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Hurricane Andrew
Hurricane Andrew
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Hurricane Andrew
Hurricane Andrew near peak intensity near the Bahamas on August 23
Meteorological history
FormedAugust 16, 1992 (1992-08-16)
ExtratropicalAugust 28, 1992 (1992-08-28)
DissipatedAugust 29, 1992 (1992-08-29)
Category 5 major hurricane
1-minute sustained (SSHWS/NWS)
Highest winds175 mph (280 km/h)
Lowest pressure922 mbar (hPa); 27.23 inHg
Overall effects
Fatalities65
Damage$27.3 billion (1992 USD)(Costliest tropical cyclone on record at the time)
Areas affectedThe Bahamas, Florida, Louisiana, Southeastern United States, Mid-Atlantic states
IBTrACSEdit this at Wikidata

Part of the 1992 Atlantic hurricane season

Hurricane Andrew was a compact, but very powerful and devastating tropical cyclone that struck the Bahamas, Florida, and Louisiana in August 1992. It was the most destructive hurricane to ever hit Florida in terms of structures damaged or destroyed, and remained the costliest in financial terms until Hurricane Irma surpassed it 25 years later. Andrew was also the strongest landfalling hurricane in the United States in decades and the costliest hurricane to strike anywhere in the country, until it was surpassed by Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

Andrew is one of only four tropical cyclones to make landfall in the continental United States as a Category 5, alongside the 1935 Labor Day hurricane, Hurricane Camille in 1969, and Michael in 2018. While the storm also caused major damage in The Bahamas and Louisiana, the greatest impact was felt in South Florida, where the storm made landfall as a Category 5 hurricane, with 1-minute sustained wind speeds as high as 165 mph (266 km/h) and a gust as high as 174 mph (280 km/h).

Passing directly through the cities of Cutler Bay and Homestead in Dade County (now known as Miami-Dade County), the hurricane stripped many homes of all but their concrete foundations and caused catastrophic damage. In total, Andrew destroyed more than 63,500 houses, damaged more than 124,000 others, caused $27.3 billion in damage (equivalent to $63 billion in 2023),[nb 1] and left 65 people dead.

Andrew began as a tropical depression over the eastern Atlantic Ocean on August 16. After spending a week without significantly strengthening itself in the central Atlantic, the storm rapidly intensified into a powerful Category 5 hurricane while moving westward towards The Bahamas on August 23. Though Andrew briefly weakened to Category 4 status while traversing The Bahamas, it regained Category 5 intensity before making landfall in Florida on Elliott Key and then Homestead on August 24. With a barometric pressure of 922 hPa (27.23 inHg) at the time of landfall in Florida, Andrew is the sixth most-intense hurricane to strike the United States. Several hours later, the hurricane emerged over the Gulf of Mexico at Category 4 strength, with the Gulf Coast of the United States in its dangerous path. After turning northwestward and weakening further, Andrew moved ashore near Morgan City, Louisiana, as a low-end Category 3 storm. The small hurricane curved northeastward after landfall and rapidly lost its intensity, becoming extratropical on August 28, and merging with the remnants of Hurricane Lester and a frontal system over the southern Appalachian Mountains on August 29.

Andrew first inflicted structural damage as it moved through The Bahamas, especially in Cat Cays, lashing the islands with storm surge, hurricane-force winds, and tornadoes. About 800 houses were destroyed in the archipelago, and there was substantial damage to the transport, water, sanitation, agriculture, and fishing sectors. Andrew left four dead and $250 million in damage throughout The Bahamas. In parts of southern Florida, Andrew produced severe winds; a wind gust of 177 mph (285 km/h) was observed at a house in Perrine. The cities of Florida City, Homestead, Cutler Ridge, and parts of Kendall received the brunt of Andrew. As many as 1.4 million people lost power at the height of the storm, some for more than one month. In the Everglades, 70,000 acres (280 km2) of trees were downed, while invasive Burmese pythons began inhabiting the region after a nearby facility housing them was destroyed. Though Andrew was moving fast, rainfall in Florida was substantial in a few areas (less in others); the rainfall peaked at 13.98 inches (355 mm) in western Dade County. Andrew was considered a "dry hurricane" by multiple media networks.[1][2] In Florida, Andrew killed 44 and left a then-record $25 billion in damage.

Prior to making landfall in Louisiana on August 26, Andrew caused extensive damage to oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, leading to $500 million in losses for oil companies. It produced hurricane-force winds along its path through Louisiana, damaging large stretches of power lines that left about 230,000 people without electricity. Over 80% of trees in the Atchafalaya River basin were downed, and the agriculture there was devastated. Throughout the basin and Bayou Lafourche, 187 million freshwater fish were killed in the hurricane. With 23,000 houses damaged, 985 others destroyed, and 1,951 mobile homes demolished, property losses in Louisiana exceeded $1.5 billion. The hurricane caused the deaths of 17 people in the state, 6 of whom drowned offshore. Andrew spawned at least 28 tornadoes along the Gulf Coast, especially in Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi. In total, Andrew left 65 dead and caused $27.3 billion in damage. Andrew is currently the ninth-costliest Atlantic hurricane to hit the United States. It is also the third-strongest hurricane to hit the U.S. mainland by wind speed (165 mph (266 km/h)).[3] Due to the destruction and loss of life caused by the storm, the name Andrew was retired by the World Meteorological Organization in the spring of 1993.

Meteorological history

[edit]
Map plotting the storm's track and intensity, according to the Saffir–Simpson scale
Map key
  Tropical depression (≤38 mph, ≤62 km/h)
  Tropical storm (39–73 mph, 63–118 km/h)
  Category 1 (74–95 mph, 119–153 km/h)
  Category 2 (96–110 mph, 154–177 km/h)
  Category 3 (111–129 mph, 178–208 km/h)
  Category 4 (130–156 mph, 209–251 km/h)
  Category 5 (≥157 mph, ≥252 km/h)
  Unknown
Storm type
triangle Extratropical cyclone, remnant low, tropical disturbance, or monsoon depression

On August 14, a tropical wave moved off the west coast of Africa. A ridge of high pressure to its north caused the wave to move quickly westward. An area of convection developed along the wave axis to the south of the Cape Verde islands, and on August 15, meteorologists began classifying the system using the Dvorak technique. The thunderstorm activity became more concentrated, and narrow spiral rainbands began to develop around a center of circulation. It is estimated that Tropical Depression Three developed late on August 16, about 1,630 mi (2,620 km) east-southeast of Barbados.[4] Embedded within the deep easterlies, the depression tracked west-northwestward at 20 mph (32 km/h).[5] Initially, moderate wind shear prevented strengthening, until a decrease in shear allowed the depression to intensify into a tropical storm, which the National Hurricane Center named Andrew at 12:00 UTC on August 17.[6]

By the morning hours of August 18, the storm had maintained convection near its center, with spiral bands to its west, as the winds increased to 50 mph (80 km/h).[7] Shortly thereafter, the storm began to lose velocity due to increased southwesterly wind shear from an upper-level low.[6] On August 19, a Hurricane Hunters flight into the storm failed to locate a well-defined center[8] and on the following day, a flight found that the cyclone had degenerated to the extent that only a diffuse low-level circulation center remained; observations indicated the barometric pressure rose to an unusually high 1,015 mbar (29.97 inHg). The flight indicated that Andrew maintained a vigorous circulation aloft. After the upper-level low weakened and split into a trough, the wind shear decreased over the storm. A strong high pressure system then developed over the southeastern United States, which built eastward and caused Andrew to turn to the west.[6] Convection became more organized as upper-level outflow became better established.[9] An eye formed, and Andrew attained hurricane status early on August 22, about 650 mi (1,050 km) east-southeast of Nassau, Bahamas.[6] In the forecast issued six hours after becoming a hurricane, the cyclone was predicted to make landfall near Jupiter, Florida, with winds of 105 mph (169 km/h) on August 25.[10] This underestimated both the strength and the speed of the storm, which would eventually make landfall in South Florida.[6]

Hurricane Andrew at peak instensity while approaching Eleuthera on August 23

The hurricane accelerated westward into an area of highly favorable conditions, and began to rapidly intensify late on August 22; the atmospheric pressure dropped by 47 mbar (1.388 inHg) to a minimum of 922 mbar (27.23 inHg) in a 24‑hour period.[6] On August 23, the storm attained Category 5 status on the Saffir–Simpson hurricane scale, reaching peak winds of 175 mph (282 km/h) a short distance off Eleuthera in the Bahamas at 18:00 UTC.[nb 2][11] Despite its intensity, Andrew was a small tropical cyclone, with winds of 35 mph (56 km/h) extending out only about 90 mi (140 km) from the center.[12] After reaching that intensity, the hurricane underwent an eyewall replacement cycle.[13] At 21:00 UTC on August 23, Andrew made landfall on Eleuthera as a Category 5 hurricane, with winds of 160 mph (260 km/h).[11] The cyclone weakened further while crossing the Bahama Banks, and at 01:00 UTC on August 24, Andrew hit the southern Berry Islands of The Bahamas as a Category 4 hurricane, with winds of 150 mph (240 km/h).[11] As it crossed over the warm waters of the Gulf Stream, the hurricane rapidly re-intensified as the eye decreased in size and its eyewall convection deepened.[6] At 08:40 UTC on August 24, Andrew struck Elliott Key as a Category 5 hurricane, with winds of 165 mph (266 km/h) and a pressure of 926 mbar (27.34 inHg). About 25 minutes after its first Florida landfall, Andrew made another landfall just northeast of Homestead, with a slightly lower pressure of 922 mbar (27.23 inHg).[11] This barometric pressure made Andrew the most intense hurricane to strike the United States since Hurricane Camille in 1969 and the strongest tropical cyclone to make landfall in Florida since the Labor Day hurricane of 1935.[6] The United States would not experience another landfall from a hurricane at Category 5 intensity until Hurricane Michael in 2018.[14]

Most intense landfalling tropical cyclones
in the United States (measured by central pressure)
Rank System Season Landfall pressure
1 "Labor Day" 1935 892 mbar (hPa)
2 Camille 1969 900 mbar (hPa)
Yutu 2018
4 Michael 2018 919 mbar (hPa)
5 Katrina 2005 920 mbar (hPa)
Maria 2017
7 Andrew 1992 922 mbar (hPa)
8 "Indianola" 1886 925 mbar (hPa)
9 "Guam" 1900 926 mbar (hPa)
10 "Florida Keys" 1919 927 mbar (hPa)
Source: HURDAT,[15] Hurricane
Research Division[16]

As the eye moved onshore in Florida, the convection in the eyewall strengthened due to increased convergence, and Hurricane Hunters reported a warmer eyewall temperature than two hours prior. However, Andrew weakened as it continued further inland, and after crossing southern Florida in four hours, the storm emerged into the Gulf of Mexico with winds of 130 mph (210 km/h).[6] In the Gulf of Mexico, the eye remained well-defined as the hurricane turned to the west-northwest, a change due to the weakening of the ridge to its north.[17] Andrew steadily re-intensified over the Gulf of Mexico, reaching winds of 145 mph (233 km/h) late on August 25.[11] As the high pressure system to its north weakened, a strong mid-latitude trough approached the area from the northwest. This caused the hurricane to decelerate to the northwest, and winds decreased as Andrew approached the Gulf Coast of the United States.[6]

At 08:30 UTC on August 26, the cyclone made landfall about 20 mi (32 km) west-southwest of Morgan City, Louisiana, with winds of 115 mph (185 km/h).[11] Andrew weakened rapidly as it turned to the north and northeast, falling to tropical storm intensity within 10 hours. After entering Mississippi, the cyclone weakened into a tropical depression early on August 27. Accelerating northeastward, the depression began merging with the approaching frontal system, and by midday on August 28, Andrew had lost its tropical characteristics while located over the southern Appalachian Mountains.[6] The storm's remnants continued moving northeast, fully merging with the remnants of Hurricane Lester and a frontal zone over Pennsylvania on August 29.[18][19][20]

Post-analysis on Andrew revealed that the storm was often stronger than operationally reported between early on August 22 and early on August 26. In real time, the National Hurricane Center assessed its peak intensity as 150 mph (240 km/h),[21] which was upgraded to 155 mph (249 km/h) in a post-storm analysis after the season ended.[6] However, a 2004 paper by Christopher Landsea and others concluded that Andrew became a Category 5 hurricane near the Bahamas on August 23 and reached maximum sustained winds of 175 mph (282 km/h). The paper also indicated that Andrew briefly re-intensified into a Category 5 hurricane around the time of landfall in South Florida early on August 24. The storm was found to have been slightly stronger than originally assessed while approaching Louisiana, but the landfall winds were decreased from 120 to 115 mph (193 to 185 km/h).[11]

Preparations

[edit]

Bahamas

[edit]

At 1500 UTC on August 22, about 30 hours prior to landfall, the government of the Bahamas issued a hurricane watch for the northwest Bahamas, including Andros and Eleuthera islands, northward through Grand Bahama and Great Abaco. Six hours later, the watch was upgraded to a hurricane warning, and about 15 hours before landfall a hurricane warning was issued for the central Bahamas, including Cat Island, Exuma, San Salvador Island, and Long Island.[6] All watches and warnings were discontinued on August 24.[6] The advance warning was credited for the low death toll in the country.[22] A total of 58 shelters were opened at churches, government buildings, and schools.[23]

Prime Minister of the Bahamas Hubert Ingraham, who took office while the storm was active, urged residents to "take this hurricane seriously".[23] Before the hurricane passed through the Bahamas, forecasters predicted a storm surge of up to 18 ft (5.5 m), as well as up to 8 in (200 mm) of rain.[24]

In a subsequent analysis by Arthur Rolle, the Bahamas Chief Meteorological Officer, national emergency agencies including the Red Cross and the Royal Bahamas Defence Force "responded exceptionally well to the hurricane alerts." The same report cited the public "[exhibiting] a degree of complacency, particularly in New Providence and The Current, Eleuthera."[25] Ultimately, the advance warning of the hurricane contributed to the low death toll from the storm.[26] The hurricane struck four days after Hubert Ingraham became Bahamian Prime Minister, the first new Prime Minister in 25 years. There was initially a concern over how Ingraham would handle the hurricane, due to many of the government officials remaining in power from the previous administration; however, government response to the hurricane was normal.[26]

Florida

[edit]
Infrared satellite image of Andrew, with its eye clearly visible
Hurricane Andrew shortly after landfall near Homestead

Initially, forecasters predicted tides up to 14 ft (4.3 m) above normal along the east coast of Florida, near the potential location of landfall.[27] Rainfall was projected to be between 5 and 8 in (130 and 200 mm) along the path of the storm. In addition, the National Hurricane Center noted the likelihood of isolated tornadoes in Central and South Florida during the passage of Andrew on August 23 and 24.[28] Several tropical storm and hurricane warnings were issued for much of Central and South Florida, from Titusville on the east coast to Venice on the west coast. Included in the warnings were Lake Okeechobee and all of the Florida Keys. By 18:00 UTC on August 24, all watches and warnings issued were discontinued after Andrew progressed into the Gulf of Mexico.[6]

Governor Lawton Chiles declared a state of emergency and activated about one-third of the Florida National Guard. Many residents evacuated, most voluntarily, from Broward, Charlotte, Collier, Lee, Martin, Dade, Monroe, Palm Beach, and Sarasota counties. A total of 142 shelters opened in these counties and collectively housed at least 84,340 people.[29] In Dade County alone, 515,670 people were ordered to evacuate.[30] As Andrew was approaching, an estimated 20,000–30,000 tourists were in the Florida Keys (Monroe County).[31] Overall, almost 1.2 million people evacuated, which contributed to the low number of fatalities, despite the intensity of the storm.[6] Many evacuees also checked into hotels, with rooms completely booked as far north as Ocala. Ultimately, the sheer number of evacuees led to likely the largest traffic jam in the history of Florida, mostly along Interstate 95. United States Coast Guard vessels on or near the Florida coastline were either secured onshore or sent to ride out the storm at sea.[32] Government offices and public and private schools were closed from Monroe County northward to St. Lucie County.[33] Many colleges and universities in southeast Florida also closed.[34] Major airports such as the Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood,[34] Key West,[35] Miami,[23] and Palm Beach international airports closed.[34]

Gulf Coast of the United States

[edit]
A satellite imagery showing a hurricane approaching Louisiana
Satellite image of Hurricane Andrew approaching Louisiana on August 25

Shortly after the storm emerged into the Gulf of Mexico from southern Florida, the National Hurricane Center issued hurricane watches and warnings for the Gulf Coast of the United States beginning at 13:00 UTC on August 24. After the initial hurricane watch from Mobile, Alabama, to Sabine Pass, Texas, the watches and warnings were expanded to eventually include areas from Mobile, Alabama, to Freeport, Texas. All watches and warnings on the Gulf Coast were discontinued late on August 26 after the hurricane moved inland over Louisiana.[6]

Due to the hurricane's threat, workers fled oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, while the Coast Guard moved their boats inland.[36] Officials in Mississippi suggested that about 100,000 people evacuate the coastal counties.[37] Shelters were opened in Hancock and Harrison counties, though only 68 people went to a shelter in the former.[38] Gambling ships were moved into harbors and inland canals. Two run-offs for special legislative elections scheduled for August 25 were postponed.[37]

In Louisiana, Governor Edwin Edwards declared a state of emergency.[36] About 1.25 million people evacuated from the central and southeast Louisiana,[6] while approximately 60,000 others fled parishes in southwest Louisiana.[39] A mandatory evacuation from Grand Isle was ordered by Mayor Andy Valence and the city council.[40] In New Orleans, Mayor Sidney Barthelemy ordered the evacuation of about 200,000 residents in the low-lying areas of the city.[41] Nine shelters were opened in the city, which were occupied by thousands of people.[37] In response to computer simulations showing that storm surge from a tropical cyclone like Hurricane Andrew could over-top the levees, workers closed 111 floodgates.[41] The New Orleans International Airport closed, with jumbo jets being flown to other airports. A total of 250 members of the Louisiana National Guard patrolled the streets during the storm. The Red Cross assisted with opening a shelter at the University of Southwest Louisiana's Cajundome in Lafayette, equipped to handle about 2,000 people.[37]

In Texas, about 250,000 people evacuated Orange and Jefferson counties.[6] Galveston City Manager Doug Matthews advised residents to develop an evacuation plan in case the city chose to call for evacuations.[42] The city later decided against ordering an evacuation.[43] School was canceled on August 25 for Beaumont, Port Arthur, and other areas of central Jefferson County,[42] while schools were closed in Dickinson, High Island, Hitchcock, La Marque, Santa Fe, and Texas City on August 26. College of the Mainland, Galveston College, and Texas A&M University at Galveston were also closed.[44] Emergency management crews in Corpus Christi began testing emergency generators and severe weather gear.[42] The Comal County chapter of the Red Cross placed their disaster alert teams on standby and ready to respond if the hurricane threatened the Corpus Christi area.[45]

Impact

[edit]
Costliest U.S. Atlantic hurricanes, 1900–2017
Direct economic losses, normalized to societal conditions in 2018[46]
Rank Hurricane Season Cost
1  4  "Miami" 1926 $235.9 billion
2  4  "Galveston" 1900 $138.6 billion
3  3  Katrina 2005 $116.9 billion
4  4  "Galveston" 1915 $109.8 billion
5  5  Andrew 1992 $106.0 billion
6  ET  Sandy 2012  $73.5 billion
7  3  "Cuba–Florida" 1944  $73.5 billion
8  4  Harvey 2017  $62.2 billion
9  3  "New England" 1938  $57.8 billion
10  4  "Okeechobee" 1928  $54.4 billion
Main article: List of costliest Atlantic hurricanes

Even though Andrew was a small tropical cyclone for most of its lifespan, it caused extreme damage, especially in the Bahamas, Florida, and Louisiana. The vast majority of the damage was as a result of extremely high winds, although a few tornadoes spawned by Andrew caused considerable damage in Louisiana. Throughout the areas affected, almost 177,000 people were left homeless. Outside of The Bahamas, Florida, and Louisiana, effects were widespread, although damage was minimal. Overall, $27.3 billion in losses[47] and 65 fatalities were attributed to Andrew,[6] although many other estimates range as high as $36 billion.[48] Andrew was, at the time, the costliest hurricane in U.S. history.[49]

Bahamas

[edit]

Hurricane Andrew brought maximum sustained winds of over 119 km/h (74 mph) to five districtsNorth Eleuthera, New Providence, North Andros, Bimini, Berry Islands – as well as three cays.[50] The storm first struck North Eleuthera,[51] The hurricane also produced tropical storm force winds in seven districts, including Cat Island, South Abaco, Central Andros, the northern island chain in Exuma, and the three districts on Grand Bahama.[52] At the capital city of Nassau, sustained winds reached 92 mph (148 km/h), while gusts up to 115 mph (185 km/h) were reported.[6] Harbour Island, near Eleuthera, reported wind gusts of 138 mph (222 km/h) – the strongest gust speed observed in the Bahamas during Andrew's passage.[6] Much of the northwestern Bahamas received damage,[53] with monetary damage throughout the country totaling about $250 million (1992 USD, $384 million 2008 USD).[6] The severe damage primarily occurred on sparsely populated islands, and in contrast the more populated areas largely received rainfall and gusty winds. The hurricane affected about 2% of the places available for rent in the country, resulting in a drop in tourism.[54] A total of 800 houses were destroyed, leaving 1,700 people homeless. Additionally, five schools were destroyed, and overall the storm left severe damage to the sectors of transport, communications, water, sanitation, agriculture, and fishing.[55] The hurricane caused four deaths in the country, of which three directly;[6] the indirect fatality was due to a heart failure during the passage of the storm.[25]

Hurricane Andrew first made landfall on August 23 as a Category 5 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale, with winds of 260 km/h (160 mph). The hurricane struck the island of Eleuthera,[51] which has a population of around 8,000,[56] and is generally about 1.6 km (0.99 mi) in width.[57] Prior to its arrival, the hurricane caused the coastline to recede about 3 mi (4.8 km), which was followed by what was described as a "mighty wall of water", or a storm surge.[26] The Current, a small village in the northwestern portion of the island, recorded a surge of 7.2 m (24 ft).[53] There, more than half of the houses in the village were destroyed, and the rest of the buildings sustained minor to major damage.[25] On nearby Current Island, the hurricane destroyed 24 of the 30 houses in the village.[25] The island's only road was heavily damaged, with parts still flooded more than a week after the storm.[26]

The hurricane was estimated to have spawned several tornadoes in Eleuthera district, based on a subsequent analysis of damage to buildings and shrubbery; tornadoes were also reported in the nearby districts of Harbour Island and Spanish Wells.[53] Towns south of where Andrew moved ashore received fairly minor damage, although the control tower at Governor's Harbour Airport was destroyed. High surf caused damage to roads and docks along the coast.[53] In Spanish Wells, located near the north coast of Eleuthera, three buildings were destroyed, and a bridge connecting to a neighboring island was wrecked. All of Harbour Island, located northeast of Eleuthera, sustained damage, with several small houses destroyed.[25] Overall, news reports indicated severe damage to 36 houses on the island.[55] One person drowned from the storm surge in Eleuthera, and two others died in nearby The Bluff.[25]

On New Providence, the hurricane destroyed one house,[25] but caused no major damage in the capital city of Nassau.[55] The Lynden Pindling International Airport near Nassau recorded 61 mm (2.4 in) of precipitation during the passage of Andrew.[52] Further west, damage on Andros Island was fairly minor and limited to the northernmost portion of the island. One dock was destroyed, and two parks were severely damaged.[52] On South Bimini, the storm caused light damage, including to two hotels on the island.[58] The private island of Cat Cay in the Bimini Islands was severely impacted by the hurricane, with damage estimated at $100 million (1992 USD). Many wealthy homes and the island's marina received heavy damage, with hundreds of trees downed by the strong winds.[54] Later, Hurricane Andrew made its second landfall in the Berry Islands early on August 24 as a Category 4 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale.[51] Damage was heavy and estimated "in the millions of dollars".[53]

Florida

[edit]
A community with nearly every trailer flattened
Damage from Hurricane Andrew in a large mobile home community

Overall, Andrew caused about $25.3 billion in damage in Florida,[6] making it the costliest hurricane to hit the state at the time.[59] Some estimates in Florida put the damage as high as $34 billion (1992 USD, $76.2 billion 2025 USD).[60] Almost all of the damage in Florida was caused by strong winds, rather than storm surge or flooding that is usually associated with a major hurricane.[61][6][62] Of the 44 deaths attributed to the storm, 15 were direct fatalities, while 29 were indirectly caused by the storm. It was later noted that if Andrew had been slightly larger or made landfall a few miles further north, it would have significantly affected Miami and Fort Lauderdale, which would have resulted in an even higher damage and death toll.[6] An analysis by the American Meteorological Society indicated that unlike most hurricanes, wind damage from Andrew was mostly north of the geometric center and occurred primarily on the eastern edge of the storm.[63] Some officials in Florida considered Andrew the worst storm in the state since the Labor Day hurricane in 1935.[64] But most others (particularly the media, former National Hurricane Center director Max Mayfield) in retrospect stated that Andrew was hardly "The Big One",[65][66] though still very devastating.[67][68]

The storm surge from Andrew was very limited in its overall coverage due the compactness of the hurricane,[69][62] although it caused between $96 million and more than $500 million in losses to boats and buildings, based on various sources.[6][70][71] At the height of the storm, more than 1.4 million people lost electricity and another 150,000 were without telephone service.[72] It is estimated that throughout Florida, the storm damaged 101,241 homes and destroyed approximately 63,000 others – the vast majority in Dade County – with about 175,000 people rendered homeless.[6][73] Smaller tropical cyclones like Andrew or Charley tend to produce less overall coverages and damage from the storm surge, in contrast to hurricanes such as Hugo, Ike, Ivan, and Katrina.[74] In addition to homes, the storm damaged or destroyed 82,000 businesses, 32,900 acres (13,300 ha) of farmland, 31 public schools, 59 health facilities/hospitals, 9,500 traffic signals, 3,300 mi (5,300 km) of power lines, and 3,000 watermains.[72] Approximately 20 million cubic yards (15 million m3) of debris left by the storm were disposed of.[75]

Tides were generally between 4 and 6 ft (1.2 and 1.8 m) above normal in the Biscayne Bay area, though near the Burger King International Headquarters, tides reached as high as 16.9 ft (5.2 m) above normal. Storm surge on the west coast was widespread but generally light, with a peak height of 6 ft (1.8 m) in Everglades City and Goodland. Strong winds from the storm were confined to a relatively small area, stretching from Key Largo to the Miami Beach area. A house near Perrine initially reported a wind gust of 212 mph (341 km/h) before the structure and instrument were destroyed; this measurement was reduced to 177 mph (285 km/h), after wind-tunnel testing at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University of the same type of anemometer revealed a 16.5% error. Several other anemometers measuring the highest wind speeds on land were destroyed or failed. At the National Hurricane Center building in Coral Gables, sustained winds of 115 mph (185 km/h) and gusts to 164 mph (264 km/h) were measured before the anemometer failed. The highest sustained wind speed for the storm was 146 mph (235 km/h), recorded at the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station, before instruments also failed there. In Key Largo, a 13-minute wind speed of 114 mph (183 km/h) was reported. Tropical storm force winds reached as far north as West Palm Beach. On the west coast of Florida, sustained winds remained just below tropical storm force on Marco Island, though a wind gust of 100 mph (160 km/h) was reported in Collier County. Rainfall was generally light, possibly as a result of the storm's relatively fast movement.[6] Overall, precipitation from Andrew peaked at nearly 14 in (360 mm) in western Dade County. Heavy rainfall in other areas was sporadic, with precipitation reported as far north as Central Florida.[18]

A close-up view of houses with evident wind damage
Damage in Lakes by the Bay

Although effects from Andrew were catastrophic, the extent of damage was limited mainly from Kendall to Key Largo due to the small wind field of the storm. The hurricane destroyed 90% of mobile homes in the county, including 99% of mobile homes in Homestead.[6] At the Homestead Air Force Base, most of the 2,000 buildings on the base were severely damaged or rendered unusable.[76] Damage to the base was extensive enough that it was recommended for closure.[77] Nearby, in the small town of Florida City, over 120 homes were demolished and 700 others were damaged, while a number of other buildings were damaged beyond repair, including City Hall.[78] Further north, damage to poorly constructed homes in communities such as Country Walk and Saga Bay resembled that of an F3 tornado. Winds in the area were estimated to have ranged from 130 to 150 mph (210 to 240 km/h), slightly below the threshold for an F3 tornado.[79] Four of the five condominiums at Naranja Lakes were destroyed.[80] The Cutler Ridge Mall suffered severe wind and water damage; after the storm, significant looting was reported at that location.[81] More than 50 streets were blocked by fallen trees and power lines.[82] Agriculture suffered extensively as well, with an 85% loss to fruit crops such as avocados, limes, and mangoes. Crop damage in Dade County totaled about $509 million.[83] The county suffered the vast majority of the damage from the hurricane, totaling approximately $25 billion. Andrew left at least 40 deaths in the county, 15 direct and 25 indirect.[6]

An aerial view of destroyed mobile homes with copious amounts of debris
The Dadeland Mobile Home Park after Andrew

Elsewhere, effects were relatively minimal, except in Broward, Monroe, and Collier counties. In Broward County, on the north side of the storm's path, damage in several municipalities was primarily limited to downed trees, several of which fell onto roads and power lines. In Pembroke Park, one of the worst affected cities in the county, approximately 260 mobile homes were damaged. Storm surge left coastal flooding in some areas, especially along state roads A1A and 858.[84] Property damage reached about $100 million and three fatalities were reported in Broward County.[6] In Everglades National Park and Biscayne National Park, more than 25% of trees were damaged or destroyed, including one-fourth of the royal palms and one-third of the pine trees in the former.[85] In addition to the damage at Everglades National Park, effects in Monroe County were significant, especially in the Upper Florida Keys. Strong winds damaged billboards, awnings, commercial signs, several boats, planes, trees,[35] and 1,500 homes, with 300 of those becoming uninhabitable.[31] Damage in that county was about $131 million.[6] In Collier County, to the north of the storm's path, sustained winds up to 98 mph (158 km/h) were observed in Chokoloskee.[86] Storm surge flooded low-lying areas, particularly in Goodland, Everglades City, and Marco Island. Many boats were damaged or destroyed by the rough seas and strong winds.[87] The storm destroyed 80 mobile homes and severely damaged 400 others.[88] Property damage in the county reached about $30 million.[6]

Louisiana

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Significant tornado damage inflicted upon a home, with its exterior walls missing and some of its interior walls and roof destroyed
Damage from an F3 tornado spawned by Andrew in LaPlace

After hitting Florida, Andrew moved across the Gulf of Mexico and made landfall about 23 mi (37 km) west-southwest of Morgan City in south-central Louisiana; at landfall, the maximum sustained winds were 115 mph (185 km/h). The highest sustained wind speed observed was 96 mph (154 km/h), while a wind gust as strong as 120 mph (190 km/h) was recorded; both measurements were taken at the fire station in Berwick. As it moved ashore, the hurricane produced storm tides of at least 8 ft (2.4 m) above normal, causing flooding along the coast from Vermilion Bay to Lake Borgne.[6] Offshore, a group of six fishermen from Alabama drowned.[38] Heavy rains accompanied the storm's passage through the state, peaking at 11.02 in (280 mm) in Robert.[6] River flooding was also reported, with the Tangipahoa River in Robert cresting at 3.8 ft (1.2 m) above flood stage.[89] Before making landfall, Andrew spawned an F3 tornado in LaPlace, which killed two people and injured 32.[6][89] The tornado was on the ground for about 10 minutes, during which it damaged or destroyed 163 structures, leaving 60 families homeless.[89] Collectively, 14 tornadoes were reported in the parishes of Ascension, Iberville, Pointe Coupee, and Avoyelles, as well as in Baton Rouge.[6][90]

Along the Louisiana coastline, damage largely resembled that of a Category 2 hurricane. Damage was heaviest in St. Mary Parish, about 32 mi (51 km) east of where Andrew made landfall. Twenty-six schools were affected, with damage totaling $2.6 million. Berwick High School, sheltering about 2,000 people, was deroofed during the storm. Generally, single-family homes fared well, with most losing only roofing shingles, though others suffered severe damage after large trees fell on them. In Cypremort Point State Park, several mobile homes were destroyed.[91] Houses in Berwick, Morgan City, and Patterson suffered major damage. Throughout the parish, 1,367 dwellings were destroyed, 2,028 were severely damaged, and 4,770 others were impacted to a minor degree. Property damage alone in St. Mary Parish reached approximately $150 million. Iberia Parish was also among the most severely impacted parishes. Two schools collectively sheltering about 3,600 people in Jeanerette and New Iberia lost their roofs. One death occurred in the parish due to electrocution. A total of 407 residences were demolished, 2,528 others were extensively damaged, and 3,526 others were inflicted with minor damage. Overall, the parish suffered $125 million in property damage, while an additional $200 million in damage was inflicted on sugar crops.[90]

Across the state, the hurricane damaged 23,000 homes and destroyed 985 homes and 1,951 mobile homes; private property damage was estimated at $1 billion. The high winds destroyed large areas of sugar and soybean crops, estimated at $289 million in damage.[90] Strong winds also left at least 230,000 people without electricity.[92] During the storm's passage, upwelling occurred in the Atchafalaya Basin and Bayou Lafourche, killing 187 million freshwater fish. Damage to the fishing industry was estimated at $266 million. Overall, losses in the state of Louisiana reached approximately $1.56 billion.[90] A total of 17 deaths occurred in Louisiana, 8 directly and 9 from indirect causes.[6] At least 75 injuries were reported.[93]

Remainder of the United States

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A map of the United States showing various rainfall totals by color code
Rainfall summary of Hurricane Andrew in the United States

While Andrew was entering the Gulf of Mexico, oil companies evacuated hundreds of employees from offshore drilling platforms.[94] The storm damaged 241 oil and gas facilities and toppled 33 platforms off the coast of Louisiana,[95] causing significant disruptions in production. Additionally, 83 pipeline segments suffered damage to some degree. The oil industry lost about $12 million per day in the days following Andrew and $4 million daily by three weeks later.[95] Initially, a production loss of 240,000 to 270,000 barrels per day occurred – approximately one-third of production throughout the Gulf of Mexico.[96] Overall, Hurricane Andrew caused about $500 million in damage to oil facilities.[6]

As Andrew moved ashore in Louisiana, its outer fringes produced a storm tide of about 1.3 ft (0.40 m) in Sabine Pass, Texas. Winds were generally light in the state, reaching 30 mph (48 km/h) in Port Arthur.[6] As Andrew crossed into Mississippi, 3 severe thunderstorm warnings, 21 tornado warnings, and 16 flood warnings were issued. Funnel clouds were observed near the path of the storm,[97] along with 26 tornadoes.[98] Structural damage was generally minimal, occurring from the tornadoes and severe thunderstorms. One tornado in Kemper County destroyed a mobile home, while another twister in Lauderdale County demolished a mobile home, damaged five other dwellings, and injured four people.[99] Additionally, a possible tornado damaged a home and two trailers in Lawrence County.[97] Strong winds knocked down trees in the southwestern portion of the state.[97] Much of Mississippi received 3 to 5 in (76 to 127 mm) of rain, while areas near the southwest corner of the state observed over 7 in (180 mm) of precipitation,[100] with a peak of 9.30 in (236 mm) at Sumrall.[101] Flooding was mostly limited to the inundation of minor roads and low-lying areas in several counties.[100]

In Alabama, precipitation amounts in the state peaked at 4.71 in (120 mm) in Aliceville.[101] The rainfall caused flooding in low-lying areas and creeks, covering a few county roads but not entering many houses or businesses.[100] Along the coast, the storm produced flooding and high tides.[38] Along Dauphin Island, high tides left severe beach erosion, with portions of the island losing up to 30 ft (9.1 m) of sand.[38] Three damaging tornadoes occurred in the state. The most damaging tornado was spawned in Elmore County and moved from an area northeast of Montgomery to the south of Wetumpka and briefly lifted during its 0.5 mi (0.80 km) track. The tornado destroyed 2 homes and damaged 18 homes, 1 mobile home, 2 barns, and 1 vehicle. One person was injured by the twister.[90] Sustained winds in the state were below tropical storm force, though a wind gust of 41 mph (66 km/h) was observed in Huntsville.[6] Although 48 counties in Alabama reported wind damage, impact across the state was generally minor.[38]

Tropical storm force wind gusts and damaging tornadoes extended eastward into Georgia. Several counties in the northwest and west-central portions of the state reported downed trees and tree limbs and fallen power lines, causing scattered power outages, but structural damage was generally minor. In Carroll County, several dwellings and barns were damaged, with one mobile home destroyed. At the Columbus Metropolitan Airport, buildings, billboards, and signs were damaged. Additionally, a tornado in Floyd County near Rome snapped and uprooted several trees, damaged several fences and homes, and flipped over a trailer, tossing it on top of four cars.[90] Monetary losses in the state reached about $100,000.[6] In Tennessee, thunderstorm winds and tornadoes associated with Andrew downed trees and power lines, but caused little overall impact to homes and buildings. Similarly, in North Carolina, thunderstorm winds toppled trees and power lines at a number of locations in the mountainous areas of the state, especially in Avery County. Rainfall from Andrew spread across the southeastern United States along the Appalachian Mountains corridor; totals of over 5 in (130 mm) were reported where Georgia and South Carolina meet North Carolina.[18] In West Virginia, the remnants of Andrew combined with a cold front to produce 1.5 to 2.5 in (38 to 64 mm) of rain over portions of the state, causing flooding in areas of Morgantown with poor drainage. The remnants of Andrew also spawned several tornadoes in Maryland. A tornado in Howard County damaged several homes, some extensively. The twister also tossed and wrecked a recreational vehicle and its trailer, downed trees, and flattened cornfields.[90] Precipitation continued along the path of Andrew's remnants through the Mid-Atlantic and Ohio Valley, with precipitation measured as far north as Upstate New York.[18]

Aftermath

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Bahamas

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Initially, the Bahamas National Disaster Coordinator believed that foreign aid was not required, but shortly after the storm, the Government of the United Kingdom began distributing blankets, food, ice, and water. HMS Cardiff, a Royal Navy Type 42 destroyer, was the operational guard ship at the time and assisted in relief operations in and around the Gregorytown area.[26][102] In addition, assistance came from Canada, Japan, and the United States, as well as the United Nations. The American Red Cross delivered 100 tents, 100 rolls of plastic sheeting, and 1,000 cots.[55] Rebuilding began quickly on the hardest hit islands. However, trees and vegetation were expected to take years to recover. Despite reconstruction efforts and the small number of resort lodgings affected (around 2%), officials expected a 10–20% decline in tourism.[54] The Government of the Bahamas, observing that their response mechanisms were not sufficient, reformed the National Emergency and Management Agency.[103]

The passage of the hurricane disrupted several breeding colonies of the white-crowned pigeon throughout the country.[25] Though the hurricane did not affect many tourist areas, officials predicted a decline in tourism by up to 20% in the months after the storm.[54]

United States

[edit]

After assessing the devastation in Florida and Louisiana, U.S. President George H. W. Bush initially proposed a $7.1 billion aid package to provide disaster benefits, small-business loans, agricultural recovery, food stamps, and public housing for victims of Hurricane Andrew.[104] After the House of Representatives appropriated aid to victims of Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii and Typhoon Omar in Guam, the cost was later increased to $11.1 billion. The bill, which was the most costly disaster aid package at the time, was passed by Congress as House Resolution 5620 on September 18,[105] and signed into law by President Bush on September 23.[106] The state of Florida alone received $9 billion through the disaster relief bill.[107]

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was criticized for its slow response in both Florida and Louisiana. Even a month prior to Andrew, the House Committee on Appropriations – which oversees the budget for FEMA – released a report calling the agency a "political dumping ground" and a "turkey farm" due to its "weak, inexperienced leaders". Congressman S. William Green of New York, a member of the Appropriations Committee, stated that he believed the agency learned little from its botched response to Hurricane Hugo in 1989. However, Green also criticized local officials for expecting "them [FEMA] to come and run the whole show". Some FEMA officials responded that it was impossible to respond as they had been requested while also continuing to provide aid for the Los Angeles riots. FEMA spokesman Grant Peterson stated, "24 hours is not reasonable to expect to have all the resources of the federal government landing in the middle of a disaster."[108] Some responsibility for the slow response must rest with Florida Governor Lawton Chiles, who waited five days to submit the formal request for Federal assistance that FEMA officials believed was required before they were empowered to act.[109]

Florida

[edit]
People working to clear debris off of a damaged home
Clean-up after Hurricane Andrew in Dade County

President George H.W. Bush declared the region a disaster area and provided public assistance to victims in counties Broward, Collier, Dade, and Monroe.[110] Governor Lawton Chiles considered asking the Florida Legislature to raise taxes[104] but instead signed a bill into law on December 17 that created a three-year reserve fund for losses to uninsured businesses, homes, government, and school buildings and functions. The bill allowed South Floridians to keep an estimated $500 million in sales tax generated by rebuilding efforts.[111]

Crime, especially looting and theft, rose sharply in the areas south of Miami immediately after Andrew. Reports indicate that merchandise was stolen at damaged or destroyed shopping centers in southern Dade County, and looting occurred in neighborhoods severely affected by the storm.[80][112] To provide temporary housing for the homeless, military personnel initially set up a total of five tent cities in Florida City and Homestead,[113] while a sixth tent city was opened at the Miccosukee Indian Reservation shortly after Labor Day weekend.[114] The Government of Canada dispatched a team of 90 military engineers to repair community centers, hospitals, and schools, and a crew of 300 military personnel was sent to Miami via HMCS Protecteur to assist American relief teams.[115]

In the aftermath of the storm, extensive psychological effects were documented, including increased divorce rates and a spike in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A panel of psychiatrists and psychologists at the University of Miami agreed that as many as 90% of residents in the worst impacted areas would experience at least a few symptoms of PTSD.[116] Within six months, the circumstances related to the aftermath of Andrew led to at least five suicides and four homicides.[117]

A heavily damaged home with much of its brick exterior and roof destroyed
A home destroyed by the storm

As homes were being rebuilt, FEMA provided free temporary mobile homes for 3,501 families and financial assistance to more than 40,000 other families for staying in hotel rooms, paying rent, and repairing homes.[118] Nearly two years after Andrew, about 70% of homes in Homestead that were damaged or destroyed were repaired or rebuilt. Additionally, of the homes destroyed or severely damaged throughout Dade County, 36,000 had been restored by July 1994.[119]

Over 930,000 policyholders in South Florida lost coverage after 11 insurance companies went bankrupt, resulting in over 600,000 insurance claims. The Florida Legislature created new entities like the Joint Underwriting Association, Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association, and Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund to restore insurance capacity.[120] Stricter building codes were established in Florida after Hurricane Andrew. A survey by Timothy P. Marshall and Richard Herzog of the Haag Engineer Company in Carrollton, Texas, highlighted construction issues in homes. Concrete tiles were glued to felt paper, while shingles were stapled perpendicular to the long axis, allowing them to be torn away. This exposed plywood and prefabricated trusses to weather, leading to structural failure and roof collapses.[121]

In 1996 Governor Chiles established the Florida Building Codes Study Commission to assess and improve the system.[122] The Florida Building Code was established in 1998 and put into effect by 2002,[123] replacing local laws and regulations with universal statewide building codes. After hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne in 2004, a study by the University of Florida found that homes built under the new code sustained less damage on average than those built between 1994 and 2001. A report by the Florida Legislature in 2006 and after hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, and Wilma in 2005 also concluded that the Florida Building Code is working.[124]

Aerial view of a large number of temporary housing tents positioned throughout several baseball fields
Tent cities were constructed to house displaced residents.

The hurricane also transformed Dade County, with a migration of mostly White families northward to Broward and Palm Beach County, which was accelerated after Andrew.[125] Many Jews relocated to areas with significant Jewish populations.[126] The county experienced a net loss of about 36,000 people in 1992, while Broward and Palm Beach counties gained about 17,000 and 2,300 residents, respectively.[127] The Hispanic population in the southern part of Dade County climbed rapidly,[125] with the Latino population in Homestead increasing from 30% to 45% between 1990 and 2000.[128]

Louisiana

[edit]

On August 26, George H. W. Bush toured devastated areas of Louisiana with Governor Edwin Edwards.[129] President Bush remarked, "The destruction from this storm goes beyond anything we have known in recent years," but noted that damage was less severe than in Florida. After his visit to Louisiana, President Bush declared only Terrebonne Parish as a disaster area,[92] but later included 34 other parishes under this declaration.[130] FEMA initially opened five field offices throughout Louisiana. These centers allowed residents to submit applications for aid.[131] After Franklin mayor Sam Jones and Congressman Billy Tauzin criticized FEMA for failing to open a field office in Franklin, FEMA promised to do so. In the first few days following the storm, Louisiana National Guard members and local residents worked to remove debris such as downed trees, roofing shingles, and torn aluminum siding. The state National Guard also dispatched water purification units and tanks with filled potable water.[132] About 1,300 National Guardsmen were deployed to southern Louisiana.[133]

In early September, officials announced that 1,400 mobile homes, homes, and apartments would become available to residents whose dwellings became uninhabitable.[133] House Resolution 5620 also included disaster aid to the state of Louisiana.[105][106] In early December, the Small Business Administration (SBA) approved $33.2 million worth of low-interest loans for repairs to homes and businesses. By then, FEMA had received about 43,600 applications for aid, while approving $35.9 million in grants to over 18,000 households that were ineligible for loans from the SBA or were uninsured. In addition to the mobile homes already provided, FEMA spent $22.6 million on disaster housing.[134]

Retirement

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Due to the hurricane's impact and damage, the World Meteorological Organization retired the name Andrew from its rotating Atlantic hurricane name lists in the spring of 1993, and it will never again be used for another Atlantic hurricane. It was replaced with Alex for the 1998 season.[135][136][137]

See also

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Notes

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Hurricane Andrew was a compact but exceptionally powerful Category 5 hurricane that formed over the tropical Atlantic Ocean in August 1992 and inflicted severe devastation across The Bahamas, southern Florida, and south-central Louisiana. Originating from a strong tropical wave that departed the African coast on August 14, the system organized into a tropical depression on August 16 and rapidly strengthened into a hurricane by August 22, reaching its peak intensity of 175 mph winds and 922 mb pressure on August 23 east of The Bahamas. The storm made landfall near , around 5 a.m. EDT on as a Category 5 hurricane with sustained winds of 165 mph, marking one of only a handful of such intense U.S. landfalls on record. Despite its relatively small size, Andrew's ferocious winds demolished over 25,000 homes, displaced more than 160,000 residents, and caused approximately $27 billion in damages in 1992 dollars, making it the costliest in U.S. history at the time. The hurricane resulted in 23 direct deaths in the United States and three in , with total fatalities reaching around 65 when including indirect losses. After crossing , Andrew weakened but restrengthened somewhat in the before striking as a Category 3 hurricane on August 26, adding further destruction estimated at $1 billion. The event exposed vulnerabilities in building standards and forecasting, leading to significant reforms in hurricane and construction codes in .

Meteorological history

Formation and early development

Hurricane Andrew originated from an n easterly wave that emerged off the west coast of around August 14, 1992, and moved westward across the tropical Atlantic at approximately 10 m/s (20 kt). The disturbance initially lacked significant organization but gradually developed convective activity and a low-level circulation as it progressed into the central Atlantic, influenced by favorable sea surface temperatures exceeding 26.5°C but moderated by moderate vertical . By 1800 UTC on August 16, and ship reports confirmed sufficient structure for classification as Tropical Depression Six, centered at 10.8°N, 35.5°W, with a central pressure of 1010 mb and maximum sustained winds of 25 kt. The depression tracked west-northwestward at 10–15 kt, passing well south of the Cape Verde Islands without direct impacts. Intensification proceeded slowly due to persistent shear disrupting the upper-level outflow, though the system maintained a broad circulation with scattered thunderstorms. At 1200 UTC on August 17, it strengthened into Tropical Storm Andrew—the first named storm of the —located at 12.3°N, 42.0°W, with central pressure decreasing to 1006 mb and winds reaching 35 kt. Early development remained modest over the next 24–48 hours, as Andrew continued west-northwestward. By 0000 UTC August 18, maximum winds had increased marginally to 40 kt amid a central of 1002 mb at 13.6°N, 46.2°W, with noting a partially exposed low-level center surrounded by asymmetric rainbands. Unfavorable upper-level winds continued to inhibit rapid organization, confining significant to the eastern semicircle and delaying the formation of a well-defined inner core until shear diminished later in the storm's lifecycle.

Rapid intensification

After traversing the northern Bahamas early on August 23, 1992, Hurricane Andrew, which had temporarily weakened to a central of 941 millibars over the shallow Great Bahama Bank, began a phase of rapid re-intensification as it moved westward over the warm waters of the Straits of Florida. This resurgence was marked by a significant and increase, with the storm attaining its peak intensity of 922 millibars and maximum sustained winds of 175 mph by late afternoon UTC on August 23. The intensification occurred explosively, with the central pressure falling 19 millibars in the hours following its passage over the Bahamas, contributing to an overall deepening rate exceeding 2 hPa per hour during the critical 24- to 36-hour window before landfall. Favorable conditions, including sea surface temperatures above 29°C in the Straits of Florida and minimal vertical wind shear, supported the development of intense convection around a contracting eyewall, enabling the small-diameter hurricane to efficiently extract heat and moisture from the ocean. Andrew's compact size, with its radius of maximum winds under 20 nautical miles, further accelerated this process by limiting dilution of the core dynamics. This rapid strengthening transformed Andrew from a Category 4 hurricane to a Category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale in less than 24 hours, underscoring the storm's potential for explosive development in low-shear environments over warm tropical waters. Post-storm reanalysis by the confirmed the peak winds through aircraft reconnaissance data and adjusted real-time estimates upward, highlighting the intensity's underappreciation during the event.

Landfalls and weakening

Hurricane Andrew made its first landfall on in around 2100 UTC on August 23, 1992, as a Category 5 hurricane with maximum sustained winds of 160 mph (260 km/h). The storm briefly weakened to Category 4 intensity over the Great Bahama Bank before reorganizing and intensifying again as it approached the coast. Andrew struck Elliott Key, , at approximately 0840 UTC on August 24, 1992, with sustained winds of 165 mph (265 km/h) and a minimum central pressure of 922 mb, marking it as a Category 5 hurricane at the point of initial U.S. . The eye then moved onshore near Homestead in southern Dade County (now Miami-Dade County) shortly thereafter, crossing the width of southern in about four hours while weakening due to friction and land interaction. Upon emerging into the near , Andrew had diminished to Category 3 strength with winds around 125 mph (200 km/h). In the , the hurricane initially weakened further to tropical storm status amid unfavorable upper-level winds but began reintensification on August 25, regaining Category 4 intensity with winds up to 145 mph (235 km/h) by early August 26. Andrew made its final landfall near Point Chevreuil, —approximately 20 miles (32 km) west-southwest of Morgan City—at 0830 UTC (3:30 AM CDT) on August 26 as a Category 3 hurricane with sustained winds of 115 mph (185 km/h). Post-landfall in , Andrew weakened rapidly over land, dropping to tropical storm intensity within hours due to terrain-induced friction and dry air entrainment. The system continued northward across south-central and the , degenerating to a tropical depression by August 27 before merging with a frontal boundary and dissipating over eastern on August 28, 1992.

Forecasting and warnings

Pre-landfall predictions

The (NHC) initiated advisories on Tropical Depression Three, which became Hurricane Andrew, on August 16, 1992, predicting a westward track across the tropical Atlantic with potential for gradual intensification into a tropical storm. Early track forecasts showed average errors of 33 nautical miles at 12 hours and 65 nautical miles at 24 hours, outperforming the 10-year climatological average by about 30 percent overall, though intensity predictions lagged due to limited model skill in anticipating rapid strengthening. As Andrew approached the northwestern Bahamas on August 23, NHC forecasts indicated a landfall in , with the probability of the storm passing within 65 miles of rising from 3 percent in the 5 p.m. EDT advisory to 8 percent by 11 p.m. EDT. A Hurricane Watch was issued for the Florida east coast from Titusville southward through the at 5 p.m. EDT on August 22, providing 36 hours of lead time before the eventual landfall near Homestead. This was upgraded to a Hurricane Warning from Vero Beach southward at 8 a.m. EDT on August 23, yielding 21 hours of advance notice, reflecting improved short-term track accuracy as the storm's path stabilized westward. By the 5 a.m. EDT advisory on August 24, the probability for reached 99 percent, confirming a high-confidence of landfall in the Homestead-Elliott Key area. Intensity forecasts significantly underestimated Andrew's strength, with the Statistical Hurricane Intensity Forecast (SHIFOR) model failing to capture the phase after passing , often lagging by one Saffir-Simpson category. For instance, pre-landfall predictions anticipated Category 3 winds around 115 mph, whereas reconnaissance data later confirmed Category 5 intensity with sustained winds exceeding 145 mph and a minimum of 922 mb at . NHC forecasters noted minimal skill in predicting such explosive deepening, relying on conservative estimates that did not account for the storm's contracting radius of maximum winds or post-Bahamas reintensification, which occurred undetected in real-time without aircraft observations. Track models like the (AVN) model performed best at longer ranges (36-72 hours), with errors of 106-243 nautical miles, but intensity guidance from SHIFOR proved unreliable for both strengthening and subsequent weakening phases.

Forecast accuracy and limitations

The National Hurricane Center's (NHC) official track forecasts for Hurricane Andrew demonstrated above-average accuracy relative to contemporaneous benchmarks. Forecast errors averaged 33 nautical miles at 12 hours, 65 nautical miles at 24 hours, 106 nautical miles at 36 hours, 141 nautical miles at 48 hours, and 243 nautical miles at 72 hours, outperforming the climatological-persistence (CLIPER) model's errors of 35, 81, 148, 233, and 437 nautical miles over the same periods, respectively. These errors were approximately 30% smaller than the 10-year average for NHC forecasts at the time. Intensity forecasting proved more limited, with models exhibiting minimal skill in predicting Andrew's rapid deepening from a tropical on 22 to a Category 5 hurricane by on August 24. Contemporary intensity guidance, reliant on coarse-resolution models and sparse observations, struggled with such abrupt changes, a persistent challenge for compact storms like Andrew whose small of maximum winds—under 10 nautical miles—evaded adequate resolution. Dropwindsonde technology, newly introduced but limited to measurements above 1,500 feet, provided incomplete low-level wind data, further hindering real-time assessments. Post-event reanalysis revealed that Andrew's peak intensity and Florida landfall strength were initially underestimated as Category 4 equivalents, with central pressures and winds later revised upward based on aircraft and indirect evidence, underscoring verification difficulties absent direct surface observations near the eyewall. Lack of operational weather stations in proximity to landfall, such as at Homestead Air Force Base, forced reliance on , public reports, and post-storm surveys, which delayed accurate post-analysis and highlighted infrastructural gaps in data collection. These constraints, combined with models' inability to capture multiscale interactions driving , contributed to conservative intensity outlooks that, while not derailing track-based evacuations, exposed broader vulnerabilities in pre-1992 forecasting capabilities.

Preparations

Bahamas preparations

The Government of the Bahamas issued a hurricane watch for the northwestern , including , northward through and Great Abaco, at 11:00 a.m. EDT on August 22, 1992, in coordination with the (NHC). This watch was upgraded to a hurricane warning for the same region at 5:00 p.m. EDT later that day, with forecasted storm surges of 8–10 feet. On August 23 at 2:00 a.m. EDT, the NHC extended the hurricane warning to the central Bahamas, encompassing Cat Island, Great Exuma, , and , as the storm intensified toward Category 4 strength. Preparations emphasized public alerts through the Bahamas Meteorological Service, which had previously collaborated with the in 1990 to adapt the SLOSH model, generating data from 1,225 simulated hurricane scenarios to inform potential inundation zones. However, no comprehensive national evacuation plan leveraging this modeling had been fully developed or enacted by 1992, limiting structured responses to voluntary measures such as residents in low-lying coastal areas moving to higher ground where available. The archipelago's geography, characterized by low elevations and scattered islands, constrained large-scale evacuations, with warnings providing lead times of approximately 24–36 hours for the most affected regions like . Surge forecasts were updated progressively, reaching 10–14 feet by early and up to 18 feet possible on by late morning, underscoring the urgency but highlighting instrumentation limitations that affected real-time data accuracy. Post-event assessments noted that while warnings were timely, the absence of detailed evacuation protocols contributed to vulnerabilities, prompting subsequent enhancements in the ' disaster management framework. Specific evacuation figures for the remain undocumented in primary records, reflecting the focus on localized sheltering rather than inter-island relocation.

Florida preparations

Florida Governor declared a in advance of Hurricane Andrew's approach, mobilizing state resources and coordinating with federal agencies such as FEMA for potential assistance. The issued a hurricane watch for coastal areas from Titusville southward to the Dry Tortugas on August 22 at 5:00 p.m. EDT, providing approximately 36 hours of lead time before , followed by a hurricane warning for the east coast from Vero Beach to the on August 23 at 8:00 a.m. EDT, offering about 21 hours of advance notice. Additional watches and warnings covered the west coast from Bayport northward to Flamingo, with upgrades as the storm's path clarified. Evacuation orders were issued across counties, targeting vulnerable zones based on projected and wind risks. In Dade County, mandatory evacuations began at 8:15 a.m. EDT on for Category 3 surge zones, expanding to Category 4 and 5 zones by 9:15 a.m. EDT; Broward County ordered evacuations for Category 4/5 zones at the same initial time. Monroe County initiated phased evacuations starting August 22 at 2:00-3:00 p.m. EDT for non-residents, progressing through the Keys by morning, while Palm Beach County issued orders at 3:00 p.m. EDT on . Similar directives affected St. Lucie, Martin, Collier, , and Charlotte counties between 8:15 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. EDT on , with over 1.2 million residents ultimately evacuating statewide, including specific actions for areas like Naranja Lakes threatened by surge. Public compliance varied by risk level, with evacuation rates reaching 69-71% in Category 1-2 zones of Broward and Dade counties but dropping to 33-46% in Category 4-5 zones, and 25-62% across Monroe County Keys. Media outlets broadcast over 600 NHC interviews starting 22, amplifying warnings and safety guidance, though some residents ignored orders, contributing to later challenges. Preparations included NWS briefings for managers using SLOSH surge models and annual statewide drills, but forecast underestimations of the storm's forward speed reduced effective response windows by up to 22 hours in some Miami-area scenarios, prompting criticism from local officials for potentially earlier warning issuance around 5:00 a.m. EDT on August 23. Despite these limitations, robust warning dissemination and evacuation programs were credited with limiting fatalities.

Gulf Coast preparations

As Hurricane Andrew emerged into the following its Florida landfall on August 24, 1992, the issued a hurricane watch at 1300 UTC for the northern Gulf Coast from , to , , providing approximately 40 hours of lead time before the storm's second landfall. This was upgraded to a hurricane warning at 2100 UTC that day for areas from , to Vermilion Bay, , with further expansions on August 25 at 0900 UTC to include west of Vermilion Bay to , and at 1500 UTC to cover west of Port Arthur through Bolivar Peninsula, . For south-central specifically, local offices, including WSFO Slidell, initiated coordination with emergency managers on August 22, using the SLOSH model to forecast potential inundation and providing surge estimates of 10-15 feet, though actual surges measured 5-8 feet due to rapid weakening. Local authorities in parishes along the central coast, such as St. Mary, Terrebonne, and Iberia, began preparations 48 hours prior to on August 26, ordering mandatory evacuations approximately 24 hours in advance in vulnerable low-lying areas. The Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness activated southeast and southwest hurricane task forces to coordinate response, while the prepared for post-storm deployment to secure areas and prevent looting, a concern that later contributed to lower evacuation compliance in urban centers like New Orleans, where only 12% of residents evacuated. Hundreds of thousands evacuated overall in south , including 42,000 from St. Mary Parish, 33,000 from Terrebonne Parish, and 35,000 from Iberia Parish, facilitated by hurricane warnings issued at 0800 CDT on (43-hour ) and upgraded at 1700 CDT (36-hour ). Forecasts from the NHC projected a Category 3 landfall near Point Chevreuil, —about 20 nautical miles west-southwest of Morgan City—with sustained winds of 105 knots, though intensity was overforecasted as Category 4; track errors were 30% below the 10-year average, enabling effective warning dissemination via and coordination meetings at emergency operations centers. These measures contributed to minimal direct fatalities (eight in ), attributed to proactive evacuations and public trust in warnings, despite challenges like limited awareness of risks and fears of property insecurity reducing overall evacuation rates.

Impacts

Bahamas impacts

Hurricane Andrew traversed the northwestern as a Category 4 hurricane, with its eye passing over northern Island around 2100 UTC on August 23, 1992, followed by landfall over the southern near 0100 UTC on August 24. Maximum sustained winds reached 120 knots (138 mph) at Harbour Island on , where anemometer readings indicated potential for even higher speeds limited by instrument failure. In Nassau, sustained winds averaged 80 knots with gusts to 100 knots shortly after midnight UTC on August 24. Storm surge inundated low-lying areas, peaking at 23 feet (7 meters) above normal tide levels at The Current on northern Eleuthera and 16 feet at Lower Bogue, one nautical mile inland. The , combined with intense winds, caused extensive coastal flooding and erosion across affected islands including , Cat Island, , and the . Rainfall totals were modest due to the storm's rapid forward speed and compact structure, though localized heavy bands contributed to minor inland flooding. The hurricane inflicted severe structural damage, particularly on Eleuthera where winds stripped roofs, demolished wooden homes, and felled power lines and trees, leaving approximately 1,700 residents homeless. Infrastructure suffered broadly, with disruptions to transportation, water supply, sanitation systems, agriculture, and fishing sectors; banana and pineapple crops were largely obliterated, and many boats were sunk or grounded. Economic losses totaled $250 million (1992 USD), marking Andrew as one of the most destructive storms to strike the Bahamas in six decades. Casualties included three direct deaths from wind and surge impacts, plus one indirect fatality, primarily on and nearby islands. Recovery efforts focused on restoring utilities and sheltering displaced populations, with international aid supplementing local resources amid widespread power outages affecting tens of thousands.

Florida impacts

Hurricane Andrew made landfall on Elliott Key in , approximately 25 miles south of , at 3:05 a.m. EDT on August 24, 1992, as a Category 5 hurricane with maximum sustained s of 165 mph and a minimum central of 922 mb. The storm's eyewall subsequently struck the Florida mainland near Homestead in southern Dade County (now Miami-Dade County) around 4:30 a.m., producing gusts exceeding 170 mph in the northern eyewall over and up to 177 mph in exposed areas of southern . As Andrew moved northwestward across the state at about 15 mph, it weakened to a Category 4 hurricane over the before emerging into the near as a Category 3 storm by late morning, with its core path confined to a swath roughly 10-20 miles wide of most intense destruction. The hurricane's impacts were overwhelmingly driven by extreme winds rather than storm surge or flooding, devastating southern Dade County where structures failed catastrophically under gusts of 140-165 mph; over 25,000 homes were completely destroyed and another 100,000 severely damaged, leaving approximately 250,000 residents temporarily homeless, primarily in Homestead and surrounding suburbs. Mobile home parks suffered near-total annihilation, with thousands of units reduced to debris fields due to aerodynamic uplift and structural inadequacy against sustained winds over 130 mph. In contrast, downtown , 25 miles north of the eyewall track, experienced only scattered damage from peripheral winds of 80-100 mph, underscoring the storm's compact radius of maximum winds—about 10 nautical miles—compared to larger hurricanes. Andrew also spawned 28 tornadoes across , contributing to localized intensification of destruction, though these accounted for minimal additional fatalities. Storm surge reached 13-18 feet in and , inundating low-lying coastal areas like the and parts of , but inland wind damage overshadowed these effects; rainfall totals peaked at 15-20 inches in southern Dade, causing urban flash flooding that exacerbated post-storm disruptions without significant fatalities. Power outages affected nearly 4 million customers statewide, with Dade County infrastructure crippled for weeks—transmission lines downed by falling trees and failed poles—leading to widespread fuel and water shortages. Agricultural losses were severe, with the destruction of groves, vegetable fields, and ornamental nurseries in Dade County alone exceeding $1 billion, as winds stripped crops and shattered greenhouses. In Dade County, Andrew caused 15 direct deaths from wind-blown debris, structural collapse, and vehicle accidents during evacuation, with total Florida fatalities reaching around 40 when including indirect causes like from generators and delayed medical care. Economic damages in totaled approximately $25 billion in 1992 dollars, the costliest in U.S. history at the time, with insured losses alone surpassing $15.5 billion from property destruction concentrated in residential and commercial buildings unprepared for Category 5 forces. The event exposed vulnerabilities in building codes, prompting subsequent revisions to require wind-resistant designs in high-risk zones, as pre-Andrew structures built to outdated standards failed at speeds far below the storm's peak.

Louisiana impacts

Hurricane Andrew made landfall near , on August 26, 1992, as a Category 3 hurricane with maximum sustained winds of approximately 115 mph (185 km/h). The storm's center tracked northward across south-central , producing sustained winds of 48 mph with gusts to 70 mph in Baton Rouge and gusts up to 86 mph near Jeanerette. A of up to 8 feet inundated coastal areas from Vermilion Bay to , causing significant tidal flooding in low-lying communities such as Grand Caillou and Montegut, where elementary schools were submerged. Rainfall totals reached a maximum of 11.92 inches in south-central , though overall hydrologic effects were limited, with minimal inland flooding reported. Widespread wind damage affected structures across southeastern , destroying 255 homes and 547 mobile homes while damaging 1,726 additional homes and 290 mobile homes. The storm spawned at least one significant in Laplace, which stripped roofs, removed exterior walls, and destroyed interior sections of homes. Power outages impacted hundreds of thousands, and agricultural losses included downed crops and disruptions in parishes like Iberia and St. Mary. Property damage exceeded $1 billion, with total impacts concentrated in coastal and near-coastal parishes including Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and Terrebonne. Human casualties in Louisiana totaled eight deaths, primarily from drowning and impact injuries, alongside numerous storm-related illnesses and injuries treated at hospitals, including carbon monoxide poisonings from improper generator use post-landfall. The state's relatively lower in the direct path and effective evacuations contributed to fewer fatalities compared to .

Broader regional effects

Hurricane Andrew's economic repercussions extended nationally, profoundly impacting the U.S. property and casualty insurance industry. The storm produced insured losses of approximately $15.5 billion in 1992 dollars, surpassing all prior natural disasters and representing the largest single-event payout in industry history at the time. These losses stemmed primarily from underestimated wind risks and inadequate reserves among insurers concentrated in , exposing systemic vulnerabilities in catastrophe exposure modeling. The financial toll led to the or withdrawal of at least 16 companies from the market, with ripple effects including sharply elevated premiums, reduced coverage availability, and heightened reinsurance costs that influenced policies across hurricane-prone coastal states. In response, the industry adopted advanced computer-based tools, mandated higher wind deductibles (typically 2-5% of insured value), and shifted toward more conservative in high-risk zones, practices that propagated to regions like the Gulf Coast and Southeast. This restructuring contributed to a 1010% in alone, fundamentally altering risk pricing and capital allocation nationwide. Meteorological remnants of Andrew, after weakening over the Southeast, merged with a to generate 1.5-2.5 inches (38-64 mm) of rainfall in , triggering localized flooding but no significant structural damage. Scattered heavy precipitation from outer bands also affected parts of Georgia and the with totals up to 5 inches, causing minor flash flooding and road disruptions without widespread devastation. Overall, physical impacts outside , , and remained limited due to the storm's compact size and rapid dissipation inland.

Casualties and damage assessment

Human casualties

Hurricane Andrew resulted in 65 total fatalities, including 26 direct deaths from the storm's immediate effects and 39 indirect deaths from subsequent complications such as cleanup accidents, heart attacks, and post-storm illnesses. Direct fatalities were primarily caused by wind-induced trauma (e.g., flying debris and structural collapse), , and tornadoes, while indirect deaths often stemmed from during debris removal, vehicle accidents, and stress-related cardiac events. The following table summarizes the breakdown of fatalities by location:
LocationDirect DeathsIndirect DeathsTotalKey Causes/Notes
314One direct death from 18-foot in Lower Bogue; others unspecified but wind-related.
(Dade County)152540All direct from wind (12 cases of or crush injuries); indirect included 3 heart attacks and cleanup incidents. Broward: 3 indirect; Monroe: 1 indirect.
8917Direct: 6 offshore drownings, 2 from F3 in St. (LaPlace/Reserve); indirect: cardiac arrests and accidents.
Overall263965U.S. direct deaths totaled 23; low overall toll attributed to advance warnings and evacuations despite Category 5 intensity.
In Florida's Dade County, the confirmed 15 direct deaths, with 12 attributed to wind forces hurling objects or collapsing buildings, and an additional 15-25 indirect natural deaths linked to storm stress. Louisiana reported 17 total deaths, with pre-landfall incidents including six drownings among offshore workers caught in rough seas. No fatalities occurred in other affected areas like Georgia or the central Gulf Coast.

Property and infrastructure damage

Hurricane Andrew inflicted severe damage to residential properties across , destroying or damaging approximately 126,000 single-family homes in Dade County alone, while 9,000 mobile homes were completely destroyed. Mobile homes proved especially vulnerable due to extreme wind loads and airborne debris, with nearly all units in affected parks rendered uninhabitable. This devastation displaced around 160,000 residents in Dade County, rendering them homeless. In , impacts were comparatively lighter, with 3,301 single-family, multifamily, and mobile homes destroyed and 18,247 units sustaining major or minor damage across a 36-parish area. Commercial structures and agricultural facilities also suffered extensively, particularly in South Florida's urban and rural fringes, contributing to roughly $25 billion in property losses there. One-third of the 45,000 registered boats in Dade County—about 15,000—were damaged or sunk. In , agricultural sectors incurred $288 million in losses, including $128.4 million to and $68.2 million to , alongside business damages exceeding $3.4 million in select parishes like St. John the Baptist. Infrastructure disruptions were profound, with the municipal electric power grid entirely destroyed in Homestead and Florida City, causing outages that affected critical operations including air-conditioning and communications at the . The WSR-57 radar at Coral Gables failed after winds gusting to 142 knots toppled its dish and structure. Communications networks collapsed, as satellite-driven systems and AFOS links failed for over 49 hours. Road access was hampered by debris and evacuation-related gridlock on routes like the Florida Turnpike, while in , 14 offshore petroleum platforms were toppled, 112 pipelines damaged, and public utilities in affected parishes incurred over $1.5 million in electrical repairs. Storm surges up to 16.9 feet exacerbated flooding in low-lying areas, though widespread inland inundation was limited.

Economic quantification

Hurricane Andrew inflicted total economic losses estimated at $25–27 billion in 1992 U.S. dollars, with the overwhelming majority—approximately $20–25 billion—concentrated in Dade County, Florida, due to widespread destruction of residential structures, mobile homes, and commercial properties. Insured losses reached about $15.5 billion in nominal terms, equivalent to $27.3 billion when adjusted to 2017 dollars, representing a substantial portion of the overall impact and contributing to the of at least 16 insurance companies in and 1993. When adjusted for inflation to 2022 dollars using factors, the total losses equate to roughly $55.9 billion, underscoring the storm's scale relative to contemporary events. In , the damage primarily stemmed from wind-induced failures in substandard , affecting over 126,000 single-family homes and 9,000 mobile homes, alongside disruptions to valued at $250–500 million. Louisiana's losses totaled over $1 billion, with hit hardest at more than $288 million, including $128.4 million to and $68.2 million to crops; fisheries and sectors added hundreds of millions more in cleanup and replacement costs.
Sector (Louisiana)Estimated Losses (1992 USD, millions)
128.4
68.2
38.6
Soybeans13.2
Corn12.7
9.1
Total Agriculture>288
Broader economic ripple effects included the loss of 86,000 jobs in and temporary halts in regional commerce, though long-term GDP impacts were mitigated by reconstruction efforts without evidence of sustained net decline. Uninsured losses, particularly from underbuilt homes and agricultural assets, amplified the burden on local economies, highlighting vulnerabilities in pre-Andrew building standards and insurance penetration.

Emergency response

Initial local and state responses

Governor declared a for on August 23, 1992, at 3:00 PM EDT, prior to landfall, and activated the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) with a direct communication line to the . Following Hurricane Andrew's landfall near Homestead in Dade County at approximately 5:00 AM EDT on August 24, the state mobilized resources for operations, which commenced within 24 hours, targeting structural collapses and drownings that accounted for 15 direct fatalities in . Chiles also activated approximately one-third of the to support relief efforts, including establishing tent cities for the homeless and preventing in the affected areas. At the local level, Dade County issued an evacuation order on August 23 at 8:15 AM EDT when Andrew was forecast as a Category 3 hurricane, upgrading alerts as intensity increased to Category 4/5 status by 9:15 AM EDT. Post-landfall, the Dade County EOC was activated immediately, declaring an emergency at 5:00 AM EDT, though operations were severely hampered by widespread power outages and communication failures. Local teams, supplemented by operators and Army MARS for coordination, initiated efforts on August 24 amid the destruction that left 160,000 residents homeless. Dade County Emergency Management Director Kate Hale had coordinated pre-storm with state and federal entities, but initial post-storm assessments were limited by infrastructure collapse, including damage to the power grid in Homestead and Florida City.

Federal and FEMA involvement

President issued a major disaster declaration for Dade, Broward, and Monroe counties in on , 1992, the same day Hurricane Andrew made landfall near Homestead. This declaration activated federal assistance under the Stafford Act, enabling FEMA to coordinate response efforts including the deployment of resources for , medical support, and logistical aid. FEMA notified the Department of Defense's Directorate of Military Support at 3:30 p.m. EDT on to initiate involvement in relief operations. FEMA implemented the newly established Federal Response Plan (FRP), finalized in 1992, marking its first major deployment for a catastrophic event. Under the FRP, FEMA led 12 federal agencies in providing emergency mass care, including water, ice, and meals, while activating the National Disaster Medical System to deploy medical teams and hospital beds. The agency also facilitated individual and public assistance programs, distributing funds for temporary , debris removal, and infrastructure repairs, with over $1 billion in federal aid allocated in the initial months. Joint Task Force Andrew, comprising U.S. military personnel under federal coordination, supported FEMA by establishing feeding and water distribution sites across affected areas, operating in Dade, Broward, and Monroe counties. By late August, federal teams had prepositioned supplies and worked with state officials to assess damage, though initial deployments faced logistical hurdles due to the storm's unprecedented destruction. FEMA's efforts extended to after the storm's second landfall on August 26, where a separate declaration enabled similar relief measures.

Criticisms of response delays and coordination

The (FEMA) response to Hurricane Andrew, which struck on August 24, 1992, was widely criticized for delays in mobilization and inadequate coordination with state and local authorities. Although President issued a major disaster declaration on the day of landfall, enabling federal aid under the Stafford Act, significant resources such as water, ice, and temporary housing did not arrive in substantial quantities until August 27–29, leaving local officials to manage initial chaos with limited support. This lag exacerbated shortages in essentials amid widespread power outages affecting over 1 million people and homelessness for nearly 200,000 residents. FEMA Director Wallace E. Stickney publicly acknowledged the agency's sluggish reaction, stating it should have anticipated the disaster's scale given advance warnings and deployed assets preemptively rather than awaiting formal requests. Governor lambasted the federal effort as insufficient, reporting that state pleas for immediate assistance were met with bureaucratic hurdles, including unclear chains of command that hindered integration of Department of Defense logistics with civilian relief operations. Communication breakdowns further compounded issues, as local governments struggled to convey damage assessments—estimated at over $20 billion—to federal coordinators, delaying targeted aid distribution. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) review pinpointed systemic flaws, including FEMA's under-resourcing for catastrophic events and fragmented authority under the Federal Response Plan, which assigned overlapping roles without a unified incident command structure. Critics, including congressional testimonies, argued these deficiencies stemmed from FEMA's pre-1993 prioritization of minor disasters and civil defense over large-scale natural calamities, eroding public trust and prompting calls for overhaul. In , where Andrew made a secondary on August 26, similar coordination lapses delayed urban search-and-rescue activations, though impacts there were less severe. These failures underscored causal gaps in proactive federal posture, as legislation then barred aid without state requests, regardless of evident need.

Recovery efforts

Short-term relief and rebuilding

Following Hurricane Andrew's landfall near , on August 24, 1992, short-term relief efforts focused on , distribution of food, water, and medical supplies, coordinated primarily by the (FEMA) in partnership with state authorities and the military. The U.S. Army and deployed personnel to assist in these operations, establishing points for aid delivery amid widespread power outages and communication disruptions. The storm rendered approximately 160,000 people homeless in Dade County alone, prompting the rapid setup of tent cities by the National Guard on sites such as baseball fields to shelter thousands of displaced residents. FEMA processed applications for temporary housing assistance from 86,000 individuals, providing mobile homes installed in cleared mobile home parks and other sites after debris removal. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers played a central role in acquiring land, clearing debris, and installing utilities for these temporary units, while also distributing blue plastic sheeting—totaling 55 million square feet—to tarp roofs on 22,000 damaged homes to prevent further water intrusion. Debris removal efforts, led by the Corps of Engineers, addressed an estimated 20 million cubic yards of wreckage across , a process that involved contracting local firms and continued for several months to enable access for relief workers and initial rebuilding. These actions mitigated secondary hazards like disease outbreaks, with aerial applications treating over 659,000 acres in Dade County within 50 days to control populations breeding in standing water. Short-term rebuilding commenced with structural assessments and emergency repairs, though full reconstruction faced delays due to the scale of destruction, including the demolition of unsalvageable complexes.

Insurance industry repercussions

Hurricane Andrew generated approximately $15.5 billion in insured losses in 1992 dollars, representing the largest insurance catastrophe up to that point and exceeding the total premiums collected for homeowners over the prior decade. These payouts resulted in a 1,010% for 's homeowners line in 1992, severely straining carriers' reserves and capital. At least 16 insurance companies became insolvent due to Andrew-related losses, with nine property-casualty insurers failing directly from the event's claims. Numerous others withdrew from the market or ceased issuing new homeowners policies, leaving over 900,000 policyholders without coverage and prompting a sharp contraction in private sector capacity. Premium rates surged, with some increases exceeding 300% in affected areas, as surviving insurers reassessed wind risk exposure and demanded stricter underwriting standards. In response, Florida lawmakers expanded the state's residual market mechanisms, creating the Joint Underwriting Association (JUA) in 1993 to provide coverage for high-risk properties unable to secure private insurance, and bolstering the Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association for wind-only policies in coastal zones. These entities, which grew to insure hundreds of thousands of policies, effectively shifted significant risk to the and taxpayers, while private carriers shifted toward and catastrophe modeling to mitigate future vulnerabilities. The crisis also accelerated industry-wide adoption of tools, as underestimation of Andrew's intensity exposed flaws in prior deterministic models.

Government aid distribution

Following President George H.W. Bush's major disaster declaration on August 24, , Congress approved roughly $9 billion in federal relief funds, predominantly for Florida's recovery, contingent on the state providing a $150 million match to access the full allocation. The (FEMA) coordinated distribution under the newly implemented Federal Response Plan, channeling aid via public assistance grants to governmental entities for infrastructure restoration and individual assistance payments to approximately 250,000 households for uninsured personal losses exceeding $1.2 billion in total payouts. Public assistance encompassed emergency protective measures, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' deployment of nearly $400 million for debris clearance—removing over 12 million cubic yards—and temporary repairs to critical facilities like power grids and water systems across Dade County. The Department of Defense supported logistics by distributing water, meals ready-to-eat, and tarpaulins, while the approved more than 10,000 low-interest loans totaling $80 million to homeowners and businesses by late 1992. For immediate needs, the U.S. Department of Agriculture issued $28.4 million in emergency food stamps to around 300,000 Dade County residents through September 1992, facilitating access at local redemption centers. Housing aid featured FEMA's provision of temporary shelters, starting with tent cities on sites like baseball fields housing thousands by August 25, transitioning to over 11,000 mobile homes installed by October, though distribution faced logistical hurdles in siting and utilities hookup. The Department of Housing and Urban Development allocated over $14 million in HOME disaster grants to municipalities like Homestead for low-income housing reconstruction, administered through local programs prioritizing rapid rebuilding compliance with updated codes. Aid disbursement occurred primarily through FEMA's network of 20+ Disaster Application Centers in South Florida, where survivors registered for multifaceted support, including crisis counseling from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration serving over 100,000 individuals.

Reforms and long-term legacy

Building code and infrastructure changes

Hurricane Andrew's winds, gusting over 165 mph (270 km/h), demolished approximately 25,000 homes in South Florida, exposing failures in construction quality, code compliance, and enforcement despite existing standards designed for lower wind loads. In immediate response, the state enacted the South Florida Building Code in 1993, which raised minimum wind design speeds to 140-160 mph in affected high-risk zones and required enhanced fastening for roofs, walls, and foundations to counter uplift and shear forces. This regional code emphasized missile impact testing for windows and doors, mandating resistance to debris propelled at 50 feet per second, and improved roof deck attachment patterns, such as 6d nails at 6-inch spacing along edges, to prevent sheathing blow-off observed in Andrew's failures. Building on these measures, Florida consolidated local variations into the uniform Florida Building Code effective March 1, 2002, which incorporated risk-based wind speed maps from the American Society of Civil Engineers' ASCE 7 standard and required continuous load paths from roof to foundation via hurricane straps and ties. The code also addressed non-structural elements, such as HVAC equipment anchorage and exterior component securement, following Andrew's revelation that loose appurtenances amplified damage through secondary projectiles. Enforcement was bolstered through mandatory inspections, third-party plan reviews in high-velocity hurricane zones like Miami-Dade and Broward counties, and penalties for non-compliance, rectifying pre-Andrew laxity where shoddy workmanship evaded oversight. Infrastructure adaptations included hardening utility systems and public facilities; for instance, upgraded transmission lines and substations with wind-resistant poles and undergrounding select lines in vulnerable areas post-Andrew. Academic and governmental investments led to the Wall of Wind facility at in 2007, simulating Category 5 gusts up to 157 mph to certify building products under ASTM E1886/E1996 protocols derived from Andrew's lessons. These changes demonstrably reduced vulnerability, as evidenced by structures built to post-Andrew standards sustaining minimal damage in later storms like in 2018, where pre-1992 homes fared far worse.

Advancements in hurricane preparedness

Hurricane Andrew's and forecasting challenges prompted significant investments in predictive technologies, enabling earlier and more accurate warnings that extend preparation time for at-risk populations. The (NOAA) reported a 75% in track forecast accuracy over the three decades following the storm, reducing average errors for 3-day forecasts from around 200 nautical miles in to approximately 50 nautical miles by the 2020s, primarily through enhanced models and increased aircraft reconnaissance missions. These advances, including the collocation of the Hurricane Research Division with the and development of specialized intensity change models to address shortcomings like the outdated SHIFOR system, allow forecasters to better anticipate rapid strengthening, as seen in Andrew's escalation from minimal hurricane status to Category 5 in under 36 hours. Refinements in warning dissemination systems emerged directly from post-Andrew assessments, shifting toward more timely, event-driven alerts rather than rigid schedules tied to routine advisories. The (NWS) implemented independent issuance of warnings, such as for embedded tornadoes, decoupling them from products to reduce delays observed during Andrew, when Hurricane Local Statements lagged critical local threats. Enhanced public communication protocols emphasized specific technical details in advisories, including projections and inland risks, fostering greater awareness and compliance with evacuation orders; this was coupled with expanded distribution of materials and annual FEMA-NWS workshops to train managers on interpreting probabilistic forecasts via accessible software. Evacuation planning in underwent targeted reforms, incorporating lessons from Andrew's gridlock-prone zones and underestimation of surge hazards, with the state developing more robust comprehensive plans that include "refuges of last resort" for scenarios where lead times prove insufficient. These changes, informed by post-storm reviews, integrated improved modeling for traffic flow and phased evacuations, alongside infrastructure like new routes, enabling safer, more orderly movements in subsequent hurricanes and reducing reliance on last-minute decisions. Public education campaigns, bolstered by NWS-FEMA collaborations, stressed inland flooding and dangers over coastal focus alone, contributing to higher evacuation rates and lower fatalities in later events despite .

Policy and scientific influences

Hurricane Andrew prompted a reanalysis of its intensity by NOAA researchers, utilizing GPS dropwindsondes and other advanced observations to determine sustained winds reached 175 mph at peak, reclassifying the storm as a Category 5 rather than the initial Category 4 assessment. This revision refined models of hurricane wind-pressure relationships and radial wind profiles, addressing prior underestimations based on limited surface data. The storm accelerated investments in hurricane , including supercomputers for enhanced modeling, frequent for real-time tracking, and robotic probes to measure subsurface conditions like heat content, which proved critical for predicting intensity beyond surface temperatures alone. Research initiatives, such as the University of Miami's SUSTAIN laboratory for simulating extreme air-sea interactions and projects analyzing decades of data on , emerged in direct response to Andrew's explosive strengthening from 75 mph to over 165 mph winds in under 36 hours. These efforts reduced the "" in track forecasts through methods like the North American Multi-Model . Forecast accuracy advanced markedly; three-day track errors declined by about 75% compared to 1992 levels, with five-day predictions now rivaling former three-day reliability, while intensity forecasting improved via better rapid intensification detection, though gaps persist. In policy terms, Andrew catalyzed Florida's overhaul of emergency management statutes. On September 11, 1992, Governor Lawton Chiles issued Executive Order 92-242, forming the Governor’s Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee under Philip D. Lewis, which delivered 94 recommendations by January 1993, emphasizing communication, evacuation, and interagency coordination. This led to 1993 enactments like House Bill 911 and Senate Bill 1858, establishing the Emergency Management, Preparedness, and Assistance Trust Fund—funded by insurance surcharges yielding $12.7 million annually—and mandating enhanced training and statewide plans. By 1995, these reforms produced a Statewide Mutual Aid Agreement, setting precedents for resilient disaster governance. Federally, the event informed NOAA's adoption of multi-model ensembles for Atlantic seasonal outlooks, integrating empirical lessons from into operational protocols.

References

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