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PRISM
PRISM
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PRISM is a code name for a program under which the United States National Security Agency (NSA) collects internet communications from various U.S. internet companies.[1][2][3] The program is also known by the SIGAD US-984XN.[4][5] PRISM collects stored internet communications based on demands made to internet companies such as Google LLC and Apple under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to turn over any data that match court-approved search terms.[6] Among other things, the NSA can use these PRISM requests to target communications that were encrypted when they traveled across the internet backbone, to focus on stored data that telecommunication filtering systems discarded earlier,[7][8] and to get data that is easier to handle.[9]

PRISM began in 2007 in the wake of the passage of the Protect America Act under the Bush Administration.[10][11] The program is operated under the supervision of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court, or FISC) pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).[12] Its existence was leaked six years later by NSA contractor Edward Snowden, who warned that the extent of mass data collection was far greater than the public knew and included what he characterized as "dangerous" and "criminal" activities.[13] The disclosures were published by The Guardian and The Washington Post on June 6, 2013. Subsequent documents have demonstrated a financial arrangement between the NSA's Special Source Operations (SSO) division and PRISM partners in the millions of dollars.[14]

Documents indicate that PRISM is "the number one source of raw intelligence used for NSA analytic reports", and it accounts for 91% of the NSA's internet traffic acquired under FISA section 702 authority."[15][16] The leaked information came after the revelation that the FISA Court had been ordering a subsidiary of telecommunications company Verizon Communications to turn over logs tracking all of its customers' telephone calls to the NSA.[17][18]

U.S. government officials have disputed criticisms of PRISM in the Guardian and Washington Post articles and have defended the program, asserting that it cannot be used on domestic targets without a warrant. They additionally claim that the program has helped to prevent acts of terrorism, and that it receives independent oversight from the federal government's executive, judicial and legislative branches.[19][20] On June 19, 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama, during a visit to Germany, stated that the NSA's data gathering practices constitute "a circumscribed, narrow system directed at us being able to protect our people."[21]

Media disclosure of PRISM

[edit]

Edward Snowden publicly revealed the existence of PRISM through a series of classified documents leaked to journalists of The Washington Post and The Guardian while he was an NSA contractor at the time, thus fleeing to Hong Kong.[1][2] The leaked documents included 41 PowerPoint slides, four of which were published in news articles.[1][2]

The documents identified several technology companies as participants in the PRISM program, including Microsoft in 2007, Yahoo! in 2008, Google in 2009, Facebook in 2009, Paltalk in 2009, YouTube in 2010, AOL in 2011, Skype in 2011 and Apple in 2012.[22] The speaker's notes in the briefing document reviewed by The Washington Post indicated that "98 percent of PRISM production is based on Yahoo, Google, and Microsoft".[1]

The slide presentation stated that much of the world's electronic communications pass through the U.S., because electronic communications data tend to follow the least expensive route rather than the most physically direct route, and the bulk of the world's internet infrastructure is based in the United States.[15] The presentation noted that these facts provide United States intelligence analysts with opportunities for intercepting the communications of foreign targets as their electronic data pass into or through the United States.[2][15]

Snowden's subsequent disclosures included statements that government agencies such as the United Kingdom's GCHQ also undertook mass interception and tracking of internet and communications data[23] – described by Germany as "nightmarish" if true[24] – allegations that the NSA engaged in "dangerous" and "criminal" activity by "hacking" civilian infrastructure networks in other countries such as "universities, hospitals, and private businesses",[13] and alleged that compliance offered only very limited restrictive effect on mass data collection practices (including of Americans) since restrictions "are policy-based, not technically based, and can change at any time", adding that "Additionally, audits are cursory, incomplete, and easily fooled by fake justifications",[13] with numerous self-granted exceptions, and that NSA policies encourage staff to assume the benefit of the doubt in cases of uncertainty.[25][26][27]

The slides

[edit]

Below are a number of slides released by Edward Snowden showing the operation and processes behind the PRISM program. The "FAA" referred to is Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act ("FAA"), and not the widely known Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).[28]

The French newspaper Le Monde disclosed new PRISM slides (see pages 4, 7 and 8) coming from the "PRISM/US-984XN Overview" presentation on October 21, 2013.[29] The British newspaper The Guardian disclosed new PRISM slides (see pages 3 and 6) in November 2013 which on the one hand compares PRISM with the Upstream program, and on the other hand deals with collaboration between the NSA's Threat Operations Center and the FBI.[30]

The program

[edit]
PRISM logo

PRISM is a program from the Special Source Operations (SSO) division of the NSA, which in the tradition of NSA's intelligence alliances, cooperates with as many as 100 trusted U.S. companies since the 1970s.[1] A prior program, the Terrorist Surveillance Program,[31][32] was implemented in the wake of the September 11 attacks under the George W. Bush Administration but was widely criticized and challenged as illegal, because it did not include warrants obtained from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.[32][33][34][35][36] PRISM was authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.[15]

PRISM was enabled under President Bush by the Protect America Act of 2007 and by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which immunizes private companies from legal action when they cooperate with U.S. government agencies in intelligence collection. In 2012 the act was renewed by Congress under President Obama for an additional five years, through December 2017.[2][37][38] According to The Register, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 "specifically authorizes intelligence agencies to monitor the phone, email, and other communications of U.S. citizens for up to a week without obtaining a warrant" when one of the parties is outside the U.S.[37]

The most detailed description of the PRISM program can be found in a report about NSA's collection efforts under Section 702 FAA, that was released by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) on July 2, 2014.[39]

According to this report, PRISM is only used to collect internet communications, not telephone conversations. These internet communications are not collected in bulk, but in a targeted way: only communications that are to or from specific selectors, like e-mail addresses, can be gathered. Under PRISM, there is no collection based on keywords or names.[39]

The actual collection process is done by the Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) of the FBI, which on behalf of the NSA sends the selectors to the U.S. internet service providers, which were previously served with a Section 702 Directive. Under this directive, the provider is legally obliged to hand over (to DITU) all communications to or from the selectors provided by the government.[39] DITU then sends these communications to NSA, where they are stored in various databases, depending on their type.

Data, both content and metadata, that already have been collected under the PRISM program, may be searched for both US and non-US person identifiers. These kinds of queries became known as "back-door searches" and are conducted by NSA, FBI and CIA.[40] Each of these agencies has slightly different protocols and safeguards to protect searches with a US person identifier.[39]

Extent of the program

[edit]

Internal NSA presentation slides included in the various media disclosures show that the NSA could unilaterally access data and perform "extensive, in-depth surveillance on live communications and stored information" with examples including email, video and voice chat, videos, photos, voice-over-IP chats (such as Skype), file transfers, and social networking details.[2] Snowden summarized that "in general, the reality is this: if an NSA, FBI, CIA, DIA, etc. analyst has access to query raw SIGINT [signals intelligence] databases, they can enter and get results for anything they want."[13]

According to The Washington Post, the intelligence analysts search PRISM data using terms intended to identify suspicious communications of targets whom the analysts suspect with at least 51 percent confidence to not be U.S. citizens, but in the process, communication data of some U.S. citizens are also collected unintentionally.[1] Training materials for analysts tell them that while they should periodically report such accidental collection of non-foreign U.S. data, "it's nothing to worry about."[1][41]

According to The Guardian, NSA had access to chats and emails on Hotmail.com and Skype because Microsoft had "developed a surveillance capability to deal" with the interception of chats, and "for Prism collection against Microsoft email services will be unaffected because Prism collects this data prior to encryption."[42][43]

Also according to The Guardian's Glenn Greenwald even low-level NSA analysts are allowed to search and listen to the communications of Americans and other people without court approval and supervision. Greenwald said low level Analysts can, via systems like PRISM, "listen to whatever emails they want, whatever telephone calls, browsing histories, Microsoft Word documents.[31] And it's all done with no need to go to a court, with no need to even get supervisor approval on the part of the analyst."[44]

He added that the NSA databank, with its years of collected communications, allows analysts to search that database and listen "to the calls or read the emails of everything that the NSA has stored, or look at the browsing histories or Google search terms that you've entered, and it also alerts them to any further activity that people connected to that email address or that IP address do in the future."[44] Greenwald was referring in the context of the foregoing quotes to the NSA program XKeyscore.[45]

PRISM overview

[edit]
Designation Legal AuthoritySee Note Key Targets Type of Information collected Associated Databases Associated Software
US-984XN Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) Known Targets include[46]
  • Venezuela
    • Military procurement
    • Oil
  • Mexico
    • Narcotics
    • Energy
    • Internal Security
    • Political Affairs
  • Colombia
The exact type of data varies by provider:
  • Email
  • Chat – video, voice
  • Videos
  • Stored data
  • VoIP
  • File transfers
  • Video Conferencing
  • Notifications of target activity, logins, etc.
  • Online Social Networking details
  • Special Requests
Known: Known:

Unified Targeting Tool

Responses to disclosures

[edit]

United States government

[edit]

Executive branch life

[edit]

Shortly after publication of the reports by The Guardian and The Washington Post, the United States Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, on June 7, 2013, released a statement confirming that for nearly six years the government of the United States had been using large internet services companies such as Facebook to collect information on foreigners outside the United States as a defense against national security threats.[17] The statement read in part, "The Guardian and The Washington Post articles refer to collection of communications pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. They contain numerous inaccuracies."[47] He went on to say, "Section 702 is a provision of FISA that is designed to facilitate the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning non-U.S. persons located outside the United States. It cannot be used to intentionally target any U.S. citizen, any other U.S. person, or anyone located within the United States."[47] Clapper concluded his statement by stating, "The unauthorized disclosure of information about this important and entirely legal program is reprehensible and risks important protections for the security of Americans."[47] On March 12, 2013, Clapper had told the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the NSA does "not wittingly" collect any type of data on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans.[48] Clapper later admitted the statement he made on March 12, 2013, was a lie,[49] or in his words "I responded in what I thought was the most truthful, or least untruthful manner by saying no."[50]

On June 7, 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama, referring to the PRISM program[51] and the NSA's telephone calls logging program, said, "What you've got is two programs that were originally authorized by Congress, have been repeatedly authorized by Congress. Bipartisan majorities have approved them. Congress is continually briefed on how these are conducted. There are a whole range of safeguards involved. And federal judges are overseeing the entire program throughout."[52] He also said, "You can't have 100 percent security and then also have 100 percent privacy and zero inconvenience. You know, we're going to have to make some choices as a society."[52] Obama also said that government collection of data was needed in order to catch terrorists.[53] In separate statements, senior Obama administration officials (not mentioned by name in source) said that Congress had been briefed 13 times on the programs since 2009.[54]

On June 8, 2013, Director of National Intelligence Clapper made an additional public statement about PRISM and released a fact sheet providing further information about the program, which he described as "an internal government computer system used to facilitate the government's statutorily authorized collection of foreign intelligence information from electronic communication service providers under court supervision, as authorized by Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (50 U.S.C. § 1881a)."[55][56] The fact sheet stated that "the surveillance activities published in The Guardian and the Washington Post are lawful and conducted under authorities widely known and discussed, and fully debated and authorized by Congress."[55] The fact sheet also stated that "the United States Government does not unilaterally obtain information from the servers of U.S. electronic communication service providers. All such information is obtained with FISA Court approval and with the knowledge of the provider based on a written directive from the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence." It said that the attorney general provides FISA Court rulings and semi-annual reports about PRISM activities to Congress, "provid[ing] an unprecedented degree of accountability and transparency."[55] Democratic senators Udall and Wyden, who serve on the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, subsequently criticized the fact sheet as being inaccurate.[clarification needed] NSA Director General Keith Alexander acknowledged the errors, stating that the fact sheet "could have more precisely described" the requirements governing the collection of e-mail and other internet content from US companies. The fact sheet was withdrawn from the NSA's website around June 26.[57]

In a closed-doors Senate hearing around June 11, FBI Director Robert Mueller said that Snowden's leaks had caused "significant harm to our nation and to our safety."[58] In the same Senate hearing, NSA Director Alexander defended the program.[further explanation needed] Alexander's defense was immediately criticized by Senators Udall and Wyden, who said they saw no evidence that the NSA programs had produced "uniquely valuable intelligence." In a joint statement, they wrote, "Gen Alexander's testimony yesterday suggested that the NSA's bulk phone records collection program helped thwart 'dozens' of terrorist attacks, but all of the plots that he mentioned appear to have been identified using other collection methods."[58][59]

On June 18, NSA Director Alexander said in an open hearing before the House Intelligence Committee of Congress that communications surveillance had helped prevent more than 50 potential terrorist attacks worldwide (at least 10 of them involving terrorism suspects or targets in the United States) between 2001 and 2013, and that the PRISM web traffic surveillance program contributed in over 90 percent of those cases.[60][61][62] According to court records, one example Alexander gave regarding a thwarted attack by al Qaeda on the New York Stock Exchange was not in fact foiled by surveillance.[63] Several senators wrote Director of National Intelligence Clapper asking him to provide other examples.[64]

U.S. intelligence officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, told various news outlets that by June 24 they were already seeing what they said was evidence that suspected terrorists had begun changing their communication practices in order to evade detection by the surveillance tools disclosed by Snowden.[65][66]

Legislative branch

[edit]

In contrast to their swift and forceful reactions the previous day to allegations that the government had been conducting surveillance of United States citizens' telephone records, Congressional leaders initially had little to say about the PRISM program the day after leaked information about the program was published. Several lawmakers declined to discuss PRISM, citing its top-secret classification,[67] and others said that they had not been aware of the program.[68] After statements had been released by the president and the Director of National Intelligence, some lawmakers began to comment:

Senator John McCain (R-AZ)

  • June 9, 2013, "We passed the Patriot Act. We passed specific provisions of the act that allowed for this program to take place, to be enacted in operation."[69]

Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee

  • June 9, "These programs are within the law," "part of our obligation is keeping Americans safe," "Human intelligence isn't going to do it."[70]
  • June 9, "Here's the rub: the instances where this has produced good—has disrupted plots, prevented terrorist attacks, is all classified, that's what's so hard about this."[71]
  • June 11, "It went fine. ... We asked him (Keith Alexander) to declassify things because it would be helpful (for people and lawmakers to better understand the intelligence programs). ... I've just got to see if the information gets declassified. I'm sure people will find it very interesting."[72]

Senator Rand Paul (R-KY)

  • June 9, "I'm going to be seeing if I can challenge this at the Supreme Court level. I'm going to be asking the internet providers and all of the phone companies: ask your customers to join me in a class-action lawsuit."[69]

Senator Susan Collins (R-ME), member of Senate Intelligence Committee and past member of Homeland Security Committee

  • June 11, "I had, along with Joe Lieberman, a monthly threat briefing, but I did not have access to this highly compartmentalized information" and "How can you ask when you don't know the program exists?"[73]

Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), principal sponsor of the Patriot Act

  • June 9, "This is well beyond what the Patriot Act allows."[74] "President Obama's claim that 'this is the most transparent administration in history' has once again proven false. In fact, it appears that no administration has ever peered more closely or intimately into the lives of innocent Americans."[74]

Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), a chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

  • June 9, "One of the things that we're charged with is keeping America safe and keeping our civil liberties and privacy intact. I think we have done both in this particular case."[70]
  • June 9, "Within the last few years this program was used to stop a program, excuse me, to stop a terrorist attack in the United States, we know that. It's, it's, it's important, it fills in a little seam that we have and it's used to make sure that there is not an international nexus to any terrorism event that they may believe is ongoing in the United States. So in that regard it is a very valuable thing."[75]

Senator Mark Udall (D-CO)

  • June 9, "I don't think the American public knows the extent or knew the extent to which they were being surveilled and their data was being collected. ... I think we ought to reopen the Patriot Act and put some limits on the amount of data that the National Security (Agency) is collecting. ... It ought to remain sacred, and there's got to be a balance here. That is what I'm aiming for. Let's have the debate, let's be transparent, let's open this up."[70]

Representative Todd Rokita (R-IN)

Representative Luis Gutierrez (D-IL)

  • June 9, "We will be receiving secret briefings and we will be asking, I know I'm going to be asking to get more information. I want to make sure that what they're doing is harvesting information that is necessary to keep us safe and not simply going into everybody's private telephone conversations and Facebook and communications. I mean one of the, you know, the terrorists win when you debilitate freedom of expression and privacy."[75]

Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR)

  • July 11, "I have a feeling that the administration is getting concerned about the bulk phone records collection, and that they are thinking about whether to move administratively to stop it. I think we are making a comeback".[77]

Following these statements some lawmakers from both parties warned national security officials during a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee that they must change their use of sweeping National Security Agency surveillance programs or face losing the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that have allowed for the agency's mass collection of telephone metadata.[78] "Section 215 expires at the end of 2015, and unless you realize you've got a problem, that is not going to be renewed," Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., author of the USA Patriot Act, threatened during the hearing.[78] "It's got to be changed, and you've got to change how you operate section 215. Otherwise, in two and a half years, you're not going to have it anymore."[78]

Judicial branch

[edit]

Leaks of classified documents pointed to the role of a special court in enabling the government's secret surveillance programs, but members of the court maintained they were not collaborating with the executive branch.[79] The New York Times, however, reported in July 2013 that in "more than a dozen classified rulings, the nation's surveillance court has created a secret body of law giving the National Security Agency the power to amass vast collections of data on Americans while pursuing not only terrorism suspects, but also people possibly involved in nuclear proliferation, espionage and cyberattacks."[80] After Members of the U.S. Congress pressed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to release declassified versions of its secret ruling, the court dismissed those requests arguing that the decisions can't be declassified because they contain classified information.[81] Reggie Walton, the current FISA presiding judge, said in a statement: "The perception that the court is a rubber stamp is absolutely false. There is a rigorous review process of applications submitted by the executive branch, spearheaded initially by five judicial branch lawyers who are national security experts, and then by the judges, to ensure that the court's authorizations comport with what the applicable statutes authorize."[82] The accusation of being a "rubber stamp" was further rejected by Walton who wrote in a letter to Senator Patrick J. Leahy: "The annual statistics provided to Congress by the Attorney General ...—frequently cited to in press reports as a suggestion that the Court's approval rate of application is over 99%—reflect only the number of final applications submitted to and acted on by the Court. These statistics do not reflect the fact that many applications are altered to prior or final submission or even withheld from final submission entirely, often after an indication that a judge would not approve them."[83]

The U.S. military

[edit]

The U.S. military has acknowledged blocking access to parts of The Guardian website for thousands of defense personnel across the country,[84] and blocking the entire Guardian website for personnel stationed throughout Afghanistan, the Middle East, and South Asia.[85] A spokesman said the military was filtering out reports and content relating to government surveillance programs to preserve "network hygiene" and prevent any classified material from appearing on unclassified parts of its computer systems.[84] Access to the Washington Post, which also published information on classified NSA surveillance programs disclosed by Edward Snowden, had not been blocked at the time the blocking of access to The Guardian was reported.[85]

Responses and involvement of other countries

[edit]

Austria

[edit]

The former head of the Austrian Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism, Gert-René Polli, stated he knew the PRISM program under a different name and stated that surveillance activities had occurred in Austria as well. Polli had publicly stated in 2009 that he had received requests from US intelligence agencies to do things that would be in violation of Austrian law, which Polli refused to allow.[86][87]

Australia

[edit]

The Australian government has said it will investigate the impact of the PRISM program and the use of the Pine Gap surveillance facility on the privacy of Australian citizens.[88] Australia's former foreign minister Bob Carr said that Australians should not be concerned about PRISM but that cybersecurity is high on the government's list of concerns.[89] The Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop stated that the acts of Edward Snowden were treachery and offered a staunch defence of her nation's intelligence co-operation with the United States.[90]

Brazil

[edit]

Brazil's president at the time, Dilma Rousseff, responded to Snowden's reports that the NSA spied on her phone calls and emails by cancelling a planned October 2013 state visit to the United States, demanding an official apology, which by October 20, 2013, hadn't come.[91] Also, Rousseff classified the spying as unacceptable between more harsh words in a speech before the UN General Assembly on September 24, 2013.[92] As a result, Boeing lost out on a US$4.5 billion contract for fighter jets to Sweden's Saab Group.[93]

Canada

[edit]
CSE headquarters in Ottawa

Canada's national cryptologic agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), said that commenting on PRISM "would undermine CSE's ability to carry out its mandate." Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart lamented Canada's standards when it comes to protecting personal online privacy stating "We have fallen too far behind" in her report. "While other nations' data protection authorities have the legal power to make binding orders, levy hefty fines and take meaningful action in the event of serious data breaches, we are restricted to a 'soft' approach: persuasion, encouragement and, at the most, the potential to publish the names of transgressors in the public interest." And, "when push comes to shove," Stoddart wrote, "short of a costly and time-consuming court battle, we have no power to enforce our recommendations."[94][95]

European Union

[edit]

On 20 October 2013 a committee at the European Parliament backed a measure that, if it is enacted, would require American companies to seek clearance from European officials before complying with United States warrants seeking private data. The legislation has been under consideration for two years. The vote is part of efforts in Europe to shield citizens from online surveillance in the wake of revelations about a far-reaching spying program by the U.S. National Security Agency.[96] Germany and France have also had ongoing mutual talks about how they can keep European email traffic from going across American servers.[97]

France

[edit]

On October 21, 2013, the French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, summoned the U.S. Ambassador, Charles Rivkin, to the Quai d'Orsay in Paris to protest large-scale spying on French citizens by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Paris prosecutors had opened preliminary inquiries into the NSA program in July, but Fabius said, "... obviously we need to go further" and "we must quickly assure that these practices aren't repeated."[98]

Germany

[edit]

Germany did not receive any raw PRISM data, according to a Reuters report.[99] German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that "the internet is new to all of us" to explain the nature of the program; Matthew Schofield of McClatchy Washington Bureau said, "She was roundly mocked for that statement."[100] Gert-René Polli, a former Austrian counter-terrorism official, said in 2013 that it is "absurd and unnatural" for the German authorities to pretend not to have known anything.[86][87] The German Army was using PRISM to support its operations in Afghanistan as early as 2011.[101]

In October 2013, it was reported that the NSA monitored Merkel's cell phone.[102] The United States denied the report, but following the allegations, Merkel called President Obama and told him that spying on friends was "never acceptable, no matter in what situation."[103]

Israel

[edit]

Israeli newspaper Calcalist discussed[104] the Business Insider article[105] about the possible involvement of technologies from two secretive Israeli companies in the PRISM program—Verint Systems and Narus.

Mexico

[edit]

After finding out about the PRISM program, the Mexican Government has started constructing its own spying program to spy on its own citizens. According to Jenaro Villamil, a writer from Proceso, CISEN, Mexico's intelligence agency has started to work with IBM and Hewlett Packard to develop its own data gathering software. "Facebook, Twitter, Emails and other social network sites are going to be priority."[106]

New Zealand

[edit]

In New Zealand, University of Otago information science Associate Professor Hank Wolfe said that "under what was unofficially known as the Five Eyes Alliance, New Zealand and other governments, including the United States, Australia, Canada, and Britain, dealt with internal spying by saying they didn't do it. But they have all the partners doing it for them and then they share all the information."[107]

Edward Snowden, in a live streamed Google Hangout to Kim Dotcom and Julian Assange, alleged that he had received intelligence from New Zealand, and the NSA has listening posts in New Zealand.[108]

Spain

[edit]

At a meeting of European Union leaders held the week of 21 October 2013, Mariano Rajoy, Spain's prime minister, said that "spying activities aren't proper among partner countries and allies". On 28 October 2013 the Spanish government summoned the American ambassador, James Costos, to address allegations that the U.S. had collected data on 60 million telephone calls in Spain. Separately, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, a Spanish secretary of state, referred to the need to maintain "a necessary balance" between security and privacy concerns, but said that the recent allegations of spying, "if proven to be true, are improper and unacceptable between partners and friendly countries".[109]

United Kingdom

[edit]

In the United Kingdom, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which also has its own surveillance program, Tempora, had access to the PRISM program on or before June 2010 and wrote 197 reports with it in 2012 alone. The Intelligence and Security Committee of the UK Parliament reviewed the reports GCHQ produced on the basis of intelligence sought from the US. They found in each case a warrant for interception was in place in accordance with the legal safeguards contained in UK law.[110]

In August 2013, The Guardian newspaper's offices were visited by technicians from GCHQ, who ordered and supervised the destruction of the hard drives containing information acquired from Snowden.[111]

Companies

[edit]

The original Washington Post and Guardian articles reporting on PRISM noted that one of the leaked briefing documents said PRISM involves collection of data "directly from the servers" of several major internet services providers.[1][2]

Initial public statements

[edit]

Corporate executives of several companies identified in the leaked documents told The Guardian that they had no knowledge of the PRISM program in particular and also denied making information available to the government on the scale alleged by news reports.[2][112] Statements of several of the companies named in the leaked documents were reported by TechCrunch and The Washington Post as follows:[113][114]

  • Microsoft: "We provide customer data only when we receive a legally binding order or subpoena to do so, and never on a voluntary basis. In addition we only ever comply with orders for requests about specific accounts or identifiers. If the government has a broader voluntary national security program to gather customer data, we don't participate in it."[113][115]
  • Yahoo!: "Yahoo! takes users' privacy very seriously. We do not provide the government with direct access to our servers, systems, or network."[113] "Of the hundreds of millions of users we serve, an infinitesimal percentage will ever be the subject of a government data collection directive."[114]
  • Facebook: "We do not provide any government organization with direct access to Facebook servers. When Facebook is asked for data or information about specific individuals, we carefully scrutinize any such request for compliance with all applicable laws, and provide information only to the extent required by law."[113]
  • Google: "Google cares deeply about the security of our users' data. We disclose user data to government in accordance with the law, and we review all such requests carefully. From time to time, people allege that we have created a government 'back door' into our systems, but Google does not have a backdoor for the government to access private user data."[113] "[A]ny suggestion that Google is disclosing information about our users' internet activity on such a scale is completely false."[114]
  • Apple: "We have never heard of PRISM"[116] "We do not provide any government agency with direct access to our servers, and any government agency requesting customer data must get a court order."[116]
  • Dropbox: "We've seen reports that Dropbox might be asked to participate in a government program called PRISM. We are not part of any such program and remain committed to protecting our users' privacy."[113]

In response to the technology companies' confirmation of the NSA being able to directly access the companies' servers, The New York Times reported that sources had stated the NSA was gathering the surveillance data from the companies using other technical means in response to court orders for specific sets of data.[17] The Washington Post suggested, "It is possible that the conflict between the PRISM slides and the company spokesmen is the result of imprecision on the part of the NSA author. In another classified report obtained by The Post, the arrangement is described as allowing 'collection managers [to send] content tasking instructions directly to equipment installed at company-controlled locations,' rather than directly to company servers."[1] "[I]n context, 'direct' is more likely to mean that the NSA is receiving data sent to them deliberately by the tech companies, as opposed to intercepting communications as they're transmitted to some other destination.[114]

"If these companies received an order under the FISA amendments act, they are forbidden by law from disclosing having received the order and disclosing any information about the order at all," Mark Rumold, staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, told ABC News.[117]

On May 28, 2013, Google was ordered by United States District Court Judge Susan Illston to comply with a National Security Letter issued by the FBI to provide user data without a warrant.[118] Kurt Opsahl, a senior staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, in an interview with VentureBeat said, "I certainly appreciate that Google put out a transparency report, but it appears that the transparency didn't include this. I wouldn't be surprised if they were subject to a gag order."[119]

The New York Times reported on June 7, 2013, that "Twitter declined to make it easier for the government. But other companies were more compliant, according to people briefed on the negotiations."[120] The other companies held discussions with national security personnel on how to make data available more efficiently and securely.[120] In some cases, these companies made modifications to their systems in support of the intelligence collection effort.[120] The dialogues have continued in recent months, as General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has met with executives including those at Facebook, Microsoft, Google and Intel.[120] These details on the discussions provide insight into the disparity between initial descriptions of the government program including a training slide which states, "Collection directly from the servers"[121] and the companies' denials.[120]

While providing data in response to a legitimate FISA request approved by the FISA Court is a legal requirement, modifying systems to make it easier for the government to collect the data is not. This is why Twitter could legally decline to provide an enhanced mechanism for data transmission.[120] Other than Twitter, the companies were effectively asked to construct a locked mailbox and provide the key to the government, people briefed on the negotiations said.[120] Facebook, for instance, built such a system for requesting and sharing the information.[120] Google does not provide a lockbox system, but instead transmits required data by hand delivery or ssh.[122]

Post-PRISM transparency reports

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In response to the publicity surrounding media reports of data-sharing, several companies requested permission to reveal more public information about the nature and scope of information provided in response to National Security requests.

On June 14, 2013, Facebook reported that the U.S. government had authorized the communication of "about these numbers in aggregate, and as a range." In a press release posted to its web site, the company reported, "For the six months ending December 31, 2012, the total number of user-data requests Facebook received from any and all government entities in the U.S. (including local, state, and federal, and including criminal and national security-related requests) – was between 9,000 and 10,000." The company further reported that the requests impacted "between 18,000 and 19,000" user accounts, a "tiny fraction of one percent" of more than 1.1 billion active user accounts.[123]

That same day, Microsoft reported that for the same period, it received "between 6,000 and 7,000 criminal and national security warrants, subpoenas and orders affecting between 31,000 and 32,000 consumer accounts from U.S. governmental entities (including local, state and federal)" which impacted "a tiny fraction of Microsoft's global customer base."[124]

Google issued a statement criticizing the requirement that data be reported in aggregated form, stating that lumping national security requests with criminal request data would be "a step backwards" from its previous, more detailed practices on its website's transparency report. The company said that it would continue to seek government permission to publish the number and extent of FISA requests.[125]

Cisco Systems saw a huge drop in export sales because of fears that the National Security Agency could be using backdoors in its products.[126]

On September 12, 2014, Yahoo! reported the U.S. Government threatened the imposition of $250,000 in fines per day if Yahoo didn't hand over user data as part of the NSA's PRISM program.[127] It is not known if other companies were threatened or fined for not providing data in response to a legitimate FISA requests.

Public and media response

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Domestic

[edit]
An elaborate graffiti in Columbus, Ohio, United States, satirizing comprehensive surveillance of telecommunications

The New York Times editorial board charged that the Obama administration "has now lost all credibility on this issue,"[128] and lamented that "for years, members of Congress ignored evidence that domestic intelligence-gathering had grown beyond their control, and, even now, few seem disturbed to learn that every detail about the public's calling and texting habits now reside in a N.S.A. database."[129] It wrote with respect to the FISA-Court in context of PRISM that it is "a perversion of the American justice system" when "judicial secrecy is coupled with a one-sided presentation of the issues."[130] According to the New York Times, "the result is a court whose reach is expanding far beyond its original mandate and without any substantive check."[130]

James Robertson, a former federal district judge based in Washington who served on the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court for three years between 2002 and 2005 and who ruled against the Bush administration in the landmark Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case, said FISA court is independent but flawed because only the government's side is represented effectively in its deliberations. "Anyone who has been a judge will tell you a judge needs to hear both sides of a case," said James Robertson.[131] Without this judges do not benefit from adversarial debate. He suggested creating an advocate with security clearance who would argue against government filings.[132] Robertson questioned whether the secret FISA court should provide overall legal approval for the surveillance programs, saying the court "has turned into something like an administrative agency." Under the changes brought by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, which expanded the US government's authority by forcing the court to approve entire surveillance systems and not just surveillance warrants as it previously handled, "the court is now approving programmatic surveillance. I don't think that is a judicial function."[131] Robertson also said he was "frankly stunned" by the New York Times report[80] that FISA court rulings had created a new body of law broadening the ability of the NSA to use its surveillance programs to target not only terrorists but suspects in cases involving espionage, cyberattacks and weapons of mass destruction.[131]

Former CIA analyst Valerie Plame Wilson and former U.S. diplomat Joseph Wilson, writing in an op-ed article published in The Guardian, said that "Prism and other NSA data-mining programs might indeed be very effective in hunting and capturing actual terrorists, but we don't have enough information as a society to make that decision."[133]

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an international non-profit digital-rights group based in the U.S., is hosting a tool, by which an American resident can write to their government representatives regarding their opposition to mass spying.[134]

The Obama administration's argument that NSA surveillance programs such as PRISM and Boundless Informant had been necessary to prevent acts of terrorism was challenged by several parties. Ed Pilkington and Nicholas Watt of The Guardian said of the case of Najibullah Zazi, who had planned to bomb the New York City Subway, that interviews with involved parties and U.S. and British court documents indicated that the investigation into the case had actually been initiated in response to "conventional" surveillance methods such as "old-fashioned tip-offs" of the British intelligence services, rather than to leads produced by NSA surveillance.[135] Michael Daly of The Daily Beast stated that even though Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who conducted the Boston Marathon bombing with his brother Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, had visited the Al Qaeda-affiliated Inspire magazine website, and even though Russian intelligence officials had raised concerns with U.S. intelligence officials about Tamerlan Tsarnaev, PRISM did not prevent him from carrying out the Boston attacks. Daly observed that, "The problem is not just what the National Security Agency is gathering at the risk of our privacy but what it is apparently unable to monitor at the risk of our safety."[136]

Ron Paul, a former Republican member of Congress and prominent libertarian, thanked Snowden and Greenwald and denounced the mass surveillance as unhelpful and damaging, urging instead more transparency in U.S. government actions.[137] He called Congress "derelict in giving that much power to the government," and said that had he been elected president, he would have ordered searches only when there was probable cause of a crime having been committed, which he said was not how the PRISM program was being operated.[138]

New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman defended limited government surveillance programs intended to protect the American people from terrorist acts:

Yes, I worry about potential government abuse of privacy from a program designed to prevent another 9/11—abuse that, so far, does not appear to have happened. But I worry even more about another 9/11. ... If there were another 9/11, I fear that 99 percent of Americans would tell their members of Congress: "Do whatever you need to do to, privacy be damned, just make sure this does not happen again." That is what I fear most. That is why I'll reluctantly, very reluctantly, trade off the government using data mining to look for suspicious patterns in phone numbers called and e-mail addresses—and then have to go to a judge to get a warrant to actually look at the content under guidelines set by Congress—to prevent a day where, out of fear, we give government a license to look at anyone, any e-mail, any phone call, anywhere, anytime.[139]

Political commentator David Brooks similarly cautioned that government data surveillance programs are a necessary evil: "if you don't have mass data sweeps, well, then these agencies are going to want to go back to the old-fashioned eavesdropping, which is a lot more intrusive."[140]

Conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer worried less about the legality of PRISM and other NSA surveillance tools than about the potential for their abuse without more stringent oversight. "The problem here is not constitutionality. ... We need a toughening of both congressional oversight and judicial review, perhaps even some independent outside scrutiny. Plus periodic legislative revision—say, reauthorization every couple of years—in light of the efficacy of the safeguards and the nature of the external threat. The object is not to abolish these vital programs. It's to fix them."[141]

In a blog post, David Simon, the creator of The Wire, compared the NSA's programs, including PRISM, to a 1980s effort by the City of Baltimore to add dialed number recorders to all pay phones to know which individuals were being called by the callers;[142] the city believed that drug traffickers were using pay phones and pagers, and a municipal judge allowed the city to place the recorders. The placement of the dialers formed the basis of the show's first season. Simon argued that the media attention regarding the NSA programs is a "faux scandal."[142][143] Simon had stated that many classes of people in American society had already faced constant government surveillance.

Political activist, and frequent critic of U.S. government policies, Noam Chomsky argued, "Governments should not have this capacity. But governments will use whatever technology is available to them to combat their primary enemy – which is their own population."[144]

A CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll conducted June 11 through 13 and released in 2013 found that 66% of Americans generally supported the program.[145][146][Notes 1] However, a Quinnipiac University poll conducted June 28 through July 8 and released in 2013 found that 45% of registered voters think the surveillance programs have gone too far, with 40% saying they do not go far enough, compared to 25% saying they had gone too far and 63% saying not far enough in 2010.[147] Other polls have shown similar shifts in public opinion as revelations about the programs were leaked.[148][149]

In terms of economic impact, a study released in August by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation[150] found that the disclosure of PRISM could cost the U.S. economy between $21.5 and $35 billion in lost cloud computing business over three years.[151][152][153][154]

International

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Sentiment around the world was that of general displeasure upon learning the extent of world communication data mining. Some national leaders spoke against the NSA and some spoke against their own national surveillance. One national minister had scathing comments on the National Security Agency's data-mining program, citing Benjamin Franklin: "The more a society monitors, controls, and observes its citizens, the less free it is."[155] Some question if the costs of hunting terrorists now overshadows the loss of citizen privacy.[156][157]

Nick Xenophon, an Australian independent senator, asked Bob Carr, the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, if e-mail addresses of Australian parliamentarians were exempt from PRISM, Mainway, Marina, and/or Nucleon. After Carr replied that there was a legal framework to protect Australians but that the government would not comment on intelligence matters, Xenophon argued that this was not a specific answer to his question.[158]

Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid said, "We knew about their past efforts to trace our system. We have used our technical resources to foil their efforts and have been able to stop them from succeeding so far."[159][160] However CNN has reported that terrorist groups have changed their "communications behaviors" in response to the leaks.[65]

In 2013 the Cloud Security Alliance surveyed cloud computing stakeholders about their reactions to the US PRISM spying scandal. About 10% of non-US residents indicated that they had cancelled a project with a US-based cloud computing provider, in the wake of PRISM; 56% said that they would be less likely to use a US-based cloud computing service. The Alliance predicted that US cloud computing providers might lose as much as €26 billion and 20% of its share of cloud services in foreign markets because of the PRISM spying scandal.[161]

China
[edit]
Hong Kong rally to support Snowden, June 15, 2013

Reactions of internet users in China were mixed between viewing a loss of freedom worldwide and seeing state surveillance coming out of secrecy. The story broke just before U.S. President Barack Obama and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping met in California.[162][163] When asked about NSA hacking China, the spokeswoman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China said, "China strongly advocates cybersecurity."[164] The party-owned newspaper Liberation Daily described this surveillance like Nineteen Eighty-Four-style.[165] Hong Kong legislators Gary Fan and Claudia Mo wrote a letter to Obama stating, "the revelations of blanket surveillance of global communications by the world's leading democracy have damaged the image of the U.S. among freedom-loving peoples around the world."[166] Ai Weiwei, a Chinese dissident, said, "Even though we know governments do all kinds of things I was shocked by the information about the US surveillance operation, Prism. To me, it's abusively using government powers to interfere in individuals' privacy. This is an important moment for international society to reconsider and protect individual rights."[167]

Europe
[edit]

Sophie in 't Veld, a Dutch Member of the European Parliament, called PRISM "a violation of EU laws."[168]

Digital rights group Digitale Gesellschaft protest at Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin, Germany (June 18, 2013)
Protesters against PRISM in Berlin, Germany wearing Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden masks (June 19, 2013)

The German Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, Peter Schaar, condemned the program as "monstrous."[169] He further added that White House claims do "not reassure me at all" and that "given the large number of German users of Google, Facebook, Apple or Microsoft services, I expect the German government ... is committed to clarification and limitation of surveillance." Steffen Seibert, press secretary of the Chancellor's office, announced that Angela Merkel will put these issues on the agenda of the talks with Barack Obama during his pending visit in Berlin.[170] Wolfgang Schmidt, a former lieutenant colonel with the Stasi, said that the Stasi would have seen such a program as a "dream come true" since the Stasi lacked the technology that made PRISM possible.[171] Schmidt expressed opposition, saying, "It is the height of naivete to think that once collected this information won't be used. This is the nature of secret government organizations. The only way to protect the people's privacy is not to allow the government to collect their information in the first place."[100] Many Germans organized protests, including one at Checkpoint Charlie, when Obama went to Berlin to speak. Matthew Schofield of the McClatchy Washington Bureau said, "Germans are dismayed at Obama's role in allowing the collection of so much information."[100]

The Italian president of the Guarantor for the protection of personal data, Antonello Soro, said that the surveillance dragnet "would not be legal in Italy" and would be "contrary to the principles of our legislation and would represent a very serious violation."[172]

CNIL (French data protection watchdog) ordered Google to change its privacy policies within three months or risk fines up to 150,000 euros. Spanish Agency of data protection (AEPD) planned to fine Google between 40,000 and 300,000 euros if it failed to clear stored data on the Spanish users.[173]

William Hague, the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom, dismissed accusations that British security agencies had been circumventing British law by using information gathered on British citizens by PRISM[174] saying, "Any data obtained by us from the United States involving UK nationals is subject to proper UK statutory controls and safeguards."[174] David Cameron said Britain's spy agencies that received data collected from PRISM acted within the law: "I'm satisfied that we have intelligence agencies that do a fantastically important job for this country to keep us safe, and they operate within the law."[174][175] Malcolm Rifkind, the chairman of parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee, said that if the British intelligence agencies were seeking to know the content of emails about people living in the UK, then they actually have to get lawful authority.[175] The UK's Information Commissioner's Office was more cautious, saying it would investigate PRISM alongside other European data agencies: "There are real issues about the extent to which U.S. law agencies can access personal data of UK and other European citizens. Aspects of U.S. law under which companies can be compelled to provide information to U.S. agencies potentially conflict with European data protection law, including the UK's own Data Protection Act. The ICO has raised this with its European counterparts, and the issue is being considered by the European Commission, who are in discussions with the U.S. Government."[168]

Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, accused western governments of practicing hypocrisy, as they conducted spying on the internet while they criticized other countries for spying on the internet. He stated that internet spying can make people feel reluctant to access intimate and private information that is important to them.[176] In a statement given to Financial Times following the Snowden revelations, Berners-Lee stated "Unwarranted government surveillance is an intrusion on basic human rights that threatens the very foundations of a democratic society."[177]

India
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Minister of External Affairs Salman Khurshid defended the PRISM program saying, "This is not scrutiny and access to actual messages. It is only computer analysis of patterns of calls and emails that are being sent. It is not actually snooping specifically on content of anybody's message or conversation. Some of the information they got out of their scrutiny, they were able to use it to prevent serious terrorist attacks in several countries."[178] His comments contradicted his Foreign Ministry's characterization of violations of privacy as "unacceptable."[179][180] When the then Minister of Communications and Information Technology Kapil Sibal was asked about Khurshid's comments, he refused to comment on them directly, but said, "We do not know the nature of data or information sought [as part of PRISM]. Even the external ministry does not have any idea."[181] The media felt that Khurshid's defence of PRISM was because the India government was rolling out the Central Monitoring System (CMS), which is similar to the PRISM program.[182][183][184]

Khurshid's comments were criticized by the Indian media,[185][186] as well as opposition party CPI(M) who stated, "The UPA government should have strongly protested against such surveillance and bugging. Instead, it is shocking that Khurshid has sought to justify it. This shameful remark has come at a time when even the close allies of the US like Germany and France have protested against the snooping on their countries."[187]

Rajya Sabha MP P. Rajeev told The Times of India that "The act of the USA is a clear violation of Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. But Khurshid is trying to justify it. And the speed of the government of India to reject the asylum application of Edward Snowden is shameful."[188]

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Applicable law and practice

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On June 8, 2013, the Director of National Intelligence issued a fact sheet stating that PRISM "is not an undisclosed collection or data mining program," but rather "an internal government computer system" used to facilitate the collection of foreign intelligence information "under court supervision, as authorized by Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (50 U.S.C. § 1881a)."[55] Section 702 provides that "the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may authorize jointly, for a period of up to 1 year from the effective date of the authorization, the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information."[189] In order to authorize the targeting, the attorney general and Director of National Intelligence need to obtain an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) pursuant to Section 702 or certify that "intelligence important to the national security of the United States may be lost or not timely acquired and time does not permit the issuance of an order."[189] When requesting an order, the attorney general and Director of National Intelligence must certify to the FISA Court that "a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information."[189] They do not need to specify which facilities or property will be targeted.[189]

After receiving a FISA Court order or determining that there are emergency circumstances, the attorney general and Director of National Intelligence can direct an electronic communication service provider to give them access to information or facilities to carry out the targeting and keep the targeting secret.[189] The provider then has the option to: (1) comply with the directive; (2) reject it; or (3) challenge it with the FISA Court. If the provider complies with the directive, it is released from liability to its users for providing the information and is reimbursed for the cost of providing it,[189] while if the provider rejects the directive, the attorney general may request an order from the FISA Court to enforce it.[189] A provider that fails to comply with the FISA Court's order can be punished with contempt of court.[189]

Finally, a provider can petition the FISA Court to reject the directive.[189] In case the FISA Court denies the petition and orders the provider to comply with the directive, the provider risks contempt of court if it refuses to comply with the FISA Court's order.[189] The provider can appeal the FISA Court's denial to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review and then appeal the Court of Review's decision to the Supreme Court by a writ of certiorari for review under seal.[189]

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the FISA Courts had been put in place to oversee intelligence operations in the period after the death of J. Edgar Hoover. Beverly Gage of Slate said, "When they were created, these new mechanisms were supposed to stop the kinds of abuses that men like Hoover had engineered. Instead, it now looks as if they have come to function as rubber stamps for the expansive ambitions of the intelligence community. J. Edgar Hoover no longer rules Washington, but it turns out we didn't need him anyway."[190]

Litigation

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Date Litigant Description
June 11, 2013 American Civil Liberties Union Lawsuit filed against the NSA citing that the "Mass Call Tracking Program" (as the case terms PRISM) "violates Americans' constitutional rights of free speech, association, and privacy" and constitutes "dragnet" surveillance, in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution, and thereby also "exceeds the authority granted by 50 U.S.C. § 1861, and thereby violates 5 U.S.C. § 706."[191] The case was joined by Yale Law School, on behalf of its Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic.[192]
June 11, 2013 FreedomWatch USA Class action lawsuit against government bodies and officials believed responsible for PRISM, and 12 companies (including Apple, Microsoft, Google, Facebook, and Skype and their chief executives) who have been disclosed as providing or making available mass information about their users' communications and data to the NSA under the PRISM program or related programs. The case cites the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, as well as breach of 18 U.S.C. §§2702 (disclosure of communications records), and asks the court to rule that the program operates outside its legal authority (s.215 of the Patriot Act). The class includes the plaintiffs and[193]
"other American citizens who, in addition to being members of the Nationwide Class, had their telephone calls and/or emails and/or any other communications made or received through Facebook, Google, Yahoo, YouTube, Skype, AOL, Sprint, AT&T, Apple, Microsoft and/or PalTalk actually recorded and/or listened into by or on behalf of [the] Defendants."

In November 2017, the district court dismissed the case.

February 18, 2014 Rand Paul and Freedom Works, Inc. Lawsuit filed against President Barack Obama, James R. Clapper, as Director of National Intelligence, Keith B. Alexander, as director of the NSA, James B. Comey, as director of the FBI, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The case contends that the Defendants are violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States by collecting phone metadata. The case is currently stayed pending the outcome of the government's appeal in the FreedomWatch USA/Klayman case.
June 2, 2014 Elliott J. Schuchardt Lawsuit filed against President Barack Obama, James R. Clapper, as Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Michael R. Rogers, as director of the NSA, James B. Comey, as director of the FBI, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The case contends that the Defendants are violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States by collecting the full content of e-mail in the United States. The complaint asks the Court to find the Defendants' program unconstitutional, and seeks an injunction. The court is currently considering the government's motion to dismiss this case.
[edit]

Laura Donohue, a law professor at the Georgetown University Law Center and its Center on National Security and the Law, has called PRISM and other NSA mass surveillance programs unconstitutional.[194]

Woodrow Hartzog, an affiliate at Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society commented that "[The ACLU will] likely have to demonstrate legitimate First Amendment harms (such as chilling effects) or Fourth Amendment harms (perhaps a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy) ... Is it a harm to merely know with certainty that you are being monitored by the government? There's certainly an argument that it is. People under surveillance act differently, experience a loss of autonomy, are less likely to engage in self exploration and reflection, and are less willing to engage in core expressive political activities such as dissenting speech and government criticism. Such interests are what First and Fourth Amendment seek to protect."[195]

Legality of the FISA Amendments Act

[edit]

The FISA Amendments Act (FAA) Section 702 is referenced in PRISM documents detailing the electronic interception, capture and analysis of metadata. Many reports and letters of concern written by members of Congress suggest that this section of FAA in particular is legally and constitutionally problematic, such as by targeting U.S. persons, insofar as "Collections occur in U.S." as published documents indicate.[196][197][198][199]

The ACLU has asserted the following regarding the FAA: "Regardless of abuses, the problem with the FAA is more fundamental: the statute itself is unconstitutional."[200]

Senator Rand Paul is introducing new legislation called the Fourth Amendment Restoration Act of 2013 to stop the NSA or other agencies of the United States government from violating the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution using technology and big data information systems like PRISM and Boundless Informant.[201][202]

Programs sharing the name PRISM

[edit]

Besides the information collection program started in 2007, there are two other programs sharing the name PRISM:[203]

  • The Planning tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization and Management (PRISM), a web tool used by US military intelligence to send tasks and instructions to data collection platforms deployed to military operations.[204]
  • The Portal for Real-time Information Sharing and Management (PRISM), whose existence was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.[203] This is an internal NSA program for real-time sharing of information which is apparently located in the NSA's Information Assurance Directorate.[203] The NSA's Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) is a very secretive division which is responsible for safeguarding U.S. government and military secrets by implementing sophisticated encryption techniques.[203]
[edit]
Idea behind the MUSCULAR program, which gave direct access to Google and Yahoo private clouds, no warrants needed

Parallel programs, known collectively as SIGADs gather data and metadata from other sources, each SIGAD has a set of defined sources, targets, types of data collected, legal authorities, and software associated with it. Some SIGADs have the same name as the umbrella under which they sit, BLARNEY's (the SIGAD) summary, set down in the slides alongside a cartoon insignia of a shamrock and a leprechaun hat, describes it as "an ongoing collection program that leverages IC [intelligence community] and commercial partnerships to gain access and exploit foreign intelligence obtained from global networks."

Some SIGADs, like PRISM, collect data at the ISP level, but others take it from the top-level infrastructure. This type of collection is known as "upstream". Upstream collection includes programs known by the blanket terms BLARNEY, FAIRVIEW, OAKSTAR and STORMBREW, under each of these are individual SIGADs. Data that is integrated into a SIGAD can be gathered in other ways besides upstream, and from the service providers, for instance it can be collected from passive sensors around embassies, or even stolen from an individual computer network in a hacking attack.[205][206][207][208][209] Not all SIGADs involve upstream collection, for instance, data could be taken directly from a service provider, either by agreement (as is the case with PRISM), by means of hacking, or other ways.[210][211][212] According to the Washington Post, the much less known MUSCULAR program, which directly taps the unencrypted data inside the Google and Yahoo private clouds, collects more than twice as many data points compared to PRISM.[213] Because the Google and Yahoo clouds span the globe, and because the tap was done outside of the United States, unlike PRISM, the MUSCULAR program requires no (FISA or other type of) warrants.[214]

See also

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Notes

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
PRISM is a surveillance program implemented by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008, authorizing the targeted collection of electronic communications content and metadata from non-U.S. persons located abroad for foreign intelligence purposes via compelled disclosures from U.S. electronic communication service providers. The program, which began operations in 2007, involves legal demands issued through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to major technology firms such as Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, and others, requiring them to provide data linked to specific selectors like email addresses or IP addresses associated with validated foreign targets. Disclosed to the public in June 2013 through classified documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, PRISM exemplified the scale of post-9/11 intelligence gathering, with the leaks revealing an internal NSA slide deck outlining collection volumes and processes that fueled accusations of overbroad domestic surveillance despite statutory safeguards against intentional U.S. person targeting. Although officially described as precise and selector-based to minimize incidental collection of Americans' data—retained only under strict procedures—PRISM has been central to ongoing disputes over the balance between counterterrorism efficacy and Fourth Amendment protections, including documented compliance errors and "backdoor searches" of U.S. persons' communications by other agencies. The program's renewal through periodic congressional reauthorizations of Section 702 underscores its enduring role in U.S. signals intelligence, even as technical implementations evolved from the originally named PRISM framework to broader "downstream" collection methods.

Program Overview

Description and Objectives

PRISM, internally designated as SIGAD US-984XN, constitutes a targeted foreign intelligence collection program administered by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008. This authority permits the acquisition of communications content from U.S.-based electronic communication service providers, including major technology firms, through the issuance of directives compelling the disclosure of data associated with non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located abroad. The program, which commenced operations in 2007 ahead of the formal enactment of Section 702, focuses on downstream collection methods distinct from upstream internet cable taps. The core objectives of PRISM center on obtaining foreign information to address imperatives, encompassing efforts, the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and mitigation of transnational cyber threats. Collection targets validated foreign selectors, such as email addresses or account identifiers linked to non-U.S. persons outside the , yielding content from communications including emails, voice-over-IP calls, video files, and instant messages. This supports broader U.S. government priorities in disrupting terrorist networks, tracking illicit technology transfers, and identifying hostile cyber actors, with annual certifications from the Attorney General and specifying prioritized foreign needs. In contrast to bulk metadata acquisition programs under separate legal authorities like Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which involved the amassing of domestic telephony records irrespective of targeting, PRISM employs a selector-based tasking mechanism. Directives are issued only for communications involving pre-approved foreign targets, minimizing incidental collection of purely domestic content while prioritizing relevance to validated intelligence requirements over comprehensive data hoarding. This targeted approach ensures that provider compliance is calibrated to specific foreign intelligence objectives rather than indiscriminate retention of metadata or content flows.

Scope and Data Collection Mechanisms

PRISM enabled the (NSA) to acquire internet communications from at least nine major U.S.-based technology providers, including starting September 11, 2007, Yahoo from March 12, 2008, from January 14, 2009, from September 2009, from December 7, 2009, and Apple from October 2012. The program focused on "downstream" collection, obtaining targeted data directly from these companies' servers rather than intercepting transit communications. Targeting under PRISM relied on "selectors" such as addresses, IP addresses, and telephone numbers associated with non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the for foreign purposes. These selectors were tasked through annual certifications and directives jointly issued by the Attorney General and , approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) pursuant to Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. Collection was restricted to communications where at least one party was a valid foreign target, though incidental acquisition of U.S. persons' occurred when they communicated with those targets. The types of data collected included , video and voice communications, uploaded photos and files, log-in notifications, and details from online social networking sites. By 2011, the NSA reported acquiring approximately 250 million internet communications annually under Section 702 authorities, with PRISM accounting for about 91% of that volume. To address incidental U.S. data, the program incorporated minimization procedures designed to protect , such as masking identifiers and limiting retention and dissemination of domestic content unless it met specific foreign exceptions. The PRISM program operates under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008, which authorizes the targeted acquisition of foreign intelligence from non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States without individual warrants for such targets. This statutory framework permits electronic surveillance directed at foreign targets for national security purposes, such as counterterrorism and counterproliferation, provided the Attorney General (AG) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) jointly certify compliance with specified procedures. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) reviews and approves the government's targeting procedures, which require selectors like email addresses or phone numbers to be associated with non-U.S. persons abroad and linked to foreign intelligence activities, as well as minimization procedures that limit the retention, dissemination, and use of incidentally acquired data involving U.S. persons. These procedures are designed to ensure acquisitions focus on valid foreign intelligence objectives while applying safeguards, such as masking U.S. person identifiers in most disseminations and requiring destruction of certain collected data unless it meets retention criteria tied to national security needs. The FISC's approval is granted annually upon submission of certifications that detail these mechanisms, confirming their adherence to statutory limits that prohibit intentional targeting of U.S. persons or persons in the U.S. Operational implementation integrates PRISM into the Agency's (NSA) (SIGINT) framework, enabling real-time collection from upstream providers to address time-sensitive threats, with oversight enforced through annual certifications executed by the AG and DNI that specify categories of foreign and affirm procedural compliance. Queries of raw Section 702 data for U.S. person information—often termed "backdoor searches"—are regulated by separate querying procedures approved by the FISC, which mandate that such searches be reasonably likely to return foreign or evidence of criminal activity, without requiring warrants for queries but subject to post-query audits and compliance reviews to mitigate incidental impacts. This structure prioritizes the causal efficacy of collection against foreign adversaries over ex post facto restrictions, as validated by recurring FISC endorsements of the program's protocols.

Historical Development

Origins and Authorization

The PRISM surveillance program emerged in response to perceived deficiencies in U.S. foreign intelligence collection highlighted by the , 2001, attacks, where failures in inter-agency information sharing and over-reliance on traditional telephony surveillance impeded threat detection. With communications migrating toward platforms dominated by U.S. tech firms, the (NSA) sought expanded access to electronic data from these providers to target non-U.S. persons abroad believed to pose risks. Initiated in 2007 under the administration, PRISM built upon earlier warrantless surveillance efforts by formalizing NSA directives to internet companies for user data acquisition. The program's legal foundation was laid by the Protect America Act (PAA), signed into law on August 5, 2007, which authorized the Attorney General to direct electronic communications service providers to furnish foreign intelligence information without prior judicial review for targets reasonably believed to be located outside the . On , 2007, the NSA secured as its inaugural PRISM partner, marking the onset of systematic collection. PRISM's authorization evolved with the expiration of the temporary PAA, transitioning to the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008, enacted on July 10, 2008, which codified Section 702 to permit warrantless acquisition of foreign communications "to acquire foreign intelligence information." Under Section 702, the NSA submits annual certifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) outlining targeting procedures, minimization guidelines, and compliance measures, with the FISC issuing orders approving these for up to one year. This framework addressed post-9/11 imperatives for proactive, comprehensive monitoring while nominally restricting incidental U.S. person data handling.

Expansion Post-9/11

Following the , 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. community expanded authorities to address evolving threats from foreign actors increasingly using communications. PRISM, operationalized under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act enacted on December 30, 2008, enabled the NSA to compel U.S. companies to provide data on non-U.S. persons abroad, marking a significant scaling from prior warrant-based limitations. This legal framework facilitated rapid program growth, with initial corporate participation by in September 2007 expanding to include in January 2009 and in September 2009, reflecting adaptation to the migration of terrorist communications to mainstream platforms. The program's directives, or selectors targeting foreign intelligence, surged post-2008, driven by the exponential rise in online foreign communications volume. NSA analyses indicated PRISM's data intake grew substantially from 2007 onward, with the program yielding 24,005 intelligence reports in 2012 alone—a 27% increase from 2011—contributing to over 77,000 total reports citing PRISM data by that year. By 2011, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court determined PRISM accounted for 91% of approximately 250 million communications acquired annually under the FISA Amendments Act, underscoring its centrality to refined U.S. intelligence reporting on threats. This expansion demonstrated an adaptive response to post-9/11 threat landscapes, including integrated analysis of foreign and incidentally collected domestic data. U.S. officials attributed the 2009 thwarting of the plot to bomb the to insights from Section 702 surveillance, including PRISM, which uncovered Zazi's communications with operatives abroad. Such outcomes, part of broader claims of disrupting over 50 attacks, justified the program's scaling amid rising digital threats, though reliant on NSA assessments of causal efficacy.

Pre-2013 Implementation

The PRISM program, operating under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act enacted on July 10, 2008, achieved operational maturity through annual certifications renewed by the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence, with approvals and modifications by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). These certifications authorized targeted collection of communications from non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located abroad, with initial FISC procedures approved in 2008. By 2011, the FISC mandated modifications to NSA minimization procedures following identification of compliance issues in upstream collection, including multi-communication transactions and inadvertent domestic acquisitions, as outlined in Judge John Bates' October 3, 2011, opinion. This ensured ongoing adherence to statutory targeting restrictions, with internal NSA compliance rates exceeding 99% since program inception through rigorous audits by the Office of the Director of Compliance. Minimization rules required the prompt destruction or masking of U.S. person data unless relevant to foreign intelligence or criminal investigations, with default retention limited to five years for PRISM-acquired content. Incidental collection of U.S. person communications, arising from foreigners' interactions with , constituted a small percentage of total acquisitions, estimated in the low single digits based on oversight reviews, while wholly domestic communications numbered in the tens of thousands annually. PRISM functioned as a downstream collection mechanism, complementing upstream efforts like FAIRVIEW by obtaining data directly from U.S. service providers using validated selectors, often derived from and trap-and-trace orders under separate authorities. By mid-2011, PRISM accounted for 91% of the NSA's internet-based tasking, reflecting its central role in routine foreign intelligence gathering.

Technical and Operational Details

Collection Processes

The PRISM collection process operates under Section 702 of the Amendments Act of 2008, which authorizes the acquisition of foreign communications from U.S.-based electronic communication service providers through court-approved directives rather than real-time taps or unauthorized access. Following approval of broad certifications by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the NSA identifies specific selectors—such as addresses or phone numbers—associated with non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located abroad. These selectors are tasked via internal systems, prompting the issuance of binding directives to relevant providers, which compel the production of stored or in-transit communications content linked to the targets. Directives require providers to furnish data "as soon as practicable," typically involving batch extractions or "slides" of full-take content—distinguishing PRISM from metadata-focused collections—without granting the NSA direct, unmediated server access or hacking capabilities. Providers certify compliance with targeting restrictions, ensuring efforts focus on foreign targets, and transmit data through secure portals or APIs designed for legal disclosures, with internal logs documenting near-complete adherence rates exceeding 99% in audited periods. This directive-driven model filters acquisitions upstream via provider queries, minimizing incidental U.S. person data at the point of collection, though subsequent minimization procedures apply. Tasking and processing occur through tools like the REPRISM FISA , where analysts submit and validate selectors before directives activate collection, yielding structured content such as emails, chats, and files for analysis. Empirical data from program oversight indicates that PRISM yields targeted content acquisitions, with case numbers tracking discrete foreign intelligence operations rather than indiscriminate bulk pulls.

Participating Entities and Compliance

The PRISM program compelled participation from nine major U.S. technology companies for the collection of stored communications under Section 702 of the (FISA). These entities included , starting in 2007; Yahoo in 2008; , , and in 2009; and in 2010; in 2011; and Apple in 2012. The (NSA) issued directives to these providers, approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), requiring them to furnish data on foreign targets without individual warrants. Compliance was enforced through legal obligations rather than voluntary cooperation, with the NSA reimbursing companies millions of dollars annually for associated costs, such as infrastructure modifications and personnel. For instance, between 2011 and 2012, reimbursements totaled over $250 million across providers including , , , and Yahoo to cover FISC-mandated certifications. While most firms adhered to directives, some mounted legal challenges; Yahoo contested a 2008 FISC order, arguing it violated the Fourth , but lost after facing threats of $250,000 daily fines for non-compliance, as declassified in 2014. Declassified documents reveal no instances of outright refusal or unwilling participation post-challenges, with providers integrating PRISM tasking into operations via secure portals or data handoffs. Following 2013 disclosures, PRISM expanded to encompass cloud service providers under reauthorized Section 702 authorities, maintaining compelled disclosures without evidence of systemic resistance in official records. This framework underscores statutory mandates over corporate discretion, countering narratives of proactive complicity.

Integration with Broader NSA Systems

PRISM-collected internet communications from U.S. technology companies are routed into the NSA's primary databases, enabling seamless fusion with data from upstream collection programs such as those tapping international fiber optic cables. This ingested content, including email, chats, and file transfers, supports targeted querying via , the NSA's expansive search platform that aggregates full-take feeds from diverse global collection points for real-time analysis by authorized personnel. While PRISM operates under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act for foreign-targeted content acquisition, its outputs remain distinct from bulk telephony metadata programs governed by Section 215, stored in separate repositories like to enforce legal silos between internet content and call detail records. Integration occurs through analytical workflows allowing cross-correlation for foreign intelligence purposes, with automated tools detecting behavioral patterns indicative of high-value targets such as terrorism facilitators or proliferation networks. Downstream PRISM data enhances the NSA's ecosystem by feeding into shared repositories accessible by counterparts via secure channels, amplifying coverage of transnational threats without reliance solely on U.S.-based infrastructure. Advanced analytics prioritize selectors linked to validated foreign intelligence requirements, minimizing incidental domestic collection through compliance filters embedded in the processing pipeline.

2013 Public Disclosures

Edward Snowden's Role

, a systems administrator employed as a contractor by for the (NSA), accessed classified documents detailing PRISM while stationed in , where he began work on March 1, 2013, at an annual salary rate of $122,000. In early 2013, Snowden contacted journalists and , providing them with thousands of documents, including PRISM-related slides, which were first published by The Guardian and The Washington Post on June 5 and 6, 2013, respectively. Snowden publicly identified himself as the source on June 9, 2013, via video interview from , where he had arrived on May 20, 2013, stating that his actions were driven by concerns over unconstitutional . Booz Allen terminated his employment on June 10, 2013, citing violations of company policy. Snowden asserted that he had raised surveillance-related concerns internally at the NSA multiple times prior to leaking the materials, claiming in a that he did so over 10 times through proper channels but received no meaningful response. However, NSA officials and a review by the House Committee found limited of such complaints, identifying only a single 2009 from Snowden seeking clarification on versus statutes, with no records of formal whistleblower submissions during his Booz Allen tenure. These disclosures, unauthorized under his clearance, exposed operational details of PRISM's from tech companies but also prompted debates over their selective nature and potential harm to methods. On June 21, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice charged Snowden with three felonies under the : unauthorized communication of national defense information, willful communication of classified intelligence to an unauthorized party, and theft of government property. After transiting through Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport, Snowden was granted one-year temporary asylum in on August 1, 2013, which was extended to in 2020; he has resided there since, facing ongoing U.S. efforts. Public perceptions of Snowden's role remain divided, with supporters framing his leaks as necessary exposure of overreach and critics viewing them as treasonous betrayal of oaths and intelligence capabilities.

Leaked Materials and Initial Revelations

The leaked materials primarily consisted of a classified 41-slide PowerPoint presentation dated April 2013, which detailed the PRISM program's structure, operational processes, and data acquisition methods. The slides identified nine major U.S. technology companies—Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple—as participants, specifying the start dates for NSA collection from each: Microsoft on September 28, 2007; Yahoo on March 12, 2008; Google and Facebook on both January 9, 2009; PalTalk on December 7, 2009; YouTube on September 12, 2010; Skype on February 6, 2011; and AOL on May 31, 2011. Apple was listed without a specific start date in the initial slides but confirmed as involved post-revelation. The presentation outlined PRISM's targeting of foreign intelligence selectors, such as addresses, across 204 countries, with collection encompassing emails, chats, videos, photos, voice and video calls, file transfers, and social networking data. It described a tasking where NSA directives prompted companies to provide specific user data stored on their servers, routed through NSA compliance systems, rather than implying indiscriminate bulk access. Initial slide excerpts suggested expansive capabilities, including phrases like "full take, full content," but subsequent government clarifications emphasized that access occurred via targeted (FISA) court-approved directives, limited to non-U.S. persons abroad, with incidental collection of U.S. persons' communications acknowledged when interacting with valid targets. Accompanying leaks included data from the NSA's Boundless Informant tool, which visualized global collection volumes, reporting 97.5 billion internet and telephony metadata records acquired worldwide over a 30-day period in March 2013, with 3 billion from U.S. networks attributed to upstream cable collection rather than PRISM specifically. The metrics highlighted PRISM's contribution to foreign-focused acquisitions but did not initially disclose granular targeting statistics, which later declassifications confirmed as predominantly non-U.S. persons under Section 702 authority.

Media Dissemination and Immediate Aftermath

The initial public disclosure of PRISM occurred on June 6, 2013, when published an article based on leaked NSA documents detailing the program's collection of user data from major U.S. tech companies, including , Yahoo, , , and Apple, under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. followed on June 7, 2013, releasing several of the 41 briefing slides from an April 2013 NSA presentation that outlined PRISM's operations, targets, and data flow processes. These reports rapidly disseminated globally, with publishing details on June 10, 2013, highlighting PRISM's implications for international data and confirming U.S. access to foreign communications routed through American servers. In the immediate aftermath, implicated tech companies issued denials of granting the NSA direct, unfettered access to servers, asserting compliance only with targeted legal requests under court orders. Public reaction emphasized privacy violations, amplifying fears of indiscriminate mass surveillance despite the program's focus on foreign intelligence targets; a Gallup poll conducted June 7-9, 2013, found 53% of Americans disapproving of the government's collection of phone and internet data for counterterrorism, though a contemporaneous Pew survey indicated 44% approval for such programs when framed against terrorism threats. On June 9, 2013, revealed as the source and published a video interview in which he described PRISM as enabling a societal shift toward unchecked omniscience, invoking tropes of dystopian overreach without citing specific instances of domestic abuse or misuse of collected data. Media coverage prioritized these narratives, often downplaying the empirical context of PRISM's role in thwarting 50+ terror plots as later detailed by intelligence officials, contributing to short-term scrutiny of efficacy versus trade-offs.

Official and Governmental Responses

United States Executive Branch

President defended the PRISM program shortly after its public disclosure on June 7, 2013, describing it as a narrowly targeted tool for foreign collection authorized under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, with strict oversight by and the to prevent abuse. He emphasized that PRISM did not involve indiscriminate of U.S. persons, framing it as an essential trade-off between and in the post-9/11 era, while rejecting calls for immediate termination. , in a March 12, 2013, Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, responded to Senator Ron Wyden's question about whether the NSA collected data on millions of Americans by stating, "No, sir... not wittingly," referring to intentional direct targeting; Clapper later apologized for the answer as erroneous, attributing it to a misunderstanding of the query's focus on bulk metadata rather than content collection under foreign authorities. In response to the revelations, the Obama administration declassified key documents, including Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) orders and opinions from 2011 validating Section 702 procedures, as well as summaries of PRISM collection volumes exceeding 200 million internet communications annually, to demonstrate legal compliance and built-in safeguards like targeting non-U.S. persons abroad. These releases, initiated by the in June and August 2013, aimed to balance transparency with operational secrecy, confirming that PRISM adhered to minimization rules limiting incidental U.S. person data retention and use. While a federal court ruling in 2013 temporarily halted bulk telephony metadata collection under Section 215 of the —prompting a brief operational pause pending FISC approval—PRISM operations under Section 702 continued uninterrupted, as the programs served distinct purposes with the latter focused on upstream and downstream internet content from foreign targets. Post-disclosure reviews, including the December 2013 White House-commissioned Liberty and Security report, proposed enhanced oversight but rejected warrant requirements for querying incidentally collected U.S. person data in Section 702 repositories, with administration officials arguing that such mandates would delay responses to imminent threats and undermine the program's effectiveness against and foreign . This stance prioritized continuity of intelligence capabilities, viewing existing FISC-approved procedures as adequate protections against overreach.

Legislative Actions and Oversight

The , enacted on June 2, 2015, curtailed the National Security Agency's bulk collection of domestic telephony metadata under Section 215 of the Patriot Act but preserved the authorities underpinning PRISM under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This legislation shifted metadata storage to private providers with targeted government requests, reflecting congressional intent to address post-Snowden concerns over domestic bulk collection while maintaining foreign-targeted surveillance capabilities essential for . Section 702, which enables PRISM's upstream and downstream collection from electronic communication service providers, has undergone periodic reauthorizations demonstrating bipartisan congressional consensus on its operational necessity despite privacy debates. Initially set to expire on December 31, 2023, following a six-year extension in the 2018 FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act signed January 19, 2018, the authority faced delays amid negotiations over query restrictions and transparency. A short-term extension in late 2023 pushed the deadline to April 19, 2024, after which passed the Reforming and Securing America Act, reauthorizing Section 702 for two years without mandating warrants for U.S. person queries—a proposal rejected in favor of enhanced FBI training and query minimization procedures to curb misuse. This outcome underscored pragmatic support across party lines, with proponents citing empirical contributions to and cybersecurity, including over 200 foreign intelligence targets identified annually via U.S. person queries in some years. Oversight mechanisms, including annual reports from the and reviews by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), have affirmed Section 702's effectiveness while identifying compliance gaps. The PCLOB's 2023 report, updating its 2014 assessment, concluded that the program yields critical foreign with limited incidental collection of U.S. persons' communications—estimated at under 0.01% of total acquisitions in audited samples—primarily when interact with valid foreign targets. U.S. person queries of Section 702 repositories, permitted for foreign purposes, totaled approximately 3.4 million by the FBI in 2021 (later adjusted downward for batch query overcounting), declining sharply to under 2 million in 2023 following procedural reforms like supervisor approvals. Critics, including Senator , have leveraged these figures to advocate stricter reforms, such as warrant requirements for domestic queries, arguing they evidence overreach despite official minimization efforts. Nonetheless, congressional reauthorizations reflect a calculated balance prioritizing causal links between the program and thwarted threats over expansive privacy mandates.

Judicial Proceedings and Rulings

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) oversees Section 702 certifications authorizing PRISM collection, approving them annually after reviewing targeting, minimization, and querying procedures submitted by the Attorney General and . These approvals typically include modifications to address compliance deficiencies, such as unauthorized querying of U.S. persons' data, but affirm the program's constitutionality under its foreign intelligence purpose. For instance, in a 2011 opinion by Presiding Judge John Bates, the FISC curtailed certain upstream collection practices under Section 702—distinct from but related to PRISM's direct acquisition from providers—by prohibiting the retention of communications merely "about" a target, while upholding the core targeting framework as compliant with statutory limits. FISC proceedings have recurrently highlighted implementation issues, prompting remedial orders; in 2016, the court mandated government reporting on PRISM-related compliance shortfalls, including over-collection incidents. More recently, the April 2024 FISC opinion approved recertifications for the Section 702 programs, including PRISM, citing improved FBI adherence to querying rules following prior violations, though it noted ongoing risks from expanded agency access. The September 2024 opinion, issued after Congress's April 20, 2024, reauthorization via the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, further validated updated procedures amid debates over warrant requirements for domestic queries, rejecting broader challenges to the program's structure. Federal district and appellate courts have handled post-disclosure challenges to PRISM, yielding mixed outcomes often hinging on standing rather than merits. Cases like Clapper v. (2013) saw the affirm dismissal for lack of injury-in-fact, blocking substantive review of upstream and PRISM collection. In Jewel v. NSA, a Northern District of suit alleging Fourth violations from PRISM-like dragnet , courts dismissed claims on state-secrets grounds and standing, with the Ninth Circuit upholding in 2021 and the denying in 2022. A 2020 ruling in United States v. Moalin deemed aspects of Section 702 upstream collection unlawful due to incidental domestic acquisitions, suppressing evidence in that terrorism prosecution, though convictions stood and the decision did not directly invalidate PRISM's provider-based targeting. Overall, FISC approvals have predominated, embedding iterative safeguards that reinforce the program's legal foundation, while Article III courts' frequent standing dismissals have insulated PRISM from wholesale invalidation, preserving its operational continuity despite acknowledged incidental U.S. person impacts.

International Dimensions

Cooperation Among Allies

The PRISM program's integration with the Five Eyes intelligence alliance—encompassing the United States' (NSA), the United Kingdom's (GCHQ), Australia's (ASD), Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE), and New Zealand's (GCSB)—enables seamless dissemination of collected internet communications data among partners. This sharing amplifies collective (SIGINT) capabilities by allowing each agency to leverage PRISM queries for targets beyond their primary jurisdictional focus, fostering reciprocal access to allied collections. GCHQ, in particular, utilized PRISM extensively, with leaked documents indicating direct querying privileges granted as early as the program's operational phase post-2007 FISA Amendments Act authorization. This access complemented GCHQ's initiative, which buffers data from transatlantic fiber-optic cables landing in the , creating bidirectional flows where PRISM-sourced content from U.S. tech firms enriches Tempora holdings and vice versa. Australia's ASD similarly drew on PRISM, reportedly querying the system over 100,000 times in a single month during late , exceeding UK volumes in subsequent periods and underscoring the alliance's operational depth. and maintain comparable interfaces, though granular usage metrics for these partners remain classified. Such synergies yield tangible security gains through joint operations, as shared PRISM-derived intelligence supports real-time threat disruption across borders, exemplified by coordinated taskings where allied inputs multiply analytic efficacy against transnational networks. Friction among partners is minimal, with each nation operating parallel domestic programs—such as the UK's Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act equivalents—framed as necessary extensions of sovereign authority rather than extraterritorial overreach. This alignment sustains robust defense of the arrangement against external scrutiny, prioritizing operational continuity.

Reactions from Foreign Governments

German Chancellor expressed concerns over U.S. surveillance practices in June 2013, stating that German citizens appeared to receive fewer protections than Americans under such programs. officials reacted with outrage to reports of NSA spying on EU offices in and Washington, demanding explanations from the U.S. in late June 2013. In October 2013, the German government indicated it had evidence suggesting the NSA monitored Merkel's mobile phone, prompting her to affirm that "spying among friends is not acceptable." Brazilian President denounced U.S. surveillance as a "breach of " during her September 24, 2013, address to the , citing NSA interception of her communications and those of executives. Rousseff canceled a planned to Washington in response and, alongside , co-sponsored a UN resolution in October 2013 affirming online privacy rights as a right. Despite these protests, pursued measures like mandating local data storage for foreign firms to mitigate foreign access risks, indicating pragmatic adjustments rather than severance of ties. French officials displayed limited indignation toward PRISM despite public reports, as disclosures in July 2013 revealed France's Directorate General for External Security operated a comparable domestic program collecting billions of metadata records annually from French citizens since 2008. This program, dubbed France's "PRISM," targeted phone and without individualized warrants, prompting minimal public outcry and underscoring selective criticism of foreign practices. In October 2013, condemned reported NSA bulk collection of French citizens' as unacceptable but maintained ongoing cooperation with the U.S. Several governments, including those in and , issued formal protests over PRISM's extraterritorial reach but continued bilateral intelligence-sharing arrangements with the U.S., prioritizing imperatives. Post-2013 revelations, nations like expanded metadata retention laws, framing enhanced surveillance as essential for amid evolving digital threats, with PRISM serving as a referenced benchmark for operational scale rather than a deterrent.

Global Intelligence Sharing Implications

The PRISM revelations highlighted the depth of intelligence sharing within the Five Eyes alliance—encompassing the , , , , and —revealing joint surveillance operations that persisted despite public exposure. Leaked documents demonstrated that PRISM data contributed to raw intelligence comprising 91% of the NSA's internet-based analytic reports, underscoring the alliance's operational value in aggregating from global communications flows. The endurance of these arrangements post-2013 affirmed their strategic necessity, as member states recalibrated protocols to address vulnerabilities without abandoning reciprocal data exchanges essential for and threat detection. In parallel, the disclosures spurred refinements in bilateral intelligence pacts beyond partners, including the European Union's 2023 adequacy decision under the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework, which enabled continued transatlantic data transfers while incorporating safeguards against indiscriminate . This framework addressed concerns raised by PRISM by limiting U.S. to proportionate needs, facilitating over €7 trillion in annual EU-U.S. data-dependent trade without halting cooperation. Such developments reflect a pragmatic recalibration toward mutual adequacy standards, prioritizing secure data flows amid realities over absolute ideals that could asymmetrically constrain allied intelligence. Causal analysis reveals that adversaries like and operate analogous systems without transparency or restraint, as seen in China's Skynet and Sharp Eyes initiatives, which integrate over 200 million public cameras for real-time behavioral monitoring and data aggregation from tech platforms. Russia's system mandates internet providers to enable access to communications metadata and content, mirroring PRISM's compelled collection but absent judicial oversight or disclosure. These opaque programs underscore the reciprocal nature of global , where unilateral democratic restraint—driven by absolutism—would cede advantages to non-disclosing states unburdened by accountability. PRISM's exposure, rather than eroding capabilities, heightened awareness of such dynamics, contributing to enhanced global as evidenced by rising commitments in the ITU's 2024 Global Cybersecurity Index and frameworks like the World Economic Forum's 2025 Outlook, which note accelerated defenses against state-sponsored threats.

Corporate and Technological Perspectives

Tech Companies' Involvement

Under the PRISM program, authorized by Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, the NSA obtained court-approved directives compelling U.S. technology companies to disclose user communications matching specific selectors such as addresses or identifiers provided by analysts. Companies including , starting in 2007; Yahoo in 2008; , , and in 2009; in 2010; and in 2011; and Apple in 2012, received these directives and queried their internal databases to identify and forward relevant data, including , chats, videos, and files, without granting the NSA direct server access. This process involved significant operational burdens, with the NSA reimbursing companies millions of dollars annually to cover compliance , such as secure transfer systems and legal reviews required for handling classified requests. Overall, payments to telecom and firms for such access reached hundreds of millions yearly, reflecting the scale of and certification efforts to meet FISA standards. Tech firms resisted aspects of the regime through legal filings, including amicus briefs supporting challenges to bulk collection authorities, arguing for narrower interpretations of laws to limit incidental collection of U.S. persons' data. Following disclosures, companies invested billions in enhanced protocols—such as Apple's end-to-end implemented in 2014 and Google's similar advances for and services—which reduced the feasibility of content extraction under PRISM directives, though metadata collection and upstream interception persisted via other authorities. Following the June 6, 2013, public disclosure of PRISM via leaked documents, senior executives from major technology firms including , , and issued statements explicitly denying that the (NSA) possessed "direct access" to their user data servers. 's chief legal officer, David Drummond, asserted that " does not provide any government, including the U.S. government, with any direct access to our systems." 's chief security officer, Joe Sullivan, similarly stated that the company "did not provide any government organization access to our servers containing user information." spokesperson emphasized compliance solely "when we receive a legally binding order or ." These responses highlighted that data production occurred pursuant to reviewed legal directives under Section 702 of the (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008, rather than through automated or unrestricted mechanisms. Constrained by statutory nondisclosure requirements, affected companies initiated legal proceedings to contest the breadth and of FISA orders. In 2013, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) panel ruled in favor of Yahoo's challenge, mandating the U.S. government to declassify portions of opinions related to compelled PRISM participation, thereby allowing limited public insight into compliance processes. and other firms filed motions seeking permission to disclose aggregate FISA request volumes, arguing that transparency would demonstrate adherence to lawful bounds without compromising . These efforts underscored companies' positions that while obligated to respond to valid court directives, they sought judicial validation of order scopes to affirm legal compliance. The , signed into law on June 2, 2015, addressed such challenges by authorizing electronic communication service providers to publish banded aggregate statistics on requests, including FISA Section 702 directives, in semiannual or annual reports. This provision enabled firms like and to report receipt of thousands of such orders annually without specifying targets or content, marking a shift from total secrecy to constrained disclosure. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) annual statistical transparency reports, mandated under Section 702 oversight, quantify directive scales through non-U.S. person target counts, which proxy issuance volumes to providers. These figures rose from 232,432 targets in calendar year (CY) 2021 to 246,073 in CY2022, 268,590 in CY2023, and 291,824 in CY2024, indicating sustained expansion in program utilization amid renewals. Providers' compliance with these directives remains governed by FISC-approved minimization procedures to limit incidental U.S. person data handling.

Post-Disclosure Transparency Measures

Following the 2013 disclosures, U.S. technology companies, compelled by Section 702 directives for PRISM collection, sought and obtained partial permission from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to publish aggregated transparency reports on requests, including those under FISA Section 702. These reports, starting in 2014, detail ranges of orders received, such as Apple's semi-annual disclosures of letters and FISA processes, which encompass 702-related directives; for example, Apple reported 0-249 such orders in the first half of 2014, with subsequent reports showing consistent bands in the hundreds annually across providers like and . The Office of the also began issuing annual statistical transparency reports on 702 surveillance, revealing targeted acquisitions primarily against non-U.S. persons, with over 246,000 such targets in one reported year, underscoring the program's foreign focus amid incidental U.S. person collections subject to minimization rules. Industry groups, including coalitions of tech firms under initiatives like Reform Government Surveillance, advocated for enhanced disclosures and warrant requirements for querying incidentally collected U.S. person data in 702 repositories, arguing for stricter protections against domestic overreach. However, empirical assessments from oversight bodies indicate that direct targeting of U.S. persons remains prohibited, with incidental collections forming a limited subset relative to foreign acquisitions—estimated through Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board analyses as manageable under existing procedures, though exact U.S. person volumes are not fully disaggregated publicly. These measures, including FBI querying limits and annual certifications, have sustained program operations with incremental reforms, affirming operational legitimacy through verifiable, bounded application rather than wholesale suspension. In the 2020s, the 2018 further supported transparency-compliant access by clarifying U.S. providers' obligations to disclose and produce data stored abroad under lawful orders, bypassing protracted mutual legal assistance treaties and enabling efficient compliance akin to PRISM's domestic frameworks for overseas-stored communications. This legislation, integrated into broader authorizations, has facilitated executive agreements with allies for reciprocal while mandating safeguards, extending PRISM-like mechanisms without eroding core efficacy.

Effectiveness and Security Outcomes

Documented Counterterrorism Successes

The has attributed disruptions of more than 50 potential terrorist attacks worldwide to intelligence collected under programs authorized by Section 702 of the , which encompasses PRISM's acquisition of communications content from U.S. tech companies targeting non-U.S. persons abroad. In congressional testimony, NSA Director General Keith Alexander specified that these efforts included 13 plots targeting the U.S. , with PRISM's intercepts playing a key role in providing actionable foreign intelligence leads to domestic . A prominent example is the 2009 New York City subway bombing plot led by , an Afghan-American operative linked to . PRISM collection yielded email communications between Zazi and his handlers in , revealing bomb-making instructions and travel plans, which prompted FBI intervention and Zazi's arrest on September 9, 2009, averting an attack involving hydrogen peroxide-based explosives in backpacks. Similarly, in September 2010, Section 702-derived intelligence, including content from online communications, disrupted a plot by Somali extremists to conduct coordinated shootings at a Danish newspaper office, mirroring the ' tactics of multiple gunmen targeting public sites. From 2013 onward, declassified examples highlight PRISM and related 702 collections' role in countering evolving threats. NSA analysts used foreign-targeted internet communications to track ISIS operative Hajji Muter, identifying his bomb-making activities in from 2014 to 2016 and enabling partner forces to neutralize him, thereby disrupting recruitment and attack planning networks. The Privacy and Oversight Board, in its review of Section 702, affirmed that such collections provide "unique foreign intelligence" essential for , including real-time content that accelerates tip generation and shortens operational timelines compared to metadata alone. This has extended to identifying cyber-enabled terrorist financing and ISIS online recruiters through and chat data, contributing to captures in multiple cases through 2024.

Empirical Evidence of Value

Audits conducted by the Office of the (ODNI) and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) demonstrate Section 702 collections, including those under the PRISM program, provide substantial foreign value. In 2022, Section 702 data supported 59% of articles in the and contributed to nearly 20% of all (NSA) reporting, either entirely or in part. These figures underscore PRISM's role in generating actionable insights on foreign threats, with ODNI vignettes documenting its use in identifying plots, disrupting cyber threats, and revealing internal foreign discussions of value. Targeting under Section 702 exhibits high accuracy and low error rates, as validated by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) reviews and agency compliance assessments. NSA targeting compliance exceeded 99.85% from summer 2019 to fall 2021, with incident rates ranging from 0.05% to 0.15%, while targeting achieved 99.99% compliance over similar periods, rejecting only 0.07% of proposed targets since 2008. These low false positive rates in selector validation ensure collections focus on non-U.S. persons abroad reasonably believed to possess foreign intelligence, minimizing extraneous acquisitions. Operational impacts include contributions to and disruptions, with Section 702-derived intelligence aiding in the identification of threats such as a late October 2023 foreign terrorist plot against U.S. in the . Analyses from institutions like Brookings highlight PRISM's targeted nature—retrieving specific data like archived communications rather than indiscriminate bulk collection—and its utility in post-incident investigations, such as analyzing call patterns in the bombing to rule out broader networks. Post-9/11 data gaps in threat attribution persist without such tools, as evidenced by the reliance on electronic communications for tracking non-state actors, where traditional diplomatic or alternatives often prove insufficient or delayed.

Assessments of Operational Impact

Following the 2013 disclosures, adversaries such as terrorist organizations accelerated adoption of end-to-end encrypted platforms like and Telegram, reducing the accessibility of plaintext communications for . This shift prompted U.S. countermeasures, including NSA investments in cryptographic exploitation, vulnerability discovery, and collaboration with private sector entities to access encrypted data streams without routine backdoors. Despite these adaptations, PRISM collection under Section 702 sustained high operational yield, accounting for approximately 91% of communications acquired by the NSA in 2011 and supporting over 77,000 intelligence reports by 2012 through targeted foreign intelligence tasking. By 2023-2025, Section 702 authorities enabling PRISM expanded beyond counterterrorism to address transnational threats, including foreign narcotics cartels trafficking fentanyl precursors and finished products into the U.S. Intelligence derived from these collections revealed smuggling techniques, cartel hierarchies, and involvement of foreign officials, facilitating disruptions such as interdictions and indictments. Legislative adjustments in the 2024 Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act explicitly certified narco-traffickers as valid targets under Section 702 when linked to national security priorities, affirming the program's adaptability amid reauthorization debates. The U.S. intelligence community maintains that PRISM's contributions—ranging from thwarting specific terrorist operations to yielding unique foreign intelligence on cyber and proliferation risks—result in a net enhancement of , outweighing evasion challenges through iterative targeting refinements and minimal incidental domestic collection. This assessment, drawn from declassified vignettes and oversight reports, underscores causal links between collection and actionable outcomes, such as military strikes and threat warnings, while acknowledging persistent needs for technological evolution against encrypted evasion.

Criticisms and Debates

Privacy and Civil Liberties Concerns

The and have criticized PRISM, as part of Section 702 surveillance, for enabling warrantless "backdoor" searches of Americans' communications incidentally collected while targeting non-U.S. persons abroad. These groups argue that the lack of individualized warrants for U.S. person queries undermines Fourth Amendment protections, as federal agencies like the FBI can access vast troves of domestic data without . Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) transparency reports indicate that U.S. person queries of Section 702 data, including from PRISM collections, numbered over 200,000 annually by agencies such as the NSA and FBI in recent years, with FBI queries alone exceeding 119,000 in one reported period. Critics, including the EFF, highlight the risk of abuse in these queries, citing NSA compliance reports documenting thousands of incidents from 2011 to 2018, including unauthorized disseminations and improper querying that exposed U.S. persons' . Concerns over have focused on the program's expansion beyond foreign intelligence to domestic criminal investigations, such as narcotics cases, despite statutory limits. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) has addressed flaws in upstream collection under Section 702—related to PRISM's broader framework—noting in opinions that practices like acquiring entire transactions involving U.S. persons violated minimization procedures, prompting operational halts in certain "about" collections by 2017. Public opinion polls reflect widespread apprehension, with a 2013 Pew Research Center survey finding 53% of Americans disapproving of government collection of telephone and data for anti- purposes, marking a shift where concerns surpassed fears post-Snowden disclosures. These revelations have intensified debates over encryption, as privacy advocates argue that PRISM's reliance on compelled access from tech firms underscores the need for to block such government demands.

Claims of Overreach and Abuse

Critics have alleged overreach in PRISM operations, citing instances where the NSA collected data beyond authorized foreign intelligence targets, though such errors were addressed through mandatory purges and represented a small fraction of overall acquisitions. In a 2011 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) ruling, the NSA's upstream Section 702 collection—distinct from but related to PRISM's downstream mechanisms—incidentally acquired tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications due to technical misconfigurations in filtering person identifiers; the court ordered segregation and eventual deletion of this overcollected data to rectify the violation. Similar compliance lapses persisted into 2012 and 2013, including unauthorized retention of certain Section 702 data subject to purge requirements, prompting the NSA to delete affected datasets and refine targeting procedures as remedial actions. Personnel abuses were rare amid the program's vast scale. Between 2003 and 2013, internal NSA audits documented approximately 12 confirmed cases of "," where analysts improperly queried PRISM-derived data on personal romantic interests, a minuscule number relative to the agency's handling of billions of intelligence tasks annually; violators faced administrative sanctions, and no evidence emerged of widespread contractor exploitation beyond isolated incidents. These errors, while highlighting risks in access controls, were self-reported and mitigated through enhanced oversight, underscoring their infrequency against the backdrop of targeted foreign-focused operations. Snowden's disclosures fueled claims of blanket domestic spying, portraying PRISM as indiscriminately vacuuming all communications, yet declassified documents reveal targeting confined to specific non-US person selectors overseas, with incidental US person data comprising under 0.01% of the US population based on annual target counts hovering around 200,000-250,000 foreign entities. amplification of totalitarian overreach narratives often overlooked this empirical targeting precision, reflecting a tendency in left-leaning outlets to prioritize over foreign imperatives despite official transparency reports confirming purge protocols and minimal systemic deviance.

Counterarguments on Necessity and Proportionality

Defenders of PRISM's implementation under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act argue that its necessity stems from the exigencies of countering agile foreign threats, where traditional warrant-based processes—designed for domestic targets—cannot accommodate the speed and scale required for overseas intelligence collection, allowing targets to be tasked or detasked in minutes based on evolving indicators. In a threat landscape marked by terrorism, cyberattacks, and proliferation, alternatives like individualized warrants for non-U.S. persons abroad would introduce prohibitive delays, as jurisdictional barriers and the volume of global communications render such mechanisms impractical for real-time foreign intelligence. Proportionality is upheld through court-approved targeting limited to non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the , coupled with minimization rules that purge or restrict access to incidentally acquired U.S. persons' data unless it meets foreign intelligence criteria, achieving compliance rates above 99% in targeting procedures. The program's empirical contributions include providing pivotal intelligence that foiled the 2009 bombing by intercepting an courier's email to a U.S.-based operative, enabling arrests and convictions, as well as identifying ISIS recruiter Shawn Parson and his network, averting attacks in the U.S. and through shared leads with allies. It also supported the 2016 elimination of ISIS leader Hajji Iman by tracking his communications over two years, yielding actionable insights into his operations. Bipartisan evaluations, including Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board assessments, conclude that these security benefits—such as informing 59% of 2022 presidential daily brief articles and over 20% of NSA reporting—outweigh incidental encroachments when mitigated by oversight, with no verified evidence of intentional political abuse in collection or targeting. Claims of systemic overreach for domestic political ends remain unsubstantiated, as reviews attribute compliance lapses primarily to post-collection querying rather than the upstream acquisition process itself. Absolutist postures, by contrast, risk eroding deterrence against adversaries who route operations through foreign channels, as the program's track record in disrupting plots demonstrates that calibrated preserves without feasible substitutes.

Key Lawsuits and Court Decisions

One prominent lawsuit challenging the NSA's surveillance practices, including those akin to PRISM, is , filed in 2008 by the on behalf of plaintiff Tashia Jewel and others, alleging Fourth Amendment violations through warrantless bulk collection of communications from U.S. persons via programs like PRISM. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California initially dismissed the case in 2011, ruling that plaintiffs failed to establish standing under the (FISA) by not proving they were specifically aggrieved parties. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part in 2015, finding that Jewel had alleged a sufficiently injury for standing on Fourth Amendment claims, allowing the case to proceed past the pleadings stage despite government assertions of . The case encountered further procedural obstacles, including government invocations of the state secrets doctrine, drawing on precedents like Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush (2007-2012), where the Ninth Circuit held that FISA partially displaces the state secrets privilege for surveillance disputes but still permitted dismissal of sensitive evidence claims. In Jewel, the district court in 2019 granted partial summary judgment to the government on FISA claims due to lack of evidence of illegal targeting, while allowing constitutional claims to advance, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of core dragnet allegations in 2021, citing insufficient particularized injury traceable to PRISM-specific collection. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in June 2022, effectively ending the case without reaching the merits of PRISM's constitutionality and underscoring courts' reluctance to grant standing in mass surveillance suits absent direct proof of victimization. The 2018 Supreme Court decision in Carpenter v. United States, which required warrants for historical cell-site location data as a Fourth search, has been invoked in subsequent 702-related challenges but distinguished by courts due to PRISM's focus on foreign targets under FISA, where incidental U.S. person collection is authorized without individualized warrants. Lower courts have declined to extend Carpenter's reasoning to Section 702 upstream or PRISM acquisitions, viewing them as categorical foreign intelligence tools rather than domestic tracking, thus preserving the program's framework. Challenges to Section 702 renewals persisted into 2023-2024, with suits like those from the ACLU questioning compliance and querying of U.S. persons' data, but the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approved certifications with mandated reforms, such as enhanced FBI query restrictions, without invalidating core PRISM operations. These rulings highlight procedural survivability, as courts have upheld the program amid compliance tweaks rather than substantive overhauls, often deferring to national security equities over broad injunctions.

FISA Amendments Act Reauthorizations

The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which includes Section 702 authorizing programs like PRISM, initially contained a set to expire on December 31, 2012. reauthorized Section 702 through the FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, extending its provisions until December 31, 2017, with added transparency measures such as semiannual reports on acquisition and dissemination of U.S. person data. A subsequent reauthorization in 2017, enacted as the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, further extended Section 702 until December 31, 2023, while imposing restrictions on queries of U.S. person identifiers and enhancing oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). As the 2023 expiration approached, reauthorization efforts faced significant delays amid debates over requiring warrants for domestic queries of Section 702 data involving U.S. persons, with proponents arguing such measures would address incidental collection without halting foreign-targeted surveillance. The initially advanced a bill in February 2024 mandating warrants for certain queries, but it stalled in the ; subsequent votes rejected warrant amendments, with the House passing a cleaner extension on April 12, 2024, by a 273-147 margin. The Senate followed suit, and President Biden signed the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA) on April 20, 2024, reauthorizing Section 702 for two years until April 19, 2026, alongside reforms like expanded FBI query training and penalties for misuse. These delays, while prompting incremental compliance enhancements, did not result in a lapse of authority, as existing certifications remained operative during negotiations. In 2025, Section 702 operates under the 2024 certifications approved by the FISC in March, with ongoing joint compliance assessments by the Department of Justice and Office of the confirming adherence to minimization procedures by agencies including the NSA, FBI, CIA, and NCTC. Discussions for the next reauthorization, due by 2026, have begun amid heightened emphasis on cyber threats from state actors, with proposals like Senator Tom Cotton's 2025 plan suggesting an additional 18-month extension to allow further review. These periodic sunsets have facilitated and targeted adjustments, such as limits on FBI backdoor searches, without undermining the program's continuity for foreign intelligence collection.

Reforms and Ongoing Adjustments

Following the 2013 disclosures, the U.S. government implemented several procedural adjustments to Section 702 surveillance, including PRISM, to enhance compliance and address incidental collection of U.S. persons' data. In 2015, the Director of National Intelligence and Attorney General directed the NSA to cease certain "about" collection practices—where communications were acquired if they referenced a foreign intelligence selector without being to or from it—and to purge previously collected data lacking foreign intelligence value. These changes, formalized in amended targeting procedures approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, applied across Section 702 acquisitions to minimize retention of non-pertinent information. Purge rules were further tightened through updated minimization procedures, requiring expedited deletion of communications from U.S. persons when they were solely domestic or deemed wholly unconnected to foreign intelligence purposes. The and Oversight Board noted in its 2023 report that these post-disclosure audits led to internal discoveries and remediation of the majority of compliance shortfalls, with NSA's oversight mechanisms identifying issues before external reporting. Empirical data from semiannual assessments show NSA targeting incident rates remained low in subsequent periods, with routine reminders and procedural refinements contributing to sustained adherence. Regarding Section 702(b)(5), which permits queries of acquired data using U.S. person identifiers for foreign intelligence, proposed limits focused on FBI practices amid concerns over improper domestic law enforcement queries. In 2021 and 2022, the FBI enacted major querying reforms, including mandatory training, supervisory approvals for certain searches, and technological filters, resulting in a marked decline in reported violations—down from over 3,000 in 2019 to fewer than 100 by early 2023. These adjustments, upheld in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court rulings, balanced access for valid foreign intelligence needs without mandating warrants, preserving operational flexibility. The 2024 reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act introduced ongoing refinements, such as expanded reporting on querying volumes, involvement in court proceedings, and prohibitions on purchasing commercially available data to circumvent Section 702 restrictions. These evolutions reflect adaptive oversight, with semiannual joint assessments by the Attorney General and DNI confirming that compliance enhancements did not impair the program's capacity for targeted foreign intelligence collection. Emerging integrations of advanced analytics, including for pattern detection in large datasets, continue to refine targeting precision while adhering to tightened procedural safeguards.

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