taras Chuprynka, served as the supreme commander from 1943 until his death in 1950, overseeing the integration of OUN-B networks into a structured . In , (nom de guerre Klym Savur) commanded UPA-North, directing operations in the region central to the anti-Polish campaign.
The UPA's overarching strategy prioritized the creation of an ethnically homogeneous in territories including and , necessitating the removal of non-Ukrainian populations perceived as threats to national sovereignty due to historical territorial claims and fears of Polish reassertion. This involved against German and Soviet forces while simultaneously targeting Polish civilians and settlements to preempt Polish irredentism and secure control over disputed borderlands. OUN-B , including Klyachkivsky, explicitly ordered the physical liquidation of the Polish minority in as early as late 1942, framing it as a defensive measure against anticipated Polish reprisals and a means to consolidate Ukrainian dominance. By , UPA units mobilized rapidly to execute this policy, conducting systematic village raids that escalated into widespread massacres during mid-1943. Tactics emphasized surprise attacks on isolated Polish communities, often at night or during religious holidays, to maximize civilian casualties and induce panic-driven flight. UPA forces, numbering several thousand by 1943, relied on local Ukrainian support, propaganda portraying Poles as colonial oppressors, and the destruction of Polish cultural sites to erase traces of presence. While UPA documents post-facto claimed actions were retaliatory, internal directives reveal premeditated as a core objective, independent of Polish efforts. This approach aligned with OUN-B's , which subordinated tactical alliances to long-term territorial purification.

Initial Massacres in Volhynia (Early 1943)

The initial phase of the massacres against Poles in commenced in early 1943, orchestrated by the (UPA) under the auspices of the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), driven by the aim to resolve territorial disputes through the elimination of Polish populations claiming the same lands. These attacks targeted Polish settlements in rural areas, primarily civilians including women and children, employing brutal methods such as axes, scythes, and arson to eradicate Polish presence and assert Ukrainian control over the territory. The operations were directed by regional UPA commanders, reflecting a strategic intent for ethnic homogenization amid the power vacuum left by retreating German forces. The inaugural major assault occurred on February 9, 1943, in the Parośla I colony near Sarny, where a UPA unit led by Hryhorij Perehijniak ("Dowbeszka-Korobka") murdered approximately 173 Polish inhabitants, hacking many with axes in a nighttime raid that spared no age or gender. Eyewitness accounts, as documented in postwar investigations, describe the assailants arriving under the guise of units before unleashing systematic slaughter, signaling the deliberate initiation of anti-Polish actions. In March 1943, further raids intensified, exemplified by the attack on Lipniki village, where UPA forces commanded by Ivan Lytvynchuk ("Dubovy") killed at least 179 Poles, burning homes and executing families en masse. These early incidents, though smaller in scale compared to later peaks, established the pattern of surprise assaults on isolated settlements, with perpetrators often local mobilized from who had defected from German service. By late April, the violence escalated with the April 22–23 destruction of Janowa Dolina, a Polish settlement and lumber mill community, where UPA detachments slaughtered around 600 residents and razed the village, underscoring the campaign's growing coordination under UPA chief Dmytro Klyachkivsky's oversight in Volhynia. Klyachkivsky's directives, emphasizing the "physical extermination" of Poles in western Volhynia counties, formalized the policy driving these initial operations, prioritizing civilian elimination over military engagement.

Escalation in Volhynia (Holy Week to Autumn 1943)

The escalation of massacres against Polish civilians in intensified during 1943, marking a shift from sporadic attacks to systematic orchestrated by the (UPA) under the command of ("Klym Savur"). On the night of April 22–23, 1943, UPA units led by Ivan Lytvynchuk ("Dubovy") assaulted the Polish settlement of Janowa Dolina, a colony, killing approximately 600 inhabitants, primarily women, children, and the elderly, using axes, pitchforks, and firearms; survivors were often mutilated or burned alive. This attack, targeting a community of Polish foresters and their families, exemplified the UPA's intent to eradicate Polish presence in rural areas, as evidenced by Klyachkivsky's earlier March directive to "remove" all Poles from to secure Ukrainian ethnic homogeneity. Subsequent months saw a surge in coordinated raids. In late and May 1943, UPA detachments targeted additional villages, such as Lipniki, where at least 179 Poles were slaughtered by Lytvynchuk's forces using similar brutal tactics, including beheadings and impalements. By June, attacks had expanded, with UPA units destroying Polish hamlets and forcing survivors to flee, resulting in thousands displaced amid the German occupation's limited interference. Klyachkivsky's strategy, influenced by OUN-B ideology and pragmatic responses to Soviet partisan resurgence, prioritized the liquidation of Polish civilians to prevent potential alliances against Ukrainian nationalists, as documented in captured UPA orders emphasizing total extermination without regard for age or gender. The campaign reached its zenith on July 11, 1943—known as "Bloody Sunday"—when UPA squads, supported by local Ukrainian peasants, simultaneously struck at least 99 Polish settlements across , murdering between 8,000 and 10,000 civilians in a single day; churches were frequent targets, as in Poryck where around 200 parishioners were killed during services. This operation, planned by regional UPA commanders under Klyachkivsky, aimed to maximize casualties through surprise assaults during harvest season, when Poles were vulnerable in fields. witnessed continued atrocities, including the razing of villages like Wola Ostrowiecka, with total Polish deaths in for the July–August peak estimated at over 20,000, predominantly non-combatants subjected to and mass executions. Into autumn 1943, UPA actions persisted but shifted toward consolidation, with raids on remaining Polish enclaves and self-defense outposts, contributing to an overall Volhynian toll of approximately –50,000 Polish victims by year's end; these figures derive from postwar investigations cross-verified with eyewitness accounts and German reports, though exact numbers remain contested due to destroyed records and survivor dispersal. The escalation reflected OUN-UPA leadership's calculation that preemptively eliminating Poles would facilitate Ukrainian control amid advancing Soviet forces, a policy substantiated by internal directives prioritizing ethnic purity over wartime alliances.

Extension to Eastern Galicia (Late 1943–1944)

In late 1943, as the (UPA) completed its primary phase of operations in , its forces under the "Zahid" (West) command, led by , shifted focus to to preempt Polish self-defense efforts and secure the region against impending Soviet reoccupation. Initial attacks were sporadic, targeting isolated Polish settlements in the and districts, but escalated into systematic by early 1944, employing tactics of mass killings, village burnings, and forced expulsions identical to those in . UPA orders emphasized the elimination of Polish civilians to achieve demographic homogeneity, with local OUN-B networks mobilizing peasants and for participation. A notable early escalation occurred on February 28, 1944, when UPA battalions "Dmytr" and "Besarab" from the "Tsutsyp" (Hummingbird) tactical group, supported by elements of the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician), assaulted the Polish village of Huta Pieniacka in the Zolochiv district, killing between 600 and 1,000 inhabitants, primarily women, children, and elderly refugees sheltered there after earlier Volhynian expulsions. Victims were subjected to torture, rape, and execution by axes and firearms before the village was razed; survivors reported UPA fighters looting homes and desecrating bodies. On March 12, 1944, the UPA's "Dzwina" battalion attacked the Dominican monastery in Podkamień (Pidkamin), a refuge for approximately 700 Polish civilians, murdering 150 to 250, including monks and patients from a field hospital, while burning adjacent hamlets and killing additional scores in surrounding areas. Further massacres proliferated through spring and summer 1944, coinciding with the Soviet offensive. For instance, on April 12, 1944, UPA forces massacred about 100 Poles in Huciska near ; similar raids struck Polish enclaves in the region, such as Hanacha and Korościatyn, where hundreds were slain in coordinated assaults. By mid-1944, UPA units like the "Siromanci" company extended operations eastward into the voivodeship's Ukrainian-inhabited fringes, declaring them part of an ethnic Ukrainian zone and killing Polish civilians, as in the June 16 attack on a train near Zatyle. These actions, documented in Polish underground reports and postwar investigations, resulted in an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Polish deaths in , with total victims across and Galicia reaching 80,000 to 120,000, though Ukrainian sources contest higher figures as inflated. The UPA's Galician branch justified the campaign as defensive against alleged Polish aggression, but archival evidence, including OUN directives, reveals premeditated intent to eradicate Polish presence through terror.

Methods of Atrocities and Ethnic Cleansing Tactics

The (UPA) and Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Bandera (OUN-B) units executed the massacres through coordinated guerrilla assaults aimed at the total expulsion or extermination of Polish civilians from and , prioritizing terror to prevent organized resistance and ensure demographic homogenization for a future . Attacks were launched without declaration of hostilities, often targeting isolated Polish villages or self-defense outposts during vulnerable moments such as early morning hours, Sundays, or Orthodox and Catholic holidays when men were absent at labor or services, maximizing surprise and civilian vulnerability. Perpetrators employed predominantly cold weapons—axes, pitchforks, scythes, saws, and knives—drawn from local farm implements to conduct silent killings that avoided gunfire's noise, which could alert German or Soviet forces and deplete limited supplies. Victims were frequently herded into barns, churches, or pits before being hacked, impaled, or dismembered en masse, with specific instances documented in where entire families in villages like Hurby (June 2, 1943) or Ziemlica (August 29, 1943) suffered such fates, resulting in hundreds slaughtered per operation. Atrocities incorporated systematic and to amplify psychological terror, including , , breast amputation on women, of men, of pregnant individuals, and live in locked structures, as evidenced in survivor testimonies compiled in IPN reports and exhumations from sites across both regions. Rape was widespread, often preceding execution, with reports from early 1943 Volhynian actions detailing gang assaults on females of all ages to demoralize communities. Ethnic cleansing tactics extended beyond immediate killing to village destruction: structures were torched post-massacre to erase Polish presence and deter return, while OUN-B directives compelled local Ukrainian peasants to participate—under threat of death—to foster collective complicity and neutralize potential witnesses or sympathizers. In from late 1943, these methods scaled up, incorporating ambushes on evacuation convoys and blockades of food supplies to force flight or , achieving near-total Polish depopulation in targeted counties by mid-1944.

Polish Responses and Self-Defense

Organization of Polish Self-Defense Units

In early 1943, as (UPA) attacks intensified against Polish settlements in , local Polish civilians initiated spontaneous measures, fortifying villages with bunkers, trenches, and armed watches to repel assaults and protect non-combatants. These initial efforts were decentralized, relying on available weapons scavenged from German forces or pre-war stockpiles, as proposals by figures such as Władysław Studnicki and Adam Ronikier of the Central Welfare Council to negotiate arms from German authorities, including officials like Otto Wächter, for protection against UPA attacks in Eastern Galicia were vetoed by the Home Army (AK) and the Government Delegation for Poland over concerns that such cooperation would be viewed as collaboration and compromise legitimacy with the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. These measures involved farmers, foresters, and former soldiers forming ad hoc detachments of dozens to hundreds per locality. By April 1943, the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK) district command in , led by Colonel Kazimierz Bąbiński, systematized these units into a network of outposts (placówki samoobrony), numbering up to 128 by 1943. Outposts operated semi-autonomously but coordinated through AK channels for intelligence, reinforcements, and supplies, with AK providing limited officers and arms despite resource shortages; total AK-affiliated fighters in Volhynia self-defense reached approximately 1,000 across nine units by summer 1943. Larger bases evolved from clustered outposts, such as Przebraże under Henryk Cybulski ("Harry"), a and September Campaign veteran appointed commander on April 20, 1943, which housed 10,000–20,000 refugees in a militarized structure of four companies (150–200 personnel each) supported by workshops, hospitals, and supply lines. Other key bases included Huta Stepańska, commanded by Kochański ("Bomba"), and Pańska Dolina, emphasizing defensive perimeters, patrols, and occasional counter-raids to disrupt UPA concentrations. In , self-defense organization followed a parallel pattern but commenced later, in late , as UPA operations expanded there following the phase. AK district commands in Lwów and Stanisławów regions directed the formation of outposts and fortified hamlets, integrating local detachments into broader operational groups; for instance, initiatives like those around Hanaczów and Podkamień Abbey adapted models, prioritizing civilian evacuation to secure sites amid UPA sieges. Coordination emphasized AK oversight to avoid uncoordinated reprisals, though arms scarcity and German disarmament efforts hampered scaling, resulting in fewer large bases compared to —typically 50–100 fighters per outpost, reliant on smuggled or captured weaponry. Overall, these units preserved Polish demographic presence in targeted areas, sheltering thousands despite disproportionate UPA numerical superiority, with success attributed to terrain knowledge, rapid mobilization, and inter-outpost signaling networks.

Home Army Operations and Reprisals

The (Armia Krajowa, AK), the dominant Polish resistance organization loyal to the , initially prioritized intelligence gathering, sabotage against German occupiers, and the fortification of Polish self-defense outposts in response to UPA attacks, given its limited manpower in —estimated at around 3,000-4,000 fighters by mid-1943 after heavy losses from prior Soviet and German repressions. These efforts included establishing fortified hubs like the Przebraże district center under Henryk Cybulski ("Gray"), which coordinated defenses for over 20 Polish settlements and repelled UPA assaults through coordinated patrols and ambushes, saving thousands of civilians without initiating broad offensive reprisals until late 1943. AK directives emphasized targeting UPA combatants and villages actively supporting them, avoiding mass civilian killings to preserve moral and strategic integrity amid the German occupation's constraints on large-scale mobilization. As UPA massacres escalated in summer 1943, AK regional commands authorized selective reprisals to disrupt insurgent logistics and deter further attacks, such as raids on Ukrainian hamlets harboring UPA bands or providing recruits, often in coordination with the Peasants' Battalions (Bataliony Chłopskie, BCh). In , the 27th Infantry Division of the AK District engaged UPA in skirmishes like the August 1943 battle at Huta Stepańska, where Polish forces inflicted significant casualties on attackers while defending a cluster. These actions remained localized and defensive, with AK avoiding ethnic extermination tactics; for instance, after the July 11, 1943, "Bloody Sunday" massacres, retaliatory strikes focused on liquidating known UPA command posts rather than wholesale village destruction. In , where AK strength was greater (up to 20,000-30,000 personnel by 1944), operations intensified from late 1943, including sweeps against UPA concentrations in Lwów and Stanisławów voivodeships to counter the extension of anti-Polish actions. A notable example was the March 10, 1944, joint AK-BCh assault on Sahryń and surrounding villages near Hrubieszów, aimed at dismantling a major UPA base; Polish units overran defenses, destroying armories and killing an estimated 500-600 insurgents and supporters, though civilian involvement in prior attacks justified the target selection per AK orders. Such reprisals disrupted UPA operations temporarily but were constrained by Soviet advances and German anti-partisan sweeps, which often exploited Polish-Ukrainian clashes. The scale of AK reprisals remained asymmetrical to UPA-initiated violence, with Polish actions causing approximately 2,000-3,000 Ukrainian deaths, primarily combatants and direct enablers, as opposed to the tens of thousands of Polish civilians targeted systematically by UPA for ethnic removal. Historians note that while some reprisals involved civilian casualties when villages shielded UPA, AK prohibited indiscriminate pogroms, reflecting a strategy of survival and retaliation against perpetrators rather than reciprocal , though isolated excesses occurred amid chaotic frontline conditions. By mid-1944, as offensives overran the region, AK shifted to anti-Soviet resistance, curtailing further anti-UPA campaigns.

Scale and Nature of Ukrainian Casualties from Polish Actions

Polish self-defense efforts and (AK) operations in response to UPA-initiated massacres led to Ukrainian casualties through targeted reprisals against villages harboring insurgents or aiding attacks on Polish settlements. These actions, beginning in mid-1943, involved AK units and local militias destroying UPA supply bases, executing suspected collaborators, and engaging in firefights that spilled over to civilians. Unlike the UPA's systematic campaign against Poles, Polish operations lacked a centralized directive for wholesale extermination but were often brutal, including of Ukrainian hamlets and summary executions to deter further aggression. Estimates of Ukrainian civilian deaths from these Polish reprisals in and during 1943–1944 center around , encompassing killings by Polish self-defense groups, often in coordination with or auxiliary German police units. This figure reflects retaliatory violence peaking after UPA's "Bloody Sunday" on July 11, 1943, when Poles struck back at over 100 Ukrainian locales to disrupt insurgent logistics. Higher Ukrainian claims, sometimes exceeding 20,000–30,000, appear in nationalist historiography to equate victimhood but lack substantiation from archival exhumations or eyewitness tallies, which indicate lower totals due to the defensive, sporadic nature of Polish operations compared to UPA's premeditated assaults. The nature of these casualties blended combat losses—UPA fighters killed in ambushes or raids, numbering in the thousands—with civilian deaths from punitive expeditions, where non-combatants were slain if deemed complicit in harboring attackers. For instance, in late 1943, AK detachments in conducted sweeps eliminating UPA cells, resulting in collateral civilian tolls amid burned-out villages, though systematic documentation remains sparse owing to wartime chaos and postwar Soviet suppression of records. Polish commanders, such as those under the 27th Infantry Division, emphasized proportionality in directives, prioritizing UPA disarmament over indiscriminate slaughter, yet local excesses occurred as survival imperatives overrode restraint. These reprisals contributed to a cycle of escalation but failed to halt UPA operations, ultimately displacing thousands of preemptively.

Casualties and Demographic Impact

Estimates of Polish Victims

The massacres resulted in the deaths of between and 120,000 Polish civilians at the hands of the (UPA), Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), and local Ukrainian collaborators across , , and the adjacent Lublin region from 1943 to 1945, according to research by the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). This figure encompasses systematic operations targeting Polish settlements, with the majority of victims being women, children, and the elderly killed through brutal methods including shootings, burnings, and mutilations. Estimates maintaining a range of 50,000 to over 100,000 reflect scholarly consensus, with higher figures accounting for unrecovered mass graves and destroyed records. In specifically, the peak assault on , 1943—known as Bloody Sunday—involved simultaneous attacks on 99 Polish localities, resulting in at least 10,000 deaths. Lower estimates, such as those proposed by Polish historian Grzegorz Motyka, place the toll at approximately 50,000 in and 25,000 to 30,000 in directly attributable to UPA and OUN-B actions, emphasizing verified local records while acknowledging undercounting due to destroyed evidence. Ukrainian sources and some Western analyses often cite figures closer to 40,000 to 60,000 total, but these are critiqued for relying on incomplete Soviet-era data that minimized nationalist atrocities. Polish government and IPN documentation, bolstered by ongoing victim databases and exhumations since 2019, supports the higher range through cross-referenced survivor testimonies, partisan reports, and archaeological findings from mass graves.
SourceEstimated Polish DeathsScope
IPN (Lesiakowski & Skrok)80,000–120,000, , Lublin (1943–1945)
Grzegorz Motyka75,000–80,000 and
Polish official consensus~100,000 and

Verification Challenges and Sources

Estimating the precise number of Polish victims in the Volhynia and Eastern Galicia massacres is hindered by the absence of perpetrator-maintained records, as the () and Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Bandera (OUN-B) did not systematically document killings, leaving reliance on fragmented Polish sources amid wartime chaos. Many atrocities occurred in isolated rural villages without surviving witnesses or administrative logs, compounded by Soviet deportations, population transfers, and deliberate post-war concealment that buried evidence in unmarked mass graves. Political restrictions, including Ukraine's moratorium on exhumations from 2017 to 2025—framed by as protecting sites but often blocking Polish victim recoveries—further delayed forensic verification until bilateral agreements enabled joint digs. Key sources comprise contemporaneous Polish Home Army (AK) intelligence reports, which logged attacks, victim counts, and UPA tactics based on survivor debriefs and reconnaissance, preserved in underground archives now held by Poland's (IPN). Post-war compilations of eyewitness testimonies, drawn from displaced Poles in refugee camps and repatriation processes, provide granular details on specific massacres, though incomplete due to trauma-induced gaps and deaths of aged witnesses. Demographic analyses, comparing pre-war Polish censuses (e.g., 1931 data showing over 1 million Poles in ) with post-1945 survivor registries, indicate population drops attributable to the , adjusted for other war factors like German and Soviet actions. The IPN serves as a primary verifier through archival cross-referencing and modern exhumations, such as the 2025 Puźniki site where over 40 Polish remains exhibited axe wounds, burns, and clustered burials matching 1943 massacre timelines, with ongoing digs uncovering additional mass graves that corroborate higher victim estimates by revealing evidence of systematic killings previously unaccounted for in records. German occupation reports, sporadically noting UPA-Polish clashes and civilian tolls, offer neutral external corroboration but undercount due to limited oversight in partisan zones. Historiographical biases complicate synthesis: Polish research, grounded in and victim-led inquiries, yields higher tallies (often 60,000– total) emphasizing premeditated extermination, while Ukrainian narratives, influenced by nationalist rehabilitation efforts, frame events as reciprocal warfare with lower Polish figures (20,000–40,000) and stress Polish reprisals, occasionally dismissing exhumation findings as politicized. Cross-verification via , like IPN-led forensics, mitigates these divergences, though full site access remains uneven, underscoring the need for unhindered bilateral to refine counts.

Long-Term Effects on Polish Population

The massacres contributed to the near-total of Polish communities in and , where pre-war Polish populations numbered in the hundreds of thousands. In voivodeship alone, the 1931 census recorded approximately 346,000 ethnic Poles, comprising about 16 percent of the region's inhabitants. By war's end, an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 Poles had been killed in , with overall victims across both regions reaching around 100,000 or more, prompting the flight of at least 485,000 survivors—125,000 from and 300,000 from —to central and other areas under Polish control. This displacement destroyed or depopulated roughly 1,500 of the 2,500 Polish-inhabited localities in that existed in 1939, erasing Polish demographic presence from vast rural swaths. Post-war border adjustments and forced population exchanges formalized the exodus, with over 1.1 million ethnic Poles repatriated from Soviet Ukraine to Poland between 1944 and 1946, many from the affected eastern territories. Survivors were largely resettled in Poland's "Recovered Territories"—former German lands in the west—disrupting familial, communal, and economic networks tied to ancestral homes. This resettlement severed ties to land ownership, agricultural traditions, and local economies, with many families arriving destitute and facing integration challenges amid Poland's own post-war reconstruction. The Polish minority in western Ukraine dwindled to negligible levels in the massacre epicenters; by the late Soviet era, remaining Poles numbered in the tens of thousands regionally, compared to pre-war majorities in parts of Eastern Galicia. Culturally and demographically, the events inflicted enduring losses, including the destruction of 70 percent of Volhynia's 166 Catholic parishes and over 200 killed between 1939 and 1947, which fragmented religious and educational continuity for survivors' descendants. Intergenerational effects manifested in dispersed communities, with limited preservation of heritage—only about 150 commemorative crosses erected in former Polish sites by the late —fostering a identity within while rendering revival of Polish settlement in the lost territories impossible under Soviet and post-Soviet Ukrainian administration. These shifts permanently altered 's ethnic composition, concentrating its population westward and contributing to strained bilateral demographics that persist in modern Polish-Ukrainian relations.

Attribution of Responsibility

Leadership Directives from OUN-B and UPA Commanders

Dmytro Klyachkivsky, the OUN-B regional leader and UPA commander in Volhynia, issued an order in June 1943 directing UPA units to exterminate the Polish population in the western counties of the region. This directive precipitated the peak of the massacres, including the coordinated attacks on July 11, 1943—known as Bloody Sunday—targeting 99 Polish settlements and resulting in thousands of deaths, primarily civilians. Klyachkivsky's initiative reportedly proceeded without prior approval from the central OUN-B leadership, reflecting autonomous regional decision-making amid escalating ethnic tensions. Stepan Bandera, as the leader of the OUN-B faction, exerted ideological influence through his advocacy for radical Ukrainian nationalism and ethnic purification, though he was imprisoned by German authorities from 1941 to 1944 and thus not directly commanding operations during the massacres' peak. Earlier, in , , a senior OUN-B figure, advocated for cleansing the "entire revolutionary territory" of Poles to secure Ukrainian control. By late March to early , UPA forces under these influences launched systematic village assaults in , encircling settlements, burning homes, and killing residents, with estimates of around 7,000 Polish deaths in initial operations. In autumn 1943, Volhynian OUN-B authorities further instructed subordinates to eradicate "traces of Polishness" by demolishing or incinerating Polish structures, aiming to preclude future territorial claims. In , , as UPA supreme commander, endorsed the ethnic cleansing campaign, overseeing the expansion of operations and integration of tactics from prior auxiliary roles. On August 15, 1943, he ordered the redistribution of lands from "former Polish colonists" to Ukrainian peasants, incentivizing participation in the expulsions and killings. Regional UPA leader Vasyl Sydor echoed this on July 10, 1944, commanding relentless strikes against Poles until their complete evacuation. These orders aligned with OUN-B's broader nationalist objectives of homogenizing territories, though post-war Ukrainian historiography often frames them as defensive responses rather than premeditated extermination, a view contested by archival evidence from Polish and Western sources.

Participation of Ukrainian Civilians and Auxiliaries

Local Ukrainian civilians played a substantial role in the massacres, often mobilized by OUN-B and UPA directives that framed the elimination of Polish populations as essential for securing ethnically homogeneous territory for a future . Declassified Ukrainian security service archives reveal that OUN-B leaders systematically recruited rural peasants, transforming them from bystanders into active perpetrators through emphasizing Polish "colonizers" as barriers to ; these civilians participated in attacks using farm implements like axes, scythes, and sickles, which facilitated the brutal, close-quarters killings characteristic of many assaults. During the coordinated "Bloody Sunday" offensive on July 11, 1943, UPA units attacked over 90 Polish settlements in , with local villagers joining in large numbers to surround villages, block escape routes, and execute inhabitants; eyewitness accounts and post-war investigations document peasants from nearby hamlets wielding improvised weapons alongside UPA fighters, resulting in the slaughter of hundreds in a single day across counties like Włodzimierz and Horochów. This pattern extended to , where civilians in villages such as Podkamień aided in the 1944 siege and massacre of Polish residents, providing manpower for killings and desecrations after UPA combatants initiated assaults. Ukrainian auxiliaries, including former members of German battalions, bolstered these efforts by integrating into UPA ranks after demobilization in 1943–1944; personnel from units like Battalion 201, previously commanded by , applied counterinsurgency tactics honed in Belarusian pacifications—such as village burnings and mass executions—to Polish targets in , with some auxiliaries leading local detachments in operations. These auxiliaries often drew from the same rural pools as civilian participants, blurring lines between irregular forces and community involvement, as evidenced by UPA reports boasting of "voluntary" mobilizations exceeding 10,000 in peak months. Beyond direct violence, civilians facilitated atrocities through intelligence gathering, harboring UPA groups, and post-massacre looting of Polish property, with UPA incentivizing participation via redistribution of seized lands and livestock to compliant villagers; this economic inducement, combined with threats of reprisal against non-participants, ensured widespread complicity, as surviving Polish testimonies and Ukrainian archival orders attest. While OUN-UPA command bore primary responsibility for orchestration, the scale of civilian engagement—spanning thousands across hundreds of incidents—distinguishes the events from isolated partisan actions, reflecting a communal dynamic driven by nationalist rather than spontaneous unrest.

Role of the Clergy and Religious Institutions

The role of the Ukrainian clergy, particularly the Greek Catholic Church in Eastern Galicia and the Orthodox Church in Volhynia, remained heterogeneous. Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky issued the influential pastoral letter "Thou Shalt Not Kill" in November 1942, explicitly condemning political murder. However, the impact on lower-level clergy varied significantly. While some priests (e.g., in Tiudów or Rogóźno) were murdered by the UPA for opposing the violence and protecting Polish neighbors, other segments of the clergy provided chaplaincy services to UPA units or, in some documented cases, radicalized local populations through nationalist rhetoric. In the post-communist era, Greek Catholic leaders have been active in joint reconciliation efforts, formally asking for forgiveness for the atrocities committed by their parishioners.

Distinction from Broader War Crimes

The Volhynia massacres differed from broader Eastern Front war crimes, which frequently arose from military reprisals, anti-partisan operations, or ideological extermination policies by state actors like or the , by constituting a premeditated campaign orchestrated by the (UPA) to eliminate the Polish minority and establish ethnically homogeneous Ukrainian territory. UPA directives, such as Mykola Lebed's order to "cleanse the entire revolutionary territory of the Polish population," emphasized the removal of civilians irrespective of combatant status, contrasting with atrocities incidental to battlefield engagements or retaliation against armed groups. This focus on demographic reconfiguration for future , rather than wartime destruction or punishment of resisters, marked the events as a distinct form of intra-ethnic conflict exploiting the power vacuum after multiple occupations. The systematic execution of these operations further underscored their separation from generalized wartime violence: on July 11–12, 1943, UPA forces launched coordinated assaults on approximately 167 Polish settlements in , resulting in around 10,000 deaths, primarily of non-combatants using improvised weapons to terrorize and depopulate villages. Unlike Soviet partisan actions, which targeted German logistics, or German pacification campaigns against perceived collaborators, UPA attacks spared military objectives in favor of total Polish expulsion, redistributing seized property to Ukrainian settlers and employing euphemisms like "chytska" (cleansing) for and . Polish responses, though involving reprisals, remained defensive and proportionally smaller after the initial UPA offensive, lacking the proactive, territory-wide intent of the latter. Historians classify the massacres as rather than mutual warfare or standard war crimes, given the unilateral targeting of civilians without equivalent Polish initiation and the absence of intent for national annihilation akin to . This premeditation aligned with European patterns of amid state collapse, as seen in Yugoslav cases, but was uniquely driven by Ukrainian nationalist elites anticipating post-war borders, not reciprocal combat violations.

External Factors

German Exploitation and Involvement

The Nazi occupation of and , beginning with on June 22, 1941, established the under , whose administration pursued a policy of maximal economic exploitation, including exorbitant grain requisitions and forced labor quotas that fueled widespread resentment among the Ukrainian population and undermined German control. These measures, aligned with Hitler's directives for treating the region as a colonial resource, created conditions of instability that nationalist groups like the OUN-B exploited for recruitment into the UPA, indirectly facilitating insurgent activities against both Poles and Germans. German-recruited forces, numbering around 12,000 in by 1942, were trained in mass killings during , assisting in the murder of approximately 150,000 , which provided tactical experience later applied by defectors to UPA operations. In late , amid Soviet partisan provocations and German reprisals, these policemen en masse deserted to the newly formed UPA, transferring German-supplied weapons—rifles, machine guns, and ammunition—that were subsequently used in the of Poles, enabling the UPA's initial attacks starting that month. While the Germans issued no direct orders for the UPA's anti-Polish campaign and remained primarily preoccupied with countering following the Stalingrad defeat in , their faltering authority permitted the UPA to operate with relative impunity during the massacres' peak on July 11–12, 1943, when attacks struck 167 Polish localities, killing about 10,000 civilians. This tolerance yielded strategic dividends for the occupiers, as inter-ethnic violence diverted Polish resources from anti-German resistance and weakened potential Allied footholds, though the UPA simultaneously targeted German forces, leading to punitive raids like those in autumn 1943. Historians such as emphasize that German involvement was thus opportunistic rather than directive, with no of explicit endorsement for systematic Polish extermination, distinguishing it from their orchestration of .

Soviet Influence and Partisan Dynamics

Soviet partisan units, operating under and command, became increasingly active in and from mid-1943 onward, as German control weakened and the Red Army advanced westward. These groups, numbering in the thousands, engaged in sabotage against German forces while competing with the (UPA) for local resources, intelligence, and civilian allegiance. Clashes between Soviet partisans and UPA fighters were frequent, driven by ideological opposition—Soviet communism versus —and practical rivalries over food supplies and village loyalties, with documented skirmishes escalating in late 1943 and 1944. In the context of anti-Polish violence, occasionally allied with Polish self-defense detachments against UPA assaults, providing arms or joint defense in fortified Polish strongholds. For instance, on August 30, 1943, reinforced approximately 1,200–1,400 Polish fighters at the Przebraże enclave in , repelling a UPA force estimated at 6,000 combatants and 6,000 civilian auxiliaries. Such collaborations stemmed from mutual interest in countering UPA expansion, though they were tactical and short-lived, as Soviet forces prioritized anti-German operations and later targeted non-communist Polish groups like the . Survivors of UPA attacks sometimes sought refuge with partisan units, which offered sporadic protection amid the chaos. Soviet influence on the UPA's anti-Polish campaign was negligible, as the massacres were orchestrated by Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Bandera (OUN-B) leaders to eliminate Polish populations and secure ethnically homogeneous territory for a future Ukrainian state, independent of Soviet objectives. Partisan memoirs from commanders like and Oleksiy Fedorov describe encountering massacre sites—devastated Polish villages with evidence of extreme brutality, such as victims impaled or hacked with axes—but frame the violence as German-instigated to exploit Ukrainian-German tensions, portraying UPA as mere tools rather than autonomous perpetrators. These accounts, compiled post-war, served propagandistic purposes to delegitimize and justify Soviet reincorporation of the region, often understating UPA agency while estimating Polish deaths at 40,000–60,000. The partisan dynamics exacerbated regional instability, with UPA units launching preemptive strikes against Soviet groups to prevent encirclement, while Soviets exploited UPA-Polish hostilities to recruit disillusioned locals or disrupt nationalist networks. By early 1944, as Soviet forces proper entered the area, partisan operations transitioned to supporting the Red Army's offensive, contributing to the eventual suppression of both UPA and remaining Polish resistance structures, though without direct causation of the ethnic cleansing's core phase in 1943.

Post-War Suppression and Rediscovery

Communist-Era Cover-Ups in Poland and Ukraine

In the (PRL), from 1945 to 1989, state censorship systematically suppressed public discussion and scholarly examination of the Volhynia massacres to preserve the official narrative of Polish-Soviet brotherhood and ethnic unity under . The regime's Main Office of Control of Press, Publications, and Shows prohibited publications that highlighted Ukrainian nationalist responsibility, framing any mention of the events as potentially inflammatory to relations with the Ukrainian SSR or disruptive to the post-war resettlement policies like in 1947, which dispersed Ukrainian populations in . Historical research was confined to state-approved institutions, where the massacres were either omitted or portrayed as isolated banditry amid broader anti-fascist resistance, with emphasis shifted to German and Soviet crimes; for example, post-war trials of UPA members focused on anti-communist rather than ethnic killings, and no official estimates of the 50,000–60,000 Polish deaths were disseminated. Limited underground or émigré works, such as those by historians like Konieczny in the , circulated but faced seizure and author harassment, ensuring the events remained a absent from school curricula, media, or commemorations until the late 1980s Solidarity-era thaw. This suppression aligned with broader communist privileging class struggle over , avoiding acknowledgment of Polish victimhood at Ukrainian hands that could undermine the PRL's legitimacy as a "people's democracy" tied to . In the , Soviet authorities from the 1940s onward condemned the UPA as "Banderist" fascists and Nazi puppets in official and , using the massacres to justify brutal anti-insurgent campaigns like those in 1944–1950s that killed thousands of UPA fighters and sympathizers. However, accounts in partisan memoirs and state publications often attributed the anti-Polish actions to direct German orders or wartime chaos rather than OUN-B/UPA initiative, minimizing evidence of systematic directives such as Dmytro Klyachkivsky's 1943 orders; this reframing portrayed the killings as collateral to anti-Soviet "banditry" rather than targeted , with victim counts underreported and Polish suffering subsumed under general "fascist atrocities." Archival documents from UPA actions were confiscated and classified, inaccessible to researchers, while public discourse enforced a "friendship of peoples" that omitted Ukrainian agency in favor of narratives of joint Soviet-Polish liberation from Nazis. This selective served to delegitimize Ukrainian independence aspirations without confronting the ethnic dimensions, ensuring no memorials or investigations occurred until in the late , when initial declassifications began revealing suppressed witness testimonies.

Archival Openings and Historiographical Shifts

The fall of in enabled access to state archives previously controlled by the regime, allowing historians to reexamine suppressed documentation on the massacres, including Polish Home Army reports and survivor testimonies that had been marginalized or classified. This archival thaw facilitated the compilation of extensive victim lists and crime site mappings, shifting from fragmentary accounts to evidence-based analyses emphasizing the organized nature of the killings. The creation of Poland's (IPN) in 1998 marked a pivotal institutional development, granting legal authority for archival declassification, exhumations, and criminal probes into wartime atrocities. IPN investigations, initiated around , drew on newly accessible files from Polish, German, and former Soviet repositories, revealing detailed UPA operational orders and perpetrator identities that contradicted earlier minimization narratives. By 2019, IPN launched a comprehensive victims' database, incorporating over 50,000 documented cases from cross-referenced archival and eyewitness sources, which has underpinned peer-reviewed studies quantifying the scale at Polish deaths. In , independence in 1991 prompted partial openings of Soviet-era archives, including UPA-related materials from and repositories, but access remained selective amid nationalist reinterpretations framing the events as reciprocal conflict rather than unilateral aggression. Ukrainian post-1991, influenced by OUN-UPA glorification in state narratives, has incorporated some archival evidence of Polish retaliations but often downplays intent, as seen in works attributing massacres to wartime chaos over directives. Joint Polish-Ukrainian commissions in the and , leveraging shared archives, yielded limited consensus, with excavations like those at Pawlokoma in 2000 confirming mutual violence but highlighting disproportionate Polish casualties based on forensic data. These developments spurred a broader historiographical pivot: Polish scholarship, bolstered by IPN findings, increasingly applies frameworks citing systematic targeting, while Western analyses, such as those cross-verifying with German occupation records, affirm premeditation without uniform adoption of the term. Ukrainian resistance to full archival transparency, evident in delayed UPA document releases until the 2010s, has perpetuated debates, though EU integration pressures post-2014 prompted incremental shifts toward acknowledging civilian targeting. Overall, the archival surge has elevated empirical rigor, displacing communist-era obfuscation with causal attributions rooted in primary directives from OUN-B leaders like Dmytro Kliachkivsky.

Classification as Genocide

Application of Genocide Convention Criteria

The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) defines genocide as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." Application to the massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (1943–1945) centers on whether the perpetrators—primarily the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)—committed qualifying acts against Poles as a national/ethnic group with the requisite specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy that group regionally. Poles constituted a protected national/ethnic group under the Convention, comprising a distinct minority (approximately 10–15% of Volhynia's per data) targeted explicitly for their Polish identity rather than political or affiliation. The acts perpetrated satisfy subsections (a) and (b): an estimated 50,000–100,000 Polish civilians were killed, with documented methods including mass shootings, burnings, (e.g., live burials, axings, and infant impalements), and village razings, causing widespread bodily and mental harm. These were systematic, peaking in July–August 1943 ("Bloody Sunday" attacks on over 100 Polish settlements), and extended to in 1944, with no evidence of equivalent acts against (e) such as birth prevention or child transfers, though conditions inflicted (e.g., forced starvation and displacement) align partially with (c). Specific intent to destroy the Polish group "in part"—namely, its presence in contested territories for an ethnically homogeneous Ukrainian state—is evidenced by OUN-B/UPA directives. UPA commander Dmytro Klyachkivsky issued orders in early 1943 mandating the "physical extermination of the entire Polish population" in Volhynia's western counties, framing Poles as an existential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty. OUN-B leadership, including Roman Shukhevych, endorsed "anti-Polish operations" to eradicate Polish settlements, prioritizing civilian elimination over mere expulsion, as confirmed in declassified UPA documents and survivor testimonies archived by Poland's Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). This intent aligns with causal patterns: massacres preceded formal expulsions, targeted non-combatants (70–80% women, children, elderly), and aimed at preventing Polish demographic recovery in the region, distinguishing from wartime reprisals. Debate persists among scholars: Polish analyses (e.g., IPN) affirm due to the totality of extermination orders and scale, while some Western historians like classify it as with genocidal methods, arguing primary aims were territorial homogenization via killing and flight rather than total annihilation. Counterviews emphasize Polish self-defense actions (killing ~2,000–10,000 ) as mutual conflict, potentially diluting perpetrator intent, though these were reactive and numerically disproportionate. Empirical alignment with Convention criteria—acts plus intent for partial destruction—supports classification in legal scholarship focused on regional eradication, as affirmed by Poland's resolution (2016) and analyses citing perpetrator documentation over revisionist narratives.

Evidence of Intent and Systematic Nature

In early 1943, , commander of the (UPA) in , issued a directive ordering the "physical liquidation" of the entire Polish population in the region's western counties, framing it as a necessary measure for Ukrainian independence. This order explicitly targeted Poles regardless of age or gender, with instructions to kill mixed Ukrainian-Polish families by prioritizing Polish spouses and children under UPA rules. Such commands reflected the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Bandera faction (OUN-B) policy of ethnic homogenization, as evidenced by internal documents labeling the campaign an "anti-Polish operation" aimed at expulsion or extermination to secure Ukrainian territorial claims. The systematic execution of this intent was demonstrated by the coordinated nature of attacks, peaking on , 1943—known as Bloody Sunday—when UPA units, supported by local Ukrainian civilians, simultaneously assaulted at least 99 Polish settlements across , resulting in approximately 8,000 to 10,000 Polish deaths in a single day. Preparatory measures included intelligence gathering on Polish villages, compilation of victim lists by OUN operatives, and mobilization of auxiliary forces, indicating premeditated planning rather than spontaneous violence. Attacks followed patterns of encirclement, of non-combatants using axes, scythes, and firearms, and destruction of infrastructure to prevent Polish return, extending into by late 1943 with similar directives from UPA leadership. Further evidence of lies in OUN-B and post-action reports, which justified the killings as defensive but documented the goal of eradicating Polish presence to avoid future conflicts, with UPA estimates acknowledging tens of thousands targeted in alone. The consistency across regions, despite German and Soviet disruptions, underscores a centralized , as UPA subunits reported compliance to higher command, contrasting with isolated reprisals elsewhere in the .

Counterarguments and Alternative Interpretations

Ukrainian historiography and official narratives frequently characterize the events as the "Volhynia Tragedy" rather than , emphasizing a context of mutual ethnic violence amid wartime chaos, including Polish actions against Ukrainians by the (AK) and earlier interwar repressions. This framing posits the killings as reciprocal conflict rather than unilateral extermination, with Ukrainian casualties from Polish reprisals estimated at 10,000–20,000 during 1943–1945, though Polish sources document far lower figures for Ukrainian deaths from Polish forces in the same period. Political scientist Ivan Katchanovski argues that the massacres constituted or a bilateral Ukrainian-Polish war rather than , citing the decentralized nature of (UPA) operations, absence of a centralized extermination plan targeting all Poles globally, and evidence of local initiatives driven by territorial control rather than ideological destruction of the Polish nation as such. He contends that UPA directives, such as those from Dmytro Klachkivsky in early 1943, focused on eliminating Polish "settlers" and armed elements in to secure Ukrainian-majority areas, allowing for expulsions over killings where feasible, which aligns more with forcible than the Genocide Convention's requirement for intent to destroy a group "as such." Katchanovski further highlights Polish AK provocations, including attacks on Ukrainian villages, as precipitating factors, framing the UPA response as defensive ethnic homogenization in a multiethnic borderland under German and Soviet pressures. Former Ukrainian Institute of National Memory head Volodymyr Viatrovych has advanced interpretations minimizing systematic intent, portraying the violence as sporadic wartime excesses amplified by Polish narratives, with UPA actions responding to perceived Polish with occupiers and historical land disputes; he estimates Polish deaths at around 35,000–40,000, lower than Polish figures of 50,000–100,000, and stresses equivalent Ukrainian suffering from Polish and Soviet forces. Critics of the label, including some Ukrainian scholars, invoke the broader context, where fluid alliances and partisan warfare blurred lines between combatants and civilians, arguing that labeling it risks equating it with the Holocaust's industrialized scale and risks politicizing history amid modern Polish-Ukrainian alliances against . Alternative views from select Western analysts propose as the precise descriptor, distinguishing it from by noting that while brutal and targeted (e.g., over 90% of Polish victims were civilians, often killed in villages on specific "Bloody Sundays" like July 11, 1943, with 99 localities attacked), the UPA's primary aim was regional depopulation for a future rather than total eradication, as evidenced by survival of Polish communities outside core areas and occasional UPA offers of safe passage. These interpretations caution against retroactive application of the 1948 , given the events' 1943–1944 timing and the convention's post hoc ratification, potentially diluting the term's legal specificity for cases like the or . Nonetheless, such arguments face empirical challenges from documented UPA orders explicitly calling for Polish liquidation without regard for military status, suggesting intent beyond mere displacement.

National and Scholarly Perspectives

Polish Recognition as Genocide

In July 2016, the , the lower house of the Polish , adopted a resolution on the 73rd anniversary of the Volhynia massacres, officially recognizing the events as an act of perpetrated by Ukrainian nationalists against the Polish between 1943 and 1945. The resolution, passed with broad support, described the massacres as "a crime of " targeting civilians, including women, children, and the elderly, and established —the date of the peak killings in 1943—as the National Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Committed by Ukrainian Nationalists against Citizens of the Second Polish Republic. The Polish Senate concurrently passed a similar resolution affirming the genocidal nature of the atrocities, emphasizing the systematic conducted by the (UPA) and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). This legislative acknowledgment built on prior parliamentary statements, such as a resolution commemorating the massacres, but marked the first explicit classification as at the national level. Polish President supported the initiative, publicly referring to the events as "genocide in " during anniversary observances and advocating for national remembrance. Subsequent affirmations have reinforced this stance. In 2024, the issued another resolution on the 81st anniversary, honoring the victims of the "" in eastern , primarily Poles, and calling for continued historical reckoning. In 2025, President Duda signed formalizing 11 as the Day of Remembrance for Victims of the Committed by the OUN and UPA, underscoring 's commitment to documenting and commemorating the estimated 100,000 Polish deaths. The Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), 's state body for investigating historical crimes, has consistently classified the massacres as , citing evidence of premeditated intent to eradicate the Polish minority through mass killings, , and destruction of settlements. Polish recognition emphasizes the one-sided scale and intent of the violence, with over 90% of documented victims being Polish civilians, contrasting Ukrainian portrayals of mutual conflict. This position aligns with applications of the 1948 UN , focusing on acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national or ethnic group, as evidenced by UPA orders and execution patterns. Annual commemorations, exhumations, and educational initiatives by Polish authorities perpetuate this framework, despite international and Ukrainian objections to the genocide label.

Ukrainian Narratives of Mutual Conflict

In Ukrainian , the events of in and are frequently characterized as a mutual Polish-Ukrainian or "war," involving reciprocal violence between the (UPA) and Polish partisan forces like the (Armia Krajowa), rather than a one-sided campaign of extermination. This perspective posits that UPA actions targeted Polish settlements as part of territorial struggles amid Nazi and Soviet occupations, with Polish responses—such as the March 1944 Sahryn , where approximately 700 Ukrainian civilians were killed—serving as evidence of equivalent brutality on both sides. Official Ukrainian narratives, reflected in school textbooks and statements from bodies like the Ministry of Education and Science, emphasize shared wartime and comparable casualty figures—often citing tens of thousands of Ukrainian deaths alongside Polish ones—to frame the as defensive measures in a chaotic interethnic clash rather than premeditated . The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINM), under influences like former director Volodymyr Viatrovych, promotes this view by attributing escalations to external factors such as and questioning the systematic intent of UPA operations, while highlighting Polish "pacification" actions in as prior provocations. The 2015 Ukrainian law granting veteran status to UPA members and recognizing their fight for further embeds this , portraying the fighters as national heroes engaged in legitimate resistance without foregrounding civilian atrocities against Poles. Politicians, including former President , have rejected Poland's 2016 genocide resolution as politicized, instead advocating for the events as a "tragedy" warranting mutual mourning over unilateral blame. This approach aligns with a broader in memory politics, where Ukrainian discourse minimizes UPA's role in the deaths of 50,000–100,000 Poles by equating it to Polish retaliatory killings estimated at 10,000–20,000 Ukrainians.

International and Western Scholarly Views

Western scholars, including , have characterized the massacres as a campaign of rather than , emphasizing the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's (UPA) objective to remove Poles from to establish an ethnically homogeneous Ukrainian territory. Snyder estimates approximately 50,000 Polish deaths in during 1943, attributing the violence to a confluence of OUN-B nationalist ideology, wartime instability following triple occupations (Soviet, German, and renewed Soviet), and local socioeconomic collapse exacerbated by the prior Jewish , which disrupted Polish-Ukrainian economic interdependence. He distinguishes this from genocidal extermination by noting the intent focused on expulsion and regional purification, not the total annihilation of the Polish nation, with UPA forces growing to 20,000 by mid-1943 to execute coordinated attacks peaking in . Per Anders Rudling, a Swedish historian, similarly frames the OUN-UPA operations as , arguing that while brutal and systematic— involving mass killings of civilians regardless of combatant status—the goal was to cleanse the area of Polish presence for future Ukrainian state-building, not their complete eradication. Rudling highlights the UPA's collaboration with local auxiliaries and the role of figures like in precursor actions, such as in , as rehearsals for Volhynia's violence, but stops short of classification due to the absence of a pan-Polish extermination policy. Ivan Katchanovski analyzes archival evidence from Ukrainian state archives (SBU and TsDAVO), concluding the events constitute comparable to 1990s Balkan cases, with around 35,000 Polish victims representing 12% of 's Polish population but lacking the proportional scale or national intent required for under the 1948 UN Convention. He rejects both Polish claims and Ukrainian "mutual war" narratives, pointing to explicit OUN-B/UPA orders for Polish liquidation in as evidence of targeted removal, though limited to that district without broader designs. A minority of Western analyses apply the label, citing UPA directives for the "liquidation of the Polish element" as demonstrating intent to destroy the group in substantial part, per UN criteria, with methods mirroring Holocaust-era killings like mass shootings and forced grave-digging. These views draw parallels to OUN collaboration with Nazis and , arguing the regional focus does not preclude given the near-total elimination of Polish communities (over 90% displaced or killed in affected areas). Overall, while affirming the deliberate, ideologically driven nature of the atrocities—distinguished from spontaneous pogroms by centralized planning—Western scholarship predominantly avoids equating with paradigmatic genocides like , prioritizing empirical distinctions in scope and aim over expansive interpretations. No major international body has recognized it as , reflecting caution amid ongoing Polish-Ukrainian historiographical tensions.

Reconciliation and Contemporary Implications

Bilateral Efforts and Joint Commissions

In the aftermath of Ukraine's independence in 1991, and initiated bilateral dialogues to address historical grievances, including the Volhynia massacres, as part of broader efforts to foster neighborly relations. Early attempts focused on mutual recognition of past sufferings, with Polish President and Ukrainian President issuing a joint statement in emphasizing while acknowledging the ethnic cleansings perpetrated by the (UPA) against Polish civilians. These initiatives, however, often stalled due to divergent national narratives, with Ukrainian historiography frequently framing the events as a mutual rather than a one-sided anti-Polish operation. A formal joint historical commission was established in 2015 between Poland's Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) and Ukraine's Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINP) to examine the Volhynia events through shared archival research and joint publications. The commission aimed to produce objective analyses based on primary sources, but progress was limited by political sensitivities, including Ukraine's 2015 decommunization laws that elevated UPA figures and restricted exhumations of massacre victims on Ukrainian soil. By 2016, tensions escalated when Poland's Sejm classified the massacres as genocide, prompting Ukrainian resistance to full access for Polish forensic teams, as Ukrainian authorities cited national security and the need for reciprocal investigations into Polish retaliatory actions. Renewed bilateral efforts intensified in 2024 amid Ukraine's defense against Russian invasion, prioritizing pragmatic reconciliation over unresolved historical disputes. In January 2025, Polish and Ukrainian officials announced a breakthrough agreement permitting systematic exhumations of Polish victims in Volhynia, the first such permissions in over a decade, with joint teams identifying remains in sites like Puźniki (Puzhniki) where over 40 victims, including women and children, were reburied in September 2025. This included reciprocal allowances for Ukrainian searches of UPA graves in Poland, such as in October 2025 near suspected mass sites, signaling a shift toward forensic verification rather than politicized denial. Despite these advances, challenges persist, as Ukrainian educational materials continue to portray Polish Home Army reprisals as the primary cause of escalation, contrasting with Polish emphasis on the UPA's premeditated ethnic cleansing documented in declassified Soviet and Polish archives. These commissions and agreements have facilitated limited access to mass graves—estimated to hold tens of thousands of unburied Polish remains—but have not resolved core interpretive differences, with Polish scholars citing UPA orders for total extermination as evidence of genocidal intent, while Ukrainian counterparts highlight contextual wartime chaos and Polish expulsions of Ukrainians post-1944. Ongoing joint work, supported by IPN-UINP protocols, prioritizes victim identification via DNA and artifacts over adjudication, aiming to humanize the tragedy amid contemporary geopolitical alignment against .

Impact on Modern Polish-Ukrainian Relations

The Volhynia massacres have persistently strained Polish-Ukrainian relations, even amid Poland's substantial military and humanitarian support for following Russia's 2022 invasion, with historical grievances manifesting in diplomatic disputes, divides, and barriers to full . Polish demands for exhumations of victims' remains and unequivocal condemnation of (UPA) perpetrators have clashed with Ukrainian narratives framing the events as a mutual or "tragedy" rather than unilateral , leading to periodic tensions that underscore an asymmetry in historical memory. For instance, Ukraine's of UPA leaders like as anti-Soviet heroes—evident in street namings and monuments—has provoked Polish criticism, as these figures are directly linked to ordering the killings of up to 100,000 Polish civilians in 1943. Recent developments reflect both progress and friction: in January 2025, Presidents and , alongside Polish Prime Minister , agreed to resume joint exhumations of massacre sites, marking a breakthrough after years of Ukrainian delays attributed to legal and political sensitivities. By mid-2025, initial joint efforts yielded reburials, yet Poland's 2025 establishment of a of Remembrance for Victims of the in and " drew Ukrainian protests, with Kyiv's Foreign Ministry decrying it as politicizing history and ignoring Polish retaliatory actions against Ukrainians. These episodes have influenced broader ties, including Ukraine's EU aspirations; Polish Deputy Prime Minister stated in August 2025 that unresolved issues, including full access for searches, preclude Ukraine's , echoing sentiments in a poll where 50% of Poles opposed or EU membership until exhumations conclude. Public attitudes in , shaped by state commemorations and media emphasis on the massacres' scale—systematic attacks on over 3,000 Polish settlements—have fostered resentment, with surveys indicating declining unconditional support for amid economic strains from hosting millions of refugees. In , resistance to Polish terminology stems from a historiographic emphasis on UPA's role in independence struggles, complicating bilateral commissions established in the 1990s but stalled since 2016 over access to sites. The 80th anniversary in 2023 amplified these divides, as Polish leaders boycotted events glorifying UPA while avoided "genocide" language, yet the Russian threat has tempered escalations, prioritizing strategic alliance over historical score-settling. Nonetheless, figures like newly elected Polish President Karol Nawrocki in 2025 have prioritized resolution, signaling that unaddressed grievances could erode long-term trust and cooperation.

Recent Commemorations and Political Tensions

In July 2023, and marked the 80th anniversary of the Volhynia massacres with commemorative events, including ceremonies in where Polish Prime Minister emphasized that full reconciliation required locating and burying all Polish victims' remains. Despite temporary de-escalation of disputes for the occasion, Polish officials reiterated the events as , while Ukrainian representatives framed them as a mutual amid wartime chaos. By 2025, exhumation efforts advanced as a partial reconciliation measure, with Ukraine permitting Polish searches for remains in Volhynia sites; on September 6, over 40 exhumed Polish victims from Puźniki were reburied in a joint ceremony attended by officials from both nations. Further permissions for additional searches were granted in October, enabling recovery of an estimated 100,000 victims' remains, though progress remained slow due to logistical and political hurdles. Local commemorations continued, such as in Domostawa and Kraków for the 82nd anniversary, focusing on victim remembrance without Ukrainian participation. Political tensions persisted, exacerbated by Ukraine's criticism of a proposed Polish bill introduced in October 2025 to criminalize promotion of (UPA) ideology, including figures like , whom Poland associates with the massacres' orchestration. Ukraine's embassy warned of retaliatory measures, arguing the law distorted historical truth and hindered bilateral ties amid ongoing Russian aggression, while Polish proponents cited UPA's documented tactics as justification. Concurrently, a to Volhynia victims in was vandalized in August 2025, highlighting domestic sensitivities. Ukrainian efforts to exhume UPA fighters in Polish sites, such as Jureczkowa in October 2025, yielded no remains but fueled reciprocal accusations of selective historical narratives. These frictions underscored divergent interpretations—Poland's emphasis on versus Ukraine's view of reciprocal violence—straining relations despite 's military aid to Ukraine.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.