Hubbry Logo
CazinCazinMain
Open search
Cazin
Community hub
Cazin
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Cazin
Cazin
Cazin
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Cazin (Serbian Cyrillic: Цазин) is a city located in Una-Sana Canton of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is situated in northwest Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Bosanska Krajina region, near the border with Croatia. As of 2013, it has a population of 66,149 inhabitants. The municipality is often also called Cazinska Krajina. The town of Cazin is located on the main road which connects Bihać and Velika Kladuša.

Key Information

History

[edit]
Cazin in 1906

Cazin has several historic places, some dating back to the 14th century. The Ostrožac Castle and Radetina Tower are located in Cazin. During the Middle Ages, the city served as the seat of the Roman Catholic bishop of Knin.[2]

The Cazin uprising of 1950, an armed anti-communist rebellion of peasants, occurred in Cazin and neighboring Velika Kladuša and Slunj, which were all part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the time.[3] The peasants revolted against the forced collectivization and collective farms by the Yugoslav government on the farmers of its country.

Following a drought in 1949, the peasants of Yugoslavia were unable to meet unrealistic quotas set by their government and were punished. The revolt that followed the drought resulted in the killings and persecution of those who organized the uprising, but also many innocent civilians.[4][5] It was the only peasant rebellion in the history of Europe that occurred during the Cold War.[6]

Settlements

[edit]

Aside from the urban area of Cazin, the city administrative area comprises the following settlements:

Demographics

[edit]

According to the 2013 census, the municipality of Cazin has a population of 66,149 inhabitants. The town of Cazin has a population of 13,863.

Ethnic groups

[edit]

The ethnic composition of the municipality: Here is the table with the columns ordered by year, starting with 2013 on the left:

Ethnic group Population
2013[7] 		Population
1991[8] 		Population
1981 		Population
1971
Bosniaks/Muslims 63,463 61,693 55,401 43,880
Croats 320 139 122 175
Serbs 29 778 826 1,196
Yugoslavs - 430 529 51
Others/Unspecified 2,337 369 232 166
Total 66,149 63,409 57,110 45,468

Twin towns – sister cities

[edit]
See also: List of twin towns and sister cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Cazin is twinned with:

[edit]
  • Cazin Srbljani (railway station)
    Cazin Srbljani (railway station)
  • Cazin fortress
    Cazin fortress
  • Cazin fortress
    Cazin fortress
  • Cazin fortress
    Cazin fortress

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Cazin

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Cazin is a city and municipality in the of northwestern , situated near the border with and encompassing an area of 356 km². As of the 2013 census, it has a population of 66,149, predominantly Bosniak, making it the most populous municipality in the canton. The region, known as Cazinska Krajina, features diverse terrain including arable lands and forests, supporting agricultural activities such as dairy production and chestnut cultivation. Economically, Cazin relies on —with annual milk output exceeding 13 million liters—, , and small-scale manufacturing, though it remains among the less industrialized parts of the . A notable landmark is Ostrožac Castle, a medieval fortress rebuilt in Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian styles, overlooking the Una River and recognized as a cultural monument. During the (1992–1995), the area around Cazin was central to the , a breakaway entity led by that allied with Croatian and Serb forces against the government, resulting in intra-Bosniak conflict from 1993 to 1995.

Geography

Location and Administrative Status

is situated in the of the , in the northwestern part of the country within the region. The municipality lies near the international border with , facilitating regional connectivity through proximity to cross-border routes. Its geographical coordinates are approximately 44°58′01″N 15°56′35″E. is located about 20 kilometers north of by road and roughly 140 kilometers from , . As a , Cazin encompasses an administrative area divided into multiple settlements, with reports indicating around 22 local communities. Following the of 1995, which established the as one of two entities and delineated internal boundaries, Cazin's municipal borders were integrated within the structure, maintaining its status without territorial reconfiguration specific to the area. The cantonal framework, including Una-Sana, was formalized post-agreement to govern sub-entity administration. Portions of the Cazin municipality border the Una River, particularly in areas like Ostrožac, contributing to its hydrological and regional connectivity features. This proximity underscores Cazin's position in the Una-Sana river basin, influencing local geography and cross-border interactions with along the Una valley.

Physical Features and Climate

Cazin lies within the region of northwestern , featuring undulating hilly terrain shaped by the Dinaric landscape, with the municipal area encompassing elevations from approximately 200 meters in the Una River valley to around 400 meters or higher in surrounding uplands. The Una River, a major tributary of the , traverses the western part of the municipality, forming a fertile valley amid limestone formations that include poljes, sinkholes, and groundwater systems typical of the region. This supports local water resources while exposing low-lying areas to periodic inundation, as evidenced by historical flood events along the Una. The climate is humid continental, with distinct seasonal variations driven by the inland position and topographic influences. Winters are cold, with January averages hovering near 0°C (highs around 4°C, lows -3°C), often accompanied by snowfall. Summers are warm, peaking in July with averages of about 20°C (highs up to 26°C, lows 14°C). Annual precipitation totals roughly 1,200 mm, distributed fairly evenly but with higher intensity in autumn and spring, fostering dense mixed forests covering significant portions of the hills and enabling arable farming in valleys. The terrain's karst permeability and river proximity heighten flood risks during heavy rains, impacting habitability and agriculture in lower elevations.

History

Origins and Medieval Period

The region encompassing modern Cazin, situated in the Una River valley, exhibits evidence of early human habitation by Illyrian tribes, particularly the Iapodes, who occupied northwestern Bosnia during the . Archaeological investigations in the Una valley have uncovered settlements, fortifications, and artifacts attributable to these groups, reflecting a tribal society engaged in , , and conflict with neighboring peoples. Roman expansion into the from the BCE onward brought indirect influences to the area through campaigns and , including nearby roads facilitating and control; remnants such as coins and building foundations in the valley attest to limited Roman penetration and interaction with local Illyrian populations. Slavic migrations into the during the 6th and 7th centuries CE led to the gradual settlement of the Una valley by South Slavic groups, supplanting or assimilating prior inhabitants amid the collapse of Roman provincial administration. By the , the area formed part of emerging Slavic polities in the region, with sparse documentation indicating rural communities centered on and local lordships. The written record for Cazin itself remains obscure until the late medieval period, consistent with the limited literacy and administrative centralization of early Bosnian principalities. In the high medieval era, the territory around Cazin integrated into the , which evolved under the . The Ostrožac fortress, overlooking the Una near Cazin, was first documented in 1286 as a holding of the Croatian noble Babonić family, serving as a defensive stronghold amid feudal rivalries; its construction underscores the strategic importance of the valley for controlling riverine routes. Under Ban Stephen Tvrtko I (r. 1353–1377), who crowned himself king in 1377 and expanded Bosnian holdings northwestward, the region likely contributed to the kingdom's and economic base, though direct references to Cazin are absent; fortifications like Ostrožac remained modest, reflecting a decentralized with low population densities inferred from the paucity of contemporary charters and tax impositions. Pre-Ottoman settlement patterns, evidenced by archaeological surveys and feudal documents, suggest dispersed villages rather than urban centers, with overall regional demographics remaining thin due to mountainous terrain and subsistence economies.

Ottoman Rule and Islamicization

The Ottoman conquest of the Kingdom of Bosnia occurred rapidly in the summer of 1463, with Sultan Mehmed II's forces overrunning central Bosnia, including the Una valley region encompassing , after the decisive defeat and execution of King Stjepan Tomasević at . This military campaign involved sieges, massacres of resisting garrisons, and forced displacements, marking the end of medieval Bosnian independence and initiating direct imperial control. The conquered territories, including Cazin, were integrated into the newly formed , an administrative unit subdivided into nahiyas for tax collection and local governance, with Ottoman defters documenting the registration of lands and populations in the area. Islamicization in the Cazin region accelerated post-conquest through a mix of economic incentives, social pressures, and institutional embedding, rather than outright mass coercion, though underlying violence from the invasion and systems like —where Christian boys were levied, converted to , and trained as Janissaries—fostered and selective compliance. Converts evaded the poll tax imposed on non-Muslims and received land grants, as evidenced in 16th-century tahrir defters recording reallocations to Muslim settlers and local converts, which boosted agricultural productivity and timber extraction in forested areas like Cazin's. By the , Ottoman records indicate a Muslim demographic in Bosnia's northwestern nahiyas, driven by conversions for status, rural incentives amid depopulation from wars, and immigration of Anatolian Muslims, though Christian communities persisted under harac taxation. The construction of mosques and Sufi tekkes in Cazin and surrounding areas institutionalized this shift, with Ottoman patrons funding structures that served as centers for conversion and orders promoting Islamic practice among locals. Economically, the region contributed to the empire's timber via Una River routes and sustained on fertile plains, with defters noting increased yields from converted timar-holders, though periodic rebellions in Bosnia—stemming from tax burdens and levies—highlighted underlying tensions, including localized unrest against Ottoman officials. This process reflected causal dynamics of enabling demographic engineering through material benefits, rather than mere tolerance, as non-converts faced cumulative disadvantages in land access and military exemptions.

Austro-Hungarian Era and Early 20th Century

Following the occupation of in 1878, authorized by the , the region including Cazin fell under Austro-Hungarian civil administration after an initial military phase, marking the end of nominal Ottoman . The authorities formally annexed the territory in 1908, integrating it into the Dual Monarchy's administrative framework while preserving certain Islamic institutions to mitigate resistance. A key policy was agrarian reform beginning in the 1880s, which abolished the Ottoman system—where state-owned lands were granted to holders—and redistributed parcels to individual peasant households, aiming to foster loyalty and productivity. This disrupted entrenched Muslim elite (agha) control over estates, often worked by peasants, leading to widespread discontent and localized unrest, as smallholdings proved insufficient for subsistence amid high taxes and population pressures; both Muslim dispossessed landlords and Christian tenants participated in protests, though suppressed by imperial forces. In and adjacent areas, such tensions erupted into revolts as early as 1882, involving over 1,000 peasants targeting administrative posts. Modernization initiatives targeted infrastructure to integrate the periphery economically, including the expansion of narrow-gauge railways from the onward; lines along the Una River valley, serving regions near Cazin, were developed by the to facilitate timber export and troop movement, connecting to broader networks from . These efforts coexisted with ethnic segregation in and administration, preserving distinct confessional identities rather than promoting assimilation. The 1910 census reflected continuity in demographic patterns, with Muslims comprising the majority in northwestern districts like Una-Sana, underscoring persistent Islamic cultural dominance in Cazin despite inflows of Catholic settlers. During World War I, Cazin and surrounding areas endured intensified military governance, with conscription drives and food requisitions exacerbating hardships, as Bosnia served as a strategic rear for Austro-Hungarian forces against Serbia. Repressive measures targeted suspected nationalists, contributing to economic strain. Following the monarchy's collapse in late 1918, the region transitioned to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, with local Muslim leaders initially wary of centralizing Serb-dominated rule.

Period Under Yugoslavia

Following the liberation of the Bihać region, which encompassed , by in November 1942 as part of the short-lived Bihać Republic, local fighters including residents from Cazin contributed to anti-Axis resistance efforts against the Independent State of Croatia and German forces. After , Cazin was integrated into the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the Federal People's Republic of , where federal policies emphasized multi-ethnic unity under communist governance, though implementation in peripheral rural areas like often prioritized central directives over local conditions. Agrarian reforms and forced collectivization in the late triggered widespread discontent among Cazin's predominantly peasant population, culminating in the of May 1950. This armed uprising, involving around 20 villages in the Cazin and districts, protested high mandatory grain delivery quotas, excessive taxation, and land expropriations, reflecting resistance to state-driven agricultural modernization. Yugoslav authorities suppressed the revolt swiftly, arresting 714 individuals, trying 288 before military courts, and executing at least 12 leaders in July 1950, underscoring the coercive enforcement of socialist policies in underdeveloped regions. The subsequent adoption of worker self-management in the aimed to decentralize economic decision-making to enterprise councils, but in Cazin and similar Bosnian peripheries, it yielded modest results amid chronic underinvestment compared to northern republics like and . Agricultural cooperatives dominated, with limited expansion into light industry such as wood processing, while remittances from guest workers in supplemented household incomes and mitigated some structural inequalities by the . Bosnia's status as a "super-peripheral" economy within exacerbated disparities, with lower per capita investment and slower infrastructure growth, fostering latent socioeconomic strains despite official narratives of balanced federal development. The municipality's population expanded to 57,110 by the 1981 census, driven by natural growth and , though outmigration for labor abroad signaled persistent local limitations.

Bosnian War and Internal Conflicts

At the outset of the in 1992, the Cazin area within the Cazinska Krajina region came under the de facto control of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH), aligned with the central government in led by . Local political tensions escalated due to dissatisfaction with Sarajevo's centralist approach, which many in the northwest viewed as neglecting regional autonomy and economic interests. , a prominent pre-war figure who had garnered substantial support as founder of the conglomerate and a successful electoral candidate in 1990, positioned himself against Izetbegović's policies, advocating for pragmatic local governance and ceasefires with surrounding Serb forces to avert devastation. On September 29, —Abdić's birthday—he declared the (APWB), a self-proclaimed entity centered in but extending influence into adjacent municipalities including Cazin, rejecting subordination to . The APWB, defended by Abdić's (NOZB), entered into alliances with the (VRS) and the Army of the (ARSK), signing operational agreements that facilitated joint actions against ARBiH positions. This intra-Bosniak rift manifested in sporadic clashes from late , as ARBiH units sought to reassert control, fracturing communities along factional lines rather than strictly ethnic ones, with families often divided between autonomist and loyalist camps. Intense fighting intensified in late 1994 during , a VRS-ARSK offensive supported by APWB forces targeting the pocket, which included ARBiH-held areas near Cazin; the operation aimed to expand autonomist territory but stalled amid counteroffensives. By mid-1995, ARBiH launched operations such as Sword-95, recapturing key APWB enclaves and dissolving the province by September, amid the broader collapse of Serb positions following Croatian advances. The Cazinska clashes, pitting Bosniak against Bosniak, contributed to heavy localized casualties, underscoring causal fractures from political and economic grievances rather than unified ethnic aggression. Atrocities occurred on both sides: APWB/NOZB units under Abdić were later prosecuted for the unlawful confinement, , and killing of ARBiH prisoners and suspected loyalist civilians in detention sites during 1994-1995, leading to Abdić's conviction for war crimes by a Croatian court in 2002 (upheld on , with a 20-year sentence served until 2016). ARBiH forces, upon retaking areas, similarly engaged in expulsions, beatings, and executions of autonomist supporters, as documented in post-war trials. Abdić's autonomist stance retained enduring local backing, evidenced by his electoral successes in the —such as winning 48% in Velika Kladuša's 2016 mayoral race and re-election in 2020—reflecting rejection of Sarajevo's centralism among segments of the population prioritizing survival and pragmatism over ideological unity.

Post-War Reconstruction and Developments

The , signed on December 14, 1995, formalized the reintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina's territories, including Cazin within the , under a decentralized structure that preserved ethnic divisions while enabling initial stabilization. NATO-led (IFOR), deployed from December 1995, enforced demilitarization and ceasefires, transitioning to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996, which facilitated early reconstruction amid ongoing tensions; European Union Force (EUFOR) assumed responsibilities in December 2004, maintaining a reduced presence focused on deterrence until gradual drawdowns. Reconstruction prioritized and basic , with international donors funding repairs to war-damaged properties through programs like the Regional Housing Programme, which targeted vulnerable returnees; in overall, aid supported the rebuilding of over 600,000 units by the mid-2000s, though local implementation in areas like Cazin faced delays from bureaucratic fragmentation and uneven aid allocation favoring politically connected recipients. Returnee initiatives, backed by the Office of the High Representative and UNHCR, aimed to reverse displacement, but emigration persisted due to economic hardship, contributing to Cazin's municipal falling to 66,149 by the 2013 census— a decline from pre-war levels exceeding 90,000. In the 2010s, external assistance supplemented domestic efforts, including (TIKA) projects enhancing regional infrastructure such as roads and utilities in , where Cazin is located, amid Bosnia and Herzegovina's broader reliance on foreign donors for development. Economic recovery remained sluggish, with annual GDP growth in the averaging 1-2% post-2005, constrained by stalled structural reforms, high perceptions (BiH ranked 110th out of 180 on Transparency International's 2023 index), and inefficiencies in aid disbursement that perpetuated dependency rather than fostering self-sustaining growth. Persistent local autonomist undercurrents in Cazin, echoing pre-war movements against Sarajevo's centralism, highlighted challenges, including protests over and limited fiscal within the cantonal system.

Demographics

The population of Cazin municipality stood at 63,409 according to the 1991 census conducted under Yugoslavia. This figure reflected steady growth from prior decades, driven by birth rates exceeding replacement levels, with Bosnia and Herzegovina's total fertility rate averaging around 2.5 children per woman in the late 1980s. The Bosnian War (1992–1995) caused widespread displacement and casualties across the region, yet the 2013 census recorded an increase to 66,149 residents, suggesting a combination of natural population growth and partial returns offsetting wartime losses. Post-2013 trends indicate reversal, with estimates placing the population at 64,518 in 2022 amid Bosnia and Herzegovina's broader demographic contraction from low fertility (now approximately 1.3–1.5 children per woman) and sustained net out-migration. Emigration accelerated after 1995, contributing to annual declines as younger cohorts sought opportunities abroad, mirroring national patterns where net migration losses exceeded 100,000 in the immediate postwar years alone. Projections aligned with United Nations models for Bosnia and Herzegovina anticipate further reduction, potentially to around 63,000 by 2025, assuming continued low birth rates and negative migration balances. Within the municipality, the urban core of Cazin town accounted for 13,863 residents in 2013, representing roughly 21% of the total and underscoring a rural-dominated settlement pattern where villages comprise the majority of inhabitants. This split has persisted, with depopulation pressures more acute in rural areas due to limited local vitality and heightened incentives.

Ethnic Composition

According to the 1991 , the of Cazin had a total population of 63,409, with (subsequently redesignated as in official terminology) comprising 61,693 individuals or 97.3%, Serbs 778 or 1.2%, Croats 139 or 0.2%, and others 799 or 1.3%; a small number, approximately 430, identified as , reflecting residual multi-ethnic identification from the socialist era. The (1992–1995) led to significant ethnic homogenization in Cazin, which remained under Bosniak Army (ARBiH) control throughout the conflict. Non-Bosniak minorities, particularly Serbs and Croats, faced displacement amid broader patterns of population transfers in ; pre-war Serb and Croat residents largely fled to Serb- or Croat-held territories, with limited returns post-Dayton Agreement due to property disputes, security concerns, and economic barriers. By the 2013 , Serb presence had dwindled to negligible levels (fewer than 50 individuals reported), and Croats numbered around 0.5% of the . The 2013 census recorded a municipal population of 66,149, with Bosniaks at 63,463 or 95.9%, Croats approximately 0.5%, Serbs effectively 0%, and others/undeclared 3.5%; this slight decline in Bosniak percentage from 1991 reflects net migration patterns rather than ingroup losses, as war-era displacements of minorities were not substantially reversed. The "Yugoslav" category, which garnered minor support in 1991 amid Yugoslavia's dissolution, vanished locally by 2013, aligning with national trends where such declarations fell below 0.3% amid entrenched ethnic polarization.
Census YearTotal PopulationBosniaks (%)Serbs (%)Croats (%)Others/ (%)
199163,40997.31.20.21.3 (incl. ~0.7 Yugoslavs)
201366,14995.9~0.0~0.53.5
These figures underscore post-war demographic consolidation, with Cazin exhibiting one of Bosnia and Herzegovina's highest majorities, driven by wartime expulsions and minimal minority .

Religious Affiliation

The population of Cazin is overwhelmingly Muslim, with over 93 percent adhering to of the , as reflected in the ethnic composition from the 2013 census where —predominantly —constitute 93.15 percent of the municipality's residents. This demographic dominance stems from Ottoman-era Islamicization and has persisted through subsequent historical periods, with the Islamic Community of maintaining extensive records of over 50 mosques in the municipality serving daily prayers, Friday congregations, and major holidays like and . Historically, religious practice in the Cazin region bore influences from Naqshbandi Sufism, a tariqa introduced during Ottoman rule that emphasized silent dhikr and adherence to sharia, with tekkes (Sufi lodges) established across Bosnia including in nearby areas of Una-Sana Canton. Post-1995 Dayton Accords, a limited Salafi presence emerged amid foreign mujahideen influences from the Bosnian War, with estimates of 100-200 adherents in Cazin and surrounding communities adopting stricter interpretations rejecting Sufi traditions and local customs like mawlid celebrations. This group remains marginal, comprising less than 1 percent of Muslims locally, and has faced pushback from the mainstream Islamic Community for promoting Wahhabi-inspired separatism. Religious minorities are negligible, with Catholics (primarily Croats) at around 3.4 percent and Orthodox (Serbs) under 0.5 percent per census data, supported by only a handful of churches amid the war's demographic shifts that reduced non-Muslim . Surveys of in , including Cazin, indicate higher-than-national-average among Muslims, with elevated mosque attendance and adherence to practices like fasting exceeding BiH Muslim norms by 10-15 percent in self-reported observance.

Socioeconomic Indicators

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the adult literacy rate reached 98.3% in 2022, reflecting near-universal basic education access nationally. Upper secondary education completion rates, however, lag at approximately 72.3% for the population aged 25 and older as of 2022, with regional variations in Una-Sana Canton—where Cazin is located—exacerbated by enrollment declines; primary school attendance in Cazin dropped 22.6% from 5,252 students in 2018/2019 to 4,064 in 2022/2023, signaling broader youth disengagement and emigration pressures. Unemployment in the country averaged 13.2% in 2023 per labor force surveys, though informal estimates and older canton-specific data indicate persistently higher structural joblessness in underdeveloped areas like Una-Sana, where rates approached 60% as of assessments. Poverty affects roughly 17% of the national at official lines, but Cazin exhibits elevated vulnerability, with household reliance on remittances from emigrants—contributing about 10% to Bosnia and Herzegovina's GDP annually—serving as a critical buffer against local . Life expectancy at birth in improved to 77.85 years in 2023, yet remains at 5.3 deaths per 1,000 live births, exceeding rates in neighboring EU states like (3.9 per 1,000). In , limited healthcare infrastructure contributes to disparities, with canton-level data underscoring higher risks compared to more developed regions.
IndicatorValue (Recent)Source
Literacy Rate (Adults)98.3% (2022)Agency for Statistics of BiH via globaleconomy.com
Upper Secondary Completion~72% (2022, national)World Scorecard
Unemployment Rate13.2% national (2023); up to 60% in Una-Sana (2015 est.)ILOSTAT; Times
At-Risk-of-Poverty Rate~17% nationalWorld Bank
Life Expectancy77.85 years (2023)World Bank via Trading Economics
Infant Mortality Rate5.3 per 1,000 (2023)

Economy

Economic Structure

Cazin municipality's fiscal framework is marked by substantial dependence on intergovernmental transfers, with the 2024 budget projecting total revenues of 44,829,227 BAM (approximately 22.9 million EUR) and expenditures of 36,075,270 BAM, resulting in a planned deficit of over 16 million BAM. Current transfers from cantonal and federal levels account for 6,863,800 BAM, while capital transfers add 4,670,000 BAM, underscoring reliance on public funding rather than local revenue generation, where taxes contribute 15,948,977 BAM and non-tax sources 17,346,450 BAM. Employment structure reflects limited dynamism, with roles comprising a notable share amid national patterns of oversized and job ; locally, total registered employees number 7,641 against a labor force yielding 43.4% . Average net monthly wages stand at 1,075 BAM (about 550 EUR), well below the of Bosnia and Herzegovina's average of 1,373 BAM, contributing to subdued domestic consumption and . The , estimated at 30% of total employment per national assessments, further distorts formal GDP contributions and fiscal receipts in areas like Cazin. External factors bolster household income, with remittances forming a critical buffer—nationally at 10.5% of GDP in 2023, likely higher in emigration-prone Cazin due to outflows to states and —while trade balances tilt toward deficits, oriented to neighboring and broader markets for imports exceeding limited exports. Overall GDP per capita lags the national figure of around 7,000 USD, exacerbated by structural underdevelopment in , though precise municipal metrics remain scarce in official data.

Primary Industries and Employment

remains a of Cazin's primary economic activities, with traditional farming centered on rearing, particularly production for , alongside cultivation of crops such as potatoes, fruits, and grains suited to the region's fertile valleys and hilly terrain. also plays a significant role, leveraging the municipality's substantial areas—part of Bosnia and Herzegovina's broader exceeding 50% of national land—which support timber harvesting and related processing for local use and export. These sectors historically dominated employment prior to the 1970s, when agriculture was the main income source for much of the population, though output remains modest due to small-scale operations and limited mechanization. Small-scale manufacturing persists in niches like textiles, furniture, and timber processing, remnants of Yugoslavia-era industrialization that included , meat processing, and wood industries, but these have contracted sharply post-1990s due to destruction, market disruptions, and lack of reinvestment, leading to evident in reduced factory outputs and job losses. Employment in these primary sectors reflects broader trends, where and absorb a disproportionate share of the workforce amid overall high rates approaching 60% as of the mid-2010s. Youth unemployment exceeds 50%, often surpassing national figures of around 57% recorded in the early , exacerbating deindustrialization effects as younger workers face skill mismatches and few industrial opportunities, prompting widespread seasonal migration for labor in . Recent efforts include targeted agricultural investments, such as those noted in for production growth, yet primary industries continue to underperform relative to pre-war capacities. Tourism holds untapped potential near , approximately 50 kilometers away, which could bolster rural through eco-related activities, though development remains minimal.

Challenges and External Dependencies

Cazin faces significant emigration pressures, contributing to a brain drain that has exacerbated labor shortages and . Between 1991 and 2013, experienced a net population loss of approximately 20% due to war-related displacement and subsequent , with rural municipalities like Cazin in particularly affected by outflows of young, skilled workers to . This depopulation, driven by limited local opportunities, has strained public services and reduced the tax base, hindering self-sustaining growth. Infrastructure deficits compound these issues, rooted in the municipality's rugged geography and post-war neglect. Cazin's location in the mountainous Una-Sana region isolates it from major transport corridors, with poor road connectivity and underdeveloped rail links—such as the underutilized Cazin railway station—limiting and mobility. Bosnia and Herzegovina's overall lags regional peers, with highways and railways requiring substantial upgrades that local budgets cannot fund independently. The municipality remains heavily dependent on external aid inflows, undermining claims of economic autonomy. Post-war reconstruction relied on foreign donors, including Saudi Arabia's funding of mosques and social projects across , with benefiting from such investments in religious infrastructure that local resources could not support. Recent Saudi loans totaling $32 million for and facilities in highlight ongoing reliance on Gulf states for basic development. Corruption perceptions further erode governance capacity, with scoring 35 out of 100 on the 2023 , reflecting systemic issues that permeate cantonal levels like Una-Sana. Surveys indicate high citizen perceptions of corruption in public sectors, including and distribution, which diverts resources from infrastructure and deters investment in areas like Cazin. Regional instability and stalled EU accession amplify vulnerabilities, as Bosnia and Herzegovina's internal ethnic divisions and slow reforms delay integration benefits. Cazin's border proximity to and exposes it to spillover risks from political tensions, while EU negotiations, candidate status granted in but with minimal progress, withhold structural funds essential for peripheral economies. These external dependencies perpetuate a cycle where local challenges cannot be addressed without broader stabilization.

Government and Politics

Local Governance Structure

The municipal governance of Cazin operates within the framework established by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's laws on local self-government, and the Una-Sana Canton's regulations, emphasizing decentralized administration with direct democratic elements. The executive is led by a mayor elected directly by residents every four years via majority vote, while the legislative authority resides in the City Assembly (Skupština Grada Cazina), comprising 35 members selected through proportional representation from closed party lists submitted to the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CIK BiH). This structure reflects post-Dayton adaptations prioritizing demographic majorities in ethnically homogeneous areas like Cazin, where Bosniaks constitute over 98% of the population, enabling de facto Bosniak-led representation without mandatory quotas for Serbs or Croats due to their minimal presence, though CIK enforces general protections for "Others" (non-constituent peoples) at 3-5% of seats where lists qualify. Electoral mechanics mandate via the CIK's unique citizen registry, with campaigns regulated under the to prevent abuse, including spending caps and media parity; assembly seats are allocated by the to favor larger coalitions in Cazin's fragmented party landscape. In the November 15, 2020, local elections, the Democratic People's Union (DPU)-aligned forces achieved a controlling in , securing the legislative agenda amid turnout of approximately 50% municipality-wide. The proposes the budget and ordinances, subject to assembly approval, with oversight committees handling audits and public petitions to maintain accountability. Fiscal operations are constrained by dependency on higher-tier funding, with roughly 60% of the annual sourced from cantonal and entity transfers allocated via formula-based for shared competencies like and , supplemented by local taxes on (around 20%) and non-tax revenues from utilities. This allocation, governed by the Law on Budgets in the , prioritizes equalization but often results in delays, as cantonal priorities influence disbursements, limiting municipal autonomy in capital projects.

Key Political Figures and Parties

Nermin Ogrešević, mayor of Cazin since 2008, leads the People's European Union (NES), a party emphasizing local development and while prioritizing municipal autonomy from Sarajevo's central authorities. His long tenure reflects sustained voter preference for NES candidates, who secured the mayoralty in the 2020 local elections amid rivalries with the (SDA), the dominant Bosniak centralist party. Ogrešević's platform focuses on infrastructure and economic self-reliance, drawing support from Cazin's predominantly Bosniak electorate wary of federal overreach. Fikret Abdić, founder of the Democratic People's Union (DNZ), exerts lingering influence in Cazinska Krajina despite basing operations in neighboring Velika Kladuša, where he was re-elected mayor in 2020 after serving a war crimes sentence. DNZ garners around 30-40% support in Una-Sana Canton municipalities like Cazin, underscoring persistent autonomist leanings against SDA's Sarajevo-aligned policies, as evidenced by DNZ candidacies and voter turnout in local contests. Abdić's 1993 declaration of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia resonates locally, with his 2002 conviction for crimes against civilians—upheld by a Croatian court but challenged by supporters as politically motivated—failing to erode regional loyalty. Municipal elections consistently highlight DNZ and NES outperforming SDA, with pro-autonomy coalitions capturing majorities in Cazin assemblies, reflecting cross-border economic ties to that bolster localist platforms over federal integration. This dynamic persists despite SDA's national dominance among , as Cazin's voters favor parties addressing canton-specific grievances like revenue redistribution.

Controversies and Autonomist Movements

, a prominent political figure from the region encompassing and nearby , declared the (APWB) on September 27, 1993, as a secessionist entity opposing the central Bosnian government in led by . This move, rooted in Abdić's advocacy for economic self-sufficiency and alliances with Croatian and Serb forces to counter the siege of the pocket, sparked intra-Bosniak conflict in Cazinska Krajina from 1993 to 1995, pitting APWB forces against the Army of the (ARBiH). In 2002, a in convicted Abdić of war crimes, including the unlawful detention, torture, and murder of at least 121 ARBiH prisoners loyal to , sentencing him to 20 years imprisonment; the verdict highlighted systematic abuses in APWB-run camps like those in . Released in 2012 after serving two-thirds of his term, Abdić maintained strong local support, winning re-election as mayor of in 2020 with over 80% of votes, reflecting persistent autonomist sentiments in the area where residents viewed him as a protector against perceived -imposed hardships rather than a perpetrator. Post-war autonomist rhetoric in Cazinska , including Cazin, has centered on demands for greater cantonal powers within the , often framed as resistance to centralized control from amid economic grievances and dysfunctional state institutions. Abdić's Democratic People's Union party, dominant in elections, has channeled these views, though formal secessionist pushes remain limited; historical memory of the APWB conflict divides communities, with supporters emphasizing pragmatic survival strategies during the war and critics alleging betrayal of Bosniak unity. Accusations of Islamist radicalism have sporadically surfaced in the region, tied to broader Bosnian concerns over foreign-influenced networks, but specific to Cazin, these involve isolated 2000s-era probes into and without large-scale convictions linking local autonomist politics directly to militancy; federal-state police tensions, including jurisdictional disputes over operations, have fueled perceptions of external overreach into cantonal affairs.

Culture and Society

Religious Conservatism and Practices

Cazin's population, over 95% Bosniak Muslims, demonstrates elevated levels of religious observance compared to pre-war norms in , with mosque attendance rising markedly since the 1990s conflict due to a broader amid reduced communist-era suppression. Friday prayers and daily rituals draw substantial participation, exceeding attendance rates typical of the Yugoslav period, where religiosity was subdued by state policies. This resurgence aligns with empirical observations of increased communal prayer across rural Bosniak-majority areas, including . Post-war reconstruction of destroyed mosques in Cazin and surrounding regions received significant funding from and Gulf donors, totaling billions in aid for Bosnia overall, which facilitated rapid rebuilding but introduced Salafi-influenced architecture, literature, and preaching styles diverging from local Hanafi traditions. While local contributions complemented foreign aid, these projects emphasized stricter ritual purity and gender segregation, contributing to conservative practices such as mandatory veiling in religious settings and avoidance of mixed-gender social events. Traditional Sufi orders, rooted in Ottoman-era tariqas like the , persist alongside these influences, fostering internal debates over doctrinal authenticity, with Sufi adherents prioritizing spiritual mysticism over Salafi literalism. Conservative norms in Cazin exceed Bosnia's urban averages, manifesting in widespread adoption of hijab among women during public and religious activities, alongside community enforcement of halal standards and Ramadan fasting compliance, though niqab remains uncommon and linked to foreign influences. Claims of widespread radicalization are tempered by data: while Bosnia recorded approximately 300-700 citizens joining jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq by 2015, per security estimates, local incidents in Cazin have been limited to isolated cases rather than systemic trends, as evidenced by 2014 nationwide arrests of 16 suspects for material support to foreign fighters, primarily from central regions like Zenica rather than Una-Sana. Sufi-Salafi tensions occasionally surface in preaching disputes, but mainstream institutions, including the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, maintain oversight to curb extremism, reflecting resident agency in preserving moderate Hanafi practices amid external pressures.

Cultural Heritage and Landmarks

Cazin's cultural heritage reflects its position as a historical crossroads, featuring Ottoman-era religious architecture and medieval fortifications that highlight layered influences from , Ottoman rule, and later Austro-Hungarian modifications. Key sites emphasize the Ottoman legacy, with structures like mosques serving as centers of community life since the . Preservation efforts have focused on these landmarks, though many endured damage during the of 1992–1995, prompting post-conflict renovations across the region. The most prominent landmark is Ostrožac Castle, a located near the village of Ostrožac outside Cazin. Originating in the 13th century under the Croatian noble house of Babonić, the fortress was captured by Ottoman forces in 1592 and subsequently fortified during their administration. In the early , Austro-Hungarian noble Lothar von Berks constructed a neo-Gothic mansion within the complex between 1900 and 1902, making it the only preserved castle of this style in . The site includes a medieval fort, Ottoman-period elements, and a collection of sculptures, with ongoing restoration addressing war-related wear; in January 2025, authorities allocated over four million BAM for reconstruction to enhance its structural integrity and accessibility. Religious sites underscore the Ottoman architectural imprint, particularly the City Mosque (also known as Sultan Ahmed Mosque), erected in 1576 within the remnants of a in Cazin's old town. This structure, one of the largest historically in , was demolished in 1879 due to structural issues and immediately rebuilt on the same foundation, later receiving a donated by Emperor Franz Joseph as a gesture of imperial favor. It remains a focal point of local Islamic practice, exemplifying classical Ottoman design with its dome and . Cazin's intangible heritage includes participation in Bosnian folk traditions such as , a monodic urban folk song genre expressing themes of love and longing, recognized by as part of Bosnia and Herzegovina's since 2024. Performed solo with instruments like the saz, sevdalinka traces roots to Ottoman-era urban culture and persists in local gatherings, though formal annual festivals dedicated to it are more prominent in larger Bosnian centers. Formal museums are scarce, with cultural artifacts and exhibits primarily integrated into sites like Ostrožac Castle or the Cazin Cultural and Tourism Center, which hosts temporary displays of regional art and history.

Education and Social Issues

Cazin maintains a network of primary schools to provide , with enrollment in these institutions totaling 4,064 students during the 2022/2023 school year, reflecting a 22.6% decline from 5,252 students in 2018/2019. This reduction correlates with broader socioeconomic pressures, including high rates that exacerbate school dropout, particularly among youth facing economic barriers to continued attendance. Secondary education options are limited locally, contributing to dropout risks linked to , as families prioritize immediate labor needs over prolonged schooling. Access to higher education for Cazin residents primarily involves commuting to the University of Bihać, approximately 40 kilometers away, which offers programs in fields such as engineering, economics, and humanities. Gender disparities in education persist regionally, with young women in Bosnia and Herzegovina facing higher rates of disconnection from schooling and employment—21.7% of females aged 15-24 are neither enrolled nor employed, compared to 20.8% of males—patterns likely amplified in conservative rural areas like Cazin by cultural norms limiting female advancement. Social structures in Cazin emphasize extended family units reminiscent of historical South Slavic zadruga systems, where collective household decision-making reinforces traditional roles and clan-like loyalties. These dynamics contribute to early marriages, prevalent in conservative Bosniak communities, though exact local rates remain underreported; nationally, child marriages occur across populations but cluster in rural settings influenced by patriarchal customs. Domestic violence reports have risen in post-war, with every second woman experiencing some form since age 15, often normalized in traditional settings; in , including Cazin, institutional responses lag due to weak enforcement. Drug use has increased exponentially since the conflicts, driven by trauma, , and routes, affecting in areas like Cazin amid limited rehabilitation access. These issues perpetuate cycles, as early family formation and hinder educational completion and .

References

  1. https://gradcazin.gov.ba/
  2. https://sarajevotimes.com/cazin-became-real-economic-wonder-short-period-time/
  3. https://lll.ba/tvrdjava-ostrozac/
  4. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335078849_The_Politics_of_Memory_in_Cazinska_Krajina_Case_Study_of_%27%27Autonomous_Province_of_Western_Bosnia%27%27
  5. https://www.routeyou.com/en-ba/location/view/51624461
  6. https://en.db-city.com/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina--Federation-of-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina--Una-Sana--Cazin
  7. https://www.distancefromto.net/distance-from-cazin-ba-to-bihac-ba
  8. https://www.travelmath.com/distance/from/Cazin%2C%2BBosnia%2Band%2BHerzegovina/to/Zagreb%2C%2BCroatia
  9. http://wikimapia.org/1930387/Cazin
  10. https://www.ohr.int/dayton-peace-agreement/
  11. https://furaj.ba/cazin-impressive-treasure-of-the-krajina-jewel/
  12. https://en-us.topographic-map.com/map-4g4t1h/Cazin/
  13. https://www.floodmap.net/Elevation/ElevationMap/?gi=3202822
  14. http://www.inweb.gr/workshops2/sub_basins/3_Una.html
  15. https://gisgeography.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina-map/
  16. https://www.worldweatheronline.com/cazin-weather-averages/federation-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina/ba.aspx
  17. https://weatherspark.com/y/78951/Average-Weather-in-Cazin-Bosnia-&-Herzegovina-Year-Round
  18. https://www.floodmap.net/?gi=3202822
  19. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366644520_The_valley_of_the_Una_river_the_land_of_the_Illyrian_Iapodes_Dolina_rijeke_Une_podrucje_ilirskih_Japoda
  20. https://www.academia.edu/104106393/The_valley_of_the_Una_river_the_land_of_the_Illyrian_Iapodes
  21. https://muzejbosanskogkraljevstva.ba/en/first-information-about-bosnia-in-the-middle-ages/
  22. https://sarajevotimes.com/interesting-story-about-ostrozac-castle-cultural-and-historical-monument-in-bih/
  23. https://muzejbosanskogkraljevstva.ba/en/cazin-2/
  24. https://www.academia.edu/114026270/The_Bosnian_Kingdom_and_the_Serbian_Despotate_1402_1459_Department_of_the_Museum_of_the_Bosnian_Kingdom_University_of_Sarajevo_Institute_of_History_Cazin_Sarajevo_2023
  25. https://www.bosniafacts.info/?view=article&id=5:ottoman-rule-1463-1606
  26. https://balkaninsight.com/2010/11/30/the-ottomans-six-centuries-in-europe/
  27. https://austriaca.at/0xc1aa5576_0x00343240.pdf
  28. https://www.ajindex.com/dosyalar/makale/acarindex-1423910765.pdf
  29. https://www.britannica.com/topic/devsirme
  30. https://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1523972390663303
  31. https://digitalcommons.lib.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=econ_wpapers
  32. https://belleten.gov.tr/tam-metin/269/eng
  33. http://pen.ius.edu.ba/index.php/pen/article/viewFile/3191/1211
  34. https://www.cabidigitallibrary.org/doi/pdf/10.5555/20123167061
  35. https://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/38040/The_spread_of_Islam_in_the_Ottoman_Balkans_Revisiting_Bulliet%27s_method_on_religious_conversion.pdf?sequence=1
  36. https://www.academia.edu/26324829/Austria_Hungary_Dynasty_Period_in_Bosnia
  37. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/johs.12350
  38. https://www.bosniafacts.info/history/early-history/austro-hungarian-rule
  39. https://unipub.uni-graz.at/obvugrhs/content/titleinfo/6073194/full.pdf
  40. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4206528
  41. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/conflict-post-war-yugoslavia
  42. https://weristwalter.eu/project/nurija-pozderac-rescuer-and-partisan/
  43. https://sarajevotimes.com/the-only-organized-rebellion-of-the-people-against-the-government-in-titos-yugoslavia/
  44. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00809A000600350062-4.pdf
  45. https://vreme.com/en/vreme/4579301/
  46. https://www.lse.ac.uk/Economic-History/Assets/Documents/WorkingPapers/Economic-History/2017/WP268.pdf
  47. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341634745_Countries_of_former_yugoslavia_Periphery_vs_super-periphery_in_the_great_recession_and_beyond
  48. https://www.scribd.com/doc/282190732/Istorija-Grada-Cazina
  49. https://www.yuantiques.com/en/blog/fikret-abdic-babo
  50. https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Bosnia-Herzegovina/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-the-return-of-Fikret-Abdic-174832
  51. https://apzapadnabosna.com/nozb
  52. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Split_Agreement
  53. https://balkaninsight.com/2016/07/01/bosnian-convict-to-run-for-office-07-01-2016/
  54. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/11/16/war-criminal-re-elected-as-mayor-in-bosnia/
  55. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122.htm
  56. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eufor-althea/eufor-bosnia-herzegovina-military-operation-althea_und_en
  57. https://citypopulation.de/en/bosnia/admin/federacija_bosna_i_herceg/10227__cazin/
  58. https://www1.up.poznan.pl/intercathedra/files/Ak%25C4%25B1ll%25C4%25B1
  59. https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/934851468013767959/pdf/295001BA0rev.pdf
  60. https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/bih/bosnia/net-migration
  61. https://population.un.org/wpp/
  62. https://www.citypopulation.de/en/bosnia/unskosanski/cazin/109452__cazin/
  63. http://www.statistika.ba/?show=12&id=10227
  64. http://www.statistika.ba/
  65. https://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/War_Demographics/en/slobodan_milosevic_municipalities_bih_030404.pdf
  66. https://vreme.com/en/projekat/kriza-zbog-popisa-u-bih/
  67. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317717995_Salafism_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina
  68. https://www.iemed.org/publication/salafism-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/
  69. http://www.studiesincomparativereligion.com/public/articles/some_notes_on_the_naqshbandi_tariqat_in_bosnia-by_hamid_algar.aspx
  70. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271511624_Sufi_orders_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina
  71. https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004283053/B9789004283053_008.pdf
  72. https://www.newarab.com/indepth/2020/3/17/No-radical-Islam-has-not-taken-root-in-Bosnia
  73. https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/15/7/809
  74. https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/literacy_rate/
  75. https://worldscorecard.com/scorecards/bosnian-scorecard/upper-secondary-attainment/
  76. https://mladi.org/en/city-of-cazin-key-findings-from-the-analysis-of-youth-position-and-needs/
  77. https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/country-profiles/bih/
  78. https://sarajevotimes.com/positive-increase-employment-young-people-una-sana-canton/
  79. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=BA
  80. https://countryeconomy.com/demography/migration/remittance/bosnia-herzegovina
  81. https://tradingeconomics.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina/life-expectancy-at-birth-total-years-wb-data.html
  82. https://www.statista.com/statistics/806679/infant-mortality-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/
  83. https://data.who.int/countries/070
  84. https://gradcazin.gov.ba/sites/default/files/dokumenti/2024-01/budzet-grada-cazin-za-2024.pdf
  85. https://fzzpr.gov.ba/files/Socioekonomski%20pokazatelji%20po%20op%C4%87inama/Socioekonomski%20pokazatelji%20po%20op%C4%87inama%20FBiH%202024.pdf
  86. https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2025/English/1bihea2025002-source-pdf.ashx
  87. https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/remittances_percent_GDP/
  88. https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/bosnia-and-herzegovina/gdp-per-capita
  89. https://gradcazin.gov.ba/sites/default/files/dokumenti/Ostalo/Brosura.pdf
  90. https://www.citycentercazin.ba/en/about_the_region/13
  91. https://www.britannica.com/place/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/Economy
  92. https://gradcazin.gov.ba/sites/default/files/dokumenti/strategic_development_plan_2005_2010.pdf
  93. https://thegroundtruthproject.org/why-bosnia-has-the-worlds-highest-youth-unemployment-rate/
  94. https://www.fena.ba/article/1602327/hrnjic-record-investments-in-agriculture-and-production-growth-in-2024
  95. https://www.backpackadventures.org/una-national-park-bosnia/
  96. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/bosnia-herzegovina-has-lost-a-fifth-of-its-pre-war-population-census-shows
  97. https://eurogeojournal.eu/articles/04_GEKIC_047_064.pdf
  98. https://ceemr.uw.edu.pl/vol-12-no-2-2023/special-section/emigration-bosnia-and-herzegovina-empirical-evidence-last-two
  99. https://sarajevotimes.com/despite-the-heaps-of-invested-money-the-road-infrastructure-of-bih-is-among-the-worst/
  100. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/BIH
  101. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/408901468224695752/pdf/2902300P079192.pdf
  102. https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/mosque-geopolitics-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina
  103. https://www.sfd.gov.sa/en/n948
  104. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2609016/%257B%257B
  105. https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/bosnia-and-herzegovina
  106. https://measurebih.com/uimages/2023-NSCP-BiH-Report-508.pdf
  107. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-07-25/bosnia-and-herzegovinas-european-integration-impasse
  108. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/Bosnia%2520and%2520Herzegovina%2520Report%25202022.pdf
  109. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2024/04/polarization-threatens-to-derail-bosnias-eu-ambitions?lang=en
  110. https://www.izbori.ba/
  111. https://gradcazin.gov.ba/sites/default/files/dokumenti/statut_opcine.pdf
  112. https://www.izbori.ba/Rezultati_izbora/?resId=27&langId=1
  113. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/e/41178.pdf
  114. https://podlupom.org/wp-content/uploads/document/376/original/POD-LUPOM-Final-Report-ENGLISH.pdf
  115. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6512a00cb23dad0012e70609/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_Toponymic_factfile.pdf
  116. https://furaj.ba/nermin-ogresevic-mayor-of-cazin-kind-hearted-and-audacious-people-bring-success/
  117. https://predsjednistvobih.ba/saop/default.aspx?id=107358&langTag=en-US
  118. https://www.rferl.org/a/1081469.html
  119. https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2024/10/08/local-elections-in-bih-major-national-parties-failed-to-achieved-important-electoral-goals/
  120. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312053904_THE_CREATION_OF_THE_AUTONOMOUS_PROVINCE_OF_WESTERN_BOSNIA
  121. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/01/warcrimes
  122. https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/bosnia-court-charges-muslim-group-for-quotterrorismquot-idUSLDE5BL0MQ/
  123. https://www.zeriislam.com/artikulli.php?id=2371
  124. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/359681118_Islamic_Revival_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_1992-2010
  125. https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publikationen/giga-focus/mosque-geopolitics-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina
  126. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/is-saudi-funded-mosque-in-sarajevo-threat-to-bosnias-moderate-muslims
  127. https://themaydan.com/2018/01/education-heart-revival-sufism-bosnia-herzegovina/
  128. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/bosnias-muslims-divided-over-inroads-of-wahhabism-idUSL29721748/
  129. https://www.dw.com/en/bosnia-police-arrest-more-than-a-dozen-for-supporting-terrorism-in-iraq-syria/a-17896851
  130. https://balkaninsight.com/2014/09/03/bosnia-arrests-15-alleged-terrorists/
  131. https://balkaninsight.com/birn_location/cazin/
  132. https://sarajevotimes.com/investment-of-more-than-four-million-bam-for-the-reconstruction-of-the-ostrozac-castle/
  133. https://sarajevotimes.com/ostrozac-is-one-of-the-best-preserved-fortifications-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina-3/
  134. https://www.bosnianexperiences.com/05-text-no06
  135. https://sarajevotimes.com/know-story-mosque-bih-received-chandelier-emperor-franz-joseph/
  136. https://www.tourismbih.com/location/cazin/
  137. https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/sevdalinka-traditional-urban-folk-song-01872
  138. https://muzejbosanskogkraljevstva.ba/en/festival-crown-of-bosnia-organized-by-the-museum-of-the-bosnian-kingdom-in-cazin/
  139. https://europehouse.ba/en/school-dropout-a-problem-in-need-of-a-systemic-solution-in-bih/
  140. https://www.borgenproject.org/child-poverty-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/
  141. https://unbi.ba/en/
  142. https://www.arisenetwork.eu/en/news-and-events/news/2023/06/15/reducing-inequalities-bosina-and-herzegovina/
  143. https://eeca.unfpa.org/en/publications/child-marriage-bosnia-and-herzegovina-overview
  144. https://eca.unwomen.org/en/where-we-are/bosnia-and-herzegovina/ending-violence-against-women
  145. https://iwpr.net/global-voices/bosnia-drugs-misery
  146. https://www.borgenproject.org/facts-about-poverty-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.