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For Truth (Russian: За правду; Za pravdu) was a national-conservative political party in Russia. It was established in February 2020 by writer Zakhar Prilepin. On January 28, 2021, the party united with the Patriots of Russia party and A Just Russia.

History

[edit]

The creation of the movement "For truth" was announced on 29 October 2019 at a press conference by Zakhar Prilepin, Alexander Kazakov, Vadim Samoilov, Eduard Boyakov and Vladislav Bevza.[6]

The party has called for Russia's annexation of eastern Ukrainian territories as well as the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[7]

On 30 November 2019, Prilepin confirmed a plan to transform the movement into a political party to participate in the elections.[8]

On 1 February 2020, the founding congress of the party was held. At the congress, Zakhar Prilepin was elected party leader.[9]

On 19 May 2020, the Ministry of Justice added party to the list of parties that can participate in the elections.[10]

The party participated in the 2020 regional elections in five regions. In the Ryazan region, the party received 7% of the vote, winning 2 seats in the regional parliament, and gaining free access to federal parliamentary elections. In other regions, the party received less than 5% of the votes without passing the electoral barrier.[11][12]

Logo of the For Truth movement after unification with A Just Russia

Notable members

[edit]

References

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For Truth

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For Truth (Russian: За правду; Za pravdu) was a short-lived national-conservative in founded in 2020 by author , a former combatant in the Chechen wars known for his nationalist writings and public advocacy. The party originated from a public movement Prilepin initiated in late 2019 to promote patriotic and traditionalist principles amid perceived liberal influences in Russian society. Formally launched on February 1, 2020, it positioned itself as a voice for national , cultural preservation, and opposition to Western-style , attracting support from veterans, intellectuals, and regional activists. Despite its ideological emphasis on truth-seeking governance and anti-corruption measures rooted in first-hand national experiences, For Truth did not contest major elections independently and merged on January 28, 2021, with A Just Russia and to form the expanded Socialist Political Party A Just Russia – Patriots – For Truth, enhancing its influence within 's parliamentary framework. Critics, particularly from outlets skeptical of Kremlin-aligned structures, labeled it a potential vote-splitter for genuine opposition, though Prilepin's longstanding nationalist credentials suggest organic appeal.

History

Origins and Founding (2019–2020)

The nationalist public movement "For Truth" (За правду) was initiated by writer and publicist Zakhar Prilepin on October 29, 2019, drawing from his prior involvement in patriotic circles and opposition to liberal ideologies perceived as undermining Russian sovereignty. On November 30, 2019, Prilepin publicly confirmed intentions to convert the movement into a full political party to enable participation in the 2020 regional and 2021 federal elections, framing it as a necessary bulwark against "Maidan"-style unrest and Western-influenced decay in Russian society. The party's formal establishment took place at its founding congress on February 1, 2020, held at Moscow's Central Telegraph building, where approximately 500 delegates from across unanimously approved the transformation, elected Prilepin as chairman, and adopted a platform centered on national-patriotic principles. This rapid organizational shift complied with Russian electoral laws requiring a minimum of 500 members and regional representation for party registration, which "For Truth" achieved swiftly through its pre-existing movement network, enabling submission of founding documents to the shortly thereafter. Positioned explicitly as a truth-oriented nationalist alternative, the party's initial emphasized combating liberal cosmopolitanism, reinforcing , and prioritizing empirical defenses of Russian cultural and over ideological abstractions, reflecting Prilepin's firsthand experiences in conflicts as a motivator for against perceived internal threats.

Early Activities and Organizational Development

Following its founding congress on February 1, 2020, the For Truth party focused on rapid organizational expansion across , building on the preexisting "For Truth" movement established in 2019. Prilepin, as leader, prioritized recruiting prominent cultural and public figures to bolster visibility and membership, including actor , musician Zhenya Chicherina, and American actor , who aligned with the party's nationalist orientation. These efforts aimed to establish regional branches in multiple oblasts, with initial activities centered on forming executive committees and gathering signatures for official registration, achieving federal party status by mid-2020. In preparation for the September regional elections, For Truth conducted targeted campaigns highlighting patriotic themes, such as 's imperial heritage and national sovereignty, encapsulated in slogans like " was, is, and will be an empire." The party nominated candidates in several regions, including the and , emphasizing internal party dynamics through Prilepin's personal platform as a and public intellectual to secure limited media exposure via interviews and writings. Organizational alliances were pursued with pro-Kremlin entities, such as the movement Patriots of the Great Fatherland led by Nikolai Starikov, culminating in a November 30, , announcement of cooperation to enhance coordination without formal merger at that stage. For Truth also engaged in broader policy influence through Prilepin's role in the central headquarters of the , contributing to initiatives for public input on national priorities like and defense. This participation allowed the to align with Kremlin-supported forums while maintaining a distinct nationalist voice, though its overall media footprint remained constrained compared to established parties.

Merger and Dissolution (2021)

On January 28, 2021, For Truth participated in a joint congress with A Just Russia and , where delegates approved a merger agreement to form a unified party provisionally named A Just Russia – Patriots – For Truth, underpinned by a shared platform of 12 principles emphasizing truth, , and . The initiative sought to amalgamate fragmented left-patriotic elements, including For Truth's nationalist orientation led by writer , to create a broader electoral base capable of challenging the entrenched dominance of in the upcoming State Duma elections scheduled for September 2021. Prilepin, as co-founder of For Truth, articulated the strategic intent to position the merged entity as a runner-up to , leveraging combined organizational resources to counter both ruling-party hegemony and rival opposition factions like the . The causal drivers reflected pragmatic electoral calculus in Russia's , where smaller parties often face barriers to independent viability due to requirements, constraints, and media access disparities favoring established players. By pooling membership—For Truth having registered nationally in 2020 after regional gains—and ideological synergies, the parties aimed to exceed the 5% threshold for more reliably than individually, thereby amplifying influence in seat allocation without direct confrontation of systemic constraints. Formal completion occurred on February 22, 2021, when the constituent parties' congress ratified the unification, entailing the legal dissolution of For Truth and as independent entities, with their structures and assets absorbed into the rebranded A Just Russia. This step-by-step integration, from preliminary accord to dissolution, underscored a calculated realism: empirical data from prior cycles showed fragmented patriotic votes diluting against United Russia's 40-50% hauls, while consolidation could yield amplified bargaining leverage in post-election dynamics and policy concessions. TASS reporting highlighted the merger's role in fortifying the bloc's negotiating position within the managed opposition framework, evidenced by the subsequent party's retention of seats despite overall low opposition turnout.

Ideology and Positions

Core Principles

The For Truth party articulated its foundational tenets around the imperatives of truth, , and , positioning these as antidotes to ideological distortions and external pressures undermining Russian sovereignty. Truth-seeking was framed as an unwavering commitment to factual disclosure in , rejecting narratives that obscure national causal realities in favor of empirically grounded assessments of historical and cultural imperatives. This approach prioritized Russia's distinct interests over abstract universalist doctrines, advocating policies derived from first-principles analysis of the nation's geopolitical and societal dynamics rather than imported ideological frameworks. Patriotism served as the ideological core, defined as resolute defense of the state's and citizens' welfare against comprador elites and foreign dependencies, with explicit opposition to liberal policies perceived as eroding traditional structures. The party emphasized causal realism by linking Russia's resilience to the preservation of its Orthodox-rooted fabric, viewing Western cultural exports as agents of that weaken communal bonds and demographic stability. underpinned this, with calls for state reinforcement of family units, equitable resource distribution, and measures to foster revival and intergenerational continuity. These principles manifested in a signed by For Truth leaders on , 2021, which outlined commitments to progressive taxation, of strategic assets, and systems as mechanisms for shielding Russian identity from globalist influences. By integrating socialist equity with nationalist fervor, the tenets rejected profit-driven —"comprador capital, knowing no homeland and valuing only superprofits"—in favor of unified action to restore societal justice and spiritual vigor.

Domestic Policy Stances

The For Truth party articulated domestic policies rooted in national-patriotic and left-leaning economic priorities, emphasizing workers' and to counter Russia's entrenched socioeconomic disparities. The party's platform highlighted the "person of labor" as central to national revival, advocating state measures to protect employment and redistribute resources amid high income inequality, where the reached 37.5 in 2020 according to World Bank data. This center-left orientation supported targeted welfare expansions, such as enhanced benefits for vulnerable groups, without endorsing wholesale , positioning the approach as a bulwark against the excesses of 1990s privatizations that concentrated wealth among a narrow elite controlling key industries. Critiquing oligarchic for prioritizing elite interests over public welfare, For Truth called for curbing undue corporate influence in policy-making, drawing on evidence of Russia's uneven post-Soviet recovery where rates hovered around 12.1% in 2020 per official statistics. The party proposed fostering domestic and under state oversight to drive sustainable growth, aiming to elevate small and medium enterprises while subordinating economic goals to social stability and reduce dependency on exports that comprised over 60% of federal revenues in recent years. On social issues, the party opposed the infiltration of Western liberal ideologies, favoring policies that uphold traditional Russian values, structures, and cultural to address demographic stagnation, including a of 1.50 births per woman in 2020. For Truth advocated strengthening through support for large and community via local referendums and , rejecting progressive agendas like expansive gender doctrines in favor of grounded in empirical policy outcomes. It critiqued unchecked , which saw over 5 million labor migrants from annually straining and ethnic cohesion, proposing stricter controls to prioritize ethnic and integrate newcomers under patriotic frameworks.

Foreign Policy and Nationalism

The For Truth party espoused a form of centered on the protection of and Russian-speaking populations in neighboring states, viewing their vulnerability as a direct threat to Russia's national security and historical integrity. Party co-chairman , a veteran of conflicts in , argued that Western-backed integrations of and Georgia into and the posed existential risks by isolating and endangering Russian compatriots, citing documented instances of discrimination and violence against Russian speakers in as empirical evidence of such threats. This stance drew on Soviet-era legacies of integrated territories and populations, positing that fragmentation post-1991 had left ethnic enclaves exposed to revanchist policies in successor states, necessitating defensive measures to restore protective unity. In July 2020, the party formally advocated for referendums on accession to for the self-proclaimed and People's Republics (), , framing these as mechanisms to safeguard ethnic from alleged genocidal pressures and to counter NATO's eastward expansion, which it claimed empirically encircled and undermined its through military basing in former Soviet spheres. Prilepin emphasized that such integrations would grant these regions subject status within the Russian Federation, prioritizing national over international norms that the party viewed as biased toward Western interests, with historical precedents in the Soviet Union's defense of fraternal republics against external aggression. The positions reflected a causal understanding that unaddressed ethnic kin vulnerabilities could precipitate broader conflicts, as evidenced by the 2008 and the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, where Russian interventions were justified as preemptive protections rather than unprovoked expansions. The party's foreign policy rejected multilateral frameworks like partnerships for , arguing that empirical data on alliance dynamics—such as 's 1999 Kosovo intervention bypassing Russian objections—demonstrated an inherent anti-Russian bias that threatened stability. Instead, it promoted a sovereign-centric approach, urging strengthened ties with non-Western powers to balance perceived , while insisting that Russia's defensive posture was rooted in realist assessments of power vacuums left by Soviet dissolution, where ethnic Russian majorities in disputed territories faced assimilation or expulsion risks without Moscow's guardianship. This was not irredentist in isolation but tied to a broader causal narrative of preserving civilizational continuity against liberal internationalist erosion of historical s.

Leadership and Organization

Founders and Primary Leadership

Zakhar , a Russian writer born in 1975, gained prominence through novels depicting the socio-political upheavals of post-Soviet , informed by his service as a riot police officer in the unit during the First and Second Chechen Wars. His military background extended to the conflict, where from 2015 he commanded a of pro-Russian separatist forces, claiming in interviews that his unit inflicted significant casualties on Ukrainian positions. Prilepin founded the For Truth party in October 2019, evolving it from his earlier civic movement launched around 2018 to advocate for conservative and resistance to liberal ideologies perceived as undermining Russian . As the party's inaugural leader, he directed its strategic orientation toward attracting patriotic voters disillusioned with mainstream parties, emphasizing anti-Western stances and support for military interventions in through public rallies and media appearances. The organization's leadership was predominantly personalized under Prilepin, who utilized his networks from literary circles, veteran groups, and online platforms to coordinate operations, bypassing extensive formal hierarchies in favor of direct appeals to supporters aligned with his worldview. This approach enabled rapid mobilization for early activities but constrained broader institutional development prior to the party's 2021 merger.

Notable Members and Affiliates

Alexander Kazakov, a political analyst and former advisor to the leadership, served as first deputy chairman of For Truth, utilizing his media appearances to promote the party's stances on and support for Russian-speaking regions in , thereby increasing its visibility among nationalist audiences. The party drew affiliates from Russia's cultural sector, including musician Vadim Samoilov, theater director Eduard Boyakov, and film director Vladislav Bevza, whose participation in the initial public announcement on October 29, 2019, helped extend the party's reach into artistic communities sympathetic to conservative and patriotic themes. , the U.S.-born actor who received n citizenship on November 5, 2016, joined For Truth as a member before its merger into A Just Russia – Patriots – For Truth on February 22, 2021, lending international celebrity endorsement that amplified the party's profile through his vocal support for Russian foreign policy positions. These affiliations underscored For Truth's connections to pro-Kremlin nationalists and intellectuals, fostering greater media exposure despite the party's short lifespan.

Electoral Engagement

Participation in Regional Elections

The For Truth party contested the September 13, 2020, unified regional elections in 11 oblasts, participating in votes for legislative assemblies as one of four newly registered parties permitted to run. These elections served as the party's primary empirical assessment of voter support prior to national contests, with participation focused on lists and select single-mandate districts. In , For Truth received 7.84% of the proportional vote share after processing over 50% of protocols, crossing the 5% threshold required for allocation of seats from party lists. This performance yielded two seats in the 40-member , reflecting localized administrative allowances that boosted visibility in that region compared to others. In the remaining regions, the party garnered under 5% of votes, failing to secure and highlighting limited broader appeal. Campaign strategies emphasized regional , drawing on the party's nationalist platform to to voters disillusioned with federal dominance, alongside pledges to combat local corruption through stricter oversight of regional officials and resources. These efforts aligned with founder Zakhar Prilepin's emphasis on mobilization against perceived elite mismanagement, though turnout and opposition dynamics constrained overall gains.

Preparations for National Elections

In October 2020, the For Truth party announced its intention to contest the 2021 elections independently, with co-chairman slated to lead the party list. This preparation included building a national-patriotic platform emphasizing sovereignty, military support in , and opposition to liberal influences, aiming to attract voters disillusioned with established parties beyond . The party's strategy focused on regional organizational efforts and candidate recruitment to secure the 3% threshold for parliamentary representation, positioning itself as a fresh voice in the patriotic spectrum. However, recognizing the challenges of fragmented opposition in Russia's —where smaller parties often struggle against dominant forces—the leadership opted to abort the standalone campaign. In January 2021, For Truth merged with A Just Russia and , dissolving its independent structure to form a unified left-patriotic bloc under the name A Just Russia – For Truth. This consolidation was driven by the need for a broader electoral base and resource pooling, enabling a single slate to challenge for greater influence in the . The merged entity explicitly targeted second place behind , as stated by coalition leaders at their February 2021 congress, leveraging combined ideological alignment on , , and anti-Western to consolidate patriotic votes that might otherwise split among minor parties. This strategic pivot causal to the merger reflected pragmatic adaptation to electoral realities, prioritizing viability over in pursuit of a stronger parliamentary foothold.

Reception and Controversies

Domestic Support and Achievements

The For Truth party attracted backing primarily from patriotic and nationalist demographics in Russia, including supporters of Russian involvement in the Donbass conflict, leveraging founder Zakhar Prilepin's background as a writer and combatant in the region. In the September 2020 regional and municipal elections, For Truth secured seats in several regional councils, meeting the necessary thresholds to qualify as a participant in the 2021 State Duma elections and demonstrating concrete electoral viability despite limited mainstream media coverage of its gains. The party's emphasis on national-conservative principles amplified anti-liberal discourse in Russian politics, challenging progressive influences and advocating for traditional values and strong state sovereignty. Upon merging with A Just Russia and Patriots of Russia in January 2021 to form A Just Russia – For Truth, the original party's platform significantly influenced the resulting entity's more assertive nationalist stance, integrating pro-Donbass patriotism and opposition to Western liberalism into its core positions.

Criticisms and Opposition Views

Liberal opponents in Russia, including figures aligned with anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny's organizations, have accused For Truth of fostering and aggressive , pointing to founder Zakhar Prilepin's direct participation in combat operations in the region starting in 2015, where he commanded a pro-separatist and publicly boasted of enemy casualties. These critics argue that Prilepin's advocacy for annexing eastern Ukrainian territories and breakaway Georgian regions promotes irredentist policies that escalate regional conflicts, framing the party as an enabler of 's military adventurism rather than a legitimate political voice. Such views portray For Truth not as independent opposition but as amplifying state-aligned hawkishness, though Prilepin's initial volunteer deployment to predated intensified involvement, evidencing personal nationalist initiative independent of central directives. Among nationalists, internal critiques have centered on For Truth's perceived lack of radicalism, with some ultrapatriotic commentators dismissing its platform as insufficiently confrontational toward perceived internal threats like liberal influences or insufficient emphasis on cultural purification. Prilepin's self-description of the as "left-nationalist" drew from purist factions, who viewed the ideological blend as a political diluting core conservative tenets. The 2021 merger with A Just Russia and to form a larger bloc elicited mixed reactions within nationalist circles: proponents saw it as a pragmatic tactical compromise enabling parliamentary access and amplification of voices like Prilepin's, as the combined entity secured approximately 7.5% of the vote in elections. Critics, however, contended it subordinated independent to systemic opposition dynamics, potentially compromising ideological purity by aligning with established parties accused of being Kremlin-managed, thus limiting radical policy pushes. This tension underscores For Truth's navigation of 's constrained political space, where merger facilitated electoral viability—evidenced by regional gains—but fueled debates over authenticity versus co-optation.

International Perspectives

International observers and media outlets have afforded scant attention to the For Truth party prior to its merger into A Just Russia in October 2021, reflecting its marginal role in Russia's broader political landscape and limited influence beyond domestic nationalist circles. Coverage in Western sources, when present, typically situated the party within narratives of Kremlin-orchestrated electoral management, depicting it as a nationalist adjunct designed to siphon votes from genuine opposition. For instance, characterized its February 2020 launch, led by writer and veteran , as emblematic of "spoiler parties" curated to dilute anti-government sentiment ahead of the 2021 elections. Such portrayals often emphasize alignment with President Vladimir Putin's agenda, as evidenced by the party's recruitment of pro- figures like actor in May 2021, which framed as bolstering its status among newly registered parties supportive of state policies. Exiled Russian media like , operating from a liberal opposition perspective critical of the , similarly contextualized For Truth and its successors as extensions of systemic opposition, though direct analyses remained sparse given the party's brevity. This framing aligns with broader institutional biases in Western and opposition , which frequently conflate Russian nationalist platforms with undifferentiated pro-Putin , undervaluing distinctions in policy nuance. In contrast to these characterizations, For Truth advocated a rooted in geopolitical realism, prioritizing Russian , , and resistance to Western liberal interventions over ideological conformity with Moscow's pragmatism. Prilepin's endorsements of Crimea's 2014 annexation and active involvement in conflicts exemplified this stance, emphasizing empirical defenses of ethnic Russian populations and strategic buffer zones against expansion rather than liberal multilateralism. The party's anti-liberal edge manifested in explicit opposition to Western cultural exports, such as advocacy against LGBT rights promotion, positioning it as a bulwark for traditional values amid perceived civilizational clashes. Occasional divergences from official lines further highlighted this independence, as seen in Prilepin's December 2023 proposal for Uzbekistan's accession to —a suggestion rooted in historical ties and security imperatives but promptly disavowed by the Russian Foreign Ministry as personal opinion not reflecting state policy. Such episodes underscore the party's hawkish realism, which critiqued perceived hesitancy in asserting influence over post-Soviet spaces, though international commentary rarely dissected these subtleties, preferring reductive labels amid in media ecosystems. Overall, For Truth's international footprint remained negligible, with global discourse overshadowed by 's larger geopolitical maneuvers, limiting opportunities for differentiated analysis.

Legacy

Influence on Russian Political Landscape

The formation of For Truth in October 2019 introduced a distinct national-patriotic voice emphasizing state , , and opposition to liberal influences, which pressured existing systemic parties to incorporate similar rhetoric to consolidate support among conservative and socialist-leaning voters. By advocating policies such as the of eastern Ukrainian regions and breakaway Georgian territories, the party highlighted gaps in the mainstream opposition's nationalist credentials, indirectly compelling the of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and A Just Russia to sharpen their anti-Western stances to retain voter loyalty. This dynamic fostered a broader left-national bloc, reducing the appeal of unsanctioned nationalist groups and channeling patriotic sentiment into Kremlin-aligned channels rather than fragmented or adversarial outlets. The January 2021 merger of For Truth with A Just Russia and exemplified a strategic consolidation that enhanced the bloc's electoral viability, yielding 7.46% of the proportional vote in the September 2021 elections and securing 27 seats overall—marginally above A Just Russia's pre-merger 23 seats from 2016. This outcome empirically demonstrated the merger's role in stabilizing the non-liberal spectrum, as the bloc collectively garnered over 25% of votes (including CPRF's 18.93%), dwarfing liberal parties like (under 1%) and ensuring their exclusion from parliamentary representation. Critics, including independent observers, have attributed such mergers to administrative orchestration aimed at simulating pluralism while preempting genuine opposition, though the empirical vote distribution underscores a causal reinforcement of pro-state consensus against liberal fragmentation. Overall, For Truth's brief trajectory accelerated a shift toward within systemic opposition, embedding nationalist priorities into legislative debates and diminishing space for pro-market or pro-EU narratives, as evidenced by the merged party's subsequent alignment on key votes supporting state interests. This contributed to a more homogenized political landscape where left-national forces serve as a controlled counterbalance to United Russia's dominance, prioritizing empirical alignment with executive priorities over ideological divergence.

Post-Merger Continuations

Following the merger of For Truth into on January 28, 2021, the original party's distinct identity did not revive as a separate entity, with its nationalist platform absorbed into the larger coalition's emphasis on , , and state sovereignty. , the founder of For Truth, assumed a co-chair position in the unified party, maintaining influence over its ideological direction through 2025. His advocacy for persisted, including efforts to denounce and marginalize artists critical of Russia's actions, framing such opposition as a to national unity. Prilepin's role extended to shaping the party's stance on the conflict, where he endorsed full incorporation of Ukrainian territory into and actively participated in proxy forces in since 2014, continuing involvement amid the 2022 invasion. This aligned with the party's broader anti-Western orientation, promoting resilience against perceived external pressures through state-centric policies and rejection of norms. A May 6, 2023, car bombing that wounded Prilepin and killed his driver—attributed by Russian authorities to Ukrainian operatives—underscored the risks of his public profile but did not diminish his political engagement. By 2025, For Truth's legacy manifested in the merged party's reinforcement of sovereignist narratives, contributing to a political prioritizing and cultural preservation over accommodation with Western institutions, without independent organizational revival. Prilepin's military rank of and ongoing efforts further embedded these continuities, emphasizing endurance against sanctions and hybrid threats.

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  64. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/08/20/russian-nationalist-writer-zakhar-prilepin-calls-for-cultural-purge_5994095_5.html
  65. https://russiapost.info/politics/special_operation_carrying_it_out
  66. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/09/04/it-s-mostly-whining
  67. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-nationalist-writer-prilepin-wounded-car-bombing-tass-2023-05-06/
  68. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-prlepin-writer-bombing/32399592.html
  69. https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/propaganda/persons/914
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