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2017–2018 Russian protests
2017–2018 Russian protests
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2017–2018 Russian protests
Part of opposition to Vladimir Putin in Russia
Rallies all across Russia, March–June 2017
Clockwise from top left
Date
26 March 2017 – 28 October 2018
  • 26–28 March 2017
  • 29 April 2017
  • 14 May 2017 (in Moscow)
  • 12 June 2017
  • 7 October 2017
  • 5 November 2017
  • 28 January 2018
  • March–May 2018 (in Moscow Oblast suburbs)
  • 27 March 2018 (in Kemerovo)
  • 2 April 2018 (in Yekaterinburg)
  • 30 April 2018 (in Moscow)
  • 1 May 2018 (in Saint Petersburg)
  • 5 May 2018
  • 13 May 2018 (in Moscow)
  • 1 July 2018
  • 29 July 2018
  • 15 August 2018 (in Moscow)
  • 9 September 2018
  • 17 September 2018 (in Vladivostok)
  • 28 October 2018 (in Saint Petersburg)
Location
More than 154 сities and towns across Russia
Caused by
In Yekaterinburg:
In Moscow:
  • Inadequate planned demolition of apartments in Moscow (since April 2017)
  • An ecological catastrophe unfolding around the Moscow, subsequently led to mass poisoning of children due to leakage of toxic substances from the landfill in Volokolamsk (since March 2018)
In Kemerovo:
In Vladivostok:
  • Massive election fraud in several eastern regions (since September 2018)
In Saint Petersburg:
  • Inadequate plans of urban development
  • Imprisoning of children, convicted because of the provocation, made by state special services
Goals
  • Resignation of Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, and his government
  • Allowing Navalny to participate in 2018 presidential elections (until March 2018)
  • Unblocking of Telegram messenger (since April 2018)
  • Cancellation of the raising of the retirement age (since June 2018)
In Yekaterinburg:
In Moscow:
  • Stop demolition of Moscow apartments (since April 2017)
  • Close the garbage landfills around the Moscow
In Kemerovo:
  • Resignation of Governor of Kemerovo region Aman Tuleyev (since March 2018)
In Vladivostok:
  • Discarding of election results in several eastern regions (since September 2018)
In Saint Petersburg:
  • Revision of inadequate plans of urban development
  • Justify and release children from the prison, convicted because of the provocation, made by state special services
MethodsDemonstration, internet activism
Resulted in
  • Seven all-national rallies has taken place,[nb 1] covering more than 100 cities
  • Navalny has been arrested three times on charges of violating the rules of organization of the rally – firstly for 15 days, then for 25 days, then for 20 days[1]
  • Chairman of the Federation Council has proposed to forbid for kids to participate in protest rallies[2]
  • Governor of Kemerovo Aman Tuleyev resigned[3]
  • Retirement age raising reduced from 63 to 60 for women
  • Repressive laws easing that allows some politically convicted activists to avoid imprisoning
  • Charges against Ivan Golunov dropped
Parties

Russia Russian opposition

Truck drivers, student activists, Moscow homeowners, and population of Moscow region, Saint Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, and Kemerovo, among others
Lead figures
Number
Moscow:
15,000–25,000+[9]
Saint Petersburg:
6,000–10,000+
Novosibirsk:
2,000–5,000+
Yekaterinburg:
1,000–5,000
Across Russia:
150,000
(according to the FBK)[10]
Unknown
Casualties
Death0
Injuries2 police officers[11][12] and 1 national guard trooper
Arrested26 March 2017: 1,030–2,000+[13][14]
29 April 2017: 200[15]
12 June 2017: 1,769[14]
7 October 2017: 136–290
5 November 2017: 448
28 January 2018: 266–371
5 May 2018: 1,600+[16]

The 2017–2018 Russian protests were a long series of countrywide street protest actions and demonstrations in the Russian Federation, which were primarily concerned with suppressing corruption in the Russian government (from 26 March 2017 through spring 2018) and abandoning the planned increase of retirement age (from 14 June 2018 through the end of 2018).

The anti-corruption protests began in March 2017 but were joined by and overlapped the 2018 Russian pension protests. The anti-corruption protests were primarily led by Alexei Navalny, who was joined by well-known participants such as the Libertarian Party, Open Russia, and Artpodgotovka. They occurred as a result of the 2014–2016 Russian financial crisis aftermath, although they had their root in the corruption at the different levels up to the highest echelons of the Russian power.

The protests and demonstrations against corruption in the Russian government began in March 2017 after the release of the investigative film He Is Not Dimon to You by Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation, which had garnered more than 23 million views on YouTube. Discontentment was triggered by the alleged corrupt activity of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev as presented in the film, the inadequately planned demolition of apartments in Moscow and the protracted strikes of truck drivers related to the Platon toll system, which had been ongoing since 2015.

National protests against corruption in Russia took place simultaneously in more than 100 cities across the country on 26 March 2017. By Sunday evening, riot police in body armor and helmets had detained more than 1000 demonstrators in central Moscow, as the crowd, numbering in the tens of thousands, cheered, whistled and chanted "Shame!", "Medvedev, resign!", and "Putin is a thief!"[17] The Levada Centre survey showed that 38% of surveyed Russians supported the protests and that 67% held Putin "entirely" or "to a large extent" responsible for high-level corruption.[18][19][20]

A new wave of mass protests occurred on 12 June 2017. After the arrest of Navalny on 29 September, hours before a planned rally in Nizhny Novgorod, a new wave of protests was announced for 7 October, the birthday of Putin.[21][22] Protests and uprisings continued in 2018, with the tendency to radicalization, and a record number of protesters was detained on 5 May, two days before Putin's inauguration. Mass rallies were held in more than 60 cities across Russia.

Background

[edit]
Protests in Moscow

In March 2017, Alexei Navalny and his Anti-Corruption Foundation launched the campaign He Is Not Dimon To You, accusing Dmitry Medvedev, the prime minister and former president of Russia, of corruption.[23] The authorities both ignored the report produced by Navalny and commented that the report was issued by a "convicted criminal" and was not worth commenting on.

On 26 March, Navalny organized a series of anti-corruption rallies in different cities across Russia. This appeal was responded to by the representatives of 95 of Russian cities, and four cities abroad: London, Prague, Basel and Bonn.[24] In some cities, the rallies were sanctioned by the authorities, but in others, including Saint Petersburg, they were prohibited. Moscow authorities declined the event request by Navalny in the city centre, but did not suggest any alternative location. Navalny referred to a decision of the Constitutional court and declared[clarification needed] the event for being permitted.[25]

The Moscow police said that 500 people had been detained, but according to the human rights group OVD-Info, 1,030 people were detained in Moscow alone, including Navalny himself.[26][27][28]

The Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs posted a message on its official website with a call to Moscow residents not to join the event. It said that the action in Moscow was not coordinated with the municipality and was illegal.[29]

Events

[edit]

26 March 2017

[edit]
Protesters in Yekaterinburg chant The one not jumping is Dimon

On 26 March, an estimated 60,000 people took part in anti-corruption protests across 80 Russian towns and cities and hundreds of protesters were detained, including opposition leader Alexei Navalny and employees of the Anti-Corruption Foundation.[30][31]

According to Human Rights Watch, Russian authorities have harassed, intimidated, or threatened to expel schoolchildren and university students who participated in anti-corruption demonstrations on 26 March. 70 children were arrested in Moscow alone.[32]

The United States Department of State condemned the detention of protesters, including Alexei Navalny, stating that "detaining peaceful protesters, human rights observers, and journalists is an affront to core democratic values."[33]

Number of protesters

[edit]

29 April 2017

[edit]

Action organized by the Open Russia civic movement led by Mikhail Khodorkovsky took place in dozens of cities all across Russia. Action was called "Fed up with" ("Nadoel" in Russian) with the aim to urge for changes in Russian political rule. Protestors called for Putin and government to resign. In Saint Petersburg, Tyumen, Kemerovo, Tula and several other cities rallies were suppressed by police, with a total of 200 people being detained countrywide.[95] As a consequence, the Open Russia organization was labeled as "undesirable" by Russia's prosecutor general, so that it was officially banned from operating in the country and its website was blocked by official Media Authorities Roscomnadzor[96]

12 June 2017

[edit]

A new wave of protests with the same goals was announced by Navalny on spring. They took place in even more cities. They occurred in 154 towns and cities. According to Reuters and rights groups, tens of thousands of protesters attended and more than one thousand were detained. A Moscow court sentenced Navalny to 30 days in prison for calling people to the protest.[97][31]

White House spokesman Sean Spicer condemned the arrest of protesters and called for their release. Russian authorities rejected US petitions and criticised the widening on the sanctions against Russia.[98][99]

7 October 2017

[edit]

Protest actions against corruption in the highest echelons of the Russian government were held on 7 October 2017, on the day of the 65th anniversary of V.V. Putin in the form of rallies, processions and single pickets in 79 cities of Russia. At the rallies came from 2560 to 21,520 people, like the supporters of Alexei Navalny, and his opponents. The main rallies were rallies in St. Petersburg and Moscow. In Saint Petersburg, the action began on the Field of Mars, and in Moscow on Tverskaya Street. The reason for their conduct were facts of corruption V.V. Putin and his associates. More than 260 participants of the action were detained.[100]

5 November 2017

[edit]

In Moscow, many police were present, the Okhotny Ryad station was closed. The police conducted selective searches of citizens, many were taken away in padded wagons. At 13:00 on the message OVD-Info in Moscow, 82 people were detained. 2 people were detained in Saint Petersburg, 4 in Krasnoyarsk. Also detained a representative of the "Echo of Moscow". Later in Saint Petersburg, another 10 people were detained near the Smolny Institute.

At 21:00 on the message OVD-Info, the number of detainees increased to 448 people. Most of the detentions took place in Moscow – 339, in Saint Petersburg 21 people, according to unconfirmed reports, 49 of them – minors. It remains to spend the night in the police departments, on the night of 6 November, about 112 people.

28 January 2018

[edit]

Protests within the framework of the "Strike of voters" were held on 28 January 2018 in the form of rallies, processions and solitary pickets in 118 cities of Russia. The reason was the refusal of the CEC to register at the election of Alexei Navalny, after which he announced a protest on 28 January, and urged all his supporters not to come to the elections and agitate others not to take part in them. The Ministry of Internal Affairs estimated the number of participants in the shares of 3500–4500 people, the HROs – in 5000. According to the supporters of Alexei Navalny, the participants were much more. The New Times, referring to eyewitnesses, reported 4,000–5,000 protesters in Moscow and 2,000–3,000 in Saint Petersburg. In Yekaterinburg, in an agreed action, Mayor Yevgeny Roizman and Navaly Head of Staff Leonid Volkov took part and spoke at the rally. The presidential candidate, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, spoke with several protestors on Tverskaya Street in Moscow. According to various estimates, about 15,000 people took part in the protests.

30 April 2018

[edit]

Approximately 13,000 people gathered in Moscow central Sakharov square for a protest rally to urge government to unblock Telegram Messenger.[101] The app was blocked by Roscomnadzor, Russian media authorities who claimed it was used to coordinate terror attacks. Protesters denounced the block as the censorship act and freedom of speech violation.

5 May 2018

[edit]
«He's not our tsar» rally in Moscow, 5 May 2018
Rally In Chelyabinsk

Mass protest actions and rallies took place in 90 towns and cities over the country against Vladimir Putin fourth inauguration. Alexei Navalny in his blog compared Vladimir Putin with a tsar. More than thousand people were arrested countrywide. The majority of people were detained in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Chelyabinsk, Yakutsk, Krasnodar, Tolyatti, Krasnoyarsk, Voronezh, Astrakhan, Penza, Kaluga, Belgorod, Novokuznetsk, Vladimir and Samara.[102]

July–September 2018

[edit]
Main article: 2018 Russian pension protests
Volunteers and employees of Newcaster.TV and Anti-corruption Foundation arrested in Moscow

From July, almost every weekend, protest rallies and demonstrations were organized against the planned retirement age hike. Such events occurred in nearly all major cities countrywide including Novosibirsk, St.-Petersburg and Moscow. Total number of participants exceeded 200 thousands, with maximal single-event attendance of about 15 thousands (in Moscow). These events were coordinated by all opposition parties with the leading role of the communists. Also trade unions and some individual politicians (among whom Navalny) functioned as organizers of the public actions.

The most noticeable street rallies, related with the retirement-age reform, proceeded on 1 July, 18, 28 July-29 July, 2 September and 9 September 2018.[103] So, on 2 September, large-scale anti-reform manifestations were led by the Russian communists and some other left-wing oppositional political forces.[104] A week later, on 9 September, the rallies were organized by Alexei Navalny all over Russia, over 800 people were detained.[105][106][107]

Aftermath

[edit]

The Anti-Corruption Foundation building was evacuated due to a bomb message, interrupting the webcast of the protest conducted from the office. Soon the staff of the Foundation were detained by police, who also began to conduct searches and seizure of equipment.[citation needed]

Some time later, Alexei Navalny was charged with organizing an unlawful meeting. An ACF employee and the head of the Moscow branch of the unregistered "Party of progress" Nikolay Lyaskin was detained for 25 days. Leonid Volkov, the head of Alexei Navalny's presidential campaign, was charged with extremism.[108]

An April 2017 Levada poll found that 45% of surveyed Russians support the resignation of Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev,[109] while 33% opposed. Newsweek reported that "An opinion poll by the Moscow-based Levada Center indicated that 38 percent of Russians supported the rallies and that 67 percent held Putin personally responsible for high-level corruption".[20] A May 2017 Levada poll found that 58% of surveyed Russians supported the protests, while 23% said they disapprove.[110]

In May, Yury Kuly was sentenced to 8 months in jail, and on 24 May Alexander Shpakov was sentenced for 1.5 years in jail, both for alleged violence against the police on the 26 March rally in Moscow.[111]

Protests across Russia

[edit]

Protests, meeting and pickets have been erupted in 79-154 towns and cities. Some protests ended with mass arrests and clashes with police (such as Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Chelyabinsk, Yekaterinburg).

Moscow

[edit]

Saint-Petersburg

[edit]

Chelyabinsk

[edit]

On 5 May, an estimated 2,000 to 5,000 protests have taken to the streets, protesters clashed with police, which resulted in arrests of 164 to 200. There are no official figures.

Krasnodar

[edit]

Government reaction

[edit]

Russian state television completely ignored the protests on Sunday. Monday morning's bulletins were similarly blank. Pro-Kremlin newspapers also ignored the protests.[112]

Police circles a group of protesters in Saint Petersburg, 12 June 2017

Across the country, students have reported being press-ganged into lectures warning them of the perils of supporting those opposed to Putin. Some schools and universities have simply tasked teachers with persuading their students not to go to protests. A 13-year old student was quoted as saying: "They don't have the right to 'reeducate' us, to change our political views. I think they're doing this because they're afraid. They know that one day we'll be able to vote."[113]

Alisa Vox, a Russian singer, appeared in the video for "Baby Boy", posted online on 15 May. It has amassed more than 2.1 million views and more than a quarter of a million 'dislikes', or downvotes.

Navalny said Vox's video was a Russian government PR stunt to dissuade his supporters that she had received money for.[114]

In many cities, on the day of the protest, the public transport route was specially changed so that it was more difficult for people to get to the protest.

The protest actions on 12 June 7 October, 5 November 2017 and 28 January 2018 were not mentioned at all on state-owned TV channels and the media.[citation needed]

[edit]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]

Literature

[edit]
  • Badalyan K., Gavrov S. Leaders of public opinion: Political communication with youth in Russia during 2018-2019 // Russian journal of communication. Tom 9, № 2, London: Taylor & Francis, 2021. – РР. 238-252.[2]


Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

2017–2018 Russian protests

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from Grokipedia
The 2017–2018 Russian protests consisted of nationwide demonstrations against entrenched corruption in the Russian government, initiated by opposition activist Alexei Navalny's February 2017 investigative film alleging that had amassed unexplained wealth through a network of luxury properties, vineyards, and offshore entities facilitated by oligarchs. The protests, which unfolded in over 80 cities including , St. Petersburg, and regional centers like , attracted tens of thousands of participants—largely urban youth disillusioned with the Putin administration's authoritarian consolidation and economic stagnation—marking the largest wave of public dissent since the 2011–2012 electoral fraud demonstrations. Key events included the March 26, 2017, rallies where authorities detained more than 1,000 individuals, Navalny himself among them, alongside subsequent actions on June 12, 2017, and into 2018 amid his barred presidential candidacy, underscoring causal links between unaddressed elite graft and eroding public trust in institutions lacking . The government's response emphasized legal crackdowns over substantive reforms, with mass arrests revealing the regime's reliance on coercive mechanisms to suppress challenges to its power rather than addressing root causes like impunity for high-level officials.

Background

Economic and Political Context

Following the 2014 annexation of , 's economy faced dual shocks from Western sanctions and a collapse in global oil prices, leading to and slowed growth. (GDP) contracted by 2.3% in 2015 and 0.2% in 2016, with modest recovery to 1.6% growth in 2017, according to estimates. Sanctions restricted access to foreign capital and technology, contributing an estimated 0.5-0.6% annual drag on GDP in their initial years, per Bank of Russia analysis, while broader effects on investment may have reduced potential growth by 2.5-3% yearly. Real disposable incomes declined cumulatively by about 10% from 2014 to mid-2017, exacerbating perceptions of stagnating living standards amid inflation and reduced consumer purchasing power. Politically, President experienced a surge in approval ratings after the annexation, reaching 89% in June 2015 according to polls, sustained around 80-85% through 2017 amid nationalist sentiment and emphasis on geopolitical defiance. This consolidation of power followed crackdowns on opposition post-2011-2012 protests, with institutions like the judiciary and media increasingly aligned under executive control, reducing space for dissent. However, public perceptions of corruption remained acute; scored 29 out of 100 on Transparency International's 2017 , ranking 135th out of 180 countries, reflecting entrenched elite graft as a persistent despite narratives. Unlike the 2011-2012 protests, driven by allegations of during a period of pre-sanctions (GDP growth averaging 4% from 2000-2013), the unrest emerged against a backdrop of post-2014 stagnation, with triggers centered on exposés rather than voting irregularities, though participation remained smaller and more youth-oriented. This shift highlighted underlying economic frustrations—such as wage erosion and regional disparities—over ideological or procedural disputes, without the middle-class buoyancy of earlier cycles.

Corruption Allegations as Catalyst

In March 2017, the published the investigative film He Is Not Dimon to You, alleging that had accumulated undisclosed assets valued at billions of rubles through a complex web of non-profit organizations, shell companies, and proxies. The 45-minute video detailed claims of Medvedev receiving "gifts" from oligarchs, including a Tuscan vineyard estate, a mansion funded by shadowy donors, and luxury , all purportedly hidden via foundations like the "Fund for Support of Education, Science and Culture" registered to Medvedev's sister-in-law. These assertions relied on property records, corporate filings, and yacht tracking data to suggest systemic graft enabling elite enrichment without direct ownership traces. Russia's entrenched corruption problems provided fertile ground for such claims, as evidenced by its low rankings in global assessments. In the 2016 by , Russia scored 29 out of 100, placing 131st out of 176 countries, indicating strong perceptions among experts and business executives of entrenched public-sector , , and . The 2017 index saw a further decline to a score of 28 and 135th out of 180 countries, underscoring persistent issues like judicial interference and resource allocation favoritism that distort economic incentives and erode institutional trust. Official responses rejected the allegations without substantive rebuttal or independent verification. dismissed the film as "nonsense" and fabrications by political opponents, while spokespersons highlighted the accuser's prior conviction to question credibility, framing the video as unsubstantiated smear tactics ahead of elections. No criminal investigations or judicial proceedings validated the specific claims against , and parliamentary leaders declined calls for probes, citing lack of prosecutorial evidence; the absence of convictions or asset seizures left the assertions unproven in legal terms, amid broader patterns where high-level probes rarely advance without regime alignment.

Key Figures and Organization

Alexei Navalny, through his founded in 2011, emerged as the central figure orchestrating the protests by releasing investigative reports on alleged corruption, such as the March 2017 video targeting that amassed over 12 million views on within days. The Foundation coordinated mobilization primarily via digital platforms, issuing nationwide calls to action that facilitated decentralized gatherings without formal hierarchical structures beyond initial online directives. Navalny's strategy emphasized appeals disseminated through livestreams and Telegram channels, which proved effective in engaging urban youth demographics accustomed to over , drawing participants from over 80 cities on March 26, 2017. This approach, while innovative, centered decision-making around Navalny and his close associates like Leonid Volkov, prompting critiques of over-reliance on a single leader, as evidenced by more centralized pro-Navalny networks on platforms like compared to pro-government counterparts. Supporting figures included , a municipal deputy and opposition coordinator who amplified calls for participation and faced repeated detentions, such as a 15-day sentence in June 2017 for organizing unsanctioned rallies. Yashin's involvement underscored limited pluralism within the opposition, as Navalny's dominance marginalized broader coalitions. The centralized focus on Navalny exposed participants to heightened risks, including arbitrary arrests—over 1,000 detentions on alone—and drew accusations that organizers underemphasized potential repercussions like fines and beatings by . In response, authorities targeted Navalny directly, detaining him shortly after the initial rallies and imposing fines, while several Foundation staff were arrested, signaling early escalation against the movement's core.

Major Protest Events

26 March 2017 Nationwide Demonstrations

The 26 March 2017 nationwide demonstrations consisted of unsanctioned anti-corruption rallies organized by Alexei Navalny's in response to Navalny's March 2 investigative film alleging that had accumulated vast undeclared wealth through corrupt practices, including luxury properties and vineyards funded by oligarchs. Protesters primarily demanded Medvedev's immediate resignation and the initiation of criminal investigations into the corruption claims highlighted in the film. Rallies took place in over 80 cities and towns across Russia, ranging from major urban centers like and St. Petersburg to regional locations such as , , and , marking one of the broadest geographic spreads of opposition activity in years. In , the focal point was initially intended for Pushkin Square but shifted to nearby streets after authorities denied permission; official police estimates reported approximately 7,000 to 8,000 attendees, while opposition organizers claimed figures closer to 14,000. Nationwide participation reached around 60,000 according to independent assessments, with crowds chanting slogans and holding signs referencing the film's revelations. Police interventions were swift and widespread, as the gatherings lacked official authorization in most locations, leading to efforts to disperse participants through physical barriers, water cannons in some cities, and mass detentions. Over 1,000 individuals were arrested across the country, with more than 800 detentions reported in alone by the independent monitoring group OVD-Info, including journalists and minors. was detained by police while en route to the rally via subway, charged with organizing an unsanctioned event and resisting authorities; a court subsequently sentenced him to a 15-day administrative detention. In St. Petersburg, similar clashes resulted in hundreds of arrests after protesters attempted to march despite restrictions, highlighting immediate tensions between demonstrators and .

12 June 2017 Rallies

On 12 June 2017, coinciding with , a national holiday, called for rallies across to protest ongoing corruption and electoral restrictions that hindered opposition participation in the 2018 presidential election, including legal barriers to his own candidacy due to prior convictions. These demonstrations shifted emphasis from solely anti-corruption themes of earlier protests toward challenging mechanisms enabling President Vladimir Putin's prolonged rule through manipulated electoral processes. Rallies occurred in over a dozen cities, including , St. Petersburg, , and , with turnout estimated in the tens of thousands nationwide, though smaller than the March events. In , the unsanctioned gathering at drew thousands, leading to clashes as police employed physical force to disperse crowds, including dragging and shoving protesters. Authorities detained approximately 1,000 to 1,400 individuals nationwide, with over 800 arrests in alone and around 500 in St. Petersburg. documented police abuses, including beatings of detainees during the Moscow operation, while noting the protests themselves remained largely peaceful aside from isolated protester actions. Navalny was detained en route to the Moscow rally and subsequently held.

7 October 2017 Actions

On 7 October 2017, coinciding with President Vladimir Putin's 65th birthday, supporters of opposition leader , who had been detained since early September, held unauthorized rallies across to demand his release, combat government corruption, and ensure fair presidential elections in 2018. The demonstrations targeted Putin's leadership directly, with participants chanting slogans such as "Happy birthday Putin and goodbye," "Putin is a thief," and "Russia without Putin," framing the events as a rejection of his continued rule rather than mere birthday disruptions. Navalny, barred from running in the election due to prior convictions, used the occasion via dictated messages to urge mass participation, emphasizing constitutional protest rights despite official refusals to authorize most gatherings. In , several hundred protesters assembled at Pushkin Square, where authorities permitted a limited rally near the to minimize confrontations on the holiday, though detentions occurred for unsanctioned activities. St. Petersburg saw the largest and most tense action, with clashes between demonstrators and police resulting in over 60 arrests amid efforts to disperse the crowd. Smaller actions unfolded in at least 23 other cities, including , where 24 individuals were detained, reflecting regional variations in turnout and police response but unified messaging. Authorities reported detaining more than 260 people nationwide for participating in the unsanctioned events, with monitors like OVD-Info confirming over 270 arrests across 26 cities, primarily for violating public assembly rules. These actions built on prior Navalny-led campaigns exposing elite graft, drawing younger participants via coordination, though official narratives portrayed them as provocations timed to spoil the presidential birthday rather than address substantive grievances like electoral fairness.

5 November 2017 and Subsequent Gatherings

On 5 November 2017, unsanctioned protests occurred in and several other Russian cities, primarily organized by the movement led by exiled opposition figure Vyacheslav Maltsev, who had forecasted a non-violent on that date since 2013. The timing aligned with Russia's Day of National Unity on 4 November, established in 2005 to replace Soviet commemorations of the Bolshevik , allowing protesters to frame their anti-corruption demands and calls for Vladimir Putin's resignation as a symbolic push for systemic change ahead of the revolution's centenary on 7 November. Authorities responded with widespread detentions, arresting more than 400 individuals nationwide, including over 300 in Moscow alone, according to monitoring by the independent group OVD-Info; these figures were corroborated by reports of preemptive arrests of expected participants. Artpodgotovka, described by its adherents as advocating peaceful mass action to occupy key sites, had been designated an extremist organization by a Russian court weeks prior, justifying the crackdown under laws prohibiting unsanctioned assemblies and perceived threats to public order. Following the November 5 actions, subsequent gatherings in late 2017 diminished in scale, often comprising localized campaign events by Alexei Navalny's supporters amid his exclusion from the 2018 presidential race due to prior convictions. These focused increasingly on electoral demands, including boycotts of the March 2018 vote to protest perceived manipulations and lack of fair competition, with smaller arrests—typically in the dozens per incident—occurring at venues like Samara on 4 , where police detained participants preparing for a rally. By , Navalny's public statements emphasized rejecting state-controlled processes, signaling a tactical pivot from broad mobilization toward undermining the legitimacy of the upcoming election, though turnout remained limited compared to spring and summer peaks.

2018 Protests Including January and May Events

In early 2018, the anti-corruption protest wave initiated by persisted through targeted actions in January and May, but with notably reduced scale amid participant fatigue, intensified government restrictions, and the shadow of the March , which barred Navalny from running. These events emphasized calls for electoral boycotts and opposition to Vladimir Putin's consolidation of power, though nationwide turnout fell short of the tens of thousands seen in 2017 demonstrations. On January 28, Navalny's supporters organized rallies in over 100 cities under the slogan of a "voters' strike," urging from the March 18 vote due to the exclusion of genuine alternatives and perceived electoral manipulation. Protesters braved subzero temperatures to decry and , with gatherings drawing hundreds in and smaller numbers elsewhere, a fraction of prior mobilizations. Navalny himself was detained briefly by police en route to a rally, alongside dozens of others nationwide, signaling ongoing official intolerance for unsanctioned assemblies. May 5 protests, timed days before Putin's May 7 inauguration for a fourth term, unfolded in more than 90 locations against his extended rule, corruption in elite circles, and the absence of competitive politics. Navalny, coordinating via his Anti-Corruption Foundation, was arrested in Moscow shortly after addressing crowds, with authorities detaining over 1,600 participants across Russia in a coordinated crackdown. Moscow saw hundreds rallying in central squares before dispersal, while regional actions involved smaller groups facing similar police action, underscoring the movement's contraction despite persistent grievances. These final major 2018 outbursts highlighted tactical shifts toward symbolic pre-election disruption but revealed challenges in sustaining broad mobilization against state controls.

Scale and Demographics

Participation Estimates and Discrepancies

Estimates of participation in the 2017–2018 Russian protests revealed consistent discrepancies between official police figures, which tended to minimize turnout, and those from opposition organizers or independent monitors like OVD-Info, which reported higher numbers based on on-site observations and data. For the 26 March 2017 nationwide demonstrations, police estimated 7,000 to 8,000 attendees in the capital, while nationwide figures from independent reports approximated 60,000 across over 80 cities, reflecting the decentralized nature of the events. served as a partial proxy for scale: police reported around 500 detentions in alone, but OVD-Info documented over 1,000 there and more than 900 nationwide, suggesting thousands participated despite not all being detained. Similar variances appeared in subsequent events, such as the 12 June 2017 rallies, where opposition sources claimed tens of thousands across Russia, contrasted by police underreporting; OVD-Info recorded 866 arrests in Moscow, indicating substantial but contained gatherings. For the 7 October 2017 protests, estimates ranged from 2,560 to 21,520 participants nationwide per and OVD-Info data, with police detentions totaling about 271 across 25 cities. These differences stemmed from methodological challenges, including police counts limited to authorized zones or visual approximations, versus opposition reliance on crowd-sourced videos and , which amplified perceived scale but lacked rigorous verification amid dispersed, unsanctioned actions in smaller cities. Aggregate participation across the protest wave likely totaled around 100,000 individuals, counting repeats, though unique attendees were fewer given the episodic nature and overlap in urban centers like and St. Petersburg. This scale remained modest relative to Russia's 146 million , underscoring limited despite viral online traction from Navalny's videos, as verification issues and selective attendance—often youth-driven—constrained broader turnout. Official sources, controlled by the state, exhibited a pattern of conservative estimates to downplay threat, while OVD-Info, though valuable for tracking detentions, aligned with opposition narratives and faced accusations of inflation from pro-government outlets.

Participant Profiles

The participants in the 2017–2018 Russian protests were predominantly urban youth aged in their late teens to thirties, with data from analyses of protest groups and arrests indicating that 66–75% were under 30 years old across major events like the 26 and 12 June 2017 demonstrations. The largest age cohorts were typically 18–24, comprising around 35–37% in sampled groups, while those under 18 accounted for 5–12%. A substantial share consisted of students, with estimates placing schoolchildren and attendees at nearly half of attendees in the initial March rallies, and protest turnout correlating positively with the proportion of university students in participating cities. This demographic skewed toward middle-class individuals in major metropolitan areas such as , St. Petersburg, and regional centers like , reflecting higher education levels and greater reliance on online platforms for mobilization—evident in the rapid spread of investigative content via , which reached millions of views among younger users who favored sources over traditional television. Working-class and rural participation remained minimal, as events were concentrated in urban settings with limited outreach to non-city populations. Surveys of broader youth cohorts around this period highlighted frustrations over limited economic opportunities and , though participant profiles specifically showed overrepresentation of educated urbanites relative to Russia's overall population structure. While many were first-time protesters drawn by digital campaigns, some events included families, with detained minors often released to parents; however, officials criticized the involvement of underage participants as irresponsible and potentially endangering . Overall, these profiles underscore a non-representative cross-section of Russian society, dominated by a minority of digitally engaged, student-heavy urban rather than mirroring national demographics of age, class, or .

Government Response

During the 26 March 2017 protests, Russian authorities detained over 1,000 people in alone, with additional arrests in other cities, primarily for participating in unsanctioned assemblies under Article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. units, including , dispersed crowds on and other locations, leading to charges of minor or disobedience for some detainees. On 12 June 2017, police arrested at least 1,721 individuals nationwide, including in and St. Petersburg, where forces used batons and shields to break up gatherings, detaining bystanders and journalists alongside protesters. documented instances of arbitrary detentions and physical abuse during transport to stations, though some arrests stemmed from protesters blocking roadways and ignoring dispersal orders. Courts imposed administrative fines ranging from 10,000 to 20,000 rubles or short-term detentions of up to 15 days on many, with opposition figures like receiving 25-day sentences for organizing unsanctioned events. Subsequent actions on 7 October 2017 resulted in approximately 271 detentions across 26 cities, concentrated in St. Petersburg and , where troops enforced public order amid clashes involving thrown objects from crowds. Legal proceedings focused on administrative violations, yielding fines and brief incarcerations, while a smaller number faced charges for resisting officers. The 5 November 2017 gatherings saw 412 arrests, mostly in , with detainees processed for unauthorized participation and possession of protest materials deemed provocative. In early 2018 events, including January raids on Navalny's offices, 185 people were held, escalating to over 1,600 nationwide on 5 May during pre-inauguration protests, where police applied similar administrative codes but also pursued criminal cases for alleged violence against officers. Authorities extended enforcement beyond immediate events by targeting participants through educational institutions; schoolchildren and university students faced interrogations, threats of expulsion, or parental notifications for involvement, particularly after the and 2017 actions. While monitors reported overuse of force, such as forced strip-searches and beatings in holding facilities, protester actions like obstructions contributed to some enforcement escalations.

Official Justifications and Measures

Russian authorities justified their response to the 2017–2018 protests by classifying them as unauthorized assemblies that contravened Federal Law No. 54-FZ on public rallies, which mandates advance notification to local authorities and restricts locations to prevent disruption of public order. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described the March 26, 2017, demonstrations as a "provocation" instigated by opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who mobilized participants via online videos alleging elite corruption without providing verifiable evidence, thereby encouraging illegal actions among uninformed or incentivized individuals. Peskov noted that while approved protests are permissible, these events bypassed legal procedures, posing risks to traffic, infrastructure, and safety in urban centers across over 80 cities. Official policy stressed a preference for and non-violent containment, with directed to enforce compliance proportionately to minimize harm while safeguarding constitutional order against potential escalation into disorder. Peskov praised the ' actions as "highly professional and legal," arguing that unchecked violations could lead to broader chaos, and rejected characterizations of the response as excessive. The dismissed foreign critiques, including U.S. and EU calls for restraint, as unwarranted meddling that implicitly endorsed lawbreaking rather than respecting Russia's sovereign handling of domestic stability. Preemptive administrative measures included directives from to internet providers to block or throttle access to websites and platforms actively promoting unsanctioned gatherings, such as those linked to Navalny's , to curb dissemination of unapproved mobilization calls ahead of events like the June 12, 2017, rallies. Regional officials issued guidance to state enterprises, universities, and employers, urging them to inform staff and students of legal risks associated with participation, framing absenteeism or involvement as threats to operational continuity and . These steps aligned with broader efforts to preempt disruptions during sensitive periods, such as pre-election preparations.

Controversies and Perspectives

Claims of Illegality and Disruption

Russian federal law, specifically Federal Law No. 54-FZ on Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches, and Pickets, mandates that organizers notify local authorities at least 10 days in advance of planned public events, with authorities empowered to approve, modify, or deny based on public order considerations; failure to comply renders gatherings unauthorized and subject to dispersal. Many 2017–2018 protests, particularly those called by Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation, proceeded without such notifications or approvals, such as the March 26, 2017, nationwide actions where organizers claimed permits for only 21 locations but held events in central urban areas regardless, prompting authorities to classify them as illegal mass gatherings. Similarly, the June 12, 2017, protests deviated from approved routes in Moscow, leading to immediate declarations of illegality by prosecutors. Authorities and pro-government commentators argued these unsanctioned events inherently disrupted public order, citing instances where marchers blocked major thoroughfares and intersections in and other cities, impeding vehicular and pedestrian traffic during peak hours; for example, on October 7, 2017, coinciding with Vladimir Putin's birthday, protesters in multiple cities occupied streets without permits, resulting in reported delays for commuters and emergency services. Clashes arose when participants refused dispersal orders, with documented cases of protesters throwing objects at police or attempting to breach barriers, though empirical footage from both state and independent sources shows these incidents as localized scuffles rather than coordinated , involving under 5% of attendees per event based on arrest ratios exceeding 1,000 detentions across 2017 actions amid crowds estimated at 60,000–100,000 nationwide. Kremlin spokespersons described such deviations as deliberate provocations by opposition figures to manufacture chaos and undermine social stability, rather than orderly . Opposition organizers countered that the protests constituted peaceful assembly protected under Article 31 of Russia's Constitution, asserting minimal inherent disruption and attributing order breaches to excessive police intervention, such as the use of riot gear and detentions preemptively in permitted zones; Navalny, for instance, highlighted post-event videos showing non-violent gatherings escalating only after forces advanced, framing permit denials as systemic repression of legitimate critique. Independent monitoring by groups like OVD-Info corroborated low levels of protester-initiated violence, with most arrests for administrative violations like unauthorized participation rather than criminal acts, though courts upheld fines and short detentions for organizers under articles penalizing public order breaches. These divergent claims underscore a core contention: whether permit strictures enforce reasonable regulation or enable selective suppression, with empirical data indicating procedural non-compliance as the primary legal trigger but limited evidence of widespread hazard beyond temporary urban inconveniences.

Allegations of Foreign Funding and Manipulation

Russian authorities, including Kremlin spokesman , alleged that organizers of the March 2017 protests incentivized participation through financial payments to young attendees, framing the events as orchestrated rather than spontaneous expressions of discontent. President , in his March 30, 2017, address following the protests, downplayed their scale while implicitly invoking foreign interference by warning against external attempts to destabilize , echoing longstanding narratives of Western-backed "color revolutions" as a model for the unrest. Security Council Secretary similarly suggested in June 2017 that heightened opposition activity ahead of elections indicated coordinated foreign efforts to provoke instability, though without specifying funding mechanisms tied directly to the protests. These claims aligned with broader Russian government assertions of Western influence via non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including those linked to figures like or previously active entities such as USAID, which Russia expelled in 2012 for alleged political meddling. However, no publicly disclosed —such as financial records or intercepted transactions—directly linked foreign donors to the 2017–2018 protest logistics or participant mobilization. Critics, including independent analysts, noted a pattern of opaque opposition financing, with Alexei Navalny's (FBK) relying on from Russian citizens but facing prior scrutiny over donor transparency, as seen in 2013 prosecutorial probes into his mayoral campaign's foreign receipts exceeding legal limits. Navalny and his allies denied foreign manipulation, insisting the protests stemmed organically from domestic sentiment fueled by FBK's investigative video on Dmitry released March 2, 2017, and were supported by voluntary domestic donations rather than external orchestration. FBK reports emphasized small, anonymous contributions from Russians, with no verified audits confirming illicit foreign inflows specifically for the protest campaigns, underscoring a evidentiary gap between allegations and substantiation. amplified manipulation narratives without forensic backing, potentially reflecting strategic deflection amid verifiable exposures, while opposition transparency disclosures invited due to partial anonymity in donor data.

Criticisms of Protest Effectiveness and Tactics

The 2017–2018 Russian protests yielded no substantive policy changes or institutional reforms, despite their scale and visibility. Alexei Navalny's disqualification from the March 2018 —stemming from a 2014 conviction upheld by Russian courts—proceeded unimpeded, allowing to secure victory with 76.69% of the official vote tally on March 18, 2018. Analysts attributed this outcome to the protests' framing as personalized campaigns rather than viable alternatives to the entrenched system, which lacks mechanisms for removing officials via street action alone. The demonstrations, while energizing participants through viral exposés like the March 2017 "He Is Not Dimon" video alleging Medvedev's hidden wealth, functioned more as outlets for frustration than strategic levers for leverage, dissipating without compelling the regime to address grievances. Critics highlighted tactical shortcomings, particularly the over-reliance on Navalny's singular and mobilization, which prioritized charismatic appeals over building resilient coalitions or institutional alternatives. This centralization exposed the movement to fragility, as Navalny's recurrent arrests—such as the 15-day detention following the March 26, 2017, rallies—disrupted continuity and limited broader opposition alliances. Furthermore, organizers faced rebuke for insufficiently disclosing risks to novice protesters, many of whom were drawn via without prior political experience, leading to disproportionate arrests among under-18 participants during unsanctioned gatherings. Such approaches, while amplifying visuals and awakening civic interest among younger demographics, invited backlash and containment without escalating to systemic pressure.

Aftermath and Impact

Immediate Political Consequences

The Russian Supreme Court rejected opposition leader Alexei Navalny's appeal on December 30, 2017, upholding a prior conviction from 2014 and confirming his disqualification from the March 2018 presidential election. This ruling, following the Central Election Commission's rejection of his candidacy on December 25, 2017, directly curtailed the protests' potential to elevate Navalny as a challenger to incumbent President , amid heightened opposition activity sparked by anti-corruption revelations earlier in the year. The decision amplified legal pressures on protest organizers, with Navalny framing it as electoral manipulation and responding by urging a of the vote. In the held on , , Putin secured 76.69% of the vote on a turnout of 67.5%, underscoring the protests' failure to substantially erode support or mobilize widespread despite Navalny's calls. Official results showed no significant uptick in invalid ballots or boycotts attributable to the movement, with opposition candidates collectively garnering under 20% of votes. Concurrently, regional and municipal elections in yielded minor gains for non-systemic opposition parties in select locales, such as securing seats in a few cities, but retained overwhelming majorities nationwide, reflecting constrained immediate electoral ripple effects from the unrest. Pre-election tensions escalated through winter 2017–2018 with sporadic demonstrations against the barring of candidates and perceived fraud, yet participation waned by mid-2018 as authorities intensified monitoring and legal restrictions on unsanctioned gatherings, diffusing momentum ahead of the vote. This short-term consolidation of executive control, without policy concessions to protesters' demands, highlighted the Kremlin's capacity to neutralize dissent through institutional levers rather than accommodation.

Long-Term Effects on Opposition and Governance

The 2017–2018 protests prompted no fundamental shifts in Russian governance structures, with President Vladimir Putin's administration maintaining centralized authority through sustained repressive measures that evolved from prior crackdowns. Following the demonstrations, authorities escalated enforcement of existing assembly restrictions, including mass detentions and administrative penalties, which reinforced controls on public gatherings without necessitating new legislation specifically tied to these events. Opposition coordination suffered long-term fragmentation, exacerbated by the barring of from the 2018 presidential election and subsequent events like his 2020 poisoning and 2021 imprisonment, which scattered activist networks and diminished unified campaigns. Public support for the government exhibited resilience, as evidenced by polls showing Putin's approval rating stabilizing around 60-70% from 2017 to 2020 before surging to over 80% by 2022 amid the conflict, reflecting a preference for stability over protest-driven change among the broader population. While the protests initially mobilized urban youth— with surveys indicating higher protest readiness among those under 25—these groups faced intensified co-optation through state patriotic programs and pressures post-2022, leading to subdued rather than sustained opposition growth. Corruption trajectories remained unaltered, as Transparency International's scores for hovered between 28 and 30 from 2017 to 2020 before declining to 26 by 2023 and 22 in 2024, underscoring that the protests spotlighted elite graft but failed to catalyze institutional reforms or accountability mechanisms. This continuity highlights a model prioritizing regime security over responsiveness, with opposition efforts yielding tactical visibility but no leverage against entrenched power dynamics.

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  114. https://www.statista.com/chart/28383/putin-approval/
  115. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/long-take/russian-youth-in-the-moscow-protests/
  116. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023
  117. https://ti-russia.org/en/2025/02/11/corruption-perceptions-index-2024-russia-scores-22-points-its-worst-result-in-history/
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