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Bosniaks
Bosniaks
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Key Information

Bosniaks,[note 2] often referred to as Bosnian Muslims, are a South Slavic ethnic group and nation native to Bosnia and Herzegovina.[14] They share a common ancestry, culture, history and the Bosnian language; and traditionally and predominantly adhere to Sunni Islam. The Bosniaks constitute significant native communities in Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Kosovo as well. Largely due to displacement stemming from the Bosnian War and Genocide in the 1990s they also form a significant diaspora with several Bosniak communities across Europe, the Americas and Oceania.

Bosniaks are typically characterized by their historic ties to the Bosnian historical region, adherence to Islam since the 15th and 16th centuries, and the Bosnian language. Bosniaks have also frequently been denoted Bosnian Muslims in the Anglosphere mainly owing to this having been the primary verbiage used in the media coverage of the Bosnian War during the 1990s. However, this term is today considered problematic for several reasons when intended as an ethnic descriptor rather than a religious one.[note 3] Bosniaks may also often simply be referred to as Bosnians, though this term is understood to denote all inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina (regardless of ethnic identity) or apply to citizens of the country.

Etymology

[edit]

According to the Bosniak entry in the Oxford English Dictionary, the first preserved use of "Bosniak" in English was by English diplomat and historian Paul Rycaut in 1680 as Bosnack, cognate with post-classical Latin Bosniacus (1682 or earlier), French Bosniaque (1695 or earlier) or German Bosniak (1737 or earlier).[15] The modern spelling is contained in the 1836 Penny Cyclopaedia V. 231/1: "The inhabitants of Bosnia are composed of Bosniaks, a race of Sclavonian origin".[16] In the Slavic languages, -ak is a common suffix appended to words to create a masculine noun, for instance also found in the ethnonym of Poles (Polak) and Slovaks (Slovák). As such, "Bosniak" is etymologically equivalent to its non-ethnic counterpart "Bosnian" (which entered English around the same time via the Middle French, Bosnien): a native of Bosnia.[17]

From the perspective of Bosniaks, bosanstvo (Bosnianhood) and bošnjaštvo (Bosniakhood) are closely and mutually interconnected, as Bosniaks connect their identity with Bosnia and Herzegovina.[18]

The earliest attestation to a Bosnian ethnonym emerged with the historical term "Bošnjanin" (Latin: Bosniensis) which denoted the people of the medieval Bosnian Kingdom.[19] By the 15th century,[15] the suffix -(n)in had been replaced by -ak to create the current form Bošnjak (Bosniak), first attested in the diplomacy of Bosnian king Tvrtko II who in 1440 dispatched a delegation (Apparatu virisque insignis) to the Polish king of Hungary, Władysław Warneńczyk (1440–1444), asserting a common Slavic ancestry and language between the Bosniak and Pole.[20][21][22] The Miroslav Krleža Lexicographical Institute thus defines Bosniak as "the name for the subjects of the Bosnian rulers in the pre-Ottoman era, subjects of the Sultans during the Ottoman era, and the current name for the most numerous of the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosniak, as well as the older term Bošnjanin (in Lat. Bosnensis), is originally a name defining the inhabitants of the medieval Bosnian state".[23]

Linguists have most commonly proposed the toponym Bosnia to be derived from the eponymous river Bosna; widely believed to be a pre-Slavic hydronym in origin[24][25] and possibly mentioned for the first time during the 1st century AD by Roman historian Marcus Velleius Paterculus as Bathinus flumen.[26]

Linguist Petar Skok expressed an opinion that the chronological transformation of this hydronym from the Roman times to its final Slavicization occurred in the following order; *Bassanus> *Bassenus> *Bassinus> *Bosina> Bosьna> Bosna.[27]

According to the English medievalist William Miller in the work Essays on the Latin Orient (1921), the Slavic settlers in Bosnia "adapted the Latin designation [...] Basante, to their own idiom by calling the stream Bosna and themselves Bosniaks [...]".[28]

History

[edit]

Origins

[edit]

The Early Slavs, a people from northeastern Europe, settled the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (and neighboring regions) after the sixth century (amid the Migration Period), and were composed of small tribal units drawn from a single Slavic confederation known to the Byzantines as the Sclaveni (whilst the related Antes, roughly speaking, colonized the eastern portions of the Balkans).[29][30]

Recent Anglophone scholarship has tended to downplay the role of migrations. For example, Timothy Gregory conjectures that "It is now generally agreed that the people who lived in the Balkans after the Slavic "invasions" were probably, for the most part, the same as those who had lived there earlier, although the creation of new political groups and the arrival of small numbers of immigrants caused people to look at themselves as distinct from their neighbours, including the Byzantines."[31] However, the archaeological evidence paints a picture of widespread depopulation, perhaps a tactical re-settlement of Byzantine populations from provincial hinterlands to Coastal towns after 620 CE.[32]

In former Yugoslav historiography, a second migration of "Serb" and "Croat" tribes (variously placed in the 7th to 9th century) is viewed as that of elites imposing themselves on a more numerous and 'amorphous' Slavic populace,[29][33][34] however such a paradigm needs to be clarified empirically.

Eighth-century sources mention early Slavophone polities, such as the Guduscani in northern Dalmatia, the principality of Slavs in Lower Pannonia, and that of Serbs (Sorabos) who were 'said to hold much of Dalmatia'.[35]

The earliest reference to Bosnia as such is the De Administrando Imperio, written by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus (r. 913–959). At the end of chapter 32 ("Of the Serbs and of the country they now dwell in"), after a detailed political history, Porphyrogenitus asserts that the prince of Serbia has always submitted himself to Rome, in preference to Rome's regional rivals, the Bulgarians. He then gives two lists of kastra oikoumena (inhabited cities), the first being those "en tē baptismenē serbia" (in baptized Serbia; six listed), the second being "εἱς τὸ χορίον Βόσονα, τὸ Κάτερα καί τὸ Δεσνήκ / eis to chorion Bosona, to Katera kai to Desnēk" (in the territory of Bosona, [the cities of] Katera and Desnik).[36]

To Tibor Zivkovic, this suggests that from a tenth-century Byzantine viewpoint, Bosnia was a territory within the principality of Serbia.[37] The implicit distinction made by Porphyrogenitus between "baptised Serbia" and the territory of Bosona is noteworthy.

Subsequently, Bosnia might have been nominally vassal to various rulers from Croatia and Duklja, but by the end of the twelfth century, it came to form an independent unit under an autonomous ruler, Ban Kulin, who called himself Bosnian.[38]

In the 14th century, a Bosnian kingdom centred on the river Bosna emerged. Its people, when not using local (county, regional) names, called themselves Bosnians.[39][40]

Following the conquest of Bosnia by the Ottoman Empire in the mid-15th century, there was a rapid and extensive wave of conversion from Christianity to Islam, and by the early 1600s roughly two-thirds of Bosnians were Muslim.[41][42] In addition, a smaller number of converts from outside Bosnia were in time assimilated into the common Bosniak unit. These included Croats (mainly from Turkish Croatia), the Muslims of Slavonia who fled to Bosnia following the Austro-Turkish war), Serbian and Montenegrin Muhacirs (in Sandžak particularly Islamicized descendants of the Old Herzegovinian and highlander tribes from Brda region, such as Rovčani, Moračani, Drobnjaci and Kuči), and slavicized Vlachs,[43] Albanians[43] and German Saxons.[43]

Bosniaks are generally defined as the South Slavic nation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia whose members identify themselves with Bosnia and Herzegovina as their ethnic state and are part of such a common nation, and of whom a majority are Muslim by religion. Nevertheless, leaders and intellectuals of the Bosniak community may have various perceptions of what it means to be Bosniak. Some may point to an Islamic heritage, while others stress the purely secular and national character of the Bosniak identity and its connection with Bosnian territory and history.[44]

For the duration of Ottoman rule, the multiconfessional community of Bosnia was delineated primarily by faith rather than ethnic or national conceptualisation, and "Bosniak" came to refer to all inhabitants of Bosnia as a territorial designation. When Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, national identification in the modern sense had been a largely foreign concept to Bosnians of both the Christian and Muslim faiths, substantially lagging behind the Romantic nationalism of Europe at the time. In this regard, Christian Bosnians had not described themselves as either Serbs or Croats before the 19th century, particularly before the Austrian occupation, when the current tri-ethnic reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina was configured based on religious affiliation.[45] For the Muslim Bosnians, this process was further delayed not least by the wish to retain local privileges bestowed upon them by the social structure of Ottoman Bosnia.[46]

Arrival of the Slavs

[edit]

The western Balkans had been reconquered from "barbarians" by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian (r. 527–565). Sclaveni (Slavs) raided the western Balkans, including Bosnia, in the 6th century.[47] The De Administrando Imperio (DAI; ca. 960) mentions Bosnia (Βοσωνα/Bosona) as a "small/little land" (or "small country",[48] χοριον Βοσωνα/horion Bosona) part of Byzantium,[48] having been settled by Slavic groups along with the river Bosna, Zahumlje and Travunija (both with territory in modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina); This is the first mention of a Bosnian entity; it was not a national entity, but a geographical one, mentioned strictly as an integral part of Byzantium.[48] Some scholars assert that the inclusion of Bosnia in Serbia merely reflects the status in DAI's time.[49] In the Early Middle Ages, Fine, Jr. believes that what is today western Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of Croatia, while the rest was divided between Croatia and Serbia.[38]

After the death of Serbian ruler Časlav (r. ca. 927–960), Bosnia seems to have broken away from the Serbian state and became politically independent.[50] Bulgaria briefly subjugated Bosnia at the turn of the 10th century, after which it became part of the Byzantine Empire.[50] In the 11th century, Bosnia was part of the Serbian state of Duklja.[50][51]

In 1137, the Kingdom of Hungary annexed most of the Bosnia region, then briefly lost it in 1167 to Byzantium before regaining her in the 1180s. Before 1180 (the reign of Ban Kulin) parts of Bosnia were briefly found in Serb or Croat units.[52] Anto Babić notes that "Bosnia is mentioned on several occasions as a land of equal importance and on the same footing as all other [South Slavic] lands of this area."[53]

Medieval Bosnia

[edit]
Medieval monumental tombstones (Stećci) that lie scattered across Bosnia and Herzegovina are historically associated with the Bosnian Church movement

Christian missions emanating from Rome and Constantinople had since the ninth century pushed into the Balkans and firmly established Catholicism in Croatia, while Orthodoxy came to prevail in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and eventually most of Serbia. Bosnia, lying in between, remained a no-man's land due to its mountainous terrain and poor communications. By the twelfth century, most Bosnians were probably influenced by a nominal form of Catholicism characterized by widespread illiteracy and, not least, lack of knowledge in Latin amongst Bosnian clergymen. Around this period, Bosnian independence from Hungarian overlordship was effected during the reign (1180–1204) of Kulin Ban whose rule marked the start of a religiopolitical controversy involving the native Bosnian Church. The Hungarians, frustrated by Bosnia's assertion of independence, successfully denigrated its patchy Christianity as heresy; in turn rendering a pretext to reassert their authority in Bosnia. Hungarian efforts to gain the loyalty and cooperation of the Bosnians by attempting to establish religious jurisdiction over Bosnia failed however, inciting the Hungarians to persuade the papacy to declare a crusade: finally invading Bosnia and warring there between 1235 and 1241. Experiencing various gradual successes against stubborn Bosnian resistance, the Hungarians eventually withdrew weakened by a Mongol attack on Hungary. On the request of the Hungarians, Bosnia was subordinated to a Hungarian archbishop by the pope, and though rejected by the Bosnians, the Hungarian-appointed bishop was driven out of Bosnia. The Bosnians, rejecting ties with international Catholicism came to consolidate their independent church, known as the Bosnian Church, condemned as heretical by both the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches. Though scholars have traditionally claimed the church to be of a dualist, or neo-Manichaean or Bogomil nature (characterized by the rejection of an omnipotent God, the Trinity, church buildings, the cross, the cult of saints, and religious art), some, such as John Fine, have stressed domestic evidence indicating the retention of basic Catholic theology throughout the Middle Ages.[54] Most scholars agree that adherents of the church referred to themselves by several names; dobri Bošnjani or Bošnjani ("good Bosnians" or simply "Bosnians"), Krstjani (Christians), dobri mužje (good men), dobri ljudi (good people) and boni homines (following the example of a dualist group in Italy). Catholic sources refer to them as patarini (patarenes), while the Serbs called them Babuni (after Babuna Mountain), the Serb term for Bogomils. The Ottomans referred to them as kristianlar while the Orthodox and Catholics were called gebir or kafir, meaning "unbeliever".[55]

The Bosnian state was significantly strengthened under the rule (ca. 1318–1353) of Ban Stephen II of Bosnia who patched up Bosnia's relations with the Hungarian kingdom and expanded the Bosnian state, in turn incorporating Catholic and Orthodox domains to the west and south; the latter following the conquer of Zahumlje (roughly modern-day Herzegovina) from the Serbian Nemanjić dynasty. In the 1340s, Franciscan missions were launched against alleged "heresy" in Bosnia; before this, there had been no Catholics – or at least no Catholic clergy or organization – in Bosnia proper for nearly a century. By the year 1347, Stephen II was the first Bosnian ruler to accept Catholicism, which from then on came to be – at least nominally – the religion of all of Bosnia's medieval rulers, except for possibly Stephen Ostoja of Bosnia (1398–1404, 1409–18) who continued to maintain close relations with the Bosnian Church. The Bosnian nobility would subsequently often undertake nominal oaths to quell "heretical movements" – in reality, however, the Bosnian state was characterized by a religious plurality and tolerance up until the Ottoman invasion of Bosnia in 1463.[56]

By the 1370s, the Banate of Bosnia had evolved into the powerful Kingdom of Bosnia following the coronation of Tvrtko I of Bosnia as the first Bosnian king in 1377, further expanding into neighbouring Serb and Croat dominions. However, even with the emergence of a kingdom, no concrete Bosnian identity emerged; religious plurality, independent-minded nobility, and a rugged, mountainous terrain precluded cultural and political unity. As Noel Malcolm stated: "All that one can sensibly say about the ethnic identity of the Bosnians is this: they were the Slavs who lived in Bosnia."[57]

Ottoman Empire

[edit]

After the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the population was subjected to the process of Islamisation.[58] The mass Islamisation didn't occur in the first years of the conquest, but in the 1480s in central Bosnia, and in other regions even later as the Ottoman administration stabilised.[59] The full intensity of conversions occurred in the 16th century.[60] After that, the numbers of conversions stagnated. The Western reporters of the 16th and the 17th century spoke of the Muslim absolute majority in Bosnia and relative majority in Herzegovina. The slowdown was also due to cessation of only declarative conversion, as the conversions became the full initiation in the Islamic religion, which could last for several months. The reportes from the 17th and the 18th century and the 18th century chronicles, reported only the individual conversions and very seldom the group conversions.[59]

At first, this Islamisation was mostly nominal. In reality, it was an attempt at reconciling the two faiths. It was a lengthy and halting progress towards the final abandoning of their beliefs. For centuries, they were not considered full-fledged Muslims, and they even paid taxes like Christians.[61] This process of Islamisation was not yet finished in the 17th century, as is witnessed by Paul Rycaut in 1670: "But those of this Sect who strangely mix Christianity and Mahometanism [...] The Potures [Muslims] of Bosna are of this Sect, but pay taxes as Christians do; they abhor Images and the sign of the Cross; they circumcise, bringing the Authority of Christ's example for it."[62]

The ethnic recomposition started to occur some time before and simultaneously with the process of Islamisation. The multiethnic structure of the Islamicised Slavic population in Bosnia and Herzegovina is evident from the lingusitic changes as the southeastern dialects of Serbo-Croatian language started to push out the northwestern ones.[58]

Additionally, the Ottoman rule affected the ethnic and religious makeup of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A large number of Bosnian Catholics retreated to the still unconquered Catholic regions of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia, at the time controlled by the Republic of Venice and the Habsburg Monarchy, respectively. To fill up depopulated areas of northern and western Eyalet of Bosnia, the Ottomans encouraged the migration of large numbers of hardy settlers with military skills from Serbia and Herzegovina. Many of these settlers were Vlachs. Most of them were members of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Before the Ottoman conquest, that church had very few members in the Bosnian lands outside Herzegovina and the eastern strip of the Drina valley; there is no definite evidence of any Orthodox church buildings in central, northern, or western Bosnia before 1463. With time most of the Vlach population adopted a Serb identity.[63][64][65]

The majority of the converts adopted Islam through regular conversion process.[66] Generally, historians agree that the Islamization of the Bosnian population was not the result of violent methods of conversion but was, for the most part, peaceful and voluntary.[67] The people subjected to the process were the native Bosnians, as well as the settled Vlachs, a nomadic Eastern Orthodox Christians, mostly ethnic Serbs. The percentage of Vlachs was somewhat lower compared to that of the native Bosnians. However, Srećko Matko Džaja wrote that their share was so high that the thesis on continuity with the medieval Bosnian society is groundless.[66] The literary work of the Bosnian Muslims doesn't contain any tradition of identity with the Bosnian medieval period, which shows the discontinuity of the Bosnian Muslim society with the medieval Bosnian society.[68]

The early converts through the devshirme system in the first decades after the Ottoman conquest were the sons of the Bosnian medieval nobility. However, as the Ottoman frontier moved towards north and west, and after the privileges of the Vlachs were abolished, they too were subjected to the devshirme.[58] The regular converts, however, had much greater share in the total Bosnian Muslim population.[66]

Ottoman records show that on many occasions devshirme practise was voluntary in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, 1603–4 levies from Bosnia and Albania imply that there were attempts of such youths and their families to include themselves amongst those selected. Of the groups sent from Bosnia, unusually, 410 children were Muslims, and only 82 were Christians. This was due to the so-called "special permission" granted in response to the request by Mehmed II, which made Bosnia the only area Muslim boys were taken from. These children were called "poturoğulları" (Bosnian Muslim boys conscripted for the janissary army). They were taken only into service under bostancıbaşı, in the palace gardens.[69]

Slovene observer Benedikt Kuripečič compiled the first reports of the religious communities in the 1530s. According to the records for 1528 and 1529, there were a total of 42,319 Christian and 26,666 Muslim households in the sanjaks (Ottoman administrative units) of Bosnia, Zvornik and Herzegovina. In a 1624 report on Bosnia (excluding Herzegovina) by Peter Masarechi, an early-seventeenth-century apostolic visitor of the Catholic Church to Bosnia, the population figures are given as 450,000 Muslims, 150,000 Catholics and 75,000 Orthodox Christians.[70]

Demographically, the Bosnian Muslims were impacted by epidemics from the mid-17th century, and especially during the 18th century. The Muslim population was more affected than the rest, as they lived densely in towns and villages, unlike the rural Christians. The demographic blow was also caused by the Great Turkish War (1683–1699) and wars on the Persian and Russian fronts in the 18th century. However, these demographic losses were compensated by Muslim refugees during the Great Turkish War, who arrived from Hungary, Syrmia, Slavonia, Croatia and Dalmatia. Some 130,000 Muslims left the mentioned regions to settle in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thanks to these refugees, the Bosnian Muslims remained an absolute majority until the second half of the 18th century.[71]

Estimate on the number of Muslims in the Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina[71]
Year Persons
1724 213,000
1732 198,000
1737 132,000
1789 265,000
1817 200,000

A large influx of Muslim refugees from Serbia arrived to Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1860s, a trend which continued until the 1880s. Serbia completely lost its Muslim population by 1867, while the emigration from southeastern Serbia ended in 1882. These were the result of efforts of the Serbian authorities to remove their Muslim population.[72] Between 1867 and 1868, around 30,000 Muslims moved from Serbia to Bosnia and Herzegovina.[73] These Muslims were descendants of converts from the local Slavic population as well as immigrants from the East and assimilated non-Slavs.[74]

Muslims in the Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina per census
Year Persons  % Total population
1851[75] 402,500 37.34% 1,077,956
1870[76] 722,188 47.82% 1,510,307

During the Ottoman Empire, the Bosnian Muslims didn't express their collective identity toward other Bosnians through Bosniak identity. At the time, the Bosnian population differentiated between the Turks – which included the Muslims in general – and the Christians (hrišćani for the Eastern Orthodox Christians and kršćani for the Catholics), also called the Vlachs. This served as a main differentiation between the Bosnian population at the time.[77]

The Ottoman military reform efforts, that called for further expansion of the centrally controlled army (nizam), new taxes and more Ottoman bureaucracy would have important consequences in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These reforms weakened the special status and privileges of the Bosnian aristocracy, while the formation of a modern army endangered the privileges of the Bosnian Muslim military men and local lords, who demanded greater independence from Constantinople.[78] Barbara Jelavich states: "The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina [...] were becoming increasingly disillusioned with the Ottoman government. The centralizing reforms cut directly into their privileges and seemed to offer no compensating benefits. [...]"[79]

Austria-Hungary

[edit]
Mehmed Kapetanović was the leading proponent of the Bosniak identity

The Austro-Hungarian administration of the joint Finance Minister Béni Kállay promoted the idea of a non-confessional unitary "Bosniak" identity that would encompass all inhabitants (more akin to "Bosnism"), going even as far as prohibiting Bosnian cultural associations from using the terms "Serb" and "Croat" in their names in the 1880s. In 1883, they officially called the vernacular language "Bosnian". The policy placed its hopes mainly with the Catholic community (who were not yet as deeply entrenched in Croat nationalism as the Orthodox were in the Serb one) and the Muslim community (seeking to distance them from the Ottoman Empire). In reality, only a small circle of Muslim notables at the time favoured such a unitary nation. The main proponent of the movement was Mehmed Kapetanović.[80] Although it failed, the Bosniak ideology promoted by the Austrian-Hungarian authorities laid the foundation for the modern Bosniak identity. By emphasising the pre-Ottoman past, it created a founding myth, a theory of the massive conversion of medieval Bogumils to Islam upon the Ottoman conquest, offering a historical continuity and reasoning behind their presence in Europe.[81]

The idea of continuity between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian medieval period thorugh the supposed conversion of the Bosnian Muslim nobility from Bogomilism, was first put forth by Nicholas of Modruš, a papal legate, in the late 15th century. The idea survived in literal circles and was used by the forgeres of the 16th and the 17th century for the need of certain upstart individuals. In the end, the idea was presented to the Bosnian Muslims. The literary work of the Bosnian Mulims doesn't contain any tradition of identity with the Bosnian medieval period, which shows the discontinuity of the Bosnian Muslim society with the medieval Bosnian society.[68]

Stephan Burián von Rajecz became the Finance Minister in 1903, marking a turning point in Austrian-Hungarian national policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. They abandoned the failed Bosniak project and promoted a communitarian identity for the various groups within Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1907, they changed the name of the vernacular language to Serbo-Croatian.[82] The Serbo-Croatian Muslims were referred to as "Mohammedans" until the early 1900s, when the term "Muslims" gained wider acceptance.[83] The term gained official recognition during the 1910 census.[84]

While the communitarisation of the socio-political life of the Eastern Orthodox and the Catholic communities was harmonised with Serb and Croat nationalist sentiment, such a process was absent in the Muslim community. In the Austrian-Hungarian period and after it, the majority of Bosnian Muslims lacked national identity, while those who did often changed it through their lifetime. Historian Robert Donia wrote that "the declarations [of nationality] were mostly tactical and political; some Muslims changed from one camp to the other on several occasions. Simply stated, a separate Muslim identity was too advanced to be easily renounced by any significant number of Bosnian Muslims".[84]

Despite the low school attendance, the Muslim community produced a small portion of intelligentsia. The intelligentsia conflicted with the traditional Muslim elites, urging them to abandon Ottoman nostalgia and accept European modernity.[85] The intellectuals refused a national identity limited to Bosnian Muslims, instead opting to join the two existing camps: the Serbian or the Croatian. The division between the two camps further weakened the Muslim intelligentsia. According to Donia, "more Muslims declared themselves as Croats prior to the turn of the [twentieth] century. They tended to be young intellectuals schooled in Zagreb, Vienna, or elsewhere in the Monarchy. After 1900, more declared themselves Serbs, probably drawn by the magnetic military and political successes of independent Serbia".[86]

The traditional representatives of the Bosnian Muslims were indifferent towards the idea of a national identity or deeply reserved about being included in one. During a parliamentary discussion about the name of the vernacular language, the Bosnian Muslim representative Derviš Bey Miralem stated that:[87]

I am convinced that the large majority of our people is indifferent to the matter, as they feel themselves to be simply Muslims, and for this reason alone, this subject should not be decided by [Muslim] members of parliament whose electors feel no need to think about or decide on this question. My stance, to tell the truth, is that this question must be resolved by the Serbs and Croats...

Illustration of resistance during the siege of Sarajevo in 1878 against the Austro-Hungarian troops.

In 1875, a revolt by Orthodox peasants in Herzegovina sparked a significant geopolitical shift in the Balkans. By 1876, Serbia and Montenegro used the uprising as a pretext to declare war on the Ottoman Empire, with the Russian Empire following suit a year later. The subsequent Ottoman defeat led to the Congress of Berlin in 1878, which reshaped the political landscape of the region. Serbia and Montenegro gained official independence and expanded their territories, while Bulgaria achieved de facto independence, marking a crucial step in the formation of Balkan nation-states.[46]

Bosnia, however, transitioned from one imperial rule to another. Except for the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, the Bosnian Vilayet was placed under Austrian-Hungarian military occupation while formally remaining under Ottoman sovereignty. The Novi Pazar Agreement, signed in 1879 between the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, reaffirmed Ottoman sovereignty in principle while outlining the framework for Austro-Hungarian administration. The agreement also secured certain religious rights for Muslims in the newly designated Province of Bosnia and Herzegovina, allowing them to maintain ties with Ottoman religious authorities, fly Ottoman flags at mosques during religious holidays, and hold khutbas (Friday sermons) in the name of the Sultan.[88]

Austrian-Hungarian troops initially encountered armed resistance from segments of the Muslim population upon entering the province. While Sarajevo fell within a few days, it took three months for Austrian-Hungarian forces to establish full control over Bosnia and Herzegovina. This resistance stemmed largely from Muslim opposition to becoming subjects of a non-Muslim power. However, the secular and religious Muslim elites generally viewed Austro-Hungarian rule as the lesser of two evils and prioritised the protection of their material interests. Consequently, they opposed armed resistance and quickly pledged allegiance to the new imperial authority. Nonetheless, many among them harboured a deep nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire and even secretly hoped for its return.[89]

Bosnian Muslim muhacirs (emigrants) left for the Ottoman Empire as a form of resistance to Austrian-Hungarian rule

Rather than armed revolt, emigration became the primary means through which some Bosnian Muslims expressed their refusal to submit to Austro-Hungarian rule. This emigration continued throughout the Austro-Hungarian period, intensifying during moments of political tension, particularly following the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, which ended the façade of Ottoman sovereignty. Austro-Hungarian records document approximately 65,000 departures to the Ottoman Empire between 1878 and 1914, suggesting that higher estimates of 100,000 to 150,000 emigrants are likely exaggerated.[90]

The issue of emigration sparked the first major doctrinal debate of the post-Ottoman era. Some members of the ulama (Islamic scholars) framed emigration as hijra (religious migration) and, therefore, a religious duty. This interpretation was reinforced by a fatwa issued in 1887 by the Şeyh-ül-Islam of Istanbul, the highest religious authority in the Ottoman Empire. However, several Bosnian ulama rejected this view, arguing that submission to a non-Muslim power was permissible. In 1884, the Mufti of Tuzla, Teufik Azapagić, asserted that Bosnia and Herzegovina had not become part of dar al-kufr (the realm of unbelief) but remained within dar al-Islam (the realm of Islam), as Muslims were still able to practice their religion freely. According to Azapagić, Bosnian Muslims were therefore not obligated to emigrate to Ottoman territory.

Muslim woman from Mostar during Austria-Hungary

During the 20th century, Bosnian Muslims founded several cultural and welfare associations to promote and preserve their cultural identity. The most prominent associations were Gajret, Merhamet, Narodna Uzdanica and later Preporod. The Bosnian Muslim intelligentsia also gathered around the magazine Bosnia in the 1860s to promote the idea of a unified Bosniak nation. This Bosniak group would remain active for several decades, with the continuity of ideas and the use of the Bosniak name. From 1891 until 1910, they published a Latin-script magazine titled Bošnjak (Bosniak), which promoted the concept of Bosniakism (Bošnjaštvo) and openness toward European culture. Since that time the Bosniaks adopted European culture under the broader influence of the Habsburg Monarchy. At the same time they kept the peculiar characteristics of their Bosnian Islamic lifestyle.[91] These initial, but important initiatives were followed by a new magazine named Behar whose founders were Safvet-beg Bašagić (1870–1934), Edhem Mulabdić (1862–1954) and Osman Nuri Hadžić (1869–1937).[92]

Bosniaks formed 31%-50% of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Infantry of the Austro-Hungarian Army.[93] BHI was commended for their bravery in service of the Austrian emperor in WWI, winning more medals than any other unit.[94]

After the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, the Austrian administration of Benjamin Kallay, the Austro-Hungarian governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, officially endorsed "Bosniakhood" as the basis of a multi-confessional Bosnian nation that would include Christians as well as Muslims. The policy attempted to isolate Bosnia and Herzegovina from its neighbours (Orthodox Serbia and Catholic Croatia, but also the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire) and to negate the concepts of Serbian and Croatian nationhood which had already begun to take ground among the country's Orthodox and Catholic communities, respectively.[95][96][97] The notion of Bosnian nationhood was, however, was rejected even by Bosnian Muslims[46] and fiercely opposed by Serb and Croat nationalists who were instead seeking to claim Bosnian Muslims as their own, a move that was rejected by most of them.[98]

After Kallay died in 1903, the official policy slowly drifted towards accepting the three-ethnic reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ultimately, the failure of Austro-Hungarian ambitions to nurture a Bosniak identity amongst the Catholic and Orthodox led to almost exclusively Bosnian Muslims adhering to it, with 'Bosniakhood' consequently adopted as a Bosnian Muslim ethnic ideology by nationalist figures.[99]

In November 1881, upon introducing the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Infantry, the Austro-Hungarian government passed a Military Law (Wehrgesetz) imposing an obligation upon all Bosnian Muslims to serve in the Imperial Army, which led to widespread riots in December 1881 and throughout 1882; the Austrians appealed to the Mufti of Sarajevo, Mustafa Hilmi Hadžiomerović (born 1816) and he soon issued a Fatwa "calling on the Bosniaks to obey military Law."[100] Other important Muslim community leaders such as Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak, later Mayor of Sarajevo, also appealed to young Muslim men to serve in the Habsburg military.

Bosniaks c. 1906, by Rudolf Bruner-Dvořák

In 1903, the Gajret cultural society was established; it promoted Serb identity among the Slavic Muslims of Austria-Hungary (today's Bosnia and Herzegovina)[101] and viewed that the Muslims were Serbs lacking ethnic consciousness.[102] The view that Muslims were Serbs is probably the oldest of three ethnic theories among the Bosnian Muslims themselves.[103] At the outbreak of World War I, Bosnian Muslims were conscripted to serve in the Austro-Hungarian army, some chose to desert rather than fight against fellow Slavs, whilst some Bosniaks attacked Bosnian Serbs in apparent anger after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina imprisoned and extradited approximately 5,500 prominent Serbs, 700–2,200 of whom died in prison. 460 Serbs were sentenced to death and a predominantly Bosniak[104][105][106] special militia known as the Schutzkorps was established and carried out the persecution of Serbs.[107] Neven Anđelić writes One can only guess what kind of feeling was dominant in Bosnia at the time. Both animosity and tolerance existed at the same time.[108]

Yugoslavia

[edit]
Mehmed Spaho was one of the most important members of the Bosnian Muslim community during the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia).

After World War I, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) was formed. In it, Bosnian Muslims alongside Macedonians and Montenegrins were not acknowledged as a distinct ethnic group.[109] However; the first provisional cabinet included a Muslim.[110]

Politically, Bosnia and Herzegovina was split into four banovinas with Muslims being the minority in each.[111] After the Cvetković-Maček Agreement 13 counties of Bosnia and Herzegovina were incorporated into the Banovina of Croatia and 38 counties into the projected Serbian portion of Yugoslavia.[111] In calculating the division, the Muslims were discounted altogether[111] which prompted the Bosnian Muslims to create the Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[112] Moreover, land reforms proclaimed in the February 1919 affected 66.9 per cent of the land in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given that the old landowning was predominantly Bosnian Muslim, the land reforms were resisted. Violence against Muslims and the enforced seizure of their lands shortly ensued. Bosnian Muslims were offered compensation but it was never fully materialized. The regime sought to pay 255,000,000 dinars in compensation per a period of 40 years with an interest rate of 6%. Payments began in 1936 and were expected to be completed in 1975; however, in 1941 World War Two erupted and only 10% of the projected remittances were made.[110]

Until 1968, the Bosnian Muslims were given no official recognition as a distinct ethnicity in the former Yugoslavia.[113][114] In 1968, the Constitution of Yugoslavia was thus amended to introduce a "Muslim nationality" that would define native Slavic Serbo-Croatian speaking Muslims on the territory of the former Yugoslavia; effectively recognizing a constitutive Yugoslav nation alongside Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians. Prior to this, the great majority of Bosnian Muslims had declared either "Ethnically Undecided Muslim" or – to a lesser extent – "Undecided Yugoslav" in Yugoslav censuses as the other available options were "Serb-Muslim" and "Croat-Muslim".[115] Albeit achieving national recognition, the novel use of "Muslim" as an ethnic rather than religious denomination was met with scepticism by leading Bosnian Muslim political figures such as Hamdija Pozderac who remarked "they are not giving us Bosnianhood, they are offering Muslimness. Let us take what they are offering, even if it is the wrong name, but we will open a process".[116]

Bosnian Muslim soldiers of the SS "Handschar" reading a Nazi propaganda book, Islam und Judentum, in Nazi-occupied Southern France (Bundesarchiv, 21 June 1943)

During World War II, Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), and the majority of Bosnian Muslims considered themselves to be ethnic Croats.[117] A large number of the Bosnian Muslim population sided with the Ustaše.[118] Muslims composed approximately 12 per cent of the civil service and armed forces of the Independent State of Croatia.[119] Some of them also participated in Ustaše atrocities, while Bosnian Muslims in Nazi Waffen-SS units were responsible for massacres of Serbs in northwest and eastern Bosnia, most notably in Vlasenica.[120] At this time several massacres against Bosnian Muslims were carried out by Serb and Montenegrin Chetniks.[121][122][123]

Some Bosnian Muslim elite and notables issued resolutions or memorandums in various cities that publicly denounced Nazi collaborationist measures, laws and violence against Serbs: Prijedor (23 September), Sarajevo (the Resolution of Sarajevo Muslims of 12 October), Mostar (21 October), Banja Luka (12 November), Bijeljina (2 December) and Tuzla (11 December). The resolutions condemned the Ustaše in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both for their mistreatment of Muslims and for their attempts at turning Muslims and Serbs against one another.[124] One memorandum declared that since the beginning of the Ustaše regime, that Muslims dreaded the lawless activities that some Ustaše, some Croatian government authorities, and various illegal groups perpetrated against the Serbs.[125]

It is estimated that 75,000 Muslims died in the war,[126] although the number may have been as high as 86,000 or 6.8 per cent of their pre-war population.[127] Several Muslims joined the Yugoslav Partisan forces, "making it a truly multi-ethnic force".[108] In the entirety of the war, the Yugoslav Partisans of Bosnia and Herzegovina were 23 per cent Muslim.[128] Even so, Serb-dominated Yugoslav Partisans would often enter Bosnian Muslim villages, killing Bosnian Muslim intellectuals and other potential opponents.[129] In February 1943, the Germans approved the 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Croatian) and began recruitment.[130]

In the 1948 census, Bosnia and Herzegovina's Muslims had three options in the census: "Serb-Muslim", "Croat-Muslim", and "ethnically undeclared Muslim".[131] In the 1953 census the category "Yugoslav, ethnically undeclared" was introduced and the overwhelming majority of those who declared themselves as such were Muslims.[131] Aleksandar Ranković and other Serb communist members opposed the recognition of Bosnian Muslim nationality.[132][133][134] Muslim members of the communist party continued in their efforts to get Tito to support their position for recognition.[132] The Bosnian Muslims were recognized as an ethnic group in 1961 but not as a nationality and in 1964 the Fourth Congress of the Bosnian Party assured the Bosnian Muslims the right to self-determination.[131] On that occasion, one of the leading communist leaders, Rodoljub Čolaković, stated that "our Muslim brothers" were equal with Serbs and Croats and that they would not be "forced to declare themselves as Serbs and Croats." He guaranteed them "full freedom in their national determination"[135] Following the downfall of Ranković, Tito changed his view and stated that recognition of Muslims and their national identity should occur.[132] In 1968 the move was protested in the Serb republic and by Serb nationalists such as Dobrica Ćosić.[132] In 1971, the Muslims were fully recognized as a nationality and in the census the option "Muslims by nationality" was added.[131]

Muslims in SFR Yugoslavia
Republic 1971 1981 1991
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1,482,430 (39.6%) 1,630,033 (39.5%) 1,902,956 (43.5%)
Serbia 154,364 (1.8%) 215,166 (2.3%) 246,411 (2.5%)
Montenegro 70,236 (13.3%) 78,080 (13.4%) 89,614 (14.6%)
Croatia 18,457 (0.4%) 23,740 (0.5%) 43,469 (0.9%)
Macedonia 1,248 (0.1%) 39,512 (2.1%) 35,256 (1.7%)
Slovenia 3,197 (0.2%) 13,425 (0.7%) 26,867 (1.4%)
Yugoslavia 1,729,932 (8.4%) 1,999,957 (8.9%) 2,344,573 (10.0%)

Bosnian War

[edit]
The Sarajevo Red Line, a memorial event of the siege of Sarajevo's 20th anniversary. 11,541 empty chairs symbolized 11,541 victims of the war which, according to Research and Documentation Center were killed during the siege of Sarajevo.[136][137]
Gravestones at the Potočari genocide memorial near Srebrenica. Around 8,000+ Bosniak men and boys were killed by the units of the Army of the Republika Srpska during the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995.

During the war, the Bosniaks were subject to ethnic cleansing and genocide. The war caused hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks to flee the nation. The war also caused many drastic demographic changes in Bosnia. Bosniaks were prevalent throughout almost all of Bosnia in 1991, a year before the war officially broke out. As a result of the war, Bosniaks in Bosnia were concentrated mostly in areas that were held by the Bosnian government during the war for independence. Today Bosniaks make up the absolute majority in Sarajevo and its canton, most of northwestern Bosnia around Bihać, as well as central Bosnia, Brčko District, Goražde, Podrinje and parts of Herzegovina.[citation needed]

At the outset of the Bosnian war, forces of the Army of Republika Srpska attacked the Bosnian Muslim civilian population in eastern Bosnia. Once towns and villages were securely in their hands, the Bosnian Serb forces – military, police, the paramilitaries and, sometimes, even Bosnian Serb villagers – applied the same pattern: houses and apartments were systematically ransacked or burnt down, civilians were rounded up or captured, and sometimes beaten or killed in the process. Men and women were separated, with many of the men massacred or detained in the camps. The women were kept in various detention centres where they had to live in intolerably unhygienic conditions, where they were mistreated in many ways including being raped repeatedly. Bosnian Serb soldiers or policemen would come to these detention centres, select one or more women, take them out and rape them.[138][139][better source needed]

The Bosnian Serbs had the upper hand due to heavier weaponry (despite less manpower) that was given to them by the Yugoslav People's Army and established control over most areas where Serbs had a relative majority but also in areas where they were a significant minority in both rural and urban regions excluding the larger towns of Sarajevo and Mostar. Bosnian Serb military and political leadership received the most accusations of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) many of which have been confirmed after the war in ICTY trials.

Most of the capital Sarajevo was predominantly held by the Bosniaks. In the 44 months of the siege, terror against Sarajevo residents varied in intensity, but the purpose remained the same: inflict suffering on civilians to force the Bosnian authorities to accept Bosnian Serb demands.[140] Bosniaks accounted for roughly half of all deaths which took place during the Yugoslav Wars (approximately 65,000 of 130,000 total fatalities).[141]

Modern identity

[edit]
The Bosniak Institute located in the city of Sarajevo.

By the early 1990s, a vast majority of Bosnian Muslims identified as ethnic Muslims. According to a poll from 1990, only 1.8% of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina supported the idea of a "Bosniak" national identity (by then already an essentially archaic term), while 17% considered the name to encompass all of the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their main political party, the Party of Democratic Action, rejected the idea of Bosniak identity and managed to expel those who promoted it. The supporters of the Bosniak nationhood established their political party, the Muslim Bosniak Organisation, and received only 1.1% of the votes during the 1990 general election.[142] At the 1991 census, 1,496 people identified as Muslims-Bosniaks, 1,285 as Bosniaks and 876 as Bosniaks-Muslims, totalling to 3,657 or 0.08% of the total population.[143]

On 27 September 1993, however, after the leading political, cultural, and religious representatives of Bosnian Muslims held an assembly and at the same time when they rejected the Owen–Stoltenberg peace plan adopted the Bosniak name deciding to "return to our people their historical and national name of Bosniaks, to tie ourselves in this way for our country of Bosnia and its state-legal tradition, for our Bosnian language and all spiritual tradition of our history". The main reason for the SDA to adopt the Bosniak identity, only three years after expelling the supporters of the idea from their party ranks, was due to foreign policy considerations. One of the leading SDA figures Džemaludin Latić, the editor of the official gazette of the party, commented on the decision stating that: "In Europe, he who doesn't have a national name, doesn't have a country" and that "we must be Bosniaks, that what we are, to survive in our country". The decision to adopt the Bosniak identity was primarily influenced by the change of opinion of the former communist intellectuals such as Atif Purivatra, Alija Isaković and those who were a part of the pan-Islamists such as Rusmir Mahmutćehajić (who was a staunch opponent of Bosniak identity), all of whom saw the changing of the name to Bosniak as a way to connect the Bosnian Muslims to the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[144]

In other ex-Yugoslav countries with significant Slavic Muslim populations, adoption of the Bosniak name has been less consistent. The effects of this phenomenon are most evident in the censuses. For instance, the 2003 Montenegrin census recorded 48,184 people who registered as Bosniaks and 28,714 who registered as Muslim by nationality. Although Montenegro's Slavic Muslims form one ethnic community with a shared culture and history, this community is divided on whether to register as Bosniaks (i.e. adopt Bosniak national identity) or as Muslims by nationality.[145] Similarly, the 2002 Slovenian census recorded 8,062 people who registered as Bosnians, presumably highlighting (in large part) the decision of many secular Bosniaks to primarily identify themselves in that way (a situation somewhat comparable to the "Yugoslav" option during the socialist period). However, such people comprise a minority (even in countries such as Montenegro where it is a significant political issue) while the great majority of Slavic Muslims in the former Yugoslavia have adopted the Bosniak national name.

September 28 is marked as Bosniaks' Day, which commemorates the anniversary of the 2nd Bosniak Assembly of 1993, when the national name "Bosniak" was reinstated.[146]

Relation to Bosnian nationalism

[edit]

National consciousness developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina among the three ethnic groups in the 19th century, with emergent national identities being influenced by the millet system in place in Ottoman society (where 'religion and nationality were closely intertwined and often synonyms'). During Ottoman rule, there was a clear distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. There were different tax categories and clothes, but only in the late 18th- and early 19th century "the differentiations develop into ethnic and national forms of identification", according to Soeren Keil. The bordering countries of Serbia and Croatia consequently laid claim to Bosnia and Herzegovina; a combination of religion, ethnic identity and the territorial claim was the basis for the three distinct nations.[147]

Expressions of a Bosnian identity that transcended confessional boundaries were uncommon. Among Muslim ayans and certain Franciscan priests, a strong sense of Bosnian identity primarily reflected regional affiliation while maintaining a clear confessional dimension. For Christians, this regional sentiment coexisted with Serbian or Croatian national identification. For Muslims, it was tied to the protection of local privileges but did not challenge their allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. In this context, their use of the term "Bosniak" to denote regional origin lacked national significance. By the time the Ottoman period in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended in 1878, the concept of national identification remained largely absent among Bosnian Muslims.[46]

Franciscan Ivan Franjo Jukić viewed Bosnians as exclusively Catholics and Eastern Orthodox Christians, while he regarded Muslims as Turks.[148] He maintained that Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats were among the "tribes" that formed the broader "Illyrian nation."[149] Sometimes the term Turčin (Turk) was commonly used to describe the Bosnian and other Slavic Muslims, designating religious, and not ethnic belonging. The Italian diplomat M. A. Pigafetta, wrote in 1585 that Bosnian Christian converts to Islam refused to be identified as "Turks", but as "Muslims".[150]

Klement Božić, an interpreter at the Prussian consulate in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 19th century, noted that Bosnian Christians referred to their Muslim fellow countrymen as "Turks" and Muslims from other places as "Ottomans," and that Bosnian Muslims would not call an Ottoman a Turk or consider him a brother. He also mentioned the mutual dislike between Bosnian Muslims and Ottomans.[151] In 1829, geographer Conrad Malte-Brun wrote that Muslims in Constantinople commonly used the term "infidel" to describe Bosnian Muslims and believed Bosnians, descended from northern warriors, were barbaric due to their isolation from European enlightenment.[152] In 1842, Croatian writer Matija Mažuranić observed that in Bosnia, Christians did not call themselves Bosniaks, while Muslims did and considered Christians as serfs. Muslim city dwellers, craftsmen, and artisans, who were free and tax-exempt, also identified as Bosniaks and spoke Bosniak language."[153]

Before that, it was Franciscan Filip Lastrić (1700–1783) who first wrote on the commonality of the citizens in the Bosnian eyalet, regardless of their religion. In his work Epitome vetustatum provinciae Bosniensis (1765), he claimed that all inhabitants of the Bosnian province (eyalet) constituted "one people" of the same descent.[154][155]

Relation to Croat and Serb nationalism

[edit]

As a melting ground for confrontations between different religions, national mythologies, and concepts of statehood, much of the historiography of Bosnia and Herzegovina has since the 19th century been the subject of competing Serb and Croat nationalist claims part of wider Serbian and Croatian hegemonic aspirations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, inherently interwoven into the complex nature of the Bosnian War at the end of the 20th century.[156] As Andras Riedlmayer 's research for the Hague Tribunal demonstrates: "What happened in Bosnia is not just genocide, the willful destruction of the essential foundations of one particular community or group of people within a society" "[....]" "What happened in Bosnia is also described as sociocide, the murdering of a progressive, complex, and enlightened society so that a regressive, simple, and bigoted society could replace it."[157]

Social anthropologist Tone Bringa develops that "Neither Bosniak, nor Croat, nor Serb identities can be fully understood with reference only to Islam or Christianity respectively, but have to be considered in a specific Bosnian context that has resulted in a shared history and locality among Bosnians of Islamic as well as Christian backgrounds."[158]

According to Mitja Velikonja, Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes "a historical entity which has its own identity and its own history".[159] Robert Donia claims that as Serbia and Croatia only occupied parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina briefly in the Middle Ages, neither have any serious historical claims to Bosnia.[160] Moreover, Donia states that although Bosnia did interact with its Serb and Croat neighbours over the centuries, it had a very different history and culture from them.[161] 12th-century Byzantine historian John Kinnamos reported that Bosnia was not subordinated to the Grand Count of Serbia; rather the Bosnians "had their distinct way of life and government".[162] The expert on medieval Balkan history John V.A. Fine reports that the Bosnians (Bošnjani) have been a distinct people since at least the 10th century.[39]

It is noted that writers on nationalism in Yugoslavia or the Bosnian War tend to ignore or overlook the Bosnian Muslim ideology and activity and see them as victims of other nationalisms and not nationalistic themselves.[163]

Genetics

[edit]
Genetic structure of Bosnians within European context according to three genetic systems: Autosomal DNA (A), Y-DNA (B) and mtDNA (C) per Kushniarevich et al. (2015)

According to 2013 autosomal IBD survey "of recent genealogical ancestry over the past 3,000 years at a continental scale", the speakers of Serbo-Croatian language share a very high number of common ancestors dating to the migration period approximately 1,500 years ago with Poland and Romania-Bulgaria cluster among others in Eastern Europe. It is concluded to be caused by the Hunnic and Slavic expansion, which was a "relatively small population that expanded over a large geographic area", particularly "the expansion of the Slavic populations into regions of low population density beginning in the sixth century" and that it is "highly coincident with the modern distribution of Slavic languages".[164] The 2015 IBD analysis found that the South Slavs have lower proximity to Greeks than with East Slavs and West Slavs, and "even patterns of IBD sharing among East-West Slavs–'inter-Slavic' populations (Hungarians, Romanians and Gagauz)–and South Slavs, i.e. across an area of assumed historic movements of people including Slavs". The slight peak of shared IBD segments between South and East-West Slavs suggests a shared "Slavonic-time ancestry".[165]

An autosomal analysis study of 90 samples showed that Western Balkan populations had a genetic uniformity, intermediate between South Europe and Eastern Europe, in line with their geographic location. According to the same study, Bosnians (together with Croatians) are by autosomal DNA closest to East European populations and overlap mostly with Hungarians.[166] In the 2015 analysis, Bosnians formed a western South Slavic cluster with the Croatians and Slovenians in comparison to an eastern cluster formed by Macedonians and Bulgarians with Serbians in the middle. The western cluster (Bosnians included) inclines Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks, while the eastern cluster toward Romanians and some extent Greeks.[165] Based on analysis of IBD sharing, Middle Eastern populations most likely did not contribute to genetics in Islamicized populations in the Western Balkans, including Bosniaks, as these share similar patterns with neighbouring Christian populations.[166]

Y-DNA studies on Bosniaks (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) show close affinity to other neighbouring South Slavs.[167] Y-DNA results show notable frequencies of I2 with 43.50% (especially its subclade I2-CTS10228+), R1a with 15.30% (mostly its two subclades R1a-CTS1211+ and R1a-M458+), E-V13 with 12.90% and J-M410 with 8.70%. Y-DNA studies done for the majority Bosniak populated cities of Zenica and Tuzla Canton, shows however a drastic increase of the two major haplogroups I2 and R1a. Haplogroup I2 scores 52.20% in Zenica (Peričić et al., 2005) and 47% in Tuzla Canton (Dogan et al., 2016), while R1a increases up to 24.60% and 23% in respective region.[168][169] Haplogroup I2a-CTS10228, which is the most common haplogroup among Bosniaks and other neighbouring South Slavic populations, was found in one archeogenetic sample (Sungir 6) (~900 YBP) near Vladimir, western Russia which belonged to the I-CTS10228>S17250>Y5596>Z16971>Y5595>A16681 subclade.[170][171] It was also found in skeletal remains with artifacts, indicating leaders, of Hungarian conquerors of the Carpathian Basin from the 9th century, part of Western Eurasian-Slavic component of the Hungarians.[172] According to Fóthi et al. (2020), the distribution of ancestral subclades like of I-CTS10228 among contemporary carriers indicates a rapid expansion from Southeastern Poland, is mainly related to the Slavs, and the "largest demographic explosion occurred in the Balkans".[172] Principal component analysis of Y-chromosomal haplogroup frequencies among the three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, showed that Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks are by Y-DNA closer to each other than either of them is to Bosnian Croats.[173]

In addition, mtDNA studies show that the Bosnian population partly share similarities with other Southern European populations (especially with mtDNA haplogroups such as pre-HV (today known as mtDNA haplogroup R0), HV2 and U1), but are for the mostly featured by a huge combination of mtDNA subclusters that indicates a consanguinity with Central and Eastern Europeans, such as modern German, West Slavic, East Slavic and Finno-Ugric populations. There is especially the observed similarity between Bosnian, Russian and Finnish samples (with mtDNA subclusters such as U5b1, Z, H-16354, H-16263, U5b-16192-16311 and U5a-16114A). The huge differentiation between Bosnian and Slovene samples of mtDNA subclusters that are also observed in Central and Eastern Europe, may suggests a broader genetic heterogeneity among the Slavs that settled the Western Balkans during the early Middle Ages.[174] The 2019 study of ethnic groups of Tuzla Canton of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) found "close gene similarity among maternal gene pools of the ethnic groups of Tuzla Canton", which is "suggesting similar effects of the paternal and maternal gene flows on genetic structure of the three main ethnic groups of modern Bosnia and Herzegovina".[175]

A 2023 archaeogenetic study published in Cell, confirmed that the spread of Slavic language in Southeastern Europe was because of large movements of people with specific Eastern European ancestry, and that more than half of the ancestry of most peoples in the Balkans today originates from the medieval Slavic migrations, with around 67% in Croats, 58% in Serbs, 55% in Romanians, 51% in Bulgarians, 40% in Greek Macedonians, 31% in Albanians and 30% in Peloponnesian Greeks.[176][177]

Language

[edit]
The Nauk karstianski za narod slovinski (Christian doctrine for the Slavic people), written by Matija Divković, is regarded as the first Bosnian language printed book, published in Venice in 1611
A Bosnian grammar from 1890 written by the unsigned author Frano Vuletić.
Bosnian language dictionary Magbuli 'arif or Potur Šahidija, written by Muhamed Hevaji Uskufi Bosnevi in 1631 using a Bosnian variant of the Perso-Arabic script.

Most Bosniaks speak the Bosnian language, a South Slavic language of the Western South Slavic subgroup. Standard Bosnian is considered a variety of Serbo-Croatian, as mutually intelligible with the Croatian and Serbian languages which are all based on the Shtokavian dialect.[178][179] As result, paraphrases such as Serbo-Croat-Bosnian (SCB) or Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (BCS) tend to be used in English on occasion.

At the vernacular level, Bosniaks are more linguistically homogeneous than Serbs or Croats who also speak non-standard dialects besides Shtokavian. Concerning lexicon, Bosnian is characterised by its larger number of Ottoman Turkish (as well as Arabic and Persian) loanwords (called Orientalisms) compared to the other Serbo-Croatian varieties.

The first official dictionary in the Bosnian language was published in 1992.[180] Church Slavonic is attested since at least the Kingdom of Bosnia; the Charter of Ban Kulin, written in Cyrillic, remains one of the oldest written South Slavic state documents.

The modern Bosnian language principally uses the Latin alphabet. However, Cyrillic (popularly termed Bosnian Cyrillic or Bosančica) was employed much earlier, as evident in medieval charters and on monumental tombstones (stećci) found scattered throughout the landscape. One of the most important documents is the Charter of Ban Kulin, which is regarded by Bosnian authors as one of the oldest official recorded documents to be written in Bosnian Cyrillic.[181][182] The use of Cyrillic was largely replaced by Arebica (Matufovica), a Bosnian variant of the Perso-Arabic script, upon the introduction of Islam in the 15th century, first among the elite, then amongst the public, and was commonly used up until the 19th century.[183]

Culture

[edit]

Folklore

[edit]
Buna river, near the town of Blagaj in southern Herzegovina. Blagaj is situated at the spring of the Buna river and a historical tekke (tekija or Dervish monastery). The Blagaj Tekija was built around 1520, with elements of Ottoman architecture and Mediterranean style[184][185] and is considered a national monument.
Gazi Husrev-begova medresa or Kuršumli medresa, madrasa founded in 1537 in honor to Gazi Husrev Bey's mother Seldžuklija, in the old part of Sarajevo.

There are many signs of pagan practices being carried over first into Christianity and later into Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina – for example, the use of the mountain tops as a place of worship, and the name of pagan gods, such as Perun and Thor, that survived in oral tradition until the twentieth century.[186] Slavic traditions such as dragons, fairies and Vila, are also present. Fairies are often mentioned in Bosniak epics, poetry and folk songs. Well known are "gorske vile", or fairies from the mountains which dance on very green meadows. The cult of post-pagan Perun survived as the day of Elijah the Thunderer which was another important event for Bosnian Muslims. Muhamed Hadžijahić mentions: "In Muslim celebration of this holiday, we see traces of ancient pagan traditions related to the cult of sun and rain." This tradition is among Bosnian Muslims known as Aliđun and among the Serbs as Ilijevdan. Pre-Slavic influences are far less common but present. Certain elements of paleo-Balkan beliefs have also been found.[187] One of these traditions which could originate from the pre-Slavic era, is a Bosniak tradition of placing a horse's skull tied with a rope into river Bosna, to fight off drought.[188] Djevojačka pećina, or the Maiden's Cave, is a traditional place of the 'Rain Prayer' near Kladanj in north-eastern Bosnia, where Bosnian Muslims gather to pray for the soul of the maiden whose grave is said to be at the entrance to the cave. This tradition is of pre-Islamic origin and is a place where the followers of the medieval Bosnian Church held their pilgrimage. Another Bosnian Muslim place of pilgrimage is Ajvatovica near Prusac in central Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the largest Islamic traditional, religious and cultural event in Europe, and is a place where devout Bosnian Muslims remember and give thanks to the founder of the holy site, Ajvaz-dedo, whose forty-day prayers were heard by Allah and much-needed water came out of a rock that had split open in a miraculous act. Even though the pilgrimage at Ajvatovica is a marking of the sixteenth-century conversion to Islam in Bosnia,[189]

National heroes are typically historical figures, whose lives and skills in battle are emphasized. These include figures such as Ban Kulin, the founder of medieval Bosnia who has come to acquire a legendary status. The historian William Miller wrote in 1921 that "even today, the people regard him as a favourite of the fairies, and his reign as a golden age.";[190]

Traditions and customs

[edit]
Bosniak girls dancing a traditional kolo dance

The nation takes pride in the native melancholic folk songs sevdalinka, the precious medieval filigree manufactured by old Sarajevo craftsmen, and a wide array of traditional wisdom transmitted to newer generations by word of mouth, but in recent years written down in several books. Another prevalent tradition is "Muštuluk", whereby a gift is owed to any bringer of good news.[191]

Rural folk traditions in Bosnia include the shouted, polyphonic ganga and ravne pjesme (flat song) styles, as well as instruments like a wooden flute and šargija. The gusle, an instrument found throughout the Balkans, is also used to accompany ancient South Slavic epic poems. The most versatile and skilful gusle-performer of Bosniak ethnicity was the Montenegrin Bosniak Avdo Međedović (1875–1953).

Bosniaks in traditional costumes

Probably the most distinctive and identifiably Bosniak music, Sevdalinka is a kind of emotional, melancholic folk song that often describes sad subjects such as love and loss, the death of a dear person or heartbreak. Sevdalinkas were traditionally performed with a saz, a Turkish string instrument, which was later replaced by the accordion. However, the more modern arrangement, to the derision of some purists, is typically a vocalist accompanied by the accordion along with snare drums, upright bass, guitars, clarinets and violins. Sevdalinkas are unique to Bosnia and Herzegovina. They arose in Ottoman Bosnia as urban Bosnian music with often oriental influences. In the early 19th century, Bosniak poet Umihana Čuvidina contributed greatly to sevdalinka with her poems about her lost love, which she sang. The poets which in large has contributed to the rich heritage of the Bosniak people include among others Derviš-paša Bajezidagić, Abdullah Bosnevi, Hasan Kafi Pruščak, Abdurrahman Sirri, Abdulvehab Ilhamija, Mula Mustafa Bašeskija, Hasan Kaimija, Ivan Franjo Jukić, Safvet-beg Bašagić, Musa Ćazim Ćatić, Mak Dizdar, as many prominent prose writers, such as Enver Čolaković, Skender Kulenović, Abdulah Sidran, Nedžad Ibrišimović, Zaim Topčić and Zlatko Topčić. Historical journals such as Gajret, Behar and Bošnjak are some of the most prominent publications, which in a big way contributed to the preservation of the Bosniak identity in the late 19th and early 20th century. The Bosnian literature is generally known for their ballads; The Mourning Song of the Noble Wife of the Hasan Aga[192] (or better known as Hasanaginica), Smrt Omera i Merime (Omer and Merimas death) and Smrt braće Morića (The death of brothers Morić). Hasanaginica were told from generation to generation in oral form, until it was finally written and published in 1774 by an Italian anthropologist Alberto Fortis, in his book Viaggio in Dalmazia ("Journey to Dalmatia").[193]

Religion

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Gazi Husrev-beg Mosque in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) are traditionally[13][194][195] and predominantly Sunni Muslim.[196] Historically, Sufism has also played a significant role among the Bosnian Muslims who tended to favour more mainstream Sunni orders such as the Naqshbandiyya, Rifa'i and Qadiriyya. There are also Bosniaks who can be categorized as Nondenominational Muslims and Cultural Muslims.[197] The Bosnian Islamic community has also been influenced by other currents within Islam than the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina prevailing Hanafi school, especially since the 1990s war.[198] The position of Sufism in Bosnia during the Ottoman era was legally the same as in other parts of the empire. Bosnian Sufis produced literature, often in oriental languages (Arabic and Turkish), although a few also wrote in Serbo-Croatian,[199] such as Abdurrahman Sirri (1785–1846/47) and Abdulwahāb Žepčewī (1773–1821). Another Sufi from Bosnia was Sheikh Hamza Bali, whose doctrines were considered to contradict the official interpretation of Islam. His supporters hamzevije formed a religious movement that is often described as a sect closely related to the tariqa of bajrami-melami.[200][201] Another prominent Bosniak Sufi was Hasan Kafi Pruščak, a Sufi thinker and the most prominent figure of the scientific literature and intellectual life of the 16th century Bosniaks.

In a 1998 public opinion poll, 78.3% of Bosniaks in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared themselves to be religious.[202] Bosnian Muslims tend to often be described as moderate, secular and European-oriented compared to other Muslim groups.[203] Bosniaks have been described as "Cultural Muslims"[204] or "Progressive Muslims".[205]

Gazi Husrev-beg mosque constructed in 1532 by the sanjak-bey of Bosnia Gazi Husrev-beg, located in Sarajevo.

Kjell Magnusson points out that religion played a major role in the processes that shaped the national movements and the formation of the new states in the Balkans after the Ottoman retreat, since the Ottomans distinguished peoples after their religious affiliations.[206] Although religion only plays a minor role in the daily lives of the ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina today, the following stereotypes are still rather current, namely, that the Serbs are Orthodox, the Croats Catholic and the Bosniaks Muslim; those native Bosnians who remained Christian and did not convert to Islam over time came to identify as ethnic Serb or Croat, helping to explain the apparent ethnic mix in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Still, however, there are a few individuals who violate the aforementioned pattern and practice other religions actively, often due to intermarriage.[207]

Surnames and given names

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There are some Bosniak surnames of foreign origin, indicating that the founder of the family came from a place outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many such Bosniak surnames have Albanian, Vlach, Turkic or Arab origins. Examples of such surnames include Arnautović (from Arnaut - Turkish ethnonym used to denote Albanians), Vlasić (from Vlach people), Tatarević (from Tatar people) and Arapović (from Arap - Turkish ethnonym used to denote Arabs). There are also some surnames which are presumed to be of pre-Slavic origin. Some examples of such surnames may be of Illyrian or Celtic origin, such as the surname Mataruga and Motoruga.[208]

Given names or first names among Bosniaks have mostly Arabic, Persian or Turkish roots such as Osman, Mehmed, Muhamed, Mirza, Alija, Ismet, Kemal, Hasan, Ibrahim, Irfan, Mustafa, Ahmed, Husein, Hamza, Haris, Halid, Refik, Tarik, Faruk, Abdulah, Amer, Sulejman, Mahir, Enver, and many others. South Slavic given names such as "Zlatan" or "Zlatko" are also present primarily among non-religious Bosniaks. What is notable however is that due to the structure of the Bosnian language, many of the Muslim given names have been altered to create uniquely Bosniak given names. Some of the Oriental given names have been shortened. For example: Huso is short for Husein, Ahmo is short for Ahmed, and Meho is short for Mehmed. One example of this is that of the Bosniak humorous characters Mujo and Suljo, whose given names are Bosniak short forms of Mustafa and Sulejman. More present still is the transformation of given names that in Arabic or Turkish are confined to one gender to apply to the other sex. In Bosnian, simply taking away the letter "a" changes the traditionally feminine "Jasmina" into the popular male name "Jasmin". Similarly, adding an "a" to the typically male "Mahir" results in the feminine "Mahira".[209]

Symbols

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The coat of arms of the Kotromanić dynasty on a 14th-century reverse – with the fleur-de-lis, which is today used as a Bosniak national symbol and was formerly featured on the flag of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The traditional symbol of the Bosniak people is a fleur-de-lis coat of arms, decorated with six golden lilies, also referred to Lilium bosniacum, a native lily of the region.[210] This Bosniak national symbol is derived from the coat of arms of the medieval Kingdom of Bosnia and was particularly used in the context of the rule of the Bosnian King Tvrtko I of Bosnia. According to some sources, the Bosnian coat of arms, with six golden lilies, originated from the French descended Capetian House of Anjou.[211] The member of this dynasty, Louis I of Hungary, was married to Elizabeth of Bosnia, daughter of the ban Stephen II of Bosnia, with Tvrtko I consequently embracing the heraldic lily as a symbol of the Bosnian royalty in token of the familial relations between the Angevins and the Bosnian royal family. It is also likely that the Bosnians adopted, or were granted, the fleur-de-lis on their coat of arms as a reward for taking the Angevin side.

This emblem was revived in 1992 as a symbol of Bosnian nationhood and represented the flag of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1998. Although the state insignia was replaced in 1999 at the request of the other two ethnic groups, the flag of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina still features a fleur-de-lis alongside the Croatian chequy. The Bosnian fleur-de-lis also appears on the flags and arms of many cantons, municipalities, cities and towns. It is still used as official insignia of the Bosniak regiment of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[212] The Fleur-de-lis can also be commonly found as ornament in mosques and on Muslim tombstones. Swedish historian Senimir Resić states that the emblem of the fleur-de-lis (symbolizing the Christian Middle Ages) which became a national symbol of Bosniaks in 1992, was, in that time of war and Islamophobia, intended to draw attention to the Western world of the Christian and medieval European past of the Bosnian Muslims.[213]

Another Bosniak flag dates from the Ottoman era and is a white crescent moon and star on a green background. The flag was also the symbol of the short-lived independent Bosnia in the 19th century and of the Bosnian uprising against the Turks led by Husein Gradaščević.

Geographical distribution

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Diaspora

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World map of the Bosnian diaspora (including Bosniaks).
  Bosnia and Herzegovina
  + 100,000
  + 10,000
  + 1,000

There is a significant Bosniak diaspora in Europe, Turkey as well as in North America in such countries as the United States and Canada.

  • Turkey: The community in Turkey has its origins predominantly in the exodus of Muslims from the Bosnia Eyalet taking place in the 19th and early 20th century as result of the collapse of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. According to estimates commissioned in 2008 by the National Security Council of Turkey as many as 2 million Turkish citizens are of Bosniak ancestry.[214] Bosniaks mostly live in the Marmara Region, in the north-west. The biggest Bosniak community in Turkey is in Istanbul; the borough Yenibosna (formerly Saraybosna, after Sarajevo), saw rapid migration from the Ottoman Balkans after the founding of the Republic of Turkey.[citation needed] There are notable Bosniak communities in İzmir, Karamürsel, Yalova, Bursa and Edirne.
  • United States: The first Bosnian arrivals came around the 1860s. According to a 2000 estimate, there are some 350,000 Americans of Bosnian ancestry.[3] Bosniaks were early leaders in the establishment of Chicago's Muslim community. In 1906, they established Džemijetul Hajrije (The Benevolent Society) of Illinois to preserve the community's religious and national traditions as well as to provide mutual assistance for funerals and illness. The organization established chapters in Gary, Indiana, in 1913, and Butte, Montana, in 1916, and is the oldest existing Muslim organization in the United States. There are numerous Bosniak cultural, sports and religious associations. Bosnian-language newspapers and other periodicals are published in many states; the largest in the United States is the St. Louis-based newspaper "Sabah". At the peak of the Bosnian presence in St. Louis 70,000 Bosnians lived in the city.[215]
  • Canada: According to the 2001 census, 25,665 people claimed Bosnian ancestry.[216] A large majority of Bosnian Canadians emigrated to Canada during and after the Bosnian War, although Bosnian migration dates back to the 19th century.[216] Traditional centres of residence and culture for people from Bosnia and Herzegovina are in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. Numerous Bosniak cultural, sports and religious associations, Bosnian-language newspapers and other periodicals are published in many states. The largest Bosnian organisation in Canada is the Congress of North American Bosniaks.[217]

Historiography

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See also

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Notes

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References

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Sources

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Books

Journals

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Bosniaks are a South Slavic ethnic group primarily native to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they comprise approximately 50 percent of the population, distinguished by their predominant adherence to Sunni Islam and use of the Bosnian language, a standardized form of the Serbo-Croatian linguistic continuum. Their ethnogenesis traces to Slavic migrations into the region during the 6th and 7th centuries CE, followed by partial Christianization under medieval kingdoms and subsequent mass conversion to Islam under Ottoman rule from the 15th century onward, a process that differentiated them from Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats through religious, cultural, and administrative roles in the empire. The term "Bosniak" (or Bošnjak), originally denoting inhabitants of the medieval Bosnian polity regardless of faith, fell into disuse after Ottoman withdrawal but was revived in the 20th century—formally recognized as a distinct nationality in socialist Yugoslavia in 1971—and solidified during the 1990s amid the breakup of the federation, when it became the self-identifier for Bosnian Muslims seeking to assert a civic-territorial identity tied to Bosnia's multiethnic heritage rather than purely religious affiliation. In the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, Bosniaks mobilized the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to defend the country's sovereignty following its internationally recognized independence referendum, facing systematic territorial losses, sieges such as Sarajevo, and ethnic cleansing by Serb forces, culminating in events like the Srebrenica genocide of over 7,000 Bosniak men and boys, later adjudicated as genocide by international tribunals. Today, Bosniaks number around 2.5–3 million globally, with significant diasporas in Turkey, Western Europe, and North America formed largely through Ottoman-era migrations and post-war displacements, maintaining cultural practices like the kolo circle dance and cuisine influenced by Ottoman traditions while navigating ongoing ethno-political tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina's fragile consociational framework. Their defining characteristics include a historical emphasis on urban literacy and trade under Ottoman governance, contributions to regional Sufi orders, and modern assertions of indigeneity to counter narratives framing them as "Turks" or religious transplants rather than autochthonous South Slavs shaped by layered historical contingencies.

Terminology and Etymology

Historical Designations

In the medieval Kingdom of Bosnia (c. 1180–1463), the inhabitants were collectively designated as Bošnjani, a term reflecting geographic origin rather than ethnic or confessional divisions, encompassing nobles, peasants, and clergy of various Christian denominations including Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Bosnian Church adherents. This designation appears in contemporary charters and diplomatic correspondence, such as references to dobri Bošnjani (good Bosnians) for the local nobility. After the Ottoman Empire's conquest of Bosnia in 1463, the emerging Muslim population—largely converts from the local Slavic stock—was classified administratively by religious affiliation as part of the millet system, simply as "Muslims" (müslüman), distinct from Christian rayah (subjects). Ottoman defters (tax registers) from 1528–1529 documented 26,666 Muslim households across Bosnian sanjaks, indicating significant early Islamization concentrated in urban centers and fertile valleys. Self-identification retained regional markers, with Bosnian Muslims viewing themselves as distinct from Anatolian Turks, often expressing mutual disdain toward Ottoman core elites; external observers sometimes derogatorily labeled them "Poturci" (half-Turks) or "Bosnian Turks." Under Austro-Hungarian occupation (1878–1918), Bosnian Muslims were enumerated in censuses as "Mohammedans" or "Muslims," totaling 448,613 individuals (38.73% of the population) in 1879, reflecting their landowning elite status amid agrarian reforms that eroded spahis privileges. In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–1941), official designations pressured alignment with Serb or Croat ethnic categories, with many declaring as "Serbs/Croats of Islamic faith," though cultural organizations like the Yugoslav Muslim Organization advocated for recognition of a separate "Muslim" identity tied to Bosnian territory. During World War II and early Socialist Yugoslavia (1945–1960s), designations remained religiously oriented as "Muslims" (Islamska zajednica), suppressing national framing to align with Marxist atheism; however, demographic pressures led to constitutional recognition of "Muslims" as a distinct nationality in 1971, when 1,769,592 Yugoslav citizens (including 1,482,430 in Bosnia) self-identified as such in the census, comprising 39.6% of Bosnia's populace. This shift marked a transition from purely confessional to ethno-national labeling, amid rising assertions of Bosnian particularism against Serb and Croat irredentism.

Emergence of "Bosniak"

The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, following the Ottoman retreat, prompted Bosnian Muslim elites to articulate a distinct national identity amid pressures from emergent Serbian and Croatian nationalisms, which sought to incorporate Bosnian Muslims as "Islamized" kin. This period marked the revival of the term Bošnjak (Bosniak), historically denoting Bosnia's native inhabitants irrespective of faith in medieval contexts, but now repurposed primarily for Muslims to emphasize territorial loyalty to Bosnia over pan-Islamic or Slavic affiliations. A pivotal figure in this development was Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak (1839–1902), an Ottoman-trained administrator and intellectual who served as mayor of Sarajevo from 1885 to 1892. In 1891, he founded and edited the newspaper Bošnjak in Sarajevo, the first publication explicitly dedicated to advancing Bosniak interests, which ran until 1912 and advocated modernization, loyalty to the Habsburg monarchy as a bulwark against Serbian expansionism, and a Bosnian-centric identity rooted in Islamic tradition and local customs. The paper's masthead slogan, "Bošnjak ma koje vjere bio" ("The Bosniak, whatever his faith"), initially suggested inclusivity, but its content focused on Muslim elites' concerns, such as land reforms threatening their holdings and cultural preservation against Croat proselytizing or Serb irredentism. This intellectual awakening countered derogatory labels like Poturak ("Turk convert") imposed by Christian neighbors and the Ottoman self-view as part of the broader ümmet (Muslim community), fostering instead a civic-territorial nationalism tied to Bosnia's multi-ethnic but administratively unified past. By the early 1900s, Bošnjak and affiliated circles, including figures like Ćamil Sijarić, had disseminated ideas of Bosniaks as a separate narod (people) with historical claims to the land, influencing petitions against full Habsburg annexation and laying groundwork for later assertions of autonomy. However, World War I and subsequent Yugoslav unification subordinated this identity, reclassifying Muslims as a religious group until its partial revival in socialist censuses post-1968.

Origins and Genetic Ancestry

Slavic Ethnogenesis

The Slavic ethnogenesis of Bosniaks began with the large-scale migration of proto-Slavic groups from Eastern Europe into the Balkans during the 6th and 7th centuries CE, establishing communities in the territory of modern Bosnia. These migrants, originating from regions around present-day Ukraine and Belarus, arrived in waves often allied with Avar nomads, exploiting the weakening of Byzantine authority amid Justinian's reconquests and subsequent plagues. Byzantine records, including Procopius of Caesarea's Wars, describe initial Slavic (Sclaveni) raids into Dalmatia and inland areas by the 530s CE, intensifying after 550 CE as settlers overran depopulated Roman provinces. Archaeological evidence from the northwestern Balkans, including Bosnia, reveals shifts to Slavic-associated material culture—such as Prague-Korchak-style pottery, semi-subterranean dwellings, and iron tools—by the late 6th century, indicating permanent settlement rather than transient raiding. Ancient DNA analyses confirm this demographic transformation: post-600 CE samples from the region show Eastern European ancestry rising from approximately 6% to 47%, reflecting an estimated 82% gene pool turnover driven by Slavic migrants, with admixture incorporating local Roman-era Illyrian and Thracian elements but dominated by incoming paternal lineages. This influx, contributing 30–60% of modern Balkan ancestry, underscores a causal mechanism of population replacement and hybridization, countering indigenist narratives that minimize migration scale in favor of cultural diffusion alone. By the 8th–9th centuries, these Slavic groups in Bosnia coalesced into tribal confederations, adopting Old Church Slavonic and Orthodox Christianity under Byzantine or Frankish influence, while local geography fostered semi-autonomous polities distinct from coastal Dalmatia. No singular "Bosnian" tribe is attested in early sources like Constantine VII's De Administrando Imperio (ca. 950 CE), which groups inland Slavs generically; instead, ethnogenesis proceeded through linguistic unification, shared pagan-to-Christian rites (e.g., stećci tombstones emerging by the 12th century), and resistance to external overlords, laying the Slavic substrate for later Bosnian identity before Ottoman-era religious divergence.

Genetic Studies and Continuity

Genetic studies of Bosniaks reveal a Y-chromosome profile dominated by haplogroup I2a (specifically I-P37.2 subclade) at frequencies around 43-49%, followed by R1a (15-17%) and E1b1b (17%), which aligns with the broader South Slavic paternal gene pool and indicates substantial continuity from early medieval Slavic migrations overlaid on pre-Slavic Balkan substrates. These haplogroups show minimal differentiation from those in Bosnian Serbs and Croats, with I2a frequencies in Bosniaks (∼44%) intermediate between higher rates in Croats (∼71%) and lower in Serbs (∼31%), reflecting shared regional dynamics rather than distinct origins. Autosomal DNA analyses position Bosniaks within a tight genetic cluster of Western Balkan populations, exhibiting principal component analysis (PCA) proximity to East and South Europeans, with admixture components dominated by European (Slavic-associated) ancestry and minor Near Eastern/Caucasian inputs consistent with ancient Balkan continuity. This profile demonstrates no significant genetic discontinuity from medieval Bosnian populations, as Ottoman-era Islamization involved largely endogenous conversion of local Slavs rather than mass demographic replacement, evidenced by low frequencies of Anatolian-specific markers like J2 (∼5%) and G (∼1%). Mitochondrial DNA in Bosniaks is overwhelmingly West Eurasian, mirroring patterns in adjacent groups and reinforcing maternal lineage stability across ethnic boundaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with negligible East Eurasian or sub-Saharan traces (∼2% combined). Overall, these findings affirm Bosniak genetic continuity as a product of cultural adaptation within a persistent South Slavic-Balkan framework, unaltered by religious shifts.

Comparisons with Adjacent Groups

Genetic studies demonstrate that Bosniaks share substantial paternal lineage continuity with adjacent Serbs and Croats, primarily through high frequencies of Y-chromosome haplogroup I2a (specifically the Dinaric subclade I-P37.2), which reflects a shared pre-Slavic Balkan substrate augmented by medieval expansions. In a sample of 256 males from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the three groups exhibited comparable distributions across 28 biallelic Y-markers, with I2 dominating (e.g., 44-71% in Bosniaks and Croats versus around 33% in local Serbs), alongside lower but present Slavic-associated R1a (17-25% in Bosniaks, varying in Serbs and Croats). This pattern underscores minimal differentiation in male-mediated ancestry, contrasting with cultural divergences driven by religion rather than genetics. Autosomal DNA analyses further confirm close clustering among Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, with no statistically significant differences in short tandem repeat (STR) profiles between Bosnia-Herzegovina's population and its neighbors, indicating shared South Slavic ethnogenesis from 6th-7th century migrations overlaying indigenous Balkan stock. Bosniaks and Croats often align more closely with East Central European references like Hungarians in principal component analyses, while Serbs show subtle southward pulls toward Greek-like components, reflecting clinal variation across the peninsula rather than ethnic barriers. Ottoman-era Islamization introduced negligible Anatolian admixture (typically <2-3%), as Bosniak profiles remain most proximate to other South Slavs, not modern Turks, consistent with elite conversion over mass population replacement. Comparisons with other adjacent groups reveal broader Balkan homogeneity: Montenegrins mirror Serbs in elevated E1b1b and J2 alongside I2a, while Slovenes display reduced Dinaric I2a (22-28%) and increased R1a with Western admixtures, positioning them intermediate between South and West Slavs. Ancient DNA from 1st-millennium CE Balkans reinforces this, showing genetic continuity post-Roman era with Slavic influxes homogenizing the region, absent major discontinuities attributable to ethnic labels.

Historical Trajectory

Medieval Foundations

The territory of modern Bosnia experienced Slavic settlement in the 6th and 7th centuries CE, as South Slavic tribes migrated into the Balkans amid Avar-led incursions that displaced Byzantine control. These Slavs, integrating with residual Romanized Illyrian and other local populations, established agrarian communities and formed early tribal principalities by the 9th century. Bosnia initially fell under the influence of neighboring Croatian and Serbian polities, but local Slavic voivodes and bans asserted autonomy, particularly from the 10th century onward. By the 12th century, the Banate of Bosnia emerged as a distinct entity under the Višević and Kulinić dynasties, followed by the Kotromanićs who consolidated power after 1250. The banate maintained semi-independence despite nominal Hungarian suzerainty, with bans like Stephen II Kotromanić (r. 1322–1353) expanding territorial control. In 1377, Ban Tvrtko I Kotromanić was crowned king in the Mileševa Monastery, elevating Bosnia to kingdom status and briefly extending its reach into Dalmatia and parts of Serbia following the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The kingdom's rulers, including Tvrtko I (r. 1353–1391) and Stephen Dabiša (r. 1391–1395), fostered a centralized Slavic polity distinct from Serb or Croat kingdoms, supported by a nobility tied to local customs rather than exclusive alignment with Orthodox or Catholic hierarchies. Religious life centered on the Bosnian Church (Crkva Bosanska), a monastic-oriented Christian institution using the Slavic liturgy and rejecting certain Roman Catholic rituals, such as mandatory clerical celibacy and elaborate iconography. Operating without formal diocesan structure, it emphasized burial rites and communal piety, with adherents known as Krstjani (Christians). Historiographical interpretations vary: 19th- and early 20th-century scholars often labeled it Bogomil dualist heresy based on Hungarian and Dubrovnik accusations, but empirical analysis of limited primary sources—such as charters and archaeological evidence—shows no doctrinal dualism; instead, modern historians like John V.A. Fine argue it represented an indigenous, non-heretical Christianity resisting external ecclesiastical control from Rome and Constantinople. The church's prevalence among the rural majority and nobility underscored Bosnia's cultural divergence, evidenced by over 70,000 stećci tombstones (12th–16th centuries) featuring unique motifs like crescents, vines, and family symbols, which reflect interconfessional burial practices and local artistry rather than explicit heresy. Medieval Bosnia's population, predominantly South Slavic and rural, adhered to variants of Christianity without significant non-Christian minorities prior to the Ottoman conquest in 1463; Catholic and Orthodox influences existed among elites and border regions, but the Bosnian Church dominated inland areas, fostering a proto-regional identity rooted in shared language, customary law, and resistance to foreign overlords. This polity's independence and ecclesiastical uniqueness provided the demographic and institutional substrate for later ethnoreligious developments among Bosnians, though ethnic self-designation remained fluid and tied to territorial loyalty rather than modern confessional nationalism.

Ottoman Islamization

The Ottoman conquest of the Bosnian Kingdom occurred in 1463 under Sultan Mehmed II, marking the onset of a prolonged process of Islamization among the local Slavic population. Initial conversions were limited and tied to military garrisons and administrative elites, with broader adoption accelerating over subsequent centuries through voluntary mechanisms rather than coercion. Ottoman tax registers from 1468 indicate minimal Muslim presence immediately post-conquest, primarily among settlers and converts in urban centers, while rural areas remained predominantly Christian. Key drivers of conversion included economic incentives, such as exemption from the jizya poll tax imposed on non-Muslims and preferential access to land ownership and timar fiefs, which favored Muslim holders. Poverty emerged as a significant factor, with village-level data from 1468 to 1604 showing higher conversion rates in economically distressed areas, where Christian peasants faced heavier fiscal burdens and land expropriations. Social mobility also played a role, as conversion enabled entry into the Ottoman military and bureaucratic classes, including the devshirme system's exemptions for Muslims. By the early 17th century, Muslims constituted a plurality in many regions, reflecting annual conversion rates estimated at 0.01 to 0.03 percent in initial phases, compounding over generations. Bosnia's Islamization was notably comprehensive compared to neighboring Balkan territories, achieving a Muslim majority—approximately 50-60 percent by the 19th century—due to the absence of a robust Orthodox ecclesiastical structure, which weakened resistance in Serbia and elsewhere. Claims of mass conversions by medieval Bosnian Bogomils, often invoked in 19th-century nationalist narratives to portray Islamization as a seamless continuation of heresy, lack empirical support and are critiqued as retrospective myths minimizing Slavic Christian heritage. Instead, records from Sarajevo's Sharia courts document sporadic individual and family conversions across Christian denominations, underscoring a pragmatic, incentive-driven process sustained by Ottoman institutional stability. This demographic shift solidified a distinct Muslim Slavic identity, later termed Bosniak, amid persistent Christian minorities.

Habsburg and Early Yugoslav Eras

Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 following the Congress of Berlin, formally annexing the territory in 1908, which shifted Bosnian Muslims from Ottoman suzerainty to Habsburg administration. The Habsburgs adopted a policy of religious tolerance toward Islam, retaining sharia courts for personal status matters, preserving waqf endowments, and appointing a Reis-ul-Ulema in 1882 as the head of the Islamic community under state oversight. This framework allowed for the maintenance of Islamic educational institutions like medresas alongside new secular schools, though it sparked tensions between traditionalist ulema resistant to modernization and emerging Muslim elites pursuing Habsburg-style education. Agrarian policies dismantled the Ottoman timar system starting in the 1880s, reclassifying much of the land held by Muslim beys and agas as state property and enabling sales or redistribution to tenants, which disproportionately impacted Muslim landowners and contributed to economic displacement. Comprehensive land reform was delayed until 1911, exacerbating grievances among the Muslim elite and prompting waves of emigration to Ottoman territories, with estimates of over 100,000 Muslims leaving by 1910. Despite these challenges, many Bosnian Muslims demonstrated loyalty to the empire, enlisting in multi-ethnic regiments such as the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Infantry, which numbered around 18,000 men by 1914 and were noted for their discipline during World War I. The 1908 annexation triggered protests among Bosnian Muslims, who viewed it as a breach of the Berlin Congress provisions guaranteeing Ottoman spiritual authority, fueling pan-Islamic sentiments and temporary alliances with Ottoman reformers. Habsburg infrastructure projects, including railways and urban development in Sarajevo, brought modernization benefits, yet colonial-style governance maintained Bosnia as a distinct condominium outside full integration into Cisleithania or Transleithania, limiting local political autonomy. After World War I, Bosnia and Herzegovina was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in December 1918, placing Bosnian Muslims in a state dominated by Orthodox Serb victors despite their prior allegiances to the Habsburg loser. Official ideology promoted unitary Yugoslavism, denying Muslims separate ethnic status and framing them as Serbs or Croats by ancestry who retained Islamic faith, which clashed with emerging regional identities tied to Bosnia. In response, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) formed on February 16, 1919, in Sarajevo under leader Mehmed Spaho, consolidating prior Muslim groups to defend religious freedoms, waqf properties, and educational rights amid centralizing pressures. The JMO's platform emphasized federal decentralization to safeguard Bosnia's administrative unity and Muslim socioeconomic positions, cooperating pragmatically with ruling coalitions while opposing assimilationist policies from Serb Radical and Croat Peasant parties. The 1921 Vidovdan Constitution granted Islam official recognition and parliamentary seats proportional to population—around 70 for Muslims—but subordinated ethnic self-definition to religious categorization. Interwar agrarian reforms from 1919 onward accelerated land redistribution from large estates, including those of Muslim owners, reducing their holdings from 60% of arable land in 1918 to under 20% by 1930 and intensifying economic marginalization. JMO advocacy fostered a proto-national consciousness among urban Muslim intellectuals, with terms like "Bošnjak" appearing in cultural circles to denote Bosnian-specific Muslim identity distinct from Serb or Croat claims, laying groundwork for later assertions of separateness. By 1929, amid King Alexander's dictatorship and the kingdom's renaming as Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims remained politically fragmented but increasingly oriented toward preserving Bosnia as a multi-ethnic entity against partition threats.

World War II and Socialist Yugoslavia

During World War II, Bosnian Muslims navigated a precarious position within the Axis-occupied Independent State of Croatia, where the Ustaše regime initially cultivated alliances by portraying Muslims as "the flowers of the Croatian people" and granting them administrative roles to counter Serb dominance. However, Ustaše massacres of Serbs provoked retaliatory Chetnik assaults on Muslim villages, killing thousands and displacing communities, which fueled local autonomist movements and selective collaboration with German forces. In March 1943, Heinrich Himmler established the 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Croatian), recruiting up to 21,000 Bosnian Muslims—primarily rural volunteers motivated by anti-communism, defense against Chetnik raids, and promises of religious autonomy—to fight Tito's Partisans in northeastern Bosnia. The division, equipped with fezzes and curved daggers symbolizing Ottoman heritage, suffered high desertion rates and mutinies by 1944 amid battlefield setbacks and internal disillusionment. Concurrently, growing numbers of Bosnian Muslims resisted Axis rule by joining the Partisan movement, particularly after 1942 when Chetnik-Ustaše pacts intensified threats to Muslim populations. By 1943, Partisans organized dedicated Muslim battalions and brigades, such as the 13th Primorska Muslim Brigade, drawing recruits from urban elites and rural survivors of interethnic violence; estimates indicate tens of thousands participated, comprising around 3-5% of total Partisan forces nationally but higher proportions in Bosnian operations. Archival research reveals that Muslim elites and masses predominantly favored anti-fascist resistance over collaboration, with Partisan policies of ethnic equality and land reform appealing amid the civil war's chaos, ultimately aiding the liberation of Bosnia by April 1945. This dual resistance—against both Ustaše brutality and Chetnik genocide—underscored Bosniak agency, though post-war communist narratives minimized collaboration while suppressing fuller ethnic acknowledgment. In Socialist Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims initially lacked official nationality status, treated as a religious group and urged to assimilate as Serbs, Croats, or supra-ethnic "Yugoslavs" to preserve federal unity; the 1948 and 1953 censuses recorded only religious affiliation, with about 718,000 Muslims in Bosnia pre-war shrinking via unapproved declarations. Rising nationalist pressures in the 1960s, including protests in Sarajevo and demands from the Bosnian Communist League, prompted Josip Broz Tito's endorsement in April 1968 of Muslims as a distinct "nation in the national sense," enabling the category in official documents and countering Serb and Croat territorial claims on Bosnia. The 1971 census saw 1,769,592 declarations as Muslims (40% of Yugoslavia's population), rising to 1,999,957 by 1981, which bolstered cultural institutions like the Institute of Oriental Philology but remained subordinated to socialist ideology, prohibiting religious political organization and framing identity within "brotherhood and unity." This recognition marked a causal shift toward institutionalizing Bosniak ethnogenesis, though underlying asymmetries in republican power fueled latent tensions.

Bosnian War and Dissolution

The dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia accelerated in 1991–1992 as Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia declared independence, prompting Bosnia and Herzegovina's leadership—dominated by Bosniaks under Alija Izetbegović—to pursue sovereignty to preserve a multiethnic state amid rising Serb and Croat separatism. A referendum on independence held February 29–March 1, 1992, saw 63.4% turnout, with 99.7% of voters approving separation; Bosnian Serbs, comprising about 31% of the population, boycotted en masse, rejecting the outcome as illegitimate for a unitary Bosniak-majority republic. Independence was declared on March 1 and internationally recognized by April 6–7, 1992, but Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, backed by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) under Slobodan Milošević's Serbia, immediately launched attacks to seize 70% of territory for a contiguous Serb entity, initiating widespread ethnic cleansing against Bosniaks through expulsions, massacres, and destruction of Islamic sites. Bosniaks, initially outgunned and disorganized, formed the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) in May 1992 to defend urban centers and resist partition; the ARBiH grew to around 200,000 fighters by 1995, relying on irregular volunteers, foreign mujahideen aid, and smuggling despite a UN arms embargo that disproportionately disadvantaged them as the JNA transferred heavy weapons to Bosnian Serb forces. The siege of Sarajevo, imposed by Bosnian Serb artillery from April 5, 1992, to February 29, 1996—lasting 1,425 days—exemplified the campaign, with over 11,000 civilians killed (including 1,600 children) from shelling, sniping, and starvation tactics that cut off food, water, and power to the city's 350,000 residents, predominantly Bosniaks. Bosnian Serb forces under Ratko Mladić systematically targeted Bosniak civilians across eastern enclaves, culminating in the July 6–19, 1995, fall of Srebrenica—a UN "safe area"—where over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were separated, executed, and buried in mass graves, an act later adjudicated as genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) due to intent to destroy the Bosniak group in that region. Tensions with Bosnian Croats escalated into open war from October 1992 to March 1994, as the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), supported by Zagreb under Franjo Tuđman, pursued Herzeg-Bosnia annexation through attacks on ARBiH positions in central Bosnia and the Herzegovina corridor, including the April 1993 Ahmići massacre of 116 Bosniak civilians; this intra-alliance conflict weakened Bosniak defenses against Serbs, causing thousands of additional deaths and displacements on both sides before the U.S.-brokered Washington Agreement on March 18, 1994, established a Bosniak-Croat Federation controlling 51% of territory. While ARBiH units committed documented war crimes, such as the 1992 killing of retreating JNA soldiers and abuses against Serb prisoners in Sarajevo camps, these were sporadic and prosecuted post-war (e.g., 2022 charges against ten ARBiH members), contrasting with the scale of Serb-orchestrated cleansing that displaced over 1 million Bosniaks and reduced their pre-war 43% demographic share in controlled areas. Croat actions similarly involved expulsions but were curtailed earlier, with total war fatalities estimated at 100,000–102,000, Bosniaks comprising 62–80% of deaths per empirical demographic analyses. NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb positions in August–September 1995, following Srebrenica and marketplace bombings, shifted momentum, enabling ARBiH counteroffensives that reclaimed about 20% of lost territory. The Dayton Accords, initialed November 21 and signed December 14, 1995, in Paris by Izetbegović, Milošević, and Tuđman, ended hostilities by formalizing ethnic division: Republika Srpska (49% of land for Serbs) and the Bosniak-Croat Federation (51%), with a weak central government, 60,000 NATO peacekeepers, and provisions for refugee returns and war crimes trials—yielding de facto partition despite Bosniak advocacy for civic unity, as territorial concessions preserved Serb gains from cleansing while stabilizing the multiethnic remnant.

Post-1995 Developments

The Dayton Agreement, signed on December 14, 1995, concluded the Bosnian War and established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state comprising two entities: the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Bosniaks formed the demographic majority, and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska. This structure allocated Bosniaks primary governance roles within the Federation, which encompassed about 51% of BiH's territory, while limiting their influence in the centralized state institutions designed to balance ethnic representation. In the immediate aftermath, Bosniak leadership under the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), founded in 1990 by Alija Izetbegović, focused on refugee returns and entity-level administration; by 1996, over 200,000 Bosniaks had begun repatriating to pre-war homes, though many faced obstructions from local Serb authorities in mixed areas. Politically, the SDA maintained dominance among Bosniaks through the late 1990s and 2000s, securing victories in entity and state elections, such as the 2002 general elections where it led coalitions advocating for stronger central authority to counter Republika Srpska's autonomy. This reflected Bosniak preferences for a more unitary state, viewing Dayton's decentralization as perpetuating Serb gains from wartime territorial conquests; SDA platforms emphasized war crimes accountability, with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indicting Bosnian Serb leaders like Radovan Karadžić in 1995, convicted in 2016 for genocide including the Srebrenica genocide of over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys. By the 2010s, intra-Bosniak competition emerged, with parties like the Social Democratic Party challenging SDA on corruption allegations, leading to SDA's first loss of the Bosniak presidency seat in the 2022 elections to Denis Bećirović of the Democratic Front. Demographically, Bosniaks constituted 50.11% of BiH's population (1,769,592 individuals) per the 2013 census, concentrated in the Federation's urban centers like Sarajevo (over 80% Bosniak) and Tuzla, though net emigration reduced overall numbers from pre-war estimates of around 1.8-2 million. The war displaced over 1 million Bosniaks, fostering a diaspora exceeding 2 million by the 2000s, primarily in Germany (over 150,000), Turkey (via historical ties and post-war aid), Austria, and Sweden, where communities preserved cultural institutions like mosques and cultural centers but contributed remittances totaling hundreds of millions annually to BiH. Recent trends show modest returns, with diaspora investments aiding reconstruction, though persistent economic stagnation—unemployment hovering at 15-20% in Bosniak-majority areas—drives ongoing outflows, particularly youth migration to EU states. In foreign policy, Bosniaks have supported BiH's EU integration as a means to transcend ethnic vetoes, with SDA and allied parties endorsing reforms for candidacy status granted in 2022; however, Bosniak representatives often block concessions to Republika Srpska's secessionist rhetoric, as seen in 2021-2023 disputes over state property laws. Culturally, post-war revival included Islamic revivalism, with Saudi-funded mosques numbering over 150 by 2000, though mainstream Bosniak Islam remains Hanafi-Sufi oriented, distinct from Salafist imports that affected a marginal minority (estimated under 1,000 adherents by 2010s security reports). Economic recovery lagged, with Federation GDP per capita at about €4,500 in 2023, reliant on remittances and light industry, underscoring Bosniak advocacy for judicial and anti-corruption reforms to attract investment.

Ethnic Identity and Nationalism

Development of Distinct Identity

The ethnonym "Bošnjak" originated in the medieval Kingdom of Bosnia, referring to inhabitants of the region irrespective of religion, but largely fell into disuse following the Ottoman conquest in 1463, with identities shifting toward religious affiliations under the millet system. During Ottoman rule, Bosnian Muslims primarily identified through Islam, reinforced by their status as the ruling class, though 19th-century rebellions against centralizing reforms—such as the 1831 uprising led by Husein Gradaščević—demonstrated emerging territorial loyalty to Bosnia distinct from broader Ottoman or Turkish identity. The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia in 1878 catalyzed further identity consolidation among Bosnian Muslims, as the transition to Christian rule threatened their socioeconomic privileges and prompted resistance, including armed uprisings and the formation of the Muslim National Organization in 1906 to advocate for communal rights. Intellectuals like Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak revived the term "Bošnjak" in the late 19th century to denote Bosnian Muslims specifically, emphasizing a historical and territorial continuity amid pressures from rising Serb and Croat nationalisms, though adoption remained limited until the 20th century. In the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia, such expressions were suppressed, with Bosnian Muslims often classified as Serbs or Croats of Islamic faith, yet organizations like the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (founded 1919) defended local interests against assimilation. Under Socialist Yugoslavia, the 1961 census permitted self-identification as "Muslim" ethnically, but formal recognition as a distinct nationality—"Muslim in the national sense"—occurred in 1971, enabling institutional development and countering claims of religious rather than national identity. This state endorsement, alongside religious revival post-1953 legal reforms and the 1968 nationality status, fostered a synthesized identity linking Islam, language, and Bosnian territory, though still under the "Muslim" label to avoid irredentist connotations. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War (1992–1995) accelerated the crystallization of a distinct Bosniak identity, with the Second Bosniak Congress in 1993 adopting "Bosniaks" as the official ethnonym to underscore secular ethnic-territorial ties over purely religious ones, amid existential threats from Serb and Croat forces. This evolution reflected causal pressures from geopolitical fragmentation, elite mobilization, and collective wartime experience, distinguishing Bosniaks from neighboring groups while rooted in historical regional continuity.

Interplay with Serb and Croat Nationalisms

The interplay between Bosniak nationalism and the nationalisms of Serbs and Croats has been characterized by mutual contestation over Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory and demographic composition, with Serb and Croat movements historically denying the existence of a distinct Bosniak nation. From the late 19th century, under Ottoman decline and Habsburg administration, Serb and Croat nationalists asserted irredentist claims on Bosnia, portraying its Muslim population—descended from Slavic converts during Ottoman rule—as ethnically identical to themselves but alienated by Islam, rather than as a separate people rooted in Bosnia's medieval and territorial history. Serbian ideologues, drawing on religious and linguistic ties, labeled Bosnian Muslims as "Islamicized Serbs," while Croatian nationalists, such as Ante Starčević, viewed them as "the best Croats" capable of reintegration into a Catholic framework, thereby rejecting any autonomous Bosniak identity in favor of partition or absorption. This framing persisted into the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia, where Bosnian Muslims lacked national recognition and faced pressures to align with either Serb or Croat blocs, exacerbating communal tensions without acknowledging Bosnia's multi-ethnic federal character. In socialist Yugoslavia, Bosniak identity gained tentative official acknowledgment in 1968 as a "Muslim nation" in ethnicity (formalized in the 1971 census), partly to counterbalance Serb and Croat dominance and preserve Bosnia's viability within the federation, yet this was undermined by persistent Serb and Croat narratives that subordinated Bosniaks to pan-South Slav or confessional unities. The 1980s economic crisis and death of Tito intensified nationalist mobilizations: Serbia under Slobodan Milošević revived "Greater Serbia" ambitions, promoting the 1989 Gazimestan speech and constitutional amendments that eroded Kosovo's autonomy, signaling threats to Bosnia's Muslims; Croatia under Franjo Tuđman pursued separatism with historical claims to western Herzegovina. Secret agreements, such as the March 1991 Karađorđevo meeting between Milošević and Tuđman, explicitly discussed partitioning Bosnia along ethnic lines, excluding a viable Bosniak-led state and treating Bosniaks as a minority to be dispersed or assimilated. In response, Bosniak leaders like Alija Izetbegović founded the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) in 1990, advocating a civic, unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina to safeguard against such encroachments, framing Bosniak nationalism as defensive and tied to the republic's sovereignty rather than religious expansionism. The 1992 independence referendum, boycotted by Bosnian Serbs (who comprised about 31% of the population), saw 99.7% approval among participating Bosniaks and Croats (63% turnout), prompting Bosnian Serb forces under Radovan Karađžić's Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) to declare the Republika Srpska and seize 70% of territory through ethnic cleansing campaigns targeting Bosniaks, displacing over 765,000 non-Serbs by 1994. Croatian forces, via the self-proclaimed Herzeg-Bosnia, initially coordinated with Serbs against Bosniaks before clashing in the 1993–1994 Croat–Bosniak War, aiming to secure ethnic cantons and rejecting Bosniak-majority governance. These actions reinforced Bosniak assertions of distinct nationhood, culminating in the 1993 constitutional recognition of "Bosniaks" as the official ethnic term, but entrenched divisions: the 1995 Dayton Accords partitioned Bosnia into the Bosniak-Croat Federation (51% territory) and Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (49%), institutionalizing veto powers that perpetuate Serb and Croat leverage against centralized Bosniak-led reforms. Post-1995, the interplay remains adversarial, with Bosnian Serb leaders invoking secession threats—echoing 1990s denial of Bosniak sovereignty—to block state-level decisions, while Croat parties demand ethnic vetoes, stalling EU integration; Bosniak nationalism, in turn, emphasizes victimhood from Srebrenica (where 8,372 Bosniak men and boys were killed in July 1995) to bolster claims for unified governance, though internal SDA factionalism has diluted its cohesion. Empirical data from censuses show Bosniaks at 50.1% of Bosnia's population in 2013, underscoring their plurality yet vulnerability to partitionist pressures that treat Bosnia as a Serb-Croat condominium rather than a sovereign entity. This dynamic reflects causal realities of demographic engineering during the war, where Serb and Croat nationalisms prioritized ethnic homogenization over multi-ethnic federalism, forcing Bosniak identity into a reactive, territorial-nationalist mold.

Scholarly Debates on Authenticity

Scholars debate the authenticity of Bosniak ethnicity as either a continuous historical lineage tracing to medieval Bosnia or a relatively recent construct emerging from religious affiliation and 20th-century politics. Proponents of historical continuity, such as those examining Ottoman-era documents, argue that the term "Bošnjak" denoted native inhabitants of Bosnia regardless of faith as early as the 16th century, reflecting a regional identity distinct from broader Serb or Croat affiliations. This view posits that the medieval Bosnian Kingdom (c. 1154–1463) fostered a unique Slavic identity, evidenced by indigenous scripts like bosančica on stećci tombstones and church architecture separate from Orthodox or Catholic norms, which persisted through Ottoman Islamization as a layered ethnic marker rather than erasure. However, these claims often rely on Bosniak nationalist interpretations, which may overemphasize regional autonomy while downplaying linguistic and genetic overlap with neighboring South Slavs, where medieval sources more frequently reference feudal loyalties than proto-national ethnicity. Critics, including analysts of Balkan nationalism, contend that Bosniak identity lacks deep pre-modern roots and constitutes a modern invention, primarily as a religious community (Muslim Slavs) elevated to ethnic nationhood under socialist engineering. In this perspective, Ottoman millet organization preserved Islam as a confessional identity without ethnic differentiation until the 19th-century national revivals, when Bosnian Muslims initially aligned with Ottoman loyalty or pan-Islamic sentiments rather than asserting a separate "Bosnian" ethnicity. Processes such as Bosniakization—the ethnic and cultural assimilation of non-Bosniak individuals or groups, particularly Muslims in regions like Sandžak, into the Bosniak ethnocultural identity—have been highlighted in scholarly critiques of Bosniak nationalism as indicative of constructed identity expansion. The pivotal shift occurred in 1971, when Yugoslavia's constitution recognized "Muslims" as a nationality to counter Serb-Croat dominance, formalizing it as "Bosniak" only in 1993 amid the Bosnian War to bolster territorial claims—a process Mirsad Kriještorac describes as nationalism preceding and shaping identity, akin to other "late" nations but accelerated by elite manipulation and conflict. This constructionist argument draws empirical support from the absence of widespread Bosniak self-identification before the 1940s and the role of communist policies in suppressing pan-Yugoslav alternatives, though Serb and Croat scholars advancing similar denials often exhibit partisan bias aimed at irredentist goals. Empirical data, including dialectal uniformity (Ijekavian Štokavian shared with Serbs and Croats) and genetic studies showing minimal divergence among Bosnians, underscore that ethnic boundaries were fluid until politicized, challenging claims of ancient authenticity while affirming religion's causal role in differentiation. Debates persist due to source credibility issues: Bosniak historiography, influenced by post-1995 state-building, may inflate medieval precedents, whereas adversarial narratives from Belgrade or Zagreb prioritize assimilationist histories, reflecting broader Balkan tendencies to retroject modern nations onto sparse records. Independent analyses, like those tracing elite compositions, reveal Bosnian Muslim intellectuals in the interwar period favoring Yugoslav integration over distinct nationhood, suggesting authenticity emerged reactively from existential threats rather than organic continuity. Ultimately, while no Balkan ethnicity boasts unalloyed primordial origins, Bosniak case exemplifies how causal pressures—Ottoman conversion dynamics, Habsburg administrative separatism, and Yugoslav federalism—crystallized a viable, if contested, national framework by the late 20th century.

Language

Dialectal Features

The Bosnian dialect spoken by Bosniaks belongs to the Ijekavian subdialect of Shtokavian, the most widespread dialect continuum in the region, characterized by the reflex "ije" for the historical yat vowel (*ě), as in mlijeko ("milk") rather than the Ekavian mleko found in standard Serbian or the rare Ikavian milkō. This phonological distinction aligns Bosnian closely with Croatian standards while differentiating it from Serbian, though regional variations exist among Bosniak speakers, such as stronger Turkish substrate influences in eastern dialects near the Drina River. The dialect's phonemic inventory includes five vowels (/a, e, i, o, u/) with phonemic length contrasts (e.g., short pas "dog" vs. long pās "belt"), 25 consonants featuring palatalization and affricates like /t͡ʃ/ (č) and /d͡ʒ/ (dž), and prosodic elements including dynamic stress and falling pitch accent on long syllables, which can shift lexical meaning (e.g., mòra "nightmare" vs. móra "plague"). Morphologically, Bosniak speech adheres to the synthetic structure of South Slavic languages, with seven noun cases, three genders, dual number relics in some rural idioms, and aspectual verb distinctions (perfective/imperfective), showing negligible divergence from neighboring Serbo-Croatian varieties beyond occasional Ottoman-era calques in derivational suffixes. Lexically, a hallmark feature is the retention and frequency of Oriental loanwords from Turkish (e.g., čaršija "bazaar," džezva "coffee pot"), Arabic (e.g., džemaat "mosque community"), and Persian, comprising up to 10-15% of everyday vocabulary in informal Bosniak registers, far exceeding their incidence in Croatian or Serbian due to prolonged Ottoman administration (1463-1878). These elements often serve as ethnic markers, with purist efforts in standardization post-1992 favoring native Slavic synonyms (e.g., tržnica over čaršija), though they persist in spoken dialects, particularly in Herzegovina and Sandžak regions. Dialectal isoglosses, such as the central Bosnian preference for progressive constructions like radim se ("I am doing"), reflect substrate influences from pre-Slavic Illyrian or medieval Bogomil speech patterns, though evidence remains conjectural.

Standardization and Linguistic Politics

The standardization of the Bosnian language, primarily associated with Bosniaks, gained momentum after Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence in 1992, marking a deliberate effort to codify a distinct linguistic norm separate from the previously unified Serbo-Croatian. Prior to this, during the socialist Yugoslav period, the Shtokavian dialect spoken by Bosniaks was subsumed under the Serbo-Croatian standard, with limited independent development despite earlier attempts at vernacular recognition in the early 20th century. The 1996 orthographic reforms, influenced by wartime national ideology, formalized spellings and grammar rules to emphasize Bosniak-specific features, such as retention of Ottoman-era Turkisms and Persian-Arabic loanwords, aiming to differentiate it from Serbian and Croatian variants. Linguistic politics surrounding Bosnian standardization have been intertwined with Bosniak nationalism, serving as a tool to assert ethnic identity amid post-Yugoslav fragmentation. Proponents, including linguists like Dževad Jahić, advocated for a grammar and orthography that revived historical elements, such as pre-Yugoslav lexicon, to counter perceived Serb and Croat dominance; Jahić's 1990 article on vernacular language and his co-authorship of a 2000 Bosnian grammar exemplify this push. These efforts, often state-supported in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, promoted neologisms and puristic reforms to distance Bosnian from its shared Shtokavian base, reflecting a broader Balkan trend where language became an instrument of division rather than unity. Debates on Bosnian's authenticity highlight tensions between political imperatives and linguistic reality, with critics arguing that its standardization involves manufactured differences—such as invented vocabulary—to fabricate separation from mutually intelligible Serbian and Croatian, despite empirical evidence of near-complete comprehension across variants. Bosniak scholars maintain its continuity from medieval Bosančica script and Ottoman influences, yet opponents, including some neutral linguists, view it as a late-20th-century construct driven by identity politics rather than organic evolution, a perspective substantiated by the language's reliance on dialectal convergence rather than profound divergence. This politicization persists, complicating education and media in Bosnia, where three "official" languages reinforce ethnic silos despite their shared substrate.

Religion

Islamic Predominance

Islam constitutes the predominant religion among Bosniaks, with virtually all members of the ethnic group identifying as Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school, a legacy of Ottoman influence that differentiates them from Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats. In the 2013 census of Bosnia and Herzegovina, individuals declaring Bosniak ethnicity numbered 1,769,592 (50.11% of the total population), while those identifying as Muslim totaled 1,790,454 (50.70%), indicating near-complete religious alignment within the group. This predominance is reinforced by the ethnic self-conception of Bosniaks, for whom adherence to Islam functions as a primary marker of distinction and communal cohesion, particularly since the formal recognition of the "Muslim" nation in 1971 and its evolution into "Bosniak" in the 1990s. The Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini, IZBiH), established in its modern form in 1882 under Austro-Hungarian administration and restructured post-1995, serves as the authoritative body governing religious affairs for the vast majority of Bosniak Muslims, administering over 1,500 mosques, Islamic education, and charitable endowments (waqfs). This institution maintains doctrinal orthodoxy aligned with the Hanafi rite and promotes religious revival through programs in madrasas and faculties of Islamic studies, though empirical surveys indicate that while nominal identification with Islam remains near-universal, active observance such as regular prayer varies, with many Bosniaks describing themselves as "believing but not strictly practicing." The IZBiH's influence extends beyond Bosnia to Sandžak and diaspora communities, underscoring Islam's role in transnational Bosniak solidarity. In the context of Bosniak nationalism, especially following the 1992–1995 Bosnian War, Islamic predominance has intertwined with ethnic survival narratives, where religious symbols and practices—such as Ramadan observance and halal dietary norms—reinforce group boundaries amid historical pressures for assimilation or secularization under Yugoslav communism. Scholarly analyses emphasize that this religious-ethnic fusion, rather than purely theological devotion, drives predominance, as Islam provides causal continuity from medieval Bogomil influences through Ottoman conversion to modern identity politics, distinguishing Bosniaks as a non-Christian Slavic entity in the Balkans. Despite secular influences and internal debates over Wahhabi inflows post-war, core institutional adherence to moderate Hanafi-Sufi traditions persists, with the Reis-ul-ulema as spiritual leader elected by the IZBiH's assembly.

Conversion Dynamics and Syncretism

The process of Islamization among Bosniaks began following the Ottoman conquest of the Bosnian Kingdom in 1463 and the Duchy of Herzegovina in 1482, with conversions occurring gradually rather than through systematic coercion. Early Ottoman policy emphasized administrative incorporation via the devşirme system and tax incentives, where non-Muslims paid the jizya poll tax, encouraging voluntary conversion for economic relief and social advancement, particularly among urban elites and landowners who gained access to timar land grants and military ranks. By the late 16th century, Ottoman defters recorded approximately 46% of the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina as Muslim, reflecting a cumulative process driven by these pragmatic factors rather than mass forced baptisms, which historiographical surveys identify as a minority occurrence limited to specific frontier campaigns. Conversion peaked in the mid-17th century, coinciding with intensified Ottomanization efforts, including the establishment of vakıf endowments and Sufi tekkes that facilitated community integration. Sharia court records from Sarajevo indicate that individual conversions often severed ties with prior Christian kin networks, embedding converts into Islamic legal and social structures, though familial motivations—such as inheritance disputes or intermarriage—played roles in some cases. Historians applying quantitative methods, such as revisiting Bulliet's conversion curves to Ottoman tax registers, estimate that Islamization rates in Bosnia accelerated post-1526 after the Battle of Mohács, with rural timar holders converting at higher rates than remote highland communities, underscoring causal links to land tenure security and avoidance of corvée labor exemptions reserved for Muslims. Political stability under Ottoman rule further incentivized adherence, as pre-conquest instability from Hungarian-Croatian incursions had eroded loyalty to Catholic institutions, making Islam a viable identity anchor without widespread violence. Scholarly consensus rejects older narratives of pervasive force, attributing higher Bosnian conversion rates compared to neighboring Serbia—where Muslims comprised under 2% by 1831—to localized elite emulation and the absence of entrenched Orthodox hierarchies. Syncretic elements persisted in Bosnian Islam, blending Ottoman-Sufi practices with pre-Islamic substrates from the medieval Bosnian Church, a schismatic institution distinct from Bogomil dualism despite popular associations. The Bosnian Church, tolerated until the 15th century, emphasized vernacular liturgy and anti-clericalism, facilitating a smoother transition to Islam's egalitarian appeals, as evidenced by 16th-century Sufi orders like the Naqshbandiyya incorporating local dervish rituals without doctrinal rupture. Folk customs, such as slava-like commemorations repurposed as mevlud gatherings and burial practices retaining stećci stele motifs in Islamic necropolises, illustrate this fusion, where pagan-Slavic ancestor veneration merged with Islamic eschatology. Architectural syncretism appears in mosques like those in Sarajevo, featuring pre-Ottoman stonework and geometric motifs echoing Bosnian Church iconography, reflecting adaptive vernacularization rather than pure importation. Debates persist on Bogomil influences, with earlier scholarship positing dualistic heresies as a bridge to Islamic monotheism, but recent analyses highlight continuity in folk Christianity—such as rejection of icons—over heretical rupture, arguing syncretism arose from pragmatic cultural retention amid elite conversions. This hybridity manifested in zadruga family structures adapting Islamic inheritance laws while preserving patrilineal Slavic norms, and in oral epics like the Hasanaginica cycle, which interweave Quranic motifs with Christian knightly archetypes. By the 19th century, such syncretism waned under Tanzimat reforms standardizing Sunni orthodoxy, yet traces endure in rural tekke practices, underscoring Islamization as a layered process of selective assimilation rather than wholesale replacement. In contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniaks maintain a predominantly cultural attachment to Islam, with religiosity levels moderated by the legacy of Yugoslav-era secularization and the country's constitutional framework as a secular state. The 1995 Dayton Agreement and subsequent Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities establish separation of religion and state, prohibiting religious instruction in public schools and ensuring equal treatment of faiths, which fosters a pluralistic environment where Islamic observance is voluntary rather than enforced. This secular structure, combined with decades of communist suppression of religious institutions from 1945 to 1991, has contributed to patterns of nominal rather than devout practice among many Bosniaks, evidenced by widespread participation in secular social norms such as alcohol consumption and interethnic marriages. Survey data indicate relatively low ritual observance compared to global Muslim norms. A 2012 Pew Research Center analysis of Muslim-majority countries found Bosnian Muslims reporting lower frequencies of daily prayers and weekly mosque attendance than counterparts in Turkey (44% weekly attendance) or Southeast Asia, aligning with broader Balkan patterns of selective piety. Among youth, a quantitative study of 279 primary and secondary students (predominantly Bosniak in Muslim-majority areas) revealed 64.2% self-identifying as "average religious" and 29.4% as "very religious," with only 6.5% claiming no religiosity; however, practices declined with age, from high daily prayer rates among younger students (mean score 4.07/5 for first-year high schoolers) to lower engagement in Qur'an reading (least practiced activity) and mosque visits, particularly among females. These findings suggest a gap between declarative faith and behavioral adherence, influenced by urbanization and education. Post-war revival efforts by the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina have emphasized "European Islam"—a depoliticized, tolerant variant compatible with modernity—but empirical trends show persistence of irreligiosity in private life, with atheism or agnosticism estimated at 2-3% in the 2013 census yet likely underreported due to ethnic-cultural ties to Islam. A 2023 poll ranked Bosnia second globally (after Turkey) in self-reported religiosity at 65.9%, but this reflects identity over observance, as interfaith dialogues and secular governance mitigate fundamentalist shifts. Scholars note that while the 1990s conflicts reinforced Muslim identity against existential threats, subsequent generations prioritize secular values like democracy and pluralism, viewing religious conservatism as reconcilable with modern lifestyles without dominating public discourse.

Culture and Society

Folklore and Customs

Bosniak folklore encompasses oral epic poetry recited to the gusle, a single-stringed instrument, featuring decasyllabic verses that narrate heroic exploits, battles, and Ottoman-era events, often paralleling South Slavic traditions while incorporating Islamic motifs. These epics, collected in the early 20th century by scholars like Milman Parry, emphasize themes of loyalty, betrayal, and valor, with figures such as Mustaj Beg of Lika embodying idealized leadership. Sevdalinka, a melancholic genre of folk song originating in the 16th century under Ottoman rule, expresses unrequited love, longing, and existential sorrow through improvised lyrics and modal scales, performed acapella or with saz accompaniment, and recognized as intangible cultural heritage. Mythical elements in Bosniak lore include supernatural beings like vile (fairies) that aid or hinder humans, ajdaha (dragons) symbolizing chaos, and peri (spirits) blending pre-Islamic Slavic and Islamic influences, often invoked in tales warning against hubris or explaining natural phenomena. Ganga, a dissonant two-note singing style used by shepherds for long-distance communication across mountainous terrain, reflects adaptive pastoral customs tied to transhumance practices. Customs feature traditional attire such as dimije (baggy trousers), jelek (vest), and feredža (veil) for women, worn during festivals and dances to preserve Ottoman-inherited aesthetics blended with Balkan styles, as documented in 19th-century ethnographies. The kolo, a communal circle dance performed in interlocking chains to accordion or tambura music, accompanies life-cycle events like weddings and Eids, fostering social cohesion through synchronized steps and hand-holds that vary regionally from lively koraci to slower moro. Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha rituals involve ritual slaughter, communal feasts with baklava and ćevapi, and visits to stećci necropolises for ancestral remembrance, syncretizing Islamic observance with pre-Ottoman stećak veneration.

Naming Practices and Symbolism

Bosniak naming conventions adhere to South Slavic patterns, where surnames precede given names in official records, as in the example Kačić Ivan, a practice shared with Serbs and Croats. Surnames are predominantly patronymic, ending in suffixes such as -ić, -ović, or -ević, denoting "son of," with common examples among Bosniaks including Hodžić (from hodža, meaning religious teacher, with 21,097 bearers in Bosnia and Herzegovina as of recent surveys) and Hadžić (referring to hajji, a pilgrim to Mecca). These surnames often incorporate Ottoman-era Islamic or Turkic elements, distinguishing them from purely Slavic forms prevalent among non-Muslim neighbors. Given names among Bosniaks reflect their Islamic heritage, favoring Arabic-origin names like Mehmed, Ali, Mustafa for males and Fatima, Aisha, or Lejla for females, which carry religious significance and were promoted during Ottoman rule to affirm Muslim identity. A cultural norm emphasizes selecting "beautiful names" (lijepa imena) as spiritual guidance within Bosnian Muslim tradition, avoiding names common to local Orthodox or Catholic populations to underscore ethnic and confessional distinction. This practice symbolizes fidelity to Islam and resistance to assimilation, with hybrid forms like Senad (a Bosnian adaptation of Arabic Sana) blending Slavic phonetics and Islamic roots. In terms of ethnic symbolism, the golden lily (Lilium bosniacum), an endemic species native exclusively to Bosnia and Herzegovina, embodies Bosniak continuity with pre-Ottoman medieval statehood. Stylized as a fleur-de-lis, it appeared in the heraldry of the 14th-century Bosnian Kingdom under Tvrtko I and was revived in the 1992–1998 coat of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina, representing sovereignty and indigenous heritage amid the Yugoslav wars. For Bosniaks, the lily contrasts with Orthodox Christian crosses or Catholic symbols, asserting a distinct Bosnian-Muslim lineage predating Islamization. Naming symbolism intersects here, as Islamic given names evoke Ottoman-Islamic causality in identity formation, while the lily underscores autochthonous Bosnian roots, countering narratives of derivative Serb or Croat origins.

Culinary and Artistic Traditions

Bosniak culinary traditions emphasize halal meats and Ottoman-influenced preparations, featuring grilled dishes like ćevapi, minced beef and lamb sausages served with somun bread, onions, and ajvar relish. Burek, a layered phyllo pastry filled with ground meat, cheese, or vegetables, represents a staple baked good adapted from Turkish borek during the Ottoman era. Soups such as begova čorba, a creamy chicken broth with vegetables and okra, highlight creamy textures and spice blends introduced via Ottoman culinary exchanges that persisted through 450 years of rule in the Balkans. Sweets like baklava, layered pastry with nuts and syrup, underscore the synthesis of Persian and Turkish dessert techniques in Bosniak households. These traditions avoid pork in adherence to Islamic dietary laws, prioritizing lamb, beef, and poultry, with Ottoman heritage evident in the use of phyllo dough and spice profiles like cumin and paprika. In artistic traditions, sevdah (sevdalinka) forms a core musical expression, characterized by slow, melancholic melodies and lyrics poeticizing love, longing, and urban life, rooted in Ottoman-Turkish influences and integral to Bosniak cultural identity. This genre, often accompanied by instruments like the tambur and violin, emerged in the 16th-19th centuries in Sarajevo and other Bosniak centers, blending Arabic, Persian, and local Balkan elements into introspective folk songs. Visual arts include Zmijanje embroidery, a cross-stitch technique employing geometric motifs and vibrant colors on clothing and household linens, practiced predominantly by women in the Zmijanje region of Bosnia since the Ottoman period. These patterns, featuring interlocking squares and floral abstractions, reflect Islamic geometric art principles while serving practical and decorative purposes in daily life. Folk dances such as the kolo, performed in circles to rhythmic music, accompany communal celebrations, integrating physical expression with sevdah rhythms.

Demographics and Distribution

Core Populations in Bosnia and Sandzak

The core Bosniak population resides predominantly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they numbered 1,769,592 according to the 2013 census, constituting 50.11 percent of the country's total population of approximately 3.53 million. This group forms majorities in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity (over 70 percent Bosniak in many cantons) and Brčko District, with concentrations in central and northern areas such as Sarajevo Canton (population density exceeding 1,000 per km² in urban cores), Zenica-Doboj Canton, Tuzla Canton, and Una-Sana Canton. These regions trace historical continuity to medieval Bosnian principalities and Ottoman-era Muslim settlements, with Bosniaks maintaining demographic majorities despite post-1995 Dayton Agreement displacements. In the Sandžak region—spanning southwestern Serbia and northeastern Montenegro—Bosniaks form the largest ethnic group, totaling around 200,000, or over 50 percent of the area's estimated 360,000 residents as of recent censuses. In Serbia's portion, the 2022 census recorded 153,801 Bosniaks (2.3 percent of national total), concentrated in Sandžak municipalities like Novi Pazar (over 95,000 residents, Bosniak majority), Sjenica, and Tutin, where they comprise 70-90 percent locally due to historical Ottoman administrative patterns and limited intermarriage. Montenegro's Sandžak areas, per the 2023 census, host 58,956 Bosniaks (9.45 percent nationally), primarily in Rožaje (Bosniak majority of ~80 percent) and Plav, reflecting similar geographic clustering around river valleys and plateaus. These populations exhibit cultural and linguistic continuity with Bosniaks in Bosnia, including shared dialects of Bosnian and adherence to Hanafi Islam, though Sandžak communities faced assimilation pressures under Yugoslav and post-1990s policies.
Region/CountryBosniak PopulationPercentage of Local/TotalCensus YearKey Municipalities
Bosnia and Herzegovina1,769,59250.11% (national)2013Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, Bihać
Serbia (Sandžak)153,801~50% (regional); 2.3% (national)2022Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin
Montenegro (Sandžak)58,956~60% (regional); 9.45% (national)2023Rožaje, Plav
Census figures in these areas have faced scrutiny—BiH's 2013 results were contested by Serb authorities for allegedly inflating Bosniak counts through residency inclusions, while Sandžak data reflect self-identification amid debates over "Muslim" vs. "Bosniak" labels in earlier Yugoslav enumerations—but official tallies provide the baseline for demographic analysis. Emigration since the 1990s has strained these cores, with net losses of 10-20 percent in rural Sandžak locales, yet urban hubs like Novi Pazar sustain vitality through return migration and higher birth rates (around 2.1 children per woman vs. sub-replacement in neighboring groups).

Diaspora and Migration Patterns

The Bosniak diaspora expanded dramatically during the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995, when ethnic cleansing and siege warfare displaced over 2 million people from Bosnia and Herzegovina, with more than 1 million emigrating abroad as refugees or through subsequent family reunification and economic migration. This exodus represented the largest displacement in Europe since World War II, driven primarily by Bosniak victims of Serb and Croat military campaigns, including the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995, which alone prompted tens of thousands to flee. Initial patterns involved short-term refuge in neighboring states like Croatia and Serbia before onward movement to Western Europe and North America via asylum programs, with UNHCR registering over 1.2 million Bosnian refugees by 1996. Germany emerged as the primary destination, absorbing approximately 439,000 Bosniaks through temporary protection schemes that facilitated rapid labor market entry, though integration challenges persisted due to language barriers and segregated housing. Austria, Sweden, and the Netherlands also received substantial inflows, with patterns shifting post-1995 Dayton Accords from emergency asylum to permanent settlement as repatriation incentives proved insufficient amid ongoing instability. In North America, the United States admitted around 130,000 Bosnian refugees by 2000 under prioritized programs, fostering communities in cities like St. Louis, Chicago, and Atlanta, where Bosniaks numbered about 272,000 by recent estimates; Canada similarly hosted tens of thousands, contributing to a combined North American Bosniak population exceeding 350,000. Turkey, leveraging historical Ottoman ties, integrated roughly 118,000 Bosniaks, many arriving via direct flights or overland routes during the war, with communities concentrated in Istanbul and Bursa exhibiting partial assimilation yet cultural retention through mosques and associations. Smaller but notable diasporas formed in Australia (around 30,000) and Scandinavian countries via humanitarian corridors. Post-war migration continued at lower volumes, propelled by economic stagnation in Bosnia—unemployment exceeding 30% in the Federation entity—and youth outflows, with remittances from diaspora workers totaling over €1 billion annually by 2020, bolstering household incomes but exacerbating domestic brain drain. Return migration remains limited, with only about 450,000 refugees repatriating by 2004 per UNHCR data, hindered by property restitution failures and ethnic tensions; recent trends show modest reverse flows among retirees and professionals, yet net emigration persists, sustaining diaspora networks that influence Bosniak politics through voting blocs and lobbying. These patterns reflect causal drivers of conflict-induced flight followed by entrenched economic disincentives for return, with diaspora populations maintaining ethnic cohesion via cultural organizations despite host-country assimilation pressures.

Demographic Pressures and Shifts

The Bosniak population faces acute demographic pressures from sub-replacement fertility and sustained emigration, contributing to stagnation or contraction in core areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak. Bosnia and Herzegovina's total fertility rate was estimated at 1.26 children per woman in 2019, among the world's lowest, influenced by economic stagnation, youth unemployment exceeding 40% in some periods, and delayed childbearing amid housing and job insecurities. This rate, updated to 1.49 by 2023, remains below the 2.1 replacement threshold, reflecting patterns applicable to Bosniak-majority regions where similar socioeconomic factors prevail. Emigration exacerbates these trends, with net migration rates at -0.38 per 1,000 population in 2022, driven by better prospects in the European Union and Turkey; an estimated 400,000 residents departed Bosnia and Herzegovina from the early 1990s onward due to combined negative natural growth and outflows, heavily impacting Bosniak communities through brain drain of skilled youth. Births nationwide fell to 10,831 in the first half of 2025, a 2.79% decline from 2024, signaling ongoing contraction in Bosniak-dense areas like the Federation entity. These dynamics have induced shifts toward an aging structure, with life expectancy rising to 77 years by 2021 but median age climbing above 42, elevating dependency ratios and straining pension systems in Bosniak-majority municipalities. In Sandžak, where Bosniaks form a plurality, historical advantages in reproductive success among Muslim lineages (e.g., higher descendant-leaving rates for women born 1880–1924 compared to Orthodox counterparts) have eroded under modernization, yielding convergence to regional lows and added assimilation strains as a minority amid Serbian-majority influences. Post-Yugoslav war segregation has reduced interethnic marriages—from 12–13% pre-1991 to under 5% by the 2010s—bolstering Bosniak endogamy and cultural retention but curtailing potential growth via mixed unions, further entrenching isolated demographic trajectories.

Political Role and Controversies

Nationalism and State-Building

Bosniak nationalism originated in the late 19th century during the Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1878–1918), as local Muslim elites sought to counter irredentist claims from neighboring Serbia and Croatia by emphasizing a distinct Bosnian identity rooted in the region's historical and territorial continuity. Key early proponent Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak (1839–1902), a Sarajevo mayor and writer, advocated for "Bošnjaci" as a national designation for Bosnia's Muslims, irrespective of religious variations within Islam, to foster cultural preservation and political autonomy. This movement gained traction amid Ottoman decline and European interventions, producing periodicals like Bošnjak (1891) that articulated demands for education reform and economic self-reliance among Bosnian Muslims. Under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–1941) and subsequent Axis occupation, Bosniak national expression was suppressed, with many Muslims pressured to assimilate into Serb or Croat categories, though underground networks maintained cultural organizations. In socialist Yugoslavia post-1945, Bosniaks were initially classified as a religious group rather than a nationality, leading to demographic undercounting; the 1961 census permitted "Muslim" as an ethnic declaration, but formal constitutional recognition as a constituent nation occurred only in 1971, enabling institutional representation in Bosnia's government. This acknowledgment stemmed from intra-communist debates to stabilize multiethnic Bosnia against rising Serb and Croat assertions, yet it deferred adoption of "Bosniak" ethnonym until the 1990s due to sensitivities over Islamic connotations. State-building efforts intensified in the late 1980s amid Yugoslavia's dissolution, with Alija Izetbegović founding the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) on May 26, 1990, to consolidate Bosniak political power around a platform of Bosnian sovereignty and civic pluralism. The SDA dominated the 1990 multiparty elections, positioning Bosnia-Herzegovina for independence; in the March 1, 1992 referendum—boycotted by Bosnian Serbs—Bosniaks and Croats overwhelmingly approved separation, with 99.4% voting yes among participants, prompting formal independence declaration on April 5, 1992. The ensuing Bosnian War (1992–1995) devastated Bosniak-majority areas, but the 1995 Dayton Accords established a decentralized state with a weak central authority, a Bosniak-Croat Federation, and Serb-dominated Republika Srpska, frustrating Bosniak aspirations for unitary governance. Postwar Bosniak nationalism has focused on reforming Dayton structures to enhance central institutions, abolish entity vetoes, and integrate Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic bodies, viewing decentralization as enabling partitionist threats from Republika Srpska. Leaders like Izetbegović framed this as defending Bosnia's territorial integrity against ethnic federalism, though critics within Bosniak circles and externally have accused SDA policies of prioritizing Islamist networks over inclusive statecraft during the war. Demographic shifts, with Bosniaks comprising about 50% of Bosnia's population per 2013 census, underpin demands for proportional influence in a centralized framework, yet persistent ethnic quotas and veto mechanisms perpetuate gridlock.

Yugoslav Wars: Actions and Atrocities

The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH), formed in April 1992 and composed predominantly of Bosniaks, conducted defensive operations against Bosnian Serb forces while also launching targeted raids and offensives that inflicted civilian casualties and property destruction. In the Srebrenica enclave, ARBiH units under local commander Naser Orić executed attacks on encircling Serb villages to obtain food and ammunition amid a Serb blockade. On 7 January 1993, coinciding with Serbian Orthodox Christmas, Bosniak forces assaulted Kravica and adjacent hamlets (Šiljkovići and Ježestica), killing 43–46 Serbs—primarily soldiers but including non-combatants—and razing structures in Kravica. These raids, documented in ICTY trials, fueled Serb reprisals but involved deliberate targeting of populated areas beyond military necessity. Foreign Islamist volunteers, numbering several hundred from countries including Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, joined ARBiH as the El Mudžahid detachment within the 3rd Corps starting in 1993, bolstering offensives but introducing systematic brutality. In late July 1995 near Zenica, detachment members beheaded one Serb prisoner of war from the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) and subjected others to beatings and inhumane conditions, acts classified as cruel treatment violating the laws or customs of war. During the September 1995 Vozuca offensive (Operation Sana), El Mudžahid fighters executed 16 Croatian Defence Council (HVO) prisoners, mutilating some corpses, and killed Croat civilians in nearby villages. ARBiH Chief of Staff Rasim Delić, aware of these incidents through reports, failed to prevent them or punish perpetrators despite his command authority; the ICTY convicted him in September 2008 solely on the count of cruel treatment regarding the mujahideen abuses, sentencing him to three years' imprisonment. Amid the parallel Croat–Bosniak War in Central Bosnia (1992–1994), ARBiH forces pursued territorial control through expulsions and violence against Croat communities, displacing over 50,000 Croats from municipalities including Zenica, Kiseljak, and Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje. Human Rights Watch reported ARBiH shelling of Croat enclaves, arbitrary detentions of Croat males, forced labor, beatings, and isolated executions, such as those in November 1992 near Gornji Vakuf where Muslim troops killed several Croat prisoners. In July 1993, ARBiH's capture of Bugojno involved civilian deaths and widespread looting, exacerbating Croat flight. These operations mirrored ethnic homogenization tactics but on a smaller scale than Serb campaigns, with ARBiH leadership often tolerating indiscipline despite nominal investigations. ICTY prosecutions of Bosniaks focused on command failures rather than direct perpetration, yielding five convictions amid 161 total indictees, underscoring ARBiH's disadvantaged position but confirming lapses in discipline and oversight.

Islamist Elements and External Influences

During the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, foreign Muslim volunteers known as mujahideen arrived to support Bosniak forces against Bosnian Serb and Croat combatants, forming the El Mudžahid detachment integrated into the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). These fighters, numbering around 3,000–4,000 at peak, originated primarily from Arab states, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, with some links to early Al-Qaeda networks; they participated in battles such as Operation Miracle in 1995 and the Battle of Vozuća, where they captured territory from Serb forces. However, the unit was implicated in war crimes, including the killing, torture, and beheading of captured Serb and Croat soldiers and civilians, as evidenced by trials of Bosnian commanders for failing to prevent such acts by foreign fighters. Post-war, many mujahideen were deported under international pressure, but several hundred remained by marrying local Bosniak women and obtaining citizenship, embedding jihadist networks in Bosnian society. Saudi Arabia emerged as a dominant external influencer, investing approximately $400 million since 1993 in reconstructing over 150 mosques, including the King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo completed in 1993, often promoting Wahhabi doctrines that contrasted with Bosnia's traditional Hanafi-Sufi Islam. This funding, channeled through organizations like the Saudi High Commission for Relief, facilitated the arrival of Wahhabi missionaries who targeted impoverished war refugees, leading to visible shifts such as increased adoption of Salafi practices like full beards for men and niqabs for women in communities where such attire was previously uncommon. Iran provided another vector of influence, supplying arms and training to Bosniak forces during the war in defiance of UN sanctions, forging ties that persisted into the post-conflict era through cultural centers and humanitarian aid, though its Shia ideology had limited appeal among Sunni Bosniaks. By the early 2000s, Bosnian authorities, aided by U.S. intelligence post-9/11, curtailed some foreign funding and closed radical institutions, prompting Saudi withdrawal of support around 2001; nonetheless, Salafi networks endured, contributing to the radicalization of a small but notable minority. In the 2010s, over 300 Bosniaks, including from the Sandžak region spanning Serbia and Montenegro, joined jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, with returnees posing risks of domestic terrorism, as seen in plots dismantled by Bosnian security forces. These external influences exacerbated tensions within Bosniak communities, where moderate Islamic traditions faced challenges from imported ideologies, though the majority resisted full radicalization due to state interventions and cultural resilience. Qatar and Turkey also extended aid, but their efforts leaned toward moderate or neo-Ottoman influences rather than jihadism, with Saudi Wahhabism remaining the primary driver of Islamist shifts until funding tapered. Empirical assessments, including genetic and migration data, indicate that while Bosniak identity retains secular-nationalist elements forged in the war, pockets of Salafi adherence persist, fueled by online propaganda and diaspora remittances from Gulf states.

Historiography and Interpretations

Traditional Narratives

The traditional narratives in Bosniak historiography portray the Bosniaks as bearers of an ancient, continuous ethnic identity rooted in the territory of Bosnia, distinct from neighboring Serbs and Croats, with ethnogenesis tied to the medieval Bosnian state and its cultural institutions. This perspective, prominently articulated in works such as Enver Imamović's Historija Bošnjaka (1997), traces Bosniak origins to pre-Slavic or early Slavic inhabitants who developed a unique Bosnian consciousness, emphasizing autonomy and resilience against external influences. A central element involves the Bosnian Church, often equated with Bogomilism, as the precursor to Bosniak identity; adherents, facing persecution from Catholic and Orthodox authorities, are depicted as converting en masse to Islam during the Ottoman conquest (1463 onward) to preserve their indigenous "old Bosnian" faith and ethnicity, rather than assimilating into broader Slavic or Islamic categories. This origin story, which emerged in Ottoman-era lore to justify the privileged status of Bosnian Muslims, underscores a narrative of cultural preservation through religious adaptation, portraying Islamization not as foreign imposition but as organic evolution that fortified Bosniak distinctiveness. The medieval Kingdom of Bosnia (1377–1463), under rulers like Tvrtko I, serves as the foundational era, symbolizing proto-Bosniak statehood with institutions like the royal court and stećci tombstones representing a syncretic, independent tradition predating Ottoman rule. Ottoman governance (1463–1878) is framed positively as a period of flourishing for Bosniak elites, who formed a loyal Muslim stratum administering the province, with landowning beys and military contributions reinforcing communal solidarity amid imperial decline. In modern interpretations, these narratives extend to a paradigm of perpetual victimhood, encapsulated in concepts like the "Ten Genocides" against Bosniaks—from the Great Turkish War (1683–1699) through Austro-Hungarian occupation, World War II Ustaša massacres (estimated 75,000–100,000 Bosniak deaths), Yugoslav Partisan reprisals, and the 1992–1995 war—attributed primarily to Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholic aggressors seeking to erase Bosniak presence. This framework, while drawing on documented events such as the 1941–1945 killings, systematically interprets diverse conflicts as genocidal destiny, prioritizing collective trauma to legitimize post-1995 state-building and national cohesion, often at the expense of nuanced causal analysis. Such accounts, dominant in Bosniak educational materials and political discourse, have been critiqued for embedding nationalist bias that mythologizes history to sustain separatism, though they remain foundational to identity assertion since the 1971 recognition of Muslims as a Yugoslav nation.

Revisionist Perspectives

Revisionist historians argue that Bosniak ethnic identity emerged primarily through the Ottoman Islamization of local South Slavic populations between the 15th and 19th centuries, rather than from a pre-existing distinct lineage separate from Serbs and Croats, with conversions driven by tax incentives, social mobility, and coercion affecting an estimated 30-50% of the Bosnian population by 1600. This perspective emphasizes the Ottoman millet system's prioritization of religious over ethnic categorization, where Bosnian Muslims identified within Islamic communal structures, often viewing themselves as loyal subjects of the Sultan rather than a nascent nation. Challenges to tracing Bosniak origins to the medieval Kingdom of Bosnia (c. 1180–1463) form a core revisionist critique, positing that the polity's rulers and populace adhered to Christianity—primarily Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and the localized Bosnian Church—without evidence of an enduring ethnic consciousness detached from broader Serbo-Croatian cultural spheres, and that post-1463 Ottoman conquest introduced Islam as a rupture, not continuity. Revisionists contend that 19th- and 20th-century invocations of medieval independence, such as by the Austro-Hungarian administration or post-1990 nationalists, retroject modern identities onto a multi-confessional, tributary state whose 14th-century peak under Tvrtko I involved alliances with both Serbian and Croatian elites. In the 20th century, Bosnian Muslims' self-identification remained fluid, officially registered as "Muslim" in Yugoslav censuses from 1971 onward (with 1.77 million or 8.9% of federal population by 1981), often aligning pragmatically with pan-Islamic, Yugoslav, or even Serb-inclusive movements like the Yugoslav Muslim Organization founded in 1919, until the 1990s when "Bosniak" was formalized at a 1993 congress amid secessionist pressures. Revisionists view this shift—proposed by intellectuals in September 1990 to replace "Musliman"—as a politicized invention to legitimize Bosnia's independence for a plurality (43.7% in 1991 census) rather than majority ethnic claim, critiquing subsequent historiography for selective emphasis on victimhood that overlooks pre-1992 inter-ethnic pacts and may reflect biases in Western academic sources prioritizing post-Srebrenica narratives over balanced archival review.

Empirical Contributions from Genetics and Archaeology

Genetic analyses of Bosniaks demonstrate close affinity to neighboring South Slavic populations, with Y-chromosome haplogroup frequencies dominated by I2a at approximately 49%, followed by R1a and E1b1b each at 17% in Bosnian-Herzegovinian samples inclusive of Bosniaks. These distributions align closely across Bosniacs, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats, indicating shared paternal lineages without significant differentiation by religious or ethnic self-identification. Autosomal DNA studies further confirm near-identical profiles among these groups, clustering Bosnians with Croatians and East Europeans in principal component analyses, reflecting predominant West Eurasian ancestry with minor Caucasus and Middle Eastern components but negligible East Asian or sub-Saharan African admixture. Ancient DNA from the Balkans supports a model of substantial Slavic genetic influx during the early medieval period, contributing to the modern South Slavic gene pool, including that of Bosniaks, overlaid on pre-existing Roman-era populations with limited continuity. Mitochondrial DNA haplogroups in Bosniaks predominantly fall within European lineages, exceeding 75% in major West Eurasian clades, underscoring maternal continuity with regional populations rather than external replacement. Overall, these findings refute notions of substantial Turkic or Arab genetic input during Ottoman Islamization, attributing Bosniak genetic composition primarily to South Slavic migrations and local Balkan admixture, with conversions occurring within existing communities. Archaeological evidence from medieval Bosnia highlights cultural continuity among South Slavic inhabitants, exemplified by stećci tombstones—monumental grave markers dating from the 12th to 16th centuries—concentrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina with over 60,000 examples, used inter-confessionally by Catholic, Orthodox, and possibly Bosnian Church adherents without ethnic exclusivity. These artifacts, featuring motifs like crescents, crosses, and human figures, suggest a localized funerary tradition amid the Kingdom of Bosnia (established 1377), but lack indicators of a distinct proto-Bosniak ethnicity separate from broader Slavic or regional Christian identities. Excavations of sites like Bobovac, a medieval fortress and royal residence, yield skeletal remains analyzed via STR markers, revealing kinship patterns and health indicators consistent with South Slavic medieval populations, but no unique genetic markers predating Ottoman influence that align specifically with modern Bosniak self-conception. Early medieval settlements from the 7th-10th centuries, post-Slavic arrival, show material culture blending Byzantine, Avar, and local Illyro-Roman elements, supporting demographic replacement or admixture models corroborated by genetics, rather than indigenous non-Slavic origins for Bosniaks. Thus, empirical data portray Bosniak ethnogenesis as rooted in religious differentiation within a genetically and archaeologically homogeneous South Slavic substrate, emerging prominently under Ottoman rule.

References

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