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Women in the workforce
Women in the workforce
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A woman employee demonstrates a hospital information management system in Tanzania
Female labor force participation rate, ages 15-64 (World Bank/ILO, 2019)
Proportion of women in senior and middle management positions (2017)

Since the Industrial Revolution, participation of women in the workforce outside the home has increased in industrialized nations, with particularly large growth seen in the 20th century. Largely seen as a boon for industrial society, women in the workforce contribute to a higher national economic output as measure in GDP as well as decreasing labor costs by increasing the labor supply in a society.

Women's lack of access to higher education had effectively excluded them from the practice of well-paid and high status occupations. Entry of women into the higher professions, like law and medicine, was delayed in most countries due to women being denied entry to universities and qualification for degrees. For example, Cambridge University only fully validated degrees for women late in 1947, and even then only after much opposition and acrimonious debate.[1] Women were largely limited to low-paid and poor status occupations for most of the 19th and 20th centuries, or earned less pay than men for doing the same work.[2] However, through the 20th century, the labor market shifted. Office work that does not require heavy labor expanded and women increasingly acquired the higher education that led to better-compensated, longer-term careers rather than lower-skilled, shorter-term jobs. Mothers are less likely to be employed unlike men and women without children.[3]

The increasing rates of women contributing in the work force has led to a more equal disbursement of hours worked across the regions of the world.[4][failed verification] However, in western European countries the nature of women's employment participation remains markedly different from that of men.

Female Labor Force Participation for persons aged 15+ (percent, 2022) in select countries[5]

According to the United Nations data, the female labor force participation rate for persons aged 15 and older was 53 percent in 2022. The highest was in the Oceania region (excluding Tuvalu) at approximately 65 percent, while the lowest was in Central and Southern Asia at 40 percent. Among individual countries, Iran had the lowest rate at 14 percent, whereas Nigeria had the highest at 77 percent—an increase of nearly 20 percentage points since 2019 (see the graphical representation: "Female Labor Force Participation for persons aged 15+ in select countries").[6]

Comparison of the Proportion of Women in Senior and Middle Management Positions by Region in 2010 vs. 2020[7]

Worldwide, the proportion of women in senior and middle management positions has minimally increased between 2010 and 2020, staying around 34 percent on average. Developing countries, as well as emerging market economies, experienced a greater increase than developed countries (see the graphical representation: "Comparison of the Proportion of Women in Senior and Middle Management Positions by Region in 2010 vs. 2020").[8]

Increasing women's equality in banking and the workplace might boost the global economy by up to $28 trillion by 2025.[9][10][11]

Areas of study

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As the Civil War raged in the U.S., Virginia Penny of Louisville, Kentucky, finished her research project and published the ground-breaking 1862 book, How women can make money married or single, in all branches of the arts and sciences, professions, trades, agricultural and mechanical pursuits.[12] Hoping to offer hard facts about what women in the workforce would encounter, Penny had interviewed thousands of employers, using both a survey via the postal mail and in person – when she would also interview workers. Many of her site visits were in Philadelphia, New York and Boston. She distilled her research to list over 500 jobs that were open to women as well as the information about the jobs and potential availability for women. She also indicated when employers offered their reasons for wage differentials based on gender.

She dedicated her book "to worthy and industrious women in the United States, striving to earn a livelihood", and the book garnered much attention from reviewers and scholars across the country. She sold her rights to the book to another publisher who put it out as an encyclopedia, The Employments of Women: A Cyclopaedia of Woman's Work,[13] in 1863. It sold better once it was re-titled again in 1870 as How Women Can Make Money, Married or Single.[14] In its several different versions, 36 editions were published between 1862 and 2006, and six editions of the adaptation in German (first published in 1867).[15]

In the twentieth century, division of labor by gender has been studied most systematically in women's studies (especially women's history, which has frequently examined the history and biography of women's participation in particular fields) and gender studies more broadly. Occupational studies, such as the history of medicine or studies of professionalization, also examine questions of gender, and the roles of women in the history of particular fields. Women dominate as accountants, auditors, and psychologists.[16][17][18]

In addition, modern civil rights law has frequently examined gender restrictions of access to a field of occupation; gender discrimination within a field; and gender harassment in particular workplaces. This body of law is called employment discrimination law, and gender and race discrimination are the largest sub-sections within the area. Laws specifically aimed at preventing discrimination against women have been passed in many countries; see, e.g., the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in the United States.

Women and economic development

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Women in informal employment as share of female employment in 2017[19]

Global research clearly delineates the correlation between women's role in the economy and an increase in the standard of living. In the 2001 World Bank report entitled "Engendering Development", the connection between women's involvement in the economy and growth is more clearly stated:[20]

While disparities in basic rights; in schooling, credit, and jobs; or in the ability to participate in public life take their most direct toll on women and girls, the full costs of gender inequality ultimately harm everyone…ignoring gender disparities comes at a great cost—to people's well-being and to countries' abilities to grow sustainably, to govern effectively, and thus reduce poverty.

Society's intrinsic value is often associated with contribution and production as a whole, thus women's inability to participate in economy further solidifies a subordinate role in society. "The fact that women have fewer opportunities in labor market may contribute to their unequal treatment in the household…Increased opportunities for women in the labor market do indeed translate into better outcomes for women…For the same increase in total household income, an increase in female income of 7 U.S. dollars per month translates into a 1 percentage point increase in the survival rate for girls."[21] Women are treated as less than men because their role in the home does not perpetuate survival of the family directly in terms of income. A stark realization of women's economic value in the eyes of under-developed countries is sex selective abortion rights and the alarming phenomenon of "missing women."[21] What many societies fail to realize is that the trade-off to helping a woman instead of a man does not exist. When a woman is empowered with education and involvement in the economy everyone is better off. Women's economic involvement will drive up Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which is a foundational standard for higher living. James Wolfensohn of the World Bank states, "Education for girls has a catalytic effect on every dimension of development: lower child and maternal mortality rates; increased educational attainment by daughters and sons; higher productivity; and improved environmental management. Together, these can mean faster economic growth and, equally important, wider distribution of the fruits of growth… More education for girls will also enable more and more women to attain leadership positions at all levels of society: from health clinics in the villages to parliaments in the capitals. This, in turn, will change the way societies will deal with problems and raise the quality of global decision-making."[20]

[edit]
This chart depicts the change in the percentage of women in three professional occupations (dentist, physician, lawyer), from 1970 to 2007.

Women still contribute to their communities in many regions mainly through agricultural work. In Southern Asia, Western Asia, and Africa, only 20% of women work at paid non-agricultural jobs. Worldwide, women's rate of paid employment outside of agriculture grew to 41% by 2008.[22]

One of the main forms of paid employment for women worldwide is actually a traditional one, that of the market "hawker". Women have worked outside the home as vendors at markets since ancient times in many parts of the world, such as Central America, South Asia, and Africa.

During the 20th century, the most significant global shift in women's paid employment came from the spread of global travel and the development of a large migrant workforce of women domestic workers seeking jobs outside of their native country. The Philippines is a major source of female domestic workers. Before the 1990s, the majority of Filipinos working outside the Philippines were male, but by 2012, an estimated 63% of Filipinos working overseas were female.[23]

Estimates of Filipino women working overseas are in the millions. Over 138,000 new domestic workers gained permission to work overseas in 2012, a number that grew 12% from the previous year.[23] Overseas employment often results in the women leaving their own children behind in the Philippines to be cared for by relatives. Domestic employees from the Philippines and other countries have also been subject to exploitation and sex and money extreme abuse, for example in several countries in the Middle East, where they are often employed. It is estimated that remittances from overseas workers (both male and female) bring $1 billion (USD) per month to the Philippines.[24]

33% of the drivers and station controllers in the Bangalore metro are female in an effort to create a more welcoming and diverse workplace. Children of employees have access to childcare facilities, while women drivers can work at stations near to their homes and have access to a separate recreation area. If women are unable to perform night shifts, they work in the mornings or evenings.[25]

Workforce participation by sector

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Attendees at a computer business networking event for potential entrepreneurs, United States
A woman press photographer covers a music festival, Poland, 2008

Women and men often participate in economic sectors in sharply different proportions, a result of gender clustering in occupations. Reasons for this may include a traditional association of certain types of work with a particular gender. There is a wide range of other possible economic, social and cultural variables that impact the gender distribution in different occupations, including within a region or country. An averaging of statistics gathered by the United Nations for 2004 through 2007 reflects these differences (totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding):

Sectoral distribution of employed persons, by sector and sex (2004 through 2007)[26]

Region Agriculture Industry Services
Africa 43% women / 42% men 11% women / 20% men 46% women / 39% men
Asia (excluding China) 32% women / 26% men 12% women / 25% men 56% women / 49% men
Latin America and the Caribbean 7% women / 22% men 13% women / 27% men 80% women / 51% men
Europe and other more developed regions 6% women / 8% men 15% women / 36% men 79% women / 55% men

More detailed statistics show large differences even within these regions. For example, 11% of employed women in East Asia are employed in agriculture, a number that rises to 55% in South Asia; 70% of women in Southern Africa are employed in the service sector, while in Eastern, Middle, and Western Africa this number is 26%.[26]

According to the International Labour Organization, women's involvement in the labor force declines by 16.5% in developing nations as a result of unsafe public transportation.[27][28]

Occupational dissimilarity index

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Choice of occupation is considered to be one of the key factors contributing to the male-female wage differential. In other words, careers with a majority of female employees tend to pay less than careers that employ a majority of males. This is different from direct wage discrimination within occupations, as males in the female-dominated professions will also make lower than average wages and women in the male-dominated occupations usually make higher than average wages. The occupational dissimilarity index is a measure from 0 to 100; it measures the percent of laborers that would need to be rearranged into a job typically done by the opposite sex for the wage differential to disappear. In 1960, the dissimilarity index for the United States was measured at 62. It has dropped since then, but at 47 in 2000, is still one of the highest of any developed nation.[29][30]

U-shaped curve

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Claudia Goldin described women's participation rate in the workforce as a U-shaped curve. One that as a country develops, women's participation rate in the workforce starts high, declines, and then rises again. Its decline starts from a move from production in the household, family farm, or small business to a wider market. A strong social stigma of women working in paid manual labor outside of the home, not only in male-dominated industries, but also female-dominated industries such as textiles. Such stigma includes that only a lazy man (or of low social status/income) who neglects his family would let his wife do manual labor. The participation rate of women falls as the income rises, which even includes an increase in income for women's labor. Participation begins to rise once women's education improves and the value of women's time increases relative to the price of goods.[31]

Organizations formed by women for rights

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In the nineteenth century women became involved in organizations dedicated to social reform.[32] In 1903 The National Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) is established to advocate for improved wages and working conditions for women. In 1920 The Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor was formed to create equal rights and a safe workplace for women.[33] In 1956 a group called Financial Women's Association (FWA), was formed. It is an organization established by a group of Wall Street women. The goal was: to advance professionalism in finance and in the financial services industry with special emphasis on the role and development of women, to attain greater recognition for women's achievements in business, and to encourage women to seek career opportunities in finance and business.[34] In 1966 the National Organization for Women (NOW) was founded by a group of feminists including Betty Friedan. The largest women's rights group in the U.S., NOW seeks to end sexual discrimination, especially in the workplace, by means of legislative lobbying, litigation, and public demonstrations. NOW has 500,000 contributing members and 550 chapters in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.[35] Founded in 1972, the National Association of Female Executives (NAFE) provides education, networking and public advocacy to empower its members to achieve career success and financial security. Members are women executives, business owners, entrepreneurs and others who are committed to NAFE's mission: the advancement of women in the workplace.[34] Many of these organizations led to legal action and protecting women's rights as workers and empowered women in the workplace.

Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg meeting with woman members of the U.S. Senate in 2013

In 2013, LeanIn.Org was founded by Sheryl Sandberg, who was at the time the chief operating officer of Meta Platforms, to support and inspire women to achieve their goals.[36]

Laws protecting women's rights as workers

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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and First Daughter and Advisor to the former U.S. President Ivanka Trump attending the World Assembly for Women to discuss women's rights, Tokyo, 2017

International laws protecting women's rights as workers exist through the efforts of various international bodies. On June 16, 2011, the International Labour Organization (ILO) passed C189 Domestic Workers Convention, 2011, binding signatories to regulations intended to end abuses of migrant domestic workers. It was anticipated that the convention would put pressure on non-ratifying countries to support changes to their own laws to meet the change in international standards protecting domestic workers.[37] Also in 2011, Hong Kong's High Court struck down a law preventing domestic workers from having residency rights granted to other foreign workers, a move that affected an estimated 100,000 domestic workers in Hong Kong.[38]

The ILO has previously ratified the Equal Remuneration Convention in 1951, which came into force in 1953, the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, which went into force in 1960 and the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000, which went into force in 2002. In 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which went into force in 1976. UNESCO also adopted the Convention against Discrimination in Education in 1960, which came into force in 1962.[39] The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, went into force in 2003. The Home Work Convention, adopted by the ILO, went into force in 2000;the Convention protects the rights of persons doing paid work out of their home, which is frequently women workers. It offers equal protection regarding working conditions, safety, remuneration, social security protection, access to training, minimum age of employment, and maternity protection.[40]

Human trafficking often targets young women who are abducted and sent outside their own country to work as domestic workers, often in conditions of extreme exploitation. As of 2020, 1 out of every 130 women globally are victims of this form of "modern slavery".[41] A number of international laws have been ratified to address human trafficking of women and children.

Maternity protection measures are put in place to insure that women will not be discriminated against in the workplace once they return from having a child. They should also not be exposed to any health hazards while they are pregnant and at work. They are allowed time off for maternity leave as well, which allows them to bond with their child; this aspect of development is crucial for infants to gain proper attachment skills. Employers are expected to hold to these policies. Yet many women on maternity leave receive very small amounts of time off to allow for their health along with their babies' health. The amount of time allowed for maternity leave as well as the pay for maternity leave varies by country, with Sweden having the longest amount off with 68 weeks and the United States being one of the worst, with the typical period being 12 weeks without pay.[42]

Women in workforce leadership

[edit]
An information technology networking social for potential entrepreneurs in New Delhi, India

Female decision-makers from around Europe are organized in several national and European wide networks. The networks aim to promote women in decision-making positions in politics and the economy across Europe. These networks were founded in the 1980s and are often very different from the "service clubs" founded in the early days of the century, like Soroptimist and Zontas.

"Women in Management" is about women in business in usually male-dominated areas. Their motivation, their ideas and leadership styles and their ability to enter into leadership positions is the subject of most of the different networks.

As of 2009, women represented 20.9% of parliament in Europe (both houses) and 18.4% world average.[43]

As of 2009, 90 women serve in the U.S. Congress: 18 women serve in the Senate, and 73 women serve in the House Women hold about three percent of executive positions.[44]

In the private sector, men still represent 9 out of 10 board members in European blue-chip companies, The discrepancy is widest at the very top: only 3% of these companies have a woman presiding over the highest decision-making body.[2] In the United States, women make up just 5.5% of company CEOs.[45]

List of members of the European Network of Women in Decision-making in Politics and the Economy:

  • Committee of Women Elected Representatives of Local and Regional Authorities (Council of European Municipalities and Regions)
  • BPW Europe, Business and Professional Women – Europe
  • Association of Organisations of Mediterranean Businesswomen
  • Eurochambres Women's Network
  • European Platform of Women Scientists
  • Network of Parliamentary Committees for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men in the European Union
  • European Network to Promote Women's Entrepreneurship
  • European Women's Lobby
  • European Women's Lawyers Association
  • CEE Network for Gender Issues
  • European Women Inventors and Innovators Network
  • European Women's Management Development International Network, EWMD
  • Femanet – Eurocadres
  • European Professional Women's Network, EPWN
  • Women's Forum for the Economy and the Society

The European Union Commission has created a platform for all these networks. It also funded the Women to the Top program in 2003–2005 to bring more women into top management.[46]

Some organizations have been created to promote the presence of women in top responsibilities, in politics and business. One example is EWMD European Women's Management Development (cited above), a European and international network of individual and corporate members, drawn from professional organisations. Members are from all areas of business, education, politics and culture.

Women who are born into the upper class rather than the middle or lower class have a much better chance at holding higher positions of power in the work force if they choose to enter it.[citation needed] According to a study published 2015, of the women who held C-suite jobs in the U.S., 94% played competitive sports, 52% at a university level.[47]

Barriers to equal participation

[edit]
What percentage of the US public approves of working wives[48]

As gender roles have followed the formation of agricultural and then industrial societies, newly developed professions and fields of occupation have been frequently inflected by gender. Some of the ways in which gender affects a field include:

  • Prohibitions or restrictions on members of a particular gender entering a field or studying a field
  • Discrimination within a field, including wage, management, and prestige hierarchies
  • Expectation that mothers, rather than fathers, should be the primary childcare providers

Note that these gender restrictions may not be universal in time and place, and that they operate to restrict both men and women. However, in practice, norms and laws have historically restricted women's access to particular occupations;civil rights laws and cases have thus primarily focused on equal access to and participation by women in the workforce. These barriers may also be manifested in hidden bias and by means of many microinequities.

Many women face issues with sexual abuse while working in agriculture fields as well. Many of the women who work in these fields are undocumented and so supervisors or other male workers may take advantage of that. These women may suffer sexual abuse in order to keep their jobs and they cannot report the incident to the police because the fact that they are undocumented will be brought up and as a result they may be deported.

Across the board, a number of industries are stratified across the genders. This is the result of a variety of factors. These include differences in education choices, preferred job and industry, work experience, number of hours worked, and breaks in employment (such as for bearing and raising children). Men also typically go into higher paid and higher risk jobs when compared to women. These factors result in 60% to 75% difference between men's and women's average aggregate wages or salaries, depending on the source. Various explanations for the remaining 25% to 40% have been suggested, including women's lower willingness and ability to negotiate salary and sexual discrimination.[49][50][51] According to the European Commission direct discrimination only explains a small part of gender wage differences.[52][53] Despite these barriers, digitalization has helped reduce obstacles to women's participation by enabling the inclusion of low-skilled and traditionally marginalized groups, such as women, people with disabilities, and low-income workers. In many Muslim-majority countries, social and cultural norms restricting interaction between men and women have historically limited female labor force participation, particularly in management roles. Digital platforms now offer alternative avenues, such as remote work, to overcome these constraints.[54]

Women who want to work with children

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In the United States, the gender pay gap has not been closed for 3 decades. It has been continuous for the past 3 decades at about $0.80 per dollar of what the man makes.[55] While we notice there is a pay gap within men and women, there is a different level of work labor participation for the working mother, married and single. While the married mother has another source of income, the single mother tends to have a higher chance of poverty. Being limited to work of take more leave.[56]

Access to education and training

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Maasai women at USAID literacy event

A number of occupations became "professionalized" through the 19th and 20th centuries, gaining regulatory bodies, and passing laws or regulations requiring particular higher educational requirements. As women's access to higher education was often limited, this effectively restricted women's participation in these professionalizing occupations. For instance, women were completely forbidden access to Cambridge University until 1868, and were encumbered with a variety of restrictions until 1987 when the university adopted an equal opportunity policy.[57] Numerous other institutions in the United States and Western Europe began opening their doors to women over the same period of time, but access to higher education remains a significant barrier to women's full participation in the workforce in developing countries. Even where access to higher education is formally available, women's access to the full range of occupational choices is significantly limited where access to primary education is limited through social custom.[58]

In low- and middle-income countries, vocational and business training program interventions are carried out with the aim of increasing employment, self-employment and income. A systematic review on vocational and business training for women in these regions summarized the evidence from thirty-five studies regarding the impacts of such training programs. The authors found that these types of programs have small positive effects on employment and income with variability across studies. They found that the effects of training may increase with a stronger gender focus of the program.[59]

According to FAO, in Africa, without adequate training and education in business, entrepreneurial skills, and awareness of trade issues and regulations and fluency in languages of trading partners, women will struggle to gain access to formalized economies and larger scale businesses.[60] Low literacy levels is often what keeps women limited to informal economic activity.[60]

Access to capital and rotating capital

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Governor of Bahia, Brazil, attending the first state women's business conference
SHG women operating a cabinet manufacturing business, India

Women's access to occupations requiring capital outlays is also hindered by their unequal access (statistically) to capital; this affects occupations such as entrepreneur and small business owner, farm ownership, and investor.[61] Numerous microloan programs attempt to redress this imbalance, targeting women for loans or grants to establish start-up businesses or farms, having determined that aid targeted to women can disproportionately benefit a nation's economy.[62] While research has shown that women cultivate more than half the world's food—in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, women are responsible for up to 80% of food production—most such work is family subsistence labor, and often the family property is legally owned by the men in the family.[62]

In Africa, women have limited access to financial services and formalized assets such as titles and deeds; this results in low levels of investment in productive capacity, hampering the growth of women-led micro, small, or medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs).[60] Alleviating financial collateral constraints can allow more women producers and traders to participate in formal markets and expand their businesses.[60] According to a study conducted on women and informal cross-border trade (ICBT) in Southern Africa, women are consistently found to rely on their own personal savings and women "savings clubs" (technically, rotating savings and credit associations) to source capital for trade as opposed to commercial banks and government programmes.[63][60] Similar patterns have been observed in China,[64] and Korea.[65] Rotating capital has also been observed across religious groups, such as Muslim women.[66] The European Investment Bank established the SheInvest program at the end of 2019 with the goal of raising €1 billion in investments to assist women in obtaining loans and running enterprises across Africa.[10][67] The Bank has funded an additional €2 billion in gender-lens investment in Africa, Asia, and Latin America at the Finance in Common Summit at the end of 2022.[10][68][69]

A 2025 report by the Danish Chamber of Commerce based on numbers by Statistics Denmark showed that, in the years 2017 to 2023, between 0.1-1.7% of capital went to startups with exclusively female founders, while between 3.7-10.8 % of the capital went to startups with a mix of both genders, with the remaining capital going to startups with exclusively male founders.[70]

Discrimination within occupations

[edit]
Unemployment rate in women in 2017[71]

According to United Nations data, the average unemployment rate by sex and age group (15 years and over) for the year 2021 was 8.7 percent for the female population worldwide, whereas it was 6.7 percent for the male population, marking a discrepancy of almost 30 percent. G20 countries, which represent the major economic markets worldwide, reflect this trend as well, though to a lesser extent. Within the G20 countries, Saudi Arabia has the greatest discrepancy between the unemployment rates of the genders (see the graphical representation: "Unemployment Rate by Sex and Age Group in G20 Countries in 2021").[72]

Unemployment Rate by Sex and Age Group (15 Years and Over) in G20 Countries in 2021[73]

The idea that men and women are naturally suited for different occupations is known as horizontal segregation.[29]

Statistical discrimination in the workplace is unintentional discrimination based on the presumed probability that a worker will or will not remain with the company for a long period of time. Specific to women, employers believe that women are more likely to drop out of the labor force to have kids, or work part-time while raising kids; this tends to hurt chances for job advancement. Women are passed up for promotions because of the possibility that they may leave, and are in some cases placed in positions with little opportunity for upward mobility due to these stereotypes.[74]

Women typically earn less money on average than men (not accounting other variables), despite establishing equal pay laws.[58][75]

The gender wage gap which is calculated by the difference between the median earnings of men and women is an indicator followed by OECD.[76] In 2022, the average gender wage gap (as percent of median earnings of men) among OECD countries in 2022 was 11.4 percent. According to the OECD data, in the last couple of years, Luxembourg has had the smallest gender wage gap (0.4 percent), while Korea has had the largest (33.2 percent) (see the graphical representation: "Gender Wage Gap in Selected OECD Countries").[76]

Gender Wage Gap in Selected OECD Countries (%, 2022)[77]

According to the textbook Race, Class, and Gender: An Anthology, women are at a higher risk of financial disadvantage in modern-day society than men. Statistical findings suggest that women are under paid for similar jobs men complete despite having the same qualifications. The statistical data collected by the U.S. Department of Labor suggests that women are discriminated against in the workforce based on gender. The textbook reads, "Women's wages are also more volatile than men's wages, and women face a much higher risk of seeing large drops in income than do men" (Kennedy 2008). Anderson clearly demonstrates a significant difference between men and women in the workforce in regards to pay. Women are left more exposed to financial devastation and unemployment. The textbook also mentions that women are often given public positions versus private or leadership positions despite having appropriate work experience, higher education, or necessary skills to qualify. According to the Joint Economic Committee, "Among women heading families, the unemployment rate has grown and is higher than the national unemployment rate and twice as high as that for either married men or married women" (Joint Economic Committee, 2009). In other words, unmarried women who are the head of household are more vulnerable to financial disadvantage than married men or women. The unemployment rate of women compared to men suggests that single women are discriminated against based on gender. Anderson writes, "All women are disproportionately at risk in the current foreclosure crisis, since women are 32% more likely than men to have subprime mortgages (One-third of women, compared to one-fourth of men, have subprime mortgages; and, the disparity between women and men increases in higher income brackets)" (Anderson 265). The statistical information illustrates the dramatic difference between men and women in regards to finances. It can be inferred that men are favored in the workforce over women. Women are discriminated against based on their gender and thus are more likely to struggle financially because of discriminatory employers.

Sex differentiation focuses on separating men and women in the workplace from different settings and duties, and it leads to the idea of sex segregation.[78] Explanations for sex segregation fall under two main categories of cultural beliefs and men's efforts to preserve their advantages in the workplace. Cultural beliefs about gender and work emphasize sex stereotypes. Certain cultures value these sex stereotypes, assumptions about individuals based on sex, which leads to stereotype thinking about the genders. Jobs become labeled male or female when these sex stereotypes relate to the sexes. Cultural beliefs for sexes lays out the inequality at work women face. In Western and Eastern cultures, men are believed to be superior to women, leading to sex inequality in job duties, authority, and pay. Women are seen as requiring protection and care, and it takes away their opportunities at many jobs.[78]

Another explanation of sex inequality is that the dominant group will preserve their position, such as men's efforts to preserve their advantages in the workplace. If women are capable of taking on the duties of male dominated jobs, especially "macho" jobs, then men's masculinity will no longer be a requirement. Women gaining equality in the workforce threatens undermining men's privileges in any other realm they wish, such as authority, family, or political life.[79] Sometimes the solution men choose is to try to drive the women out of the job.[78] Women are 41% more likely to be subjected to a toxic workplace culture and are more likely to be burned out than men.[80][81]

Women, globally, are also responsible for nearly "two and a half times more unpaid household and care [labour] than men".[82] These higher care labour responsibilities for women along with increasing participation in the labour market [83] is creating a strain on women that has negative implications on their ability to properly provide for their families.[84][85] Larger care labour responsibilities for women can also have negative impacts on their ability to participate in the paid labour market and achieve "their full economic potential".[82] In addition to women performing more unpaid care work, they also make up the majority of single parent households,  "8% of householders are headed by single parents, with 84% of them mothers".[84] This unequal distribution of care labour is a significant factor in reducing the economic ability of women in the workforce.[86]

Women bear a disproportionate burden when it comes to unpaid work. In the Asia and Pacific region, women spend 4.1 times more time in unpaid work than men do.[87] Additionally, looking at 2019 data by the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, the average time women spent in unpaid work is 264 minutes per day compared to men who spent 136 minutes per day.[88] Although men spend more time in paid work, women still spend more time, in general, doing both paid and unpaid work. The numbers are 482.5 minutes per day for women and 454.4 minutes per day for men.[88] These statistics show us that there is a double burden for women.

According to The Lancet Regional Health - Europe, only 29.8% of the authors of scientific articles are women, while only 17% of women occupy the highest positions in academic research. They make up just 30% of the research workforce and occupy only 26% of full professorships, while the highest positions in academic careers are held by women in 22% of cases for the natural sciences and 17% for engineering and technology.[89]

Actions and inactions of women themselves

[edit]

Through a process known as "employee clustering", employees tend to be grouped throughout the workplace both spatially and socially with those of a similar status job. Women are no exception and tend to be grouped with other women making comparable amounts of money. They compare wages with the women around them and believe their salaries are fair because they are average. Some women are content with their lack of wage equality with men in the same positions because they are unaware of just how vast the inequality is.

Furthermore, women as a whole tend to be less assertive and confrontational. One of the factors contributing to the higher proportion of raises going to men is the simple fact that men tend to ask for raises more often than women, and are more aggressive when doing so.[90] Women, and men, are socialized at young ages into these roles. School-age boys and girls in the United States have been noted as enacting the same aggressive and passive characteristics, respectively, in educational settings that we see in adults in the workplace. According to Joan Spade, boys are more likely to be pushed competitively in school, and sports, to be dominant. The idea that "winning is everything" is not emphasized to the same extent for girls and therefore they are less likely to seek recognition for their work.[91]

An additional issue that contributes to income inequality by gender is that women are much more likely than men to take "breaks" in their careers to have children, often remaining out of the workforce for extended periods of time, while men in the same role or occupation (or other women who do not leave the workforce) most likely are continuing to earn promotions and/or male-favoring merit-based salary increases. When a woman in this scenario re-enters the workforce, she may be offered a smaller salary or a lower position than she might have merited had she remained in the workforce alongside her colleagues (both male and female) who have not interrupted their careers.

Sex segregation

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An Egyptian Muslim woman who works in a men's hairdresser, 2020

A form of discrimination in the workplace is sex segregation. Men and women are separated to do different tasks, same tasks in different settings or at different times. Historically, most men did agricultural work while women managed the household, however within time women eased their way into employment, but the segregation they experience remained. Males identify with the masculine identity and their authority are considered appropriate. Male dominated industries do not leave a chance for women to prove possible history in the role, leaving the job identified as a male way of working.[92] Males masculine behavior undermine females in the workforce, and they are forced to endure it. Women's segregation in the workforce takes form of normative masculine cultural dominance. Men put on the image of macho physical toughness, limiting women in their careers. Women find themselves experiencing the concept of "doing gender", especially in a traditional masculine occupation. Women's standpoint of men's behavior sheds light on mobilizing masculinity. With the feminist standpoint view of gender in the workplace, men's gender is an advantage, whereas women's is a handicap.[93][94] However, sex segregation can happen by women's and men's own choices of different occupations.[78]

Descriptive gender stereotypes emphasize the characteristics a woman possesses. The prescriptive component focuses on the beliefs about characteristics a woman should possess. The descriptive component is expected to lead to workplace discrimination, while the prescriptive component is expected to lead to discrimination against women.[95] If women violate these prescriptions, they are more susceptible to disparate treatment. In other words, if a woman is able to perform a job that generally requires stereotypical male masculinity they receive the discrimination that punishes women for violating the prescriptions of feminine characteristics.

Gender inequality by social class

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Mechanic working on a motorcycle, United States

In the last 50 years, there have been great changes toward gender equality in industrialized nations, such as the United States of America. With the second wave feminist movement of the 1960s, women began to enter the workforce in great numbers. Women also had high labor market participation during World Wars. In the late 1960s when women began entering the labor force in record numbers, they were entering in addition to all of the men, as opposed to substituting for men during the war. This dynamic shift from the one-earner household to the two-earner household dramatically changed the socioeconomic class system of industrialized nations in the post-war period.

Effects on the middle and upper classes

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The addition of women into the workforce was one of the key factors that has increased social mobility over the last 50 years, although this has stalled in recent decades for both genders. Female children of the middle and upper classes had increased access to higher education, and thanks to job equality, were able to attain higher-paying and higher-prestige jobs than ever before. Due to the dramatic increase in availability of birth control, these high status women were able to delay marriage and child-bearing until they had completed their education and advanced their careers to their desired positions. In 2001, the survey on sexual harassment at workplace conducted by women's nonprofit organisation Sakshi among 2,410 respondents in government and non-government sectors, in five states[clarification needed][96] recorded 53 percent saying that both sexes don't get equal opportunities, 50 percent of women are treated unfairly by employers and co-workers, 59 per cent have heard sexist remarks or jokes, and 32 percent have been exposed to pornography or literature degrading women.

In comparison with other sectors, IT organisations may be offering equal salaries to women, and the density of women in technology companies may be relatively high, but this does not necessarily ensure a level playing field. For example, Microsoft (US) was sued because of the conduct of one of its supervisors over e-mail. The supervisor allegedly made sexually offensive comments via e-mail, such as referring to himself as "president of the amateur gynecology club". He also allegedly referred to the plaintiff as the "Spandex Queen". E-harassment is not the sole form of harassment. In 1999, Juno Online faced two separate suits from former employees who alleged that they were told that they would be fired if they broke off their ongoing relationships with senior executives. Pseudo Programs, a Manhattan-based Internet TV network, was sued in January 2000 after male employees referred to female employees as "bimbos" and forced them to look at sexually explicit material on the Internet. In India, HR managers admit that women are discriminated against for senior Board positions and pregnant women are rarely given jobs but only in private. In addition to this, it has been suggested that there are fewer women in the IT sector due to existing stereotypes that depict the sector as male-orientated. In a recent book, Own It: Leadership Lessons From Women Who Do, author Aparna Jain interviewed 200 women in senior management and leadership positions in India about the problems they face at the workplace and noted that 86% of the women she spoke to experienced harassment in one form or the other.[97] Among the issues she notes are bias, bullying, sexual harassment and the impact of motherhood on women's career.[98] Recently a sexual harassment suit against a senior member shocked the Indian IT sector, as was the sexual harassment case against the Taj Hotels Resorts and Palaces' (Taj Group) CEO, Rakesh Sarna .[99] A startling example of institutional mechanisms that allow for an unfettered environment for sexual harassment to fester is the Rajendra K. Pachauri scandal at The Energy and Resources Institute in India.[100] Improvements in the education system could be the key to encouraging women to take up roles in this sector.

Recognizing the invisible nature of power structures that marginalize women at the workplace, the Supreme Court in the landmark case Vaishaka versus High Court of Rajasthan (1997) identified sexual harassment as violative of the women's right to equality in the workplace and enlarged the ambit of its definition. The judgment equates a hostile work environment on the same plane as a direct request for sexual favors. To quote: "Sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually determined behaviour (whether directly or by implication) as: physical contact and advances; a demand or request for sexual favours; sexually coloured remarks; showing pornography; any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature". The judgement mandates appropriate work conditions should be provided for work, leisure, health, and hygiene to further ensure that there is no hostile environment towards women at the workplace and no woman employee should have reasonable grounds to believe that she is disadvantaged in connection with her employment.

This law thus squarely shifts the onus onto the employer to ensure employee safety but most mid-sized Indian service technology companies are yet to enact sexual harassment policies. Admits K Chandan, an advocate from Chandan Associates, "I have a few IT clients. When I point to the need for a sexual harassment policy, most tend to overlook or ignore it. It's not high on the agenda." An HR Manager of India's premier technology companies rues: "I am going to use the recent case to push the policy through. Earlier the draft proposal was rejected by the company." Yet another HR manager from a flagship company of India's leading business house, oblivious to the irony of her statement, admitted that the company had a grievance redressal mechanism but no sexual harassment policy in place. The lax attitudes transgress the Supreme Court judgment wherein the Court not only defined sexual harassment, but also laid down a code of conduct for workplaces to prevent and punish it, "Employers or other responsible authorities in public or private sectors must comply with the following guidelines: Express prohibition of sexual harassment should be notified and circulated; private employers should include prohibition of sexual harassment in the standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946." As for the complaint procedure, not less than half of its members should be women. The complaint committee should include an NGO or other organization that is familiar with the issue of sexual harassment. When the offense amounts to misconduct under service rules, appropriate disciplinary action should be initiated. When such conduct amounts to an offense under the Indian Penal Code, the employer shall initiate action by making a complaint with the appropriate authority. However, the survey by Sakshi revealed 58 per cent of women were not aware of the Supreme Court guidelines on the subject. A random survey by AssureConsulting.com among hundred employees working in the IT industry revealed startling results: Less than 10 per cent were familiar with the law or the company's sexual harassment policy. Surprisingly, certain HR managers were also ignorant of the Supreme Court guidelines or the Draft Bill by the National Commission of Women against sexual harassment at the workplace.

Not surprisingly many cases go unreported. However, given the complexities involved, company policy is the first step and cannot wish away the problem. Says Savita HR Manager at Icelerate Technologies, "We have a sexual harassment policy that is circulated among employees. Also the company will not tolerate any case that comes to its notice. But the man at home is no different from the person at the office", thus implying the social mindset that discriminates against women is responsible for the problem. Considering sexual censorship and conservative social attitudes emphasizing "woman's purity", the victim dare not draw attention for fear of being branded a woman with "loose morals". Women would rather brush away the problem or leave jobs quietly rather than speak up, even in organizations that have a zero tolerance policy. Says Chandan, "I do not have exact statistics but from my experience as an advocate one in 1,500 cases are reported." The problem cannot be resolved till more women speak up but the social set-up browbeats women into silence. The social stigma against the victim and the prolonged litigation process for justice thwarts most women from raising their voice. Purports K Chandan "It may take between three and five years to settle a case, and in a situation where the harassment is covert, evidence is hard to gather and there is no guarantee that the ruling would be in favour of the victim. In one of the rare cases I handled a Country Manager was accused and the plaintiff opted for an out of court settlement."

Effects on the working class

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Women in lower wage jobs are more likely to be subject to wage discrimination. They are more likely to bring home far less than their male counterparts with equal job status, and get far less help with housework from their husbands than the high-earning women. Women with low educational attainment entering the workforce in mass quantity lowered earnings for some men, as the women brought about a lot more job competition. The lowered relative earnings of the men and increase in birth control made marriage prospects harder for lower income women.[101]

For the first time in the history of this country,[which?] there were distinctive socioeconomic stratification among women as there has been among men for centuries. This deepened the inequality between the upper/middle and lower/working classes. Prior to the feminist movement, the socioeconomic status of a family was based almost solely on the husband/father's occupation. Women who were now attaining high status jobs were attractive partners to men with high status jobs, so the high earners married the high earners and the low earners married the low earners. In other words, the rich got richer and the poor stayed the same, and have had increased difficulty competing in the economy.[29]

Impact issues of female participation in the workforce

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A 2008 study published in the British Medical Journal found that women were 46% more likely to call in sick for short time periods than men and a third more likely than men to take short term sick leave. At 60 days or more, men and women were equal in terms of sick leave.[102]

U.S. Department of Labor celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993

The number of women in the workforce has tripled and due to this increase, it has become difficult for both mothers and fathers to be able to take care of their own new born child or a sick family member. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 has allowed for workers to have up to 12 weeks a year to leave work.[103]

Female labor and contraceptive pills

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Women have for a long time been unable to actively participate in the labor force. One main reason is the lack of freedom as to when to have kids. With the advancement of the contraceptive pill in the US and nonstop women activists like Katharine McCormick,[104] women gained access to the pill in the 1960s, and with time wild access has been made available for women in many parts of the world. Now women have the option of more control over when they want to have children and have more power over their life plans. This might seem like women were the most affected by this change. However, the pill also changed the game for men. In his article about the pill, Rob Norton[105] mentioned the impact it had on couples as a whole. We have two effects related to the universality of the pill. The Direct effect is how it affected the educational and career path of most women. For instance, women were able to postpone when they wanted to have kids and focus on their education and career advancement. We also have the indirect effect which shows how it impacted both men and women as to when they wanted to get married or start a family. Both partners now had the ability to focus on theirs careers and personal advancement without being worried of not finding any eligible bachelor later on.

Lack of work-family policies in US workplaces

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Compared to other Western countries, the female labor participation rate in the US has been largely stagnant since the early 2000s, due in part to the lack of work-family policies. For example, the US does not have any paid maternity leave mandates while other countries have made significant progress in this area. Women in the US are more likely to access higher positions in companies than in those other countries because they spend less time on maternity leave, which offers them a competitive advantage. However, the lack of advancement in family-friendly policies greatly harms both parents' mental health and sometimes that of the child(ren), which explains the decrease in female labor participation. Men can also be harmed by lack of family-friendly policies.[106]

In 1990, US women had one of the highest labor force participation rates among Western, economically advanced nations.[107] Changes in work-family policies appear to be a major contributor in these participation rates failing to increase with other Western, economically advanced nations. In 1990, women's labor force participation in the US was 74% compared to the non-US average of 67.1%, ranking the US 6th out of 22. In 2010, women's participation increased slightly to 75.2% in the US, while the non-US average jumped more than 12 percentage points to 79.5%. As a result, US women ranked 17th out of 22 countries only 20 years later. While the US did enact a mandate of up to 12 weeks of unpaid leaves due to the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, parental leave mandates may encourage women to remain out of the labor force longer than before. As a result, such mandates could raise the expected cost of employing women in their childbearing years, potentially lowering their wages and deterring employers from hiring them.[108] Despite intentions of increasing women's labor force participation rates, such mandates created more ambiguous effects on these rates, despite seeing a positive effect from these types of mandates in other countries.[109]

Fertility

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Increased participation of women in the workforce is associated with decreased fertility. A cross-country panel study found this fertility factor effect to be strongest among women aged 20–39, but with a less strong but persistent effect among older women as well.[110] International United Nations data suggests that women who work because of economic necessity have higher fertility than those who work because they want to do so.[111]

The impact of women's employment is more negatively associated with the birth of a second child, as opposed to the first.[112]

However, for countries in the OECD area, increased female labor participation has been associated with an increased fertility.[113]

Causality analyses indicate that fertility rate influences female labor participation and not as much the other way around.[114]

Regarding types of jobs, women who work in nurturing professions such as teaching and health generally have children at an earlier age.[114] Since the 2010s, European demographists have theorized that women often self-select themselves into jobs with a favorable work–family balance in order to combine motherhood and employment.[114]

History

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Early history

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Women have worked at agricultural tasks since ancient times, and continue to do so around the world.[citation needed]

18th century

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Russian noblewoman Yekaterina Vorontsova-Dashkova was the first woman in the world to head a national academy of sciences, the first woman in Europe to hold a government office[115] and the president of the Russian Academy.

19th century

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The Industrial Revolution of the late 18th and early 19th centuries changed the nature of work in Europe and other countries of the Western world. Working for a wage, and eventually a salary, became part of urban life. Initially, women were to be found doing even the hardest physical labor, including working as "hurriers" hauling heavy coal carts through mine shafts in Great Britain, a job that also employed many children. This ended after government intervention and the passing of the Mines and Collieries Act 1842, an early attempt at regulating the workplace.

During the 19th century, an increasing number of women in Western countries took jobs in factories, such as textile mills, or on assembly lines for machinery or other goods. Women also worked as "hawkers" of produce, flowers, and other market goods, and bred small animals in the working-class areas of London. Piecework, which involved needlework (weaving, embroidery, winding wool or silk) that paid by the piece completed, was the most common employment for women in 19th century Great Britain. It was poorly paid, and involved long hours, up to 14 hours per day to earn enough wages to survive.[116] Working-class women were usually involved in some form of paid employment, as it provided some insurance against the possibility that their husband might become too ill or injured to support the family. During the era before workers' compensation for disability or illness, the loss of a husband's wages could result in the entire family being sent to a Victorian workhouse to pay debts.

Inequality in wages was to be expected for women. In 1906, the government found that the average weekly factory wage for a woman ranged from 11s 3d to 18s 8d, whereas a man's average weekly wage was around 25s 9d. Employers stated they preferred to hire women, because they could be "more easily induced to undergo severe bodily fatigue than men".[117] Childminding was another necessary expense for many women working in factories. Pregnant women worked up until the day they gave birth and returned to work as soon as they were physically able. In 1891, a law was passed requiring women to take four weeks away from factory work after giving birth, but many women could not afford this unpaid leave, and the law was unenforceable.[118]

The 1870 US census was the first United States census to count "females engaged in each occupation" and provides an intriguing snapshot of women's history. It reveals that, contrary to popular belief, not all American women of the 19th century were either idle in their middle-class homes or working in sweatshops. Women were 15% of the total work force (1.8 million out of 12.5). They made up one-third of factory "operatives", but teaching and the occupations of dressmaking, millinery, and tailoring played a larger role. Two-thirds of teachers were women. Women could also be found in such unexpected places as iron and steel works (495), mines (46), sawmills (35), oil wells and refineries (40), gas works (4), and charcoal kilns (5) and held such surprising jobs as ship rigger (16), teamster (196), turpentine laborer (185), brass founder/worker (102), shingle and lathe maker (84), stock-herder (45), gun and locksmith (33), and hunter and trapper (2). Formal classification may grossly under-estimate female labor force participation via self-employment or family employment with studies suggesting participation may have always been high.[119]

Some women began entering the workforce in the 19th century through textile factories,[120] the industrial and garment assembly jobs done during this time "[provided a] point for participation by rural women in the formal economy".[121] Several of the tasks performed by women in the textile factories were decided due to cultural attitudes of women's capabilities. Sex-typing, is the stereotypical categorization of people according to traditional notions of gender roles and expectations. This segregation of tasks was demonstrated in textile factories, "women [were] considered to possess sex-specific skills that determine their abilities; they are apparently dexterous, decorative, and meticulous".[122] Women were assumed to have physical skills that made them naturally suitable to complete certain tasks, "employers hired women as mill operatives, they said, because their small, graceful fingers could piece the threads together easily".[120] In addition to physical differences, women were assumed to have a specific emotional temperament that made them innate for working in textile mills, "the female temperament-passive, patient and careful was thought to be perfectly suited to boring, repetitive work".[120]

20th century

[edit]
Rosie the Riveter is an iconic propaganda image of the US government's efforts to exhort women to work during World War II. It has been adapted numerous times to represent working women or, more broadly, women overcoming adversity and other proto-feminist messages.

In the beginning of the 20th century, women were regarded as society's guardians of morality; they were seen as possessing a finer nature than men and were expected to act as such.[123] Their role was not defined as workers or money makers. Women were expected to hold on to their innocence until the right man came along so that they can start a family and inculcate that morality they were in charge of preserving. The role of men was to support the family financially.[124] Yet at the turn of the 20th century, social attitudes towards educating young women were changing. Women in North America and Western Europe were now becoming more and more educated, in no small part because of the efforts of pioneering women to further their own education, defying opposition by male educators. By 1900, four out of five colleges accepted women and a whole coed concept was becoming more and more accepted.[125]

Operating a turning machine in Royal Shell Factory 3 in the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, London, in May 1918.

In the United States, World War I made space for women in the workforce, among other economical and social influences. Due to the rise in demand for production from Europe during the raging war, more women found themselves working outside the home.

In the first quarter of the century, women mostly occupied jobs in factory work or as domestic servants, but as the war came to an end they were able to move on to such jobs as: salespeople in department stores as well as clerical, secretarial and other, what were called, "lace-collar" jobs.[126] In July 1920, The New York Times ran a head line that read: "the American Woman ... has lifted her skirts far beyond any modest limitation"[123] which could apply to more than just fashion; women were now rolling up their sleeves and skirts and making their way into the workforce.

World War II created millions of jobs for women. Thousands of American women actually joined the military: 140,000 in the Women's Army Corps (United States Army) WAC; 100,000 in the Navy (WAVE); 23,000 in the Marines; 14,000 in the Navy Nurse Corps and, 13,000 in the Coast Guard. Although almost none saw combat, they replaced men in noncombat positions and got the same pay as the men would have on the same job. At the same time over 16 million men left their jobs to join the war in Europe and elsewhere, opening even more opportunities and places for women to take over in the job force.[126] Although two million women lost their jobs after the war ended, female participation in the workforce was still higher than it had ever been.[127] In post-war America, women were expected to return to private life as homemakers and child-rearers. Newspapers and magazines directed at women encouraged them to keep a tidy home while their husbands were away at work. These articles presented the home as a woman's proper domain, which she was expected to run.[128][129] Nevertheless, jobs were still available to women. However, they were mostly what are known as "pink-collar" jobs such as retail clerks and secretaries.[130] The propaganda to encourage women to return to the home is depicted in the film The Life and Times of Rosie the Riveter.

The Quiet Revolution

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Customer account operators working for a photography firm in Seattle, 1945
A diner waitress at Pike Place Market in Seattle, United States, 1981

The increase of women in the labor force of Western countries gained momentum in the late 19th century. At this point women married early on and were defined by their marriages. If they entered the workforce, it was only out of necessity.

The first phase of this "revolution" encompasses the time between the late 19th century to the 1930s. This era gave birth to the "independent female worker." From 1890 to 1930, women in the workforce were typically young and unmarried. They had little or no learning on the job and typically held clerical and teaching positions. Many women also worked in textile manufacturing or as domestics. Women promptly exited the work force when they were married, unless the family needed two incomes.

The second phase began towards the end of the 1920s, when married women begin to exit the work force less and less. Labor force productivity for married women 35–44 years of age increase by 15.5 percentage points from 10% to 25%. There was a greater demand for clerical positions and as the number of women graduating high school increased they began to hold more "respectable", steady jobs. This phase has been labeled as the "Transition Era," referring to the time period between 1930 and 1950. During this time the discriminatory institution of marriage bars, which forced women out of the work force after marriage, were eliminated, allowing more participation in the work force of single and married women. Additionally, women's labor force participation increased because there was an increase in demand for office workers, and women participated in the high school movement. However, women's work was still contingent upon their husband's income. Women did not normally work to fulfill a personal need to define their career and social worth; they worked out of necessity.

In the third phase, labeled the "Roots of the Revolution" - encompassing the time from 1950 to the mid-to-late 1970s - the movement began to approach the warning signs of a revolution. Women's expectations of future employment changed. Women began to see themselves going on to college and working during their marriages and even attending graduate school. However, many still had brief and intermittent work force participation, without necessarily having expectations for a "career." To illustrate, most women were secondary earners, and worked in "pink-collar jobs" as secretaries, teachers, nurses, and librarians. The sexual harassment experienced by these pink collar workers is depicted in the film 9 to 5. Although more women attended college, it was often expected that they attended to find a spouse—the so-called "M.R.S. degree". Nevertheless, labor force participation by women still grew significantly.

The fourth phase, known as the "Quiet Revolution", began in the late 1970s and continues today. Beginning in the 1970s women began to flood colleges and graduate schools. They began to enter professions like medicine, law, dental and business. More women were going to college and expected to be employed at the age of 35, as opposed to past generations that only worked intermittently due to marriage and childbirth. They were able to define themselves prior to a serious relationship. Research indicates that from 1965 to 2002, the increase in women's labor force participation more than offset the decline for men.[131]

The reasons for this big jump in the 1970s has been attributed by some scholars to widespread access to the birth control pill.[132] While "the pill" was medically available in the 1960s, numerous laws restricted access to it. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (overturning a Connecticut statute barring access to contraceptives) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (establishing the right of unmarried people to access contraception). By the 1970s, the age of majority had been lowered from 21 to 18 in the United States, largely as a consequence of the Vietnam War; this also affected women's right to effect their own medical decisions. Since it had now become socially acceptable to postpone pregnancy even while married, women had the luxury of thinking about other things, like education and work. Also, due to electrification, women's work around the house became easier leaving them with more time to be able to dedicate to school or work. Due to the multiplier effect, even if some women were not blessed with access to the pill or electrification, many followed by the example of the other women entering the work force for those reasons. The Quiet Revolution is called such because it was not a "big bang" revolution; rather, it happened and is continuing to happen gradually.[133]

21st century

[edit]

By the early 21st century, women were more likely than men to experience job burnout. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic that began in early 2020 had a major impact on the work environment. The hardest-hit industries were those employing many women, who not only had to work from home but also had to deal with additional caregiving responsibilities due to school closures and other disruptions.[134] The Great Resignation of 2021 was the result of many factors, including wage stagnation amid rising cost of living, limited opportunities for career advancement, hostile work environments, lack of benefits, inflexible remote-work policies, and long-lasting job dissatisfaction.[135]

As difficult as it was for many women (as well as men), the changes in the work environment due to the pandemic may have lasting benefits: more flexibility in work locations and hours, changes in company culture to adapt to women's needs, more movement of women into positions of leadership, and more sharing of household responsibilities with spouses and other partners.[134]

Occupational safety and health

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Women tend to have different occupational hazards and health issues than men in the workplace. Women get carpal tunnel syndrome, tendonitis, anxiety disorders, stress, respiratory diseases, and infectious diseases due to their work at higher rates than men. The reasons for these differences may be differences in biology or in the work that women are performing. Women's higher rates of job-related stress may be due to the fact that women are often caregivers at home and do contingent work and contract work at a much higher rate than men. Another significant occupational hazard for women is homicide, which was the second most frequent cause of death on the job for women in 2011, making up 26% of workplace deaths in women.[136][137] Immigrant women are at higher risk for occupational injury than native-born women in the United States, due to higher rates of employment in dangerous industries.[137]

Women are at lower risk for work-related death than men. However, personal protective equipment is usually designed for typical male proportions, which can create hazards for women who have ill-fitting equipment.[136] Women are less likely to report an occupational injury than men.[137]

Time poverty heightens the risk for depression, inflated BMI, and cardiovascular disease in women.[138]

Research is ongoing into occupational hazards that may be specific to women. Of particular interest are potential environmental causes of breast cancer and cervical cancer.[136] Sexual harassment is an occupational hazard for many women, and can cause serious negative symptoms including anxiety, depression, nausea, headache, insomnia, and feelings of low self-esteem and alienation. Women are also at higher risk for occupational stress, which can be caused by balancing roles as a parent or caregiver with work.[138]

See also

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Women's participation in different occupations

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A news anchor going live on TV in Poland

Below is a selection of encyclopedia articles that detail women's historical involvement in various occupations.

Sources

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References

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Bibliography

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Women in the workforce encompasses the participation of females in paid and market-based economic production, distinct from historical domestic and subsistence roles centered on childrearing and household maintenance. This involvement has expanded markedly since the mid-20th century in developed economies, propelled by industrialization, contraceptive innovations reducing burdens, and legal reforms dismantling overt barriers, with the U.S. female labor force participation rate rising from roughly 34 percent in 1950 to about 57 percent by the before stabilizing amid evolving family priorities. Globally, similar patterns hold, though rates vary widely by region due to cultural norms and development levels, averaging lower in low-income countries where informal and agricultural work predominates. Notable achievements include women's overrepresentation in expanding service sectors like healthcare and , alongside gains in higher education attainment surpassing men in many nations, enabling entry into professional roles previously male-exclusive. However, persists, with women clustering in lower-risk, flexible positions emphasizing interpersonal skills—aligning with of sex differences in vocational interests rooted in evolutionary adaptations—while men predominate in hazardous, high-remuneration fields such as and . Average hours worked also diverge, as women more frequently reduce labor supply for family responsibilities, contributing to flatter trajectories. Central controversies revolve around earnings disparities, where raw gender pay gaps of 15-25 percent in advanced economies shrink to near parity when adjusting for occupation, experience, and effort choices, underscoring the primacy of voluntary trade-offs over systemic . Policies addressing these gaps, such as mandated leave or quotas, yield mixed outcomes, often prioritizing equity metrics over productivity and facing critique for overlooking causal factors like intra-household specialization. Underrepresentation in executive suites and STEM persists despite affirmative efforts, highlighting tensions between meritocratic principles and interventionist approaches.

Biological and Evolutionary Foundations

Sex Differences in Interests and Preferences

Sex differences in vocational interests are large and consistent, with men exhibiting stronger preferences for working with things (e.g., , ) and women for working with (e.g., healthcare, ), yielding an effect size of d = 0.93 on the things-people dimension. These patterns hold across diverse interest inventories and are evident in specific Holland RIASEC categories, where men show higher realistic (d = 0.84) and investigative interests, while women show higher social (d = 0.68) and artistic interests. Meta-analyses confirm the stability of these differences over decades and across cultures, suggesting biological underpinnings rather than solely , as variances do not diminish in gender-egalitarian societies. Personality traits further differentiate occupational inclinations, with women scoring higher on average in agreeableness (facilitating people-oriented roles) and neuroticism, while men score higher in systemizing tendencies and risk-taking, aligning with thing-oriented and high-stakes fields. Heritability estimates for vocational interests range from 36% to 50%, derived from twin studies comparing monozygotic and dizygotic pairs reared together, indicating substantial genetic influence independent of shared environment. Prenatal testosterone exposure, proxied by digit ratios (2D:4D), correlates with stronger thing-oriented interests in both sexes, supporting a hormonal basis for these preferences that manifests in psychological orientation toward objects versus people. Longitudinal data reveal that sex-differentiated interests emerge by early (around ages 10-12), diverging sharply before converging slightly in adulthood, and independently predict career choices beyond parental or societal encouragement. Twin and adoption studies reinforce that these early patterns persist, with genetic factors accounting for continuity in interests from childhood to occupational outcomes.

Evolutionary Explanations for Labor Patterns

Evolutionary psychologists invoke theory, originally formulated by in 1972, to explain sex differences in labor patterns as adaptations to ancestral reproductive costs. Women face higher obligatory investments through , , and initial childcare, which selected for greater and prioritization of kin proximity and social bonds over high-variance pursuits. Men, with lower minimal parental costs but advantages in upper-body strength and spatial abilities, evolved tendencies toward provisioning via or resource acquisition, favoring tolerance for physical danger and separation from dependents. These dynamics manifest in contemporary preferences: women disproportionately select people-oriented occupations involving and interpersonal care, while men gravitate toward thing-oriented roles emphasizing systems, , or . Ancestral selection pressures reinforced this division, as evidenced by patterns in hunter-gatherer societies, where men typically engaged in mobile, high-risk requiring endurance and spatial navigation, while women focused on gathering and childcare in familiar territories to minimize threats to offspring survival. These roles, shaped over millennia, align with cognitive and temperamental dimorphisms—such as men's higher competitiveness and risk-seeking—that persist into industrialized economies, sustaining even amid legal equality and interventions. Empirical data from cross-national studies indicate that such preferences do not erode with socioeconomic development; instead, sex differences in vocational interests often amplify in more gender-egalitarian nations, suggesting innate drivers over purely cultural imposition. Socialization or blank-slate models, which attribute labor patterns chiefly to environmental conditioning, falter against evidence of cross-cultural universality in sex-dimorphic interests and behaviors, including analogs in nonhuman lacking human-like cultural transmission. Primate studies reveal consistent male biases toward object manipulation and territorial risk-taking, and female emphases on and infant care, mirroring human patterns without artifacts. These findings undermine purely constructivist accounts, as interventions aimed at overriding preferences yield limited convergence, whereas evolutionary frameworks account for both the robustness and variability in dimorphisms across contexts.

Historical Development

Pre-Industrial and Agricultural Societies

In societies, such as the Hadza of and the !Kung San of , women predominantly foraged for plant foods like tubers, berries, and nuts near camp sites, activities that allowed simultaneous child supervision and yielded reliable caloric returns. Among the !Kung, women's gathering provided the majority of dietary calories, with one woman-hour of effort producing approximately 2,000 calories compared to 800 calories per man-hour of , emphasizing the efficiency of sex-based specialization in subsistence tasks. Men's roles centered on large game and collecting , pursuits involving higher risk, variability in success, and greater distances from camp, which were less compatible with childcare demands. This division minimized role overlap, optimized group survival through complementary strengths—such as women's consistent provisioning during lean periods—and involved no formal wage labor or market exchange. Ethnographic evidence from these groups confirms high female input into subsistence, often accounting for 60-80% of calories via in contexts like the !Kung during seasonal scarcities, where women and children supplied up to 85% of intake through roots and plants. While recent analyses note occasional female participation in across 79% of studied foraging societies, the predominant pattern remained gathering for women, aligned with physiological factors like and that favored proximate, lower-risk activities. Such arrangements fostered interdependence, with food sharing across sexes and ages sustaining the group, distinct from competitive wage-based "" participation observed in later economies. In pre-industrial agricultural societies, women's labor shifted toward intensive , seed processing, and domestic production like and , typically performed near the homestead to integrate childcare, while men handled capital-intensive tasks such as plowing fields, clearing forests, and herding . This complementarity persisted from early transitions, where female roles in complemented male land preparation, but female field involvement declined with agricultural intensification and technologies like the , which favored male strength and reduced women's proportional subsistence contribution. Labor remained overwhelmingly subsistence-oriented, with families producing for self-sufficiency rather than market wages, and minimal overlap in tasks until altered dynamics. In both and agrarian contexts, these patterns prioritized through differences in mobility, , and reproductive burdens, yielding balanced household outputs without formalized .

Industrial Revolution and Early Modern Era

The , beginning in Britain around the and spreading to the by the early , mechanized production and spurred , displacing many rural women from agricultural tasks like spinning and that had supplemented family income under proto-industrial systems. Enclosures of common lands from the late onward consolidated farms, reducing opportunities for female field labor and compelling working-class families to migrate to cities for work to avoid destitution. In textiles—the dominant early industry—women filled low-skill roles such as spinning and , comprising approximately 50-60% of factory operatives in British mills by the , often alongside children, as and widowhood necessitated their earnings for survival rather than voluntary entry into wage labor. Similarly, in U.S. mills, women constituted the majority of the workforce in the 1820s-1840s, with nearly 30,000 employed in , by 1843, drawn from rural farms amid economic pressures. Child labor was pervasive, with children under 10 routinely working 12-16 hour shifts in hazardous conditions until reforms curbed it; the UK's 1833 Factory Act banned employment of children under 9 in mills, mandated 2 hours of daily for those aged 9-13, and limited their hours to 9 per day, primarily targeting apprentices' exploitation but extending oversight via factory inspectors. Subsequent acts addressed women alongside children, reflecting recognition of sex-based physical differences: the 1844 Factory Act capped women's hours at 12 daily (matching young persons), citing their lesser endurance compared to men in heavy sectors like , where females were eventually barred underground by 1842 due to moral and bodily risks. The 1847 Ten Hours Act further restricted women and youths aged 13-18 to 10 hours, justified by parliamentary inquiries into fatigue and health vulnerabilities disproportionate to men's capacity for prolonged exertion in mechanized environments. Class distinctions sharply delineated participation: upper- and middle-class women in 19th-century and America were culturally and socially barred from paid , confined to domestic spheres as a marker of respectability, with of fields like excluding them from prior informal roles. Working-class women, however, remained tethered to economies, contributing wages amid urban squalor and the double burden of factory shifts plus unpaid home labor, as eroded cottage industries without alleviating subsistence pressures. These patterns underscore entry driven by structural displacement and necessity, not ideological shifts toward autonomy.

20th Century Mobilization and Expansion

During , labor shortages prompted significant mobilization of women into the workforce, particularly in Britain, where female employment rates rose from 23.6% of the working-age population in 1914 to between 37.7% and 46.7% by 1918, filling roles in munitions factories and vacated by men at . Similar patterns emerged across , with women undertaking industrial and transport jobs, though these gains were driven by wartime necessity rather than enduring shifts in preferences. In the United States, female labor force participation rates (LFPR) for women aged 16 and over were around 20% in 1900, rising gradually to approximately 25% by 1910 and 1930 (with 23% in 1920), reaching ~26% by 1940 based on decennial census data. World War II accelerated this trend, increasing from ~26% in 1940 to over 34% by 1945, exemplified by the "Rosie the Riveter" campaign that recruited women into defense industries amid acute male shortages. In Britain, over 7 million women engaged in war work by 1944, comprising a third of the civilian workforce and including previously male-dominated sectors like engineering. However, these expansions proved temporary; U.S. participation dropped sharply post-1945 as returning veterans displaced women, with records showing abrupt declines in female job placements coinciding with male reentry into the labor market. This retreat underscored the cyclical nature of surges tied to exogenous shocks like war, rather than irreversible progress toward higher baseline involvement. The post-war era in the reinforced domestic priorities amid the , with U.S. fertility rates peaking at 3.77 births per woman in 1957, correlating with relatively subdued female labor force participation—around 34% overall in 1950, with married women and mothers showing lower rates due to emphasis on . Cultural and encouraged withdrawal from paid work, as household technologies and rising male wages supported single-income families, contrasting wartime exigencies. From the 1960s to 1980s, , alongside technological and legal changes, facilitated more sustained entry, with U.S. female LFPR rising to ~38% in 1960, 43% in 1970, and 51% in 1980. The introduction of the birth control pill in enabled better fertility control, contributing to accelerated labor force participation among younger women post-1970 by decoupling childbearing from career timelines. Title VII of the , enforced by the EEOC, prohibited sex-based , opening professional opportunities previously barred by overt bias. Yet, data indicate these shifts reflected voluntary choices amid expanding options—women disproportionately entering service and clerical fields aligning with preferences—rather than coercive mandates, with overall participation rising steadily from 37.8% in through the 1980s but without erasing the pattern of war-induced spikes followed by normalization.

Late 20th to Early 21st Century Shifts

In the United States, female labor force participation rates (LFPR) rose substantially from 43.3 percent in 1970 to a peak of 60.0 percent in 1999, reaching ~60% in 2000 before a slight decline to ~58% in 2010 and ~57% in 2020, marking what economist Claudia Goldin termed the "Quiet Revolution" in women's employment, education, and family dynamics. This surge coincided with women surpassing men in college enrollment and graduation rates; by 1982, women earned 53 percent of bachelor's degrees, increasing to approximately 57 percent by the early 2000s and stabilizing around 59 percent in subsequent years. The shift reflected greater investments in women's human capital, facilitated by technological changes like the birth control pill and expanding professional opportunities, though it did not eliminate occupational choices favoring flexibility for family responsibilities. Globally, economic development often followed a U-shaped pattern in female LFPR, with initial declines in low-income agrarian societies as women withdrew from subsistence labor amid rising incomes and social norms emphasizing domestic roles, followed by increases in higher-income stages due to , , and service-sector growth. This trajectory, observed in historical U.S. data from the late and cross-country comparisons in the late , challenged assumptions of monotonic convergence toward male participation levels, as middle-income transitions frequently saw temporary drops before rebounds. In developing regions like parts of and during the 1980s–2000s, female LFPR climbed alongside industrialization, yet persistent cultural and institutional barriers, including limited childcare and norms prioritizing family, moderated the pace. By the early 2000s, female LFPR in advanced economies began stagnating or reversing, with U.S. prime-age (25–54) rates for women falling from 77.0 percent in 2000 to 74.0 percent by 2016, a trend echoed in several countries. This slowdown, amid rising female education levels, highlighted the influence of family-related costs—such as childcare expenses and career-family trade-offs—over purely structural factors, questioning narratives of inevitable full convergence with male patterns. Data from the period underscored that while policy interventions like could support participation, underlying preferences for work-life balance often led to plateaus rather than uniform advances.

Global Participation Patterns

Current Rates by Region and Economy

The global female labor force participation rate (LFPR), defined as the share of women aged 15 and older who are employed or seeking work, was 48.7% in 2023 according to (ILO) estimates. This figure reflects modeled data accounting for both formal and informal employment across economies. Regional disparities remain stark, with exhibiting rates above 70%; for instance, recorded 70.3% in 2024, while similar highs prevail in and due to robust welfare systems and cultural norms supporting employment. In contrast, (MENA) countries average around 19%, the lowest globally, as reported by the World Bank for recent years, influenced by legal, cultural, and institutional barriers.
Region/Economy GroupFemale LFPR (Recent Estimate)Source Year
Global48.7%2023
Nordic (e.g., )70.3%2024
MENA19%2022-2023
~65% (high informal)2023
& Pacific~60% (mixed formal/informal)2023
In the United States, the overall female LFPR for women aged 16 and older hovered around 57% as of mid-2025, per (BLS) data, while the prime-age (25-54) rate reached 77.7% in August 2025, reflecting recovery to near-record levels post-pandemic. Participation varies by : led at 61.0% in early 2025, followed by women at 58.7%, with Asian and women trailing slightly lower overall but showing strong prime-age engagement, particularly among Asian women exceeding 60% post-2020 recovery. Higher education levels correlate with elevated participation rates, often surpassing 70% in advanced economies where tertiary-educated women outpace those with by 10-20 percentage points, as evidenced in cross-national analyses. In developing regions like and parts of , rates are mixed and elevated by informal sectors; for example, averages around 65% with over 90% of female employment informal, while lags below 30% despite informal contributions. These snapshots highlight persistent gaps, with formal sector data undercounting informal work prevalent in lower-income economies. The female labor force participation rate exhibits a U-shaped pattern across stages of , declining initially before rising as increases. In low-income agrarian economies, women often engage substantially in and home production, contributing to high measured participation rates. As economies industrialize and shift toward urban manufacturing, this home-based work diminishes—replaced by purchased market goods and services—leading to a withdrawal of women from the formal labor market due to specialization in roles and an income effect where rising male wages reduce the need for dual incomes. This pattern, first hypothesized by Esther Boserup and empirically analyzed by , is observed both historically in developed nations like the during the late 19th and early 20th centuries and cross-sectionally across contemporary countries. The subsequent upward leg of the U occurs with further development, as fertility rates decline—freeing time from childrearing—education levels for women rise, and service-sector jobs expand, offering flexible, white-collar opportunities compatible with family responsibilities. Economic theory posits a substitution effect where market wages increasingly compete with the opportunity cost of home production, drawing women back into paid work. Empirical cross-country data from approximately 100 nations confirm this non-linear relationship, with participation lowest at middle-income levels (around $1,500–$3,000 GDP per capita in 1990 dollars) before rebounding in high-income economies. For instance, in South Korea, female labor force participation rose from 42.5% in 1980 to approximately 56% by 2020, coinciding with rapid industrialization, fertility drops from 2.8 to below 1 child per woman, and growth in education and services. While the U-shape holds robustly in , variations arise from policy and institutional factors; in welfare states with extensive childcare subsidies and family leave, the curve may flatten or shift upward at higher income levels by mitigating barriers to re-entry, though evidence suggests these interventions amplify rather than negate the underlying trend driven by structural changes. Cross-country heterogeneity, including cultural norms restricting female work, can delay the ascent, as seen in some Middle Eastern and South Asian economies where participation remains suppressed even at elevated development levels. Overall, the pattern underscores causal mechanisms rooted in technological substitution for household tasks and demographic transitions over exogenous or .

Recent Declines in Maternal Participation

In the United States, labor force participation rates among mothers of young children have reversed post-pandemic gains, with over 212,000 women aged 20 and older exiting the workforce between and August 2025, a trend disproportionately affecting those with caregiving responsibilities. For mothers with children under 5, participation reached a peak of 71.2% in summer 2023 before declining sharply, marking the largest six-month drop in 40 years during the first half of 2025 amid rising childcare costs and return-to-office mandates. This contrasts with broader prime-age female participation (ages 25-54), which rose from 74.7% in 2021 to approximately 78% by early 2025, highlighting a persistent motherhood penalty where demands exert a stronger pull than overall economic structural improvements. Empirical evidence attributes these exits primarily to biological and familial imperatives, including the high opportunity costs of childcare—which can consume up to 20-30% of household income for lower-earning families—and the insufficiency of flexible arrangements to fully offset maternal time investments in child-rearing. While facilitated re-entry and narrowed employment gaps between 2021 and 2024—boosting maternal rates by about 1.5% for every 10% increase in work-from-home prevalence—its benefits have waned with employer shifts back to in-office requirements, failing to accommodate the uneven division of childcare labor that falls predominantly on mothers. Similar patterns echo globally, particularly in and , where post-pandemic maternal has stagnated or declined despite prior advances, driven by escalating childcare expenses and cultural expectations prioritizing maternal involvement in early . In regions like the , motherhood reduces female labor force attachment by 20-40 percentage points compared to childless peers, a gap exacerbated by insufficient subsidies and the biological realities of and that structural policies alone cannot erase. These reversals underscore that while aggregate female participation has benefited from technological and policy enablers, the specific burdens of motherhood—rooted in causal factors like child dependency and parental specialization—continue to drive selective withdrawals from paid work.

Occupational Segregation and Distribution

Sectoral and Professional Breakdowns

Globally, women constitute approximately 67% of the health and care workforce, reflecting significant overrepresentation in caregiving and social service roles. In , women similarly dominate, comprising over 70% of teachers in many countries, particularly at primary and secondary levels. Conversely, women hold fewer than 25% of positions in STEM fields worldwide, with only 22% of STEM jobs in countries occupied by women as of 2024. In and sectors, female representation remains around 25-30%, with women accounting for just 26% of the STEM workforce in recent estimates. In the United States, as of 2024, women represent about 11% of the workforce, underscoring underrepresentation in manual and trade occupations. data indicate women comprise roughly 48% of entry-level white-collar positions but skew toward service-oriented roles, with over 75% in and services combined.
SectorGlobal Female Share (Approximate, Recent Data)Key Notes
67%Dominant in and caregiving roles.
70%+ (primary/secondary)Higher in lower levels, lower in higher education administration.
STEM/Technology22-31%Varies by subfield; lowest in and ICT.
~25%Concentrated in assembly; under 20% in advanced tech manufacturing.
<15% (global avg.); 11% Primarily administrative; minimal in trades.
In developing countries, women predominate in the , where they account for 60% or more of agricultural , often in subsistence farming lacking formal protections. In and , over 70-80% of non-agricultural female jobs are informal, compared to lower rates for men. Post-2020, the rise of gig and has increased female participation in flexible platforms, with women comprising 42% of online gig workers globally, exceeding their general labor in some regions due to home-based opportunities. However, these roles exhibit volatility, with inconsistent hours and limited benefits.

Measures of Dissimilarity and Clustering

The , also known as the , measures the extent of by calculating the proportion of workers (women or men) who would need to switch occupations to achieve proportional across all fields; values range from 0 (complete integration) to 1 (complete segregation). , the index declined from 0.667 in 1970 to 0.505 in 2000, but subsequent progress slowed markedly, with only a 1.1 drop between 2000 and 2009, stabilizing near 0.5 thereafter. This level indicates that approximately half of the would require reallocation to eliminate disparities, a pattern that has endured despite expanded and antidiscrimination laws since the 1970s. Globally, gender occupational segregation indices hover in the 0.4 to 0.6 range across diverse economies, with persistence evident even as female labor force participation rises; for instance, urban recorded a Duncan index of 0.417 in 2019-2020, while broader cross-country analyses show no automatic decline tied to income growth or development. data on occupational distributions from 2000 to 2024 confirm minimal convergence, with women's shares in major categories—such as 75-80% in healthcare support and under 20% in —exhibiting stability rather than narrowing overlaps. Occupational clustering exacerbates measured dissimilarity, as women disproportionately concentrate in roles affording temporal flexibility and reduced exposure to physical hazards or irregular hours, including (75% female) and administrative support (70-75% female), while men predominate in high-variance domains like (85% male) and protective services (80% male) that often entail greater risk premiums or demanding schedules. This sorting aligns with compensating differentials, where flexibility trades against earnings potential, contributing to sustained segregation metrics without implying uniform coercion across genders. Longitudinal tabulations through 2024 underscore the inertia, with gender shares in these clusters shifting by less than 5 percentage points over two decades.

Role of Innate Preferences Over Coercion

Empirical studies consistently demonstrate robust sex differences in vocational interests, with women exhibiting stronger preferences for occupations involving social interactions and people-oriented tasks, while men favor those centered on systems, objects, and things. A meta-analysis of over 500,000 participants across multiple interest inventories found large effect sizes (Cohen's d = 0.84 for realistic interests in mechanical activities; d = 0.68 for social interests in helping professions), indicating that these preferences account for substantial variance—up to 50%—in career choices and occupational segregation. Surveys of adolescents in 80 countries reveal that approximately 47% of girls aspire to people-oriented careers (e.g., nursing, teaching), compared to 15% of boys, with these ratios holding even after controlling for socioeconomic factors. Such patterns suggest that free choice, rather than external coercion, drives clustering in fields like healthcare and education for women, and engineering or technical roles for men. Cross-national data further indicate that occupational segregation intensifies in societies with higher and , challenging attributions to patriarchal constraints. In nations ranking highest on indices (e.g., ), the proportion of women in STEM fields is lower than in less egalitarian regions like or , with gaps in vocational interests mirroring these outcomes. This "" implies that reduced barriers allow innate preferences to manifest more fully, as evidenced by larger differences in aspirations and actual enrollment in egalitarian contexts. Longitudinal tracking confirms that interests measured in predict adult occupations with high fidelity, independent of societal pressures. Biological mechanisms, including prenatal exposure, underpin these stable preferences, supporting their innateness over malleability through or policy. Higher prenatal levels correlate with greater interest in things-oriented activities and reduced people-orientation in women with , effects persisting into career-relevant domains. Evolutionary frameworks posit these differences as adaptive outcomes of ancestral divisions in , risk-taking, and caregiving, with sex-specific interests emerging early and resisting interventions. Personality traits mediated by s, such as women's higher and , further channel preferences toward relational roles. Efforts to override these preferences via targeted interventions, such as STEM outreach programs funded by U.S. grants exceeding $1 billion since 2000, have yielded minimal long-term increases in women's participation, with enrollment gaps persisting or widening at key transitions. Meta-analyses of such initiatives show short-term boosts in interest but no sustained shifts in major or career choices, as preferences prove resistant to modification. This evidence aligns with the view that voluntary, interest-driven selections, not systemic coercion, primarily explain occupational distributions.

Wage and Earnings Disparities

Raw Gaps and Common Misconceptions

The raw gender wage gap refers to the unadjusted difference in median earnings between men and women, typically calculated without accounting for factors such as occupation, hours worked, , or education. In the United States, for 2024, women earned 85 cents for every dollar earned by men based on median hourly earnings of full- and part-time workers. Alternative measures using full-time, year-round workers show a of 80.9 percent for median annual earnings in 2024. Globally, the unadjusted gap is larger, with women earning approximately 73 cents per dollar earned by men on average, though this varies significantly by region and development level. In developing economies, raw gaps often exceed 30 percent, reflecting lower female labor force participation and informal . A common misconception is that the raw gap directly indicates widespread pay discrimination for equal work, assuming men and women make identical career and life choices. In reality, aggregates suffer from , as they compare dissimilar groups: women tend to work fewer hours (about 10 percent less on average in full-time roles), select occupations with lower average pay, accumulate less continuous experience due to family-related breaks, and prioritize flexibility over maximum . The motherhood penalty exemplifies this, with empirical studies estimating a reduction of 2.5 to 7 percent per child due to time away from work and shifts to part-time or less demanding roles. This oversight ignores risk and payoff differences in choices: men disproportionately enter high-hazard occupations, accounting for over 90 percent of U.S. fatalities (91.5 percent in 2023, with women comprising only 8.5 percent of the 5,283 total deaths). Such selections reflect rational trade-offs, including men's greater willingness to accept danger for higher compensation, which the raw metric conflates with rather than voluntary differences in preferences and responsibilities.

Adjusted Analyses and Causal Factors

When econometric models control for observable factors including , work experience, occupation, hours worked per week, and tenure, the gender wage gap diminishes substantially, often by 80% or more, leaving an unexplained residual typically ranging from 5% to 10%. This residual is frequently attributed to unobservables such as differences in aggressiveness, tolerance in choices, or subtle variations not captured in standard datasets, rather than systemic after observables are accounted for. data from 2023, adjusted for hours and sectoral distribution, similarly show that much of the raw gap—around 18% on an hourly basis—evaporates once these controls are applied, underscoring the role of labor supply decisions over inherent pay inequities. A primary causal factor in the adjusted gap is women's systematic preference for schedule flexibility over maximizing earnings, driven by family obligations and differing valuations of work-life trade-offs. Economist Claudia Goldin's analysis of professional labor markets reveals that occupations demanding unpredictable long hours or constant availability impose a "flexibility penalty," which women disproportionately incur due to primary caregiving roles, flattening their lifetime earnings arcs relative to men's more continuous trajectories. This choice-based dynamic explains why gaps persist even among highly educated cohorts: women trade higher pay for reduced hours or remote options, with empirical decompositions attributing over half of the remaining disparity to such voluntary adjustments rather than external constraints. Longitudinal studies of earnings trajectories confirm that gaps accelerate post-childbearing, as women experience intermittent workforce exits or hour reductions that compound over careers. Using panel data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, research on within-couple dynamics shows pre-parenthood pay parity often erodes sharply after the first child, with women's wages diverging by 15-20% within five years due to cumulative experience gaps from part-time shifts or maternity interruptions, while men's paths remain stable. These patterns hold across cohorts born since 1960, with the "motherhood wage penalty" estimated at 4-7% per child after controlling for prior observables, reflecting causal interruptions in human capital accumulation rather than pre-existing differences.

Empirical Evidence on Discrimination's Scope

Audit studies, including resume correspondence experiments, provide on hiring by comparing callback rates for identical resumes differing only in applicant signals, such as names. A meta-reanalysis of 28 such experiments found that callback disadvantages for women are concentrated in male-dominated occupations, where women receive approximately 10-20% fewer callbacks, while no disadvantage—and sometimes advantages—appear in female-dominated fields; this pattern aligns with occupational composition rather than uniform bias. Overall, these effects are small in magnitude, with meta-analyses of U.S. studies across diverse sectors showing no statistically significant aggregate at the study level, though subgroup analyses reveal modest biases in specific contexts like high-status male-typed roles. The economic impact of such hiring remains limited, as callback disparities translate to less than 5% of observed gaps when isolated from other factors like occupational choice and experience; broader meta-analyses of field experiments confirm these hiring frictions do not explain persistent workforce disparities, emphasizing instead individual sorting into preferred roles. appears to have declined over time, with meta-analyses of audits since the documenting reduced callback gaps against women in male-typed jobs, uncorrelated with the timing or stringency of anti- laws, suggesting through norms or selection rather than . In promotions and internal advancement, experimental and archival evidence similarly indicates limited systemic favoring men when merit-based criteria are applied; claims of a ""—where women are disproportionately appointed to precarious amid crises—lack consistent empirical support across datasets, with analyses in finding no excess risk assignment to female executives beyond performance matching. Instead, comparable advancement rates emerge for women who opt into competitive tracks, underscoring that observed differences often reflect voluntary choices over coerced exclusion, as audit-style controls for qualifications yield parity in promotion probabilities. These findings position as a real but marginal contributor to outcomes, dwarfed by empirical patterns of preference-driven segregation and retention decisions.

Influences on Entry and Retention

Educational Attainment and Skills

Globally, women have achieved parity or superiority in tertiary educational attainment, comprising 113 enrollments per 100 men as of 2023 according to data, with similar trends in graduation rates where they represent the majority of graduates in regions like the at 57.8% in 2023. This surge in , particularly since the 1990s, has directly elevated labor force participation rates (LFPR), with cross-national studies indicating that completing upper increases women's employment probability by 20-30 percentage points compared to those without it, and tertiary attainment further amplifies this effect through enhanced skills and market signaling. Despite overall gains, field-specific distributions reveal persistent mismatches, as women constitute only 35% of (STEM) graduates worldwide based on 2018-2023 UNESCO Institute for Statistics data, with no improvement over the prior decade. Women dominate fields like and (over 70% in many OECD countries), which align with high female LFPR in those sectors, but underrepresentation in STEM—despite approximate in average mathematics scores on assessments like PISA 2022 and TIMSS 2023—stems from divergent vocational interests rather than aptitude deficits. across cultures confirms women preferentially select "people-oriented" occupations (e.g., social and artistic domains) while men favor "things-oriented" ones (e.g., realistic and investigative), patterns robust to controls for socioeconomic factors and observed in longitudinal and cross-national samples. Economic returns to underscore its value for women, with multiple studies estimating higher relative wage premiums for females—often 10-15% greater per year of schooling than for men—due to baseline lower participation and the signaling effect in female-dominated fields. However, these returns emphasize and alignment over sheer quantity of attainment, as mismatches in high-growth technical fields limit broader integration, even as cognitive baselines support potential equivalence.

Family Obligations and Work-Life Trade-offs

Women's labor market trajectories frequently involve trade-offs upon motherhood, where reduced participation and earnings reflect deliberate choices to prioritize childrearing over continuous full-time . In the United States, administrative data from 2000–2019 reveal that women's quarterly earnings fall by approximately 40% in the year following a first birth, with the decline driven mainly by fewer hours worked rather than lower hourly . This pattern persists across multiple children, as mothers often exit or scale back work to manage intensive early-childhood demands, representing a rational response to the high opportunity costs of delegating primary caregiving. Meta-analyses of wage penalties, controlling for and skills, estimate a 3-7% reduction per , accumulating to larger long-term effects through forgone promotions and tenure. Labor force participation rates illustrate these adjustments empirically: mothers with children under age 5 show rates of 68-71% in recent data, compared to 80-85% for childless women in prime working ages, yielding a 10-15 gap attributable to family pulls. Cross-national evidence confirms an average 24% drop in mothers' participation post-childbirth, with exits concentrated among those facing inflexible jobs ill-suited to irregular needs. These reductions stem from women's in investment, informed by biological imperatives like and attachment bonding, which incentivize primary maternal roles even in high-income households. Time-use surveys underscore the causal weight of family obligations: in dual-earner families, women devote roughly twice as many hours to childcare as men—about 1-2 additional hours daily on for young children—despite similar paid work commitments. This allocation persists post-paternity leave expansions, suggesting innate drivers over pure social norms, as maternal time investments correlate with child outcomes in ways paternal inputs do not equivalently. Mothers' resultant preference for schedule flexibility leads to part-time or telework uptake, which carries a 20-30% discount but enables sustained family involvement—a voluntary trade-off explaining up to half of motherhood-related gaps in some decompositions. Such decisions embody a where the marginal returns to child quality exceed those to capital, particularly given women's higher elasticity of labor supply to family shocks. Empirical models incorporating compensating differentials show that flexibility premiums—forgone wages for accommodating roles—account for 40% or more of persistent disparities, framing reduced attachment not as a but as an efficient allocation of household resources.

Institutional and Cultural Barriers

Institutional barriers to women's workforce participation include maternity and policies that, while designed to support needs, can inadvertently reduce rates when overly generous. Empirical analyses of expansions reveal that extensions beyond moderate durations correlate with decreased likelihood of women returning to formal and lower wages, as employers perceive higher costs and risks associated with hiring women of childbearing age. For example, countries with extended paid leave mandates, such as Spain's 16-week minimum maternity leave supplemented by additional parental options, exhibit female labor force participation rates of 53.3% in 2023, compared to 56.7% in the , which lacks federal paid maternity leave but relies on shorter unpaid protections under the Family and Medical Leave Act. This disparity suggests that prolonged absences may elevate opportunity costs and employer hesitancy, outweighing re-entry benefits in some contexts. Cultural norms represent significant hurdles, particularly in regions with conservative traditions emphasizing women's domestic roles. In the (MENA), female labor force participation averages around 19% as of 2022, the lowest globally, driven by societal expectations that prioritize obligations and restrict women's mobility and public engagement, even amid rising levels. Reforms like legal quotas have yielded limited gains, as entrenched attitudes continue to deter entry, with surveys indicating persistent male disapproval of working wives in non-urgent economic scenarios. In advanced economies, cultural convergence toward in participation has stalled since the late , with gaps persisting at 10-15 percentage points despite policy interventions, partly due to lingering norms around work-life division that discourage full-time commitment. Male-dominated professional further impede advancement, as informal connections—often formed in -segregated social settings—influence promotions and opportunities. Research models attribute a substantive portion of the glass-ceiling effect to network composition, where women's exclusion from male-centric ties reduces visibility and sponsorship, exacerbating promotion gaps estimated at 16% after controlling for qualifications. However, quantitative assessments indicate these effects are not overwhelming, with explaining variations in career trajectories but secondary to performance and experience in most empirical frameworks.

Individual Choices and Opportunity Costs

Women frequently exercise agency in selecting participation levels that align with personal priorities, often favoring obligations, , or work-life balance over full-time or high-risk careers. Surveys indicate that among mothers not in the labor force, a substantial share attribute their status to caregiving; for instance, 79% of mothers who exited the in 2021 cited and care as the primary reason, down slightly from 86% in 1989 but remaining dominant. Similarly, a 2015 Gallup poll found that 56% of U.S. women with children under 18 preferred staying to working outside the , underscoring voluntary trade-offs for domestic roles. These choices entail opportunity costs, such as forgone earnings and progression, yet longitudinal on high-achieving women reveal deliberate prioritization of time. In a study of graduates, approximately 40% of women reported taking a for -related reasons by their late 30s or early 40s, often to manage child-rearing demands. Among highly educated mothers, about 10% with postgraduate degrees remain out of the specifically to care for , reflecting calculated decisions amid competing demands rather than systemic exclusion. Such opt-outs align with preferences for flexibility; a 2015 analysis showed part-time working mothers are half as likely as full-time counterparts to report significant difficulty balancing work and (11% vs. 20%), and indicate full-time working mothers experience happiness levels comparable to fathers, with no evidence of widespread dissatisfaction driving exits. Gender differences in occupational risk tolerance further highlight individual preferences shaping choices. Men predominate in hazardous roles, accepting elevated dangers for higher compensation; U.S. data for 2023 record 5,283 fatal work injuries, with males—comprising 53% of the workforce—accounting for over 90% of fatalities, yielding a female rate below 1 per 100,000 workers versus 8 for males. Women, by contrast, disproportionately select safer occupations emphasizing balance and lower physical demands, forgoing premium pay associated with peril. This pattern persists despite equal access, suggesting intrinsic valuation of safety and non-monetary rewards over maximal earnings.

Advancement to Leadership

Representation in Executive and Political Roles

In the United States, women held 11% of CEO positions among companies as of June 2025, marking a modest increase from 10.4% in 2024 but remaining a small minority overall. Women occupied approximately 33% of board seats in these companies in 2024, reflecting incremental progress driven partly by investor pressure and disclosure rules rather than proportional executive pipelines. In political roles, women comprised 28% of members in the 119th U.S. (2025-2027), with 26 in the and 125 in the , a figure unchanged from the prior Congress despite expanded candidate pools. Globally, female representation in executive roles varies by institutional structure, with parliamentary systems showing higher shares in legislative positions—such as 33.4% of seats in national parliaments in 2024—often bolstered by voluntary party quotas or electoral incentives. In contrast, merit-based corporate hierarchies in competitive economies exhibit persistent gaps, with women's advancement stalling not primarily at an artificial "" but through earlier attrition, where representation falls from 63% at entry levels to 29% in C-suites due to differential promotion rates and self-selection, as detailed in the McKinsey Women in the Workplace 2025 report marking the tenth year of tracking progress in corporate America. The report notes sustained representation gains over the decade but persistent challenges, including the "broken rung" with 93 women promoted to manager per 100 men, declining corporate priority on gender equity (only half of companies prioritize it), reduced sponsorship and manager support, flexibility stigma for remote workers, bias perceptions, and high burnout rates (e.g., 70% among newer senior women). It recommends recommitment via merit-based processes, accountability for leaders, and inclusive practices like sponsorship programs and ERGs. Empirical analyses indicate that supply-side factors, including fewer women pursuing high-stakes trajectories amid comparable qualifications, explain much of the disparity rather than systemic exclusion at senior levels. Trends show slow, stable gains in representation, with quotas accelerating board diversity but yielding mixed firm performance outcomes; for instance, Norway's 2003 mandate for 40% female directors increased immediate representation yet correlated with short-term declines in and in affected firms, attributed to rushed appointments of less experienced candidates. Political parity lags in presidential systems like the U.S., where incumbency advantages and primary selection processes favor established networks over gender-balanced outcomes, contrasting with quota-influenced European legislatures. These patterns suggest that while legal and cultural shifts have narrowed gaps, underlying differences in career commitments and institutional incentives limit convergence to parity without compromising selection on merit.

Merit, Networks, and Risk Aversion Effects

Women demonstrate higher levels of compared to men across experimental and real-world financial decisions, which influences their selection into career paths requiring tolerance for uncertainty, extended hours, or frequent relocation—common prerequisites for executive advancement. This aversion correlates with preferences for stable, predictable roles over high-variance leadership trajectories that often demand 80-hour workweeks or extensive travel, as evidenced by occupational sorting patterns where women gravitate toward lower-risk professions despite comparable qualifications. attributes these differences to pressures, where ancestral male risk-taking enhanced mating success, fostering persistent sex-based variances in competitiveness and hazard tolerance that manifest in modern career choices. Empirical data from controlled studies confirm that such traits, modulated by prenatal testosterone exposure, predict women's underrepresentation in risk-laden fields like and , independent of effects. Gender homophily in professional exacerbates advancement disparities by confining women to female-dominated subgroups, reducing access to male gatekeepers who disproportionately influence promotions in senior roles. Simulations and observational data from corporate hierarchies show that this assortative connecting—where individuals bond preferentially with same-sex peers—limits cross-gender sponsorship, perpetuating underrepresentation even when performance metrics are equivalent. programs aimed at broadening yield marginal improvements in connectivity but fail to substantially mitigate homophily-driven barriers, as underlying preferences for similarity persist. Consequently, women's often lack the density of high-status ties needed for in meritocratic evaluations, though this effect diminishes in contexts with formalized, blind promotion criteria. Adjusting for self-reported ambition, competitiveness, and willingness to endure demanding conditions substantially attenuates gender gaps in attainment, underscoring self-selection as a primary causal factor over . Longitudinal analyses of professional cohorts reveal that once preferences for work intensity and risk are controlled, women's promotion rates approach parity with men's, with residual disparities attributable to stable psychological traits rather than . Evolutionary models predict the endurance of these patterns, as innate divergences in mate-value signaling and strategies favor men's pursuit of status-maximizing roles, rendering interventions targeting bias insufficient without addressing volitional choices. This framework aligns with causal realism, prioritizing agentic decisions in explaining persistent underrepresentation amid equalized opportunities.

Entrepreneurship Gaps and Capital Access

Women represent roughly 25% of startup founders globally, though this figure rises to about one-third among high-growth-oriented entrepreneurs according to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor's 2023/2024 report. In the United States, founders accounted for 17.6% of new startups as of recent , with mixed-gender teams comprising an additional share but all-male teams dominating at over 70%. Venture capital allocation exacerbates these disparities, with female-only founding teams receiving just 2.3% of global VC in 2024, while all-male teams captured 83.6%. Even when including startups with at least one founder, totals around $38.8 billion in the for that year, representing under 10% of overall VC dollars amid a total market exceeding $400 billion. This underfunding persists despite female-led firms showing superior performance metrics, such as generating 2.5 times the return per dollar invested compared to male-led counterparts in analyzed samples. Key causal factors include gender differences in risk tolerance, where empirical studies consistently find women exhibit lower willingness to engage in high-uncertainty ventures, contributing more to entry gaps than isolated funding biases. and cultural norms further constrain access, as women often hold fewer assets for collateral—such as titled in male relatives' names—and face expectations prioritizing domestic roles over expansion. Consequently, female-founded enterprises tend toward smaller-scale, stability-focused models aligning with these preferences, yielding higher survival rates—up to 65% post-accelerator versus 48% for male-led—and sustained revenue growth over five years, though rarely scaling to unicorn status. This pattern underscores preference-driven outcomes over systemic exclusion, with women-led firms averaging 10% more cumulative revenue despite initial capital shortfalls.

Broader Societal Consequences

Impacts on Fertility and Population Dynamics

The entry of women into the paid labor force has been associated with a substantial decline in total fertility rates (TFR) in developed economies, with cross-national data from 1960 to 2015 showing a negative correlation between women's wage employment rates and TFR, alongside reduced unmet need for family planning. In OECD countries, average TFR fell from 3.3 children per woman in 1960—when female labor force participation rates (FLFPR) were often below 50%—to around 1.5 by the early 2020s, coinciding with FLFPR rising to over 60% in many nations. Empirical analyses confirm this pattern persists in panel data for 28 OECD countries, where Granger causality tests indicate FLFPR Granger-causes lower TFR, though the relationship has occasionally shown positive associations in subsets of data from the late 1980s to 1990s, potentially due to expanding childcare supports that partially offset opportunity costs. Causal mechanisms include elevated opportunity costs for childbearing: women's increases foregone wages and interruptions from maternity, delaying first births and reducing completed family size, as evidenced by studies linking higher female education and labor supply to postponed and fewer children overall. Time constraints from dual full-time roles for couples exacerbate this, with micro-level showing employed women having 20-30% lower of additional births compared to non-employed peers, independent of effects. instability, such as temporary contracts or , further suppresses transitions to parenthood by heightening economic uncertainty. While policies like paid can modestly boost by redistributing childcare burdens, evidence from systematic reviews indicates they rarely restore TFR above replacement levels (2.1), as the structural trade-offs between advancement and childrearing persist. These fertility declines contribute to adverse , including sub-replacement TFRs that drive natural population decrease in countries like (TFR 1.3 in 2023) and (1.2), leading to aging populations where the old-age —the proportion of those over 65 to working-age individuals—projected to exceed 50% by 2050 in many nations. Shrinking cohorts of native-born workers strain pension systems and labor markets, prompting reliance on to maintain size, though this introduces integration challenges and cultural shifts without addressing underlying drivers. Long-term, sustained low fertility risks "low-fertility traps," where social norms adapt to smaller families, further entrenching declines and potentially halving populations in affected countries within a century absent policy reversals.

Changes in Family Formation and Stability

The entry of women into the workforce has coincided with a marked increase in divorce rates, particularly following the widespread adoption of laws in the 1970s. For couples marrying around 1970, roughly 50% eventually divorced, a sharp rise from under 20% for those marrying in 1950, driven in part by women's greater economic which lowered the costs of marital dissolution. This enabled women to exit unions previously sustained by financial dependence, contributing to the growth of single-parent households, which rose from about 10% of families in 1960 to over 25% by 2020 in the U.S. Economic analysis highlights how dual-earner arrangements disrupt traditional household specialization, where partners allocate efforts between market work and home production to maximize joint efficiency, thereby bolstering marital stability through higher gains from continued union. Gary Becker's framework argues that such specialization raises the opportunity costs of by embedding investments specific to the marriage, a dynamic undermined when both spouses prioritize market careers, leading to reduced commitment and higher separation risks. Empirical patterns bear this out, as cross-national data show elevated and instability in contexts of high female labor force participation, contrasting with more enduring traditional structures. Parallel shifts include delayed family formation, with the mean age of women at first birth in countries climbing to 29.5 years by 2022, up from 26.4 in 2000, as career establishment often precedes childbearing. rates have concurrently declined in developed nations since the , while has surged, with over 13% of U.S. partnered adults cohabiting unmarried by 2023 compared to under 1% in 1967. These trends reflect opportunity costs of early amid workforce demands, fostering less stable partnerships, as cohabiting couples with children exhibit higher breakup rates than married counterparts across more than 60 countries. Overall, the dual-earner model trades relational durability for individual , yielding empirical trade-offs in cohesion evident in sustained elevations of and non-marital unions.

Outcomes for Child Development and Upbringing

Research from longitudinal studies, such as the NICHD Study of Early Child Care and Youth Development, indicates that maternal employment, particularly when involving extensive non-maternal care in infancy, yields mixed effects on , with some domains showing neutral outcomes and others revealing modest deficits that persist into later childhood. Children in center-based care often demonstrate slightly elevated cognitive and language skills compared to home-reared peers, attributed to structured environments and peer interactions, but these gains are offset by increased externalizing behavioral problems, such as and disobedience, observed both in care settings and . Long-term tracking through reveals these behavioral elevations can endure, though effect sizes remain small to moderate. Early maternal does not broadly mother-child attachment , as evidenced by NICHD assessments at 15 and 36 months showing no main effects from type or hours on attachment classifications. However, first-year full-time maternal work correlates with lower cognitive readiness scores at age 3, including deficits in readiness and verbal ability, with effects more pronounced for children from lower-income families or those in lower-quality care. These findings suggest that intensive early separation may hinder foundational cognitive processes, though subsequent maternal during years shows neutral or positive associations with academic performance. Non-cognitive outcomes, including self-regulation and behavioral adjustment, exhibit patterns of elevated risk among children of working mothers, with studies reporting higher conduct problems—potentially 10-20% increased incidence in externalizing behaviors—linked to reduced maternal availability. While academic achievement metrics like test scores and attainment levels remain comparable between children of employed and non-employed mothers in most analyses, gaps emerge in traits such as perseverance and emotional resilience, where maternal presence correlates with stronger development. No significant differences in grit have been consistently observed across groups, but nonstandard maternal schedules exacerbate anxiety and insecurity in children. Maternal employment entails trade-offs between enhanced family income, which supports cognitive enrichment through resources like books and activities, and diminished direct parental time, which empirical data links to poorer emotional and behavioral trajectories. Increased paternal involvement often compensates partially for maternal absence, boosting child outcomes via shared caregiving, yet evidence indicates it substitutes imperfectly for maternal investment, as children of dual-earner families display persistent elevations in problem behaviors compared to those with stay-at-home mothers. Long-term data prioritize these temporal investments, suggesting that while economic gains mitigate some risks, quality maternal time remains a causal driver of secure development, particularly in early years. Despite gains in labor force participation and , empirical measures of women's in the United States have shown stagnation or decline relative to men's since the 1970s. Analysis of (GSS) data from 1972 to 2006 reveals that women overtook men in reported happiness in the early 1970s but experienced an absolute and relative decline thereafter, eroding the prior in . This trend, termed the " of declining female happiness," persists across demographics, including education, marital status, and parental roles, and is corroborated by multiple indicators. In the , women's challenges have intensified, with higher rates of anxiety and depression reported among those in the , particularly mothers balancing professional and familial demands. CDC data indicate that adult women experienced depression rates over twice that of men in 2021, with working parents showing elevated burnout levels—65% in one 2024 study—linked to role overload. Surveys from the pandemic era, such as the APA's Stress in America 2020, highlight that mothers reported disproportionate anxiety from caregiving and pressures, with 37.5% exhibiting moderate to severe symptoms during early COVID waves. Retrospective accounts from midlife women often reflect short-term satisfaction from pursuits giving way to long-term regrets over diminished family time, though few explicitly prioritize regrets over relational ones across cohorts. Cross-nationally, greater correlates with widened happiness gaps favoring men. In highly egalitarian , adolescent girls report lower than boys—e.g., 29% vs. 39% very satisfied among 15-year-olds in PISA-linked surveys—contrasting smaller gaps in less equal societies. This pattern extends to adult , where Scandinavian women exhibit larger relative declines in despite policy advancements, attributing to heightened role strain and unmet expectations in dual-burden environments. Such findings underscore causal tensions from expanded choices without corresponding reductions in traditional familial loads.

Policy Interventions and Outcomes

In the United States, the amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to require equal pay for equal work regardless of sex, covering all forms of compensation and applying to most employees engaged in interstate commerce. This was followed by Title VII of the , which prohibits employers with 15 or more employees from discriminating on the basis of sex in hiring, promotion, discharge, compensation, and other employment terms or conditions. Enforcement is handled by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which investigates charges and pursues litigation where merited. In the , Directive 2006/54/EC recasts earlier legislation to implement the principle of equal opportunities and treatment for men and women in matters of and occupation, addressing access to , pay, working conditions, and occupational social security. Member states must transpose these requirements into national law, with the monitoring compliance through infringement proceedings. Globally, the International Labour Organization's Convention No. 111 (1958) obligates ratifying states—over 170 as of 2023—to pursue national policies eliminating in and occupation based on sex, among other grounds, with a focus on access to vocational training, recruitment, and terms of . These statutes have curtailed overt discriminatory practices, such as explicit job exclusions by , facilitating broader entry into previously male-dominated fields post-enactment. However, depends heavily on individual complaints, with the EEOC receiving 81,055 total charges in fiscal year 2023—equating to under 0.05% of the U.S. of approximately 167 million. Sex-based charges, including , numbered in the thousands but still represented a minor share of potential issues, indicating limited litigation coverage. Concurrently, claims of reverse —alleging preferential treatment disadvantaging non-favored groups—have risen, particularly amid initiatives, comprising a growing portion of EEOC filings.

Work-Family Policies: Incentives vs Unintended Effects

Work-family policies, such as paid and subsidized childcare, seek to lower the opportunity costs of childbearing and childrearing for women, thereby incentivizing greater labor force participation. California's Paid Family Leave Act, implemented in 2004, provides up to six weeks of paid leave at 55-60% wage replacement, leading to an 18 increase in leave-taking among eligible mothers. However, long-term evaluations using tax data reveal no sustained gains in or for women, with some analyses indicating reduced for first-time mothers due to extended absences signaling lower commitment to employers. Subsidized childcare expansions similarly yield modest effects on maternal labor supply. Empirical studies across European contexts show that a one increase in subsidized childcare slots raises mothers' participation rates by approximately 0.2 , often through crowding out informal or family-based care rather than net supply growth. In Quebec's universal childcare program, introduced in , initial boosts in female employment faded over time, with costs escalating to over CAD 10 billion annually by 2019 while delivering limited per-participant gains amid quality concerns. These policies favor lower-income or less-educated women who utilize them more intensively, potentially exacerbating skill gaps by subsidizing shorter-term attachment. Unintended consequences include dependency risks and neutrality. Generous leave systems may trap women in part-time or lower-wage roles by normalizing extended career breaks, diminishing accumulation and . In , where parents share 480 days of paid leave at 80% wage replacement, fertility rates have hovered around 1.7 births per woman since the 1990s expansions, failing to exceed replacement levels despite comprehensive supports, as high taxes and housing costs offset incentives. Systematic reviews confirm mixed or negligible long-term impacts from leave extensions, with some evidence of shortened birth intervals but no quantum increase in completed family size. These interventions impose trade-offs on firms and markets. Paid leave mandates elevate costs, particularly burdening small businesses unable to absorb administrative or replacement expenses, leading to hiring hesitancy for women of childbearing age. Economists note that such policies distort natural family divisions of labor, where specialization—mothers focusing on early childrearing—maximizes , as evidenced by persistent gaps in hours worked post-childbirth even in high-policy nations. While short-term returns like higher leave uptake occur, the net effect often reinforces rather than mitigates intermittency for mothers.

International Comparisons of Policy Efficacy

In comparisons of policy approaches to female workforce integration, the , with minimal mandated (12 weeks unpaid under FMLA since 1993) and reliance on market-driven flexibility, exhibits higher average annual hours worked by employed women—approximately 1,800 hours in 2022—compared to like (1,450 hours) and (1,500 hours), where generous paid leave (up to 480 days in , shared but mother-dominated) correlates with elevated part-time among mothers (25-35% in Nordics vs. 20% in ). This flexibility in the supports fuller labor supply from women post-childbirth, with prime-age female rates reaching 75% in 2023, though overall LFPR lags slightly behind Nordic highs (e.g., 77% in for ages 15-64). Nordic models, emphasizing state-subsidized childcare and quotas, achieve high female LFPR (e.g., 62% in , 2023) but fail to reduce ; women remain overrepresented in public-sector roles like and (70-80% female in ), exceeding levels (50-60% in similar fields), suggesting policies reinforce rather than erode gender-typed preferences despite equality rhetoric. Fertility outcomes underscore trade-offs: total fertility rate (TFR) at 1.62 in 2023 outpaces Nordic lows ( 1.40, 1.45), implying that extensive leave and subsidies, while boosting short-term participation, may not sustain family formation without cultural or incentive shifts. In developing economies with sparse formal policies, female workforce engagement often manifests in informal sectors—83% of non-agricultural female employment in and similar shares in (e.g., 60-70% in , 2022)—driven by economic necessity amid rather than , yielding low productivity and wages without institutional supports like those in nations. Cross-national evidence indicates that expansive interventions, such as prolonged paid leave beyond 6 months, correlate with stagnant convergence in outcomes; Nordic segregation persists or intensifies, while market approaches yield more hours and adaptability, though neither fully closes gaps attributable to choices or .

Debates and Viewpoint Clashes

Feminist Claims of Systemic Oppression

Feminist theorists posit that systemic perpetuates male-dominated workplace norms, confining women to subordinate roles and erecting invisible barriers such as the , which limits advancement to senior positions despite qualifications. This framework attributes and underrepresentation in leadership—where women hold about 10% of CEO roles as of 2023—to entrenched power structures favoring masculine traits like over collaborative styles often associated with women. Proponents argue these norms foster environments of exclusion, including subtle biases in hiring and promotions, evidenced by audit studies showing resumes with female names receiving fewer callbacks. A central claim involves the gender wage gap, frequently cited as raw earnings data indicating women earn 77-84 cents for every dollar men earn in full-time roles, interpreted as direct proof of discriminatory pay practices rooted in devaluing women's labor. Organizations like the (NOW) frame this disparity as a manifestation of ongoing , advocating for equity-focused interventions such as mandatory pay transparency laws and gender quotas in corporate boards to dismantle biased structures, prioritizing outcomes over formal equality. However, empirical analyses reveal shortfalls in these narratives; when controlling for factors like occupation, hours worked, , and —often reflecting voluntary choices—the unexplained gap shrinks to 3-7%, with much of the remainder attributable to unmeasured productivity differences rather than overt . Further scrutiny highlights that gender differences in work preferences, such as women's greater willingness to trade pay for flexibility and stability, explain substantial occupational sorting and hours variances, undermining claims of purely systemic coercion. Studies across cultures confirm persistent preferences for people-oriented roles among women and thing-oriented among men, correlating with workforce distributions independent of socialization pressures. While some experimental evidence suggests residual bias, mainstream feminist advocacy often overlooks these choice-driven dynamics, as peer-reviewed decompositions attribute over 80% of the raw gap to measurable selections rather than irreducible oppression. This disconnect persists despite data from sources like the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics showing the adjusted gap's stability over decades, prompting internal feminist debates on whether emphasizing discrimination eclipses agency.

Evolutionary and Choice-Based Counterarguments

Evolutionary psychologists argue that observed gender disparities in occupational choices stem from innate differences in interests and preferences, shaped by ancestral selection pressures rather than systemic . Men, on average, exhibit stronger interests in "things-oriented" activities involving mechanical or analytical tasks, while women prefer "people-oriented" domains focused on social interaction and caregiving, with meta-analytic evidence showing a large (d = 0.84) for this across vocational interest inventories spanning decades. These patterns align with evolutionary theories positing that men's historical roles in and tool-making favored systematizing traits, whereas women's and child-rearing emphasized empathizing abilities, as supported by data from 53 nations where such preferences persisted independently of social-environmental factors like indices. Prenatal exposure further corroborates innateness, predicting later "thing" interests in both sexes, independent of . In STEM fields, the absence of despite extensive interventions reflects these biological preferences rather than barriers; women comprise only about 20-30% of graduates in and globally, even in high-equality nations where choices are unconstrained, exemplifying the "" wherein freer societies amplify rather than erase differences. Longitudinal studies of gifted youth reveal that equally capable women opt for family-compatible paths, devoting 25% less time to careers than men, prioritizing work-life balance over status maximization—a choice pattern consistent with evolved mating strategies where women value providers but select fields aligning with relational priorities. This agency-driven divergence challenges narratives of , as vocational interests emerge early (by ) and show minimal convergence with age or policy efforts. Empirical data on undermine claims that workforce gains universally empower women; U.S. surveys from 1972 to 2006 document a decline in happiness both absolutely and relative to men, coinciding with labor force participation rising from 43% to 59%, suggesting role conflicts or unmet expectations from dual burdens rather than liberation. Cross-national analyses reinforce this, finding women's lags in negative affect metrics amid rising , implying that innate preferences for -centric roles may yield higher fulfillment when honored over enforced parity pursuits. Thus, counterarguments emphasize biological realism: occupational gaps represent adaptive choices maximizing individual utility, and overriding them via quotas risks inefficiency in merit-based systems while undervaluing contributions essential to societal reproduction.

Conservative Concerns Over Cultural Erosion

Conservatives argue that the expansion of women's participation has undermined the complementary roles between sexes that historically sustained cohesion and societal stability, contributing to a broader cultural characterized by declining rates and weakened communal bonds. This perspective posits that prioritizing career over disrupts the division of labor where men focus on provision and women on nurturing, leading to role confusion and relational strain. For instance, commentators like Aaron Renn have critiqued conservative reticence in fully endorsing domestic primacy for women, warning that failure to reaffirm these roles accelerates familial disintegration amid modern economic pressures. Empirical trends support claims of correlated decay: total fertility rates have inversely related to female labor force participation across OECD nations, with studies showing that as women's employment rises, birth rates fall, often dropping below replacement levels of 2.1 children per . In the United States, has declined from 2.1 in the late to 1.6 by 2025, exacerbating concerns over sustainability. Similarly, the surge in female labor force participation from the onward parallels a sharp rise in rates, with nonfarm women's employment growth closely tied to increased marital dissolution, as economic reduces barriers to separation. These shifts are framed as existential threats to , with low birth rates posing greater risks than environmental challenges, potentially leading to workforce shrinkage, strained , and cultural stagnation without reversal. Op-eds in 2025 highlight how sustained —now evident in most developed economies—mirrors historical precedents of societal decline, urging a reevaluation of policies that incentivize dual-income norms over formation. In response, conservative prescriptions emphasize structural incentives for homemaking, such as tax credits for single-income families or expanded child allowances that favor stay-at-home parents, arguing these restore stability by aligning economics with traditional roles proven adaptive for child-rearing and social order. Organizations like the Institute for Family Studies advocate balancing work and home without mandating full-time employment for mothers, noting that conservative women with young children are far less likely to work full-time (36% versus 73% for liberals), correlating with higher reported family satisfaction. Such approaches counter secular declines by promoting homemaker support as a bulwark against erosion, rather than relying on expansive welfare that may disincentivize fertility.

References

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