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Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
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IRIB's northeast gate along Valiasr Street, Tehran

Key Information

The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB; Persian: سازمان صداوسیمای جمهوری اسلامی ایران, romanized: Sazmân-e Seda-o-sima-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslâmi-ye Irân, lit. 'Voice and Vision Service of the Islamic Republic of Iran') or Seda o Sima (Persian: صدا و سیمای, lit. 'Voice and Vision') for short, formerly called National Iranian Radio and Television until the Iranian revolution of 1979, is an Iranian state-controlled media corporation that holds a monopoly of domestic radio and television services in Iran. It is also among the largest media organizations in Asia and the Pacific region and a regular member of the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union.[2][3] Its head is appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[4]

With 13,000 employees and branches in 20 countries worldwide, including Italy, France, Belgium, Guyana, Malaysia, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting offers both domestic and foreign radio and television services, broadcasting 12 domestic television channels, four international news television channels, six satellite television channels for international audiences, and 30 provincial television channels countrywide, half of which are broadcast in minority-status languages in Iran, such as Azerbaijani and Kurdish, as well as the local dialects of Persian. IRIB provides 12 radio stations for domestic audiences, and through the IRIB World Service, 30 radio stations are available for foreign and international audiences.[citation needed] It also publishes the Persian-language newspaper Jam-e Jam.[5]

History

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Before the 1979 revolution

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On 24 April 1940, Radio Iran was officially opened by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi – the then crown prince of Iran – with Isa Sedigh as the first head of the company.[6] The channel broadcast five hour programs including news, traditional and western music, religious and sports programming as well as programs dedicated to economic and political discussion. according to estimates from the Statistical Center of Iran, in 1976 about 76% of urban population and 45% of rural population had access to the radio.

National Iranian Television officially opened on 21 March 1967 to create National Iranian Radio and Television. At that time, hardware equipment was at the disposal of the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone and its media was producing by Advertising and publishing department. In later years, radio and television expansion request across the country to create an integrated entity and from 1971 all facilities were given to National Radio and Television. The Shah personally appointed Reza Ghotbi as head of organization, and the duration of the programs increased quickly.

Before the 1979 revolution about 40% of TV programs were foreign, and imported and internal programs were usually modeled after foreign programs. After the revolution two TV channels (first program and second program) were active and with facility expansion, more than 95% of the urban population and about 75% of the overall population was able to receive TV signals.

After the 1979 revolution

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During the Iranian Revolution, when Gholam Reza Azhari became prime minister of Iran, Touraj Farazmand was chosen for head of National Iranian Radio and Television after Reza Ghotbi.[7]

The organization expanded greatly after the revolution, and in addition to internal and global broadcasting channels, it manages more than 100 electronic and written media.

A broadcasting budget of 4,000 billion Tomans was expected in the 2018 budget bill. However, according to Ali Asgari (the organization manager), a channel budget like that of BBC Persian consists of over 6,000 billion Tomans and IRIB needs a larger budget for managing 62 TV channels and 83 radio channels.[clarification needed]

Iran–Israel war

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Further information: Islamic Republic of Iran News Network
Israeli attack on IRIB studio in Tehran on 16 June 2025

During the Iran–Israel war, IRIB's headquarters including the studio of Islamic Republic of Iran News Network (IRINN) in Tehran was hit by an Israeli airstrike on 16 June during a live broadcast resulting in a temporary halt in programming.[8][9] Two IRIB employees, including IRINN's editor-in-chief, were killed in the attack, while the station said its offices were struck by four bombs.[10] The attack was condemned as a war crime by the International Federation of Journalists, saying "under international law, journalists are civilians, and deliberate attacks against them constitute war crimes".[11] The Committee to Protect Journalists also condemned the strike.[12]

Broadcasting sign

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  • Sign of National Iranian Radio and Television
    Sign of National Iranian Radio and Television
  • Sign of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
    Sign of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting

The IRIB sign includes the Emblem of the Islamic Republic at the top and two characters "لا". When this sign was conceived at the beginning of the revolution, it represented the revolution's slogan of "neither Eastern, nor Western – Islamic Republic" and thus symbolized denial of both capitalist and communist influence or specifically the United States and Soviet Union. These two words at the middle get together like a channel and there is an eye sign at the intersection of them (which was later adapted into the logo of the flagship television channel). At the bottom of the sign, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting phrase is written in Nastaliq font in the Persian language.

Organisational structure

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According to Article 175 of the Iranian constitution,

  1. The freedom of expression and dissemination of thoughts in the Radio and Television of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be guaranteed in keeping with the Islamic criteria and the best interests of the country.
  2. The appointment and dismissal of the head of the Radio and Television of the Islamic Republic of Iran rest with the Leader. A council consisting of two representatives each of the President, the head of the judiciary branch, and the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Iranian parliament shall supervise the functioning of this organization.
  3. The policies and the manner of managing the organization and its supervision will be determined by law.

Channels operated by IRIB

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  • IRIB TV1: Iran’s first and longest-running television channel, launched in 1958. It offers a wide array of programs including drama series, major Iranian movie premieres, talk shows, news coverage, and live broadcasts of the Friday prayers.
  • IRIB TV2: Similar to IRIB TV1, IRIB TV2 offers a variety of programming, including miniseries, comedies, children’s content, talk shows, news, and original films. It is promoted as the family-friendly network of the IRIB family.
  • IRIB TV3: Known for its youth-oriented content, IRIB TV3 places a significant emphasis on sports, airing major Iranian sporting events, along with comedies, mini-series, and both local and international movies.
  • IRIB TV4: A channel with a more intellectual focus, IRIB TV4 showcases documentaries, academic discussions, interviews with scholars, artistic films, economic shows, theatrical productions, and philosophical programs.
  • IRIB TV5/IRIB Tehran: Dedicated to viewers in Tehran, this channel features content tailored to the local audience.
  • IRINN: IRIB's primary news channel, providing updates on current events along with coverage of sports, science, and health topics.
  • Press TV: An English-language, 24-hour news channel that focuses on Iranian foreign policy. It has been accused of broadcasting government-backed propaganda, which has led to its bans and sanctions in several Western countries.

Affiliates

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  • Jam-e Jam is the official organ of the IRIB organization.
  • IRIB News Department is a news agency affiliated to the IRIB organization.
  • IRIB has a movie production company, called Sima Film.
  • IRIB also outsources media production to numerous privately owned domestic media companies.
  • TAKTA Co. produces technical equipment such as transmission and switching systems for IRIB
  • Soroush Rasaneh Co. IT & ICT Company related to IRIB which provides IPTV services and it has 26 branch offices in Iran.
  • Soroush Multimedia Co. provides CD/DVD of IRIB programs and holds some special short term education in 31 offices all over Iran.
  • IRIB Pension Fund Co. is the holding company of 17 companies related to IRIB, such as Soroush Multimedia Co., Soroush Rasaneh Co., and TAKTA CO.
  • IRIB University[13] provides some courses related to media
  • IRIB Research Center is responsible for research in the social and religious fields related to media.
  • IRIB Media Trade, known before as Cima Media Int'l, is the sole representative of IRIB in the distribution of its productions (documentaries, feature films, TV series, telefilms and animations) as well as program acquisition for local IRIB TV channels.
  • IRIB HD was a television channel run by IRIB. It was launched on 15 June 2014. This channel was a channel for test HD broadcasting. At 25 January 2016, it was removed in Tehran and replaced by provincial channel IRIB Tehran, as IRIB TV5 has been national.[citation needed]

Heads

[edit]
Head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
since 29 September 2021
Reports toCouncil of representatives of two each from:
President of Iran
Head of the Judiciary
Islamic Consultative Assembly
AppointerSupreme Leader of Iran
Constituting instrumentArticle 175 of the Constitution of Iran
PrecursorDirector-General of National Iranian Radio and Television (1966–1979)
Inaugural holderReza Ghotbi
Formation1966 (as Director-General of National Iranian Radio and Television)

The director-general of IRIB is Peyman Jebelli, who was appointed by the Supreme Leader of Iran in 2021.

# President Years Time in post
1 Reza Ghotbi 1966–1979 13 years
2 Sadegh Ghotbzadeh 1979 1 year
— Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha (acting)
& Other acting committees 		1979–1981 2 years
3 Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani 1981–1994 12 years
4 Ali Larijani 1994–2004 10 years
5 Ezzatollah Zarghami 2004–2014 10 years
6 Mohammad Sarafraz 2014–2016 2 years
7 Abdulali Ali-Asgari 2016–2021 5 years
8 Peyman Jebelli 2021–present in post

Controversies

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The isolation of Iran’s movie industry has forced filmmakers to reorient themselves around national television broadcasters. These networks churn out ideological products in line with the state’s Islamic gender norms, with women sometimes cast in traditional roles and deferential to men, who are portrayed as their guardians and protectors. Amid the intensified conflict with the United States, Iran’s security establishment has emerged as a major producer of blockbuster television and film centering on the prowess of the Revolutionary Guards and its intelligence services. Iran is awash in sophisticated domestic versions of “Homeland,” and lacks the self-interrogating, subversive cinema that allows a society to have a public conversation with itself about gender, culture, marriage, and power.[14]

Allegations of false confessions

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A study published in June 2020 by the Justice for Iran and the International Federation for Human Rights claimed that Iranian television had broadcast the potentially coerced confessions of 355 detainees since 2010.[15] Former prisoners stated they had been beaten and been threatened with sexual violence as a means for their false confessions to be delivered for use by the country's broadcasters.[15]

Censorship of reformists

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IRIB, along with other Iranian state-run media, tend to censor or silence voices or opinions of reformist politicians as well as ridicule them even as the reformists are in power since IRIB's editorial bias is closer to the Supreme Leader and the Principlists.[16][17]

April 2024 Iranian strikes in Israel

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In April 2024, IRIB reported on the April 2024 Iranian strikes against Israel — but it actually showed footage of a fire in Chile (not Israel), filmed several months prior.[18]

Religious insults

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In 1989, five IRIB employees were prosecuted over a radio report in which Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, was described as not being a suitable role model for women since she lived centuries ago. The incident reportedly resulted in lashes and purges in the agency.

In April 2025, four IRIB employees were arrested on charges related to the airing of a TV program insulting the Sunni caliph Abu Bakr. IRIB head Peiman Jebeli condemned the remarks as “sedition” and “unforgivable wrongdoing.”[19]

International sanctions

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United States

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Pursuant to the United States Presidential Executive Order 13628, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting is subjected to U.S. sanctions under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act which gives the U.S. Treasury Department the authority to designate those in Iran who restrict or deny the free flow of information to or from the Iranian people.[20]

European Union

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IRIB was placed in the list of sanctioned entities of the European Union in December 2022 due to its role in the repression of the Mahsa Amini protests.[21] Following this order, Eutelsat ceased broadcasts of the IRIB international channels for the Europe region via Hot Bird satellite on 21 December 2022.[22]

See also

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting

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from Grokipedia
The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is Iran's state-owned , constitutionally mandated as the exclusive legal operator of domestic radio and television services, functioning as a primary instrument for disseminating ideology and suppressing . Formed in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution to replace the secular National Iranian Radio and Television, IRIB operates under the direct oversight of the Supreme Leader, who appoints its director-general and ensures alignment with regime policies. With a network spanning over a dozen national TV channels, multiple radio stations, and international outlets targeting audiences in the and beyond, IRIB enforces a monopoly that prohibits private competitors, channeling state narratives on , , and while censoring reformist or oppositional content. Critics, including U.S. sanctions designations, highlight IRIB's role in airing coerced confessions from detainees, fabricating accusations against dissidents and foreigners, and serving as a arm that distorts facts to bolster the regime's . Notable incidents include the June 2025 Israeli airstrike on IRIB's headquarters, which disrupted operations and underscored its strategic value to the amid proxy conflicts.

History

Pre-1979 Revolution Establishment and Operations

Radio broadcasting in Iran commenced with the establishment of Radio Iran on April 24, 1940, during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. This state-operated service initially transmitted from Tehran, focusing on national programming to foster unity and disseminate government messages amid early modernization efforts. Television transmission began experimentally in 1958 under private commercial operation, marking Iran's entry into visual broadcasting. By the mid-1960s, the government had nationalized television services, integrating educational content through entities like the Educational Radio and Television of Iran (ERTI), which expanded to support literacy and development programs under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's White Revolution reforms. Coverage grew from urban centers, with transmitters enabling reception in major cities by the late 1960s. In 1971, Radio Iran merged with the National Iranian Television Network to form the National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT), a unified state broadcaster headquartered in . NIRT operated autonomously but under royal oversight, producing Persian-language content alongside regional dialects to reach diverse audiences. By the mid-1970s, it broadcast two television channels and multiple radio frequencies, emphasizing cultural promotion, entertainment, and pro-monarchy while incorporating Western formats like serials and news bulletins. The organization's infrastructure included studios and transmission towers, supporting nationwide reach estimated at over 50% of households by 1978 through expanding relay stations.

Post-1979 Revolution Reorganization and Islamization

Following the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy in February 1979, the National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT), established in , was swiftly reorganized under the new revolutionary authorities and renamed the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) by early 1979, marking its transition from a broadcaster to an instrument of the Islamic Republic's ideological apparatus. Under Article 175 of the 1979 Constitution (revised 1989), IRIB's operations were constitutionally subordinated to the Supreme Leader, who appoints its director-general for a five-year term, ensuring alignment with "the exalted Islamic and humanitarian objectives of the Revolution" and "the sublime criteria of " while prohibiting content contrary to public morals or revolutionary principles. This framework formalized IRIB's role as a monopoly broadcaster, with no private competition permitted, and empowered a supervisory including regime representatives to enforce compliance. Reorganization involved extensive purges of personnel perceived as loyal to the former regime; in the media sector broadly, at least 860 journalists were arrested, imprisoned, or executed in the decades following the revolution, with similar displacements occurring at IRIB where pre-revolutionary staff—often trained in Western styles—were replaced by ideologically aligned revolutionaries. Islamization of content was immediate and systemic: programming shifted from diverse, modernization-focused fare—including Western imports and satirical shows—to mandatory promotion of Shia Islamic doctrine, velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), anti-imperialist narratives, and strict moral codes, such as requiring for all female on-screen appearances by 1981 and prioritizing religious ceremonies, revolutionary history, and regime over or critical . This transformation expanded IRIB's channels from two national ones pre-revolution to multiple outlets by the , amplifying its reach for doctrinal dissemination amid the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988).

Expansion and Modernization Post-2000

In the early 2000s, IRIB intensified its international broadcasting efforts to extend Iran's narrative abroad, launching Press TV on July 8, 2007, as an English-language news channel targeting Western and global audiences with 24-hour coverage emphasizing perspectives aligned with Iranian state views. This was followed by the introduction of iFilm TV, an Arabic-language entertainment channel, in September 2010, which airs dubbed Iranian films and series to promote cultural soft power in the Arab world. In January 2012, IRIB debuted HispanTV, a Spanish-language satellite channel broadcasting news, documentaries, and programming to Latin America, with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inaugurating it as a counter to perceived Western media dominance. Domestically, IRIB proliferated its channel lineup from five nationwide networks in to approximately 47 national and regional television channels by , alongside 31 provincial outlets, enabling specialized content in news, sports, education, and youth programming. This growth included thematic channels like IRIB Nasim (launched September 17, 2013, for family-oriented content) and IRIB Ofogh (launched June 3, 2014, for documentaries), tested initially in before national rollout. Technological modernization accelerated with the completion of Iran's analog-to-digital transition in March 2012 across 31 provincial capitals, facilitating multiplexed signals for additional channels without spectrum expansion. IRIB adopted distribution for nationwide signal reliability and launched high-definition upgrades, including its second HD channel (Tehran Channel) in January 2016, building on initial HD tests from 2014. By 2021, infrastructure enhancements converted 16 standard-definition channels to HD and introduced 4K via terrestrial networks, enhancing production quality and viewer access through digital platforms like Telewebion for streaming. These upgrades, coupled with online extensions such as IRINN 2's streaming debut in August 2022 before terrestrial integration, supported IRIB's shift toward hybrid media delivery amid growing internet penetration in .

Organizational Structure

Governance and Leadership

The governance of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is established under Article 175 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which mandates that the Supreme Leader appoints and dismisses the head of IRIB and determines the organization's general policies to ensure alignment with Islamic criteria and the dignity of the Iranian nation. This constitutional provision places IRIB directly under the supervision of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, bypassing parliamentary or executive oversight typical of independent broadcasters in other nations. The structure emphasizes centralized control, with the head responsible for implementing these policies across domestic and international operations, reflecting the regime's prioritization of ideological conformity over journalistic autonomy. Peyman Jebelli serves as the current head of IRIB, appointed by Khamenei on September 29, 2021, succeeding Abdolali Ali-Asgari. Jebelli, a media executive with prior roles in state-affiliated outlets, has overseen IRIB's response to domestic unrest and , including U.S. designations in November 2022 for facilitating and interrogations aired on IRIB channels. Under his , IRIB maintains a hierarchical organization with deputy heads for programming, technical affairs, and international services, all subordinate to the Supreme Leader's directives, which prioritize promoting the Islamic Republic's narrative on issues like nuclear policy and regional influence. IRIB's leadership operates without public accountability mechanisms, as the head reports directly to the Supreme Leader rather than to elected bodies like the , enabling swift alignment with state priorities but drawing criticism from international observers for suppressing dissenting viewpoints. The organization's statutes, derived from Article 175, further stipulate that programming must adhere to Islamic principles, with the head empowered to enforce content guidelines that exclude material deemed contrary to or revolutionary values. This model contrasts with pluralistic systems, as evidenced by IRIB's role in coordinated coverage of events like the 2022 protests, where leadership directives ensured uniform regime-aligned reporting.

Funding Mechanisms and Budgetary Oversight

The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is primarily funded through direct allocations from the Iranian national budget, which constitutes the bulk of its operational revenue amid consistent financial deficits. In the 2024 budget, IRIB's total estimated expenses reached 140 rials, with the government required to cover the shortfall through increased appropriations as mandated by the (). For 2025, IRIB's allocation was set at 35 tomans, reflecting a 46% increase from the prior year and exceeding the combined budgets of ten government ministries, despite Iran's broader $35 billion national budget deficit. This funding model positions IRIB as one of the regime's most subsidized entities, with annual increases often outpacing and prioritizing ideological over fiscal efficiency. Budgetary oversight occurs principally through the , which debates, amends, and approves IRIB's proposed allocations as part of the annual national budget bill submitted by the . In 2017, for instance, the Majlis voted to double IRIB's budget to approximately $750 million, demonstrating parliamentary influence over funding levels. Recent sessions have seen similar interventions, such as mandates to elevate the government's share in covering IRIB's losses, though critics within and outside have contested these hikes amid and public discontent. Supplementary revenues from and commercial activities exist but are insufficient to offset deficits, rendering state appropriations indispensable. No mandatory receiver or license fees from households contribute to IRIB's funding, distinguishing it from public broadcasters in other nations. IRIB's financial autonomy is limited by its structural ties to the Supreme Leader's office, which appoints its leadership, yet parliamentary approval ensures some legislative scrutiny, albeit often yielding to regime priorities like amplification during crises. Budget growth—such as the 50% proposed increase for 2025—has drawn domestic backlash for diverting resources from welfare amid currency devaluation and exceeding 40%. In 2023, government financing alone totaled 79.38 trillion rials (about $158 million at official rates), underscoring reliance on taxpayer funds funneled through opaque budgeting processes prone to political maneuvering.

Internal Departments and Workforce

The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) operates through a hierarchical structure led by a president appointed by the Supreme Leader, with vice presidencies overseeing major functional areas such as planning, technical operations, programming, and international affairs. Key internal departments include the Technical Department for infrastructure and , the Programme Department for content production and scheduling, the Sports Department for athletic coverage, the Department for domestic and foreign reporting, the Legal Division for , the Publication Division for print and archival materials, and the Media Academy for training personnel. Specialized units such as the IT Department manage digital systems and cybersecurity, while the Department handles transmission and international signal distribution. IRIB's workforce comprises approximately 40,000 employees, including journalists, producers, technicians, and administrators, positioning it among the largest state media organizations in the Middle East. Personnel are predominantly state-salaried civil servants selected through processes emphasizing loyalty to the Islamic Republic's ideological framework, with recruitment often involving vetting by security apparatus to ensure alignment with regime narratives. The workforce includes dedicated "interrogator journalists" who collaborate with intelligence agencies like the Ministry of Intelligence and Security to produce and air coerced confessions from detainees, a practice documented in U.S. sanctions targeting six senior IRIB officials in November 2022 for enabling such broadcasts. Internal training and oversight prioritize ideological conformity, with the Media Academy providing courses on Islamic principles and state-approved journalism ethics to maintain content adherence to Supreme Leader directives. Despite its size, the workforce faces operational constraints from resource allocation tied to government budgets, which totaled around 10 trillion Iranian rials (approximately $240 million at official rates) for IRIB in the fiscal year ending March 2023, funding salaries and departmental activities amid economic pressures. Reports indicate high turnover in creative roles due to and , though core technical and news staff remain stable under regime control.

Programming and Operations

Domestic Television and Radio Channels

IRIB operates a monopoly on domestic in , providing and radio services through terrestrial, , and cable distribution to promote government-approved content, including religious programming, national , and cultural series aligned with the Islamic Republic's . The organization maintains approximately 12 national television channels alongside provincial outlets, with programming emphasizing state narratives, moral education, and avoidance of content deemed contrary to Islamic principles or regime interests. Radio services include around 12 national stations, supplemented by regional frequencies, focusing on , , religious recitations, and announcements. Television Channels
National television offerings center on generalist and specialized networks. IRIB TV1 serves as the primary channel, broadcasting news bulletins, historical dramas, family series, and religious programs since its establishment as Iran's first regular TV service in the late 1950s, though reoriented post-1979 to reflect revolutionary values. IRIB TV2 features entertainment-oriented content such as miniseries, comedies, movies, children's shows, talk programs, and periodic news segments. IRIB TV3 targets youth audiences with sports coverage, entertainment, and lighter programming, including live events and variety shows. IRIB TV4 emphasizes intellectual and educational material, including documentaries, academic discussions, scholarly interviews, artistic films, and economic analyses. Specialized channels include IRIB Quran for religious content, IRIB Amoozesh for formal education, IRIB Nasim for family comedies and light fare, IRIB Ofogh for documentaries, IRIB Mostanad for factual reporting, and IRIB Varzesh for sports, all reinforcing themes of national unity and Islamic ethics while excluding dissenting viewpoints. IRINN provides dedicated news coverage, often framing events to support official positions. Provincial channels, such as Tehran TV, adapt national formats to local languages and issues but remain under central oversight. Radio Channels
Domestic radio networks deliver audio content via AM, FM, and shortwave, with national stations like Radio Iran offering general news, talk, and music for broad audiences. Radio Javan focuses on youth programming with and cultural discussions. Radio Payam provides informational and segments aimed at rural and public outreach. Radio Quran specializes in Quranic recitations, religious lectures, and Islamic teachings. Other national outlets, such as Radio Farhang for cultural topics and Radio Maaref for knowledge-based content, contribute to a total of 12 primary domestic services, prioritizing regime-aligned messaging over independent journalism. Regional radio extends coverage in local dialects, but all adhere to IRIB's centralized editorial control, resulting in uniform ideological slant across frequencies.

International Broadcasting Networks

The international broadcasting networks of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) operate under its external services division, providing multilingual television and radio programming to global audiences to promote Iran's perspectives and counter Western media narratives. These networks, including , Al-Alam, and HispanTV, broadcast in languages such as English, Arabic, Spanish, and others, reaching viewers in the , , , , and beyond through satellite, online streaming, and digital platforms. Established post-1979 to extend ideological influence abroad, the networks receive substantial funding from IRIB's overall budget, which exceeded 240 trillion rials (approximately $480 million) in 2024, enabling operations despite . Press TV, IRIB's flagship English-language channel, launched on July 8, 2007, as a 24-hour news service headquartered in with correspondents in multiple countries, aiming to offer an "alternative" viewpoint to outlets like and . It focuses on international news with an emphasis on anti-imperialist themes, Iran's achievements, and criticism of U.S. and Israeli policies, broadcasting via satellite to over 100 countries and online globally. In January 2025, IRIB expanded with a Turkish-language service targeting audiences in and . Al-Alam, an Arabic-language news channel, began operations in 2003, providing 24-hour coverage oriented toward Arab viewers, particularly in , , and the broader , with programming that supports Iran's regional allies and critiques Sunni-led governments and Western interventions. Complementing it are other Arabic services like TV, focused on religious content, and iFilm networks for entertainment aimed at Arab audiences. Al-Alam Syria, a variant, targets Syrian viewers with similar ideological framing. HispanTV, launched on January 31, 2012, by then-President , serves Spanish-speaking regions in and , featuring news, documentaries, and cultural programs that highlight Iran-Latin American ties, oppose U.S. influence, and promote anti-Zionist narratives. In January 2025, IRIB introduced HispanTV Brasil, a Portuguese-language extension to engage Brazilian audiences amid growing Iran-Brazil diplomatic relations. Additional channels include Hausa TV for West African viewers and Sahar TV for global Persian and multilingual outreach, alongside international radio services in 30 languages. IRIB's international broadcasting strategy operates in synergy with Iran's global academic and religious networks. Prominent commentators on channels like HispanTV include clerics who lead major religious centers abroad, particularly in Latin America, and who received education at , Iran's primary institution for international Islamic outreach. This institutional overlap enables IRIB to extend influence within Shiite and Sunni communities worldwide by leveraging local religious figures to amplify Iranian ideological narratives and circumvent Western media restrictions. These networks collectively form IRIB's "" apparatus, though U.S. sanctions in 2022 designated IRIB executives for using them to spread state propaganda and false claims internationally.

Digital and Emerging Media Platforms

IRIB has extended its broadcasting operations into digital realms, providing and on-demand access to its channels via official websites such as irib.ir and Telewebion, its dedicated video-on-demand platform offering live broadcasts and archives of national and provincial channels. This includes internet delivery of over 150 television and radio services, enabling real-time viewing and archived content for domestic audiences navigating Iran's restricted environment. To centralize under state control, IRIB secured legislative authority over privately operated video-on-demand (VOD) platforms in 2023, mandating alignment with official content guidelines for services like Filimo and Namava. This followed interventions where IRIB-backed blocks on unauthorized streaming sites redirected users toward regulated alternatives, effectively monopolizing online video distribution. IRIB channels actively utilize social media for content promotion and audience interaction, with identified as the leading platform across domestic and international networks due to its visual format and evasion via VPNs in . Accounts for entities like IRIB News Agency on platforms including target global viewers, while domestic uploads to video-sharing sites such as support archival and supplementary distribution of programs, including news segments and documentaries. Emerging strategies emphasize international digital expansion, as seen in Press TV's 2024 launch of a Turkish-language service optimized for online dissemination to broaden ideological outreach. These platforms integrate with Iran's apparatus, incorporating influence operations to amplify state narratives amid competition from independent online voices.

Sociopolitical Role

Ideological Promotion and National Unity

The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is constitutionally mandated to diffuse and advance the principles of the 1979 Islamic Revolution through its programming. Under Article 175 of the Iranian Constitution, the head of IRIB is appointed by the Supreme Leader, ensuring alignment with the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (), which positions the organization as a key instrument for ideological dissemination. IRIB's general policies further require it to function as a "" promoting public awareness in ideological, political, and cultural domains consistent with Islamic tenets and revolutionary values, including the rejection of Western influence and the emphasis on (esteghlal). In pursuit of national unity, IRIB frames cohesion around loyalty to the Supreme Leader and resistance against perceived external threats, such as sanctions from the and , portraying these as unifying forces against . Programming often highlights collective triumphs, like Iran's nuclear advancements or military exercises, to instill a sense of shared revolutionary destiny over ethnic or secular divisions, prioritizing Islamic identity. Official statements underscore IRIB's role in "deepening trust and bolstering interaction between people and the ," as articulated by Iranian , with budget allocations rising 50% in the Iranian year beginning March 2025 to reinforce regime-aligned values amid economic pressures. IRIB has collaborated with the Intelligence Ministry and IRGC to produce high-budget series such as Gando and Safe House. These depict security agents as patriotic heroes combating foreign spies, often drawing from real cases of political activists and dual nationals portrayed as threats prior to judicial outcomes. Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi acknowledged the Ministry's production of Safe House to educate the public against espionage. This approach employs entertainment as soft power to legitimize repression and influence perceptions beyond traditional broadcasting. Critics, including former President , contend that IRIB undermines unity by vilifying domestic opponents as foreign agents, thereby exacerbating internal fissures rather than bridging them. This approach aligns with the regime's strategic use of media to suppress dissent, as evidenced by broadcasts of coerced confessions that label protesters as , which regime opponents argue prioritizes ideological purity over broad national . Despite such accusations, IRIB maintains that its content safeguards cohesion by countering "enemy " and promoting Islamic-Iranian teachings to enhance .

Educational and Cultural Programming

IRIB operates dedicated channels for educational content, including Amoozesh (Channel 7), which focuses on formal instruction such as curricula, preschool programs, and skill-building series like the Iran Television . During the in 2020, Amoozesh broadcast nationwide student lessons to sustain amid closures. This channel emphasizes categorical news alongside in subjects like , , and technical skills, serving as a primary tool for public instruction under state oversight. For cultural programming, IRIB TV4 (Shabake 4) airs documentaries, historical analyses, scientific debates, and content on Persian heritage, alongside IRIB Mostanad, a digital documentary channel launched on October 6, 2009, featuring Iranian-produced works on cultural themes. These outlets promote through explorations of Iranian , societal issues, and traditional , often integrating Islamic perspectives to align with the broadcaster's mandate. IRIB Ofogh complements this with elite-focused dialogues and specialized documentaries. In 2025, over 50 hours of Iranian cultural documentaries were prepared for international and broadcast, highlighting efforts to export regime-approved narratives of Persian-Islamic civilization. Such programming reinforces ideological cohesion by embedding revolutionary values, anti-Western sentiments, and religious observance into educational formats, functioning less as neutral and more as a mechanism for under theocratic control. ensures content avoids dissent, prioritizing content that sustains loyalty to the Islamic Republic's framework over pluralistic inquiry.

Coverage of Domestic Events and Protests

IRIB's coverage of domestic events and protests adheres closely to the Iranian government's official stance, often framing dissent as orchestrated by foreign adversaries such as the , , or domestic opponents like the Mujahedin-e-Khalq organization, while emphasizing security responses and portraying protesters as "rioters" or "thugs" rather than legitimate demonstrators voicing grievances. This approach minimizes reported casualties from government forces, highlights instances of vandalism or counter-demonstrations, and broadcasts coerced statements to undermine opposition claims. Such reporting has contributed to public distrust, particularly evident in surveys and during major unrest, where audiences turned to alternative sources for unfiltered accounts. ![Attack on IRIB's Live News Broadcasting Studio during protests](./assets/Attack_on_IRIB's_Live_News_Broadcasting_Studio_02_22 During the 2009 Green Movement protests, sparked by allegations of fraud in the June 12 presidential election won by , IRIB provided sparse coverage of opposition marches involving millions across cities like , instead prioritizing broadcasts of pro- rallies and official declarations that the unrest constituted a "" plot backed by Western intelligence agencies. The network aired forced confessions from arrested protesters and activists, presenting them as admissions of foreign collusion, a practice later cited in against IRIB for enabling repression. Protesters targeted IRIB facilities, including attempts to storm the headquarters on June 24 to seize control and demand impartial airtime for opposition voices, reflecting widespread perceptions of the broadcaster as a regime mouthpiece. In the November 2019 protests triggered by a sudden price hike on , IRIB delayed acknowledging the unrest, which spread to over 100 cities and resulted in an estimated 1,500 deaths according to sources inside , initially blacking out live footage and focusing on isolated acts of or attributed to "infiltrators." Subsequent reports emphasized arrests—over 1,000 within days—and aired interrogations of detainees denying security force abuses, aligning with government efforts to conceal the crackdown's scale. documented 321 specific fatalities, many by deliberate shootings to the head or torso, contrasting sharply with IRIB's narrative of minimal, justified interventions against criminal elements. The 2022 protests following the in morality police custody on September 16 ignited nationwide demonstrations under the slogan "," met by IRIB's portrayal of events as "riots" instigated by external enemies and domestic "hypocrites," with coverage spotlighting damaged property and security successes rather than underlying demands for reform. The broadcaster reported only 41 total deaths including police by late September, far below estimates exceeding 500, and featured "interrogator journalists" coercing relatives of slain protesters to recant claims of foul play on air. IRIB's live news was hacked multiple times, including on , overlaying anti-regime messages, images of killed demonstrators like Nika Shakarami, and flames engulfing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's portrait, exposing vulnerabilities and prompting blame on Israeli cyber operations. Additional included muting anti-government chants during Iran’s match on November 21. In the nationwide anti-government protests of early January 2026, protesters set fire to an office of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting in Isfahan, as verified by BBC Persian through footage analysis.

Controversies and Criticisms

Censorship Practices and Suppression of Dissent

The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) exercises a over television and radio in , enabling comprehensive of content that challenges the regime's authority. This control manifests in the systematic exclusion of dissenting voices, with IRIB refusing to air footage or reports of anti-government protests, instead framing such events as orchestrated by foreign adversaries or criminal elements. During the 2022 nationwide protests following the on September 16, 2022, IRIB broadcast minimal coverage of the demonstrations, prioritizing regime narratives that portrayed protesters as rioters influenced by external powers, while state authorities imposed parallel internet restrictions to limit alternative information flows. A prominent mechanism of suppression involves IRIB's airing of forced confessions extracted from detainees, which undermines opposition credibility and deters dissent. Between 2009 and 2019, IRIB broadcast at least 355 such coerced statements from political prisoners, journalists, and protesters, often obtained through , , or threats to family members. In response, the sanctioned six senior IRIB officials in November 2022 for producing and disseminating these confessions, particularly those tied to the 2022 protests, where IRIB aired interrogations of detained women to discredit the movement against compulsory veiling. Such broadcasts, described by monitors as tools, have been recurrent since the 2009 post-election unrest, serving to publicly humiliate dissidents and signal severe repercussions for opposition. IRIB also engages in proactive censorship of live events to align with regime ideology. For instance, during Iran's match against on November 21, 2022, amid ongoing s, IRIB's TV3 channel muted audio of players appearing to the and censored crowd chants critical of the , preventing domestic viewers from accessing unfiltered expressions of . This incident exemplifies IRIB's editorial interventions, which extend to blacking out satellite signals of foreign broadcasters and enforcing among its own journalists under threat of reprisal. The broadcaster's practices have drawn international condemnation, including prior U.S. sanctions in 2013 for enabling and abuses, underscoring its integral role in maintaining informational control to suppress public mobilization.

Allegations of Propaganda and Misinformation

The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) has been repeatedly accused of serving as a primary vehicle for state propaganda, systematically advancing the Iranian regime's ideological agenda while engaging in disinformation to discredit opposition and foreign adversaries. Operating under the direct supervision of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, IRIB's charter requires alignment with the Islamic Republic's principles, subordinating factual reporting to narratives that portray the government as infallible and external forces as existential threats. This structure inherently prioritizes regime promotion over independent journalism, as evidenced by its role in broadcasting content that justifies domestic repression and amplifies anti-Western rhetoric. In November 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on six senior IRIB officials, including producers known as "interrogator-journalists," for creating and airing forced confessions extracted from political detainees under duress, designating IRIB as a state broadcaster that fabricates narratives to legitimize repression. These sanctions highlighted IRIB's production of scripted videos featuring coerced admissions from protesters and dissidents, often aired to portray them as traitors or foreign spies rather than addressing underlying grievances. Similar practices were documented in Amnesty International's 2019 report on compelled "confessions" from women protesting compulsory veiling laws, where IRIB aired footage obtained through incommunicado detention and threats to extract propaganda material. IRIB's international arms, such as , have drawn specific allegations of misinformation and hate propagation. 's UK broadcasting license was revoked by in January 2012 for multiple breaches of impartiality and fairness rules, including failure to maintain standards in news presentation. A 2023 report by the detailed 's social media campaigns promoting anti-Semitic tropes, , and conspiracy theories framing and Jewish influence as global threats, aligning with Iran's state-sponsored . These efforts extend IRIB's domestic propaganda model abroad, using digital platforms to sow division and deny regime atrocities. During the nationwide protests sparked by Mahsa Amini's death in custody on September 16, 2022, IRIB engaged in by depicting demonstrators as orchestrated by Western intelligence agencies or ethnic separatists, downplaying police violence and inflating regime counter-narratives. under IRIB control repeatedly claimed protests were foreign plots, a tactic rooted in longstanding psychological operations to delegitimize , as analyzed in reports on Iran's disinformation playbook. This coverage contributed to a broader of , including fabricated stories of protester executions that were later debunked but initially amplified to confuse public perception. In March 2025, Iran's approved a 50 percent budget increase for IRIB—rising to approximately 10 trillion tomans (about $200 million USD at official rates)—despite and exceeding 40 percent, signaling the regime's prioritization of media control to manipulate amid internal unrest. Critics, including exiled Iranian analysts, argue this funding sustains IRIB's capacity for narrative dominance, such as glorifying military proxies like while omitting failures in regional conflicts. These allocations underscore allegations that IRIB functions less as a public broadcaster and more as a subsidized apparatus for ideological .

Human Rights Violations and Forced Confessions

The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) has systematically aired coerced confessions extracted from political prisoners, dissidents, and protesters under duress, often following , incommunicado detention, and threats to family members, as a means of to discredit opposition and justify repressive measures. Between 2009 and 2019, , including IRIB, broadcast at least 355 such forced confessions alongside defamatory content targeting victims' reputations, according to documentation by and the , which analyzed broadcasts revealing patterns of psychological coercion and scripted narratives. These practices violate international standards on fair trials and prohibitions against , as coerced statements undermine and serve to preempt judicial proceedings by publicly presuming guilt. Detainee testimonies indicate that IRIB's confession programs are frequently scripted and staged productions. Former prisoners have described being compelled to rehearse responses pre-written on whiteboards positioned behind the camera until their delivery seemed spontaneous and natural. A documented case of fabrication is the August 5, 2012, documentary "Terror Club" aired on IRIB Channel 1, which featured coerced confessions from 13 suspects accused of assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists, purportedly recruited by the CIA and Mossad. In 2019, Iranian government spokesperson Ali Rabiei confirmed the scenario was fabricated via torture and duress, resulting in the release of surviving suspects after an IRGC inquiry exposed Ministry of Intelligence orchestration of the frame-up. IRIB's involvement extends to employing "interrogator journalists" who collaborate with security forces to film these sessions, often in IRIB studios, amplifying the state's narrative control. In November 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned six senior IRIB officials, including those overseeing such programming, for facilitating the broadcast of forced confessions from Iranian, dual-national, and foreign detainees to distort facts and intimidate critics. Specific instances include the July 2019 airing of confessions from women protesters against compulsory veiling laws, obtained via prolonged and family threats, as reported by based on victim testimonies and broadcast analysis. Similarly, in November 2016, IRIB and affiliated outlets aired pre-execution "confessions" from Sunni men convicted in unfair trials, using the videos to retroactively legitimize capital sentences amid allegations of torture. During the 2022-2023 protests following Mahsa Amini's death, IRIB continued broadcasting coerced admissions from detainees, including on its channels to portray protesters as foreign agents or terrorists, contributing to a broader pattern condemned in Department human rights reports for enabling arbitrary detentions and suppressing dissent. In August 2025, IRIB Channel 2 aired a documentary featuring forced confessions from recently arrested Christian converts, accusing them of proselytizing under intelligence ministry pressure, as detailed by IranWire through analysis of the program and arrest timelines. A 2025 prison letter from activist Amir-Hossein Mousavi further highlighted ongoing , describing IRIB's role in scripting and filming admissions to break detainees' resistance. These broadcasts not only violate to privacy and but also perpetuate a climate of fear, deterring by associating public figures with fabricated crimes prior to any verdict.

Role in International Conflicts and Incitement

IRIB, as Iran's state-controlled broadcaster, has actively supported the Islamic Republic's proxy networks in regional conflicts, framing groups like , , and the Houthis as defenders against perceived aggressors such as and the . Through its international arms, including and HispanTV, IRIB disseminates narratives portraying these militias as part of an "axis of resistance" aligned with Iranian interests, often glorifying their military operations while condemning opposing forces as terrorists or imperialists. For instance, following 's operations against targets in August 2024, reported praise from 's Qassam Brigades, emphasizing coordinated resistance efforts. Similarly, IRIB leadership has publicly affirmed support for "resistance media" during escalations like the October 2023 attacks on , positioning the broadcaster as a conduit for ideological alignment in Iran's proxy strategy across , Gaza, and . In the context of direct confrontations with , IRIB's coverage has amplified calls for escalation, contributing to its designation by Israeli officials as a hub for . During the June 2025 Israeli strikes on IRIB's headquarters, which disrupted a and killed two staff members, 's Defense Minister described the organization as the "propaganda and broadcasting authority of the Iranian regime," citing its role in justifying proxy attacks. IRIB programming has routinely broadcast material endorsing Hezbollah's 2006 war against and subsequent rocket campaigns, as well as Hamas's October 7, 2023, assault, framing these as legitimate resistance rather than . This aligns with Iran's broader use of to mobilize support for proxies, including in where IRIB echoed regime narratives backing against rebels, though direct operational coordination remains unverified beyond amplification. Critics, including monitoring groups, have documented IRIB-affiliated content as crossing into incitement, particularly through antisemitic tropes and endorsements of violence against and targets. Press TV's "Palestine Declassified" series, for example, has promoted conspiracy theories blaming for global conflicts and included viewer comments explicitly calling for the "destruction" of , with the platform failing to moderate such rhetoric despite platform policies. The analyzed over 100 instances of such material on Press TV's , reaching millions, including and justifications for attacks on civilians. HispanTV, IRIB's Spanish-language outlet, has similarly propagated anti-Jewish hatred in , with reports citing content inciting violence against the "" even prior to major escalations. These patterns reflect IRIB's integration into Iran's "soft war" doctrine, where media serves as a tool for ideological export, though Iranian officials maintain it as legitimate journalism countering Western bias.

International Sanctions and Responses

United States Actions and Justifications

The United States designated the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) on February 6, 2013, pursuant to Executive Order 13628, for restricting or denying the free flow of information to or from the Iranian people or the Government of Iran. This action, authorized under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, placed IRIB on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with it and blocking its assets under U.S. jurisdiction. The justification centered on IRIB's role in facilitating the Iranian regime's censorship and suppression of independent media, thereby undermining the dissemination of uncensored information critical to countering state control over public discourse. On November 16, 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's (OFAC) imposed sanctions on six senior IRIB officials under Executive Order 13846, which targets persons engaging in censorship or other specified activities with respect to . The designated individuals included Peyman Jebelli, IRIB's director since September 2021, who collaborated with the (IRGC) to produce false narratives; Mohsen Bormahani, deputy director involved in replacing channel leadership with regime loyalists; and "interrogator-journalists" such as Ali Rezvani, who coerced and broadcast forced confessions from detainees including opposition figure and Kavous Seyed-Emami. Other targets were Ameneh Sadat Zabihpour, who produced aired confessions from British-Iranian and Baha'i community members; Ahmad Noroozi, head of IRIB World Service; and Yousef Pouranvari, director of foreign language programming. These sanctions were justified as measures to hold accountable IRIB's function as a arm of the Iranian , enabling human rights abuses through the systematic airing of coerced confessions and that bolsters domestic repression and international narratives aligned with Tehran's interests. U.S. officials emphasized that IRIB deviates from objective journalism by serving as an instrument of and psychological coercion, including fabricating evidence against political prisoners and dual nationals to delegitimize and deter opposition. The actions aim to disrupt IRIB's capacity to export while signaling that entities complicit in Iran's information control and rights violations face financial isolation, though periodic waivers have been granted for limited humanitarian or diplomatic purposes.

European Union and Multilateral Sanctions

The imposed sanctions on key figures associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) in March 2012, targeting Ezzatollah Zarghami, then-head of IRIB, for authorizing the broadcast of forced confessions obtained from detainees following the 2009 post-election protests. These measures were enacted under the EU's sanctions regime against , freezing assets and imposing travel bans, in response to IRIB's role in disseminating state-orchestrated that included coerced admissions violating international standards on fair trials and prohibitions. On December 12, 2022, the formally designated IRIB itself as an entity responsible for serious abuses, amid the regime's violent suppression of nationwide protests triggered by the death of Mahsa Amini in custody. The designation cited IRIB's systematic involvement in producing and airing content that justified the crackdown, including fabricated narratives and footage of coerced testimonies, thereby enabling the regime's and tactics. This action extended asset freezes and prohibitions on EU entities providing funds or economic resources to IRIB, aligning with broader Council Decision (CFSP) 2011/235 updating the Iran sanctions list. Multilateral sanctions on IRIB have been coordinated among Western allies, with Canada designating IRIB and its affiliates in 2012 and subsequently for complicity in forced confessions and protest coverage distortions. These measures complement EU actions by targeting IRIB's international outreach, such as Press TV, which the EU separately sanctioned in November 2022 for broadcasting coerced statements from political prisoners. No United Nations-wide sanctions specifically on IRIB have been imposed, though the entity's operations have drawn scrutiny in multilateral forums for undermining media freedom and inciting violence against dissenters. The aligned sanctions reflect a consensus on IRIB's function as a state instrument for , with empirical evidence from broadcast archives showing patterns of during events like the 2022 protests, where over 500 deaths were reported by independent monitors.

Iranian Countermeasures and Sanctions Evasion

The Iranian government has characterized on the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRIB) as illegitimate attempts to suppress its narrative on global affairs and domestic policies, asserting that such measures infringe on national sovereignty and media independence. Despite U.S. designations of IRIB and six senior officials in November 2022 under 13628 for forced confessions and suppressing , the organization has sustained operations through state-controlled domestic funding mechanisms, including parliamentary allocations from the national budget—totaling approximately 2,500 billion tomans (around $60 million USD at official rates) for 1402 (2023–2024)—and revenues from mandatory television receiver fees equivalent to 1% of certain electricity bills. This internal financial structure insulates IRIB from disruptions in Western financial networks, enabling uninterrupted domestic programming and production. To mitigate impacts on international outreach, has leveraged diplomatic negotiations, particularly during nuclear talks, to secure temporary waivers of sanctions. In 2014, the Obama administration waived penalties on IRIB initially imposed in 2013, citing the need to facilitate broader policy objectives, which allowed the broadcaster's affiliates to resume certain cross-border transactions and satellite uplinks. Similar relief was extended under the 2015 (JCPOA), permitting IRIB channels like to regain access to European airwaves via providers such as after prior bans. The Biden administration renewed this waiver in August 2024, despite ongoing designations, arguing it supported targeted non-proliferation efforts without broadly easing restrictions. These waivers represent a key countermeasure, as has conditioned compliance in nuclear discussions on such concessions, effectively circumventing full enforcement through bargaining rather than outright violation. IRIB has also pursued technological adaptations to sustain global dissemination amid sanctions, relying on satellite providers in non-Western jurisdictions and expanding online streaming via platforms hosted in allied countries like and , which face fewer alignment pressures from U.S. or enforcers. While U.S. authorities have disrupted broader Iranian networks involving front companies for equipment —such as those evading export controls on technology—no public designations specifically tie IRIB to illicit schemes, though general Iranian tactics include rebranding subsidiaries and using third-country intermediaries. Iran's Supreme Leader has publicly directed to amplify anti-sanctions rhetoric, framing them as "economic " to rally domestic support and justify resource prioritization for IRIB amid fiscal strains. These strategies have enabled IRIB to maintain a presence in over 100 countries via 15 international channels, in multiple languages despite targeted restrictions on officials like director Ezzatollah Zarghami.

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  94. https://iranwire.com/en/religious-minorities/144168-iranian-state-tv-airs-forced-confessions-of-christian-converts/
  95. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202510087300
  96. https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/08/25/732064/Qassam-Brigades-Hezbollah
  97. https://www.presstv.co.uk/Detail/2023/11/10/714349/IRIB-Peyman-Jebelli-resistance-front-media-Israeli-onslaught
  98. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3w46pw2xn0o
  99. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/16/iranian-state-broadcaster-dubbed-torture-tv-struck-by-idf/
  100. https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/09/19/733601/Lebanon-Hezbollah-Palestine-Israel-
  101. https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2024-07/ADL24-HispanTV.pdf
  102. https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ideological-expansion/presstv
  103. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0397
  104. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1847
  105. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-iran/
  106. https://data.europa.eu/apps/eusanctionstracker/subjects/146479
  107. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/12/iran-eu-adopts-council-conclusions-and-additional-restrictive-measures/
  108. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2022/dec/15/new-eu-and-british-sanctions-iran
  109. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/14/iran-eu-adopts-additional-sanctions-against-perpetrators-of-serious-human-rights-violations/
  110. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/terrorism-a-fundamentalism/iran-news-reuters-accused-of-supplying-4-million-in-services-to-sanctioned-irib-and-press-tv/
  111. https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions
  112. https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-waives-sanctions-on-iran-broadcaster/
  113. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl1969
  114. https://www.jns.org/biden-harris-admin-waives-sanctions-on-state-run-iranian-media/
  115. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0220
  116. https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/08/sanctioning-facilitators-of-iran-sanctions-circumvention-and-political-oppression
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