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25°18′1″N 60°36′46″E / 25.30028°N 60.61278°E / 25.30028; 60.61278 Chabahar Port (Persian: بندر چابهار) is a seaport located in Chabahar in southeastern Iran, on the Gulf of Oman. It serves as Iran's only oceanic port, and consists of two separate ports named Shahid Kalantari and Shahid Beheshti, each of which has five berths.[1] It is only about 170 kilometres west of the Pakistani port of Gwadar.

Key Information

Development of the port was first proposed in 1973 by the last Shah of Iran, though development was delayed by the 1979 Iranian Revolution.[2] The first phase of the port was opened in 1983 during the Iran–Iraq War as Iran began shifting seaborne trade east towards the Pakistani border in order to decrease dependency on ports in the Persian Gulf, which were vulnerable to attack by the Iraqi Air Force.[3]

India and Iran first agreed to plans to further develop Shahid Beheshti port in 2003, but did not do so on account of sanctions against Iran.[4] As of 2016, the port has ten berths.[1] In May 2016, India and Iran signed a bilateral agreement in which India would refurbish one of the berths at Shahid Beheshti port, and reconstruct a 600 meter long container handling facility at the port.[5] The port is partly intended to provide an alternative for trade between India and Afghanistan as it is 800 kilometers closer to the border of Afghanistan than Pakistan's Karachi port.[6] The port handled 2.1 million tons of cargo in 2015,[7] which was planned to be upgraded to handle 8.5 million tons by 2016, and to 86 million tons in the future.[8][9]

In October 2017, India's first shipment of wheat to Afghanistan was sent through the Chabahar Port.[10] In December 2018, India took over the port's operations.[11] Following the re-imposition of sanctions against Iran, foreign companies became reluctant to participate in the port's expansion,[12] and only 10% of the port's 8.5 million-ton total capacity was utilized in 2019.[13] Sanctions also played a role in reducing India's involvement and investment in the US$1.6 billion Chabahar–Zahedan railway.[14]

Location

[edit]
Boats anchored in Chabahar Bay.

The port of Chabahar is located on the Makran coast of Sistan and Baluchistan Province, next to the Gulf of Oman and at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. It is the only Iranian port with direct access to the Indian Ocean. Being close to Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and others, it has been termed the "Golden Gate" to these landlocked countries.[15]

Chabahar is 700 km (430 mi) away from Zahedan, the capital of the Sistan and Baluchistan province, 950 km (590 mi) away from Milak, the closest city to the Afghan border, and 1,827 km (1,135 mi) away from Sarakhs on the Turkmen border.[15]

The marine distance to Dubai is 353 nautical miles (654 kilometres; 406 miles), to Karachi in Pakistan is 456 nmi (845 km; 525 mi), and to Mumbai in India is 843 nmi (1,560 km; 970 mi) .[16] Pakistan's deep sea port at Gwadar is also on the Makran coast, at a distance[17] of a mere 76 nautical miles. Gwadar also claims to provide access to Central Asia, and comparisons between the two ports are frequently made by analysts.[18][19][20]

Because 90 percent of Iran's population is concentrated in the western part of the country, the eastern part is relatively less developed. Iran is intending to change that with the development around Chabahar port, with a free trade zone and road and rail links between Chabahar and Central Asia. Its plan is to use Chabahar port as the gateway to Central Asia and to maintain the Bandar Abbas port, which currently handles 85% of Iran's seaborne trade, as a hub for trade with Russia and Europe.[15]

The highly congested Bandar Abbas port is not a deep water port and cannot handle the 250,000-ton oceangoing cargo ships. At present, such ships dock in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the cargo is transferred to smaller, 100,000-ton ships for onward shipment to Iran. This makes Iran dependent on the UAE for shipments and represents a loss of revenue. Unlike Bandar Abbas, Chabahar has the ability to handle standard cargo ships.[21][22]

History

[edit]

A former port named Tis in Chabahar's neighborhood dates back to the Sasanian times, and was known to Ptolemy as "Tesa".[23] Alberuni wrote that the sea coast of India commences with Tis.[24] The Portuguese forces under Afonso de Albuquerque gained control of Chabahar and Tis, staying there until 1621. The British, and later the Portuguese in the 17th century entered this region.[25]

Chabahar dates back to around 1970, when it was declared a municipality, and large port projects were started by order of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. The Shah planned to construct a $600 million naval base at Chabahar, mostly employing American companies as contractors. The American naval officials held talks with their Iranian counterparts on securing an "option" to operate out of Chabahar in the event of an emergency.[26] However, in 1977, the Shah got strapped for cash, caught in a tug of war between the OPEC and western oil companies over oil prices, and the construction of Chabahar base was postponed. Soon afterwards, the Shah was overthrown in the 1979 Iranian revolution.[27]

After the Iranian revolution, the foreign companies left the projects and Iranian public companies linked to the Ministry of Jahad-e Sazandegi (or jihad for construction) took them over. The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) caused Chabahar to gain in logistical and strategic importance. War brought insecurity to the Strait of Hormuz and ships were unable to enter the Persian Gulf. Accordingly, Chabahar became a major port during the war.[28]

The Chabahar port actually contains two separate ports called Shahid Kalantari and Shahid Beheshti. Between 1982 and 1983, Iran constructed four 45 meters (150 feet) berths at Shahid Kalantari and four 150 meters (492 feet) berths at Shahid Beheshti.[25][29] Two larger berths, 235 meters (771 feet) and 265 meters (869 feet) meters long, were constructed in 1997 and 2004 respectively.[29]

In 2013, India approved a cabinet proposal to invest $115 million into the port.[30]

In August 2017, Indian Union Minister of Ports, Nitin Gadkari, informed at an event in Iran that the civil work at Chabahar port developed by India is complete, and the Indian government is ordering INR 400 crores (US$63 million) worth of mechanised equipment and cranes, and the port will be operational in 2018 to export Indian wheat to Afghanistan. after meeting with Iranian President Hasan Rouhani, he said "now, we are building a railway line in Iran. From Chabhar, we can go to Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Russia."[31]

In August 2017, India Global Ports Limited (IGPL) had applied for the permission to run the Chabahar port in the interim, while Iran has already completed the construction of jetty and IGPL will build two new terminals, one for the containers and another for the multi-purpose ships. In October 2017, IGPL had already started constructing the terminals after placing order for the construction equipment.[32]

On 29 October 2017, the first shipment through the port was sent from India en route to Afghanistan.[32] To demonstrate the viability of the route, seven shipments of wheat as aid to Afghanistan were planned to be sent by India by the end of January 2018.[33]

On 3 December 2017, the first phase of the port construction was inaugurated by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.[34]

In January 2018, Iran and India signed an agreement worth $2 billion for cooperation in the rail sector. A part of the agreement pertains to a memorandum of understanding worth $600 million for Iran to purchase locomotives and freight cars from India.[35]

In November 2018, The United States has exempted the multinational Chabahar port project from its sanctions against Iran due to its economic importance to Afghanistan.[36]

In February 2019, Afghanistan Launches New Export Route To India Through Chabahar Port. At the inauguration of the new export route, officials said 23 trucks carrying 57 tonnes of dried fruits, textiles, carpets and mineral products were dispatched from the southwestern Afghan city of Zaranj to Iran's Chabahar port. The consignment will be shipped to Mumbai.[37][38]

On 14 July 2020, Iran proceeded with the construction of the Chabahar-Zahedan rail link independently, citing delays in the proposed funding from India.[39] Iran issued a statement, clarifying that while the funding of the rail link by IRCON had come up in negotiations, it had not been agreed upon between India and Iran.[40]

In late February 2024, the Taliban-led government of Afghanistan announced an investment of $35 million in the Chabahar port in southern Iran.[41] According to The Diplomat, cooperation between Afghanistan and Iran can provide the Taliban regime with more policy options and reduce its dependence on Pakistan.[42]

In 2026, India was reported to have exited the port citing the American tariffs,[43] however, the Indian government denied such reports and added that they are in talks with the US for extension of the waiver.[44] One government source added, "India has no choice but to exit the Chabahar port".[45]

India–Iran–Afghanistan partnership

[edit]

During the 1990s Iran and India, along with Russia, collaborated in backing the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Pakistan-backed Taliban. At this time, Iran invited India to develop the Chabahar port to obtain ready access to Afghanistan.[46][47] In 1997, a trilateral agreement was signed with Turkmenistan to expand trade into Central Asia and, in 2000, another agreement with Russia to provide seamless transport between India and Europe via an International North-South Transport Corridor.[48]

After the American presence in Afghanistan, India, Iran and Afghanistan got together in January 2003, agreeing on a joint development of transportation links to Afghanistan. India agreed to expand the Chabahar port and to lay a railway track between Chabahar and Zaranj. Iran has completed 70 percent of the first phase of the Chabahar project at a cost of $340 million.[49] India has spent $134 million during 2005–2009 to construct a road from Delaram in Afghanistan to Zaranj at the Iran–Afghanistan border.[50] Iran has also built a roadway between Milak, close to Zaranj, and Chabahar passing through Zahedan and Iranshahr. Through Milak, Zaranj and Deleram, connectivity has been established to the Afghan 'garland road', which connects the major Afghan cities Herat, Kandahar, Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif.[51] In March 2012, ships from India docked at Chabahar carrying 100,000 tonnes of wheat under humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.[52] The Afghan businesses have begun to shift from the Karachi port to Chabahar port for transit.[53]

India–Iran–Afghanistan transport corridor map

In 2016, India signed a deal with Iran entailing $8 billion investment in Chabahar port and industries in Chabahar Special Economic Zone, including an aluminium smelter and a urea making facility, at Chabahar port is being developed was a transit route to Afghanistan and central Asia.[54] India has already built a 240-km road connecting Afghanistan with Iran.[54] Also in planning is a rail route connecting Chabahar with the India-promoted $11-billion Hajigak iron and steel mining project in central Afghanistan,[54] as seven Indian companies in 2011 acquired rights to mine central Afghanistan's Hajigak region, which contain Asia's largest deposit of iron ore.[55] The Government of India has pledged to Afghanistan to spend $2bn in developing supporting infrastructure including Chabahar to Hajigaj railway.[55] All this will bring cargo to Bandar Abbas port and Chabahar port, and free Kabul from its dependence on Pakistan to reach the outer world, giving India access to Afghanistan and beyond to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Europe via 7,200-km-long multi-modal North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[54]

However, without further development of the Chabahar port, these road links would remain underutilized.[51] Despite intentions, India's involvement in the infrastructure development within Iran has been minimal, possibly due to the Western pressure to apply sanctions. Iran is also believed to have a shown a preference for Iranian contractors instead of Indians.[56][57] The initiative was restarted in August 2012 in a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of a Non-Aligned Summit.[56]

2016 trilateral Transit Agreement

[edit]

"This is a very, very crucial agreement for Afghanistan. The opening of this corridor will help us to fully reach our potential, give us a new trade route. This is a completely new chapter".
— Shaida Abdali, Afghan ambassador to India, April 2016.[57]

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at the signing of the trilateral transit agreement between the three countries in May 2016.

In May 2016, India signed a series of twelve memoranda of understanding, which centered upon the Port of Chabahar.

The trilateral transit agreement signed by India, Iran and Afghanistan allows Indian goods to reach Afghanistan through Iran. It links ports in the western coast of India to the Chabahar port and covers the road and rail links between Chabahar and the Afghan border.[58]

The bilateral agreement between India and Iran gives India the right to develop two berths of the Chabahar port as agreed in 2015 and allows them to be operated for 10 years by India Ports Global, a joint venture between Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust and Kandla Port Trust, in partnership with Iran's Aria Banader.[59] India Ports Global has guaranteed handling of 30,000 TEUs by the third year of operations, and aims to eventually handle 250,000 TEUs.[60]

The berths will be developed at a cost of $85 million over the course of 18 months.[61] Under the agreement, India Ports Global will refurbish a 640 meters (2,100 feet) long container handling facility, and reconstruct a 600 meters (1,970 feet) long container handling facility at the port.[5] India Ports Global will modernize ancillary infrastructure by installing four rail-mounted gantry cranes, sixteen rubber-tire gantry cranes, two reach stackers, two empty handlers, and six mobile harbor cranes.[62] Upon completion of upgrade works agreed to in the May 2016 agreements, Chabahar's capacity will be increased to 8 million tons from the current 2.5 million ton capacity.[4]

The investment is supplemented with a $150 million credit line to Iran through the Exim Bank of India.[58][63] India has also offered to supply $400 million worth of steel towards the construction of a rail link between Chahbahar and Zahedan.[64] Indian commitments to Iranian infrastructure could total $635 million as per the twelve memoranda of understanding signed in May 2016.[65]

As per the deal, India will also be developing various industries, including aluminum and urea production plants, in the Chabahar economic zone attached to the port.[66]

Iran's ambassador to Pakistan, Mehdi Honerdoost stated that Pakistan and China had both been invited to contribute to the project before India, but neither China nor Pakistan had expressed interest in joining.[67][68]

On 29 October 2017, the trilateral transit trade and route was implemented when the first shipment of wheat was sent from India to Afghanistan via Chabahar.[32]

Connectivity Plan

[edit]

The India–Iran–Afghanistan three-way memorandum of understanding (MoU) plans have committed at least $21bn to Chabahar–Hajigak corridor,[69] including $85m for Chabahar port development by India,[64] $150m line of credit by India to Iran,[64] $8bn India-Iran MoU for Indian industrial investment in Chabahar Special Economic Zone,[54] $11-billion Hajigak iron and steel mining project awarded to seven Indian companies in central Afghanistan,[54][55] and India's $2bn commitment to Afghanistan for developing supporting infrastructure including the Chabahar-Hajigaj railway,[55] with potential for several times more trade via connectivity to 7,200-km-long multi-mode North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) connecting to Europe and Turkey, R297 Amur highway and Trans-Siberian Highway across Russia,[70] and planned Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif railway providing access to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.[70] Chabahar Port also provides direct access to India's Farkhor Air Base in Tajikistan.[71] Chabahar route will result in 60% reduction in shipment costs and 50% reduction in shipment time from India to Central Asia.[72]

Transport infrastructure

[edit]

Chabahar–Zahedan–Bam–Hajigaj Railway

[edit]
Existing Iran railway network in 2006; Zahedan–Bam railway was completed in 2009

India had initially proposed a plan to construct a 900 km Chabahar–Zahedan–Hajigak railway line that would connect Chabahar to the mineral-rich Hajigak region of Afghanistan.[73][74] In 2011, seven Indian companies acquired rights to mine central Afghanistan's Hajigak region, which contain Asia's largest deposit of iron ore. The Government of India had pledged to spend $2bn in developing supporting infrastructure.[55] In May 2016, a MoU was also signed for financing of the planned Chabahar–Zahedan railway section of Chabahar–Zahedan-Hajigak railway,[75] as part of North–South Transport Corridor, by Indian Railways's public sector unit Ircon International.[76]

India had offered to supply approximately $400 million worth of steel towards the construction of this railway,[77] as well as offered to finance construction of the Chabahar to Zahedan rail line at a cost of $1.6 billion.[78] India began shipping rail tracks worth US$150 million in July 2016, and in December 2016 Iran also allocated US$125 million toward this rail route.

However, on 14 July 2020, Iran announced that it would be proceeding with constructing the Chabahar-Zahedan railway independently, citing delays in the Indian funding as the reason for dropping the partnership.[39] The Iranian government has projected completion of the rail link by March 2022, utilising the National Development Fund of Iran to complete the project.[39]

Chabahar's connection to the country's railway plan is under study and consideration.[citation needed] A rail link between Chabahar and Zahedan, when completed, can connect Chabahar to the Kerman–Zahedan railway and further to the Trans-Iranian Railway.[79]

Mashhad–Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif Railway

[edit]
See also: Rail transport in Afghanistan § Afghanistan–Iran rail service

Mashhad in north east Iran to Herat in north west Afghanistan rail route has four sections, two each in Iran and Afghanistan. Within Iran, section-1 from Khaf to Sangan 16 km route was completed in September 2016 and section-2 from Sangan to Iran–Afghanistan border at Shamtiq (Shematigh, Shmtygh, شمتیغ) 62 km was completed in October 2017. Within Afghanistan, section-3 from the Iran–Afghanistan border at Shamtiq–Jono (Jonaw, Junaw) to Ghurian 61.2 km route was completed in October 2017 and finally section-4 from Jono to Herat is an Italy-supported 86 km route.[80][81] Herat is already linked with Turkmenistan via rail and road routes.[82] India and Afghanistan plan to extend rail route from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif.[70] Mazar-i-Sharif is already linked with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan via rail as well as via road routes with other central Asian nations.[82][70]

Private sector investments

[edit]

India's minister of Road Transport and Highways Nitin Gadkari also stated that Indian companies could potentially invest over ₹1 lakh crore (US$12 billion) in the Chabahar Special Economic zone.[83] He however stated that potential investments would depend on whether Iran would be willing to supply Indian projects with natural gas at tariffs substantially lower than those offered by Iran.[84]

In March 2017, India has invited expression of interest from private parties to manage the port for 10 years, Adani Group and Ruia family's Essar Group are interested, and India announced that port equipment such as crane etc. will be procured soon.[85] In March 2017, India is already running training in Nagpur for the Afghan customs officials to be posted at Iran-Afghan border customs post built by India on the road built by India and Afghan ambassador to India announced that Indian shipments to Afghanistan via Chabahar will commence soon.[86]

Security

[edit]

Defense cover

[edit]

Chabahar Port benefits from the protection of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran military bases located in Konarak, Iran, across Chabahar Bay to the West.

Security issues

[edit]

Chronic instability in Afghanistan may limit the usefulness of Chabahar as a conduit to Afghanistan and Central Asia.[87] Road networks between Chabahar and Afghanistan rely upon connections to the Afghan Ring Road.[88] In August 2016, insurgent activity by Afghanistan's Taliban insurgent group forced closure of the Ring Road between Kandahar and Helmand Province.[89] After the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, IS-KP became a major security threat in the region.[90]

Iran's Sistan and Baluchestan Province, in which Chabahar port is located, was also the stage for insurgent activity by the insurgent group Jundallah, which claims to be fighting for the rights of Sunni Muslims,[91] and the local ethnic Baloch.[92] In 2010, Jundallah fighters dispatched a suicide bomber to a Shi'ite mosque in Chabahar, killing 38 people.[93] In the 2020s, its successor, Jaish ul-Adl, continues terror attacks in the Baloch insurgency.

Misinformation

[edit]

There have been several instances of misinformation campaigns aimed at undermining Iran’s foreign engagements related to the Chabahar Port, including the dissemination of false claims regarding its agreements with partner states.

In July 2025, the Iranian Embassy in India flagged a misinformation campaign targeting the India–Iran Chabahar Port agreement, warning that fake social media accounts—some traced to Pakistan—were impersonating Iranian entities to falsely claim that Tehran was reconsidering the pact. The embassy released screenshots of these accounts, some bearing verified badges, and labeled them as deliberate attempts to undermine bilateral relations by spreading disinformation.[94]

Strategic implications

[edit]

American policy analyst Rorry Daniels has characterized both the Indian investment in Chabahar and the Chinese investment in Gwadar as generating perceptions of "strategic encirclement". According to her, China fears encirclement by the US, India by China, and Pakistan by India. All of these encirclements are seen by the respective countries as "containment strategies", which they attempt to break out of.[18] Indian news commenter Shishir Gupta described India's Chabahar Port deal as "a counter to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor," as it has "broken through the strategic encirclement by China and Pakistan."[95]

Scholar Neil Padukone however disagrees that India has a goal of encircling Pakistan.[96] India needs access to iron from Afghanistan's Hajigak mine and other natural resources from the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which is made possible by the Chabahar port. But, in the long run, the pipeline-to-road-to-rail-to-sea-to-road shipment costs through Chabahar should be circumvented by direct transit through Pakistan. So far, Pakistan has been reluctant to provide such access.[97] The US State Department does not currently see military cooperation between Iran and India as part of the Chabahar project, although it has cautioned India to remain within the legal parameters with respect to collaboration with Iran.[98] The US also sees the Indian presence in greater Central Asia beneficial for spreading the soft power of democratic and friendly regimes.[18] India hopes to see the Western countries use the Chabahar route to link to Afghanistan and reduce their dependence on Pakistan.[99]

Padukone agrees that India has need for establishing a "naval counterweight" to China's presence in Gwadar,[96] as India sees the Gwadar Port as a manifestation of a strong China–Pakistan alliance that seeks to choke Indian investments in the Indian Ocean region.[18] Scholar Christophe Jaffrelot states that Gwadar gives the Chinese a key listening post to monitor US and Indian naval activity in the Persian Gulf as well as a dual-use civil-military base for Chinese ships and submarines. India perceive a direct threat and its response has been to help build the Chabahar port.[19]

Relationship with CPEC

[edit]

Iran has stated that Chabahar is not a rival to Pakistan's Gwadar and invited Pakistan to join in its development. Pakistani analysts have endorsed the view, stating that Gwadar has an advantage by being a deep sea port and the expansion of Chabahar would in fact expand trade through Gwadar. Larger vessels that cannot dock at Chabahar could dock at Gwadar and the cargo transshipped to Chabahar.[100] Pakistan's foreign policy advisor Sartaj Aziz has signaled that Pakistan may link the Gwadar port to Chabahar.[101]

However, in 2016, a retired Pakistani military officer characterized cooperation between India, Iran, and Afghanistan as a "security threat to Pakistan", that had "ominous and far-reaching implications" to the region. He also bemoaned the country's increasing "isolationism" and blamed what he called the “inaction” of the Foreign Office of Nawaz Sharif's government.[102]

In light of trade restrictions imposed on Iran by USA, India had reduced oil imports from Iran, but USA has not intervened directly in the port's development. Jeff Smith, a South Asia expert at The Heritage Foundation in Washington, said in November 2017, "conservative analysts in [Washington] DC have accepted the fact that India will maintain some form of relationship with Iran, Iran is more about a transport corridor to Afghanistan; that it has no interest in advancing Iran's agenda in the Middle East; and that whatever space India evacuates there will be filled by China".[32]

Iran's international strategy

[edit]
See also: Transport in Iran
North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC).

Consistent with its desire to be seen as a significant regional player, Iran has taken the initiative to engage with all the neighbouring countries to enhance the transit potential of Chabahar. It has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Afghanistan and Tajikistan on the construction of railway lines, water pipelines and energy transmission lines. It has been keen to extend the Khvaf-Herat rail line to connect to the railways of Central Asia, Turkey, and Europe. It has entered into an agreement with Oman, Qatar, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to establish a transport corridor between these countries. It is also a key partner in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) along with Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Oman, Syria, India and the Central Asian countries, which aims to connect South and Central Asian countries to Northern Europe via Iran and Russia. Specifically with respect to Chabahar, Iran has envisioned it as a key port in linking India with Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. Initiatives in this regard include a roadway from Chabahar to Milak on the Afghanistan border, Chabahar-Faraj-Bam railway, Chabahar-Zahedan-Mashhad rail link, which will be further extended to Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan and Termez in Uzbekistan.[103] Iran also plans to build the Iranrud, a Suez Canal like canal through Iran to connect the Caspian Sea with the Persian Gulf.[citation needed]

See also

[edit]

Citations

[edit]
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    "Currently only 10% of the capacity of Chabahar Port is being utilized, Khiyabani said recently.
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Chabahar Port

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Chabahar Port is a deep-sea commercial port in southeastern along the , functioning as the nation's sole oceanic outlet and a vital conduit for overland trade to and . Developed through bilateral agreements between and , the port's Shahid Beheshti terminal has been equipped and operated by India's India Ports Global Limited since 2018, following a 10-year operational signed on May 13, 2024, under which India committed $120 million for upgrades to boost container and multipurpose cargo handling capacity. This initiative establishes Chabahar as a key component of the International North-South Transport Corridor, enabling shorter maritime and rail routes from India to that avoid Pakistan's territorial constraints and the Chinese-operated nearby. Despite persistent U.S. sanctions on Iran posing risks to foreign investment and operations—exacerbated by the revocation of prior waivers—the port has facilitated over 8 million tonnes of cargo and 90,000 TEUs by 2024, including humanitarian wheat shipments to , underscoring its role in India's pursuit of strategic connectivity and regional autonomy.

Geography and Location

Physical Site and Environmental Features

Chabahar Port is located on the southeastern coast of in , facing the at approximately 25°17′N 60°37′E. The site spans over 11 km² at an elevation of 7 m above , between longitudes 60°20′E and 60°32′E. It comprises two main terminals, Shahid Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari, positioned within the sheltered confines of Chabahar Bay, an omega-shaped (Ω) inlet that offers natural protection from oceanic swells due to flanking headlands. The bay covers a surface area of 290 km² with depths ranging from 4 to 22 m and a mean depth of 12 m, facilitating access for vessels with drafts up to 16 m at developed berths. Natural deep-water channels and the absence of significant river inflows contribute to moderate sedimentation influenced by longshore transport and monsoon-driven currents. The features sedimentary deposits, including beach sands and aeolian materials, with geomorphological processes historically modulated by changes. Surrounding terrain includes a strandplain exceeding 5 km in width, composed of mudstones, marine terraces, and systems, bordered by high-relief coastal ranges to the north and west. The region exhibits arid tropical conditions, with annual average temperatures varying from 15°C to 37°C and scant of approximately 117 mm, concentrated in winter, under the influence of summer winds from the . These features underpin the port's role as Iran's sole oceanic harbor, distinct from Persian Gulf ports vulnerable to chokepoints.

Strategic Maritime Positioning

Chabahar Port is located on the northern coast of the in southeastern , offering direct access to the and . This positioning distinguishes it as the only Iranian port with unobstructed maritime connectivity to high seas, unlike facilities in the that require transit through the . The port's location outside the provides strategic advantages by mitigating risks associated with congestion or blockades in that narrow chokepoint, which handles a significant portion of global oil shipments. As a warm-water, ice-free harbor, Chabahar remains operational year-round, facilitating reliable trade routes to the , , and beyond without seasonal limitations. Geographically, Chabahar lies approximately 800 kilometers closer to Afghanistan's border than Pakistan's Karachi Port, positioning it as a vital entry point for overland trade to landlocked and Central Asian republics via routes like the Zaranj-Delaram highway. This proximity enables shorter transit times and reduced dependency on Pakistani territory, enhancing connectivity for and regional partners to energy-rich .

Historical Development

Pre-Modern and Early Modern Context

The region encompassing modern , historically known as the port of (or Tiz), served as a significant maritime outpost on the coast during antiquity, with evidence of activity tracing back to the (c. 550–330 BCE). This port facilitated regional trade in goods such as spices, textiles, and metals across the and into the , leveraging the area's natural deep-water access and proximity to overland routes connecting Persia to . Archaeological surveys indicate settlements and harbor infrastructure from this era, underscoring Tis's role in the empire's naval and commercial networks, though direct epigraphic evidence remains limited. Hellenistic records provide the earliest textual references to Tis, associating it with Alexander the Great's campaigns (356–323 BCE), during which the port likely supported logistical operations for Persian Gulf expeditions. Under subsequent Parthian (247 BCE–224 CE) and Sassanid (224–651 CE) dynasties, the coast, including Tis, retained strategic value for defending against maritime incursions and sustaining Indo-Roman trade routes, with ports handling exports of pearls, dates, and . However, environmental challenges like arid conditions and seismic activity constrained sustained urban growth, limiting Tis to a primarily and hub rather than a major emporium like Hormuz. In the medieval Islamic period (post-651 CE), Tis experienced intermittent prosperity under Abbasid (750–1258 CE) and local Baloch dynasties, benefiting from monsoon-driven commerce with and . Accounts suggest the port's decline following Mongol invasions in the 13th century, which devastated coastal infrastructure across , reducing it to a minor village by the time of Ilkhanid rule. Early modern developments (c. 1500–1800 CE) saw limited revival under Safavid (1501–1736 CE) oversight, with the area functioning as a outpost amid rivalries involving naval presence in the and Omani Arab incursions. cartographers documented Chah-Bahar (an early variant name) as a minor anchorage, but no major fortifications or expansions occurred, as trade shifted to more secure ports; the site's role remained ancillary to overland caravan paths until the 19th century. Qajar-era (1789–1925 CE) records note sporadic use for local fishing and pilgrimage routes, presaging its neglect prior to 20th-century modernization.

20th-Century Planning and Initial Construction

The development of Chabahar Port was initially proposed in 1973 by Iran's last , , as part of a broader strategy to establish a deep-water port and on the , leveraging the site's natural advantages for maritime trade and military positioning. Contracts for preliminary planning and site preparation were signed that year, marking the formal commencement of feasibility studies and phases under the Pahlavi . The 1979 Iranian Revolution significantly disrupted these efforts, leading to the abandonment of the Shah-era plans amid political upheaval, nationalization of projects, and a shift in priorities toward wartime needs during the subsequent Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). Post-revolution, the repurposed the site initially for naval operations to safeguard Iran's fleet from Iraqi threats in the , delaying commercial port development. Initial construction of basic port infrastructure resumed in the early 1980s, driven by the need to redirect seaborne trade eastward away from war-vulnerable western routes near the and toward Pakistan's border. The first phase, consisting of rudimentary berths and handling facilities, was operationalized by , enabling limited cargo operations primarily for domestic and regional shipments during the ongoing conflict. This modest setup handled basic container and but lacked modern equipment, reflecting resource constraints imposed by sanctions and war.

Post-2000 Expansion Phases

The post-2000 expansion of Port focused primarily on upgrading the Shahid Beheshti terminal to enhance capacity and operational efficiency, driven by bilateral - agreements amid regional connectivity goals. Initial discussions began in January 2003, leading to commitments for to equip and operate berths at the terminal. Progress stalled due to on following its nuclear program advancements, limiting substantive development until the mid-2010s. Revival occurred in May 2015 with a bilateral , followed by a May 2016 during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to , under which provided a $500 million to refurbish the terminal and construct a 600-meter container facility. Phase 1 development, involving two berths capable of handling vessels up to 14 meters draft, was completed and inaugurated in December 2017, achieving an annual capacity of approximately 8.5 million metric tons. The first Indian wheat shipment to via the port arrived in October 2017, demonstrating early operational viability for regional transit. India's IPGL assumed operations in December 2018 under an initial 18-month lease, handling over 90,000 TEUs and 8.4 million metric tons of cargo by 2024, including transshipments to . Renewed U.S. sanctions in 2018 prompted short-term extensions and arbitration delays, constraining further investment. Phase 2, aimed at deepening berths to 16.5 meters draft and expanding capacity to over 20 million tons annually, has progressed slowly, with undertaking independent dredging and infrastructure works while focuses on operational enhancements. In May 2024, and signed a 10-year contract for IPGL to operate Shahid Beheshti, backed by $120 million for equipment procurement, a $250 million credit line for infrastructure, and $25 million for six mobile harbor cranes, targeting a five-fold capacity increase over the next decade despite ongoing sanction risks.

Infrastructure and Capacity

Core Port Facilities and Equipment

The Chabahar Port's core facilities primarily consist of the Shahid Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari terminals, with Shahid Beheshti serving as the main hub for multi-purpose and container cargo operations. Shahid Beheshti features five functional berths capable of handling diverse cargo types, including bulk, break-bulk, and containers, with an operational annual capacity of 2.5 million tons. One of these berths supports vessels up to 80,000 deadweight tons (DWT), while the terminal's berths generally accommodate drafts up to 14 meters. Cargo handling equipment at Shahid Beheshti includes six mobile harbor cranes supplied by as of May 2024, valued at approximately $24 million in total equipment deliveries by November 2024, enhancing unloading and loading efficiency for larger vessels. Further upgrades involve tenders issued in 2023 for 14 rubber-tyred gantry cranes (each 40-ton capacity), three all-terrain cranes, and three reach stackers, alongside orders for five additional mobile harbor cranes placed in early 2025 to support capacity expansion toward 100,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) by fiscal year 2026. The Shahid Kalantari Terminal, operational since earlier phases, maintains five berths focused on general and lighter , with supporting for basic handling but limited advanced mechanization compared to Shahid Beheshti. Both terminals incorporate open storage areas and warehouses, though specific capacities remain subordinate to Shahid Beheshti's development priority under recent India-Iran agreements emphasizing equipment modernization for regional transit efficiency.

Development Phases and Technical Specifications

The Shahid Beheshti terminal at Port follows a master plan divided into five phases, designed to achieve a nominal annual capacity of 86 million tonnes by the mid-2020s, though implementation timelines have faced delays due to geopolitical and financial constraints. Phase one prioritized foundational , including the construction of three multi-purpose berths each 540 meters long and initial container handling capabilities, with operations launching in December 2017 following inauguration by Iranian President . India's involvement in phase one, under a 2016 memorandum of understanding, included equipping the terminal with two ship-to-shore gantry cranes, mobile harbor cranes, reach stackers, and other cargo-handling machinery, enabling an initial capacity increase from 2.5 million tonnes to 8.5 million tonnes annually. The container berths feature a quay length of 640 meters per berth with a draft of 16 meters, accommodating post-Panamax vessels, while multi-purpose berths maintain a 14-meter draft. Phase two focuses on expanding facilities, including a new 360-meter berth and preparation for additional operations, as part of broader efforts to reach 82 million tonnes total capacity with 32 berths comprising 10 , 16 multi-purpose, and specialized and bulk terminals. In May 2024, and signed a 10-year granting India Ports Global Limited operational rights and investment authority, facilitating phase two advancements and targeting 500,000 TEUs annually by 2026. Subsequent phases emphasize specialized terminals for liquids and dry bulk, alongside expansions exceeding 33,000 square meters and stacking yards supporting up to 740,000 TEUs in intermediate stages.

Operational Performance Metrics

The Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar Port, managed by Ports Global Limited since December 2018, recorded 60,088 TEUs of cargo in financial year 2023-24, reflecting a 558% increase from 9,126 TEUs in FY 2022-23. handling reached 1.9 million metric tons in FY 2023-24. These figures represent operational utilization well below the terminal's equipped capacity of approximately 8.5 million tons annually, constrained by factors including on and limited regional trade volumes. Container throughput for calendar year 2024 surged 83% to 90,800 TEUs, driven by expanded vessel calls and direct shipping lines to and the UAE. Cumulative performance since IPGL's involvement includes over 450 vessel berthings and handling of more than 134,000 TEUs and 8.4 million tons of total as of September 2025. The port's current capacity stands at around 100,000 TEUs annually, with upgrades underway to reach 500,000 TEUs by mid-2026 through additional and rail connectivity.
Fiscal YearContainer TEUs HandledYear-over-Year GrowthBulk Cargo (Million Metric Tons)
2022-239,126-2.08
2023-2460,088558%1.90
Data derived from Indian government and trade analyses indicate primary cargo types include bulk commodities such as wheat and fertilizers for transit, alongside growing ized exports to . remains challenged by geopolitical tensions, including U.S. sanctions waivers expiring in 2025, which have intermittently disrupted financing and equipment procurement despite bilateral India-Iran agreements.

International Agreements and Investments

India-Iran Bilateral Deals

In May 2015, and signed a for the development of Chabahar Port, laying the groundwork for Indian involvement in equipping and operating terminals. This was followed by a bilateral in May 2016 during Indian Narendra Modi's visit to , between India Ports Global Private Limited (IPGL) and Iran's Arya Banader, focusing on port development and operations for Phase I, which included building and operating two berths with an Indian capital of $85 million and annual revenue expenditure commitments. Progress stalled amid U.S. sanctions on , limiting Indian equipment shipments and funding until a was granted in for non-sanctionable activities. On May 13, 2024, and formalized a 10-year contract enabling IPGL to develop and operate the Beheshti terminal, with committing $120 million for infrastructure and equipment upgrades, alongside a $250 million for related projects such as and road connectivity. This agreement prioritizes enhancing terminal capacity to handle 8.5 million tonnes annually initially, aiming to position as a transit hub for Indian goods to and while circumventing Pakistani routes. The 2024 deal builds on prior phases by granting operational control without ownership, with revenues shared based on performance metrics, though implementation faces risks from renewed U.S. sanctions pressure, including the revocation of India's in September 2025. Indian officials have emphasized the port's role in regional diversification, projecting potential throughput growth to support $1-2 billion in annual facilitation.

Trilateral and Regional Partnerships

The primary trilateral partnership involving Chabahar Port is the agreement signed on May 24, 2016, between India, Iran, and Afghanistan to establish an international transport and transit corridor. This pact enables the efficient movement of goods and passengers from Indian ports through Chabahar to Afghanistan via road and rail links, providing Afghanistan with direct access to the Indian Ocean and circumventing Pakistani territory. India pledged approximately $500 million in investments to develop the port's infrastructure under this framework, focusing on enhancing connectivity for landlocked Afghanistan. Implementation of the trilateral accord has progressed through periodic consultations, including a joint statement issued on December 3, 2017, during a meeting in , which outlined steps for operationalizing the corridor, such as customs facilitation and infrastructure upgrades. Practical utilization includes India's shipment of 20,000 tonnes of aid to via Chabahar in 2023, demonstrating the corridor's role in humanitarian and trade logistics despite geopolitical tensions. Regionally, Chabahar has drawn interest from Central Asian states seeking diversified trade routes to South Asia and beyond. In the 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue on June 6, 2025, participants expressed enthusiasm for utilizing the Shahid Beheshti Terminal at to facilitate exports to , aligning with India's Connect Central Asia policy and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Countries like have explored investments in Chabahar-linked projects, though U.S. sanctions imposed in 2025 have introduced risks, potentially deterring deeper commitments. These partnerships position Chabahar as a multimodal hub integrating sea, rail, and road networks to enhance economic ties across South and Central Asia.

Other Foreign Contributions

Uzbekistan reached an agreement with in 2023 to develop a center, along with terminals and warehouses, at the Shahid Beheshti terminal of Chabahar Port, aiming to enhance regional connectivity for Central Asian trade. However, as of October 2025, continues to evaluate the investment risks amid U.S. sanctions on , geopolitical instability in the region, and potential disruptions from conflicts involving , which could deter full implementation. No specific investment amounts from have been publicly committed or disbursed beyond the initial accord. Russia has expressed interest in utilizing Chabahar for transiting goods to bypass traditional routes, with discussions focusing on facilitating investments by Russian businesses in port-related infrastructure and operations. In alignment with broader International North-South Transport Corridor initiatives, Russia signed a with Iran on transit cooperation in April 2025, potentially extending to Chabahar's integration, though concrete port-specific funding or construction commitments remain limited. Russian involvement appears geared more toward logistical usage than direct development, constrained by international sanctions and competing priorities in other Eurasian corridors. China's engagement with has been exploratory rather than substantive, with no verified major investments materializing as of 2025, partly due to Beijing's substantial commitments elsewhere, such as the $62 billion allocated to Pakistan's rival . Iranian media outlets have occasionally advocated replacing Indian involvement with Chinese partners, citing alignment on regional issues, but no bilateral agreements for Chinese funding or operational control have been formalized. Speculation persists about potential Chinese assistance in linking to for cross-border efficiency, yet such proposals lack confirmed progress and face hurdles from U.S. sanctions and strategic rivalries. Other prospective partners, including entities from Afghanistan's administration, have signaled minor investments—such as a reported $35 million pledge in early 2023 for port facilities—but these have not advanced significantly amid ongoing regional security challenges and limited financial capacity. Overall, foreign contributions beyond primary bilateral frameworks remain preliminary, with progress hampered by sanctions, economic viability concerns, and divergent national interests, resulting in far less capital inflow compared to established Indian projects.

Connectivity and Integration

Railway and Road Networks

The primary railway initiative enhancing Port's connectivity is the –Zahedan railway, a 628-kilometer line designed to link the port directly to Iran's national rail network through , the provincial capital of and Baluchestan. This project facilitates integration with broader corridors, including routes extending toward and . Sections 7 and 8, spanning to Khash, were completed and inaugurated in 2023. As of October 2025, the – railway has surpassed 84% physical progress, achieving a national record by laying 50 kilometers of track in a single month and demonstrating a daily laying rate that supports accelerated completion. has allocated approximately $110 million to expedite construction, with full operations anticipated by mid-2026, enabling the port's cargo to access inland destinations more efficiently. Upon completion, the line will form a critical segment of the International North-South Transport Corridor, reducing transit times for goods from the to Eurasian markets. Complementing rail development, road networks provide established overland access from to and onward to the Afghan border at , supporting multimodal freight under the Chabahar Transit Project. This project encompasses road routes as part of a combined network linking , , , and , with existing infrastructure enabling truck transport to Afghan entry points before connecting to further regional highways. These roads, integrated with the port's operations since its expansion phases, handle current cargo volumes pending full rail activation, though they face limitations in capacity compared to anticipated rail efficiencies.

Multimodal Corridors to Central Asia

Chabahar Port facilitates multimodal corridors to through integrated sea, rail, and road networks, enabling freight movement from ports to landlocked states like , , and while bypassing . These routes leverage Iran's southeastern rail and road infrastructure, with the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line—under since 2017 and projected for completion by 2026—serving as a critical link to Iran's national network and onward connections to via . The Transit Project, initiated on May 24, 2016, by , , and , establishes a foundational multimodal framework combining maritime access at Chabahar with road transport via the Chabahar-Zaranj-Delaram highway to western , facilitating extension northward to and . This corridor supports 's exports, such as 2.5 million tons of to in 2017-2018, and positions Chabahar as an alternative gateway for Central Asian diversification amid reliance on Russian and Chinese routes. Emerging extensions include Uzbekistan's proposed multimodal corridor through Turkmenistan and Iran to Chabahar, discussed in trilateral consultations since 2020, aiming to reduce transit times and costs for Indian goods to compared to maritime alternatives around the . In May 2024, India's 10-year contract to operate Chabahar's Shahid Beheshti terminal bolstered these links, with weighing investments despite geopolitical risks from U.S. sanctions on . Integration with 's participation in the China--Turkmenistan- railway, joined by in 2025, further enhances connectivity to . These corridors align with India's Connect Central Asia policy, promoting resilient trade paths that could elevate bilateral trade volumes to $200 billion through synergies with the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), though actual utilization remains constrained by incomplete infrastructure and sanctions. Central Asian states, including and , increasingly view Chabahar as a strategic outlet to the , with discussions in 2024 emphasizing rail-road synergies for regional transit.

Integration with Afghan and Beyond

Chabahar Port's integration with stems from the 2016 trilateral transit agreement signed by , , and , establishing the port as a dedicated transit hub for Afghan goods to access the without reliance on Pakistani ports. This agreement facilitates the transport of cargo and passengers, with committing $500 million initially for port development to enable seamless connectivity. Under the pact, gained preferential access, allowing imports like Indian wheat shipments in 2017 totaling 1.1 million tonnes delivered via Chabahar to address food shortages. Infrastructure linkages include India's construction of the 218-kilometer Delaram-Zaranj highway in southwestern , completed in 2009, which connects directly to the Iranian border and onward to , reducing transit distances by approximately 800 kilometers compared to . Road access from extends via the Zahedan-Milak route to the Afghan border at , supporting overland trucking for Afghan exports such as fruits and minerals. Rail integration is advancing through the under-construction 628-kilometer -Zahedan railway in , set for completion by 2025, which will link to Afghanistan's rail network at Khaf-Herat for faster movement. Extending beyond Afghanistan, Chabahar serves as India's primary maritime gateway to Central Asia, channeling trade through trans-Afghan corridors to landlocked states like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The port integrates with the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), enabling multimodal routes from Chabahar via Iran and Afghanistan to Central Asian hubs, potentially halving shipping times to Europe compared to Suez Canal paths. Uzbekistan has expressed interest in investing in Chabahar as of October 2025, viewing it as a diversification from Chinese-dominated routes, though geopolitical risks including U.S. sanctions on Iran pose hurdles. Trade volumes remain modest, with Central Asian linkages projected to grow following the May 2024 India-Iran 10-year operational contract, which enhances port capacity to 8.5 million tonnes annually for regional transit. Challenges persist due to Afghanistan's post-2021 political instability under rule, which has disrupted consistent trade flows despite the port's operationalization for Afghan exports like dried fruits in 2024. Iranian security concerns and incomplete cross-border infrastructure further limit full potential, yet the corridor's strategic value lies in fostering amid regional rivalries.

Economic and Trade Impacts

Cargo Volumes and Trade Flows

Chabahar Port's throughput has shown incremental growth amid operational expansions and Indian involvement, though it operates below its phase-one capacity of 8 million tonnes annually. In 2023-24, the port handled 2.84 million tonnes of , an increase from 2.22 million tonnes in FY 2022-23 and 2.23 million tonnes in FY 2021-22. handling marked a sharp rise to 60,059 TEUs in FY 2023-24, compared to 9,126 TEUs in the prior year. Since assumed terminal operations in 2018, cumulative volumes facilitated include over 90,000 TEUs and 8 million tonnes of through 2024.
Fiscal YearTotal Cargo (million tonnes)Containers (TEUs)
2021-222.23-
2022-232.229,126
2023-242.8460,059
Trade flows at Chabahar predominantly feature bulk shipments from to , including 20,000 tonnes of in 2023 and pesticides in 2021, leveraging the as a bypass to Pakistani routes. These movements support 's import needs and extend to Central Asian markets via connected land corridors. Containerized and dry bulk goods increasingly transit the , integrated with Iran's to facilitate diversified trade with regional partners like , where bilateral trade with neared $1 billion in 2024. Goods loading and unloading rose 30% in the first ten months of the Iranian year ending 2025, reflecting heightened activity post the May 2024 India-Iran operational agreement.

Benefits for Landlocked Economies

Chabahar Port serves as a vital maritime gateway for landlocked economies in Afghanistan and Central Asia, offering direct access to the Indian Ocean and reducing reliance on longer or geopolitically unstable overland routes through Pakistan or other neighbors. By integrating with road and rail networks, such as the Chabahar-Zahedan railway, the port enables efficient transit of goods to inland destinations, potentially lowering transportation costs and transit times compared to alternatives like the port of Karachi, which is approximately 800 kilometers farther from Afghanistan's border. This connectivity supports export of minerals, agricultural products, and imports of essentials, fostering economic diversification for these resource-rich but access-constrained nations. For , Chabahar has facilitated significant humanitarian and commercial shipments, including over 2.5 million tonnes of Indian wheat aid delivered via the port by early 2022, bypassing disruptions in Pakistan's transit corridors. Bilateral trade between and reached $779 million in 2023, with the port handling portions of this volume, including exports of Afghan dry fruits and imports of machinery and pharmaceuticals, thereby enhancing revenue from transit fees and reducing logistical vulnerabilities amid regional instability. Operations at have processed over 8 million tonnes of and 90,000 TEUs by 2024 under Indian management, with a portion directed toward Afghan markets, demonstrating scalable benefits for sustained trade flows. Extending to Central Asian states like , , , , and , Chabahar integrates with the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), providing the shortest sea-to-land route to warm-water ports and onward links to and via Iranian and Caspian infrastructure. This corridor could expedite goods movement for energy exports and imports, with Uzbekistan-India trade nearing $1 billion in 2024, potentially amplified through Chabahar's role in multimodal logistics. Such access mitigates the high costs of northern routes via or , promoting regional while offering these economies leverage in diversifying trade partners beyond immediate neighbors.

Investment Returns and Economic Viability

has committed approximately $370 million to the development and operation of Port's Beheshti terminal under a 10-year agreement signed in May 2024, including $120 million in direct equity investment by India Ports Global Limited and an additional $250 million credit line for infrastructure enhancements. This investment aims to equip the terminal to handle up to 8.5 million tons of cargo annually, though actual throughput has remained significantly lower, reaching 2.84 million tons in 2024, up from 1.2 million tons in 2021. Cargo volumes have shown modest growth, with over 8 million tons handled cumulatively since Indian operations began in 2018, including more than 90,000 TEUs by 2024, but these figures fall short of projections and indicate underutilization relative to the port's potential capacity exceeding 8 million tons per year. Revenue generation has been constrained by limited commercial traffic, primarily driven by wheat shipments to Afghanistan and sporadic bulk cargo, rather than sustained high-volume trade flows essential for positive returns on investment. No public analyses quantify a specific return on investment (ROI) for the project, but low occupancy rates—often below 30% of capacity—suggest that break-even timelines extend beyond a decade under current conditions, assuming no escalation in utilization. Economic viability faces substantial risks from U.S. sanctions, which were intensified in September 2025 with the revocation of a prior , exposing Indian investments to secondary penalties and deterring participation. Geopolitical tensions, including from Pakistan's backed by $62 billion in Chinese funding, further undermine Chabahar's competitiveness, as transit costs and reliability issues persist without integrated regional corridors achieving full scale. While proponents argue for long-term gains through reduced dependency on Pakistani routes—potentially lowering costs by 30% for Central Asian trade—the absence of diversified revenue streams and persistent underperformance indicate that the port's viability hinges more on strategic imperatives than immediate financial returns.

Geopolitical and Strategic Role

Competition with Gwadar and CPEC

Chabahar Port serves as India's strategic counterweight to Pakistan's , which forms a key node in China's China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), highlighting broader Sino-Indian geopolitical competition in the region. Located approximately 170 kilometers apart along the coast, the ports enable divergent connectivity routes: Chabahar facilitates India's access to and via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), bypassing , while anchors CPEC's extension of China's (BRI) into the , providing shorter maritime routes to the and . This rivalry intensified after India's 10-year agreement with on May 13, 2024, committing $120 million for equipment at the Beheshti terminal and a $250 million credit line for infrastructure, contrasting with China's operational control of Gwadar since 2013 under a 40-year . Development progress underscores differing trajectories and capacities. , backed by over $1.6 billion in direct Chinese investment for Phase I completion in , aims for a projected annual handling of up to 400 million tons by 2045, supported by CPEC's $62 billion total framework including roads, projects, and special economic zones, though plagued by delays from security threats, local insurgencies, and Pakistan's debt burdens exceeding $30 billion to as of 2023. In comparison, Chabahar's Beheshti terminal reached 2.5 million tons annual capacity post-Indian in 2017-2018 but has seen sporadic usage, with India's 2024 deal targeting expansion to 8-10 million tons amid U.S. sanctions risks, including the of waivers in September 2025 that previously shielded Indian firms. Analysts note Gwadar's deeper-water advantages (14.5 meters vs. Chabahar's 16.5 meters post-) for larger vessels, yet Chabahar's position outside Pakistan's territorial constraints offers India logistical independence for aid to , handling 85,000 tons of shipments there in 2022.
PortPrimary BackerKey InvestmentsProjected Capacity (tons/year)Operational Challenges
ChabaharIndia$120M (2024 terminal) + $250M credit8-10 million (short-term); up to 12.5 millionU.S. sanctions, low cargo volumes (under 3 million in 2023)
GwadarChina (via CPEC)$1.6B+ (port phases); $62B corridor total400 million by 2045Security attacks, debt ($30B+), delays in hinterland links
Despite proximity fostering potential cooperation—such as Iran-Pakistan talks in May 2025 on joint - trade—the ports embody zero-sum dynamics, with viewing as a Chinese naval outpost encircling its interests, while perceives as diluting BRI dominance in regional trade flows projected at $100 billion annually through these gateways. Empirical data reveals limited direct cargo competition thus far, as handled under 100,000 TEUs in 2023 amid infrastructure gaps, versus 's focus on bulk goods to landlocked states, but strategic posturing persists, with 's INSTC reducing transit times to by 40% compared to Pakistani routes.

India's Access and Security Objectives

India's primary access objective for Chabahar Port centers on establishing a reliable alternative maritime gateway to and , circumventing land routes through that have been restricted due to bilateral tensions. In pursuit of this, India signed a with in May 2015 to develop the port, followed by a trilateral agreement with and in May 2016 to facilitate , transit, and connectivity. This framework enabled the operationalization of the Shahid Beheshti terminal, with India investing approximately $500 million to equip and operate it under a 10-year contract signed in May 2024 by India Ports Global Limited. The port connects via the Chabahar-Zaranj railway and road networks to key Afghan entry points, supporting multimodal corridors that extend to republics and integrate with broader initiatives like the International North-South Transport Corridor. From a perspective, enhances India's by diversifying transit options and mitigating risks associated with overreliance on Pakistan-controlled pathways, which have historically been vulnerable to political disruptions and cross-border threats. This access bolsters India's ability to deliver and sustain economic engagement with , particularly post-2021, without intermediaries prone to interference. The port's development also counters the encirclement effects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by providing a counter-route for secure trade flows, thereby preserving India's influence in the region amid competing infrastructure projects. Indian officials have emphasized the port's role in fostering stable connectivity, with trilateral dialogues underscoring commitments to operationalize routes for mutual benefits, including expedited transit protocols.

Iran's Regional Leverage and Limitations

Chabahar Port bolsters Iran's regional leverage by offering direct oceanic access via the , distinguishing it from Iran's other ports and enabling enhanced maritime trade projections into and beyond. This strategic positioning allows Iran to promote alternative transit corridors to landlocked and , circumventing Pakistan's territorial controls and integrating with the International North-South Transport Corridor for diversified economic outreach. The port serves as a to Pakistan's under the China-Pakistan , positioning to vie for influence in regional connectivity and trade flows. Through bilateral engagements, such as the May 13, 2024, 10-year agreement with —entailing $120 million for terminal infrastructure and $250 million in credit for rail connectivity— secures foreign investment and operational expertise, amplifying its role in Eurasian trade networks. Despite these advantages, U.S. sanctions severely curtail Iran's ability to realize full potential, with the revocation of a 2018 on September 29, 2025, subjecting the port to secondary sanctions that discourage international participation and financing. Iran's designation on the exacerbates these restrictions, blocking access to global financial systems and limiting trade scalability. Geopolitical dependencies compound limitations, as Iran's reliance on partners like —who prioritize U.S. alliances—for development exposes vulnerabilities to external policy shifts, evidenced by India's cautious navigation of sanctions risks post-2024 deal. Regional rivalries, including tensions with Sunni states and Western powers, further isolate , hindering multilateral endorsements for port expansion. Security challenges in Sistan-Baluchestan province, marked by Baloch separatist insurgencies and cross-border militancy, threaten port stability, with persistent attacks underscoring flaws and ethnic grievances that amplify operational risks. Internal and economic barriers, intensified by sanctions, constrain modernization, perpetuating underutilization despite strategic intent.

Security and Defense Aspects

Defensive Infrastructure and Arrangements

The defensive responsibilities for Chabahar Port fall under the authority of Iranian military and security apparatus, including the (IRGC) and the Iranian Navy's Southern Fleet, which maintains operational presence in the to safeguard maritime access. The port's location in exposes it to asymmetric threats from Baloch separatist insurgents, such as Jaish al-Adl, who have staged attacks on nearby infrastructure and personnel to challenge Tehran's control over the ethnically Baloch region. Iranian forces prioritize operations, including intelligence-driven raids and fortified perimeters around port facilities, to mitigate these risks. In practice, these arrangements involve rapid-response tactics by IRGC ground units, as demonstrated in February 2025 when security forces raided insurgent positions in using rocket-propelled grenades and sustained gunfire during clashes that highlighted ongoing separatist incursions. Similarly, in July 2025, IRGC personnel neutralized six alleged militants plotting an assault on the port, underscoring the emphasis on preemptive neutralization of terrorist threats. Naval patrols by Iran's fleet provide layered defense against maritime interdiction, leveraging the port's proximity to international shipping lanes while integrating with broader IRGC doctrines, such as swarm tactics and coastal missile deployments in the southeastern theater. Under the 2024 India-Iran operational agreement for the Shahid Beheshti terminal, retains management of commercial activities but cedes security oversight to Iranian entities, with provisions for coordinated safety protocols to ensure personnel and without foreign involvement. This delineation reflects Iran's insistence on sovereign control amid regional tensions, though public details on fixed defensive assets—like arrays or hardened bunkers—remain limited due to operational secrecy. IRGC-affiliated firms have supplemented local defenses by recruiting foreign fighters, including Afghan Fatemiyoun members, for and perimeter security roles, a practice criticized for blending proxy militancy with infrastructure protection.

Regional Threats and Vulnerabilities

The Chabahar Port, situated in Iran's Sistan and Baluchestan province bordering Pakistan, faces significant vulnerabilities from Baloch separatist militants operating in the region. Groups such as Jaish al-Adl, a Sunni Baloch insurgent organization designated as a terrorist entity by Iran and the United States, have conducted multiple attacks in and around Chabahar city, targeting government and security installations that could extend to critical infrastructure like the port. For instance, in December 2018, Jaish al-Adl carried out a suicide bombing on a police post in Chabahar, killing at least one officer and wounding dozens, highlighting the group's capacity for asymmetric attacks in the port's vicinity. More recently, in February 2025, the group claimed responsibility for an explosion destroying a government housing office in Chabahar, followed by clashes with Iranian security forces that resulted in militant casualties. These incidents underscore the port's exposure to local insurgencies fueled by ethnic grievances, economic marginalization, and cross-border safe havens in Pakistan, where similar Baloch groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army escalate attacks on Pakistani infrastructure. Cross-border militancy amplifies these risks, with porous frontiers enabling militant mobility and potential spillover from 's , where insurgents target Chinese- projects akin to Chabahar's strategic role. and have intensified cooperation against shared Baloch threats, including joint operations since 2024, yet ongoing attacks—such as Jaish al-Adl's October 2024 twin assaults in and Baluchestan killing six security personnel—demonstrate persistent vulnerabilities. In July 2025, Jaish al-Adl struck a in the , killing at least nine, further straining local security resources and illustrating the challenge of securing extended supply lines to landlocked neighbors like amid governance instability. While no direct assaults on facilities have been recorded, the provincial insurgency's toward sophisticated tactics, including coordinated bombings, poses a latent threat to operational continuity. Maritime approaches in the introduce additional regional hazards, though less acute than in the . Iran's support for proxies like Yemen's Houthis, who conducted over 55 attacks on shipping between November 2023 and February 2024, indirectly heightens tensions that could disrupt Chabahar-bound vessels via retaliatory actions or broader naval confrontations. has historically perceived Chabahar as a risk due to its circumvention of , potentially incentivizing covert interference, though bilateral border management efforts aim to mitigate this. Overall, these threats necessitate robust defensive measures, including enhanced Iranian-Indian pacts, to safeguard the port against non-state actors and geopolitical friction in a volatile borderland.

Challenges, Controversies, and Risks

US Sanctions and Compliance Issues

The United States has maintained comprehensive sanctions against Iran since 1979, targeting its nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for terrorism, with secondary sanctions penalizing foreign entities engaging in significant transactions with sanctioned Iranian ports including Chabahar. Following the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018, the Trump administration initially granted India a limited waiver under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act, permitting Indian firms to develop and operate Chabahar for humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, exempting it from certain secondary sanctions until November 2018, with subsequent six-month extensions until 2020. This waiver reflected U.S. recognition of Chabahar's role in countering Pakistani influence over Afghan access, though it explicitly barred broader commercial use that could benefit Iran's military. Under the Biden administration, the waiver lapsed without renewal, but India proceeded with limited operations, investing over $120 million by 2024, culminating in a May 2024 10-year agreement with Iran valued at $370 million for terminal operations and development by India's Port Trust and IPGL. Compliance challenges intensified as U.S. authorities warned that any non-exempt involvement risked designation under Executive Order 13846, prohibiting U.S. financial system access and imposing extraterritorial penalties on third-party facilitators. Indian entities faced dual pressures: adhering to U.S. secondary sanctions to preserve access to global finance and markets, versus Iran's demands for investment, leading to operational slowdowns and reluctance from international shipping lines fearing vessel seizures or blacklisting. In September 2025, the returning Trump administration revoked the 2018 waiver entirely, effective September 29, 2025, as part of a "maximum pressure" campaign to disrupt Iran's revenue streams funding proxy militias and nuclear evasion, explicitly ending exemptions for operations and warning of sanctions on any entities providing financing, technology, or services to the port. This revocation heightened compliance risks for , which had utilized Chabahar for over 3 million tons of wheat shipments to since 2017, prompting to assess diplomatic options amid stalled International North-South Transport Corridor progress and potential retaliation from . Post-revocation, vessel calls declined due to sanctions apprehension, underscoring the port's to U.S. extraterritorial , which has historically frozen assets and barred dealings for non-compliant firms like those in China's Belt and Road projects.

Geopolitical Rivalries and Misinformation

The development of has intensified geopolitical rivalries in the region, primarily pitting against and through competing port projects. 's investment in serves as a strategic counter to 's , which is central to 's via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), allowing to bypass Pakistani territory for access to and . 's proximity to —approximately 170 kilometers apart—positions the ports as direct competitors for regional trade routes, with benefiting from over $62 billion in Chinese commitments compared to 's under $500 million for . United States sanctions on Iran further complicate these dynamics, as the revocation of India's sanctions waiver in September 2025 exposed Indian firms to secondary sanctions, requiring them to cease operations within 45 days or risk asset freezes. This move aligns with Washington's maximum pressure campaign against but undermines India's connectivity goals, prompting to weigh continued involvement against broader US-India ties. , meanwhile, leverages to diversify partnerships, courting both Indian and Chinese investment despite Beijing's primary focus on , which heightens tensions as Tehran navigates US isolation and Sino-Indian competition. Misinformation campaigns have amplified these rivalries, with fabricated claims circulating to discredit the project. In September 2024, a viral falsehood alleged the cancellation of the India-Iran Chabahar agreement, which fact-checks confirmed as entirely baseless despite the deal's signing months earlier. Iranian authorities in July 2025 warned of fake social media accounts impersonating officials to sow discord in India-Iran relations, potentially linked to adversarial interests amid escalating Israel-Iran shadows. Such disinformation often originates from Pakistani or Chinese-aligned outlets downplaying Chabahar's viability post-sanctions, contrasting with empirical delays but ignoring India's prior $120 million investments and operational shipments to Afghanistan since 2017. These narratives exploit sanctions' real constraints to exaggerate project failure, obscuring Chabahar's role in Iran's pursuit of non-Pakistani trade gateways.

Operational and Environmental Hurdles

Despite investments exceeding $120 million in equipment and operations under a 10-year agreement signed in May 2024, Chabahar Port's operational efficiency remains constrained by underutilization and logistical bottlenecks. Container throughput at the Shahid Beheshti Terminal rose to 60,059 TEUs in fiscal year 2023-24, a sharp increase from 9,126 TEUs the previous year, yet bulk cargo volumes have stagnated at 2-2.5 million tonnes annually over the past three years. This limited growth stems from inadequate hinterland connectivity, including delays in completing the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line, projected for mid-2026, which hampers multimodal transport integration. Equipment shortages, such as dependence on mobile harbor cranes, further impede handling capacity, which stands at 8 million tonnes for Phase 1 but requires expansion to realize full potential. Environmental challenges exacerbate these issues, given the port's location in the cyclone-prone Makran coast. Tropical Cyclone Shaheen struck southeastern Iran in October 2021, killing six people in and damaging electrical infrastructure and roads, disrupting local operations. Assessments indicate high coastal vulnerability to sea , with large port-area zones at risk of inundation under projected climate scenarios, including extreme significant wave heights reaching 17.3 meters by 2100 in high-emission pathways. Storm surges from events like Ashobaa have demonstrated potential for substantial water level changes and current shifts, posing ongoing threats to berthing stability and cargo handling. These factors, combined with arid conditions and seismic activity in the region, necessitate robust defensive measures to mitigate downtime and structural risks.

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