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History of Germany
IMPERIUM ROMANO-GERMANICUM oder DEUTSCHLAND MIT SEINEN ANGRÄNTZENDEN KÖNIGREICHEN UND PROVINCIEN. Neulich entworffen und theils gezeichnet durch IULIUM REICHELT, Chur Pfaltz
Topics
Early history
Middle Ages
Early Modern period
Unification
German Reich
German Empire1871–1918
World War I1914–1918
Weimar Republic1918–1933
Nazi Germany1933–1945
World War II1939–1945
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1945–1949/1952
Expulsion of Germans1944–1950
1949–1990
1990
Modern historysince 1990

The new states of Germany (German: die neuen Länder / die neuen Bundesländer) are the five re-established states of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) that unified with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with its 10 "old states" upon German reunification on 3 October 1990.

The new states, which were dissolved by the GDR government in 1952 and re-established in 1990, are Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia. The state of Berlin, the result of a merger between East and West Berlin, is usually not considered one of the new states although a number of its residents are former East Germans and some of its areas were in the former East Berlin. There have been 16 states in Germany since reunification.

Demographics

[edit]
See also: Demographics of Germany
The population density of the new German states is lower than that of the old states.
Proportion of Germans without a migrant background as of 2016

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the former East German states experienced high rates of depopulation until around 2008.[1] About 2,000 schools closed between 1989 and 2008, because of a demographic shift to a lower number of children.[2] In 2006, the fertility rate in the new states (1.30) approached those in the old states (1.34) and in 2016 it was higher than in the old states (1.64 vs. 1.60 in the old states).[3][4] In 2019, the new states had exactly the same fertility rate as the old states (both 1.56).[5]

More children are born out of wedlock in the new states than in the old states. In the new states, 61% of births were from unmarried women compared to 27% in the old states in 2009. Both states of Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania had the highest rates of birth outside wedlock at 64% each, followed by Brandenburg with 62%, Bavaria and Hesse at 26%, while the state of Baden-Württemberg had the lowest rate at 22%.[6]

Demographic evolution

[edit]

Brandenburg had a population of 2,660,000 in 1989[7] and 2,531,071 in 2020.[8] It has the second-lowest population density in Germany. In 1995, it was the only new state to experience population growth, aided by nearby Berlin.[9]

Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania had a population of 1,970,000 in 1989[7] and 1,610,774 in 2020,[8] with the lowest population density in Germany. The local Landtag held several inquiries on population trends after the opposition requested an annual report on the topic.[9]

Saxony had a population of 5,003,000 in 1989,[7] which fell to 4,056,094 in 2020.[8] It remains the most populated among the five new states. The proportion of the population under 20 years of age fell from 24.6% in 1988 to 19.7% in 1999.[9] Dresden and Leipzig are among the fastest-growing cities in Germany, both raising their population to over half a million inhabitants again.

Saxony-Anhalt had a population of 2,960,000 in 1989,[7] which fell to 2,180,684 in 2020.[8] The state has a long history of demographic decline: its current territory had a population of 4,100,000 in 1945. The emigration had already begun during the GDR years.[9]

Thuringia had a population of 2,680,000 in 1989,[7] which fell to 2,120,237 in 2020.[8]

As of 2021, the new states have 12.5 million people, about 15% of Germany's population, and slightly less than that of Bavaria.[10]

Migration

[edit]

There are more migrants in former West Germany than in former East Germany.[11][12][13] About 1.7 million people (or 12% of the population) had left the new states.[2] A disproportionately high number of them were women under the age of 35.[14] About 500,000 women under the age of 30 left for western Germany between 1993 and 2008.[15] In some rural regions, the number of women between the ages of 20 and 30 dropped by more than 30 percent.[2] After 2008, the net migration rate decreased significantly.[16] In 2017, for the first time since German reunification, more people emigrated from the old states to the new states than vice versa.[16] All of the new states have populations where 90-95% of people do not have a migrant background.[11][12][13]

Religion

[edit]
See also: Irreligion in Germany and Christianity in East Germany

Irreligion is predominant in former East Germany.[17][18][19] An exception is former West Berlin, which had a Christian plurality in 2016 (44.4% Christian and 43.5% unaffiliated). It also has a higher share of Muslims at 8.5%, compared to former East Berlin with only 1.5% self-declared Muslims as of 2016.[20]

Eurostat's Eurobarometer survey in 2015, found that 27.0% of the adult population declared themselves as agnostics or non believer, while 34.1% declared themselves as atheists. Christians comprised 37.2% of the total population; by denomination, members of the Protestant Churches were 19.2%, members of other Christian denominations were 8.8%, Catholics were 7.1%, the Christian Orthodox were 2.1%.[21]

An explanation for the atheism in the new states, popular in other states, is the aggressive state atheist policies of the former GDR government. However, the enforcement of atheism existed only for the first few years. After that, the state allowed churches to have a relatively high level of autonomy.[22]

Another explanation could be the secularizing trend (the "Kulturkampf") dating back to the second half of the 19th century in Prussia and through the Weimar Republic which was strongest in the states of Thuringia and Saxony as well as the late arrival of Christianity to the region as opposed to southern Europe where it was the state religion from late antiquity.

Religion by state, 2016[20] Protestants Catholics Not religious Muslims Others
Brandenburg 24.9% 3.5% 69.9% 0.0% 1.5%
former East Berlin 14.3% 7.5% 74.3% 1.5% 2.4%
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 24.9% 3.9% 70.0% 0.3% 0.9%
Saxony 27.6% 4.0% 66.9% 0.3% 1.1%
Saxony-Anhalt 18.8% 5.1% 74.7% 0.3% 1.2%
Thuringia 27.8% 9.5% 61.2% 0.0% 1.5%
Total 24.3% 5.2% 68.8% 0.3% 1.4%

Major cities

[edit]
Federal capital
State capital
Rank City Pop.
1950 		Pop.
1960 		Pop.
1970 		Pop.
1980 		Pop.
1990 		Pop.
2000 		Pop.
2010 		Pop.
2022 		Area
[km2] 		Density
per km2 		Growth
[%]
(2010–
2022) 		surpassed
100,000 		State
(Bundesland)
1. Berlin 3,336,026 3,274,016 3,208,719 3,048,759 3,433,695 3,382,169 3,460,725 3,570,750 887,70 3,899 3.18 1747 Berlin
2. Dresden 494,187 493,603 502,432 516,225 490,571 477,807 523,058 585,446 328,31 1,593 11.93 1852 Saxony
3. Leipzig 617,574 589,632 583,885 562,480 511,079 493,208 522,883 600,609 297,36 1,758 14.86 1871 Saxony
4. Chemnitz 293,373 286,329 299,411 317,644 294,244 259,246 243,248 264,042 220,84 1,101 8.55 1883 Saxony
5. Halle 289,119 277,855 257,261 232,294 247,736 247,736 232,963 251,358 135,02 1,725 7.90 1890 Saxony-Anhalt
6. Magdeburg 260,305 261,594 272,237 289,032 278,807 231,450 231,549 249,597 200,99 1,152 7.79 1882 Saxony-Anhalt
7. Erfurt 188,650 186,448 196,528 211,575 208,989 200,564 204,994 227,342 269,14 762 10.9 1906 Thuringia
8. Rostock 133,109 158,630 198,636 232,506 248,088 200,506 202,735 216,466 181,26 1,118 6.8 1935 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
9. Potsdam 118,180 115,004 111,336 130,900 139,794 129,324 156,906 190,422 187,53 837 21.4 1939 Brandenburg
Total 5,730,523 5,643,111 5,630,445 5,541,415 5,853,003 5,622,010 5,779,061 6,156,052 2,708 2,134 2.79
Rank City Pop.
1950 		Pop.
1960 		Pop.
1970 		Pop.
1980 		Pop.
1990 		Pop.
2000 		Pop.
2010 		Pop.
2022 		Area
[km2] 		Density
per km2 		Growth
[%]
(2000–
2010) 		surpassed
100,000 		State
(Land)

Culture

[edit]
See also: Culture of East Germany and Ostalgie
The Ampelmännchen, a symbol of East German culture

Persisting differences in culture and mentality among older East Germans and West Germans are often referred to as the "wall in the head" ("Mauer im Kopf").[23] Ossis (Easties) are stereotyped as racist, poor and largely influenced by Russian culture,[24] while Wessis (Westies) are usually considered snobbish, dishonest, wealthy, and selfish. The terms can be considered to be disparaging.

In 2009, a poll found that 22% of former East Germans (40% under 25) considered themselves "real citizens of the Federal Republic";[25] 62% felt they were no longer citizens of East Germany, but not fully integrated into the unified Germany; and around 11% would have liked to have re-established East Germany.[25] An earlier poll in 2004 found that 25% of West Germans and 12% of East Germans wished reunification had not happened.[23]

In 2023, a poll found that 40% of people in the eastern states still identify as East Germans rather than just German; the latter was chosen by the majority with 52%.[26][27]

Some East German brands have been revived to appeal to former East Germans who are nostalgic for the goods they grew up with.[28] Brands revived in this manner include Rotkäppchen, which holds about 40% of the German sparkling wine market, and Zeha, the sports shoe maker that supplied most of East Germany's sports teams as well as the Soviet Union national football team.[28]

Economy

[edit]
See also: Economy of Germany
Tesla Gigafactory, seen under construction, in Grünheide, Brandenburg

The economic reconstruction of eastern Germany (German: Aufbau Ost) proved to be longer-term than originally foreseen.[29] As of 2005, the standard of living and average annual income remained significantly lower in the new states.[30]

The federal government spent €2 trillion to reunify[29] and privatise 8,500 state-owned east German enterprises.[31] Almost all East German industries were considered outdated while reunifying.[31] Since 1990, amounts between €100 billion and €140 billion have been transferred to the new states annually.[31] More than €60 billion were spent supporting businesses and building infrastructure in the years 2006–2008.[2]

A €156 billion economic plan, Solidarity Pact II, was enforced in 2005 and provided the financial basis for the advancement and special promotion of the economy of the new states until 2019.[29] The "solidarity tax", a 5.5% surcharge on the income tax, was implemented by the Kohl government to match the infrastructure of the new states to the levels of the western ones[32] and to apportion the cost of unification and the expenses of both the Gulf War and European integration. The tax, which raises €11 billion annually, was planned to remain in force until 2019.[32]

Since reunification, the unemployment rate in the East has doubled that of the West. The unemployment rate reached 12.7%[33] in April 2010, after reaching a maximum of 18.7% in 2005. As of 2020, the unemployment rates in the new states were lower than in some old states.[34]

In the decade 1999–2009, economic activity per person rose from 67% to 71% of western Germany.[2] Wolfgang Tiefensee, the minister then responsible for the development of the new states, said in 2009: "The gap is closing."[2] The new states are also the part of the country that was least affected by the 2008 financial crisis.[35]

Women in the eastern Germany are more likely to be employed full-time and reach higher positions in their career, and work longer hours.[36][37] During the division of Germany, East German women were encouraged to seek full-time employment, housewives were derided as "parasites" (Schmarotzer); in contrast to West Germany, where tax and benefits system discouraged dual-earner families, so working mothers were seen in a negative light and derided as "raven mothers" (Rabenmutter). At the time of reunification, almost 90% of women in East Germany were in full-time employment, whilst only about 55% in West Germany. In addition, East German mothers tend to have children earlier in life and return to work after taking just one year of maternity leave (as was the standard in the former East Germany), whilst women from the Western states usually stay on maternity leave for the full 3 years until job protection ends.[38][39][40]

All the new states qualify as Objective 1 development regions within the European Union and were eligible to receive investment subsidies of up to 30% until 2013.[needs update]

Infrastructure

[edit]

The German Unity Transport Projects (German: Verkehrsprojekte Deutsche Einheit, VDE) is a programme launched in 1991 that is intended to upgrade the infrastructure of eastern Germany and modernize transport links between the old and new states.[41] It consists of nine railway projects, seven motorway projects, and one waterway project with a total budget of €38.5 billion. As of 2009, all 17 projects were under construction or have been completed.[42] The construction of new railway lines and high-speed upgrades of existing lines reduced journey times between Berlin and Hanover from over four hours to 96 minutes.[41] Multiple railway lines (branches and main lines) have been closed by the unified Deutsche Bahn (German Railways) because of increased car usage and depopulation. The VDE states that some main lines are still not finished or upgraded, with the Leipzig-Nuremberg line (via Erfurt and part of the Munich-Berlin route) scheduled to come on-line in December 2017,[needs update] almost three decades after reunification.

Deutsche Einheit Fernstraßenplanungs- und -bau GmbH, (English: German Unity Road Construction Company; DEGES) is the state-owned project management institution responsible for the construction of approximately 1,360 km of federal roads within the VDE with a total budget of €10.2 billion. It is also involved in other transport projects, including 435 km of roads costing about €1,760 million as well as a city tunnel in Leipzig costing €685 million.[43]

The Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2003 includes plans to extend the A14 motorway from Magdeburg to Schwerin and to build the A72 from Chemnitz to Leipzig.[42]

Private ownership rates of cars have increased since 1990: in 1988, 55% of East German households had at least one car; in 1993 it rose to 67% and 71% in 1998, compared to the West German rates of 61% in 1988, 74% in 1993, and 76% in 1998.[44][45]

Politics

[edit]

Unlike the West, there was a three-party system (CDU, SPD, PDS/The Left) until the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) formed in 2013,[46][47][48] creating a four-party system.[49] Since 2009 at least four factions have been represented in each of the East German regional parliaments, six in Saxony. In 1998/1999, for example, only one of the regional parliaments included more than three factions.[50] In the elections to the Bundestag, the CDU, SPD, FDP and Greens almost always receive fewer votes in the new states than in the old states, while Die Linke (and since 2024 splinter group BSW) and AfD receive more votes and support in the new states than in the old states.

Far-left

[edit]
The Left party vote share in the 2009 German federal election

The democratic socialist party, The Left (Die Linke, successor to the Party of Democratic Socialism, the GDR state party's successor) has been successful throughout eastern Germany, perhaps as a result of the continued disparity of living conditions and salaries compared with western Germany, and high unemployment.[51][promotional source?] Ever since it associated with the WASG, The Left frequently loses in state elections and has been losing members since 2010.[52]

The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), and The Left from 2005, have gained the following vote shares in recent elections:

Election Vote percentages
1990 East German general election 16.4%, Communist Party of Germany (KPD) 0.1%
1990 all-German federal election East 11.1%, West 0.2%
1990 state elections East Berlin 30.1%, KPD 0.2%; Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 15.7%; Saxony 10.2%; Saxony-Anhalt 12.0%; Thuringia 9.7%; East Berlin 23.6%
1994 federal election East 19.8%, West 1%
1994 state elections 18.7% in Brandenburg; 19.9% in Saxony-Anhalt; Saxony 16.5%; Thuringia 16.6%; 22.7% in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
1995 Berlin state election in East Berlin the PDS was the biggest party with 36.3%.
1998 federal election East 21.6%, West 1.2%.
1998–99 state elections 23.3% in Brandenburg; 19.6% in Saxony-Anhalt; Saxony 22.2%, KPD 0.1%; Thuringia 21.3%; 24.4% in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; 39.5% in East Berlin.
2001–02 state elections 16.4% in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; 20.4%, KPD/DKP 0.1% in Saxony-Anhalt; 47.6%, 0.2% DKP in East Berlin.
2002 federal election East 16.9%, West 1.1%
2005 federal election East 25.3%, West 4.9%
2004–06 state elections 16.8% in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (+0.5% WASG), 24.1% in Saxony-Anhalt and 28.1% (+3.3% WASG) in East Berlin (–19.5%).
2009 federal election East 28.5% (The Left became the strongest force in Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt); West 8.3%.
2009 state elections 20.6% in Saxony, 27.2% in Brandenburg and 27.4% in Thuringia
2011 state elections 18.6% in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 23.7% in Saxony-Anhalt and 22.7% in East Berlin.
2013 federal election East 22.7%, West 5.2%.
2014 state elections 18.9% in Saxony, 28.2% in Thuringia and 18.6% in Brandenburg (–8.6%).
2014 European Parliament election German Communist Party (DKP) had its strongest vote in Eastern Germany (0.2% in East,[53] 0.0% in West[54]).
2016 state elections 16.3% in Saxony-Anhalt, 13.2% in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and 23.4% in Berlin
2017 federal election East 17.8%; West 7.4%.
2021 federal election East 10.4%; West 3.7%.
2024 state elections 13.1% in Thuringia, 4.5% in Saxony and 3% in Brandenburg
2025 federal election East 12.9%; West 7.9%.

In 2024, a faction led by Sahra Wagenknecht split from The Left, forming a new party, Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), with more populist, nationalist and cultural conservative tendencies.[55] BSW quickly dominated over The Left in the 2024 state elections, but saw their support drop by the 2025 federal election and due to their low level of support in the West, fell narrowly short of the 5% threshold necessary to gain seats in Bundestag. In addition, The Left managed to regain some support in the East, and BSW outperformed The Left only in Saxony-Anhalt (11.24% vs 10.75%), and got only 36 votes less than The Left (10.696% vs 10.698%) in Brandenburg.[56]

Election Vote percentages
2024 state elections 15.8% in Thuringia, 13.5% in Brandenburg and 11.8% in Saxony
2025 federal election East 9.9%; West 3.8%.

After losing votes to the AfD, the Left plans to establish a regional group in eastern Germany.[57][58][59]

Far-right

[edit]
Second vote share percentage for the AfD in the 2013 federal election in Germany, final results
Second vote share percentage for the AfD in the 2017 federal election in Germany, final results
AfD votes in the 2024 European Parliament election in Germany
AfD votes in the 2025 federal election
Main article: Far-right politics in Germany (1945–present) § Germany (since 1990)

After 1990, far-right and German nationalist groups gained followers. Some sources[who?] claim mostly among people frustrated by the high unemployment and the poor economic situation.[60] Der Spiegel also points out that these people are primarily single men and that there may also be socio-demographic reasons.[14] Since around 1998 the support for right-wing parties shifted from the south of Germany to the east.[61][62][63][64]

The far-right party German People's Union (DVU) formed in 1998 in Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg since 1999. In 2009, the party lost its representation in the Landtag of Brandenburg.[65]

The far-right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) was represented in the Saxon State Parliament from 2004 to 2014.[66][67] In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern the NPD losts its representation in the parliament following the 2016 state elections.[68] In 2009, Junge Landsmannschaft Ostdeutschland, supported by the NPD, organized a march on the anniversary of the Bombing of Dresden in World War II. There were 6,000 Nationalists which were met by tens of thousands of ″anti-Nazis″ and several thousand policemen.[69]

The Free Voters of Germany emerged in 2009 from the Land Brandenburg regional branch of Free Voters, after being excluded because of "signs of right infiltration" from the Federal Association of Free Voters Germany.[70]

Pegida has its focus in eastern Germany.[71] A survey by TNS Emnid reports that in mid-December 2014, 53% of East Germans in each case sympathised with the PEGIDA demonstrators. (48% in the West)[72]

The Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland; AfD) had the most votes in the new states of Germany in the 2013 German federal elections, in 2017.[73] and in 2021 elections. The party is seen as harbouring anti-immigration views.[74]

In 2016, AfD reached at least 17% in Saxony-Anhalt,[75] Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (where the NPD lost all seats)[76] and Berlin.[77]

In 2015, Rhineland-Palatinate interior minister Roger Lewentz said the former communist states were "more susceptible" to "xenophobic radicalization" because former East Germany had not had the same exposure to foreign people and cultures over the decades that the people in the West of the country have had.[78]

In the 2017 federal election, AfD received approximately 22% of the votes[79] in the East and approximately 11%[80] in the West.[81]

In the 2021 federal election, the AfD emerged as the largest in the states of Saxony and Thuringia, and saw a strong performance in eastern Germany.[82]

The AfD became the biggest party in all five former East German states in the 2024 European Parliament election in Germany.[83]

In the 2024 Thuringian state election, the AfD became the first far-right party in Germany since the Nazi Party to win a plurality of seats in a state election, its was also the best ever performance and the first time it placed first in a state election in Germany.[84][85][86]

In the 2025 federal election, the AfD emerged as the largest party in all five former East German states.[87]

Protest vote

[edit]

Fringe parties, particularly the AfD and The Left,[89][90][91] receive a large number of protest votes in eastern Germany, which causes voter shifting from left to right and vice versa.[92]

The Pirate Party Germany was chosen slightly more frequently in the East (10.1 percent) than in the West (8.1 percent) of Berlin. Among those under 30 years of age in East Berlin, the Pirates were the second most popular party with 20 percent of the votes.[93] For example, none of the parties elected to the Berlin House of Representatives in 2011 lost a high proportion of their voters to the AfD as the Pirates at the next election in 2016 (16%).[94][95] Other findings also suggest that some of their voters, like the AfD, regard the Pirate Party primarily as a protest party.[89][96]

The election slogans of the DVU in the regional elections in Saxony-Anhalt in 1998 were directed primarily against the politicians already represented in parliament: "Not the people – the political bigwigs, will dole!" And "German, let's not make the sow you. DVU – The protest in the election against dirty things from above". In particular, politically dissatisfied people were advertised towards with the slogan "vote protest – vote German." [97] At the time, the DVU had 12.9% of the votes.

Independence

[edit]

In 1991, the PDS demanded the right for Thuringia to leave the united Germany in its draft of the constitution, which ultimately did not pass.[98][99]

Tatjana Festerling was a leader in the Dresden Pegida demonstrations from February 2015 to mid-April 2016 after Kathrin Oertel withdrew. She demanded the "Säxit"—the secession of Saxony from the Federal Republic of Germany—on October 12, 2015, after she had already demanded the rebuilding of the former Iron Curtain over Germany on March 9, 2015.[100][101]

The Freie Sachsen (Free Saxons) party supports "Säxit".

Opinion polls

[edit]

Percentage of respondents supporting independence from the new states of Germany:

Polling firm Fieldwork date Sample size Brandenburg Berlin Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Saxony Saxony-Anhalt Thuringia
YouGov[102] 2017 2076 19 13 21 21 20 22
infratest dimap 2014 2020 16
Insa-Consulere[103] 2014 ~1000 19 (partially)
Emnid 2010 1001 15 (+8 partially)
Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungszentrum Berlin-Brandenburg 2010 ~1900 10
Emnid 2009 1208 57 (partially)
RP Online 2009 2892 11
Infratest dimap 2007 ? 23
Institut für Marktforschung Leipzig 2007 1001 18
mitBERLIN 1996 6000 63.6
Infratest 1996 2000 22
Infratest 1990 ? 11

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

New states of Germany

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The New states of Germany, or Neue Bundesländer, are the five federal states—, , , , and —re-established from the territories of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) following national reunification on October 3, 1990. These states, which together form the eastern part of the excluding , underwent rapid administrative reconfiguration from the GDR's 14 districts into entities aligned with pre-war Prussian and other historical boundaries, enabling their accession under Article 23 of the . Post-reunification integration involved extensive economic restructuring, including the of over 8,000 state-owned enterprises through the and trillions in transfer payments via the Solidarity Pact, aimed at bridging infrastructural and productivity gaps inherited from four decades of central planning. Despite these efforts yielding relative gains—such as East Germany's GDP growth outpacing the national average in certain years like 2023 at 0.5% versus -0.6%—the region maintains lower per capita output, with persistent disparities in wages and productivity rooted in deindustrialization shocks and skill mismatches. Demographically, the new states grapple with aging populations and net out-migration, particularly of younger cohorts, exacerbating labor shortages amid higher unemployment rates of 7.8% in the east compared to 5.1% in the west as of recent data. Politically, they exhibit distinct orientations, including elevated support for the (AfD) and residual attachments to the Left Party, driven by perceptions of incomplete convergence and cultural alienation from western norms, as evidenced by surveys showing greater eastern skepticism toward EU institutions and higher dissatisfaction with democratic processes. These divides, often termed the "Wall in the head," underscore causal legacies of divergent institutional paths under and , influencing electoral outcomes where eastern states have propelled AfD into governing coalitions in and by 2024.

History

Formation and dissolution under the GDR

In the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ) established after World War II, the Soviet Military Administration formed five Länder by mid-1945 to administer the region: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern on 9 July 1945, Saxony-Anhalt in July 1945 from the merger of Prussian Saxony, Anhalt, and parts of other territories, and Thuringia and Saxony continuing with adjustments from pre-war structures. Brandenburg was reconstituted in 1947 following the Allied Control Council's dissolution of Prussia on 25 February 1947, incorporating remaining Prussian territories in the zone. These Länder provided the initial federal structure for the German Democratic Republic (GDR) upon its founding on 7 October 1949, with each having elected Landtage (state parliaments) and governments nominally exercising regional authority under central oversight by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). The persistence of these Länder, which retained historical identities and some , conflicted with the GDR's drive for centralized socialist control modeled on Soviet practices. On 23 July 1952, the People's Chamber passed a , approved at the SED's 5th Party Congress, abolishing the five Länder and reorganizing the GDR into 14 Bezirke ()—Rostock, , , , Frankfurt (Oder), , , Halle, , , Karl-Marx-Stadt, , , and —plus East as a separate capital . This reform subdivided the former states into smaller units often crossing traditional boundaries to dilute regional loyalties and facilitate uniform under direct SED supervision from , aligning with Stalin-era centralization efforts amid reconstruction and collectivization drives. Each was headed by a (Rat des Bezirkes) and party apparatus, with 217 Kreise (counties) below them, emphasizing hierarchical party control over . The change eliminated state-level parliaments and executives, subordinating administration to the central Ministry of Interior and economic councils for five-year plans, though it faced criticism even internally for disrupting local governance efficiencies. This system endured as the GDR's primary territorial division until 1990, shaping administrative legacies in the eventual new federal states.

Reunification process in 1990

The reunification process in 1990 was precipitated by the economic collapse and political instability in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) following the opening of the in November 1989, with mass protests and emigration demanding integration with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The first free elections to the GDR's People's Chamber on March 18, 1990, resulted in a victory for the coalition, comprising the Christian Democratic Union and allied parties, which obtained 47.7% of the vote and formed a pro-unification government under Prime Minister . This outcome reflected widespread East German preference for swift accession to the FRG's political and economic systems rather than gradual , as evidenced by the coalition's campaign emphasis on rapid unity. To stabilize the GDR economy and facilitate integration, the Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union was signed on May 18, 1990, and took effect on July 1, 1990, introducing the as the common currency at a 1:1 conversion rate for wages and most savings up to 4,000 marks per adult, while higher amounts and certain assets converted at 2:1. This union aligned the GDR with FRG principles, including property rights reforms and competition laws, though it accelerated industrial collapse in the East due to the inability of state-owned enterprises to compete without subsidies. The measure, driven by fears of further —over 1 million East Germans had emigrated since —prioritized rapid alignment over gradual adjustment, imposing immediate exposure to Western standards on an economy characterized by inefficiency and overmanning. Concurrently, the "Two Plus Four" negotiations, involving the FRG, GDR, , , , and , addressed external aspects of ; initiated on May 5, 1990, in , they concluded with the signing of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany on September 12, 1990, in . This accord restored full German , confirmed the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern border, mandated the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the GDR by 1994, and limited troop numbers in former GDR territory initially to 370,000 nationwide. The treaty's provisions, negotiated amid Gorbachev's and reduced Soviet influence, enabled internal unification without Allied veto, reflecting the causal shift from containment to post-communist realignment. The domestic framework was finalized in the Unification Treaty signed on August 31, 1990, between the FRG and GDR governments, which regulated the accession of the re-established GDR —, , , , and —along with , to the FRG under Article 23 of the . Effective October 3, 1990, this accession dissolved the GDR as a state, extended FRG institutions including the , , and legal system eastward, and established transitional funds like the for privatizing state assets. The treaty's ratification by the FRG on September 20 and GDR People's Chamber on September 23 underscored the process's speed, necessitated by the GDR's fiscal insolvency—its 1990 budget deficit exceeded 50 billion marks—and public demand for Western prosperity, with polls showing over 70% East German support for unity by mid-1990. On October 3, 1990, German unity was formally achieved, marking the end of the division imposed after .

Initial post-reunification reforms and shocks

The economic integration of East Germany began with the on July 1, 1990, when the replaced the at a 1:1 conversion rate for wages, salaries, and personal savings up to 2,000 marks per person, with higher amounts converted at 2:1. This parity overvalued the East German economy relative to its productivity levels, triggering immediate price surges as market mechanisms replaced state controls, leading to a rapid erosion of and widespread shop shortages followed by . The formal political reunification occurred on October 3, 1990, under Article 23 of the West German , extending its legal framework to the new of , , , , and , plus the re-established as a unified . Administrative reforms swiftly recreated the federal structure abolished in the GDR since , restoring the five with new state constitutions and parliaments elected in October 1990, integrating them into the Bundesrat and aligning with West German standards of and . Personnel changes were profound, with over 50% of East German civil servants dismissed or retired by for ideological reasons or incompetence, replaced by West German experts and retrained locals, though this caused short-term inefficiencies and resentment. The shift to a inflicted severe shocks through the , established in 1990 to privatize or liquidate approximately 8,000 state-owned enterprises encompassing 45% of East Germany's GDP. By 1995, it had sold or closed most assets, often to Western buyers, but the process resulted in the loss of around 3 million jobs—over 40% of the East German workforce—driving official to 20% by 1991 and hidden unemployment via short-time work schemes even higher. Industrial output plummeted by over 50% in 1990-1991 due to uncompetitive legacy industries exposed to Western competition without gradual adjustment, exacerbating regional depopulation as 2.5 million mostly young East Germans migrated westward by 1995. Federal transfers exceeding 1.5 trillion euros in the first decade mitigated collapse but could not prevent a deep , with East German GDP contracting sharply before partial recovery.

Geography

Territorial extent and borders

The new states of Germany—, , , , , and —cover a combined land area of approximately 108,000 square kilometers, equivalent to about 30% of the Federal Republic's total territory of 357,022 square kilometers. This extent matches the boundaries of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) at reunification on October 3, 1990, with no major territorial alterations since, apart from minor administrative rectifications. Externally, these states share land borders with Poland (467 kilometers, chiefly along the established post-World War II and affirmed by the 1990 German-Polish Border Treaty) and the (approximately 648 kilometers, running through and bordering ). The , running from the southward, demarcates and from Polish voivodeships, while the Czech border follows natural features like the Elbe Valley and . Internally, the new states adjoin western Länder such as (sharing extensive boundaries with , , and ), (with ), and (with and ), totaling over 1,000 kilometers of inter-state borders. , fully encircled by since 1990, maintains no external frontiers but integrates into this eastern bloc. These configurations reflect the post-reunification restoration of pre-1952 state outlines, adjusted for contemporary federal needs.

Physical features and climate

The new states of Germany, comprising , , , , and , feature a dominated by the in the north, with flat to gently rolling glacial lowlands shaped by Pleistocene ice ages. includes the coastline and the Mecklenburg Lake Plateau, home to over 1,000 lakes, including the Müritz, Germany's largest inland lake entirely within national borders at 117 square kilometers. consists largely of sandy, post-glacial plains interspersed with rivers like the and Spree, while the River traverses and , forming valleys amid fertile floodplains. In the southern portions, the terrain rises into the , including the in , a narrow range extending about 100 kilometers with elevations up to nearly 1,000 meters. The Harz Mountains straddle , reaching a peak of 1,141 meters at , and the (Erzgebirge) form the southeastern border with Czechia in , culminating at 1,244 meters on Fichtelberg. These low mountain ranges, covered in dense forests, contrast with the predominantly agrarian plains and support biodiversity hotspots, though and mining legacies persist. The region's climate is humid continental, with colder winters averaging -2°C to 0°C and warmer summers around 18–20°C, exhibiting stronger seasonal contrasts than western due to reduced Atlantic influence. proximity moderates temperatures in , where coastal areas experience milder winters, while inland and southern upland zones see greater extremes, including more frequent frost days. Annual ranges from 500–700 mm, lower than in the west, concentrated in summer thunderstorms, contributing to drier conditions in and . Recent trends show increasing hot days, particularly in the east, with multi-year averages rising markedly over the past decade.

Major urban and rural areas

The new states of Germany, comprising and the five Länder of , , , , and , exhibit a pronounced urban-rural divide, with over 70% of the residing in urban areas despite the territories' overall low averaging around 120 inhabitants per square kilometer, significantly below the national figure of 241. Urban centers, shaped by historical industrialization and post-reunification economic revival, concentrate economic activity, while rural expanses dominate land use, covering forests, agricultural plains, and coastal zones with sparse settlement patterns influenced by GDR-era collectivization and subsequent depopulation. Berlin, the dominant urban agglomeration with an estimated 3,685,265 residents as of December 2024, functions as a global metropolis and , driving services, technology, and culture across the region; its density exceeds 4,000 per square kilometer, absorbing commuters from surrounding . In , (population approximately 590,000 in 2023) and (around 550,000) stand as key industrial and cultural hubs, with benefiting from logistics and media sectors post-1990 investments, while hosts and automotive manufacturing. features (about 240,000) as a administrative center with engineering focus and Halle (similar size), tied to chemical industries; Thuringia's (210,000) emphasizes and , alongside (110,000), a university-driven innovation pole. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern's primary port city, (210,000), supports maritime trade and tourism, while 's (180,000) relies on and proximity to . Rural areas, encompassing over 60% of the land in states like and , are characterized by large-scale , forestry, and declining village clusters, where population densities often fall below 50 per square kilometer, exacerbated by out-migration of youth since reunification—eastern rural populations dropped 16% from 1990 to 2020 excluding , versus western growth. These regions feature the Mecklenburg Lake Plateau for and , the flat, fertile Magdeburger Börde for production, and forested uplands like the supporting timber and , though structural challenges including aging demographics (median age over 48 in rural east versus 44 nationally) and farm consolidation limit vitality. Sustainable development efforts focus on and niche farming, yet persistent exodus to urban west or abroad sustains low vitality, with villages averaging fewer than 500 residents.

Demographics

The five new federal states—Brandenburg, , , , and —had a combined population of 14.8 million at the time of in 1990. This figure represented the population of the former German Democratic Republic excluding , which was integrated into the reunified state. Post-reunification, the underwent a significant decline, dropping by 16 percent to 12.4 million as of 2025, driven primarily by net out-migration to western Germany amid economic disparities and unemployment following the collapse of the centrally . The most rapid losses occurred in the , with over 10 percent of the population emigrating by 2000, though the pace slowed after 2000 due to partial economic recovery and policy interventions like infrastructure investments. By contrast, the western federal states saw a 10 percent increase to 67.5 million over the same period, highlighting persistent regional imbalances. Population density in the new states, averaging around 115 inhabitants per square kilometer in recent years across their combined 108,000 square kilometers, has correspondingly decreased from approximately 137 per square kilometer in , reflecting the fixed land area amid depopulation. This lower density compared to western Germany's average of over 200 per square kilometer underscores the rural character of much of the east, with depopulation most acute in peripheral areas while urban centers like and experienced relative stability or modest growth. Recent trends show tentative stabilization, with net migration turning slightly positive in some years post-2010 due to and improving job markets, though low fertility rates below replacement level continue to exert downward pressure.

Internal and external migration dynamics

Following in 1990, the new experienced substantial net losses to the old , driven primarily by stark economic disparities, with in the East reaching 20% by 1991 compared to under 5% in the West. Between 1990 and approximately 2018, an estimated 3.7 million people migrated from East to West Germany, while 2.5 million moved in the opposite direction, resulting in a net loss of over 1.2 million residents from the East. This outflow peaked in the early 1990s, with annual net losses exceeding 200,000 individuals, disproportionately affecting young adults aged 18-29 and those with higher education, including a higher proportion of women, exacerbating labor shortages and demographic imbalances in the East. By the mid-2000s, rates declined as wage gaps narrowed and East German economies stabilized, with annual West-to-East flows stabilizing at around 100,000 persons since 1994. A turnaround occurred in 2017, marking the first net gain for the East since reunification, with small positive balances continuing into the early , attributed to return migration of young families seeking and family support policies in states like and . However, cumulative effects persist, contributing to a 13.2% in the East from 1991 to 2023, compared to a 9.6% increase in the West (including ). External migration to the new has remained limited, with foreign-born residents comprising only 5-7% of the in most East German states as of 2023, versus 15-20% in Western states, reflecting lower economic pull factors such as fewer job opportunities in services and tech sectors. Net external inflows, primarily from countries and post-2022 Ukrainian refugees, have been modest—totaling under 50,000 annually in recent years—and insufficient to offset internal outflows or natural decrease, with many newcomers concentrated in urban areas like and . This pattern underscores the East's relative homogeneity and slower integration of international migrants compared to the West.

Age structure, birth rates, and ethnic composition

The new display a distinctly older age structure than the western states, reflecting decades of net out-migration among younger residents and subdued natural . In 2023, the average age across the new Länder (, , , , and ) stood at 47.3 years, compared to 44.2 years in the former excluding . This disparity contributes to a higher old-age in the east, straining pension systems and local services amid a shrinking . pyramids for the reveal a narrow base from low birth cohorts since the and a bulge in post-World War II generations approaching retirement. Birth rates in the new states remain among the lowest in , exacerbating demographic aging. The (TFR) in eastern reached 1.27 children per woman in , below the replacement level of 2.1 and trailing the western figure of 1.38. This marks a reversal from the early post-reunification period, when eastern TFR briefly exceeded western levels due to delayed family formation, but persistent economic uncertainty, housing shortages, and cultural shifts toward smaller families have since driven convergence toward nationwide. Crude birth rates in the east hovered around 7-8 per 1,000 inhabitants in recent years, insufficient to offset elevated mortality rates among the elderly. Ethnically, the new states maintain a higher proportion of native-born Germans with minimal migrant ancestry compared to the west, stemming from lower historical immigration inflows tied to weaker economic pull factors and geographic peripherality. Approximately 11.3% of the population in the eastern states (excluding Berlin) had a migration background in 2024, encompassing individuals with at least one parent born abroad or foreign citizenship, far below the national average exceeding 25%. The share of non-German nationals was 7.9% in 2023, primarily from eastern Europe and recent Ukrainian inflows, contrasting with over 16% in the west. This relative homogeneity influences social cohesion but limits labor market replenishment without policy interventions to retain or attract younger workers.

Economy

Legacy of centrally planned economy

The centrally planned economy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), characterized by of production means, fixed prices disconnected from scarcity signals, and prioritized output over consumer needs, resulted in chronic inefficiencies and suppressed by 1989. Productivity levels in lagged approximately 70% behind , with capital stock overvalued due to distorted that ignored and needs. This system fostered shortages in consumer goods and services while directing resources toward uncompetitive exports to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance bloc, rendering much of the industrial base obsolete upon exposure to global markets post-reunification. Following reunification on October 3, 1990, the rapid integration into the via the on July 1, 1990—converting Ostmarks to Deutsche Marks at a 1:1 rate for wages and 1:2 for larger assets—exposed these distortions, triggering a severe . Uncompetitive enterprises, lacking adaptability from decades of bureaucratic allocation rather than profit-driven decisions, faced collapse; industrial output plummeted by over 50% between 1989 and 1991, with sectors like and glass production nearly vanishing. The , tasked with privatizing or liquidating around 8,000 state-owned firms, oversaw the closure of thousands, leading to mass layoffs: surged from near-zero under the GDR's disguised to peaks of 20% in the early , disproportionately affecting workers and exacerbating social dislocation. Persistent structural legacies include a gap, with East German revenue productivity remaining substantially below West German levels three decades later, attributed to smaller firm sizes, lower R&D , and inherited capital inefficiencies rather than solely labor differences. As of 2023, GDP per capita in the new (including ) stood at approximately €40,309, compared to €53,052 in western states, reflecting about 75-80% convergence from pre-unification baselines but stalled progress since the early due to demographic shrinkage and limited entrepreneurial ecosystems shaped by prior state monopolies. rates in eastern states averaged 7.8% in 2024, higher than the western 5.1%, with long-term structural mismatches in skills and regional depopulation compounding the effects of . Environmental degradation from unchecked industrial pollution under central planning—such as chemical contaminants in soil and water from lignite mining—continues to impose remediation costs estimated in billions of euros, while outdated like Plattenbau stock requires ongoing subsidies. These factors have sustained reliance on inter-regional fiscal transfers exceeding €2 trillion since 1990, underscoring how the absence of market incentives in the GDR perpetuated capital misallocation and deficits that market reforms could not fully rectify in a single generation.

Privatization, investment, and convergence attempts

The Treuhandanstalt, established on March 1, 1990, was tasked with privatizing or liquidating approximately 14,000 East German state-owned enterprises, encompassing around 45,000 smaller entities, in a rapid transition from central planning to market allocation. By the end of its mandate in 1994, it had facilitated the sale or closure of most assets, with privatized firms achieving a survival rate of about 67% over the subsequent decade, though the process resulted in the loss of roughly 2.5 million jobs as uncompetitive operations were shuttered. This "shock therapy" approach, prioritizing speed to minimize fiscal burdens on West Germany, preserved viable entities through selective investor screening but drew criticism for inadequate due diligence, leading to instances of undervalued sales and short-term asset stripping by some buyers. Post-privatization investment inflows were channeled through fiscal transfers via the German equalization (Länderfinanzausgleich) and a 5.5% surcharge on income taxes introduced in , totaling over €2 from West to between 1990 and 2020 to fund , social welfare, and business incentives. Annual net transfers averaged €80 billion in the and early , supporting upgrades in networks, , and energy systems, while structural funds added supplementary investments exceeding €100 billion by 2020. surged initially, with West German firms acquiring key assets and new greenfield projects emerging in and services; however, much capital was absorbed by public spending rather than private productivity enhancements, partly due to persistent institutional mistrust stemming from the Treuhand era. Convergence efforts yielded initial rapid gains, with East German GDP per capita rising from about one-third of West German levels in 1990 to roughly 60% by 2000, driven by productivity catch-up in surviving industries and labor market reforms. Growth averaged 5-7% annually in the 1990s, but slowed to 1-2% post-2000 amid demographic outflows—over 1.5 million working-age residents migrated westward by 2010—and structural rigidities like smaller firm sizes and lower R&D intensity. By 2023, East German GDP per capita stood at approximately 75-80% of the Western average (€36,000-€38,000 versus €46,000-€48,000 in PPP terms), reflecting partial but incomplete closure of the gap despite sustained subsidies, as productivity differentials (20-25% lower) and human capital erosion hindered full alignment. Recent initiatives, such as targeted tax incentives for high-tech clusters in Saxony and Brandenburg, have attracted investments like semiconductor plants, yet analysts attribute ongoing disparities to initial deindustrialization legacies and insufficient entrepreneurial culture development rather than funding shortfalls alone.

Contemporary performance, sectors, and disparities

In 2024, the per capita in the new federal states (including ) reached 41,858 euros, compared to 53,052 euros in the old states, representing approximately 79% of western levels and reflecting limited convergence three decades after reunification. Overall GDP in eastern contracted by 0.1% in 2024, outperforming the western decline of 0.3%, amid national driven by high energy costs and weak exports. stood at 7.8% in the east versus 5.1% in the west, with eastern rates having fallen 1.7 percentage points since but remaining elevated due to structural mismatches in skills and demographics. Key sectors include manufacturing, which accounts for a higher share of employment in the east (around 25-30% in states like ) than the national average, bolstered by clusters in automotive production (e.g., in and in ), chemicals, and machinery. Services, comprising over 70% of national GDP, provide stability in urban areas like Berlin's tech and hubs, while and employ over 10% of the eastern workforce—double the western figure—supporting rural economies in and through exports of grains and renewables-related . Emerging strengths include in "" ( region), optics and biotech in (), and electric vehicle battery production via Tesla's in Grünheide, which began operations in 2022 and created thousands of jobs despite local environmental controversies. Disparities persist both vis-à-vis the west and internally among the new states, with average eastern wages 30% below western levels, constraining consumption and private . and urban exhibit higher productivity (near 85-90% of western averages in select metrics) due to industrial clusters, while rural and lag at 70% or below, exacerbated by population outflows and dependence on subsidies. Productivity gaps stem from lower and innovation rates, with eastern firms generating fewer patents per capita, though recent has narrowed some divides since 2010. These imbalances, rooted in the legacy of state-owned monopolies and rapid shocks, continue to fuel out-migration of skilled workers, perpetuating a cycle of demographic decline and fiscal transfers exceeding 2 trillion euros cumulatively from west to east.

Politics

State governments and federal relations

The state governments of Germany's new Länder—Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia—function as parliamentary democracies modeled on the federal system outlined in the (Grundgesetz). Each state's unicameral legislature, the , elects a who appoints a cabinet responsible for areas like education, policing, and cultural affairs, while concurrent powers such as environmental policy overlap with federal jurisdiction. Following reunification on October 3, 1990, these states were re-established by integrating the former East German Bezirke (districts) into the West German Länder framework, with provisional administrations transitioning to full elections by October 1990. This rapid integration preserved local administrative continuity but required adapting socialist-era structures to competitive multi-party governance, resulting in initial CDU dominance across most new states due to voter preference for continuity with West German conservatism. As of October 2025, state governments typically form grand coalitions or "Kenia" alliances (CDU/SPD/Greens) to secure majorities, deliberately excluding the AfD despite its leading poll positions in regional elections since 2019, a practice known as the "firewall" (Brandmauer) to isolate parties classified as right-wing extremist by federal . Saxony's , for example, operates as a CDU-SPD-Greens minority tolerated by the Left Party, reflecting post-2024 electoral necessities where AfD secured 30.6% of votes but no governing role. Similarly, maintains a CDU-led with SPD support, while SPD-led executives in and partner with the CDU. Thuringia's mirrors Saxony's, prioritizing centrist stability amid BSW () gains. These arrangements underscore a regional pattern of pragmatic centrism, contrasting with AfD's opposition strength, which stems from voter disillusionment over and perceived federal neglect rather than ideological alone. Federal-state relations operate through cooperative federalism, with the Bundesrat providing the new Länder 20 of 69 votes to veto or amend federal laws affecting state competencies, ensuring eastern interests influence national policy on issues like fiscal transfers. Post-reunification, the federal government allocated over €2 trillion in solidarity pacts (Solidaritätszuschlag) from 1995 to 2019—extended via structural funds—to mitigate east-west disparities, funding infrastructure and job programs that reduced unemployment from 20% in 2000 to around 7% by 2025, though per capita GDP remains 20-25% below western averages. Tensions persist over causal mismatches: eastern states criticize federal mandates on energy transition, as lignite-dependent regions like Lusatia face 2038 coal phase-out deadlines without adequate compensation, prompting lawsuits from Saxony and Brandenburg against Berlin for violating investment guarantees. Migration policy exacerbates frictions, with eastern governments arguing federal Konigstein quotas ignore depopulation and integration strains, leading to lower acceptance rates and clashes during the 2015-2016 crisis when states like Thuringia sued over disproportionate burdens. The shift to a CDU/CSU-SPD federal coalition under Chancellor following the February 23, 2025, election has eased some strains, as CDU-led eastern executives align more closely with on and priorities, evidenced by the September 2025 Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz Ost (MPK-Ost) focusing on joint goals like digitalization and regional autonomy. However, underlying causal realism reveals persistent divides: eastern voters' support for AfD (often exceeding 30% in polls) reflects unmet expectations from reunification promises of rapid convergence, fostering accusations of western dominance in federal decision-making. Sources attributing eastern discontent solely to "" (nostalgia for GDR) overlook empirical data on sustained net fiscal outflows and industrial hollowing, while federal analyses from institutions like the Bundesbank emphasize structural reforms over perpetual transfers to avoid dependency. These dynamics highlight federalism's tension between unity and regional realism, with eastern states leveraging Bundesrat leverage to demand tailored policies.
StateMinister-President (Party)Coalition Composition (as of Oct 2025)
Dietmar Woidke (SPD)SPD-CDU
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (SPD)SPD-CDU
(CDU)CDU-SPD-Greens (minority)
Reiner Haseloff (CDU)CDU (majority with SPD support)
Mario Voigt (CDU)CDU-SPD-Greens
Note: Coalitions exclude AfD per cross-party consensus; tolerances or adjustments may apply for stability.

Electoral outcomes and party strengths

In federal elections since reunification, the new states have consistently shown stronger support for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Die Linke compared to western states, reflecting persistent regional disparities in economic performance and migration attitudes. In the 2021 Bundestag election, AfD garnered an average of approximately 21% of second votes across the five eastern states (excluding Berlin), ranging from 15.9% in Brandenburg to 27.5% in Saxony, while nationally it received 10.3%. Die Linke, with historical roots in the former Socialist Unity Party, averaged 13-15% in the east versus 4.9% nationally. The CDU/CSU performed competitively at 24-26% regionally but trailed in some areas, underscoring a fragmentation of conservative and protest votes. The 2025 federal election amplified these trends, with securing 28.5% nationally under , yet AfD achieved second place overall at around 20%, doubling its 2021 share and performing markedly higher in the east—often exceeding 30% in states like and —amid voter dissatisfaction with the prior coalition's handling of costs and . This outcome highlighted AfD's consolidation as the primary opposition force in the region, though cordon sanitaire policies by mainstream parties prevented its inclusion in . State-level elections further illustrate party strengths, with AfD emerging as the dominant force in recent contests despite varying winners. In on 1 September 2024, AfD won 32.8% of the vote, its first plurality in a state parliament, followed by CDU at 23.0% and the new (BSW) at 15.8%; SPD and Greens fell below 10% and 5%, respectively. Saxony's concurrent election saw CDU edge AfD (31.0% to 30.6%), with BSW at 11.2%, signaling a split in right-leaning support but AfD's near-parity. Brandenburg's 22 September 2024 poll yielded a narrow SPD victory at 30.9% over AfD's 29.8%, CDU at 12.1%, reflecting incumbency advantages but underscoring AfD's sustained challenge to establishment parties. Earlier cycles, such as 2021 (SPD 39.6%, AfD 14.7%) and 2021 (CDU 30.1%, AfD 23.4%), showed temporary moderation in AfD support, yet the 2024 results indicate a structural shift toward protest voting driven by empirical regional grievances like depopulation and welfare dependency.
State ElectionDateLeading Party (%)AfD (%)CDU/CSU (%)SPD (%)Other Notable
1 Sep 2024AfD (32.8)32.823.06.1BSW (15.8), Linke (13.1)
1 Sep 2024 (31.0)30.631.07.1BSW (11.2)
22 Sep 2024SPD (30.9)29.812.130.9Greens (6.0)
These patterns reveal weaker anchorage for Greens and FDP in the east—often under 5-8%—contrasting western strongholds, while BSW's debut siphoned votes from both Left and AfD, emphasizing left-populist appeals on sovereignty and . Overall, electoral from official returning officers confirm that no single party dominates, but AfD's resilience stems from verifiable correlations with higher (e.g., 7-9% vs. 5% national) and net out-migration, fostering toward federal consensus .

Emergence of populist and regionalist movements

Post-reunification economic disruptions and perceived marginalization in the new federal states fostered disillusionment with established parties, contributing to the rise of populist movements expressing grievances over , , and central government policies. This sentiment, rooted in the rapid and following , manifested in support for parties challenging the post-unity consensus, with voters in eastern states showing higher volatility and preference for options compared to the west. The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), successor to the former East German ruling party, evolved into Die Linke in 2007, blending socialist nostalgia with critiques of neoliberal convergence policies, securing strongholds in states like Thuringia where it formed coalitions. Die Linke polled around 15-20% in eastern state elections through the 2010s, appealing to those feeling economically bypassed, though its influence waned nationally amid internal divisions. In Thuringia, for instance, Die Linke governed under Bodo Ramelow from 2014 until 2024, reflecting persistent left-populist resonance tied to historical legacies rather than broad ideological revival. The (AfD), founded in 2013 as a euroskeptic party, pivoted to immigration restrictionism amid the 2015 migrant influx, rapidly gaining traction in the east where distrust of federal elites amplified its message on sovereignty and welfare prioritization for natives. AfD achieved breakthrough results in eastern state polls, such as 24.0% in in 2016 and over 27% in by 2019, outperforming western averages due to localized protests against perceived overreach in energy transitions and asylum policies. By 2024, AfD secured 32.8% in —its first state-level plurality since 1945—and 30.6% in , signaling entrenched regional polarization. In the 2025 federal election on February 23, AfD captured the highest vote shares across the five new states, averaging over 30% and doubling its national tally to 20.6%, underscoring eastern voters' prioritization of border controls and economic sovereignty amid ongoing disparities. Regionalist sentiments, while present in localized autonomy demands, have largely channeled into these populist vehicles rather than distinct separatist formations, with minor parties like Freie Wähler gaining under 10% in select contests but failing to eclipse AfD's appeal. This pattern reflects causal links between sustained —e.g., eastern GDP per capita lagging 20-25% behind the west—and rejection of centrist convergence narratives.

Culture

Historical cultural suppression and revival

During the existence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from 1949 to 1990, the ruling enforced comprehensive censorship across literature, arts, media, and public expression to align cultural output with Marxist-Leninist ideology and suppress perceived bourgeois or Western influences. All publications and artistic works required state approval, with censors eliminating content deemed ideologically deviant, resulting in the prohibition of thousands of books and the promotion of as the dominant aesthetic. Self-censorship became pervasive among creators, as writers and artists anticipated regime scrutiny to avoid professional ruin or imprisonment; for instance, dissident figures like faced expulsion in 1976 for satirical works critiquing the state. The further permeated cultural institutions, maintaining networks that monitored theaters, publishers, and unions, leading to the of over one-third of the in some sectors and the stifling of independent movements. Religious culture endured particular repression, as the atheistic viewed churches as potential centers of opposition; Protestant and Catholic institutions were infiltrated by agents, youth programs curtailed, and clergy harassed, contributing to a decline in church affiliation from approximately 90% in 1949 to 30% by 1990. , including and , was treated as a vector for , with rock bands and imported media subjected to bans or state-controlled alternatives like the FDJ's mandated socialist youth concerts. Despite sporadic concessions, such as limited easing of church controls in the early , these measures ensured cultural , with empirical evidence from opened archives revealing systematic intimidation tactics that deterred innovation and fostered conformity over four decades. Following the fall of the on November 9, 1989, and formal reunification on October 3, 1990, the abrupt dismantling of censorship enabled the revival of suppressed traditions and the reevaluation of GDR-era works. Banned resurfaced through private publishing and state-funded reprints, sparking "literature debates" in the early 1990s that grappled with the legacy of state-sponsored without endorsing its ideological underpinnings. Churches underwent physical and institutional restoration, exemplified by the 1990s reconstruction of the Church of Reconciliation in , built atop a site demolished for , symbolizing reclaimed sacred spaces amid a post-atheist landscape. from the GDR gained international recognition via exhibitions like the 1989-1990 "Twelve Artists from the GDR" show, challenging prior dismissals of Eastern works as propagandistic and highlighting expressions that evaded overt control. This revival, however, confronted challenges including the closure of some cultural venues in 1990 due to economic restructuring and ongoing debates over whether to preserve or purge SED-influenced heritage, with archival access to millions of files aiding critical reflection rather than uncritical nostalgia.

Distinct regional traditions and media

The new federal states of Germany, formed from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), exhibit regional traditions shaped by historical Slavic, Germanic, and Hanseatic influences, many of which faced suppression or ideological reframing under socialist rule from 1949 to 1990 before experiencing partial revival after reunification. In , spanning and , the Sorbian ethnic minority—numbering around 60,000—preserves Slavic customs such as the Zapust with masked processions and satirical plays, bird weddings symbolizing spring renewal on January 25, rides on decorated horses, and maypole erections followed by ritual "throwing" contests. These practices, rooted in pre-industrial agrarian life, endured Nazi-era bans and GDR-era marginalization, with post-1990 efforts including bilingual signage and cultural festivals supported by institutions like the Domowina organization to counter assimilation pressures. In , traditions reflect Pomeranian maritime heritage, including Hanseatic festivals and dialects in folksongs, alongside post-reunification restorations of sites like Schwerin's Gothic castle, which hosted revived cultural events by to reclaim pre-GDR identity. maintains Ore Mountain customs, such as wooden pyramids and carvings originating from 17th-century mining communities, while emphasizes folklore, including Bach-inspired musical heritage and regional sausage-making tied to medieval guilds—elements commodified in but distinct from western German variants like Bavarian attire. These traditions often diverge from western counterparts in culinary emphases, such as East Prussian-influenced potato dishes in the northeast versus hearty stews in central states, fostering localized pride amid economic challenges. The media landscape in the new states evolved rapidly after 1990 from GDR state monopolies to a pluralistic but regionally concentrated system, with over 100 local newspapers emerging initially before consolidations reduced outlets amid circulation declines. Public broadcasters like (MDR), serving , , and since 1991, and Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg (RBB) for and , prioritize regional content such as Sorbian-language programming and Ostdeutschland-specific reporting, reaching 80-90% of households via radio and TV. Private regional dailies, including Sächsische Zeitung in (circulation ~150,000 as of 2020) and Volksstimme in , reflect local dialects and issues like rural depopulation, though eastern media trust lags western averages by 10-15 percentage points due to GDR legacies, prompting higher reliance on alternative online sources. This fragmentation sustains distinct narratives, including Ostalgie retrospectives on GDR life, differentiating from national outlets like ARD, which eastern audiences consume at rates 20% below the federal average.

Education systems and societal values

Following reunification in , the education systems of the new federal states—, , , , and —underwent a rapid transition from the German Democratic Republic's (GDR) centralized, comprehensive model, which emphasized ideological conformity to Marxist-Leninist principles and equal access regardless of ability, to decentralized Länder-based structures aligned with western German norms. This shift introduced a tripartite system featuring Gymnasium (academic track), Realschule (intermediate), and (vocational), though implementation varied; for instance, and eastern initially retained more comprehensive elements before fully adopting stratification. Pre-unification, inequality of educational opportunity (IEO) was lower in the east due to the GDR's meritocratic facade masking class origins, but post-reunification adoption of western systems amid economic recession amplified IEO, with (university entrance qualification) attainment rising sharply yet unevenly, outpacing western rates among lower-status groups initially. Performance metrics reveal persistent east-west gaps. In national assessments, western students outperform eastern counterparts in subjects like English (mean score 496 vs. 480), reflecting resource disparities and demographic pressures. shortages exacerbate this, with eastern states facing a 22% annual shortfall for new vacancies (approximately 1,500 educators) as of recent analyses, driven by aging workforces—up to 65% retirement rates projected in —and lower recruitment amid depopulation. enrollment has converged somewhat, with eastern Abitur rates increasing more rapidly post-1990, yet overall tertiary participation lags due to vocational preferences rooted in GDR-era emphases on practical training over abstract academics. Societal values in the new states, shaped partly by education's evolution from ideological to merit-based , exhibit a blend of GDR-inherited and post-unification . Eastern Germans display higher irreligiosity—church affiliation below 20% in most states—yet adhere to conservative social norms, prioritizing stability and solidarity over , as evidenced by stronger opposition to rapid societal changes like expansive compared to western counterparts. This manifests in through preferences for disciplined, outcome-oriented schooling that echoes socialist-era collectivism but rejects perceived western "softness," contributing to lower about systemic reforms (41% pessimistic in east vs. western majorities optimistic). Values emphasize and toward elite institutions, informed by historical experiences of state overreach, fostering resilience but also disillusionment with federal equalization efforts.

Infrastructure

Transportation and connectivity

Following in 1990, the transportation in the new federal states—, , , , and —underwent extensive upgrades to integrate with western networks, addressing the legacy of underinvestment under the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The 1991 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan initiated 17 major projects encompassing highways, railroads, and waterways, aimed at enhancing cross-border connectivity and regional development. These efforts included the completion of key autobahns such as the A9 (-Berlin) and A13 (Dresden-Berlin), which by the early linked eastern industrial areas to western economic centers, reducing travel times significantly—for instance, Berlin to via A9 now spans approximately 580 km in under 5 hours under optimal conditions. The rail network, previously operated by the state-run , merged with in 1994 to form , prompting widespread electrification and modernization. Post-reunification renovations focused on high-speed corridors, including the Nuremberg-Erfurt line (opened 2017, reducing travel time to 1.5 hours over 190 km) and upgrades to the Berlin-Hamburg route (A24 parallel road-rail axis). By 2023, eastern lines benefited from renovated conventional tracks, with regional services comprising about 20% of DB's network length but serving lower passenger volumes due to depopulation trends. However, unprofitable rural branches faced closures, contributing to a denser but less utilized legacy network compared to western lines. Air connectivity centers on (BER, operational since 2020 after delays), handling 22 million passengers in 2023 as a growing hub for routes, and , Europe's top cargo facility with dominance (2.5 million tons annually). Smaller airports like and support regional flights but lag in frequency. Public transport in urban areas like features integrated and U-Bahn systems covering 1,500 km, yet rural bus and regional train services in states like operate at reduced frequencies—often hourly or less—exacerbating isolation in low-density areas. Persistent east-west disparities remain, with eastern per-kilometer density comparable to the west (about 0.5 km per km²) but lower volumes and higher backlogs due to demographic decline reducing demand. The 2030 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan allocates €11 billion for rail capacity in bottlenecks, including eastern upgrades, amid fiscal constraints limiting new highway expansions. Overall, while connectivity has improved—evidenced by doubled freight volumes on eastern rails since 2000—rural accessibility lags, influenced by economic dependencies rather than inherent infrastructural deficits.

Energy production and transition challenges

The new federal states maintain a disproportionate reliance on (brown coal) for production compared to western Germany, with major mining operations concentrated in the Lusatian and Central German coalfields spanning , , , and parts of . In 2022, approximately 90% of Germany's output—116.9 million tonnes—was directed toward power generation, comprising 19.9% of the national total, much of it from eastern facilities operated by companies like LEAG in . -fired plants generated about 71 TWh of in 2024, underscoring persistent dependence amid fluctuating demands, including temporary increases following the 2022 Russian gas supply disruptions. While renewables have grown, with eastern states contributing roughly one-third of Germany's renewable output in recent years despite their smaller land area and , remains a economic anchor in structurally weak regions. The , Germany's policy framework for shifting to renewables and phasing out fossil fuels, faces acute implementation hurdles in the east due to socioeconomic dependencies and infrastructural legacies from the GDR era. mining supports around 13,000 specialized jobs in alone, with broader regional economies tied to mining, power plants, and supply chains, fostering resistance to accelerated closures that could exacerbate and already prevalent post-reunification. The federal target of 2038 includes eastern-specific compensation, such as a €1.75 billion EU-approved package in 2024 for LEAG's exit from certain operations, yet operators remain "very optimistic" about extending extraction beyond interim deadlines like 2030, citing needs and incomplete alternative development. Structural transformation efforts, mediated through bodies like the Coal Commission, emphasize job retraining and diversification into renewables or , but progress lags owing to skill mismatches, limited investment inflows, and geographic mismatches between renewable generation sites (e.g., windy northern areas like ) and consumption centers. Additional challenges include grid bottlenecks for transmitting eastern renewable surplus to industrial western states, high transition costs disproportionately burdening eastern households and industries with elevated energy prices, and uneven distribution of benefits, where western regions have captured more solar and efficiency gains while the east grapples with 's entrenched role. Political opposition in eastern state governments and local communities often prioritizes short-term stability over rapid decarbonization, as evidenced by calls for extended use amid 2022-2024 supply crises, complicating national targets for 80% renewable by 2030. These dynamics highlight a tension between environmental imperatives and regional economic realism, with eastern regions requiring sustained federal support to avoid deepening east-west divides.

Housing, utilities, and digital access

In the new federal states, housing stock expanded significantly post-reunification through extensive renovations funded by programs like Aufbau Ost, addressing dilapidated GDR-era buildings, though demographic decline has since led to persistent overcapacity and higher vacancy rates in rural and shrinking urban areas outside . By 2024, Germany's national housing completions fell to 251,900 units, a 14.4% drop from 2023, exacerbating supply shortages in growing eastern cities like while surplus persists elsewhere due to out-migration. Affordability remains relatively higher in the east compared to western states, with lower purchase prices reflecting slower economic convergence, but maintenance costs strain local budgets amid population losses. Utilities infrastructure in the new states underwent major upgrades after 1990 to integrate with western networks, including energy grids reliant on in regions like and , but shrinking populations have created "cold spots" of overcapacity, prompting utilities to manage through demand reduction strategies rather than expansion. The Energiewende has accelerated closures of coal plants, contributing to job losses—nearly three-quarters of industrial positions vanished post-reunification partly due to energy sector —while fostering opposition in lignite-dependent areas to rapid phase-outs. Water and waste systems, once heavily polluted, now meet standards following investments, yet decentralized management in depopulating municipalities faces efficiency challenges from underutilized networks. Digital access in the new states trails western counterparts, particularly in rural expanses of and , where optic coverage lags national averages amid ongoing Gigabit Strategy expansions. By mid-2024, gigabit-capable connections reached 76.5% of German households overall, but fixed very high-capacity network coverage stood at about 75% in 2023, with eastern rural gaps persisting due to lower discouraging private . Government funding surged to €38 billion by 2024 for rollout, aiming to bridge divides, yet only 36.8% national coverage was achieved that year—below the EU's 69.2%—highlighting infrastructural hurdles in low-density eastern regions. Mobile covers 99.1% of the population nationally, providing partial mitigation, but fixed disparities impede economic competitiveness in the east.

Persistent Challenges

Demographic decline and labor shortages

The population of Germany's new federal states—Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, , , and —has declined markedly since reunification in 1990, driven by and sustained net out-migration of working-age residents. Excluding , these states lost approximately 16% of their population over the period through 2023, while western states grew by about 10%. This shrinkage reflects a post-unification "demographic shock," with internal migration outflows exceeding 2 million people, predominantly young adults seeking economic opportunities in the west. Fertility rates in the new states remain among Europe's lowest, below the national average of 1.35 children per woman in 2023. Saxony's stood at 1.27 that year, with and both at 1.32; these figures follow a sharp post-1990 drop from 1.6 to a low of 0.77 by 1994, attributed to economic disruption, delayed family formation, and uncertainty under market transition. Births in eastern fell disproportionately in recent years, contributing to natural population decrease as deaths outpace births by widening margins. The resulting aging profile is acute: the new states have higher ages and elderly shares than the west, with projections indicating a 2% national decline in working-age by 2045 but steeper losses in the east due to fewer young entrants. Out-migration patterns favor women of reproductive age, further depressing future cohorts and amplifying gender imbalances in rural areas. These trends have intensified labor shortages, particularly for skilled workers, despite persistently higher rates in the east (around 7-8% versus 5% nationally in 2024). In Q1 2024, 42.1% of eastern firms reported operations hampered by personnel gaps, exceeding western levels and reflecting demographic-driven workforce contraction alongside skill mismatches. Sectors like manufacturing, construction, and elder care face acute pressures, with vacancies persisting even amid economic slowdowns; national skilled labor shortfalls reached 487,000 in 2024, disproportionately burdening depopulating regions.

Economic dependencies and welfare burdens

The new federal states of Germany, comprising , , , , and (with often included in analyses), maintain substantial economic dependencies on the western states through fiscal equalization payments and federal transfers. Since reunification in 1990, cumulative net transfers from west to east have reached approximately €2 trillion, funding infrastructure upgrades, public services, and economic restructuring efforts. These inflows, channeled via mechanisms like the Länderfinanzausgleich (fiscal equalization among states) and the (solidarity surcharge on ), have prevented collapse but have not eliminated structural gaps, as eastern remains mired at 75-80% of western levels due to legacy inefficiencies from the centrally , including low capital stock and skill mismatches. In 2024, GDP in eastern Germany (including ) was €41,858, compared to €53,052 in the west, underscoring persistent divergence despite decades of subsidies. rates further highlight vulnerabilities, at 7.8% in the east versus 5.1% in the west as of August 2024, with eastern labor markets hampered by outmigration of skilled workers and insufficient private investment. Federal data indicate that eastern states consistently run fiscal deficits covered by western contributions, with equalization receipts exceeding €3,000 annually in recent years, far outpacing outflows from donor states like or . Welfare burdens amplify these dependencies, as social expenditures—particularly , pensions, and —constitute about 45% of total transfers to the east, sustaining consumption levels that exceed local tax revenues. Eastern pension systems, burdened by a shrinking workforce and demographic aging, rely heavily on cross-subsidies from western contributors, with recipients drawing benefits calibrated to western wage scales post-reunification, despite lower lifetime contributions under the GDR . This arrangement, while equalizing living standards, incentivizes low and public sector , as evidenced by eastern states' disproportionate share of Hartz IV (now ) recipients, who numbered over 1 million in the region as of 2023, straining the national budget amid rising overall social spending at 31% of GDP. Critics, including economists at the IWH Halle institute, argue that such provisions entrench a "growth trap," where subsidized welfare discourages productivity-enhancing reforms and perpetuates reliance on federal bailouts rather than fostering competitive industries.

Immigration integration and social tensions

Immigration to the new federal states remains significantly lower than in western , with non-German nationals constituting about 8% of Saxony's population in 2024, compared to national averages exceeding 15%. This disparity stems from demographic decline and out-migration in the east, limiting inflows despite national policies distributing asylum seekers proportionally. Integration challenges persist, particularly for low-skilled migrants, who encounter barriers in labor market entry and amid regional economic dependencies on low-wage sectors. Crime data highlight tensions, as non-citizens in committed 26.9% of recorded offenses in 2024 despite their minority share, including elevated rates of violent and property crimes. Similar patterns appear in and , correlating with youth and migrant-specific increases of 18-28% from 2022 to 2023 nationwide, though eastern states report fewer absolute incidents due to lower immigrant densities. Attacks on asylum accommodations numbered 218 across in 2024, with (41 incidents) and (35) in the second quarter alone accounting for a disproportionate share relative to their migrant populations. These dynamics have intensified social frictions, evident in protests following high-profile crimes like the 2018 stabbing by a migrant, which sparked anti-immigration demonstrations, and recurring unrest in cities such as . Electoral responses underscore discontent: the AfD garnered 30-33% in 2024 state elections in , , and , attributing support to failed integration, cultural erosion, and welfare strains from unchecked inflows. While counter-protests against AfD have mobilized in urban centers, eastern rural areas exhibit stronger resistance to , reflecting causal links between rapid demographic shifts and eroded social cohesion in post-communist societies with pre-existing trust deficits. Overall asylum applications fell 30% to 230,000 in 2024, yet unresolved integration gaps perpetuate tensions.

Political disillusionment and radicalization drivers

Post-reunification economic restructuring in the new federal states resulted in severe job losses, with manufacturing employment declining by over 3 million between 1989 and 1995, fostering widespread disillusionment with the perceived inequities of unification. This transition to , often described as shock therapy, led to higher rates in the East—peaking at 20% in some regions during the 1990s—compared to the West, exacerbating feelings of and betrayal by West German-dominated institutions. Persistent wage gaps, with East German salaries averaging 75-80% of Western levels as of 2023, have sustained perceptions of second-class status, driving support for parties promising to address regional neglect. Political distrust in mainstream parties like the CDU and SPD stems from their failure to deliver promised , with many Eastern voters viewing Berlin's policies as favoring Western interests and ignoring local grievances such as decay and demographic decline. Empirical analyses of AfD voting patterns indicate that and low correlate strongly with support in the East, where the party garnered 24-30% in 2021 federal elections versus 9% nationally, often as protest votes against establishment complacency. Immigration concerns, amplified by events like the 2015-2016 migrant influx, further fuel , as Eastern residents report higher exposure to integration challenges and cultural shifts without adequate policy response, leading to AfD's framing of these as existential threats. In 2024 state elections in and , AfD and allied parties secured nearly 50% of votes, reflecting deepened alienation. Radicalization drivers include youth disillusionment, with surveys showing Eastern teenagers more prone to nationalist sentiments amid limited opportunities and perceived Western cultural imposition. Longitudinal studies link this to "geography of shrinkage"—population decline in rural East correlating with AfD gains—as economic stagnation erodes trust in democratic processes, prompting shifts toward anti-system actors. While mainstream sources attribute this primarily to extremism, causal factors emphasize unaddressed material hardships and institutional biases that marginalize Eastern voices, as evidenced by lower voter turnout in the East (around 70% versus 80% in West for recent federals) signaling apathy or rejection of the system. In the 2025 federal election, AfD's Eastern strongholds underscored ongoing drivers, with support exceeding 30% in several new states despite national moderation efforts.

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