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Deng Ai
Deng Ai
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Deng Ai (c.197 – late March 264[3]), courtesy name Shizai, was a Chinese military general and politician of the state of Wei during the Three Kingdoms period of China.[1] He is best known for his pivotal role in the Wei conquest of its rival state, Shu, in late 263. He was described as a very loyal subject who made great contributions to Wei, but was also noted for his arrogance and audacity, which led to his downfall and death.

Born in a peasant family, Deng Ai started his career as a minor agricultural officer. Sometime between 235 and 239, he met Sima Yi, who recognised his talent and gave him a higher position in the civil service. Around this time, he also wrote a proposal on starting agricultural works in the Huai River region, and received credit for his ideas. Deng Ai gained greater prominence in Wei from 249 onwards after he joined the Wei general Guo Huai in stopping a Shu invasion. He also advised the regent Sima Shi on some issues. In 255, he participated in the suppression of a rebellion started by the generals Guanqiu Jian and Wen Qin, and was promoted to the status of a top general. From 255 to 262, he defended Wei's western borders in present-day Gansu from multiple incursions by the Shu forces led by the general Jiang Wei.

Deng Ai reached the pinnacle of his career in 263, when he led Wei forces to conquer Shu. By leading a strike force through a shortcut across dangerous mountainous terrain, Deng Ai showed up in the vicinity of the Shu capital, Chengdu, and took the enemy by surprise. After a failed attempt by the Shu general Zhuge Zhan to stop Deng Ai at Mianzhu, the Shu emperor Liu Shan voluntarily surrendered to Deng Ai and brought an end to the Shu state. Following his success in the Shu campaign, Deng Ai became arrogant about his achievements and showed disregard for the Wei government's authority. The Wei general Zhong Hui exploited and manipulated Deng Ai's arrogance to great effect. In 264, Deng Ai was arrested by Wei Guan and Zhong Hui, who were acting under order by the Wei regent Sima Zhao. He was placed in a prison cart and escorted to the capital Luoyang, but was killed en route by soldiers sent by Wei Guan. His sons were executed as well. His surviving family members were exiled but allowed to return in 266 after the Jin dynasty was established.

Early life and career

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Deng Ai was from Jiyang County (棘陽縣), Yiyang Commandery (義陽郡), which is around present-day Xinye County, Henan. He was born towards the end of the Eastern Han dynasty and lost his father at a young age. When the warlord Cao Cao conquered northern Jing Province in 208, Deng Ai moved to Runan Commandery (汝南郡; in present-day southern Henan), where he lived as a farmer and raised cattle. When he was 11 years old, he and his mother passed by Chen Shi's tomb in Yingchuan Commandery (潁川郡; around present-day Xuchang, Henan). He read two lines engraved on Chen Shi's tombstone: "his writings became examples of excellent prose; his conduct served as a role model for scholar-officials" (文為世範,行為士則). He was so inspired that he wanted to change his given name to Fan (literally "(role) model") and his courtesy name to Shize (literally "for scholar-officials to emulate"). However, since the names Fan and Shize were already used by members of his extended family, he could not change his names as such because it would violate the naming taboo.[4]

Deng Ai later became an academician (學士) under the Commandant of Xiangcheng (襄城; present-day Xiangcheng County, Henan). However, he was not too successful in his career because he stuttered in his speech. He then switched his job to an agricultural officer in charge of grain and fodder. The locals pitied him for his poor family background and often provided him with financial aid. Deng Ai initially did not show any form of gratitude towards them. Whenever he saw mountains and lakes, he started gesturing and pointing out how and where he believed army camps should be laid out, but was scorned by others. Later on, he was promoted to a clerical position which put him in charge of maintaining records of agricultural output.[Sanguozhi 1]

Deng Ai had an acquaintance, Shi Bao (石苞; father of Shi Chong), who was about the same age as him. They were quite close to Guo Xuanxin (郭玄信), who served as an Internuncio (謁者). When Ji Ben, an imperial physician, started a rebellion in Xu (許; present-day Xuchang, Henan) in 218, Guo Xuanxin was implicated and initially placed under house arrest until an officer came to escort him to the imperial capital for trial. Deng Ai and Shi Bao were among the escorts. While travelling for about ten li, Guo Xuanxin chatted with them along the way and remarked that the two of them would become very capable officials in the future. Deng Ai was later promoted to the rank of an Agricultural Officer of Merit (典農功曹).[Sanguozhi zhu 1]

Sometime between 235 and 239,[c] he was sent as a messenger to the capital, Luoyang, where, by chance, he met Sima Yi, who was then serving as the Grand Commandant (太尉) under the Wei government. Sima Yi felt that Deng Ai was an extraordinary person so he recruited him and promoted him to the position of a Gentleman of Writing (尚書郎).[Sanguozhi 2]

Agricultural and irrigation projects

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Around the time, the Wei state was planning to promote agriculture and stockpile food resources in preparation for military campaigns against its rival states, Shu and Wu. Deng Ai was sent to survey the lands from the east of Chen () and Xiang () commanderies (around present-day Zhoukou, Henan) to Shouchun (壽春; around present-day Shou County, Anhui), and assess their suitability for agriculture. He saw that the lands were fertile but lacked moisture, so they were not fully utilised. He suggested digging irrigation channels to irrigate the land, and open up new canals for transporting goods by water.[Sanguozhi 3]

Deng Ai wrote a proposal, the Ji He Lun (濟河論; Discussion on the River), to explain his ideas:[Sanguozhi 4]

"The tuntian system started when the Yellow Turban Rebellion broke out. There are a lot of food supplies stored in the capital, Xu. Even though most of the Empire has been pacified now, the lands south of the Huai River are still ravaged by war. Every time a southern campaign is launched, about half the manpower is used for transporting supplies. The lands between Chen and Cai commanderies are fertile, so we can reduce the number of grain fields around Xu and direct the river flow east to Chen and Cai commanderies. At the moment, there are 20,000 troops stationed north of the Huai River, and 30,000 at the south. There are about 40,000 active soldiers guarding territory and farming at the same time. In good weather, the harvest is three times of that in the western lands. After deducting allowances for the people and soldiers, we have about five million hu of grain ready for military use. Within six to seven years, we can accumulate 30 million hu of grain on the upper part of the Huai River. This amount of grain is able to feed 100,000 people for up to 15 years. With such abundant food supplies, we can attack Eastern Wu and secure victory!"[Sanguozhi 5]

Sima Yi agreed with Deng Ai's proposal and implemented his ideas.[Sanguozhi 6]

In 241, the agricultural projects were complete. Whenever there were battles in the southeast between Wei and Wu, the Wei forces could sail down the river towards the Huai River region to counter the enemy. This was because they had plenty of food supplies stockpiled upstream and had the water pathways to their advantage. Deng Ai received credit for his proposal.[Sanguozhi 7]

Battle of Tao River

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Deng Ai later became a military adviser to the Wei general Xiahou Xuan and served as the Administrator of Nan'an Commandery (南安郡; around present-day Longxi and Wushan counties, Gansu). In 249, he followed Xiahou Xuan's successor Guo Huai to resist an invasion led by the Shu general Jiang Wei. After the Shu forces were repelled, Guo Huai advanced west to attack the Qiang tribes. Deng Ai cautioned him: "The enemy did not retreat far. They might turn back to attack us again, so we should split up our forces in case they attack us again."[Sanguozhi 8]

Guo Huai then ordered Chen Tai, Xu Zhi and Deng Ai to lead Wei forces to attack the fortresses at Qushan and cut off their food and water supplies. Ju An and Li Xin led their men to taunt Deng Ai to attack them, but Deng Ai ignored them. As time passed, the two fortresses gradually ran out of supplies. Jiang Wei led his troops from Mount Niutou (牛頭山; west of present-day Zhaohua District, Guangyuan, Sichuan) to reinforce the fortresses. They encountered Chen Tai and his troops along the way. Chen Tai said: "The Art of War says that the best way to win a battle is to win without fighting. If we manage to occupy Mount Niutou, Jiang Wei's return route will be sealed off and he can be easily captured by us." He then ordered his troops to build forts to resist Jiang Wei's forces but refrain from engaging the enemy. At the same time, he also wrote to Guo Huai and requested his help in attacking Mount Niutou. Guo Huai did so and led his troops across the Tao River in preparation for attacking Mount Niutou.[Sanguozhi 22 1][Zizhi Tongjian 75 1]

Deng Ai remained behind and garrisoned at the north of Baishui County. Three days later, Jiang Wei sent Liao Hua to lead a force to approach Deng Ai's camp from the south of Baishui. Deng Ai told his officers: "Jiang Wei has turned back to attack us. We have few troops. Ideally, we should cross the river and not build a bridge. I believe Jiang Wei must have sent Liao Hua to hinder us so that we are forced to remain here, while he would attack Taocheng (洮城) from the east." Taocheng was located north of the river and was about 60 li away from Deng Ai's position. Deng Ai immediately dispatched troops to travel overnight to Taocheng to defend the fortress. As he expected, Jiang Wei crossed the river to attack Taocheng, but failed to capture the fortress because Deng Ai had already strengthened its defences. For his achievements, Deng Ai was enfeoffed as a Secondary Marquis (關內侯), awarded the rank of General Who Attacks Rebels (討寇將軍), and subsequently appointed as the Administrator of Chengyang Commandery (城陽郡; around present-day Zhucheng, Shandong).[Sanguozhi 9]

Military advisor service

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Around the time, the Xiongnu prince Liu Bao, who was nominally a vassal under the Wei government, unified the Five Divisions of Xiongnu in Bing province and was building up his military force. Deng Ai wrote a memorial to the Wei imperial court:[Sanguozhi 10]

"The barbarians have the hearts of beasts and cannot be reasoned with. When they are powerful, they become violent; when they are weak, they pledge allegiance to the imperial court. This was why King Xuan of the Zhou dynasty was attacked by the Rongdi while Emperor Gao of the Han dynasty was besieged in Pingcheng. Whenever the Xiongnu grew powerful, the previous dynasties always saw them as a great threat. When the chanyu (Xiongnu ruler) lived in the barbarian lands, the imperial court could not directly control the chanyu and his followers. However, when the chanyu was lured to our territory to become a subject of the imperial court, the Xiongnu lost their leadership and could not cause trouble. As of now, as the chanyu has been living in the capital all this time, he has been alienated from his followers. At the same time, the Xiongnu prince Liu Bao has been living at the border and his military power has been increasing and he poses a threat to the imperial court. We should take extra precautionary measures against him. I heard that there are rebels within Liu Bao's domain, so we can try to split up his domain and hence reduce his military power. Qubei rendered meritorious service to the previous dynasty, but his son (Liu Meng) was not allowed to inherit his domain. We should grant him an honorary title and let him remain at Yanmen Pass. The best strategy to maintain peace at the borders is to isolate the barbarian leaders from their home territories and give them some rewards for their past contributions."[Sanguozhi 11]

Deng Ai also suggested: "We should gradually segregate those Han Chinese living with barbarians, inculcate moral values such as integrity in them, so as to prevent them from resorting to unlawful actions." Sima Shi, the General-in-Chief (大將軍) who had recently taken over the reins of power as the regent of Wei, accepted Deng Ai's suggestions. He also appointed Deng Ai as the Administrator of Runan Commandery (汝南郡; in present-day southern Henan), where Deng lived in his younger days. Upon arriving in Runan to take office, Deng Ai sought a man who generously helped his father before because he wanted to repay that man for his kindness. However, he was disappointed to learn that the man had already died, so he sent his subordinates to pay respects at the man's tomb on his behalf. He also gave many gifts to the man's mother and recruited the man's son to be an accounting officer under him. During his tenure, Deng Ai developed wastelands in Runan and ensured that his soldiers and the common people had their basic needs fulfilled.[Sanguozhi 12]

When the Wu regent Zhuge Ke retreated after a failed attempt to capture the Wei-controlled fortress at Hefei, Deng Ai approached the Wei regent Sima Shi and said:[Sanguozhi 13]

"Sun Quan is dead and most of the Wu officials are undecided on whose leadership to follow. Many Wu nobles and aristocrats have their own followers and private armies, and are capable of seizing the mandate to rule Wu. Zhuge Ke may have recently taken control of the Wu government, but he has no backing from the ruler. Besides, he cares little about consolidating power and instead treats the people harshly and continue to fight a war with us. He mobilised the people of Wu to attack our fortress and failed to conquer it after sustaining heavy losses. This is when he becomes an enemy of his own people. In the past, Wu Zixu, Wu Qi, Shang Yang and Yue Yi rose to prominence because they were favoured by their respective rulers, and they met their downfall after the ruler's death. Zhuge Ke is not only not comparable to these four great men, but also unaware that he is getting himself into deep trouble. His downfall is imminent."[Sanguozhi 14]

As Deng Ai foresaw, Zhuge Ke was ousted from power not long after he returned to Wu and was killed along with his family.[Sanguozhi 15] Deng Ai was appointed as the Inspector of Yan Province (兖州刺史) and promoted to General Who Inspires Might (振威將軍). He wrote a memorial to the Wei imperial court:[Sanguozhi 16]

"The most important policy areas are agriculture and war. If the state is wealthy, the army will be powerful. If the army is powerful, it will win battles. Therefore, the key to victory lies in agriculture. Confucius mentioned before, 'abundance in food supplies and number of troops'. Having abundant food supplies is important to maintaining a powerful army. If the state does not designate any officials to be in charge of collecting taxes and food supplies, there will be no one to accumulate wealth from the masses. As of now, the system of giving rewards based on merit is aimed at collecting food supplies and distributing them to the people. If not, the state will break off all its trade routes with the outside world, and a wealthy and prosperous state will become isolated."[Sanguozhi 17]

Suppression of Second Shouchun rebellion

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Deng Ai was enfeoffed as the Marquis of Fangcheng Village (方城亭侯) after Cao Mao became the new Wei emperor in 254. In the following year, when the Wei generals Guanqiu Jian and Wen Qin started a rebellion in Shouchun (壽春; around present-day Shou County, Anhui),[5] they sent messengers to other areas to incite the people to join their rebellion. Deng Ai arrested and executed the messengers, and then led troops to suppress the rebellion. His force occupied Yuejia (樂嘉; present-day Xiangcheng, Henan) and started building pontoon bridges. When the main Wei army led by Sima Shi showed up, Deng Ai rendezvoused with him and they advanced towards Shouchun together. The rebels were subsequently defeated. Deng Ai pursued the fleeing Wen Qin to Qiutou (丘頭; southeast of present-day Shenqiu County, Henan), but Wen Qin still managed to escape and defect to Wei's rival state, Wu.[Sanguozhi 18]

The Wu general Sun Jun led thousands of troops and crossed the Yangtze to support the rebels. The Wei general Zhuge Dan ordered Deng Ai to resist the enemy at Feiyang (肥陽), but Deng saw that if he was stationed in Feiyang he would be in a disadvantageous position, so he relocated his troops to a neighbouring village. He then sent Zhuge Xu to attack the remaining rebels and Wu forces at Lijiang Village (黎漿亭; southeast of present-day Shou County, Anhui), where they defeated the enemy.[Sanguozhi 19]

In the same year, Deng Ai was promoted to Colonel of Changshui (長水校尉). Later on, for his contributions in suppressing the rebellion, he was further promoted to acting General Who Stabilises the West (安西將軍) and his marquis rank was increased by one grade to Marquis of Fangcheng District (方城鄉侯).[Sanguozhi 20][6]

Defending Wei territory

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Around 255, the Shu general Jiang Wei led forces to attack Wei and besieged Wang Jing, the Inspector of Yong Province, in Didao (狄道; southwest of present-day Lintao County, Gansu). The Wei imperial court appointed Deng Ai as General Who Stabilises the West (安西將軍) and Colonel Who Protects the Eastern Qiang (護東羌校尉) to lead troops to lift the siege. By then, Jiang Wei had withdrawn to Zhongti (鍾提; south of present-day Lintao County, Gansu), so many of Deng Ai's subordinates thought that Jiang Wei was exhausted and would not attack Didao again. However, Deng Ai held a different opinion and he said:[Sanguozhi 21]

"The defeat at the west of the Tao River was not an insignificant loss. The loss of troops and officers, depletion of stores and reserves, and displacement of refugees are signs pointing towards imminent destruction. I shall explain the situation. First, the enemy is riding on a wave of victories, while we are actually weak. Second, the enemy forces are well-trained and battle-ready, while ours are newly recruited and not well-equipped. Third, the enemy is less tired than us because we travel by land whereas they travel by water. Fourth, the enemy focuses on attacking Didao only, while we spread our defences across four locations – Didao, Longxi, Nan'an and Mount Qi. Fifth, Nan'an and Longxi have grain produced by the Qiang people, while there are fields of wheat beyond Mount Qi. The enemy is cunning. They will definitely come for the wheat."[Sanguozhi 22]

As Deng Ai predicted, Jiang Wei led his forces to attack Mount Qi later but were repelled by the defences set up by Deng. Jiang Wei retreated to Dong Village (董亭; south of present-day Wushan County, Gansu), while Deng Ai stationed his troops at Mount Wucheng (武城山). Jiang Wei tried to seize control of the mountainous terrain from Deng Ai, but was driven back. That night, Jiang Wei attempted to cross the Wei River to attack Shanggui (上邽; present-day Tianshui, Gansu). Deng Ai intercepted Jiang Wei at Duan Valley (段谷; southwest of present-day Tianshui, Gansu) and defeated him.[Sanguozhi 23] In 256, the Wei imperial court issued an edict as follows:

"The cunning enemy Jiang Wei has been inciting the local tribes to rebel against the government, resulting in chaos in the western lands. Deng Ai planned his strategies well, and displayed courage and loyalty in battle. He defeated tens of enemy officers and killed thousands of enemy troops. Our state has caused the Bashu region to tremble in fear, while our military might spreads beyond the rivers. Deng Ai is hereby appointed as General Who Guards the West (鎮西將軍) and put in charge of overseeing military affairs in Longyou. He shall also be enfeoffed as the Marquis of Deng (鄧侯), and given 500 taxable households as his marquisate. His son, Deng Zhong (鄧忠), shall be enfeoffed as a village marquis (亭侯)."[Sanguozhi 24]

In the following year, Jiang Wei advanced to the Mang river in his attempt to attack the position of Deng Ai and Sima Wang.[7] However, both Wei generals refused to engage and held their position.[7]

Deng Ai defeated Jiang Wei in battle again along the Great Wall and forced him to retreat back to Shu. He was further promoted to General Who Attacks the West (征西將軍), and had the number of taxable households in his marquisate increased to 6,600.[8]

In 262, he defeated Jiang Wei in battle at Houhe (侯和). Jiang Wei retreated to Tazhong (沓中; northwest of present-day Zhugqu County, Gansu) and garrisoned there.[Sanguozhi 25]

Conquest of Shu

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Strategic planning and opening moves

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In the autumn of 263, the Wei imperial government started mobilising troops in preparation for a campaign against Shu. Sima Zhao, who oversaw the campaign, ordered Deng Ai to lead 30,000 troops[Sanguozhi 26] to Tazhong (沓中; northwest of present-day Zhugqu County, Gansu) to harass Jiang Wei and keep him occupied, while Zhuge Xu, the Inspector of Yong Province, would lead forces to block Jiang Wei's retreat route back to Shu.[Sanguozhi 27] Before Deng Ai embarked on the campaign against Shu, he dreamt of himself sitting on a mountaintop with water flowing near him. He asked an official, Yuan Shao (爰邵), who was well-versed in the Yijing, to explain to him what his dream meant. Yuan Shao told him that he would successfully conquer Shu, but would not return to Wei. Deng Ai felt gloomy after hearing this.[Sanguozhi 28]

Deng Ai sent Wang Qi (王頎) to lead troops attack Jiang Wei's camp directly, with Qian Hong leading another force to clear the path, and Yang Xin (楊欣) to attack the enemy positions at Gansong (甘松; around present-day Songpan County, Sichuan).[Sanguozhi 29]

When Jiang Wei received news that another Wei army led by Zhong Hui had occupied Hanzhong Commandery, he led his troops from Tazhong back further into Shu territory, but was pursued by Yang Xin to Qiangchuankou (彊川口; the intersection of the Bailong and Jialing rivers), where he was defeated. Jiang Wei learnt that Zhuge Xu had blocked his retreat route at the bridge of Yinping, so he led his men through Konghan Valley (孔函谷; south of present-day Xigu District, Lanzhou, Gansu) to the northern road in an attempt to bypass Zhuge Xu's position. When Zhuge Xu heard about it, he retreated back by 30 li. By then, Jiang Wei and his troops had travelled about 30 li on the northern road when they heard that Zhuge Xu had lifted the blockade at the bridge. Jiang Wei ordered his troops to quickly turn back and cross the bridge. Zhuge Xu tried to turn back to block Jiang Wei again but arrived at the bridge one day too late. After crossing the bridge, Jiang Wei moved to the mountain pass of Jiange and garrisoned there. Zhong Hui attacked Jiang Wei at Jiange several times but was unable to breach the defences.[Sanguozhi 30]

Capture of the Shu capital

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Deng Ai proposed:

"The enemy has suffered a setback. We should take advantage of our success to press on the attack. From Yinping (陰平; northwest of present-day Wen County, Gansu), there is a shortcut passing through Deyang Village (德陽亭; around present-day Deyang, Sichuan) to Fu County (涪縣; present-day Mianyang, Sichuan), leading to an area 100 li west from Jiange and about 300 li from Chengdu, the heartland of Shu. We can send a strike force to take this route to attack Chengdu. When Fu County is under attack, Jiang Wei will definitely send troops from Jiange to reinforce Fu County, and then Zhong Hui's army can move through the main road to attack the enemy. If Jiang Wei does not send reinforcements from Jiange, Fu County will be isolated. As military texts say, 'Attack the enemy where they are unprepared, and appear where you are not expected'. If we can strike the enemy at their weak points, we will eventually overcome them."[Sanguozhi 31]

Zhong Hui approved Deng Ai's idea and even ordered his subordinate Tian Zhang (田章) to join Deng Ai on the expedition. Some time between 18 November and 17 December 263,[d] Deng Ai led a strike force from Yinping through the shortcut, bypassing the west of Jiange and heading straight towards Jiangyou. The shortcut covered a distance of more than 700 li and cut across mountainous terrain. Deng Ai and his men had to construct several bridges along the way. The mountains were high and the valleys were deep, which made the journey extremely dangerous. After some time, they were completely cut off from their supply train. Deng Ai wrapped himself in a large piece of felt and rolled down the mountain. His men climbed trees and scaled cliffs in single file.[9] Along the way, they encountered three groups of Shu ambushers, defeated them and destroyed their camps. Deng Ai let Tian Zhang lead the vanguard and clear the path.[10] Deng Ai and his vanguard showed up at Jiangyou. Ma Miao (馬邈), the Shu-appointed administrator of Jiangyou, gave up resistance and surrendered to Deng Ai.[11]

The Shu general Zhuge Zhan led an army from Fu County to Mianzhu, where they engaged Deng Ai and his troops in battle. Deng Ai ordered his son Deng Zhong (鄧忠) to flank the enemy from the right, and Shi Zuan (師纂) to flank the enemy from the left. Both Deng Zhong and Shi Zuan were driven back by Zhuge Zhan, and they told Deng Ai: "The enemy cannot be defeated.". Deng Ai sternly replied: "This battle will determine whether we live or die. What do you mean when you say the enemy cannot be defeated?" He wanted to execute them, but they turned back and hastily readied their troops for battle again. They defeated the Shu forces and killed the enemy officers Zhuge Zhan, Zhuge Shang and Zhang Zun.[Sanguozhi 32]

Deng Ai and his men then pressed on further to Luo County (雒縣; north of present-day Guanghan, Sichuan). Liu Shan, the Shu emperor, sent an emissary to present his imperial seal to Deng Ai and indicate his wish to surrender.[Sanguozhi 33]

Managing post-war Shu

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When Deng Ai arrived in Chengdu, Liu Shan tied himself up and led an entourage of over 60 people to officially surrender. Deng Ai freed Liu Shan from his bonds and treated him kindly. He also forbid his soldiers from plundering and pillaging the city, and ordered that daily activities in the city resume as per normal. Many former Shu officials were so impressed with Deng Ai that they willingly submitted to him; the people of Shu also praised Deng Ai for his kindness. Deng Ai used his acting imperial authority granted by the Wei government to appoint Liu Shan as acting General of Chariots of Cavalry (驃騎將軍) and grant titles to many former Shu nobles and officials; some of them became his subordinates. Deng Ai also appointed Shi Zuan as the Inspector of Yi Province and put Qian Hong in charge of overseeing the former Shu commanderies. A memorial was constructed at Mianzhu to glorify Deng Ai's victory over Zhuge Zhan, and the fallen Wei soldiers were buried alongside their Shu counterparts.[Sanguozhi 34]

Deng Ai became arrogant about his achievements in conquering Shu. He once bragged to the former Shu officials: "All of you are lucky to have encountered me, which is why you are where you are today. If you encountered someone like Wu Han, you would have been destroyed." He also said: "Jiang Wei is a short-lived hero. He pales in comparison with me." Some people scorned him for his boastfulness.[Sanguozhi 35]

On 8 February 264, the Wei imperial court issued an edict praising Deng Ai for his successful conquest of Shu and comparing him to famous generals such as Bai Qi, Han Xin, Wu Han and Zhou Yafu. Deng Ai was promoted to the position of Grand Commandant (太尉) in the imperial court and had the number of taxable households in his marquisate increased by 20,000. His two sons were made village marquises (亭侯) and given 1,000 taxable households each in their marquisates.[Sanguozhi 36]

Downfall and death

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Correspondence between Deng Ai and Sima Zhao

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Deng Ai wrote to Sima Zhao, suggesting that they let the weary troops rest and recuperate while concurrently making preparations for a future campaign against Wei's other rival state, Wu. He also proposed that Liu Shan be treated generously by making him a prince and showering him with luxuries. The purpose of doing so was to induce and tempt Sun Xiu, the Wu emperor, into voluntarily surrendering to Wei. He wrote:

"In war, we always tend to exaggerate our prowess before we actually take military action. Now that we have pacified Shu, we should ride on this wave of victory and proceed to attack Wu. The people of Wu are terrified. Now is the time to conquer the Empire. However, after this campaign, our troops are weary and exhausted, so we cannot launch another campaign any time soon. We should let them rest and recuperate first. I suggest we leave 20,000 troops in Longyou (隴右) and another 20,000 in Shu to stockpile resources, build warships, and make other preparations for a future campaign against Wu. When we are ready, we will announce to the people in Wu that they are in a precarious situation, and then persuade them to surrender. Wu will definitely submit to us. If this happens, we will conquer Wu without fighting a war. As of now, we should treat Liu Shan generously, so as to induce Sun Xiu and the people of Wu into surrendering to us. If we send Liu Shan to Luoyang, the people of Wu will think that we are holding him hostage. This is not beneficial to our plan of winning them over. I suggest we let Liu Shan remain in Shu until late next year. By then, Wu would have been completely pacified. We can grant Liu Shan the title "Prince of Fufeng", and endow him with material wealth and luxuries, so as to let him enjoy life for now. The former residence of Dong Zhuo in Fufeng can be converted into Liu Shan's new residence. We can also grant titles of dukes and marquises to Liu Shan's sons and give them counties in Fufeng Commandery as their personal estate. This will show others that those who submit to our imperial court will be treated very well. In the meantime, we can also create estates in Guangling and Chengyang to receive those from Wu who surrender to us. By doing so, Wu will tremble at our might and have no choice but to submit to us."[Sanguozhi 37]

Sima Zhao sent Wei Guan to reply Deng Ai that his proposal would be submitted to the Wei imperial court for further deliberation before it could be implemented.[Sanguozhi 38] Deng Ai grew impatient and argued that they would be wasting time if they had to wait for further instructions from the imperial court before taking action. He quoted lines from the Spring and Autumn Annals and The Art of War to hint that he was justified in ignoring standard protocol and acting autocratically as long as what he did was to Wei's benefit. He wrote:

"I was commissioned by the Emperor to attack Shu. Now that the enemy leaders have surrendered, I can grant them official positions under the imperial system, so as to secure their allegiance. My actions suit the present circumstances. Now that all of Shu has surrendered, we control all the lands stretching to the southern sea and share eastern borders with Wu, which we should pacify as soon as possible. If we wait for further instructions from the Emperor, we will end up wasting time because of the time taken to deliver reports. The Spring and Autumn Annals mentioned that when a general leads a campaign to a distant land, he is allowed to act in an authoritarian manner as long as his actions are beneficial to the state he serves. As of now, Wu has yet to be pacified. It shares borders with Shu, so we should not forsake this opportunity just because we need to follow standard protocol. The Art of War also stated that 'a general who advances not to covet fame can retreat without fearing that he will be disgraced.' Although I may not be like the ancients, I will not look down on myself and do harm to my state."[Sanguozhi 39]

Zhong Hui's role in Deng Ai's arrest

[edit]

Zhong Hui, Hu Lie (胡烈), Shi Zuan (師纂) and others accused Deng Ai of showing disrespect for the Wei imperial court's authority, and claimed that he was likely to start a rebellion.[Sanguozhi 40] The Shiyu mentioned that Zhong Hui was skilled in imitating people's handwriting. After getting his hands on a letter written by Deng Ai to Sima Zhao,[e] he edited it to make it sound arrogant and demanding. At the same time, he also destroyed a letter from Sima Zhao to Deng Ai to increase Sima's suspicions towards Deng.[Sanguozhi zhu 2]

Sometime in late February or early March 264,[2] the Wei imperial court then issued an edict ordering Deng Ai to be arrested and transported back to the capital, Luoyang. Wei Guan and Zhong Hui went to Deng Ai's camp, where they used Sima Zhao's letter to order Deng Ai's men to put down their weapons. Deng Ai was arrested and placed in a prison cart for his journey to Luoyang.[Sanguozhi 41] When he was arrested, Deng Ai exclaimed: "I am a loyal subject, yet I meet with such a fate! Whatever that happened to Bai Qi in the past has just happened to me in the present."[Sanguozhi zhu 3]

Death

[edit]

After Deng Ai was escorted away, Zhong Hui started a rebellion against Wei in Chengdu on 1 March 264, but the rebellion failed when some Wei officers, who were unwilling to participate, mutinied against Zhong Hui and killed him on 3 March 264. After Zhong Hui's death, Deng Ai's subordinates caught up with the convoy escorting their general, freed him, and brought him back to Chengdu. When Wei Guan heard about it, he ordered Tian Xu to lead troops to attack Deng Ai.[Sanguozhi 42]

Tian Xu had initially served under Deng Ai during the campaign against Shu. During an earlier battle at Jiangyou, Deng Ai wanted to execute Tian Xu for delaying his advance against the enemy, but spared him eventually. When Wei Guan sent Tian Xu to attack Deng Ai, he told Tian, "You can now take revenge against Deng Ai for how he humiliated you at Jiangyou."[Sanguozhi zhu 4]

Tian Xu and his soldiers intercepted Deng Ai at the west of Mianzhu and killed him along with his son, Deng Zhong (鄧忠), and Shi Zuan.[Sanguozhi zhu 5] After Deng Ai's death, his other son(s) in Luoyang was/were also rounded up and executed, while his surviving family members were exiled to the Western Regions.[Sanguozhi 43]

When the Wei general Du Yu heard about what Wei Guan told Tian Xu, he remarked that Wei Guan, as a man of high social status, should not behave in such a petty and spiteful manner. When Wei Guan heard about Du Yu's remarks, he immediately went to meet Du Yu to thank him.[Sanguozhi zhu 6]

Posthumous rehabilitation

[edit]

In 266, after the Jin dynasty replaced the Wei regime in February, Sima Yan (Emperor Wu) issued an imperial edict to pardon Deng Ai's descendants and allow them to return from exile. He noted that Deng Ai was fairly punished for his arrogance and audacity, but the "redeeming" factor was that Deng Ai did not resist arrest and willingly resigned to his fate.[Sanguozhi 44]

When Deng Ai was stationed in Yong and Liang provinces, he strengthened the parapets in the area and had some forts constructed for defensive purposes. During the mid-Taishi era (265–274) in Emperor Wu's reign, the Qiang tribes in Yong Province rebelled against Jin rule and killed the Inspector of Liang Province. The surviving officials and local residents found safety in the forts built by Deng Ai about a decade earlier.[Sanguozhi 45]

Legacy

[edit]

Family and descendants

[edit]

Deng Ai had at least two sons. Two of his sons – one of whom was Deng Zhong (鄧忠) – held village marquis titles and owned marquisates of 1,000 taxable households. Deng Zhong was killed along with his father. Deng Ai's other sons who were in Luoyang were arrested and executed in the aftermath of their father's death. Deng Ai's surviving family members were exiled and allowed to return only in 266 after Emperor Wu of the Jin dynasty issued an imperial edict pardoning them.[f]

In 273, Emperor Wu appointed Deng Ai's grandson, Deng Lang (鄧朗), as a langzhong (郎中).[Sanguozhi 46] Deng Lang served as the Prefect of Danshui County (丹水縣; around present-day Xichuan County, Henan) and then as the Prefect of Dingling County (定陵縣; around present-day Qingyang County, Anhui). He had at least one son, Deng Tao (鄧韜). During the Yongjia era (307–313) in the reign of Emperor Huai, Deng Lang was appointed as the Administrator of Xindu Commandery (新都郡; around present-day Guanghan, Sichuan). However, before he left to assume office, he died in a fire in Xiangyang Commandery along with his mother, wife and children. Only his grandson Deng Xing (鄧行), Deng Tao's son, survived the fire.

Deng Qianqiu (鄧千秋), another grandson of Deng Ai, was recruited to serve under Wang Rong, a prominent Jin dynasty official. He died before Deng Lang while his two sons also perished in the Xiangyang fire.[Sanguozhi zhu 7]

Appraisal

[edit]

Chen Shou (233–297), who wrote Deng Ai's biography in the Sanguozhi, commented on Deng Ai as follows: "Deng Ai was upright and strong. He achieved many successes, but failed to protect himself from hidden pitfalls and dangers, which resulted in his eventual downfall. He could envision what would happen to Zhuge Ke, yet ironically could not foresee his own fate. This was probably what the ancients called 'lack of self-awareness and narrow-mindedness'."[Sanguozhi 47]

In 267, Duan Zhuo (段灼) wrote a memorial to Emperor Wu of the Jin dynasty to speak up for Deng Ai. In the memorial, Duan Zhuo discussed Deng Ai's contributions to Wei and argued that Deng had no intention of rebelling against Wei, citing Deng's advanced age (Deng was nearing 70 at the time of his death) as one reason. He also mentioned that Deng Ai had been deeply misunderstood because of his boorish and uncouth behaviour, which made him likely to offend people easily. Duan Zhuo also compared Deng Ai to Bai Qi and Wu Zixu, two generals in the Spring and Autumn period who made great contributions to their respective states but were forced to commit suicide.[Sanguozhi 48]

During the mid-Xianning era (275–280) in Emperor Wu's reign, Fan Zhen (樊震), a general who previously served under Deng Ai during the Wei campaign against Shu, had an audience with the emperor. When Emperor Wu asked about Deng Ai, Fan Zhen became very emotional and he recalled that Deng Ai was a very loyal subject of Wei.[Sanguozhi zhu 8]

[edit]

Deng Ai is first introduced as a playable character in the seventh instalment of Koei's Dynasty Warriors video game series. In the games, he is anachronistically associated with the Jin dynasty faction; historically, he died one year before the Jin dynasty was established.

See also

[edit]

Appendix

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ Deng Ai's year of birth is not clearly recorded in the Sanguozhi. However, his biography in the Sanguozhi recorded that he was 12 years old (by East Asian age reckoning) around the time when Cao Cao conquered Jing Province in 208. If we assume that Deng Ai was 11 in 208, by calculation, his year of birth should be 197. Chen Shou recorded in Deng's biography in Sanguozhi that Jin official Duan Zhuo wrote in a petition to Emperor Wu that Deng was nearing 70 at the time of his death.
  2. ^ The Zizhi Tongjian makes it clear that Deng Ai died in 264. However, his birth year is not incontrovertibly accepted to be 197. Therefore, 66, the age at which he died, would only make sense if we assume his birth year to be 197.
  3. ^ Vols. 73–74 of the Zizhi Tongjian recorded that Sima Yi was appointed as Grand Commandant (太尉) in 235 and he held office until his replacement by Man Chong in 239. Therefore, the time when Deng Ai first met Sima Yi should probably be in between 235–239.
  4. ^ Deng Ai's biography in the Sanguozhi recorded that he took the shortcut in the 10th month of the 4th year of the Jingyuan era of Cao Huan's reign.[9] This month corresponds to 18 November to 17 December 263 in the Gregorian calendar.
  5. ^ It is not clear whether this letter refers to either of the two letters written by Deng Ai to Sima Zhao, or another letter.
  6. ^ Sima Yan only ascended the throne in Feb 266. Thus, Deng Ai's surviving family members only returned in or after Feb 266.

References

[edit]
Citations from the Sanguozhi
  1. ^ (淮從泰計,使泰率討蜀護軍徐質、南安太守鄧艾等進兵圍之,斷其運道及城外流水。安等挑戰,不許,將士困窘,分糧聚雪以稽日月。維果來救,出自牛頭山,與泰相對。泰曰:「兵法貴在不戰而屈人。今絕牛頭,維無反道,則我之禽也。」勑諸軍各堅壘勿與戰,遣使白淮,欲自南渡白水,循水而東,使淮趣牛頭,截其還路,可并取維,不惟安等而已。淮善其策,進率諸軍軍洮水。維懼,遁走,安等孤縣,遂皆降。) Sanguozhi vol. 22.
  1. ^ (為都尉學士,以口吃,不得作幹佐。為稻田守叢草吏。同郡吏父怜其家貧,資給甚厚,艾初不稱謝。每見高山大澤,輙規度指畫軍營處所,時人多笑焉。後將典農綱紀,上計吏, ...) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  2. ^ (... 因使見太尉司馬宣王。宣王奇之,辟之為掾,遷尚書郎。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  3. ^ (時欲廣田畜糓,為滅賊資,使艾行陳、項已東至壽春。艾以為「田良水少,不足以盡地利,宜開河渠,可以引水澆溉,大積軍糧,又通運漕之道。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  4. ^ (乃著濟河論以喻其指。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  5. ^ (又以為「昔破黃巾,因為屯田,積穀於許都以制四方。今三隅已定,事在淮南,每大軍征舉,運兵過半,功費巨億,以為大役。陳、蔡之間,土下田良,可省許昌左右諸稻田,并水東下。令淮北屯二萬人,淮南三萬人,十二分休,常有四萬人,且田且守。水豐常收三倍於西,計除衆費,歲完五百萬斛以為軍資。六七年間,可積三千萬斛於淮上,此則十萬之衆五年食也。以此乘吳,無往而不克矣。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  6. ^ (宣王善之,事皆施行。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  7. ^ (正始二年,乃開廣漕渠,每東南有事,大軍興衆,汎舟而下,達于江、淮,資食有儲而無水害,艾所建也。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  8. ^ (出參征西軍事,遷南安太守。嘉平元年,與征西將軍郭淮拒蜀偏將軍姜維。維退,淮因西擊羌。艾曰:「賊去未遠,或能復還,宜分諸軍以備不虞。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  9. ^ (於是留艾屯白水北。三日,維遣廖化自白水南向艾結營。艾謂諸將曰:「維今卒還,吾軍人少,法當來渡而不作橋。此維使化持吾,令不得還。維必自東襲取洮城。」洮城在水北,去艾屯六十里。艾即夜潛軍徑到,維果來渡,而艾先至據城,得以不敗。賜爵關內侯,加討寇將軍,後遷城陽太守。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  10. ^ (是時并州右賢王劉豹并為一部, ...) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  11. ^ (... 艾上言曰:「戎狄獸心,不以義親,彊則侵暴,弱則內附,故周宣有玁狁之寇,漢祖有平城之困。每匈奴一盛,為前代重患。自單于在外,莫能牽制長卑。誘而致之,使來入侍。由是羌夷失統,合散無主。以單于在內,萬里順軌。今單于之尊日疏,外土之威寖重,則胡虜不可不深備也。聞劉豹部有叛胡,可因叛割為二國,以分其勢。去卑功顯前朝,而子不繼業,宜加其子顯號,使居鴈門。離國弱寇,追錄舊勳,此御邊長計也。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  12. ^ (又陳:「羌胡與民同處者,宜以漸出之,使居民表崇廉恥之教,塞姦宄之路。」大將軍司馬景王新輔政,多納用焉。遷汝南太守,至則尋求昔所厚己吏父,乆已死,遣吏祭之,重遺其母,舉其子與計吏。艾所在,荒野開闢,軍民並豐。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  13. ^ (諸葛恪圍合肥新城,不克,退歸。艾言景王曰: ...) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  14. ^ (... 「孫權已沒,大臣未附,吳名宗大族,皆有部曲,阻兵仗勢,足以建命。恪新秉國政,而內無其主,不念撫恤上下以立根基,競於外事,虐用其民,悉國之衆,頓於堅城,死者萬數,載禍而歸,此恪獲罪之日也。昔子胥、吳起、商鞅、樂毅皆見任時君,主沒而敗。况恪才非四賢,而不慮大患,其亡可待也。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  15. ^ (恪歸,果見誅。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  16. ^ (遷兖州刺史,加振威將軍。上言曰: ...) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  17. ^ (... 「國之所急,惟農與戰,國富則兵彊,兵彊則戰勝。然農者,勝之本也。孔子曰『足食足兵』,食在兵前也。上無設爵之勸,則下無財畜之功。今使考績之賞,在於積粟富民,則交游之路絕,浮華之原塞矣。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  18. ^ (高貴鄉公即尊位,進封方城亭侯。毌丘儉作亂,遣健步齎書,欲疑惑大衆,艾斬之,兼道進軍,先趣樂嘉城,作浮橋。司馬景王至,遂據之。文欽以後大軍破敗於城下,艾追之至丘頭。欽奔吳。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  19. ^ (吳大將軍孫峻等號十萬衆,將渡江,鎮東將軍諸葛誕遣艾據肥陽,艾以與賊勢相遠,非要害之地,輒移屯附亭,遣泰山太守諸葛緒等於黎漿拒戰,遂走之。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  20. ^ (其年徵拜長水校尉。以破欽等功,進封方城鄉侯,行安西將軍。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  21. ^ (解雍州刺史王經圍於狄道,姜維退駐鍾提,乃以艾為安西將軍,假節、領護東羌校尉。議者多以為維力已竭,未能更出。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  22. ^ (艾曰:「洮西之敗,非小失也;破軍殺將,倉廩空虛,百姓流離,幾於危亡。今以策言之,彼有乘勝之勢,我有虛弱之實,一也。彼上下相習,五兵犀利,我將易兵新,器杖未復,二也。彼以船行,吾以陸軍,勞逸不同,三也。狄道、隴西、南安、祁山,各當有守,彼專為一,我分為四,四也。從南安、隴西,因食羌穀,若趣祁山,熟麥千頃,為之縣餌,五也。賊有黠數,其來必矣。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  23. ^ (頃之,維果向祁山,聞艾已有備,乃回從董亭趣南安,艾據武城山以相持。維與艾爭險,不克,其夜,渡渭東行,緣山趣上邽,艾與戰於段谷,大破之。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  24. ^ (甘露元年詔曰:「逆賊姜維連年狡黠,民夷騷動,西土不寧。艾籌畫有方,忠勇奮發,斬將十數,馘首千計;國威震於巴、蜀,武聲揚於江、岷。今以艾為鎮西將軍、都督隴右諸軍事,進封鄧侯。分五百戶封子忠為亭侯。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  25. ^ (二年,拒姜維於長城,維退還。遷征西將軍,前後增邑凡六千六百戶。景元三年,又破維於侯和,維却保沓中。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  26. ^ (四年秋,乃下詔使鄧艾、諸葛緒各統諸軍三萬餘人, ...) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  27. ^ (四年秋,詔諸軍征蜀,大將軍司馬文王皆指授節度,使艾與維相綴連;雍州刺史諸葛緒要維,令不得歸。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  28. ^ (初,艾當伐蜀,夢坐山上而有流水,以問殄虜護軍爰邵。邵曰:「按易卦,山上有水曰蹇。蹇繇曰:『蹇利西南,不利東北。』孔子曰:『蹇利西南,往有功也;不利東北,其道窮也。』往必克蜀,殆不還乎!」艾憮然不樂。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  29. ^ (艾遣天水太守王頎等直攻維營,隴西太守牽弘等邀其前,金城太守楊欣等詣甘松。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  30. ^ (維聞鍾會諸軍已入漢中,引退還。欣等追躡於彊川口,大戰,維敗走。聞雍州已塞道屯橋頭,從孔函谷入北道,欲出雍州後。諸葛緒聞之,却還三十里。維入北道三十餘里,聞緒軍却,尋還,從橋頭過,緒趣截維,較一日不及。維遂東引,還守劒閣。鍾會攻維未能克。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  31. ^ (艾上言:「今賊摧折,宜遂乘之,從陰平由邪徑經漢德陽亭趣涪,出劒閣西百里,去成都三百餘里,奇兵衝其腹心。劒閣之守必還赴涪,則會方軌而進;劒閣之軍不還,則應涪之兵寡矣。軍志有之曰:『攻其不備,出其不意。』今掩其空虛,破之必矣。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  32. ^ (蜀衞將軍諸葛瞻自涪還綿竹,列陳待艾。艾遣子惠唐亭侯忠等出其右,司馬師纂等出其左。忠、纂戰不利,並退還,曰:「賊未可擊。」艾怒曰:「存亡之分,在此一舉,何不可之有?」乃叱忠、纂等,將斬之。忠、纂馳還更戰,大破之,斬瞻及尚書張遵等首, ...) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  33. ^ (... 進軍到雒。劉禪遣使奉皇帝璽綬,為箋詣艾請降。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  34. ^ (艾至成都,禪率太子諸王及群臣六十餘人靣縛輿櫬詣軍門,艾執節解縛焚櫬,受而宥之。檢御將士,無所虜畧,綏納降附,使復舊業,蜀人稱焉。輙依鄧禹故事,承制拜禪行驃騎將軍,太子奉車、諸王駙馬都尉。蜀群司各隨高下拜為王官,或領艾官屬。以師纂領益州刺史,隴西太守牽弘等領蜀中諸郡。使於緜竹築臺以為京觀,用彰戰功。士卒死事者,皆與蜀兵同共埋藏。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  35. ^ (艾深自矜伐,謂蜀士大夫曰:「諸君賴遭某,故得有今日耳。若遇吳漢之徒,已殄滅矣。」又曰:「姜維自一時雄兒也,與某相值,故窮耳。」有識者笑之。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  36. ^ (十二月,詔曰:「艾曜威奮武,深入虜庭,斬將搴旗,梟其鯨鯢,使僭號之主稽首係頸,歷世逋誅,一朝而平。兵不踰時,戰不終日,雲徹席卷,蕩定巴蜀。雖白起破彊楚,韓信克勁趙,吳漢禽子陽,亞夫滅七國,計功論美,不足比勳也。其以艾為太尉,增邑二萬戶,封子二人亭侯,各食邑千戶。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  37. ^ (艾言司馬文王曰:「兵有先聲而後實者,今因平蜀之勢以乘吴,吴人震恐,席卷之時也。然大舉之後,將士疲勞,不可便用,且徐緩之;留隴右兵二萬人,蜀兵二萬人,煑鹽興冶,為軍農要用,並作舟船,豫順流之事,然後發使告以利害,吴必歸化,可不征而定也。今宜厚劉禪以致孫休,安士民以來遠人,若便送禪於京都,吴以為流徙,則於向化之心不勸。宜權停留,須來年秋冬,比爾吴亦足平。以為可封禪為扶風王,錫其資財,供其左右。郡有董卓塢,為之宮舍。爵其子為公侯,食郡內縣,以顯歸命之寵。開廣陵、城陽以待吴人,則畏威懷德,望風而從矣。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  38. ^ (文王使監軍衞瓘喻艾:「事當須報,不宜輙行。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  39. ^ (艾重言曰:「銜命征行,奉指授之策,元惡旣服;至於承制拜假,以安初附,謂合權宜。今蜀舉衆歸命,地盡南海,東接吳會,宜早鎮定。若待國命,往復道途,延引日月。春秋之義,大夫出疆,有可以安社稷,利國家,專之可也。今吴未賔;勢與蜀連,不可拘常以失事機。兵法,進不求名,退不避罪,艾雖無古人之節,終不自嫌以損于國也。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  40. ^ (鍾會、胡烈、師纂等皆白艾所作悖逆,變釁以結。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  41. ^ (會內有異志,因鄧艾承制專事,密白艾有反狀,於是詔書檻車徵艾。司馬文王懼艾或不從命,勑會並進軍成都,監軍衞瓘在會前行,以文王手筆令宣喻艾軍,艾軍皆釋仗,遂收艾入檻車。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  42. ^ (艾父子旣囚,鍾會至成都,先送艾,然後作亂。會已死,艾本營將士追出艾檻車,迎還。瓘遣田續等討艾, ...) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  43. ^ (... 遇於緜竹西,斬之。子忠與艾俱死,餘子在洛陽者悉誅,徙艾妻子及孫於西域。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  44. ^ (泰始元年,晉室踐阼,詔曰:「昔太尉王淩謀廢齊王,而王竟不足以守位。征西將軍鄧艾,矜功失節,實應大辟。然被書之日,罷遣人衆,束手受罪,比於求生遂為惡者,誠復不同。今大赦得還,若無子孫者聽使立後,令祭祀不絕。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  45. ^ (艾在西時,修治障塞,築起城塢。泰始中,羗虜大叛,頻殺刺史,涼州道斷。吏民安全者,皆保艾所築塢焉。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  46. ^ (九年,詔曰:「艾有功勳,受罪不逃刑,而子孫為民隷,朕常愍之。其以嫡孫朗為郎中。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  47. ^ (評曰: ... 鄧艾矯然彊壯,立功立事,然闇於防患,咎敗旋至,豈遠知乎諸葛恪而不能近自見,此蓋古人所謂目論者也。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  48. ^ ([泰始]三年,議郎段灼上疏理艾曰:「艾心懷至忠而荷反逆之名,平定巴蜀而受夷滅之誅,臣竊悼之。惜哉,言艾之反也!艾性剛急,輕犯雅俗,不能恊同朋類,故莫肯理之。臣敢言艾不反之狀。 ...七十老公,反欲何求!... 赦寃魂於黃泉,收信義於後世,葬一人而天下慕其行,埋一魂而天下歸其義,所為者寡而恱者衆矣。」) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
Citations from the Sanguozhi zhu
  1. ^ (世語曰:鄧艾少為襄城典農部民,與石苞皆年十二三。謁者陽翟郭玄信,武帝監軍郭誕元弈之子。建安中,少府吉本起兵許都,玄信坐被刑在家,從典農司馬求入御,以艾、苞與御,行十餘里,與語,恱之,謂二人皆當遠至為佐相。艾後為典農功曹,奉使詣宣王,由此見知,遂被拔擢。) Shiyu annotation in Sanguozhi vol. 28. This anecdote was also recorded in Shi Bao's biography in Book of Jin, albeit in lesser detail. (县召为吏,给农司马。会谒者阳翟郭玄信奉使,求人为御,司马以苞及邓艾给之。行十馀里,玄信谓二人曰:“子後并当至卿相。”苞曰:“御隶也,何卿相乎?”) Jin Shu, vol.33
  2. ^ (世語曰:會善效人書,於劒閣要艾章表白事,皆易其言,令辭指悖傲,多自矜伐。又毀文王報書,手作以疑之也。) Shiyu annotation in Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  3. ^ (魏氏春秋曰:艾仰天歎曰:「艾忠臣也,一至此乎!白起之酷,復見於今日矣。」) Wei Shi Chunqiu annotation in Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  4. ^ (漢晉春秋曰:初艾之下江由也,以續不進,欲斬,旣而捨之。及瓘遣續,謂曰:「可以報江由之辱矣。」) Han Jin Chunqiu annotation in Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  5. ^ (世語曰:師纂亦與艾俱死。纂性急少恩,死之日體無完皮。) Shiyu annotation in Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  6. ^ (杜預言於衆曰:「伯玉其不免乎!身為名士,位望已高,旣無德音,又不御下以正,是小人而乘君子之器,將何以堪其責乎?」瓘聞之,不俟駕而謝。) Han Jin Chunqiu annotation in Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  7. ^ (先是以艾孫朗為丹水令,由此遷為定陵令。次孫千秋有時望,光祿大夫王戎辟為掾。永嘉中,朗為新都太守,未之官,在襄陽失火,朗及母妻子舉室燒死,惟子韜子行得免。千秋先卒,二子亦燒死。) Shiyu annotation in Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  8. ^ (世語曰:咸寧中,積射將軍樊震為西戎牙門,得見辭,武帝問震所由進,震自陳曾為鄧艾伐蜀時帳下將,帝遂尋問艾,震具申艾之忠,言之流涕。) Shiyu annotation in Sanguozhi vol. 28.
Other citations
  1. ^ (淮乃使泰率討蜀護軍徐質、南安太守鄧艾進兵圍麴城,斷其運道及城外流水。安等挑戰,不許,將士困窘,分糧聚雪以引日月。維引兵救之,出自牛頭山,與泰相對。泰曰:「兵法貴在不戰而屈人。今絕牛頭,維無反道,則我之禽也。」敕諸軍各堅壘勿與戰,遣使白淮,使淮趣牛頭截其還路。淮從之,進軍洮水。) Zizhi Tongjian vol. 75.
  1. ^ a b c de Crespigny (2007), p. 109.
  2. ^ a b (春,正月,壬辰,詔以檻車徵鄧艾。 ...) Zizhi Tongjian vol. 78. Note that there is no renchen day in that month.
  3. ^ Vol.04 of Sanguozhi and vol.02 of Jin Shu both indicated that Deng Ai was arrested in the 1st month of the 1st year of the Xianxi era. The month corresponds to 15 Feb to 14 Mar 264 in the Julian calendar. Volume 78 of Zizhi Tongjian dated Deng Ai's arrest to the renchen day of that month, but there is no renchen day in that month. The next renchen day is in the 2nd month, and corresponds to 16 Mar 264 in the Julian calendar. All sources agree that Deng Ai died after Zhong Hui, who died on 3 Mar 264.
  4. ^ Brashier, K.E. (2020). Public Memory in Early China (ebook) (general history). Brill. p. 90. ISBN 9781684170753. Retrieved 14 January 2022.(鄧艾字士載,義陽棘陽人也。少孤,太祖破荊州,徙汝南,為農民養犢。年十二,隨母至潁川,讀故太丘長陳寔碑文,言「文為世範,行為士則」,艾遂自名範,字士則。後宗族有與同者,故改焉。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  5. ^ Declercq (1998), p. 175.
  6. ^ Yuan (1988).
  7. ^ a b Michael Farmer, J. (2008). The Talent of Shu Qiao Zhou and the Intellectual World of Early Medieval Sichuan (paperback) (general history). State University of New York Press. p. 59. ISBN 9780791471647. Retrieved 14 January 2022.
  8. ^ 河南省地方志编簒委员会 (Henan Province Local Chronicle Compilation Committee) (2008). 河南年鉴 [Henan Yearbook] (in Chinese). 《河南年鉴》编辑部 ("Henan Yearbook" editorial department). Retrieved 1 March 2022. 鄧艾因功升任徵西將軍,前後共增食邑六千六百户。
  9. ^ a b ([景元四年]冬十月,艾自陰平道行無人之地七百餘里,鑿山通道,造作橋閣。山高谷深,至為艱險,又糧運將匱,頻於危殆。艾以氊自裹,推轉而下。將士皆攀木緣崖,魚貫而進。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  10. ^ (鄧艾追姜維到陰平,簡選精銳,欲從漢德陽入江由、左儋道詣緜竹,趣成都,與諸葛緒共行。緒以本受節度邀姜維,西行非本詔,遂進軍前向白水,與會合。會遣將軍田章等從劒閣西,徑出江由。未至百里,章先破蜀伏兵三校,艾使章先登。遂長駈而前。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.
  11. ^ (先登至江由,蜀守將馬邈降。) Sanguozhi vol. 28.

Primary sources

[edit]

Secondary sources

[edit]
  • Declercq, Dominik (1998). Writing Against the State: Political Rhetorics in Third and Fourth Century China. New York: Köln Brill.
  • de Crespigny, Rafe (2007). A Biographical Dictionary of Later Han to the Three Kingdoms 23-220 AD. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 9789004156050.
  • Sima, Guang (1084). Zizhi Tongjian.
  • Yuan, Tingdong (1988). War in Ancient China (first ed.). Chengdu: Sichuan Academy of Social Science Publishing House. ISBN 7-80524-058-2.
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from Grokipedia

Deng Ai (197–264), courtesy name , was a military general and politician of the state during China's period. Orphaned at a young age and originating from humble peasant roots in Yiyang county, he rose through administrative roles and , initially as a farmland guard and later under as a clerical , where he proposed innovative irrigation projects that enhanced agricultural output in northern regions. His strategic defenses repeatedly thwarted incursions led by , earning promotions to generalships such as Zhenxi Jiangjun and governorships over commanderies like Nan'an and Yanzhou.
Deng Ai's defining achievement came in 263, when, as part of a Wei offensive, he commanded forces that traversed over 700 li of perilous, snow-covered mountain paths—bypassing fortified —to surprise and defeat Shu defenders, culminating in the capture of and the surrender of Shu emperor without widespread plunder or disorder among his troops. Post-conquest, he advocated for conciliatory policies toward Shu elites and outlined plans for further expansion against , but these were rebuffed by regent . His success bred envy, leading to accusations of disloyalty and rebellion orchestrated by rival general ; arrested and imprisoned during transport to , Deng Ai and his son Deng Zhong were executed by subordinates Wei Guan and Tian Xu in early 264, with his family exiled to the western frontiers.

Early Life and Career

Humble Origins and Personal Challenges

Deng Ai was born circa 197 in Jiyang, Yiyang Commandery (modern , Province), into circumstances marked by poverty and early familial loss. His father died when he was young, leaving him orphaned, after which he relocated to Runan Commandery amid the upheavals following Cao Cao's capture of Jing Province in 208. Despite these hardships and a lack of prominent lineage, Deng Ai managed to learn reading and writing, skills uncommon for those of lowly birth in the late Eastern Han era. A significant personal challenge was Deng Ai's lifelong speech impediment, a stutter that manifested in repetitive utterances, such as invoking his own name "Ai Ai" during address. This condition invited derision from elites, exemplified by Sima Zhao's taunt questioning the number of "Ais" in Deng's self-reference, highlighting how physical flaws could undermine social standing in a status-conscious . Historical accounts portray this as a barrier he navigated through , though it persisted into his and shaped perceptions of his unpolished demeanor.

Initial Recognition and Administrative Roles

Deng Ai, born circa 197 CE in Yiyang County, Yingchuan Commandery (modern ), lost his father at a young age and relocated to Runan before settling in Yingchuan at age twelve, where he stuttered and initially worked guarding farmland due to his impoverished background. Despite these challenges, he self-taught and demonstrated administrative aptitude, leading to his promotion as a minor administrative officer handling local records. During a routine trip to the capital to submit accounting records, Deng Ai encountered , the Wei regent and Defender-in-chief, who was impressed by his sharp insights into governance and resource management; promptly transferred him to his personal staff and appointed him as a shangshu lang (secretarial court gentleman) in the central Secretariat. This patronage marked Deng Ai's initial recognition at the imperial level, elevating him from local obscurity to a position influencing policy discussions, where he contributed memoranda on agricultural efficiency and flood control. Sima Yi's endorsement facilitated Deng Ai's subsequent assignments as (taishou) of Nan'an, Runan, and Chengyang commanderies, roles in which he prioritized practical administration for commoners, including and basic to mitigate risks. By the 250s CE, his reputation for competent, detail-oriented governance led to his appointment as regional inspector (cishi) of Yanzhou Province, his highest early administrative post, overseeing civil order and economic stability amid post-conquest recovery in northern territories. These roles underscored Deng Ai's transition from a stuttering agrarian clerk to a trusted bureaucratic figure, rewarded with enfeoffment as Marquis of Fangcheng Township by Emperor around 254–260 CE for his foundational contributions to state administration.

Civil and Economic Contributions

Irrigation and Agricultural Innovations

Deng Ai proposed extensive and agricultural development in the region during the early 240s AD, advocating for the establishment of military-agricultural colonies to cultivate underutilized lands and enhance food production for Wei's armies. In a titled Ji He Lun (Discussion on the River), he recommended deploying 20,000 troops north of the and 30,000 south to reclaim barren areas through systematic farming and water diversion, reallocating channels from less fertile regions like Chen Commandery and Xiang Commandery eastward to Shou Commandery and the Huai basin. These efforts prioritized fertile for maximal yield, integrating labor with oversight to build canals and fields. A key innovation was the redirection of water resources to mitigate flooding and support perennial cultivation; Deng Ai's plans involved army-led construction of diversionary channels that stabilized the Huai River's flow, preventing inundations while enabling irrigated agriculture across newly opened tracts. Implementation began around the second year of the Zhengshi era (241 AD), yielding sufficient grain within six to seven years to sustain an army of 100,000 soldiers for five years without external supply lines. In the Ru'nan region during his tenure as administrator, he further promoted reclamation of wasteland, resulting in improved local provisioning and reduced famine risks. In 241 AD, Deng Ai oversaw practical near what would become the Hongze Lake system, connecting Pofu Lake to Baishui Lake and erecting three weirs alongside eight watergates to regulate flow for downstream . This expanded cultivable area by approximately 12,000 hectares in northern , bolstering grain output for both troops and civilians while fostering in the Huai basin. These measures exemplified Deng Ai's emphasis on adaptive water management in flood-prone eastern commanderies, contrasting with the arid west where later postings focused more on border defense than novel farming techniques.

Policy Reforms and Governance

Deng Ai proposed the expansion of the tuntian (military-agricultural colony) system into the Liang and regions—encompassing northern and provinces—to increase grain production and provision troops for campaigns against Wu. This reform integrated soldiers into farming duties during peacetime, fostering self-reliance in border areas, alleviating central supply burdens, and enhancing overall agricultural output to support Wei's military posture. The initiative reflected Deng Ai's emphasis on economic-military synergy, drawing from earlier Wei precedents but tailored to eastern frontiers vulnerable to Wu incursions. In administrative roles, including as of Nan'an Commandery and regional of Yanzhou around the 240s CE, Deng Ai implemented measures to stabilize local economies amid nomadic pressures. He advocated policies to fragment tribal alliances, such as those among the and Qiang groups, preventing their consolidation into unified threats that could disrupt agriculture and trade routes. These strategies involved selective resettlement, fortified settlements, and incentives for sedentary farming among subdued tribes, which reduced raids and expanded taxable farmlands in the northwest. Outcomes included bolstered granaries and population growth in affected commanderies, earning imperial commendation from . Deng Ai's governance extended to fiscal prudence, recommending reduced tax levies on newly cultivated lands to encourage reclamation and migration. In Shouchun (modern ) circa 250 CE, his oversight promoted integrated , linking administrative oversight with productive reforms to counter famine risks and Wu aggression. Such policies underscored a pragmatic approach, prioritizing empirical agricultural yields over rigid hierarchies, and contributed to Wei's resilience in peripheral regions before his prominence in military affairs.

Military Engagements Before the Shu Campaign

Battle of the Tao River

In 256 AD, during the ninth of 's northern expeditions against , forces under the command of crossed the Tao River (洮水; present-day area in Province) to attack Wei garrisons in the northwest, aiming to seize territory and disrupt Wei defenses. , serving as Administrator of Jincheng Commandery and a , mobilized approximately 5,000 troops to intercept the invading Shu army. Exploiting environmental conditions, including fog that obscured visibility, Deng Ai launched a surprise ambush on the Shu forces, catching them off guard and inflicting heavy casualties. The Shu army was routed and driven back across the river, marking a decisive Wei victory that halted the incursion and demonstrated Deng Ai's tactical foresight in predicting and countering Jiang Wei's movements. This success earned Deng Ai recognition and promotion within the Wei military hierarchy, enhancing his reputation as a capable defender against Shu aggression prior to his later conquest campaigns.

Suppression of Rebellions and Border Defense

In 249, Deng Ai was appointed to a military post under General Guo Huai in Yong Province (modern ), where he focused on securing the northwestern borders against incursions from and nomadic tribes. He proposed dividing the Qiang and Hu populations—relocating those assimilated into Han society away from unassimilated groups—to prevent coordinated rebellions or alliances with Shu forces, a rooted in exploiting ethnic fractures for defensive advantage. These policies complemented Guo Huai's campaigns, stabilizing the region by reducing the tribes' capacity for unified action. Shortly after his arrival, a Qiang tribal rebellion erupted, bolstered by Shu support under Jiang Wei, prompting Deng Ai to reinforce defenses and contribute to its suppression. Following Guo Huai's death in 253, Deng Ai assumed greater command responsibilities, defeating Qiang and Di rebels in subsequent clashes and pushing back Shu probes. He established agricultural colonies (tuntian) along the frontiers to sustain garrisons independently, minimizing supply vulnerabilities during prolonged defenses. In 255, Deng Ai aided in quelling the eastern rebellion led by Guanqiu Jian and Wen Qin, executing rebel envoys and deploying troops to secure key positions, which earned him promotion to General Who Subdues the West (鎮西將軍) and oversight of Yong and Liang Province military affairs. Returning west, he fortified strategic sites like Mount Qi, repelling Jiang Wei's autumn 256 offensive before it gained momentum; Shu forces withdrew after encountering entrenched positions and depleted logistics. Through 262, Deng Ai's preemptive and tribal pacification maintained Wei's border integrity, averting deeper penetrations despite Shu's repeated expeditions.

Conquest of Shu Han

Strategic Planning and Logistical Preparations

In 263, orchestrated Wei's invasion of with a multi-pronged to overwhelm Shu defenses concentrated at Jian'ge. Deng Ai advocated a daring western flanking route through the Yinping trail—a remote, 700-li expanse of sheer cliffs, raging torrents, and uninhabited wilderness—to circumvent the pass and strike directly at , approximately 300 li beyond Fu Pass. This proposal countered more conventional advances by exploiting Shu deemed impassable, forcing enemy forces to divide or abandon positions. Sima Zhao endorsed the plan despite reservations from subordinates like Zhuge Xu, who favored caution. Deng Ai received command as General Who Attacks the West, leading 30,000 troops sourced from Longxi and Liang provinces, complemented by the main army under (over 100,000 strong) via and Zhuge Xu's 30,000-man diversion. Troops were selected for endurance, with elite infantry prioritized over cavalry unsuitable for the mountains. Logistical emphasis fell on secrecy and self-sufficiency to evade Shu intelligence. Deng Ai imposed oaths forbidding discussion of the route under penalty of death, limiting advance knowledge even among officers. Supply lines eschewed wagons and draft animals, infeasible in the rugged defiles; soldiers shouldered 3–5 days' rations, tools for bridge-building, and minimal gear, enabling rapid foot marches. Subsidiary forces under Deng Ai's sons Deng Zhong and Deng Yao, plus allied Qiang cavalry led by Tian Zhang, handled segmented advances to mitigate exhaustion. Pre-invasion infrastructure supported the thrust: Xu Yi oversaw road extensions from Wei frontiers into flanking approaches, while granaries in Tazhong stocked forward depots against attrition. Deng Ai, hampered by lifelong hearing impairment and mobility issues, traveled by litter to direct engineering—fashioning rope ladders, felled-tree spans over chasms, and cleared paths—transforming the "impracticable" trail into a viable corridor traversed in roughly 12 days to Jiangyou, catching Shu unprepared. These measures underscored causal trade-offs: high-risk exposure to ambushes and supply shortfalls, offset by surprise yielding decisive momentum.

Bold Advances and Tactical Innovations

Deng Ai demonstrated exceptional boldness in the 263 conquest of by proposing and leading a high-risk through the Yinping route, a narrow trail traversing roughly 700 li (approximately 350 kilometers) of steep, forested mountains and ravines long considered impassable for large armies. Despite warnings from subordinates that the path's cliffs and lack of provisions would doom the expedition, Deng Ai selected elite vanguard units, including his son Deng Zhong's detachment, to pioneer the way with axes, boring tools, and minimal armor for enhanced mobility, enabling on-the-spot engineering to fell trees, level ground, and bridge streams. This unorthodox approach, informed by his decades of experience patrolling Wei's western borders, allowed his forces to cover the grueling distance in secret during and 263, emerging undetected to threaten the Shu heartland while the main Wei army under pinned Shu defenses at the formidable Jiange pass. The tactical innovation of this divided advance—coordinating a frontal with a surprise envelopment—exploited Shu commander Jiang Wei's focus on the expected axis of attack, shattering the enemy's strategic assumptions and forcing reactive deployments. Upon reaching Jiangyou, Deng Ai accepted the surrender of garrison commander Ma Miao, incorporating local guides and resources to sustain momentum without foraging disruptions, then pressed onward to Mianzhu where Shu forces under mounted a desperate stand. In the ensuing battle, Deng Ai's troops, leveraging their rapid arrival and superior from the undetected march, routed Zhuge's army, slaying him and his brother Zhuge Shang, thus clearing the final obstacle to . This maneuver not only accelerated Shu's collapse, culminating in Emperor Liu Shan's capitulation on , 263, but also highlighted Deng Ai's emphasis on speed, terrain mastery, and operational discipline over conventional siege tactics. Further underscoring his pragmatic innovations, Deng Ai enforced strict prohibitions against upon entering captured territories, framing surrender as a merciful alignment with Wei's benevolence to psychologically resistance and expedite administrative integration, a contrast to the plunder typical in prolonged campaigns. His prior advocacy for self-sustaining military agro-colonies along the border had honed logistical foresight, ensuring supply lines via oxen trains and pre-positioned depots that mitigated the Yinping march's isolation risks, though executed with captured Shu assets. These elements collectively transformed a potentially suicidal gamble into a decisive , validating Deng Ai's first-hand assessment of Shu's vulnerabilities over courtly .

Capture of Chengdu and Surrender

Following the decisive victory at Mianzhu, where Shu general and his son were killed, Deng Ai's forces advanced unopposed toward , the Shu capital. With the main defensive barrier breached between late November and mid-December 263, Shu emperor convened his court amid reports of the Wei army's rapid approach. Advisor Qiao Zhou urged immediate surrender to preserve lives and infrastructure, arguing that prolonged resistance would lead to devastation without altering the outcome given Shu's depleted resources and morale. Influenced by this counsel and the collapse of organized resistance, dispatched envoys carrying the imperial seal, scepter, and formal surrender edict to Deng Ai's camp outside the city. Deng Ai accepted the terms without contest, entering peacefully in December 263. He imposed strict discipline on his troops, executing violators of orders against plundering to prevent unrest and facilitate a smooth transition. Local Shu officials were promptly reinstated in their roles under Wei oversight, ensuring administrative continuity and minimizing disruption to the populace. formally yielded authority, presenting himself to Deng Ai, who treated the former emperor with measured courtesy, unbinding him from ritual self-abasement and granting him the Wei title of Anle xianghou (Marquis of Peace and Joy) with an annual stipend. This capitulation marked the effective end of after 43 years, with Wei forces numbering around 30,000 securing control over a region of approximately 280,000 households and vast granaries. The surrender's terms emphasized clemency: Shu nobility retained partial estates, and commoners were exempted from immediate or taxation hikes, reflecting Deng Ai's pragmatic assessment that integration via stability would yield greater long-term loyalty than coercion. Deng Ai reportedly remarked to subordinates that Shu's fortune lay in submitting to Wei rather than Wu, as the latter's predatory history would have invited harsher exploitation. These measures, drawn from Deng Ai's prior administrative expertise, averted widespread rebellion in the immediate aftermath, though underlying resentments persisted among Shu loyalists.

Administration of Occupied Shu

Following the surrender of emperor in the ninth month of 263 (October), Deng Ai's forces entered without incident, maintaining strict military discipline to prevent plundering or disorder among the troops. Exercising the acting imperial authority delegated by the Wei court, Deng Ai appointed as Assistant General of the Guards (Piaoqi Jiangjun) and enfeoffed him as Marquis of Anle, while reinstating many surrendered Shu officials to their prior administrative roles to ensure continuity in local governance. These measures aimed to foster stability and encourage loyalty from the Shu elite by preserving familiar structures rather than imposing wholesale purges. As the newly appointed Defender-in-chief (Si Tu) responsible for the Sichuan Basin, Deng Ai independently oversaw the integration of Shu territories into Wei administration, leveraging the region's distance from the capital Luoyang to implement on-the-ground decisions with minimal immediate oversight. He directed the joint burial of fallen Wei and Shu soldiers to symbolize reconciliation and ordered the distribution of Shu's ample grain reserves from state granaries to alleviate immediate hardships among the populace, drawing on inventories that revealed Shu's capacity to sustain over 100,000 troops despite a registered population of approximately 280,000 households. In memorials to the Wei court, Deng Ai advocated for lenient fiscal policies, including reduced taxation and corvée exemptions, to rebuild agricultural productivity and prevent resentment, arguing that Shu's accumulated wealth in silk, cash, and provisions could subsidize Wei's central treasury for decades if harnessed judiciously rather than squandered on excessive garrisons. Deng Ai's approach emphasized pragmatic adaptation over rigid centralization, permitting retention of certain Shu customs and local appointees to minimize resistance, though this autonomy later fueled suspicions of overreach. By prioritizing economic recovery—such as redirecting Shu's resources to supply regions—he sought to transform the conquest into a net benefit for the empire, but implementation was curtailed by court politics and Zhong Hui's rival oversight in adjacent areas.

Downfall and Execution

Escalating Tensions with Sima Zhao

Following the successful conquest of Shu Han in early 263, Deng Ai's conduct increasingly deviated from Wei court protocols, fostering suspicions of disloyalty toward the regent . Upon entering on 3 February 263, Deng Ai accepted the surrender of and immediately began administering the region, but he appointed local officials—such as designating his son Deng Zhong as acting Protector of Yizhou and others to key posts—without prior imperial authorization, actions perceived as presumptuous overreach. He also treated surrendered Shu officials with disdain, reportedly boasting to them that their survival hinged on his mercy alone, which alienated potential allies and fueled reports of his growing hubris back to . Deng Ai further escalated matters by bypassing Sima Zhao's authority through direct memorials to Emperor , advocating aggressive expansion against without awaiting regental approval. In one such petition, dated shortly after the conquest, he urged immediate invasion of Wu, warning that delays would allow Shu remnants to regroup and incite rebellion; when Sima Zhao responded cautiously, prioritizing consolidation and expressing reservations about hasty campaigns, Deng Ai defiantly mobilized troops and supplies toward Wu borders around March 264, interpreting the regent's hesitation as timidity. This prompted Sima Zhao to dispatch stern edicts halting the advance and questioning Deng Ai's judgment, while simultaneously instructing military supervisors like Wei Guan to monitor him closely for signs of rebellion. These incidents compounded existing wariness in the Wei court, where , consolidating power after his brother Sima Shi's death, viewed any erosion of centralized control as a to his regency. Reports from subordinates, including exaggerated accounts of Deng Ai's authoritarian style in Shu—such as unauthorized tax collections and fortification projects—reached , portraying him as a potential seeking autonomy akin to past regional strongmen. , though initially rewarding Deng Ai with titles like Duke of Pingyang for the conquest, shifted to suspicion by spring 264, confiding concerns to advisors like Jia Chong about the general's "arrogant demeanor" undermining imperial unity, setting the stage for formal inquiries into his loyalty.

Arrest, Charges, and Zhong Hui's Involvement

Following the conquest of in late 263, Deng Ai's issuance of unauthorized proclamations and edicts in , coupled with his proposal for an unapproved campaign against , drew scrutiny from the Wei court. , the de facto regent of Wei, explicitly rejected Deng Ai's plan to advance on Wu without prior imperial sanction, directing him to submit it for higher review instead. Deng Ai's indignant response to this directive, interpreted as defiance, exacerbated suspicions of disloyalty. Zhong Hui, Deng Ai's rival general who had commanded a parallel army during the Shu campaign, along with officers Hu Lie and Shi Zuan under Deng Ai's nominal command, submitted reports to the Wei court accusing Deng Ai of plotting rebellion. These accusations highlighted Deng Ai's self-aggrandizing administrative measures in Shu, such as styling himself as a provincial protector and confining local officials, as evidence of treasonous intent. Zhong Hui, motivated by personal ambition and jealousy over Deng Ai's unorthodox successes, leveraged his proximity to the court to amplify these claims, framing Deng Ai's actions as a direct challenge to central authority. In response, issued an edict in early 264—specifically on or around February 15—ordering Deng Ai's immediate arrest on charges of high treason and unauthorized usurpation of power. To ensure compliance amid fears of resistance from Deng Ai's loyal troops, simultaneously empowered , promoting him to Minister of the Interior and instructing him to oversee the operation while advancing into with his forces. dispatched the supervisor Wei Guan to execute the arrest, presenting 's edict to Deng Ai's camp; Deng Ai and his son Deng Zhong were seized, bound, and confined to a wooden cart for conveyance to . Although Deng Ai's veteran soldiers briefly liberated him and his son during transit, they were swiftly recaptured in by pursuing forces under Wei Guan and Tian Xu. , having secured the arrest to neutralize a competitor, withheld further intervention as he consolidated control in Shu, only to launch his own abortive shortly thereafter. The charges against Deng Ai, rooted in his tactical and perceived overreach, underscored the fragile balance of power within Wei's military hierarchy post-conquest.

Death and Family Consequences

Deng Ai and his son Deng Zhong were executed in by the Wei officials Wei Guan and Tian Xu amid the chaos of Zhong Hui's in early 264, as the pair feared Deng Ai's potential release and retaliation against them. Tian Xu led soldiers to intercept Deng Ai's prison transport west of Mianzhu County, where they killed him, his son, and subordinate Shi Zuan on or after March 3. Following Deng Ai's death, Sima Zhao ordered the execution of his remaining sons in , effectively eliminating the male line of his immediate family in the capital. His wife and daughters were exiled to remote countryside areas, marking the severe punitive measures against his kin for the perceived . While some reportedly evaded total eradication and survived in , the clan's prominence was decisively curtailed.

Rehabilitation and Enduring Legacy

Posthumous Honors and Restoration

In 265, shortly after Deng Ai's execution, the charges of against him were determined to be fabricated, leading to his posthumous and the restoration of his reputation. Following the establishment of the Jin dynasty in 266 by Sima Yan (Emperor Wu), the surviving members of Deng Ai's family—previously exiled to remote —were allowed to return to their original locales. This act implicitly recognized the in his arrest and death, engineered amid the chaos of Zhong Hui's rebellion, though Deng Ai received no additional posthumous titles or marquessates beyond his pre-execution honors for conquering .

Historical Appraisals and Scholarly Debates

In traditional , Deng Ai is appraised as a military genius whose strategic acumen and logistical innovations enabled the conquest of in 263 CE, yet whose personal flaws precipitated his downfall. , in the Records of the (Sanguozhi), portrays Deng Ai as possessing "exceptional talent" in governance and warfare, crediting him with early successes in flood control projects along the in 232 CE and defensive campaigns against Shu incursions in the 250s CE, but critiques his "arrogance and self-conceit" for bypassing imperial protocols during the Shu campaign, such as advancing without authorization to capture on November 19, 263 CE. This evaluation underscores Deng Ai's administrative foresight, including his authorship of the lost Treatise on Dikes and Irrigation (Jihelun), which advocated engineering solutions for agricultural stability, as noted in later annotations to the Sanguozhi. Subsequent Jin dynasty historians, writing under Sima influence, amplified suspicions of Deng Ai's ambitions, emphasizing his unilateral proclamations in Shu—such as styling himself " of the Shu Territory" and proposing population relocations of non-Han groups in 251 CE—as evidence of disloyalty, though these policies aimed at stabilizing the frontier through assimilation and resource redistribution. Pei Songzhi's 5th-century annotations to Chen Shou's work incorporate memorials defending Deng Ai's integrity, highlighting rivalries with , who fabricated treason charges amid jealousy over Deng Ai's unassisted victory. Modern scholarship debates the causal factors of Deng Ai's execution on February 2, 264 CE, with some attributing it to systemic court paranoia under rather than genuine sedition, given Deng Ai's prior loyalty and the rapid posthumous exoneration in 265 CE that restored his family's honors. Analysts like Zhu Zongmin interpret his Shu governance proposals—favoring low taxes and cultural integration over punitive measures—as pragmatically realist, contrasting with Zhong Hui's more aggressive stance, and argue that his "discovery" of the treacherous Yinping trail (a 700-li mountain path) exemplifies adaptive genius over reckless ambition, enabling a surprise envelopment of Jiang Wei's forces. Others question the veracity of charges, viewing them as politically expedient to consolidate Sima power, though empirical records confirm Deng Ai's overreach in bypassing Clocktower Advisor Jia Chong's directives, fueling legitimate fears of warlordism in a fragmented era. These interpretations prioritize Deng Ai's enduring legacy in military hydrology and terrain exploitation, positioning him as a causal innovator whose flaws reflected the era's zero-sum power dynamics rather than inherent moral failing.

Family Lineage and Descendants

Deng Ai hailed from Jiyang in Yiyang Commandery (modern , ), where he was born into a peasant family around 197 CE. He lost his father at a young age and relocated with his mother to Yingchuan Commandery at approximately age 12 following Cao Cao's conquest of northern Jing Province. No records indicate any notable ancestral lineage or prominent forebears; his early life was marked by and self-education in and military texts despite personal challenges such as a speech impediment. Deng Ai had at least two sons, one named Deng Zhong, who accompanied him on the Shu campaign and was promoted to Duke of Ting for military contributions. Following Deng Ai's arrest and execution in in 264 CE, Deng Zhong was killed alongside him by subordinates under orders from superiors in . His remaining sons, located in the capital, were also executed in the ensuing purge. Deng Ai's wife and grandsons were exiled to the (modern and beyond) as punishment for his alleged . Partial rehabilitation occurred during the Jin dynasty; in the 9th year of Taishi (273 CE), following petitions highlighting injustices against the family, a descendant was appointed to an official court position, signaling restoration of some status. No further details on specific or their long-term lineage are recorded in primary accounts.

Depictions in Literature, Drama, and Modern Media

In the 14th-century historical novel by , Deng Ai emerges as a key protagonist in the later chapters, credited with devising the audacious strategy to conquer by leading 30,000 troops over the treacherous Yinping trail in 263 CE, bypassing Jiang Wei's defenses and forcing Liu Shan's surrender at . The narrative emphasizes his logistical foresight, stuttering speech as a quirky trait masking sharp intellect, and tragic downfall amid court intrigues with , blending historical records from Chen Shou's with fictional embellishments to highlight Wei's triumph over Shu. Traditional Chinese drama portrays Deng Ai in works like Bei Di Wang, staged to depict the 263 CE encirclement of , where his military advance precipitates Shu's collapse, often underscoring themes of imperial hubris and strategic inevitability through stylized and singing. In modern media, Deng Ai appears as a playable character in Koei Tecmo's series, starting from (2003), rendered as a muscular, map-obsessed tactician whose attacks simulate supply-line disruptions and mountain assaults, reflecting his historical role in the Shu campaign while amplifying his persona for action gameplay. He also features in spin-offs like , maintaining Wei allegiance and emphasizing analytical prowess over personal combat. Adaptations in Chinese television series on the era, such as those drawing from the novel, typically cast him as a stern, innovative commander in ensemble narratives of the 263 conquest, though with varying to primary sources like Pei Songzhi's annotations.
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