Hubbry Logo
Khost ProvinceKhost ProvinceMain
Open search
Khost Province
Community hub
Khost Province
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Khost Province
Khost Province
Khost Province
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Khost (Pashto[a], Dari[b]: خوست), is one of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan located in the southeastern part of the country. Khost consists of thirteen districts and the city of Khost serves as the capital of the province. Historically, Khost used to be a part of Paktia and a larger region surrounding Khost is still referred to as Loya Paktia.

Key Information

Throughout history, the province has been the site for numerous rebellions, leading to the local Pashtun populace to consider themselves the “traditional king-makers in Kabul”.[7] The province was previously known as the Southern province and was united with the neighbouring Paktia province. Khost is also home to numerous universities, including Shaikh Zayed University, which is the only university in Afghanistan with a faculty in computer science.[8]

As of 2021, it was estimated that the population of the province stood at 647,730, which makes it the 16th most populated province in Afghanistan.[5]

Khost International Airport began providing the province with international flights after it was inaugurated by the former president Ashraf Ghani on July 10, 2021.[9]

To the east, Khost Province is bordered by the North Waziristan and Kurram districts of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. To the north, it is bordered by the Nangarhar. To the south, it is bordered by Paktika. To the west, it is bordered by Paktia.

History

[edit]

Second Anglo-Afghan War

[edit]
See also: Second Anglo-Afghan War
Military engagement near Khost.

During the second Anglo-Afghan War, British forces led by Lord Roberts entered the province. Approximately 8,000 raiders from the Mangal tribe, which had a long tradition of resisting outside control, launched several attacks on weakly protected British supply convoys in Khost Province. In reprisal, Lord Roberts ordered his forces to attack eleven Mangal villages which had launched raids that murdered several camp followers, resulting in them being sacked and burnt. As the news of the reprisals spread over Britain, his political opponents in the British parliament criticized Lord Robert's actions. At the end of the conflict, British forces withdrew from the province.[10][11]

Khost rebellion (1924–1925)

[edit]
See also: Khost rebellion (1924-1925)
Map of the Southern Province.

In 1924, the province of Khost, then known as the Southern province, was the site of a rebellion against Emir Amanullah Khan by the Mangal tribe. The rebellion began in March 1924 when Mulla Abd Allah accused a local official of violating Sharia by forbidding a marriage in accordance with a new family law as the father of the bride in question had pledged her to another man whilst she was an infant. As a result, Mulla Abd Allah issued a fatwa against Amanullah Khan, condemning him as a kafir(infidel) and launching Jihad after a failed attempt was made by mediators to justify the new laws. The rebels were soon joined by the son of the former king Yaqub Khan, Abd-al Karim, who managed to escape British surveillance and moved to Khost, where he was crowned king by the rebels. Rebel forces then conquered the city of Gardez, which is adjacent to Khost. By late July, the rebels had captured Hisarak, which was 12 kilometres far from the capital, Kabul. However, the rebels didn’t try to seize the capital and instead returned to Khost, taking the spoils of war with them.[12]

The Deobandi-trained council of ’ulama’ issued a fatwa denouncing Mulla Abd Allah as a rebel and began to provide Amanullah Khan with levies after he allowed them to alter the constitution so that it would align with their interpretation of Sharia. In August, Shah Wali Khan attacked the rebels in Logar whilst the Afghan Air Force were simultaneously bombing rebel positions. By early October, government forces had regained possession of the city of Gardez. Two months later, tribal leaders from Khost travelled to Kabul with the aim of initiating a peace process, only to be thrown in jail. Mulla Abd Allah, along with his three sons, were eventually captured and executed, and the rebellion was quelled in January 1925. Shah Wali Khan burned and looted more than 300 homes in Khost and brought 600 female captives back with him to Kabul, where they were distributed amongst the Mohammadzais as war booty.[13] In the aftermath of the government’s victory, Amanullah Khan decided to construct a victory pillar in Kabul to commemorate his vanquishing of the rebels. The new pillar was meant to demonstrate the “triumph of knowledge over ignorance”.[14]

Soviet–Afghan War

[edit]
See also: Soviet–Afghan War
Map of the Mujahideen in 1985.

In April 1978, the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan staged a coup d'état against the then president Mohammed Daoud Khan, ending the Republic of Afghanistan and establishing the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan under the rule of Nur Muhammad Taraki, who would later be overthrown and killed by Hafizullah Amin in 1979. The coup is also known as the Saur Revolution. In late 1978, a rebellion occurred in the remote region of Nuristan, but it didn't spread to the other parts of the country due to its isolation.[15] The new communist government strived to eliminate illiteracy and implement agrarian reforms by sending literacy campaigners and agrarian reformers to various provinces, including Khost.[16] Following a rebellion by the Zadran tribe, a Pashtun tribe native to Loya Paktia, president Hafizullah Amin decided to launch a full scale military operation in Paktia. The operation was a "crushing defeat" and it, alongside the ousting of former President Taraki, was one of the reasons why the Soviets decided to intervene in December 1979, thus starting the Soviet–Afghan War.[17]

At the end of July 1983, the forces of Jalaluddin Haqqani laid siege to two towns in Khost and the Tani, Mangal, Zazai and Waziri tribes began taking an active part in the fighting, despite being passive up until then. All of the aforementioned events coincided with the appeal of former King Mohammed Zahir Shah for a united front, which caused rumours about the Royalists intending to establish a provisional government in a liberated Khost. However, Khost wasn't captured and by October, the Tani tribe had withdrawn from coalition due to a tribal rivalry with the Zadran. Many rebels also returned home as winter came on. By the end of December, government forces arriving from Gardez ended the siege of the two towns and recaputered Zazi Maidan.[18]

Khost was considered a "bastion of the regime" during the Soviet–Afghan War and its loyalty to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan allowed it to be granted a de facto provincial status in 1986. This provided the province with a force of paid provincial staff and an annual budget that was separate from the neighbouring provinces.[19]

1993-present

[edit]

Khost Province saw the Battles of Zhawar and part of Operation Infinite Reach. Khost Province was captured by the Taliban during the 2021 Taliban offensive on August 15, 2021.[20]

On 16 April 2022, Pakistani airstrikes targeted several villages in Spera District, including Afghan-Dubai, Pasa Mela, Mir Sapar, Mandata, and Kanai, and struck refugee camps belonging to internally displaced persons from Waziristan, killing at least 41 people, mainly women and children, and wounding 22 others, according to the Taliban interim government. Pakistan claimed it struck TTP camps.[21][22][23][24][25]

On 22 June 2022, a magnitude 5.9 earthquake struck the province. In Spera District, approximately 500 homes were destroyed, and 40 people were killed, with 95 others injured.[26][27] Many houses constructed primarily of mud and wood were razed to the ground.[26] Heavy rain and the earthquake contributed to landslides that destroyed entire hamlets.[28]

Healthcare

[edit]
Further information: Health in Afghanistan

The percentage of households with clean drinking water increased from 34% in 2005 to 35% in 2011.[29] The percentage of births attended to by a skilled birth attendant increased from 18% in 2005 to 32% in 2011.[29]

Education

[edit]
Further information: Education in Afghanistan

The overall literacy rate (6+ years of age) fell from 28% in 2005 to 15% in 2011.[29] The overall net enrolment rate (6–13 years of age) fell from 38% in 2005 to 37% in 2011.[29]

Universities

[edit]
See also: List of universities in Afghanistan
Image of Shaikh Zayed University.

There are multiple universities in Khost, the following list consists of all of the universities that can be found in the province:

Demographics

[edit]
Further information: Demography of Afghanistan
Districts of Khost and surrounding areas.

As of 2021, the population of the province is around 950,000 people.[5][30] Other sources put the number at over a million.[31]

The Pashtun people make up 99% of the population, with the remaining 1% being Tajiks and others.[32]

Districts of Khost

Districts of Khost:

Districts of Khost Province
District Capital Population Area
in km2 		Pop.
density 		Ethnic groups
Bak 24,977 139 180 >99% Pashtun.
Gurbuz 29,627 379 78 >99% Pashtun.
Jaji Maydan 27,236 331 82 >99% Pashtun.
Khost Khost 156,106 418 373 Predominantly Pashtun, few Tajiks.
Mandozayi 63,772 128 498 >99% Pashtun.
Musa Khel 46,368 470 99 >99% Pashtun.
Nadir Shah Kot 36,005 381 94 >99% Pashtun.
Qalandar 11,559 100 116 >99% Pashtun.
Sabari 80,114 259 310 >99% Pashtun.
Shamal 15,411 169 91 >99% Pashtun.
Spera 27,501 499 55 >99% Pashtun.
Tani 67,360 410 164 >99% Pashtun.
Tirazayi 50,486 427 118 >99% Pashtun.
Khost 636,522 4,235 150 99.8% Pashtuns, 0.2% Tajiks.[note 1]
  1. ^ Note: "Predominantely" or "dominated" is interpreted as 99%, "majority" as 70%, "mixed" as 1/(number of ethnicities), "minority" as 30% and "few" or "some" as 1%.

Water

[edit]

Khost Province is traversed by the Kurram River, which rises from the Rokian Defile, passes through the district, and then enters the "country of the Turis or the Kurram Valley".[33]

[edit]
  • Khost, the capital of Khost province
    Khost, the capital of Khost province
  • Children in Khost
    Children in Khost

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Khost Province

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Khost Province is a landlocked province in southeastern , bordering along the disputed to the southeast, with its capital at the city of . Covering 4,152 square kilometers, the province has an estimated population of 644,119, predominantly ethnic from tribes such as the Khostwal, Mangal, and Zadran, who make up 99 percent of residents and adhere mainly to . The features rugged, mountainous interspersed with fertile valleys, supporting an agriculture-based economy centered on , , , and , with recent developments in and greenhouse cultivation enhancing productivity. Comprising 13 , has long been characterized by strong tribal affiliations and cross-border kinship ties, rendering it a strategic area prone to , militancy, and influence from networks like the Haqqani group, which has operated as a affiliate from bases in the province. Under the -led Islamic Emirate since their 2021 takeover, the province experiences governance emphasizing Islamic law enforcement and border security measures amid ongoing regional tensions with .

Geography

Location and Borders

Khost Province occupies a position in southeastern , directly along the international with . The province lies within the eastern region of the country, characterized by its proximity to the rugged terrain of the Afghan-Pakistani frontier. Its external boundaries primarily abut 's , including to the east and elements of South Waziristan and Kurram Agency further along the southeastern perimeter, with the Ghulam Khan crossing serving as a key point of connectivity. Internally, Khost Province shares borders with to the northwest, to the southwest, and to the west. These adjacencies position Khost within a cluster of eastern Afghan provinces dominated by Pashtun populations and mountainous landscapes. The province's capital, city, is situated approximately 150 kilometers southeast of , serving as the administrative and population center in a predominantly rural setting. The province encompasses several districts, including Musa Khel, Tani, Spera, and others, which collectively form its administrative divisions amid varied terrain. Khost's strategic geographical placement near Pakistani tribal regions has historically facilitated cross-border networks among Pashtun communities, who often view the border as permeable due to ethnic and kinship ties rather than a strict national divide. This proximity has supported patterns of migration and legitimate , underscoring the province's role in regional connectivity without endorsing unauthorized activities.

Topography and Natural Resources

Khost Province exhibits a rugged, mountainous characterized by hills and peaks extending from the southern system, with influences from the adjacent ' eastern spurs in southeastern . Elevations generally range from about 1,000 meters along the central plateau near the provincial capital to peaks exceeding 2,800 meters in the northern districts, such as the Khost-Gardez Pass at 2,897 meters. This terrain features steep slopes, narrow valleys, and dissected plateaus, limiting flat expanses to small alluvial basins suitable for localized settlement and . The province's landscape supports sparse vegetation and is marked by seasonal wadis and rivers dependent on inflows from , with aquifers providing primary water sources amid semi-arid conditions receiving 250-400 mm annual . Arable land is confined to valley floors, comprising less than 10% of the total area, where terraced farming and dryland cultivation predominate, though from steep gradients hampers productivity. Geological formations include basement rocks and ophiolitic sequences, contributing to the province's fractured, faulted relief that enhances defensive positions but impedes transportation and development. Natural resources remain limited, with chromite emerging as the primary exploitable following small-scale extractions initiated in 2023. Operations in Tani District's chromite deposits and the Rakhak-Mangi site in Zazai Maidan yielded up to 21,500 tons annually at rates of 10,000 Afghanis per ton, processed by private firms under oversight. and occurrences have been identified, including a significant quartz vein discovered in May 2025, but these lack systematic surveying for commercial viability. USGS assessments of Afghanistan's southeastern tracts, including , highlight minor pods in ultramafic units but underscore low-grade deposits and infrastructural barriers, rendering industrial unfeasible without foreign investment and advanced technology. Seasonal rivers offer limited potential, while broader arid constraints and security issues further diminish resource extraction prospects.

History

Early Tribal and Pre-Modern Period

Khost Province, historically part of the Loya Paktya region, has been predominantly inhabited by including the Mangal, Zadran, Jaji, and Gurbuzi, whose presence traces to medieval confederacies within the broader Pashtun lineage. These groups maintained semi-autonomy in the rugged southeastern frontier, leveraging the mountainous terrain to limit external control prior to the . Local khans oversaw tribal affairs, fostering through customary institutions rather than imposed hierarchies. During the (1747–1823), functioned as a along the eastern marches, where tribes like the Gurbuzi negotiated tribute payments for land use while resisting deeper centralization efforts by the loose Pashtun confederation. By the 19th century, the area was administratively divided into sub-districts aligned with major tribes—Mangal, Zadran, Jaji, and Tani—under khan-led structures that prioritized tribal solidarity over Kabul's influence. Governance relied on jirgas, assemblies of elders enforcing , the ancient Pashtun code regulating disputes, hospitality, and vendettas through consensus rather than state edicts. This system underscored enduring tribal independence, with weak state penetration until partial subjugation under Amir around 1891. Ethnographic accounts highlight adaptive strategies suited to the sparse, elevated landscape, including low population densities and among Kuchi herders who conducted seasonal migrations for , integrating with settled tribal economies. These practices reinforced tribal resilience, as mobility and decentralized authority mitigated vulnerabilities in the pre-modern frontier.

19th-20th Century Rebellions Against Central Authority

During the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), tribes in Khost Province actively resisted British invasion forces, with local fighters engaging advancing units as early as 1879 when British troops entered the region for the first time. This resistance contributed to broader tribal disruptions along supply routes in southern Afghanistan, complicating British logistics amid efforts to install a puppet emir and secure influence against Russian expansion. Such actions stemmed from longstanding tribal autonomy in the rugged border areas, where central Afghan authority under Emir Sher Ali Khan was weak, prioritizing defense of local territories over allegiance to Kabul's faltering campaigns. In the early , saw direct uprisings against Afghan central rulers, exemplified by the 1912 rebellion under Emir , marking the only major internal crisis of his reign and highlighting persistent tensions over taxation and governance interference in tribal affairs. The most significant revolt occurred in 1924–1925, when Mangal Pashtun tribesmen in , led by figures like Abdullah Khan and local mullahs, rose against King Amanullah Khan's modernization reforms enacted in 1923. These policies imposed new taxes, compulsory military , and cultural changes such as mandatory veiling for women and , perceived by rebels as erosions of Islamic traditions, economic burdens, and threats to tribal self-rule rather than mere resistance to progress. Rebels quickly seized control of , establishing a provisional administration and declaring temporary , drawing support from allied tribes and sustaining the uprising for nearly a year through guerrilla tactics that inflicted significant losses. forces, bolstered by , —the first use of the Afghan Air Force in combat—and levies from rival tribes, eventually suppressed the rebellion by late 1924, with mullah leaders executed publicly in May 1925; estimates of total Afghan casualties ranged from 2,000 to over 14,000, underscoring the rebels' fierce defense of local interests until overwhelmed by superior firepower. This pattern of revolts demonstrated Khost tribes' capacity to delay centralization, rooted in pragmatic opposition to policies disrupting established social and economic structures, rather than ideological abstraction.

Soviet-Afghan War and Mujahideen Resistance

During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), Khost Province emerged as a major center of resistance due to its proximity to the border and rugged terrain, which facilitated guerrilla operations against Soviet and (DRA) forces. groups, primarily from local such as the Zadran and Mangal, encircled the provincial capital of starting in 1980, isolating the Soviet-backed garrison and severing ground supply lines, compelling reliance on vulnerable airlifts. This prolonged siege, lasting through much of the war, exemplified effective asymmetric tactics, including ambushes on lines of communication (LOCs) and attacks on the Khost airfield, which disrupted Soviet logistics despite repeated relief operations. Heavy combat concentrated in districts like Tani, Nadir Shah Kot, Mandozai, Shamal, and Spera, where exploited mountainous passes for hit-and-run raids and to control infiltration corridors from Pakistan's North Agency. In Tani District, a mujahideen stronghold, fighters dominated key routes, launching sustained attacks that prevented Soviet consolidation and contributed to tribal disunity exploited by both sides. Nadir Shah Kot saw intense engagements, including a mujahideen capture of an outlying post of the DRA's 59th in early 1983, resulting in 130 government troops killed or captured, further tightening the noose around city. These actions stemmed from local defenses of tribal and Islamic practices against Soviet-imposed secular reforms, which lacked legitimacy among Pashtun communities and fueled persistent insurgency rather than co-optation. Prominent mujahideen commander , affiliated with Hezb-e Islami Khalis and based in Mandozai District, coordinated operations from Khost-area strongholds like and Jaji Maidan, utilizing cross-border supply routes such as those from Khama Ghar in through Spera District. Haqqani's forces received arms via Pakistani (ISI) channels, including Pakistani-supplied weapons funneled through USAID and CIA programs originating in Pakistan's bazaars and distributed to faction leaders. The introduction of U.S.-supplied man-portable air-defense systems, first tested in by Haqqani subordinate Mawlawi Hanif Shah, proved decisive by downing Soviet helicopters and , eroding air superiority and exacerbating supply shortages for the besieged during the late 1980s. Empirical evidence from declassified assessments indicates Khost's resistance inflicted disproportionate costs on Soviet forces relative to the province's size, with tactics amplifying casualties through denial of terrain and sustained attrition, though precise provincial figures remain elusive amid broader war estimates of 15,000 Soviet deaths. The failure of Soviet to integrate local structures or counter tribal motivations underscored causal factors in the war's prolongation, as external arms inflows via border routes sustained operations that ground forces alone could not suppress.

Civil War, Taliban Emergence, and Pre-2001 Conflicts

Following the collapse of the Najibullah government in April 1992, Khost Province experienced intense infighting amid a national power vacuum, with rival factions such as Hizb-i Islami under clashing against Jamiat-i Islami forces loyal to , resulting in localized warlord control, extortion rackets, and disrupted trade routes that devastated the local economy. Local commanders like , leader of the Khalis faction of Hizb-i Islami—who had previously commanded resistance in Khost during the Soviet era—asserted dominance in the province's border areas, sheltering fighters and engaging in alliances that perpetuated factional violence until the mid-1990s. The movement, originating among Pashtun religious students in in 1994 to combat corruption and banditry, expanded eastward and seized in early 1995, displacing remaining holdouts and establishing courts that prioritized of local militias over prolonged rivalries. Haqqani aligned with the shortly thereafter, serving as a minister in their regime and integrating his networks into provincial administration, which allowed —along with adjacent Paktya and Paktika—to operate under semi-autonomous local governors rather than strict oversight from -based leadership. This transition curtailed the chaos of mujahideen-era checkpoints and feuds, enabling safer passage for goods and reducing opportunistic predation that had plagued the region post-1992, though enforcement relied on harsh corporal punishments and conscription. Pre-9/11, Khost's proximity to Pakistan's tribal areas facilitated the hosting of Arab veterans by Haqqani-linked groups, with verifiable operatives using the province as a node for and transit, yet local priorities centered on internal consolidation and border security over transnational plotting. Haqqani's facilitation of foreign fighters stemmed from jihadist solidarity forged in the anti-Soviet struggle, but provincial governance emphasized Pashtun tribal codes and anti-warlord purges, subordinating external agendas to authority. Eyewitness reports from the era note that rule, despite its repressive social edicts on women and , achieved measurable order by dismantling predatory militias, contrasting the civil war's estimated thousands of civilian deaths from factional clashes in eastern alone.

U.S.-Led Occupation, Insurgency, and Taliban Resurgence (2001-2021)

Following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, coalition forces established a presence in Khost Province to dismantle and networks, with the province's proximity to Pakistan's making it a hotspot for cross-border militant activity. American troops set up bases such as near Khost city, which served as a CIA forward operating base for interrogations and gathering on high-value targets. By 2002, U.S. had conducted operations in the region, capturing or killing , but remnants regrouped in rural areas, leveraging tribal loyalties and safe havens across the border to sustain low-level attacks. A pivotal blow to U.S. intelligence efforts occurred on December 30, 2009, when a suicide bomber detonated explosives at Camp Chapman, killing seven CIA personnel, including the base chief Jennifer Matthews, and wounding six others. The attacker, , was a Jordanian doctor posing as a who had provided tips on leaders; he was not thoroughly searched due to his perceived cooperation, exposing flaws in vetting local and recruited assets amid cultural and operational pressures. This was the deadliest single attack on CIA personnel since the agency's founding, underscoring the risks of intelligence-driven in a province where influence persisted despite $145 billion in U.S. reconstruction aid nationwide by that point. Taliban resurgence in Khost intensified from 2006 onward, with insurgents establishing shadow governance structures in rural districts like and Tani, imposing taxes, resolving disputes through parallel courts, and intimidating locals to undermine (ANSF). By 2009, U.S. military assessments indicated control or influence over much of the province's countryside, despite ISAF surges deploying up to 30,000 additional troops nationally; in , this enabled ambushes on supply convoys and IED attacks that caused dozens of coalition casualties annually. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) audits revealed systemic in aid programs, with up to 40% of funds for projects in eastern provinces like diverted through ghost workers and bribes to provincial officials, many with ties, eroding ANSF cohesion—desertion rates exceeded 20% yearly by 2015—and fostering dependency rather than self-sufficiency. Efforts to build secular democratic institutions clashed with Khost's Pashtun tribal codes and Islamist ideologies, where to kin and religious trumped centralized , leading to fragmented governance and persistent . U.S.-backed local militias, such as the , provided temporary security but alienated communities through abuses, while national expenditures totaling over $2.3 trillion by 2021 yielded negligible enduring control in the province, as fighters exploited terrain and cross-border logistics to outlast withdrawals. SIGAR analyses emphasized that unaddressed cultural incompatibilities and mismanagement amplified these failures, with insurgents capturing weapons and funds intended for ANSF units.

Taliban Consolidation Post-2021

Following the 's nationwide offensive, Khost Province fell under their control on August 12, 2021, with government forces offering scant resistance amid the rapid disintegration of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; this outcome reflected the province's pre-existing networks and insurgent strongholds from prior years. The group swiftly established administrative structures, including sharia-based courts that adjudicated local disputes, leading to a documented decline in blood feuds—traditional vendettas rooted in tribal honor codes that had persisted for centuries and exacerbated instability. Local reports indicate these courts resolved cases through mediated settlements and punishments, reducing ongoing cycles of retaliatory violence that previously claimed numerous lives annually in Khost. Taliban governance has yielded verifiable security improvements, including curbs on highway robbery and inter-factional clashes, which plagued roads linking Khost to Kabul and Pakistan during the prior republic era; checkpoints and patrols enforced order, minimizing banditry that targeted travelers and merchants. These measures, alongside suppression of rival militias, fostered relative stability in a province long marked by tribal factionalism, though enforcement relied on harsh penalties like public floggings for offenses such as and . The 2022 opium poppy ban further aimed at self-sufficiency by prohibiting cultivation, resulting in near-elimination of the crop nationwide—including in Khost's marginal arable areas—and redirecting farmers to and other staples, despite initial economic strain from lost income. Border dynamics complicated consolidation, as Khost's proximity to 's North fueled accusations of harboring Tehrik-i- Pakistan (TTP) militants; UN analyses and bilateral clashes in 2024-2025 highlighted TTP incursions from Afghan sanctuaries, prompting Pakistani airstrikes and strained relations, with the denying active support while providing de facto refuge. Policies restricting women's public roles and drew global condemnation, yet empirical from Pashtun communities—prevalent in Khost—reveal a "" where heavy-handed rule garners support for delivering security absent under prior governments, prioritizing order over liberal norms amid local tribal preferences for Islamic governance. This acceptance, evidenced in reduced internal conflicts, underscores causal trade-offs: stability via centralized enforcement versus curtailed individual freedoms, with mainstream critiques often overlooking such grassroots dynamics in favor of ideological frameworks.

Demographics and Society

Ethnic and Tribal Composition

Khost Province is inhabited almost exclusively by , who comprise approximately 99% of the population, with negligible non-Pashtun minorities such as a small Tajik presence estimated at 1%. The province's demographics reflect intense tribal , where marriages predominantly occur within Pashtun tribal groups, reinforcing ethnic and cultural homogeneity and conservative social structures that prioritize kinship over broader national affiliations. Tribal loyalties frequently supersede state identity, as evidenced by historical patterns of localized alliances and resistance that have persisted despite central governance efforts. The Mangal tribe dominates demographically and socially, particularly in districts like Musa Khel, Sebari, and Qalandar, where they form the core population alongside subclans and allied groups. Other significant Pashtun tribes include the Khostwal, Waziri, Suleimankhel, Zadran, and Kharoti, each maintaining distinct territories and internal hierarchies that shape local interactions. A minor nomadic element consists of Kochis (Pashtun herders), who seasonally traverse the province but represent a fractional share of residents. Population estimates for 2017–2018 placed the total at around 575,000 to 615,000, characterized by high fertility rates exceeding 5 children per woman and a pronounced youth bulge, with over 60% under age 25, amplifying pressures on tribal resource allocation and cohesion. Social norms in Khost adhere rigorously to Pashtunwali, the unwritten Pashtun code of conduct emphasizing nang (honor), melmastia (hospitality), (revenge), and (asylum), which empirically sustains low rates of impersonal crime through kin-based policing and jirga-mediated . This system fosters internal stability by channeling conflicts into honor-bound vendettas or reconciliations rather than widespread lawlessness, though it can perpetuate feuds if unresolved; recent data indicate a decline in blood feuds due to stricter tribal enforcement of equality (seyal) and mediation. Such mechanisms underscore the province's conservative fabric, where tribal and interplay to preserve amid external influences.

Population Dynamics and Social Structure

Khost Province remains predominantly rural, with the majority of its estimated 647,730 residents in 2021 living in over 80% village-based settlements, reflecting the province's agrarian and tribal character. The provincial capital, city, serves as a modest urban hub with a population of around 96,000 to 106,000 as of recent estimates, concentrating administrative and market functions amid surrounding mountainous terrain. This rural dominance shapes settlement patterns, where dispersed villages cluster around fertile valleys and border areas, fostering localized tribal autonomy over centralized urban migration seen elsewhere in . Population dynamics have been volatile due to protracted conflicts, including significant internal displacement during the Soviet-Afghan War, civil strife, and the 2001-2021 , which drove many residents to safer provinces or across the border into . Post-2021 Taliban consolidation facilitated returns, with nationwide data indicating over 1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) repatriated by 2022, including flows back to eastern provinces like amid reduced fighting and improved border access. Emigration pressures persist, particularly to , where historical refugee waves from Khost's Pashtun communities—estimated in the millions since the —have offset local growth despite voluntary returns exceeding 500,000 from by early 2024. Social structure centers on patriarchal extended families, typical of rural Pashtun , where multi-generational households reinforce ties and resource sharing amid economic . High rates, empirically around 5.4 children per woman in rural , sustain population resilience in Khost, countering emigration losses through natural increase rather than modern family planning uptake. Norms of limit women's public mobility, confining much of their labor to domestic and secluded agricultural tasks, yet this traditional division—men in plowing and market dealings, women in harvesting, dairying, and household processing—bolsters household self-sufficiency, with female contributions comprising up to half of farm labor despite underrecognition in external analyses. Such structures prioritize familial and tribal over individualistic mobility, enabling adaptation to insecurity without reliance on state welfare systems.

Economy

Agriculture, Livestock, and Primary Production

Khost Province's agriculture remains largely subsistence-based, constrained by its mountainous terrain and limited concentrated in narrow, irrigated valleys. Wheat constitutes the primary crop, essential for local food security, with and serving as key supplements; production, including pomegranates and persimmons, accounts for over half of crop output in suitable microclimates, yielding higher-value returns where is feasible. Livestock husbandry dominates rural livelihoods, with sheep and reared extensively for , , and hides across rangelands; these adapt well to the province's arid slopes, supporting household resilience amid crop vulnerabilities. National FAO data indicate Afghanistan's sheep and goat populations exceed 16 million head, though provincial disaggregation for Khost highlights their proportional significance in economies without precise enumeration. Opium poppy cultivation, once a marginal but lucrative option in parts of Khost, has been effectively prohibited under the Taliban's nationwide ban declared in April 2022, resulting in a 95% contraction of Afghanistan's total poppy area to 10,800 hectares by 2023. This enforcement prompted farmers to pivot to lower-yield staples like wheat, imposing immediate income shortfalls—evident in rural distress metrics—while alternatives such as saffron remain underdeveloped locally due to climatic mismatches and nascent market chains. Persistent constraints include acute , limiting expansion of irrigated fields to roughly 20-30% of cultivable area, and accelerated by and steep gradients, which degrade up to 80% of Afghanistan's land base per FAO assessments. Traditional, low-input farming methods have empirically outperformed imported models, which often falter in conflict-affected terrains due to dependency on unavailable inputs and .

Trade, Border Dynamics, and Economic Challenges

Khost Province's economy relies heavily on informal cross-border trade with , facilitated by its proximity to North and South Waziristan agencies, serving as alternatives to major crossings like . Local networks exchange minerals such as extracted from Khost mines for Pakistani consumer goods and timber, with smuggling routes historically generating revenue through border transit. Under Taliban rule since 2021, checkpoints have regulated these flows by imposing taxes, shifting unregulated toward a more structured informal system that reduces uncontrolled trafficking while sustaining local commerce. Youth unemployment in Khost remains acute, with rates in bordering eastern provinces like exceeding national averages, where male unemployment for ages 15-29 reached 22% in 2023 per modeled estimates. Remittances from in and Gulf states provide a critical buffer, contributing to household resilience amid stagnant formal employment; national inflows stabilized around $320 million annually by recent data, supporting modest without sanctions relief. International sanctions exacerbate challenges by restricting access to global banking, forcing reliance on hawala networks and localized barter for transactions, which underscore the efficiency of informal systems over corrupt formal alternatives. Pre-2021 international aid, totaling billions, often suffered from waste and fraud, with U.S. expenditures highlighting inefficiencies like unused infrastructure, contrasting with current adaptive local economies not solely attributable to Taliban policies.

Governance and Security

Tribal Governance and Local Administration

Under Taliban rule since August 2021, district governors in Khost Province are appointed by the central leadership in but operate within a that incorporates consultation with tribal elders to address local grievances and enforce decisions. This approach leverages the province's entrenched Pashtun tribal networks, particularly among dominant groups like the Mangal and Zadran, to ensure compliance and mitigate resistance, as evidenced by the Haqqani network's historical influence in blending insurgent authority with tribal diplomacy. Local shura councils, functioning as consultative assemblies, integrate principles with customs such as nanawatai (asylum) and badal (revenge compensation), prioritizing mediated resolutions over formal courts for disputes involving land, honor, and family matters. These bodies, often comprising mullahs and maliks (tribal leaders), have facilitated settlements in feuds that previously escalated into multi-year cycles of violence, drawing on empirical patterns observed in post-2021 stability reports where tribal mediation reduced vendetta durations compared to the fragmented of the 2000s. Anthropological examinations of southeastern Afghanistan's tribal dynamics underscore that this decentralized model enhances through elders' reputational stakes and , circumventing the and remoteness plaguing prior state-centric administrations in remote provinces like . Such structures align causal incentives—where leaders' legitimacy hinges on equitable outcomes—yielding more responsive governance than top-down impositions, as documented in studies of Loya Paktia region's egalitarian norms.

Historical and Ongoing Conflicts

Khost Province's rugged mountainous terrain and strategic position adjacent to Pakistan's have historically rendered it a focal point for insurgent operations, enabling cross-border movements and ambushes that sustain low-level conflict. This geography intertwines with ideological factors, including strong tribal loyalties and interpretations of defensive rooted in Pashtun traditions, fostering resistance to central authority or external forces. The province serves as a longstanding stronghold for the , whose affiliates have leveraged local support networks for , contributing to its reputation as a militancy hub. Post-2021, while Haqqani figures hold prominent roles, residual network elements perpetuate vigilance against rival groups, linking historical patterns to ongoing tensions. Recent conflicts feature sporadic clashes with Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) operatives and border incursions tied to militants using Khost as a . In May 2024, armed confrontations erupted in Gurbuz District between forces and Pakistani troops pursuing TTP elements, resulting in casualties on both sides. Additional skirmishes occurred in Jaji Maidan District in September 2024, amid broader UN-documented exchanges along the . UNAMA reports indicate such incidents contribute to annual deaths in the dozens province-wide, far below the hundreds recorded during 2000s peak insurgency operations involving coalition raids and IED attacks. These dynamics enforce tribal self-reliance and deterrence of threats but discourage foreign and development. Local perspectives often frame engagements as legitimate defense against incursions, per tribal accounts emphasizing , contrasting with external designations of involved groups as terrorist entities by bodies like the UN. This disparity highlights source biases, as Western media amplify threats while underreporting stabilized baselines relative to prior decades.

Taliban Rule: Policies, Stability, and Criticisms

The administration in Khost Province has prioritized enforcement of Sharia-based governance since consolidating control in August 2021, with policies emphasizing and moral policing. Local authorities have expanded madrassa networks, converting or repurposing secular schools to focus on , aligning with nationwide directives that quadrupled the number of such institutions by 2024 to instill doctrinal adherence among youth. Vice and virtue patrols, under the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, conduct routine checks in urban centers like Khost city to prohibit un-Islamic attire, music, and inter-gender mingling, with reports of intensified operations along border areas following cross-border tensions in October 2025. These measures, framed by officials as restoring societal order, have reduced visible petty crime and drug-related disturbances, as uniform enforcement supplants prior fragmented tribal vigilantism. Security metrics indicate substantial stabilization in , a province long sympathetic to networks, where the monopoly on force has curtailed intra-Afghan conflict. Post-, (IED) attacks and ambushes—hallmarks of the prior —plummeted nationwide, with UNAMA documenting a near-total halt to large-scale Taliban-Republic clashes by late 2021, enabling safer road travel and in border districts like Tani and . This causal shift stems from eliminating rival factions' operational space, though sporadic Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) incursions persist, prompting Taliban patrols. Empirical data from UN reporting confirms a dramatic drop in conflict-related civilian casualties, from thousands annually pre-takeover to minimal levels by 2022, fostering perceptions of order in conservative Pashtun areas like Khost over the Republic's decentralized chaos. Criticisms of Taliban rule in Khost focus on systemic curbs to women's public roles, including bans on secondary and higher education for girls since 2021 and restrictions on employment outside the home, enforced via local edicts that limit mobility without male guardians. Human rights organizations, such as , decry these as gender apartheid, citing anecdotal accounts of arbitrary detentions for non-compliance, though such sources often prioritize normative frameworks over comparative security outcomes and may reflect institutional biases favoring prior liberal interventions. From a causal realist perspective, these policies trade expanded individual liberties for collective stability, with proponents arguing that moral regimentation mitigates social decay—evidenced by anecdotal reductions in urban vice—and aligns with local tribal norms in , where pre-2021 experiments in secular fueled factional rather than enduring peace. Local Islamist voices contend that enforced piety yields long-term societal benefits, curbing the blamed for the Republic's collapse, though verifiable surveys on resident satisfaction remain scarce amid restricted data access.

Infrastructure and Public Services

Healthcare Provision

Healthcare provision in Khost Province remains severely limited, with the primary facility being the provincial hospital in city, which serves as the main hub for basic and emergency care amid widespread shortages of specialized equipment and personnel. The administration has prioritized continuity of existing services, urging female healthcare workers to return to roles post-2021 takeover, yet ongoing restrictions on women's medical training have exacerbated deficits in female doctors and midwives, particularly acute in southern provinces like . These policies compound pre-existing challenges, including aid suspensions that cut funding for 80% of prior healthcare operations, leading to medicine shortages and reliance on limited local resources. Maternal and neonatal mortality rates in , reflective of provincial conditions like , stand at approximately 521 deaths per 100,000 live births as of 2023, down from higher historical figures but still elevated due to inadequate obstetric care access. In , efforts such as the MSF-initiated Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric and Neonatal Care project, operational since 2011, have targeted reductions through hospital upgrades and training, though bans on female since 2023 threaten sustainability by halting new workforce entry. Mobile clinics and community outreach have provided marginal post-2021 improvements in rural access, but doctor shortages—estimated to worsen with female staff exodus—persist, forcing male-only treatment protocols that deter female patients without male guardians. International , curtailed broadly after 2021, continues selectively through organizations like the ICRC, which in 2024 supplied Khost provincial hospital with emergency medicines and supported enhancements, alongside equipment donations valued at $106,000 in 2025 for diagnostics like . assertions of have led to restrictions on certain NGOs, balancing reduced dependency against aid gaps, while baseline deficiencies in trained personnel and smuggling-vulnerable supply chains undermine overall efficacy. Local reliance on traditional remedies fills voids in remote areas, overlooked by aid focused on urban or institutional models.

Education System

The adult rate in , including Khost Province, stands at approximately 37% as of 2021, with significant gender disparities wherein female literacy lags at around 23%. In Khost, a predominantly rural and conservative Pashtun region, enrollment rates favor boys over girls, particularly at secondary levels, reflecting national patterns where attendance for girls has declined post-2021 amid governance. Traditional barriers such as early marriage and cultural norms exacerbate these gaps, though remains accessible for both genders in segregated settings. Higher education in Khost is anchored by Shaikh Zayed University, founded in 2000 and relocated from to the provincial capital, offering programs in fields including , , and to serve local needs. Under Taliban rule since August 2021, the university has aligned curricula with religious priorities, reopening in 2023 with emphasis on Islamic sciences alongside practical disciplines. Taliban policies have shifted focus toward madrasas, with religious schools proliferating nationwide, including in , where enrollment has surged fourfold since 2021 as secular for girls remains banned. These institutions prioritize Quranic and Islamic over Western-style curricula, enabling continued basic for girls through segregated religious instruction, though critics argue this entrenches exclusion and limits skill development. Empirical data indicates over 1.4 million girls nationwide deprived of secondary schooling by 2024, prompting alternatives like home-based tutoring in conservative areas such as , yet surveys reveal broad Afghan support—92%—for resuming girls' despite policy resistance. Local adherence to traditional models fosters religious discipline valued in tribal society, contrasting Western assessments of the system's restrictiveness. Khost Province relies primarily on the Khost River and aquifers for its , with surface flows exhibiting high seasonal variability due to the region's arid to and limited annual averaging around 300-400 mm. Hydrological indicate recurrent droughts, including hydrological deficits in river flows and levels, which have intensified in recent years from prolonged low snowfall and rainfall. In 2024-2025, these conditions contributed to widespread water shortages, with borewells drying up and reduced river recharge linked to upstream reducing retention and replenishment rates by exacerbating runoff losses. Traditional karez () systems, consisting of underground tunnels channeling groundwater to surface outlets, have proven more resilient in Khost's villages than imported modern , minimizing losses—estimated at under 5% compared to 20-30% in open canals—and enabling consistent low-volume supply in arid conditions without reliance on mechanical maintenance. These decentralized networks, numbering in the dozens across Khost's central and district areas, sustain localized access amid tribal fragmentation, where centralized schemes often falter due to disputes over shared control and sabotage risks. Under Taliban administration, rehabilitation efforts have focused on clearing silt from ten karez in Khost city and districts like Speri as of May 2025, part of broader initiatives costing 55 million Afghanis, though efficacy remains constrained by ongoing tribal claims to communal water sources that prioritize local adjudication over provincial oversight. A notable of modern approaches occurred when a newly built small in Khost collapsed on May 28, 2025, just five days after , highlighting vulnerabilities in rapid, top-down amid immature hydrological and enforcement gaps. Empirical assessments underscore that decentralized karez management aligns better with causal factors like variable recharge and social fragmentation, avoiding the overreliance on foreign-engineered dams prone to disrepair in conflict-prone terrains.

References

  1. https://nps.edu/web/ccs/khost
  2. https://moph.gov.af/sites/default/files/2019-10/SAPR1_Khost_FINAL.pdf
  3. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/06/20/new-horticultural-methods-raise-hopes-for-a-better-life-in-khost-province
  4. https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/afghanistan
  5. https://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Khost%20Province%20Districts%20Studies%20%2820May13%29.pdf
  6. https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-afghan-border-pashtun-lose-business-rights-tribal-ties/31258865.html
  7. https://nps.edu/web/ccs/paktika
  8. https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-afghanistan-2020/paktyapaktia
  9. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1206632/1930_1415355081_afghanistan-khost-province-district-atlas.pdf
  10. https://smallwarsjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/131-bebber.pdf
  11. https://elevation.maplogs.com/poi/khost_afghanistan.493888.html
  12. https://www.dangerousroads.org/asia/afghanistan.html
  13. https://kids.kiddle.co/Khost
  14. https://en-us.topographic-map.com/map-s2brf3/Khost/
  15. https://pubs.geoscienceworld.org/geoarabia/article-pdf/14/1/147/5444251/montenat.pdf
  16. https://www.khaama.com/extraction-of-chromite-starts-in-afghanistans-khost-province/
  17. https://www.ariananews.af/private-company-officials-starts-extraction-of-chromite-in-khost/
  18. https://www.khaama.com/quartz-mine-discovered-in-khost-afghanistan/
  19. https://pubs.usgs.gov/myb/vol3/2020-21/myb3-2020-21-afghanistan.pdf
  20. https://www.unm.edu/~ybosin/documents/durrani.pdf
  21. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/context-culture/breaking-the-cycle-of-centuries-old-violence-a-decline-in-blood-feuds-in-khost-province/
  22. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2891284/the-ghost-of-khost-what-history-might-tell-us-about-the-future-of-afghanistan/
  23. https://www.britannica.com/event/Second-Anglo-Afghan-War
  24. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/a/afghan-wars-1839-42-and-1878-80.html
  25. https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/afghanistan-1919-present/
  26. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/themed-reports/context-and-culture-themed-reports/the-khost-rebellion-of-1924-the-centenary-of-an-overlooked-but-significant-episode-in-afghan-history/
  27. http://opar.unior.it/1317/1/Annali_1996_56_%28f3%29_S.Nawid.pdf
  28. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2024/12/Khost-Rebellion-of-1924.pdf
  29. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jan/06/2002922444/-1/-1/1/JIPA%2520-%2520ALI%2520-%252022.PDF
  30. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jan/06/2002922444/-1/-1/1/JIPA%20-%20ALI%20-%2022.PDF
  31. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D214-PURL-LPS72248/pdf/GOVPUB-D214-PURL-LPS72248.pdf
  32. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA513743.pdf
  33. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/MatthewsOP36.pdf
  34. https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/afghanis.html
  35. https://www.rferl.org/a/jalaluddin-haqqani-s-deadly-legacy-continues-to-shape-the-war-in-afghanistan/29471611.html
  36. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm
  37. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1988/materials/summaries/individual/sirajuddin-jallaloudine-haqqani
  38. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701.pdf
  39. https://greydynamics.com/camp-chapman-the-cias-frontline-in-afghanistan/
  40. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/the-frantic-effort-to-save-lives-after-a-deadly-attack-on-the-cia/2019/12/29/275b828c-2729-11ea-ad73-2fd294520e97_story.html
  41. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/khost_province_in_talibans_gri.php
  42. https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Lessons-Learned/SIGAR-21-46-LL.pdf
  43. https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/
  44. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/15/taliban-continues-advances-captures-key-city-of-jalalabad
  45. https://www.stimson.org/2022/afghanistan-under-the-taliban-findings-on-the-current-situation/
  46. https://khybernews.tv/afghan-taliban-publicly-flog-nine-people-for-various-offenses-in-khost/
  47. https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2023.pdf
  48. https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/12/understanding-implications-talibans-opium-ban-afghanistan
  49. https://www.dw.com/en/taliban-regime-deepens-pakistans-internal-security-woes/a-73638665
  50. https://blog.prif.org/2025/01/21/the-resurgence-of-the-pakistani-taliban-implications-for-afghanistan-pakistan-relations/
  51. https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/paradox-heavy-handed-insurgent-public-support-taliban-among-afghan-pashtuns
  52. https://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=5316&task=view&total=5223&start=2511&Itemid=2
  53. https://opendataforafrica.org/atlas/Afghanistan/Khost
  54. https://worldpopulationreview.com/cities/afghanistan
  55. https://data.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/96620
  56. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/afghanistan-displacement-challenges-country-move
  57. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2479336/amp
  58. https://platform.who.int/docs/default-source/mca-documents/policy-documents/report/afg-cc-62-01-report-2015-eng-afdhs-key-findings-2015.pdf
  59. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258140739_Gender_Roles_in_Agriculture_The_Case_of_Afghanistan
  60. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/02/26/modern-methods-and-much-needed-irrigation-help-farmers-increase-their-incomes-in-rural-afghanistan
  61. https://studylib.net/doc/25329472/overview-khost
  62. https://www.fao.org/afghanistan/news/detail-events/en/c/1731357/
  63. https://www.fao.org/afghanistan/news/detail-events/en/c/1677673/
  64. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-022-09318-2
  65. https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/699891ef-b05f-4f6a-bfa1-39718f73392f/content
  66. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/386078693_Climate_Smart_Agriculture_Opportunities_and_Challenges_in_Afghanistan
  67. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-05/sr404-industrial-scale-looting-of-afghanistan-s-mineral-resources.pdf
  68. https://www.xcept-research.org/publication/changing-the-rules-of-the-game-how-the-taliban-regulated-cross-border-trade-and-upended-afghanistans-political-economy/
  69. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/381636740_The_Border_Business_The_Political_Economy_of_Checkpoint_Taxation
  70. https://asylos.libguides.com/c.php?g=708887&p=5113107
  71. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/777eab7b5ab9802aa3535f1e73fa1456-0310012025/original/Afghanistan-Development-Update-April-2025.pdf
  72. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=AF
  73. https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Audits-and-Inspections/Evaluation/SIGAR-24-32-IP.pdf
  74. https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/barriers-to-afghanistans-critical-private-sector-recovery/afghanistans-private-sector-recovery_format-.pdf
  75. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/07/asia/us-afghanistan-spending-waste-intl-cmd
  76. https://centralasiaprogram.org/publications-all/local-governance-under-taliban-rule/
  77. https://www.refworld.org/en/download/97472
  78. https://www.academia.edu/110346292/Tribal_Leadership_in_Southeast_Afghanistan
  79. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2012/DIEEEO18-2012_Inglesribalismo-Localismo_KReedy.pdf
  80. https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf
  81. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_update_march_2024_engf.pdf
  82. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/b183-islamic-state-afghanistan-jihadist-threat-retreat
  83. https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-afghanistan-2022/14-islamic-state-khorasan-province-iskp
  84. https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-secular-schools-converted-madrasahs-education/31914672.html
  85. https://www.voanews.com/a/religious-education-surges-under-taliban-as-secular-schooling-languishes/7815283.html
  86. https://8am.media/eng/talibans-fresh-warning-morality-police-prepare-for-intensified-suppression/
  87. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGQnyj5LmAA
  88. https://unama.unmissions.org/un-releases-report-human-rights-afghanistan-taliban-takeover
  89. https://unicri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/Afghanistan-Security-Landscape.pdf
  90. https://docs.un.org/en/A/76/328
  91. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/06/taliban-and-global-backlash-against-womens-rights
  92. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/afghanistan
  93. https://www.usip.org/tracking-talibans-mistreatment-women
  94. https://twitter.com/ICRC_af/status/1808424988447588633
  95. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/healthcare-women-afghanistan-under-taliban/
  96. https://theafghantimes.com/severe-shortage-of-female-doctors-in-southern-afghanistan/
  97. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9830451/
  98. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/rights-freedom/is-maternal-mortality-on-the-rise-in-afghanistan-no-official-data-but-much-cause-for-concern/
  99. https://evaluation.msf.org/evaluation-report/evaluation-khost-maternal-health-project-afghanistan
  100. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/03/afghanistans-taliban-ban-medical-training-women
  101. https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/afghanistan
  102. https://moph.gov.af/en/essential-medical-equipment-valued-106000-dollars-provided-khost-province%25E2%2580%2599s-national-and
  103. https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/02/12/disaster-foreseeable-future/afghanistans-healthcare-crisis
  104. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10882370/
  105. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS?locations=AF
  106. https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/new-school-year-starts-afghanistan-almost-400000-more-girls-deprived-their-right
  107. https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation?paperid=55902
  108. https://free-apply.com/en/university/1000400039
  109. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/themed-reports/political-landscape-themed-reports/the-emergent-taleban-defined-university-enforcing-a-top-down-reorientation-and-unquestioning-obedience-under-a-war-of-thoughts/attachment/khosts-sheikh-zayed-university-reopens-for-students-and-starts/
  110. https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-education-girls-madrassa-7cdaf68896e8ccfda2abd71a07a02b99
  111. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/15/taliban-deliberately-deprived-1-4-million-girls-of-schooling-un
  112. https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/press-release/2025/08/four-years-after-taliban-takeover-afghans-overwhelmingly-back-girls-education
  113. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/taking-terrible-toll-talibans-education-ban
  114. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/396842249_Sustainable_Agricultural_Water_Resources_Management_in_Afghanistan_Using_the_Hydrological_Modelling
  115. https://www.icrc.org/en/article/afghanistan-addressing-water-crisis-communities
  116. https://www.globalforestwatch.org/dashboards/country/AFG/17/
  117. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347480862_Sustainable_Irrigation_Karez_System_in_Afghanistan
  118. https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/provincial-194408
  119. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR372-Addressing-Land-Conflict-in-Afghanistan.pdf
  120. https://8am.media/eng/poor-project-implementation-newly-built-water-dam-in-khost-collapses-five-days-after-inauguration/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.