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The Russian United Democratic Party Yabloko (RUDP Yabloko; Russian: Росси́йская объединённая демократи́ческая па́ртия «Я́блоко», romanized: Rossiyskaya obyedinyonnaya demokraticheskaya partiya "Yabloko", IPA: [ˈjabləkə] ⓘ, lit. 'Apple') is a social-liberal[2][3][4] political party in Russia.

Key Information

The party consequently participated in the elections of deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of all eight convocations. Until 2003, Yabloko was represented by a faction in the State Duma and later until 2007 by individual deputies. In March 2002, the party became a full member of the Liberal International, and since November 1998, it has been in observer status.[20] The founder of the party Grigory Yavlinsky is an honorary vice-president of the Liberal International and winner of its Prize for Freedom.[21][22] Yabloko was a member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) from 2006 to 2025. As of 2021, the party was represented by factions in 4 regional parliaments of the Russian Federation. In addition, members of the party were deputies of 13 administrative centers of the subjects of the Russian Federation, 183 representatives of the party were municipal deputies in Moscow and 84 in Saint Petersburg.[23]

The party also advocates for the protection of the rights of LGBT people in Russia.[24][25][26]

History

[edit]

The party dates back to the early 1990s. Originally established as a public organization in 1993, it transformed into a political party in 2001. From 1993 to 2003, the party had a small faction in the State Duma; in 2003, four single-mandate deputies passed from Yabloko to the Duma: one of them joined United Russia, and three joined the informal group of independent democrats.[27] After the tightening of Russian legislation in 2011, only 7 registered political parties remained in Russia, among which was Yabloko. In 2011, the party managed to obtain the right to state funding, which allowed further functioning of the organization. As a result of the 2016 elections, the party is not receiving any state funding any further.

Emergence of the Party (1993–2002)

[edit]

The immediate predecessor of the Yabloko party was the electoral bloc Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin, formed for the legislative elections of 1993. "Yabloko" is an acronym of the names of its founders: "Я" (Ya) for Grigory Yavlinsky; "Б" (B) for Yury Boldyrev, and "Л" (L) for Vladimir Lukin, with the full name meaning "Apple" in Russian.[28][29][30][31][32][33]

The bloc included several political parties: the Republican, the Social Democratic, and the Russian Christian Democratic Union – New Democracy.[28] The Yabloko bloc in the 1993 elections received 7.86% of the vote, as a result of which the Yabloko faction was created in the State Duma[34] In January 1995 Yabloko was transformed into a public association after holding a founding congress. Yavlinsky became the head of the central council. Already during this period, there were some changes in the leadership. In 1994 part of the representatives of the Republican Party, headed by Vladimir Lysenko, left the bloc.[35] At the same time, the Regional Center Party from St. Petersburg joined Yabloko as a regional organization. In September 1995, due to disagreements on some fundamental issues, Yury Boldyrev left the association as well.

The Yabloko public association was able to form factions based on the results of the elections to the State Duma in 1995 and 1999. In 1995, in the elections to the State Duma of the 2nd convocation, the Yabloko association received 6.89% of the vote. In the elections of the State Duma of the III convocation in 1999 Yabloko association made an alliance with Sergei Stepashin, including him as number three of the party list. According to the results of the vote count, the party received 5.93% of the votes.

Yabloko during the entire period of President Yeltsin became the "democratic opposition" to the president's policies. For example, Yabloko opposed privatization conducted by Anatoly Chubais, and offered an alternative program in 1998, which stated that privatization was carried out in an economically senseless and socially detrimental way, passing control of sold organizations to the "directors" with several backdrop nominal owners.[36]

During the 1996 elections, Yavlinsky was offered to join the government. As a condition to join Yabloko's leader demanded an end to hostilities in Chechnya and to make serious adjustments to the socio-economic policy. In addition, he demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, head of the Security Service of the President of the Russian Federation Alexander Korzhakov, First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, head of the presidential administration Nikolai Yegorov, director of the FSS Mikhail Barsukov. Since these conditions were not accepted, Yavlinsky and his team did not enter the government.[37]

Some members of the Yabloko faction nevertheless accepted the proposals of the executive branch. Mikhail Zadornov and Oksana Dmitrieva became members of the government, for which they were expelled from the party. Also, Ivan Grachev and Vyacheslav Igrunov left Yabloko.

In May 1999, the Yabloko faction voted for the impeachment of President Yeltsin. The bulk of the State Duma deputies supported the accusation of the president of unleashing war in Chechnya and 24 deputies voted for the impeachment of Yeltsin on charges of an armed dispersal of the Supreme Council in October 1993. Yabloko, however, refused to support other articles of accusations, including the article proposed by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation about the "genocide of the Russian people." Yabloko criticized presidential and government policies and regularly voted against draft state budgets submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers to the Duma.

On 16 August 1999, 18 members of the Yabloko faction, including Yavlinsky,[38] voted for the appointment of Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister, 4 members abstained, 8 voted against, and 15 did not vote. In May 2000, 4 deputies of the Yabloko faction voted for the appointment of Mikhail Kasyanov as prime minister, 8 members voted against and 4 abstained. Yabloko also supported a bill developed with the participation of faction deputy Mikhail Zadornov on the introduction of a flat income tax instead of a progressive taxation scale.[39]

Since Putin was never supported by a majority of Yabloko members, the party found itself in fierce opposition to the government, criticizing the government during the remaining term of the State Duma of the third convocation, especially as parliamentary elections approached.

In December 2001, on the basis of the all-Russian political public organization Yabloko and the Party of Social liberalism[40] the Russian Democratic Party Yabloko was officially created, which advocates the European path of development of the Russian Federation and is a member of several international and European organizations. Since November 1998, the Yabloko association has had observer status with the Liberal International and participated in its events. At the 51st Congress of the Liberal International, held on 21–23 March 2002 in Budapest,[41] the Yabloko party was accepted into the ranks of this international organization as a full member.

On 26 April 2002, the Russian Democratic Party Yabloko (Reg. No. 5018) was registered by the Ministry of Justice. Grigory Yavlinsky was elected chairman of the party.

Political party (2002 to present)

[edit]

According to the deputy chairman of Yabloko, Sergei Ivanenko, in 2002 the party had 20,000 members.

In June 2003, the Yabloko faction voted for a vote of no confidence in the government, which, however, was not approved by the Duma.

Since 2003, Yabloko's position has worsened. In the 2003 State Duma elections, the Yabloko party received 4.3% of the vote (less than the 5% threshold) and did not receive seats in the State Duma on party lists (only 4 candidates from the party went through single-mandate constituencies). Interestingly, the fact that Vladimir Putin called Grigory Yavlinsky at night, during the counting of votes, with congratulations on the victory, became widely known.[42]

After the joining of Green Russia and Soldiers' Mothers in 2006, the name of the party was changed to the Russian United Democratic Party "Yabloko" (RODP "Yabloko"). Since 2006, the Yabloko party has become part of the European party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). Sergey Mitrokhin became party chairman in 2008.

In the 2007 elections, only 1.59% of voters voted for Yabloko, and the party did not enter the State Duma again. In 2008 the party had 58,540 members. In the 2011 elections according to official data from the CEC, 3.43% of voters (2.25 million people) voted for Yabloko. In these elections, the party more than doubled its result but still did not get into the State Duma. However, this result gave Yabloko the possibility of state funding. In 2012 Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky was not registered by the Central Election Commission as a candidate for the presidential elections.

In 2021 the party had 16,100 members.

In the elections to the State Duma of 2021, Grigory Yavlinsky for the first time in the history of the party refused to run for deputies, and the federal list of candidates was headed by Yabloko chairman Nikolay Rybakov.[43] 1.34% of voters voted for Yabloko (750 000 people). On 14 October 2021, the Federal Political Committee of the party decided to withdraw from the election candidates who supported the idea of Smart Voting Alexei Navalny. Several Yabloko members criticized the party's policies and demanded the leadership to resign.[44]

On 26 October 2021, the members of the Arkhangelsk regional branch of Yabloko published a statement, in which they demanded that the central political committee of the party be dismissed due to the adoption of the so-called "Yavlinsky blacklist", which lead to the suspension of the activities of the branch.[45] On 19 November 2021, the federal bureau of Yabloko appointed the re-registration of party members prior to the upcoming party congress in December[46][47]

Russian invasion of Ukraine and stance on war in Ukraine

[edit]

On 13 February 2022, Yabloko published a petition against a possible war with Ukraine.[48] Yabloko is opposing Russia's 2022 attack on Ukraine and has been taking part in protests against the war.[49] After the beginning of the invasion, the Federal Political Committee of the party declared[50]

"Yabloko expresses its categorical protest against the outbreak of hostilities against Ukraine. This war is Russia's war with the objective course of history, a war against time, a tragic fall from the reality of the modern world. The consequences of this war will last for a very long time, but now, first of all, it is a tragedy, suffering, and death of people, and this will never be corrected. The reason for the tragedy is lies, cruelty, and absolute indifference to the people of the Russian authorities. The Yabloko party considers the war with Ukraine to be the gravest crime. We believe that this war is contrary to the national interests of Russia and destroys the future of Russia."

On 28 February 2022, the Yabloko factions in the parliaments of Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Pskov region, and Karelia tried to initiate appeals from their legislative assemblies to President Putin with a call to immediately stop hostilities on the territory of Ukraine and start peace negotiations with international mediation, withdraw military units to places of permanent deployment, to exchange prisoners on the principle of "all for all".[51] Several members of the Yabloko party in various regions were detained for participating in anti-war protests.[52][49]

Organizational structure

[edit]

RUDP Yabloko consists of regional branches, one per subject of the federation, regional branches from local branches, one per urban district or municipal district, local branches from primary branches, and one per urban settlement or rural settlement.

  • The supreme body is the Congress, between Congresses – is the Federal Council, between the Federal Councils – is the Political Committee, the executive body is the Bureau, the highest official is the chairman, the highest control body is the Party Arbitration, the highest audit body is the Control and Auditing Commission.
  • The supreme body of the regional branch is the Conference, between Conferences is the Regional Council, the executive body of the regional branch is the Bureau of the Regional Council, the highest official of the regional branch is the chairman of the regional branch, the audit body of the regional branch is the Control and Audit Commission of the regional branch.
  • The supreme body of the local branch is the Conference, between Conferences – the Council of the Local Branch, the executive body of the local branch – is the Bureau of the Council of the local branch, and the highest official of the local branch is the chairman of the local branch.
  • The supreme body of the primary branch is the General Meeting, between General Meetings is the Council of the primary branch, and the highest official of the primary branch is the chairman of the primary branch.

Leadership

[edit]

The first chairman of the party (1993–2008) was Grigory Yavlinsky.

In 1995 Vladimir Lukin and Yury Boldyrev were elected vice-chairmen (he left Yabloko in the same year). Since 1996 Vladimir Lukin has become the first deputy chairman of the party, and Sergey Ivanenko and Vyacheslav Igrunov have been the deputies. In 2000–2001, Vladimir Lukin was again the only deputy chairman of the party. In 2001–2004, Lukin served as the first deputy chairman of the party, while the deputy chairmen were Alexei Arbatov, Igor Artemiev, Sergei Ivanenko,and Sergey Mitrokhin. In 2004–2008, the first deputy chairman of the party was Sergei Ivanenko, deputy chairmen were Alexei Arbatov, Igor Artemyev, and Sergey Mitrokhin. The posts of deputy chairman until 2007 were also presented by Sergey Popov, Galina Khovanskaya, and Irina Yarovaya. After joining the party of the Green Russia movement, the post of deputy chairman of the party in 2006–2008 was held by Alexei Yablokov.

At the XV Party Congress on 21–22 June 2008, Mitrokhin was elected the second chairman of Yabloko. In 2008–2015, the posts of deputy chairmen of the party were abolished.

The next party leadership elections were held at the XVIII Congress of Yabloko on 19–20 December 2015. Emilia Slabunova became the third chairman of the Yabloko party, and Alexander Gnezdilov, Sergei Ivanenko, and Nikolay Rybakov were elected as her deputies.

At the XXI Congress on 15 December 2019, Nikolay Rybakov was elected the new chairman of the party. Sergey Ivanenko, Boris Vishnevsky, and Ivan Bolshakov became his deputies.

No. Leader Took office Left office
1
Grigory Yavlinsky 16 October 1993 21 June 2008
2
Sergey Mitrokhin 21 June 2008 20 December 2015
3
Emilia Slabunova 20 December 2015 15 December 2019
4
Nikolay Rybakov 15 December 2019 Incumbent

Federal Political Committee

[edit]

The Federal Political Committee is the collegiate governing body of the party. It formulates the party's position on major political issues between congresses; makes submissions to the party's federal bureau on key personnel appointments; makes decisions on the volumes and main directions of financing the activities of the party; organizes the work of the federal council of the party and convenes its meetings. The Federal Political Committee has the right to convene extraordinary congresses of the Party.

Federal Bureau

[edit]

The Federal Bureau of the Party is the permanent governing body of the party. The Federal Bureau makes political decisions and makes statements on behalf of the party by the decisions of the Political Committee, approves the estimates of income and expenses of the party, the procedure for receiving and spending funds, and the report on their implementation by the decisions of the Political Committee, exercises the rights of a legal entity on behalf of the party and performs its duties in accordance with the party charter, and also exercises other powers in accordance with the party charter.

  • Babushkin Andrei Vladimirovich – chairman of the public human rights charitable organization Committee "For Civil Rights", member of the Presidential Human Rights Council
  • Boldyreva Galina Vasilievna – chairman of the Volgograd regional branch of the party, President of the Volgograd regional public organization Club "Ecology"
  • Bolshakov Ivan Viktorovich – political scientist, head of the analytical department of the party
  • Vishnevsky Boris Lazarevich – deputy of the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg, publicist, political scientist, member of the Federal Political Committee, Candidate of Technical Sciences
  • Golov Anatoly Grigoryevich – head of the Social Democratic faction of the party, co-chairman of the Union of Consumers of Russia
  • Goncharenko Alexander Ilyich – chairman of the Altai Regional Branch of the Party, Honorary President of the Public Monitoring Commission of the Altai Territory, laureate of the Moscow Helsinki Group Prize in the field of human rights protection
  • Goncharov Kirill Alekseyevich – deputy chairman of the Moscow Regional Branch of the Party
  • Goryachev Valery Sergeyevich – lawyer, head of the central apparatus of the party, executive secretary of the Bureau of the party
  • Grishin Grigory Aleksandrovich – deputy chairman of the Saratov regional branch of the party, candidate of philological sciences
  • Dorokhov Vladimir Yurievich – chairman of the Tula regional branch of the party
  • Efimov Alexander Vladimirovich – member of the regional council of the Volgograd regional branch of the party
  • Ivanenko Sergey Viktorovich – deputy chairman of the Party, member of the Federal Political Committee of the Party, Candidate of Economic Sciences
  • Kolokolova Olga Arkadievna – chairman of the Perm regional branch of the party
  • Kruglov Maxim Sergeyevich – head of the Yabloko faction in the Moscow City Duma, deputy chairman of the Moscow regional branch of the party, candidate of political sciences
  • Mutsolgov Ruslan Adamovich – chairman of the regional branch of the party in the Republic of Ingushetia
  • Petlin Maxim Anatolyevich – deputy chairman of the Sverdlovsk regional branch of the party
  • Rybakov Nikolay Igorevich – chairman of the Party, member of the Bureau of the Party
  • Talevlin Andrey Aleksandrovich – ecologist, deputy chairman of the Chelyabinsk regional branch of the party
  • Tsepilova Olga Dmitrievna – chairman of the faction "Green Russia" of the party, candidate of sociological sciences
  • Cherepanova Anna Fedorovna – deputy of the City Duma of Veliky Novgorod, chairman of the Novgorod regional branch of the party
Control and Audit Commission
[edit]
  • Zinatullin Ruslan Mansurovich – chairman of the regional branch of the party in the Republic of Tatarstan
  • Kushpita Dmitry Yurievich – chairman of the Vladimir regional branch of the party, former deputy of the Council of People's Deputies of Vladimir
  • Monin Vadim Vladimirovich
  • Shkred Tatyana Valerievna
  • Lysenko Kirill Yevgenyevich
Exclusion of members
[edit]

Over the entire history of the party, several prominent party members were excluded, who became prominent politicians on their own: Oksana Dmitriyeva, Alexei Navalny, Maxim Reznik, Maxim Katz, and Ilya Yashin.

The period of Sergey Mitrokhin was marked not only by the exclusion of members but also by the suspension of the powers of the regional branches. It was the case in party regional branches in Omsk, Belgorod (for cooperation with United Russia party), Bryansk (for the removal of the chairman of the local branch – candidate for governor of the region Andrei Ponomarev – from the elections in the interests of the current governor of the region Nikolai Denin, later accused of corruption), Krasnodar (for violating party discipline), St. Petersburg, and several other branches.

In 2020, the Federal leadership of Yabloko decided to exclude the chairman of the Novosibirsk branch Svetlana Kaverzina [ru], and three of her associates from the party. The leadership considered that they "did not comply with the decision of the party bureau and publicly declared their disagreement with it, which caused political damage to the party". In addition to Kaverzina, Anton Nelidov, Mikhail Ryazantsev, and Vyacheslav Udintsev lost their membership in the party.[54]

Also in 2020, the Federal Bureau of Yabloko expelled other 16 people from the party, including Maxim Katz, co-founder of the City Projects Foundation. The decision of the bureau announced that Katz tried to gain control over the Moscow branch of the party by creating an "artificial majority" of his supporters who voted unanimously. Katz announced his intention to appeal the bureau's decision.[55]

In 2021, mass expulsions from the party as part of the "fight against katzism"[56][57] and for signing open appeals of party members to the Congress continued.[58] At least 98 members were expelled from the Moscow branch (according to one of the excluded – more than 200).[59]

The expelled members announced that they would form a new, independent from the party leadership organization, as well as that the current leadership of the party "is conducting a systematic fight against civil society", "justifies the repressions" and "accuses those who fight against them". The creation of the public movement "Yabloko" was announced, the declared aim to return the party under the control of their like-minded people or creating a new legal entity.[60]

In addition, 189 members were denied registration, and 488 were suspended, depriving them of the right to any form of participation in internal elections.[59] Many suspended party members consider this action to be inconsistent with the law on political parties and challenge it in court.[61]

Local representation

[edit]

Federal authorities and advisory structures under them

[edit]

Authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation

[edit]

Yabloko in the parliaments of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation

[edit]

Election results

[edit]

Presidential election

[edit]
Election Candidate First round Second round Result
Votes % Votes %
1996 Grigory Yavlinsky 5,550,752
7.34%
 Lost Red XN
2000 Grigory Yavlinsky 4,351,452
5.80%
 Lost Red XN
2004 Didn't nominate a candidate[65]
2008 Endorsed Vladimir Bukovsky Not admitted to the elections[66]
2012 Grigory Yavlinsky Not admitted to the elections[67]
2018 Grigory Yavlinsky 769,644
1.05%
 Lost Red XN
2024 Didn't nominate a candidate

State Duma elections

[edit]
Election Party leader Performance Rank Government
Votes % ± pp Seats +/–
1993 Grigory Yavlinsky 4,233,219
7.86%
 New
27 / 450
 New 5th Opposition
1995 4,767,384
6.89%
 Decrease 0.97
45 / 450
 Increase 18 Increase 4th Opposition[a]
1999 3,955,611
5.93%
 Decrease 0.96
20 / 450
 Decrease 25 Decrease 5th Opposition
2003 2,610,087
4.30%
 Decrease 1.63
4 / 450
 Decrease 16 Steady 5th Opposition
2007 1,108,985
1.59%
 Decrease 2.71
0 / 450
 Decrease 4 Decrease 6th Extra-parliamentary
2011 Sergey Mitrokhin 2,252,403
3.43%
 Increase 1.84
0 / 450
 Steady 0 Increase 5th Extra-parliamentary
2016 Emilia Slabunova 1,051,335
1.99%
 Decrease 1.44
0 / 450
 Steady 0 Decrease 6th Extra-parliamentary
2021 Nikolay Rybakov 753,280
1.34%
 Decrease 0.65
0 / 450
 Steady 0 Decrease 7th Extra-parliamentary
  1. ^ Some members of the party (Mikhail Zadornov as Minister of Finance in 1997–1999, Oksana Dmitriyeva as Minister of Labour and Social Protection in Apr.-Sep. 1998) participated in the government on an individual basis, for which they were expelled from the party.

Regional parliamentary elections

[edit]

Regional parliaments of Russia in which Yabloko is represented.

Regional Parliament Election year & amount of seats Current seats Next Election
# Position
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Republic of Karelia 4 3 2
2 / 36
 #3[a] 2026
Khabarovsk Krai 0 0 1 0[b]
0 / 36
 None 2024
Kostroma Oblast 0 1 1[c]
0 / 36
 #3[a] 2025
Pskov Oblast 1 0[d] 1[e] 2[f] 1
1 / 36
 #4 2026
Saint Petersburg 6 2 2
2 / 50
 #3 2026
Moscow 0 0 4 5[g] 4[h]
0 / 45
 #3 2024
  1. ^ a b Tied with other parties.
  2. ^ On 23 December 2021, deputy Viktor Fedoreyev left the party and switched to United Russia
  3. ^ Maksim Guterman resigned on 16 June 2022 and in the subsequent by-election a United Russia candidate took his place.
  4. ^ In 2015, Lev Schlossberg was deprived of authority by a court and by vote of fellow deputies.
  5. ^ In 2016, Lev Schlossberg won his seat back
  6. ^ In September 2019, another member of the Pskov legislature joined Yabloko
  7. ^ In 2021, Vladimir Ryzhkov won the by-elections to the Moscow City Duma.
  8. ^ On 28 December 2021, deputy Darya Besedina was expelled from the party.

Election results (regional)

[edit]

Following the results of the elections on 4 December 2011 to the regional parliaments, Yabloko formed its own factions in three regions: St. Petersburg (6 seats out of 50 in the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg: Grigory Yavlinsky became the head of the faction), Karelia (4 seats out of 50 in the Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Karelia), Pskov Region (1 deputy seat out of 44 in the Pskov Regional Assembly of Deputies).[68] In the elections on 4 December 2011, the Yabloko party received 6.72% of votes on party lists to the Pskov Regional Assembly of Deputies,[69] to the Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Karelia – 7.13% of the votes,[70] to the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg – 12 .50%.[71]

Ideology

[edit]
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Political memorandum

[edit]

In 2015, Yabloko adopted a Political Memorandum, which is a summary of the party's ideology.[72] The new version of the memorandum was adopted in 2019.[73] The document, in support of its provisions, must be signed by Yabloko candidates in elections at all levels.

Contents of the memorandum:

  1. Our country needs deep and comprehensive political reforms aimed at moving from an authoritarian system of power to a real separation of powers, independent, fair and merciful justice, full-fledged local self-government, transparency of the legislative and executive authorities and their accountability to citizens, to fair elections and depoliticization of law enforcement agencies.
  2. Bolshevism and Stalinism are misanthropic ideologies and practices. The state must give a legal assessment of the coup d'état of 1917–1918 and the heinous crimes that followed.
  3. Nationalism and religious fundamentalism in any form and manifestation are unacceptable.
  4. The transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one must be peaceful, non-violent and carried out in a legal, constitutional way.
  5. An immediate cessation of the arms race, a renunciation of state propaganda for war, militarization of the country, threats and intimidation in foreign policy is necessary.
  6. It is necessary to completely separate business and property from the authorities (which were merged due to the erroneous policies of the 1990s and 2000s), and to refuse to support oligarchic business from the budget. The transition from a resource-based economy to a modern high-tech economy is obligatory.
  7. It is necessary openly and publicly investigate all facts of corruption in the Government, the Presidential Administration, law enforcement agencies, state companies and state corporations. The perpetrators must be punished, whoever it may concern.
  8. Political repressions must be stopped, all repressive laws restricting human rights and freedoms, enshrined in the second chapter of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (including the anti-orphan law, restriction of the right to rallies, conferring the status of a "foreign agent" on NGOs and the law on undesirable foreign organizations) must be abolished. It is necessary to abolish censorship in the media, social networks and culture, stop the arbitrary blocking the Internet resources.
  9. Russia must recognize the sovereignty of Ukraine within the 2013 borders, stop supporting crime and separatists, inciting hatred and propaganda for war. The solution of the Crimean issue is possible in accordance with the road map developed within the framework of a specially convened international conference.
  10. A worthy and successful future for Russia can only be based on the values of freedom, human rights, the principles of democracy, the rule of law and the inviolability of private property.

The process of ideological self-determination of the party

[edit]

Yabloko arose and developed in line with the democratic movement as an alliance of political groups representing various ideological currents – liberals, social democrats, Christian democrats. In the process of forming the party, it was necessary to decide what "niche" in the party-political spectrum it would occupy – whether it would eventually become a social democratic or liberal party. It was also necessary to decide which particular formula of liberalism could most accurately express its ideological credo. The decisive factor that influenced this decision was the attitude to the ongoing changes in the country.

At the II Congress of Yabloko (September 1995), the program document "The Path of Russian Reforms"[74] was adopted, containing a negative assessment of the first results of Russian reforms, which were characterized as follows:

  • politics – authoritarian tendencies, accompanied by disorganization and disorder;
  • economy – the foundation for economic growth has not been created;
  • society – growing discontent and disappointment due to the deterioration of the social situation and a sharp drop in living standards.

The congress document formulated a fundamental vision of the reforms – that they should be carried out in the interests of the majority of the population.

The idea was put forward to return control powers to the parliament and thus eliminate the possibility of one authority appropriating the powers of another. The advancement of these principles meant the establishment of Yabloko as a political association of a social-liberal type.

"Yabloko" about Russian specifics

[edit]

According to the founders of the Yabloko party, European models of liberalism are preferable to American ones. Recognizing the civilizational, socio-cultural specifics of Russia, the leaders of Yabloko insisted on the need to take it into account when implementing reforms.[75] This specificity primarily includes the traditionally high role of the state in the economic life of the country, the steady orientation of significant sections of the population towards ensuring that state institutions provide social assistance. Analyzing the features of the socio-economic and historical evolution of Russia, representatives of Yabloko paid special attention to disproportions in the development of our country. For the success of the reforms, it is necessary to eliminate these disproportions, which is possible only with an effective regulatory role of the state.

Social democracy

[edit]

Among the founders of Yabloko was a group of social democrats, but as a result of the discussion, it was initially decided not to identify themselves social democrats. In this regard, Grigory Yavlinsky noted:

Our ideological model is based on the need to combine liberal and social democratic approaches in Russia. This is a feature of Russia, in which we must be liberals in order to protect private property, achieve tax cuts, maximum freedoms for entrepreneurs, large-scale development of private entrepreneurship, because without this it is impossible to create a “public pie”. But we must not forget that Russia is a country that cannot exist without free education, without high-quality free healthcare. We cannot forget how many pensioners we have, how many people with disabilities, how many territories we have that today do not yet fit into the liberal approach ... We must do everything to ensure that the liberal foundations of the economy are as deep as possible, and at the same time solve the country's priority social tasks.

In the first half of the 1990s, the ideas of socialism were generally not popular in the democratic movement. Yabloko's distancing from social democracy was manifested in the party's attitude to such a principle as social justice. In 1995, Grigory Yavlinsky said:

The social justice thesis is one of the most dangerous theses that can exist. It has been proven many times that the struggle for social justice sooner or later ends in terrible tragedies. Therefore, for our country, the thesis would be correct not about social justice, but about social acceptability. This is a dynamic situation, which suggests that at different stages, under different conditions, society can agree with certain social costs. Especially during the period of reforms. And if, instead of organizing an efficient economy, we again begin to seek justice, while realizing that it does not exist, that this is an abstract thesis, we will again and again push people into social conflicts.

Land – Housing – Roads

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A book with a program titled[76] "Land – Housing – Roads" was distributed by the party. To the housing issue:[77] a breakthrough strategy contains a description of the strategy “Land – housing – roads”, approved by decision No. 10 February 28, 2009 of the Political Committee of the RODP “Yabloko”. The strategy is positioned by the party as aimed at a comprehensive withdrawal of the country from the crisis.[78][77][79]

In the period after the publication, the program was a permanent part of the Yabloko party election program.

Politics

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Yukos

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On 22 April 2005, in connection with the completion of the trial[80] of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, Grigory Yavlinsky issued an open statement in which he indicated:

"This process has nothing to do with strengthening the rule of law in the country, or at least establishing some kind of order ... Instead, it created an atmosphere of intimidation and legal chaos in the country ... The number of procedural violations during the process exceeded all possible limits, and the consequences of this will take a very long time to overcome. Probably, since the time of Stalin and the shooting within "anti-thieves" decrees of Khrushchev in the 1950s. The right was not violated so revealingly and rudely. And after such a high-profile precedent, this will have fatal consequences for thousands of entrepreneurs across the country".

According to Yavlinsky, when organizing the trial, the Russian authorities set three goals: to prevent the sale of Yukos to foreigners, to intimidate and subjugate Russian big business, and to put Yukos under the control of a certain group of government officials. Wherein:

"Since none of the objectives could be achieved by legal means..., brute force was used, under the guise of, as far as possible, quasi-legal procedures".

Yavlinsky believes that with this process “the political elite of the country begins a new stage: physical persecution and, possibly, destruction of each other ... This is a war that has no end. Its goal is the destruction of people from the highest echelons of power and business, current and former, the destruction of the fate of their loved ones and families.”

"Such a wheel can only be rolled – and it cannot be stopped. Repressions – revenge, new repressions – new revenge. Is it really not clear that the current top will be the same in a few years ...? Stalin's bloody 20 years showed that repressions within the political class are continuous and pointless – everyone lives in an atmosphere of fear of the future. Because if our country smells the smell of repression and blood, it will not stop for a long time. The execution of 1993 and the subsequent war of 1994, which lasted for more than 10 years, is from this area ... The imprisonment of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev is the way into repression and revenge. After that, no one can feel safe anymore – neither the accused, nor the accusers, nor the members of their families. This is the path to self-destruction of the nation and the country. The political class and top business in Russia must understand that the day the verdict of imprisonment is announced is the actual beginning of physical mutual destruction ... <...> Without a doubt, only President Putin can make a decision. It is necessary to proceed from reality – the outcome of the Yukos case, the imprisonment or not of Khodorkovsky, as well as the term of this imprisonment, entirely depend on the decision of Vladimir Putin. He actually bears political and moral responsibility for it. It is not necessary, taking advantage of your position of power, to put your opponents (or opponents of your entourage) in prison. And so much has already happened to make the situation irreversible, but in the main thing – as far as people's lives are concerned, there is still an opportunity to stop.

Chechen conflict

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According to the Yabloko party, the Chechen problem is very complicated and ambiguous. It was provoked, according to the party, by the wrong policy of the Russian leadership, which dragged Russia into a protracted bloody conflict that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and created conditions for criminal business in Chechnya. The Chechen war caused very high military spending and also threatened the safety of many people. After the defeat of the Supreme Soviet in 1993, Yeltsin needed, according to the party, a "small victorious war" that would provide an excellent opportunity to show the power of power. In addition, at that time the power of the Chechen criminal communities on Russian territory increased enormously, and Dzhokhar Dudayev greatly weakened his position by his actions.

The Yabloko party, however, believes that restoring constitutional order is one thing, but demonstrating strength is another. Especially when this demonstration is carried out to distract the people from the socio-economic crisis in the country. 29 November 1994 Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued an ultimatum to all forces in Chechnya. On 5 December, Yabloko gathered a delegation ready to replace Russian tankmen prisoners of war – officers and soldiers of the Kantemirovskaya division, who participated in the unsuccessful attempt to storm Grozny on 26 November, allegedly carried out by anti-Dudaev opposition forces as hostages. Dzhokhar Dudayev agreed to meet with Russian deputies, including Grigory Yavlinsky and Sergei Yushenkov. The deputies arrived in Grozny, but the negotiation process was disrupted – according to Yavlinsky, this happened because "the negotiations were not part of the authorities' plan for a small victorious war." The peaceful initiatives of Yabloko were not accepted by either the broad masses or the State Duma. The majority of the Duma deputies refused to consider the bill "On delegations for the settlement of the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic".

The "easy war", however, did not work out – it hit the whole society hard. The capture of Grozny by militants in March 1996, a year after the city was taken by federal troops, demonstrated the weakness of the federal troops, which then led to the Khasavyurt agreements. The only faction that supported the Khasavyurt agreements was the Yabloko faction. Three years later, during the impeachment of Boris Yeltsin, Yabloko formulated its position as follows:

"... Responsibility for this war lies not only with Yeltsin and Dudayev's regime. It is also borne by the military leaders who gave and carried out criminal orders, the head of the government, Chernomyrdin, his deputies, ministers, bear this guilt and politicians, some of whom supported this war, others did not want to stop, and still others could not. However, we, Yabloko, are also responsible, because we did not do everything possible, not all of our resources were devoted to stopping the slaughter. Since no one can fix what happened, there is only one responsibility – to create such conditions under which what happened will never happen again. We, Yabloko, consider ourselves obligated to do everything possible to minimize the likelihood of such tragedies recurring in the future. Today we are obliged to create a precedent for punishing the authorities for crimes. The inevitable responsibility and punishability of the authorities for crimes against their own people is real democracy."

However, a long-term peace did not work out, and as a result, events quickly escalated into the Second Chechen War. Nevertheless, even then Yabloko advocated the possibility of negotiations. In October 2002, during the seizure of hostages by Chechen terrorists in the theater center on Dubrovka in Moscow, one of the demands of the bandits was the participation of Grigory Yavlinsky in the negotiations. After the tragedy, Grigory Yavlinsky made a statement that expressed the official point of view of the Yabloko party:

"We firmly believe that there can be no justification for terrorism – neither political, nor religious, nor by good causes, not even by so-called "symmetrical and retaliatory" measures, or any other. There is no justification for killing or threatening, blackmailing by killing innocent, defenseless people. In this sense, the cause of terrorism is not poverty or suffering, and not even revenge (which is directed at the guilty), but boundless meanness ... Undoubtedly, those who embark on the path of terror must be brought to justice or, if this is not possible, eliminated. However, what happened with a new acuteness raises the question of resolving the armed conflict in Chechnya, of ending the cleansings, torture, kidnappings, extrajudicial killings, bullying, unlimited physical violence – in essence, the cessation of the most brutal war to exterminate an entire people. All efforts to find political ways to end the war are required to be repeatedly intensified. All lessons must be learned from this tragedy."

The death penalty

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Yabloko advocates the complete abolition of the death penalty in Russia. After on 10 February 2013, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, in an interview with the program Saturday Vesti of the TV channel Russia-1 said that he had nothing against the return of the death penalty in Russia, this caused severe criticism from the party, on the website of which there was a proposal to send the minister to resign.

LGBT rights

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The Yabloko party has repeatedly advocated for the rights of the LGBT community. On 5 April 2012, activists of the Amur branch of the party organized a rally for the rights of LGBT people agreed with the authorities.[81] In 2016, the St. Petersburg branch of the party included items on support for LGBT people in the program,[82] and in 2017, in the program of the electoral association "Yabloko Party in Moscow" during the elections of deputies of representative bodies of local self-government in the city of Moscow, it was recorded that that party candidates oppose discrimination based on sexual orientation.[82] Also in 2016, the pre-election plan for the legislative work of the Yabloko faction in the State Duma included a clause on the need to repeal the law on liability for "propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations". The need to repeal this law was also discussed on the party's pre-election website. And the federal program of the party declared the need to develop "such forms of interpersonal support as a civil partnership that allows people who are not related to each other to provide each other with mutual support and assistance, providing citizens who enter into such a partnership with the opportunity to visit each other in a hospital, joint ownership property, inheritance, etc." The youth and gender factions of the Yabloko party have repeatedly made statements and held actions in support of the rights of the LGBT community.

Some well-known Yabloko supporters, including Galina Mikhaleva, Maxim Reznik[83] and Aleksey Melnikov, support LGBT people. "Protection against discrimination of the LGBT community" was identified in 2011 as one of the new areas of work for the gender faction.[84] Members of the Moscow Yabloko took part in the events of the Week Against Homophobia in 2011, and the Moscow Youth Yabloko issued a special statement in support of it. Also, Youth Yabloko planned to participate in the Equality March in 2011.[85] Party leaders Sergei Mitrokhin and Grigory Yavlinsky have repeatedly condemned homophobia. Nikolai Kavkazsky, a member of the Youth Yabloko, noted that "the gay parade is not a carnival, but a human rights event <...> which should be held more often than once a year". However, LGBT support is not included in the party program.[86]

Deputy of the State Duma of the III convocation Alexander Fedulov, head of the Kursk party organization of Yabloko, in the summer of 2011 appealed to the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev with an appeal to "protect the moral and spiritual health of the absolute majority of Russians from the aggressive, impudent" pink-and-blue "minority",[87] after which he was criticized by Sergei Mitrokhin, who noted that "In a civilized state, the rights of citizens must be respected regardless of their nationality, social class and sexual orientation."

Sergei Mitrokhin at the same time called on the LGBT community to refrain from holding gay pride parades "provoking part of the Russian society to aggression and violence – against not only the participants in the parades themselves, but in general all citizens of non-traditional sexual orientation".[88]

Later, Alexander Fedulov was expelled from the party "for repeated public statements and statements of a nationalist and misanthropic nature, as well as support for the leadership of an authoritarian-oligarchic corrupt regime".[89]

On 2 April 2017, the party adopted a statement on the inadmissibility of the genocide of the LGBT community in the Chechen Republic.[90][91]

On 28 March 2019, the position of the Yabloko party against LGBT discrimination was published on the official website of the party. In it, the party refers to its program documents and documents of international organizations to which it is a member. The party stated that:

The protection of human rights in relation to representatives of the LGBT community is one of the important areas of the human rights activities of the Yabloko party.[92]

See also

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Further reading

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Notes

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Yabloko

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The Russian United Democratic Party is a in , established in the summer of 1993 by economists and politicians , Yury Boldyrev, and Vladimir Lukin as a democratic alternative to the policies of President . The party's name derives from the initials of its founders' surnames, forming the Russian word for "apple." Yabloko has maintained a consistent opposition stance against authoritarian consolidation, military interventions such as the Chechen wars, and the corrupt schemes of the , while advocating for , democratic institutions, and emphasizing and reforms. Under Yavlinsky's leadership until 2008, the party achieved notable representation in the during the , but its influence has since diminished amid electoral restrictions and political repression, positioning it as one of Russia's few enduring non-systemic opposition voices critical of Vladimir Putin's rule.

History

Founding and Initial Formation (1993–1995)

Yabloko originated as an electoral bloc in the summer of 1993, formed by Grigory Yavlinsky, Yuri Boldyrev, and Vladimir Lukin amid political turmoil following President Boris Yeltsin's dissolution of the Supreme Soviet. Yavlinsky, an economist known for co-authoring the "500 Days" program advocating gradual market reforms, positioned the bloc as a democratic alternative to Yeltsin's radical "shock therapy" policies under Yegor Gaidar and the Russia's Choice movement. The name "Yabloko" derived from the initials of its founders: Yavlinsky–Boldyrev–Lukin (Ya–Blo–Ko in Russian). The bloc's core drew from Yavlinsky's Center for Economic and Political Research (), emphasizing social-liberal principles, , and opposition to authoritarian tendencies exhibited during the 1993 . Contesting the December 12, 1993, elections, Yabloko secured 7.86% of the vote, earning 20 seats from the party list and an additional 7 from single-mandate districts, thus forming the fifth-largest faction in the new parliament. By December 1994, Yabloko expanded into the "Yabloko Popular Movement," establishing 58 regional branches to broaden its organizational base. In January 1995, absent a formal party law, it transitioned into the Yabloko association, solidifying its structure as a non-governmental political organization focused on liberal democratic advocacy. This period marked Yabloko's emergence as a principled opposition force, critical of both communist remnants and executive overreach.

Expansion and Early Challenges (1996–2001)

Following the 1995 State Duma elections, in which Yabloko secured 45 seats (31 from the list and 14 from single-mandate districts), the party pursued organizational expansion to consolidate its position as a liberal opposition force. This electoral breakthrough enabled the establishment and strengthening of regional branches, with the party reporting 58 such organizations by late 1995, facilitating participation in subnational contests and grassroots mobilization. Membership recruitment emphasized intellectuals, professionals, and anti-war activists, though the party struggled to surpass a core base of fewer than 10,000 members by the early 2000s, reflecting challenges in mass appeal amid Russia's volatile post-Soviet transition. Grigory Yavlinsky's candidacy in the June 1996 further elevated Yabloko's profile, positioning it as a centrist democratic alternative to incumbent and communist . Yavlinsky finished fourth, drawing support from voters disillusioned with Yeltsin's economic reforms and the ongoing , which Yabloko had opposed since its 1994 outbreak, advocating political negotiations over military escalation. The campaign highlighted the party's commitment to , market-oriented reforms without oligarchic capture, and , yet yielded limited votes, underscoring Yabloko's niche as a principled but non-populist entity unwilling to endorse Yeltsin's re-election despite calls for a united liberal front. The period's challenges intensified with the 1998 financial default, which eroded public trust in liberal economics and prompted Yabloko to critique predatory while proposing stabilization measures, including and safeguards. Yabloko's rigid anti-war posture on —viewing the conflict as a violation of and constitutional order—isolated it from patriotic majorities, as the party rejected compromises that other democrats made to back federal policies. This stance, rooted in first-hand critiques of the war's human cost, contrasted with emerging pro-Kremlin narratives but failed to broaden support, exacerbated by internal debates over alliances and the rise of new entities like Fatherland-All Russia. By the December 1999 Duma elections, amid the Second Chechen War's onset, Yabloko's hesitation in articulating a unified anti-militarization message limited gains, securing only 5.97% of the proportional vote—barely clearing the 5% threshold for representation—resulting in far fewer seats than in 1995 and signaling early decline.

Institutionalization and Decline (2002–2011)

In early 2002, Yabloko registered as a nationwide under Russia's new on , enacted in 2001 to impose stricter organizational requirements, including minimum membership thresholds and regional branches in at least half of the federal subjects. This formalization aligned the party with the evolving legal framework for political organizations amid President Putin's centralization efforts. Concurrently, Yabloko attained full membership in in March 2002, enhancing its international ties within the global liberal network. The party's electoral fortunes waned sharply in the December 7, 2003, elections, where it secured 4.3 percent of the vote, insufficient to cross the 5 percent threshold for factional representation and resulting in the loss of its parliamentary presence. This outcome reflected broader challenges for liberal opposition amid pro-Kremlin dominance, including limited media access and administrative hurdles, though Yabloko's leadership attributed it partly to voter disillusionment with 1990s reforms. Yabloko rejected merger overtures from the (SPS), another liberal grouping that also fell short at 4 percent, citing irreconcilable ideological differences on and . , the party's enduring leader, emphasized preserving Yabloko's social-liberal distinctiveness over tactical unification, a stance critics argued exacerbated the liberals' fragmentation against United Russia's . Subsequent years entrenched Yabloko's marginalization. In regional contests during 2004–2005, joint Yabloko-SPS blocs occasionally fielded candidates but yielded limited successes, underscoring persistent organizational weaknesses. The 2007 elections amplified the decline, with Yabloko failing to regain parliamentary seats under the fully proportional system, as support dwindled amid intensified state control over electoral processes and media narratives favoring managed democracy. By 2008, internal shifts included Sergei Mitrokhin's election as party chairman at a , signaling efforts to refresh without altering core opposition to Chechen policies and erosions. Through 2011, Yabloko maintained principled stances against authoritarian consolidation but struggled with voter mobilization, its vote shares hovering below viable thresholds in national polls and contributing to a systemic exclusion of non-aligned liberals from power structures.

Contemporary Period and War Opposition (2012–Present)

In the years following the 2011–2012 protests against electoral fraud, Yabloko engaged in opposition coordination efforts while critiquing more confrontational tactics, emphasizing legal and democratic avenues for change. The party faced ongoing marginalization in national politics, securing 1.99% of the vote in the 2016 State Duma elections and 1.34% in 2021, failing to surpass the 5% threshold for proportional representation seats. Regionally, it achieved modest successes, electing 48 deputies across 12 regions in September 2020 local elections. Emilia Slabunova served as party chair from 2015 to 2020, succeeding Sergei Mitrokhin, before Nikolai Rybakov took leadership, maintaining Yabloko's focus on liberal reforms amid tightening state controls. The party retained a presence in regional legislatures, such as through Lev Shlosberg in , but encountered increasing barriers to registration and campaigning. The 2022 marked a pivotal escalation in Yabloko's opposition activities. On February 24, 2022, the party condemned the as against a sovereign neighbor, demanding an immediate and troop withdrawal. Founder publicly urged negotiations to halt the "massacre," publishing analyses criticizing the war's futility and economic costs. Yabloko positioned itself as the sole national party advocating in post-invasion elections, using Pablo Picasso's dove symbol in campaigns since 2022 and calling for direct Russia-Ukraine talks. In September 2023 regional elections, it was the only organization explicitly campaigning for and . By September 2025, its fourth "For " campaign highlighted polling data showing 58% Russian support for an immediate agreement. Repression intensified against Yabloko's anti-war stance, with members facing criminal charges under laws prohibiting "discrediting" the . Deputy leader Maxim Kruglov was charged in October 2025 for statements calling for a and labeling the a mistake. Lev Shlosberg faced prosecution seeking 440 hours of in October 2025 for anti-war advocacy. Local leaders, such as Kamchatka branch head Vladimir Yefimov, received two-year prison sentences in January 2025 for social media posts opposing the war. Yavlinsky reiterated in December 2024 that achieving a remains the party's core objective. Despite these pressures, Yabloko persisted as one of Russia's few legal anti-war voices operating domestically.

Ideology and Principles

Core Ideological Foundations

Yabloko's ideological foundations are grounded in , prioritizing individual freedoms, democratic governance, and as safeguards against . The party upholds the , , and inviolability of as essential to a functioning , viewing these as bulwarks against both oligarchic capture and state overreach. It explicitly rejects totalitarian ideologies, equating , , , and National Socialism as misanthropic systems incompatible with pluralistic society, and advocates for ideological diversity to prevent unified state dogma. Economically, Yabloko endorses a that combines competitive markets with mechanisms for , including equality of starting opportunities and protections against monopolies. This approach seeks to dismantle oligarchic structures that subordinated to business interests in the , promoting instead fair , anti-corruption measures, and welfare provisions to mitigate inequality without abandoning private enterprise. Politically, the party emphasizes , of authority, and robust development to foster accountable and counter centralization trends. Its commitment to peaceful, legal opposition underscores a in electoral legitimacy and non-violent power transitions as the path to , positioning Yabloko as a principled democratic force amid Russia's managed political landscape.

Economic and Social Policies

Yabloko advocates for a socially oriented market economy that emphasizes equality of starting opportunities and the inviolability of private property, positioning itself against unchecked state intervention or oligarchic dominance in economic affairs. The party has consistently opposed tax increases proposed by the Russian government, particularly those funding militarization, arguing that such measures lead to business bankruptcy, state fiscal strain, and citizen impoverishment; for instance, in June 2024, St. Petersburg's Yabloko branch protested tax hikes earmarked for military purposes, and in October 2024, the party rejected a broader government tax package submitted to the State Duma. This stance reflects Yabloko's critique of Russia's post-1990s economic path, where it has favored regulated competition over rapid liberalization akin to Gaidar's reforms, prioritizing social safeguards to mitigate inequality. On social policies, Yabloko promotes the expansion of , , and self-organization of citizens through civic society institutions, viewing these as foundational to a democratic state. The party supports targeted public welfare measures, such as exempting outpatient clinics and hospitals from property taxes to bolster healthcare access, an initiative proposed in regions like where Yabloko operates. Environmental forms a core element, with advocacy for sustainable policies evident in party activities, including ecological conferences led by figures like Nikolai Rybakov in May 2014. Yabloko's platform integrates these with broader goals of political and , aiming to counter authoritarian centralization by fostering social structures and equitable public services.

Foreign Policy Orientation

Yabloko's foreign policy orientation prioritizes Russia's national interests through an active, consistent, realistic, and firm approach designed to compensate for military and economic disparities with leading global powers. The party advocates seeking partners and allies worldwide while avoiding serious confrontations with the broader . This includes fostering partnerships with the and alongside maintaining traditional relations with , Eastern European countries, the , and the . Historically, Yabloko has positioned itself against aggressive military actions, such as the wars in , emphasizing adherence to and in foreign engagements. On NATO expansion, the party has adopted a pragmatic stance, stating in 2003 that Russia should not fear enlargement to the and that Russian leadership was no longer categorically opposed, reflecting a preference for over . Leader has warned that any direct -NATO conflict risks rapid escalation to nuclear war, underscoring a deterrence-focused realism rather than belligerence. In broader terms, Yabloko promotes Russia's deeper integration with European institutions and cooperation with democratic Western states, critiquing the Kremlin's isolationist and adversarial policies as detrimental to and . The party supports multilateral and rule-based , opposing and in favor of balanced alliances that enhance Russia's global standing without ideological crusades.

Organizational Structure

Leadership and Key Figures

Grigory Yavlinsky, an economist and politician, founded Yabloko in June 1993 as a social-liberal movement, initially comprising the "Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin" bloc named after its three co-founders. Yavlinsky served as the party's longstanding leader, guiding its participation in multiple elections, including his presidential candidacies in 1996 and 2018, where he garnered 7.4% and 1.05% of the vote, respectively. Yuri Boldyrev and Vladimir Lukin, the other initial co-founders, contributed to the party's early ideological framework, with Boldyrev focusing on anti-corruption stances and Lukin later becoming Russia's commissioner from 2004 to 2014. Viktor Sheinis, another founding member, represented Yabloko in the during its first two convocations (1993–2003) and remained active in its political council. Leadership transitioned in December 2019 when Nikolai Rybakov was elected party chairman, succeeding Sergey Mitrokhin, who had led from 2008 to 2019; Rybakov continues in this role as of 2025, emphasizing opposition to and electoral participation despite restrictions. Other prominent figures include Emilia Slabunova, former branch leader and deputy from 2016 to 2021, and Lev Shlosberg, branch chair and deputy , noted for regional activism but facing legal pressures including in 2025 for alleged military discreditation.

Internal Governance Mechanisms

The supreme governing body of the Russian Democratic Party Yabloko is the Party , which convenes at regular intervals to elect key leaders, amend the and by-laws, endorse electoral candidates, and approve programmatic documents. The operates on a delegate drawn from regional branches, ensuring representation from across the party's structure. For instance, the 21st , held on 3–4 April 2021, adopted by-law amendments to increase member influence in processes. Similarly, the 22nd in October 2023 focused on leadership elections, reflecting the body's central role in personnel selection. Earlier, the 13th on 10–11 2006 revised the without altering core membership criteria. The Federal Political Committee functions as the executive authority between congress sessions, handling , candidate approvals, and statements. Composed of senior party figures, it develops overall tactics and responds to current events, such as evaluating election results and setting priorities, as demonstrated in its 15 2021 press release following regional votes. The committee's responsibilities include ensuring alignment with the party's liberal-democratic principles during inter-congress periods. The party chairman, elected directly by Congress delegates for a fixed term, oversees daily operations and represents Yabloko publicly; Nikolai Rybakov has served in this role since his election in 2020. Internal statutes, periodically updated via , delineate member rights and obligations, including participation in regional organizations that feed into national decisions, while prohibiting activities contradicting the party's charter. These mechanisms emphasize collective deliberation, though historical analyses note occasional tensions in leadership influence.

Electoral Performance

Presidential Elections

Grigory Yavlinsky, founder and long-time leader of Yabloko, represented the party as its presidential candidate in the held on June 16. He secured 4,311,482 votes, equivalent to 7.29% of the total vote share in the first round, finishing fourth behind , , and . Yavlinsky's campaign emphasized liberal economic reforms, measures, and democratic principles, positioning him as an alternative to both the incumbent and communist challenger . He did not advance to the July 3 runoff, which won. Yabloko again nominated Yavlinsky for the 2000 presidential election on March 26, following Yeltsin's resignation and Vladimir Putin's ascension as acting president. Yavlinsky received 4,351,452 votes, accounting for 5.85% of the vote, placing third after Putin and Zyuganov. The campaign focused on critiquing the centralization of power under Putin and advocating for and market-oriented policies, though it faced media disadvantages and competition from pro-Kremlin forces. Putin won outright with 52.94%. Yabloko has not fielded a presidential since 2000, citing escalating barriers to registration, media blackouts, and systemic biases favoring the ruling party. In the 2004, 2008, and 2012 elections, the party opted out, arguing participation would legitimize flawed processes amid opposition crackdowns. For the 2018 election, Yabloko's leadership, including Yavlinsky, considered a run but ultimately declined, prioritizing actions over electoral engagement in what they deemed a controlled environment. Similarly, in December 2023, Yabloko's Federal Political Committee resolved against participating in the 2024 election (held March 15–17), describing it as a tool for authoritarian consolidation rather than genuine competition, and called for instead.
YearCandidateVotesPercentage
1996Grigory Yavlinsky4,311,4827.29%
2000Grigory Yavlinsky4,351,4525.85%

Federal Parliamentary Elections

Yabloko first contested federal parliamentary elections to the in December 1993 as the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, securing representation in the chamber during its formative years amid post-Soviet political fragmentation. The party benefited from a , with half of seats allocated via (PR) lists requiring a 5% threshold and the other half via single-mandate districts (SMD). Its performance peaked in , reflecting appeal among urban liberals and reformers disillusioned with economic shocks, before a steady decline as consolidated dominance and opposition faced administrative barriers. Subsequent elections saw Yabloko fail to meet the PR threshold after 1999, relying on sporadic SMD wins until the system's shift to full PR in 2007, after which it secured no seats. Voter support eroded due to factors including control favoring pro-Kremlin parties, exclusion from alliances, and Yabloko's principled refusal to compromise on and stances, limiting broader appeal. By the , results hovered below 4%, with allegations of ballot irregularities and opposition suppression cited by observers, though Yabloko maintained participation to signal dissent.
Election YearPR Vote %PR SeatsSMD SeatsTotal Seats
19937.320323
19956.9311445
19995.916420
20034.3044
20072.30N/A0
20113.30N/A0
20162.00N/A0
20210.90N/A0
In the absence of parliamentary seats since , Yabloko has focused on regional activism and criticism of electoral manipulations, such as electronic voting discrepancies in , while rejecting participation in managed opposition blocs to preserve ideological independence. This stance has sustained its niche as a consistent liberal voice but precluded institutional leverage in a system increasingly centralized under executive influence.698018_EN.pdf)

Regional and Local Elections

Yabloko has participated in Russia's regional and local elections since the , typically securing limited representation through single-mandate districts in urban centers with relatively higher liberal support, such as St. Petersburg and , while struggling against the proportional-list dominance of and frequent administrative hurdles. The party's results reflect broader challenges for non-ruling parties, including signature collection requirements, candidate disqualifications, and electoral commissions' decisions favoring incumbents, often leading to marginal vote shares below 5% in proportional contests. In the , 2020, regional and local elections across multiple districts, Yabloko achieved one of its more notable outcomes, electing 48 deputies in 12 regions, primarily via local councils and single-mandate seats rather than proportional lists. This included gains in municipal assemblies where the party leveraged platforms and . In Pskov Oblast's 2021 regional assembly elections, Yabloko retained seats, with deputy Lev Shlosberg continuing as part of the faction, emphasizing ongoing legislative work despite opposition status. St. Petersburg has been a stronghold for Yabloko at the local level, with successes in 2017 and 2019 municipal elections drawing opposition activists barred from other parties; Boris Vishnevsky heads the faction in the city's . However, participation has faced increasing restrictions, as in July 2024 when all 83 Yabloko candidates were barred from St. Petersburg municipal council races due to alleged paperwork issues, effectively nullifying their bids. Similar barriers occurred in , where Yabloko's lists were canceled for the 2006 Legislative Assembly elections over procedural disputes, a decision upheld domestically but later challenged at the as violating electoral rights. Recent cycles, including 2023 and 2025, show diminished competitiveness, with Yabloko fielding candidates in select districts—such as two in 2023 regional races—but prioritizing message dissemination over victories amid widespread disqualifications and low turnout favoring the . In 2025, the party nominated 164 candidates across 39 campaigns in 19 regions, yet official tallies indicate no major breakthroughs, underscoring systemic constraints on opposition efficacy. These patterns align with reports of manipulated processes, including fake vote assignments in St. Petersburg districts to undermine Yabloko wins.

Political Positions and Stances

Stance on the Ukraine War

Yabloko has consistently opposed Russia's full-scale invasion of , which began on , 2022, characterizing it as "unacceptable and criminal" and urging Russian authorities to prevent escalation even prior to the military operation. On February 13, 2022, the party initiated a drive against the war, collecting signatures from citizens and emphasizing that hostilities would lead to catastrophic consequences for . Party founder explicitly stated that the invasion aimed to destabilize and position it as a "," rejecting any justification for military action. The party's core position centers on an immediate ceasefire as the only viable path to halt the conflict, rather than pursuing military victory or prolonged engagement. Yabloko has campaigned under slogans like "For Peace and Freedom" in elections, advocating for direct negotiations between and to end hostilities, with polling indicating growing public support for this stance—reaching 58% of Russians by September 2025. In an October 2023 meeting with President , Yavlinsky pressed for a ceasefire, describing it as "absolutely necessary" to stop the "massacre" and enable talks, while critiquing the war's futility amid frontline stalemates and domestic repercussions. This anti-war advocacy has drawn legal repercussions, underscoring the party's isolation from the Kremlin's narrative. Deputy leader Lev Shlosberg faced charges in October 2025 for "spreading lies" about the Russian military after publicly calling for a , marking the latest in a series of fines and arrests targeting Yabloko figures for "discrediting" the armed forces. Despite operating as one of Russia's few remaining legal opposition entities, Yabloko's insistence on without endorsing unconditional Ukrainian concessions has led to internal and external tensions, including severed ties with international liberal groups like ALDE over perceived "inhumane" positions on continued fighting. The party frames the war as a "cursed" endeavor from , rejecting glorification of casualties and viewing all deaths as tragic victims of policy failure.

Positions on Domestic Conflicts and Rights

Yabloko has maintained a consistent opposition to Russia's military engagements in , viewing both the (1994–1996) and the Second Chechen War (1999–2009) as violations of and ineffective paths to resolution. The party advocated for political negotiations over force, criticizing the federal government's approach for exacerbating civilian suffering and failing to address root causes of . This stance stemmed from early party principles emphasizing democratic federalism and rejection of authoritarian suppression of regional autonomy. On broader human rights, Yabloko prioritizes the , condemning systemic issues such as arbitrary detentions, suppression of dissent, and official impunity. The party has campaigned against as a core barrier to rights enforcement, arguing it undermines and public trust in institutions. In recent statements, leaders like Nikolai Rybakov have collected petitions demanding accountability for rights abuses, including calls for resignations of implicated officials. Regarding civil liberties, Yabloko opposes restrictions on freedoms of assembly, expression, and digital communication, protesting laws that enable state control over protests and online activity. The party supports genuine electoral competition and gubernatorial elections without manipulation, framing these as essential to preventing domestic . It critiques the erosion of and speech under pretexts of , advocating for legal safeguards against overreach in areas like and media .

Views on Economic Reforms and Governance

Yabloko has consistently advocated for a transition to a socially oriented , emphasizing the inviolability of , free competition, and equal opportunities as foundational elements. The party's founder, , co-authored the " in 1990, which proposed a structured, gradual shift from the Soviet to market mechanisms, including price liberalization, , and stabilization measures to avoid and social upheaval. This approach contrasted with more abrupt "shock therapy" reforms, prioritizing the creation of efficient private owners through targeted rather than broad schemes, which Yabloko criticized for fostering oligarchic capture and inefficiency. In governance, Yabloko stresses the and institutional reforms to underpin , arguing that technocratic, top-down economic policies since 1992 have undermined democratic and sustainable growth. The party supports minimizing es on labor to encourage employment and investment, including the introduction of a low flat-rate , which was implemented in under its influence. More recently, as of October 2024, Yabloko opposed the Russian government's proposed tax increases, warning they would lead to business , state fiscal strain, and citizen impoverishment by distorting incentives and eroding competitiveness. Yabloko's economic stance integrates social protections with , rejecting as a policy foundation and calling for policies that raise living standards through measures, transparent governance, and reduced state intervention in competitive sectors. This includes advocacy for contract-based and fiscal responsibility to prevent the "phony capitalism" resulting from flawed 1990s reforms under figures like . In its 2001 Democratic , the party outlined the need for renewed commitment to and market institutions to rectify early post-Soviet failures in fulfilling social obligations while building a competitive .

Controversies and Criticisms

Internal Divisions and Strategic Failures

Yabloko experienced early internal divisions stemming from its origins as the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin electoral bloc formed for the parliamentary elections, which formalized into the party in 1995 after Yury Boldyrev departed in 1994 to establish the Commonwealth of Self-Government, citing disagreements over the bloc's direction and Yavlinsky's dominant role. Vladimir Lukin similarly exited in 1995 to assume the position of Russia's human rights commissioner, reflecting tensions over balancing party ideology with broader institutional roles. Subsequent leadership conflicts intensified under Grigory Yavlinsky's prolonged influence, with veteran member Viktor Sheinis repeatedly challenging Yavlinsky's strategy by advocating for mergers with other democratic groups and protecting internal dissenters whose views diverged from the leadership's line, a stance that highlighted factional rifts over the party's isolationist posture. These divisions persisted into the , contributing to leadership transitions such as Sergei Mitrokhin's as chairman in 2008, which failed to reverse the party's stagnation and alienated some members who viewed it as insufficient departure from Yavlinsky's . Yabloko's strategic failures largely arose from its principled refusal to form electoral alliances, most notably rejecting merger proposals from the (SPS) ahead of the 2003 Duma elections, despite both parties hovering near the 5% threshold; Yabloko secured 4.3% while SPS garnered 4.0%, resulting in neither entering parliament and forfeiting potential combined viability. This decision, justified by Yabloko as preserving ideological purity against SPS's perceived pro-oligarch tilt, exemplified a pattern of prioritizing independence over pragmatism, as evidenced by mutual recriminations that diverted resources from critiquing the regime to intra-liberal infighting. The party's electoral base eroded further due to inadequate adaptation to changing media landscapes, maintaining reliance on traditional urban support in and St. Petersburg—yielding peaks of 6-7% in the 1990s—while neglecting regional outreach, mobilization, and youth engagement, factors that confined recognition to superficial levels among only 55% of Russians by 2016. This insularity compounded failures in opposition coordination, such as limited participation in 2011-2012 protests and ongoing hesitance toward broader coalitions, perpetuating vote shares below 3% in subsequent national elections and underscoring a causal link between doctrinal rigidity and diminished relevance in Russia's managed . In the wake of Russia's full-scale invasion of in February 2022, Yabloko members have faced heightened legal scrutiny and punitive measures under laws prohibiting the "discrediting" of the (Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code) and related administrative offenses, often tied to the party's public calls for a ceasefire and troop withdrawal. These actions reflect broader government efforts to suppress domestic dissent, with Yabloko's status as a registered party offering limited protection compared to fully independent groups. A prominent case involves Lev Shlosberg, Yabloko's deputy chairman and a regional legislator, who was charged in June 2025 with repeated discrediting of the military based on posts criticizing the war; he was placed under on June 11, 2025, and faced trial where prosecutors sought 440 hours of mandatory as punishment. Earlier, in October 2024, authorities initiated a criminal probe against him for alleged "false information" about military actions, underscoring repeated targeting of his anti-war statements. Regional branches have also encountered severe repercussions; for instance, in January 2025, the head of Yabloko's Kamchatka branch was imprisoned after initial fines totaling 200,000 rubles for posts deemed to discredit the , later converted to six months of restricted , with violations leading to further incarceration. In , Yabloko municipal deputy Alexei Gorinov received a seven-year sentence in July 2022 for remarks at a council meeting highlighting civilian child deaths in , interpreted as spreading "fake news" about the armed forces. Another Yabloko lawmaker, Yulia Galyamina, was sentenced to four years in in December 2022 on charges, which she and supporters described as fabricated to neutralize her activism. Administrative pressures compound these criminal cases, including fines for non-compliance with "" designations applied to affiliated media or individuals; for example, in March 2025, a Yabloko-linked figure was fined 35,000 rubles for failing to register as a foreign agent media head. Yabloko has responded by compiling a register of repressive , highlighting over 100 laws enacted since 2012 that facilitate such restrictions on speech and association. These measures have contributed to the party's operational constraints, though it remains one of the few opposition entities not fully banned.

Ideological Critiques from Diverse Perspectives

Nationalist and conservative critics in have frequently portrayed Yabloko as a pro-Western force undermining national , particularly citing the party's opposition to actions in as evidence of disloyalty to Russian interests. State-aligned narratives have labeled such opposition figures, including Yabloko members, as "" or part of a "" serving foreign agendas, a framing intensified after the 2022 invasion when Yabloko condemned the war as contrary to Russia's future. This perspective draws on Yabloko's historical advocacy for democratic reforms and , which detractors interpret as alignment with Western liberal values over patriotic priorities, especially amid accusations of foreign funding influences on liberal parties. From the communist left, represented by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), Yabloko is critiqued as a relic of neoliberal policies that exacerbated and social dislocation in the , prioritizing market liberalization over socialist protections. CPRF rhetoric often frames Yabloko's social-liberalism as insufficiently addressing working-class grievances, viewing it as complicit in the post-Soviet " of the Russian people" through support for and reduced state intervention, contrasting with communist emphasis on state control and anti-capitalist redistribution. Electoral competition has reinforced this divide, with CPRF outperforming Yabloko in votes since the early , attributing liberal failures to ideological detachment from mass proletarian concerns. Within the broader liberal opposition, Yabloko faces accusations of excessive moderation and systemic compromise, with figures like Alexei Navalny's allies decrying it as insufficiently confrontational against the , likening it to tolerated "systemic" parties rather than genuine radicals. Critics argue Yabloko's principled stances—such as boycotting certain elections or refusing alliances—have rendered it electorally marginal, prioritizing moral purity over pragmatic unification with right-leaning liberals like the defunct , thus diluting the opposition's impact. This intra-liberal tension highlights Yabloko's left-leaning social focus as a barrier to broader coalitions, contributing to its characterization as outdated in a polarized landscape favoring bolder anti-regime tactics.

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