Hubbry Logo
Panglong ConferencePanglong ConferenceMain
Open search
Panglong Conference
Community hub
Panglong Conference
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Panglong Conference
Panglong Conference
Panglong Conference
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

The Panglong Conference (Burmese: ပင်လုံညီလာခံ), held in February 1947, was a historic meeting that took place at Panglong in the Shan States in Burma between the Shan, Kachin and Chin ethnic minority leaders and Aung San, head of the interim Burmese government. Aung Zan Wai, Pe Khin, Bo Hmu Aung, Sir Maung Gyi, Dr. Sein Mya Maung and Myoma U Than Kywe were among the negotiators of the historical Panglong Conference who negotiated with Bamar representative General Aung San and other ethnic leaders in 1947. All these leaders unanimously decided to join the Union of Burma. On the agenda was the united struggle for independence from Britain and the future of Burma after independence as a unified independent republic.

History

[edit]

Burma has been called an anthropologist's paradise. Various groups of people migrated south into the Irrawaddy–Chindwin, Sittang and Salween valleys from the China–Tibet region in the latter part of the first millennium, the Mon followed by the Tibeto-Burman and Tai-Shan races. The main groups were the Mon, Bamar, Shan and Rakhine, establishing their own kingdoms, and the first three groups vying for supremacy. The Bamar under Anawrahta in the 11th century, Bayinnaung in the 16th century, and Alaungpaya in the 18th century unified and expanded their kingdoms establishing the first, second and third Burmese Empires respectively, whilst the Shan were ascendent during the 14th and the 15th centuries. The ancient Mon kingdom in the south was finally overwhelmed by the Bamar into submission only in the mid-18th century, and the Arakan annexed subsequently, establishing a Bamar-dominant nation state approximately within its current boundaries. Although the Arakan and Monlands were under Bamar administration, the Shanlands and the Trans-Salween states of the Karen and Karenni were never under direct control but only under Burmese suzerainty.

The British fought three wars with Burma in 1824, 1852 and 1885, culminating in the loss of Burmese sovereignty and independence. They established a colonial administration 'at least possible cost' according to Lord Dufferin. A distinction between the hills and the plains also developed that evolved during the arduous annexation process and became formalised into Ministerial Burma, formerly Burma Proper, and the Frontier Areas. During the annexation process there was armed resistance not just from the Bamar but from the Shan, Chin and Kachin. The Shan and Karreni Saophas or Sawbwas, and Kachin Duwas were left to continue their feudatory rule in their areas; the Karenni states were never even included within the borders of British Burma. In parliament, seats were reserved for the Karen, immigrant Chinese, Indian and Anglo-Burmese minorities, an arrangement bitterly opposed by many Burmese politicians. The Mon of Lower Burma and the Rakhine included in Ministerial Burma had no representation at all even though the plains Karen (the majority of the Karen population) and the Mon shared the Irrawaddy Delta of Lower Burma.[1]

The draining of the marshes for rice cultivation drew Burman migration into British Burma even before the final annexation of Upper Burma. The Bamar however were virtually excluded from military service, and even as late as 1939 there were only 432 Burmans in the army compared with 1448 Karens, 886 Chins and 881 Kachins. Karen villagers had acted as guides for the British during the Anglo-Burmese Wars, and Karen troops had played a major part in the suppression of rebellions in Lower Burma in 1886 and again in the Saya San rebellion of 1930-32.

American, British and other European missionaries had also succeeded in converting the hills peoples to Christianity, the Karen in particular, and also the Kachin and Chin, whereas they made very little headway among the Buddhist Bamar, Mon, Rakhine, Shan and the plains Karen. Once they had benefited from a Christian education, Karen migration to towns in Lower Burma and the Tenasserim also increased. Burman leaders would blame the 'divide and rule' policy of Western imperialists and the 'servile streak' in the ethnic minorities who would look up to them; U Nu, the first prime minister of independent Burma, was later to accuse certain missionaries and writers of 'having deliberately sown the seeds of racial and religious conflict'. The ethnic minorities would, in turn, point the finger at Burman 'chauvinism' and 'oppression'.[1]

The Frontier Areas or Scheduled Areas were divided into Part I or Excluded Areas such as the Kachin state with no right of election to parliament, and Part II or Partially Excluded Areas subdivided into two groups, one with electoral representation such as Myitkyina and Bhamo with Kachin minority and Shan/Burman majorities, and the other group with no electoral representation. A Federal Council of Shan Chiefs was formed in 1922 which gave the Shan and their Sawbwas an important channel for representation. The Burma Frontier Service boasted just 40 members employed in the administration of the entire Scheduled Areas at the outbreak of the World War II.[1]

When the Japanese invaded Burma in 1942, the Karen remained loyal to and fought with the British, and consequently suffered at the hands of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) under Gen. Aung San and the Imperial Japanese Army. Villages were destroyed and massacres committed in their areas, and among the victims were Saw Pe Tha, a pre-war cabinet minister, and his family.[1]

First Panglong conference

[edit]

In March 1946, the Saophas or Chaofa (Sawbwa in Burmese) of the Shan states sponsored a conference at Panglong in order to discuss the future of the Shan states after independence. It was led by the Saopha of Yawnghwe Sao Shwe Thaik, and the Kachin, Chin and Karen representatives were also invited. They realised that Burma would soon gain independence from the British, and that the Frontier Areas faced a real risk of remaining a British dominion since the hill tracts were deemed backward and not yet ready for self-determination. The pre-war prime minister U Saw and Thakin Nu from the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) gave speeches as the Burman majority representatives, and a message from the British Governor of Burma was read out which reiterated the White Paper policy that no decisions would be made on the Frontier Areas and their peoples without their full consent.[1]

The Chin delegates expressed their sense of insecurity stemming from their heavy economic dependence on Burma Proper, hence their weak bargaining position. The Kachins were critical of U Nu's diatribe against the British and sceptical of Burman sincerity as regards equal rights. The Karens wanted a separate state that included the Tenasserim seaboard. The one positive outcome was the formation of a United Burma Cultural Society with Sao Shwe Thaik as chairman and U Saw as secretary.[1]

Relations later improved between the hill peoples and the AFPFL through contacts such as the Sama Duwa Sinwa Nawng, a Buddhist Kachin whose father was killed in the fight against British annexation at the turn of the century, and who himself raised Kachin levies and fought with the Burma National Army (BNA) in World War II, also the Chin leader Vamthu Mawng, and the Sawbwa of the Pa-O substate of Hsihseng (Hsahtung or Thaton) Sao Khun Kyi. In November 1946, a Supreme Council of the United Hills Peoples was formed at the instigation of the AFPFL, and Sao Shwe Thaik was elected as president.[1]

The minority leaders however continued to lobby London and the Frontier Areas Administration (FAA) directly at the same time the AFPFL was in almost continuous consultation with the British authorities for independence. The Karen National Associations (KNA), founded in 1881, had argued at the 1917 Montagu–Chelmsford hearings in India that Burma was not "yet in a fit state for self-government" to the dismay of Burmese nationalists, but 3 years later, after submitting a criticism of the 1920 Craddock Reforms, won for themselves 5 (later 12) seats in the Legislative Council of 130 (later 132) members. Sao Shwe Thaik and Sawbwa of Mong Mit Sao Khin Maung travelled to London to argue for an independent Shan state at the Burma Round Table hearings in 1931, despite the British Governor's disapproval. The Karen Goodwill Mission to London in August 1946 likewise failed to receive any encouragement for their separatist demands from the British government.[1]

H. N. C. Stevenson, the director of the FAA, criticised by both the Burma Office and the AFPFL, lamented the lost opportunities, and the lack of economic data or coordination between the Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma. He stated,"I believe that the multiplication of and strengthening of the economic relations between the hills and the plains will be the shortest and most inexpensive route to a unified Burma."

In Blueprint for a Free Burma, composed by the Japanese military but wrongfully attributed to Aung San,[2] the question of minorities is addressed in similar vein:

the essential prerequisite is the building of one unified nation. In concrete terms it means we must now bridge all gulfs now existing through British machinations between the major Burmese race and the hill peoples, the Arakanese, the Shans and unite all these peoples into one nation with equal treatment unlike the present system which divides our people into "backward" and "administered" sections. All the natural barriers that make mutual associations and contacts shall be overcome, for instance, by construction of effective modern communications such as railways and roads.[1]

Panglong Agreement

[edit]
Main article: Panglong Agreement
Aung San and Arthur Bottomley at Panglong Conference

A significant breakthrough came when an agreement was signed between the Shan, Kachin and Chin leaders, and Aung San as leader of the Governor's Executive Council at the second Panglong Conference on February 12, 1947. The Karens sent only four observers; also absent were the Mon and Arakanese representatives as they were not considered separately, but within Ministerial Burma.[1] There were 23 signatories in all expressing their willingness to work with the 'interim Burmese government' in order to achieve independence speedily, and agreeing in principle the formation of a 'Union of Burma'.

  • The Agreement proposed a Counsellor to the Governor to be appointed and co-opted as a member of the Executive Council, on recommendation by the Supreme Council of United Hills Peoples, in order to deal with the Frontier Areas, thus bringing the subject 'within the purview of the Executive Council', and the Counsellor to be assisted by two deputies who should also be allowed to attend relevant meetings of the EC.
  • Full autonomy in internal administration of the Frontier Areas was to be accepted in principle.
  • A separate Kachin state was agreed to be desirable, subject to discussion in the Constituent Assembly.
  • Citizens of the Frontier Areas were to enjoy the rights and privileges regarded as fundamental in democratic countries.
  • The financial autonomy of the Federated Shan States was not to be affected.
  • Financial assistance to the Kachin and Chin Hills likewise was not to be affected, and the feasibility of the same arrangement for them as existed with the Shan states to be considered.[3]

The British were left in no doubt that Aung San and the Burman dominated AFPFL were able to mediate with the leaders of the hills peoples. Sao Shwe Thaik was appointed Counsellor to the Governor, with Sinwa Nawng and Vumthu Mawng as his deputies. Aung San's assurance on the day, "If Burma receives one kyat, you will also get one kyat", has often been quoted by ethnic nationalists since.[1]

Legacy

[edit]

Thanks to the Panglong Agreement, the Union of Burma came into being after independence on January 4, 1948, and February 12 has been celebrated since as 'Union Day'. The spirit of Panglong is often invoked, although many today feel that another Panglong is long overdue.[4] The debate certainly needs to move on from the old black-and-white caricatures of 'imperialist stooges' and 'chauvinist oppressors' for any progress to be made.

Even at the time, there was no representation from the Karen and Karenni, no consideration regarding the Mon and Rakhine as they fell within Ministerial Burma, and the Pa-O, Palaung and Wa were subsumed under the Shan states, although the Saopha of Tawngpeng Palaung substate was among the signatories. The Frontier Areas Commission of Enquiry (FACE) was set up in April/May 1947 as a condition of the Aung San-Attlee Agreement of January 27, 1947, and although the Burmese independence movement was represented by just one united front, the AFPFL, there were 50 often conflicting groups from the hill tracts; the Delta Karen, Mon and Rakhine were still excluded.[1]

The shortcomings of the conference which resurfaced in the Constituent Assembly, and the consequent inadequacies of the Constitution promulgated on September 24, 1947, were to emerge soon after independence, and in fact in the Arakan the veteran monk U Seinda had already started a rebellion in May 1947. The Karen had isolated themselves further by boycotting both the EC and the elections to the Constituent Assembly, notwithstanding seats reserved for them, though persistent in their demand for an independent state similar to the kind their cousins, the Karenni, had enjoyed under their own Sawbwas; their future was as a result left unsettled, deferred till after independence. The Kachin had to make concessions in their representation in parliament in exchange for the inclusion of Myitkyina and Bhamo, towns with Shan and Burman majorities, in the new state, although in the hills the Duwas would continue their rule. The Chin ended up with no state, only a special division. The Mon and Rakhine again were not even considered separately.[1] One Mon group contested unsuccessfully at the elections which they claimed were rigged, but another boycotted; the Mon after independence threw in their lot with the Karen and joined the rebellion.[1]

Rebellion

[edit]

The Regional Autonomy Enquiry Commission in October 1948, though now expanded to include six Karens, six Mons, five Arakanese, seven Burmans and four others, did not report until February 1949, by which time the Karen rebellion had already broken out. The Karen had repeated their controversial demand to include Karen majority areas of the Irrawaddy Delta in the independent Karen state as well as a joint Mon–Karen independent state in the areas of the Tenasserim where they could not stake an exclusive claim.[1]

Communal relations turned sour when the AFPFL government deployed Karen and Kachin troops, which proved to be ruthlessly efficient, in suppressing the Burmese Communist rebellion that started in March 1948 centred on their stronghold of Pyinmana.[1] The situation went from bad to worse when U Nu raised the Sitwundan auxiliary troops in order to reduce the government's heavy dependence on ethnic troops, and not least in anticipation of a Karen insurrection. They were put under the command of Maj. Gen. Ne Win and not the Army Chief of Staff Gen. Smith Dun, a Karen who was later removed and replaced by Ne Win on January 31, 1949. They soon outnumbered the Karen Rifles and Union Military Police (UMP), and were subsequently used against the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), a paramilitary force formed in July 1947 by the Karen National Union (KNU), and the Karen UMP units.[1]

History repeated itself when the KNU was judged to be a separatist movement as an 'imperialist plot' at the Left Unity talks in July/August 1948 between the AFPFL and the PVO (Pyithu yèbaw or People's Volunteer Organisation, a paramilitary force formed earlier by Aung San from BIA veterans) and their allies the Communists. A gun-running plot had been uncovered involving an Anglo-Burmese officer, Capt. Vivian, who was convicted and jailed but later escaped with the Karen; he was linked to U Saw who was in the frame for the assassination of Aung San and six other cabinet members in July 1947. Another plot led by Col. Cromarty-Tulloch, an ex-Force 136 adventurer, and a few other Britons and Anglo-Burmese officers, in the early days of the Karen insurrection, was also uncovered shortly after it started.[1] Naw Seng, a commander of the Kachin Rifles, after being dispatched to suppress the Karen revolt, joined the KNDO whose ranks now swelled from the defection of the Karen Rifles; he then went on to lead the Pawng Yawng rebellion before going into exile to China in 1950, only to make a comeback in 1968 as a Communist commander.[1]

It was not just the Karen and Mon that rose up in rebellion, soon after independence in early 1949. The Rakhine led by the veteran monk U Seinda started an insurrection as early as 1946 followed by the Rakhine Mujahid in December 1947 in northern Arakan along the border of modern Bangladesh, migrants and their descendants from East Bengal. The Karenni revolt however was precipitated by a Baptist-Catholic split in its leadership in August 1948, when the veteran leader Bee Tu Re was brutally murdered, and as a result the Kyebogyi Sawbwa Sao Shwe took up arms against the AFPFL-backed Kantarawaddy Sawbwa Sao Wunna, both ex-Force 136 and erstwhile comrades-in-arms, and Sao Shwe was later aided by Tulloch.[1]

But it was not until 1949 when the Karen attacked Rangoon, triggered by the broken promise of independence. and after a brief battle both sides agreed to a cease fire and after receiving promises that the Burmese government would reconsider their requests, returned home. Nothing was done to implement these promises under Ne Win's interim Government. Then in the early 1960s the Kachin rebelled, triggered by the former Marxist U Nu's declaration of Buddhism as state religion, and the Shan rebellion, triggered by Gen. Ne Win's coup d'etat of March 1962, took off. In fact it was the Shan Federal Movement, led by Sao Shwe Thaik and aspiring to a 'loose' federation with Burma, but seen by army hardliners as a separatist movement insisting on the government honouring the right to secession after 10 years provided for by the 1947 Constitution of Burma to both the Shan and the Karenni, which precipitated the coup.[1] Ne Win had already stripped the Sawbwas of their feudal powers in exchange for comfortable pensions for life in 1959 during his caretaker government.[1] His 1962 coup put paid to the 1947 Constitution and what little remained of the Panglong spirit.[1] The Chin launched a rebellion also in the 1960s. The Kayan insurgency in the Shan substate of Mong Pai was triggered by the first 'demonetization' declaring the 100 and 50 kyat notes illegal in 1964 which wiped out the savings of hill farmers as well as the rest of the country.[1] The Shan rebellion was partially caused by the CIA who armed them in cooperation with the Chinese Kuomintang forces that fought with General Stilwell in the War against Japan and remained in the region. The latter were removed by the USA after being ordered by the UN and flew some of the Kuomintang to Formosa.

Personal journeys

[edit]

Aung San was assassinated with several members of his cabinet, including Sao Sarm Htun, the Saopha of Mong Pawng and a signatory of the Agreement, and a Karen member Mahn Ba Khaing, on July 19, 1947, just months after Panglong and before independence; July 19 has been commemorated since as 'Martyrs' Day'. U Saw was convicted and hanged in May 1948 for his role in the crime. The Socialist leader Thakin Nu became the first Prime Minister of independent Burma as a direct consequence of Aung San's untimely death and the earlier expulsion of the Burmese Communists from the AFPFL.[1] Sao Shwe Thaik was elected the first President of independent Burma (1948–52), arrested at the time of the 1962 coup when his youngest son was the one fatality, shot dead, in what was generally described as a 'bloodless' coup, and he himself died shortly afterwards in custody.[1] His wife Mahadevi Sao Nang Hearn Kham and son Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe formed the Shan State Army (SSA) in 1964 taking the Shan rebellion that started in 1958 to a new phase.[1]

Sinwa Nawng and Vamthu Mawng both became cabinet ministers in the first AFPFL government. Brang Seng, the late Chairman of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and former headmaster of Myitkyina Baptist Mission High School, was the nephew of one of the Kachin signatories Lawdan ''Duwa'' Zau La. Khun Kya Nu, a leader of the SSA and former Rangoon University student, is the son of one of the Shan delegates at Panglong, Kya Bu.[1]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Panglong Conference

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Panglong Conference was a series of meetings convened from 7 to 12 February 1947 in Panglong, , British Burma, where Burmese nationalist leader negotiated with representatives of the Shan, Kachin, and ethnic minorities to secure their support for a unified push toward from British colonial rule. The resulting , signed on 12 February, committed these frontier areas to join the Burmese-dominated executive council, forgoing separate negotiations with Britain in exchange for assurances of full in internal administration, equitable development , and the right to secede after ten years of . This pact facilitated the formation of the Union of Burma upon in January 1948 but excluded major groups such as the Karen and Mon, limiting its scope to select highland minorities. While hailed as a foundational step toward multi-ethnic unity—and commemorated annually as Union Day—the agreement's vague provisions and subsequent centralization under Burman-majority governments failed to deliver promised autonomies, fueling decades of ethnic insurgencies and civil war that persist today.

Historical Background

Colonial Legacy and Ethnic Divisions

British colonial administration in Burma employed a divide-and-rule strategy that institutionalized ethnic divisions by establishing distinct governance systems. The central lowlands, known as Ministerial Burma or Burma Proper, were directly administered under British legal, revenue, and administrative frameworks, predominantly inhabited and influenced by the Burman majority. In contrast, the peripheral hill regions—collectively termed the Areas, encompassing territories of the Shan, Kachin, , and other minorities—were governed indirectly through local chiefs and tribal structures under the oversight of a British frontier service, with minimal integration into the lowland systems. This separation, formalized after the annexation of Upper Burma in 1885 and reinforced by the Government of Burma Act 1935 which detached Burma from British , limited inter-ethnic political interaction and fostered mutual suspicions, as Frontier Area residents viewed Ministerial Burma's elected assemblies as alien to their customary autonomies. The Second World War exacerbated these divisions through divergent alliances. Japanese forces, invading in 1942, collaborated with Burman nationalists, including Aung San's (BIA), which was overwhelmingly Burman in composition and aimed at ousting British rule, thereby alienating many ethnic minorities who perceived the BIA as expansionist. Conversely, Allied forces recruited extensively from minority groups—such as Kachin, , and Karen—forming levies that fought Japanese occupation, with promises of postwar support for that heightened expectations of or even separate administration post-liberation. By war's end in 1945, these experiences had solidified minority apprehensions of Burman , as returning Burman-led forces under the (AFPFL) sought centralized control, while frontier communities invoked Allied wartime assurances to demand protections against assimilation. Postwar British proposals further underscored the tensions, as the 1945 outlined dominion status for Burma Proper but left Frontier Areas' future ambiguous, with Reginald Dorman-Smith suggesting in 1946 that they could pursue separate paths to if unwilling to join a unified state. Aung San's AFPFL, prioritizing a unitary Burmese state to consolidate power, rejected such options and pressed for Frontier Areas' inclusion under central authority, dispatching delegations to rally support while dismissing minority calls for as divisive. This stance, evident in AFPFL advocacy for a single to define the union's structure, intensified ethnic fears of marginalization in an independent dominated by Burman interests, setting the stage for negotiations amid unresolved demands.

Lead-Up to Negotiations

In the aftermath of , as the British government accelerated plans for Burma's independence under the terms of the 1945 White Paper and subsequent agreements, General , leader of the (AFPFL), initiated outreach to ethnic leaders in the frontier areas to secure their support for a unified push against colonial rule. In late 1946, toured regions inhabited by the Kachin, , and Shan populations, engaging directly with local rulers and representatives to emphasize the benefits of collective independence over fragmented separation. These efforts were driven by the recognition that British withdrawal—formalized in negotiations leading to the January 27, 1947, Aung San-Attlee Agreement—required broad ethnic buy-in to prevent the new state from disintegrating along administrative lines established under colonial policy, which had kept Ministerial Burma separate from the excluded frontier territories. By early 1947, invitations were extended primarily to Shan saophas (princes), Kachin headmen, and chiefs for a conference at Panglong, orchestrated under the auspices of the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples and facilitated by Aung San's AFPFL to address unification terms. This selective outreach reflected strategic priorities, as these groups controlled vast hill territories bordering and , whose inclusion was essential for and international viability. Karen representatives, however, were notably absent from full participation, having pursued parallel negotiations with British authorities for autonomous status or a separate administrative entity, amid internal divisions and distrust of Burman-led central authority. Ethnic leaders entering these discussions voiced insistent demands for robust safeguards, including the right of free consent to any union and a provisional secession clause after ten years, rooted in longstanding fears of and political marginalization under a Burman-dominated . These concerns stemmed from historical precedents of central lowland powers exerting control over hill peripheries, compounded by post-war uncertainties where ethnic had been preserved under British "excluded areas" administration, leading to skepticism about AFPFL assurances of equality despite Aung San's pledges.

The 1947 Panglong Conference

Participants and Setting

The Panglong Conference was held on February 12, 1947, in Panglong, a town in southern , selected primarily because it lay within Shan territory under the jurisdiction of local saophas (hereditary rulers), making it a convenient and symbolically neutral venue for Shan delegates while remaining accessible via rudimentary transport routes to Kachin and representatives from more remote frontier regions. This location underscored the conference's ad-hoc character, organized rapidly following Aung San's return from negotiations with Britain, to forge a unified front for independence without extensive prior planning or broader ethnic inclusion. Leading the Burmese delegation from the (AFPFL) was General , who sought to enlist the support of frontier ethnic leaders for a joint application to Britain for dominion status, offering assurances of in return to incentivize participation in a centralized independence push. Key ethnic attendees included Shan saophas such as Sao Shwe Thaike and Sao Sam Htun; Kachin representatives like Duwa Zau Lawn (also known as Duwa Zau Tu) and Duwa Hsinwa Nawng; and leaders including Vum Ko Hau. Karens attended only as observers, reflecting the conference's limited scope to Shan, Kachin, and groups, excluding other minorities amid time constraints and divergent interests.

Discussions and Compromises

Ethnic representatives from the Shan, Kachin, and communities voiced primary concerns over equitable revenue sharing from natural resources in the Areas, including forests in Kachin and Shan territories and minerals across these regions, fearing that central control would lead to exploitation without fair returns to local development. They also debated integration, insisting on protections for their local defense forces against forced disbandment or subordination to Burman-dominated units, alongside demands for such as the preservation of customary laws, languages, and religious practices free from imposed assimilation. Aung San responded with verbal assurances of "full autonomy" in internal administration, pledging that Frontier Areas would handle their own governance, education, and customs without interference from Rangoon, while committing to development parity that would allocate resources to elevate these regions to equivalent standards as central . These pledges emphasized voluntary unity for but omitted any explicit mention of a right during the informal deliberations, prioritizing instead mutual equality and non-discrimination among ethnic groups to build consensus. Mutual concessions facilitated agreement, as ethnic leaders relinquished demands for immediate separate statehood or direct British negotiations in favor of a joint independence push, while yielded ground on recognizing the Frontier Areas' distinct administrative status and financial study mechanisms. However, the talks lacked enforceable binding structures beyond good-faith commitments, deferring details to a future , and notably excluded broader minority inclusion, with Karen delegates present but divided and unable to commit, alongside absences of groups like the Mon and Rakhine.

The Panglong Agreement

Core Provisions

The Panglong Agreement established mechanisms for ethnic representation in governance by providing for the appointment of a Counsellor for Frontier Areas, selected by the Governor of , who would serve as a member of the Executive Council with executive authority over those regions. To support this role, two Deputy Counsellors representing different ethnic groups would assist, operating under joint responsibility and with the ability to attend Executive Council meetings concerning Frontier Areas matters. A foundational commitment was the acceptance in principle of full for the Areas in their internal administration, alongside the preservation of the financial of the Federated . The agreement further stipulated that citizens of these areas would enjoy rights and privileges equivalent to those in democratic countries, with no differentiation based on race. Financial arrangements included examining assistance for the Kachin Hills and Chin Hills from their own resources or Union revenues, without prejudice to existing entitlements. The accord emphasized a unified front toward British authorities to accelerate , including the desirability of establishing a separate within a unified —a matter deferred to the for final decision. While the written text did not explicitly codify a right to secede after ten years, some participants later interpreted verbal assurances from Burmese leaders as implying such an option for the Frontier Areas if promises were unfulfilled.

Signatories and Omissions

The Panglong Agreement was signed on February 12, 1947, by General on behalf of the Burmese government and representatives from the Shan, Kachin, and ethnic groups, specifically from the frontier areas designated as "Excluded Areas" under British colonial administration. Key signatories included for the (AFPFL), (S.S. Thaike) as Saohpalong of State representing the Shan, Hkun Pan Sing of Tawngpeng State for the Shan-Kachin areas, Sinwa Naw and Zaurip from for the Kachin Committee, and leaders such as Vum Ko Hau. In total, 23 individuals signed the document, reflecting participation from three representatives, six Kachin delegates, and several Shan saophas (hereditary chiefs). This composition emphasized commitments from the specified ethnic committees rather than individual ethnic nationalities as a whole. Significant omissions marked the conference's scope, excluding major ethnic groups such as the Karen, Mon, and Rakhine (Arakanese), who resided primarily in "Ministerial Burma" under direct British governance and were not classified among the areas. The Karen declined full participation due to longstanding distrust of Burman-dominated politics and preferences for separate negotiations or alignment with British interests, sending only four observers rather than a formal delegation. Similarly, the Mon and Rakhine were integrated into central administrative structures and not invited as distinct entities, prompting parallel demands for outside the Panglong framework. The Karenni (Kayah) states, historically autonomous and never under direct British control but only Burmese suzerainty, were also not substantively involved, with later assertions from Karenni representatives claiming complete non-participation and exclusion from the agreement's guarantees. These absences highlighted the conference's limited focus on Shan, Kachin, and Chin territories, fostering incomplete representation of Burma's ethnic diversity and seeding doubts about the agreement's pan-ethnic legitimacy from inception. Selective inclusion thus constrained the pact's applicability, as unbound groups pursued independent paths toward statehood or federal rights, exacerbating post-independence tensions.

Path to Independence and Early Implementation

Integration into Burmese Constitution

The principles of the , signed on February 12, 1947, were embedded in the of the Union of Burma, which the adopted on September 24, 1947, prior to on January 4, 1948. Chapter X, titled "Right of Secession," granted the , , and Special Division of the Hills the option to secede from the Union after ten years, exercisable through resolutions by their respective state councils requiring a two-thirds majority and potential referenda, thereby codifying the agreement's commitment to voluntary participation and . Provisions in the , particularly under transitional arrangements in Section 232, established provisional councils for frontier areas, including the Council, Council, Provisional Chin Hills Special Division Council, and Provisional Karenni State Council, to oversee internal administration in line with the agreement's assurance of full in such matters. These structures aimed to preserve local governance distinct from Ministerial , though Karenni State, despite not being a Panglong signatory, was included as a distinct entity with its own council. Initial implementation included the appointment of ethnic ministers to the Union Government cabinet, with dedicated portfolios for , , Karenni State, Affairs, and Karen Affairs, reflecting efforts to incorporate frontier representatives into central during the transition to . This representation provided an early mechanism for ethnic input, aligning with the agreement's spirit of equality among union partners.

Aung San's Assassination and Transition

On July 19, 1947, , along with six of his cabinet colleagues, was assassinated in a gun attack at the Secretariat Building in Rangoon during a meeting of the Executive Council. The perpetrators, including gunmen hired by political rival —a former opposed to Aung San's dominance—targeted him to eliminate the central figure who had forged ethnic alliances through the just months earlier. This act removed the primary architect of Burma's push for unified independence, whose personal authority and rapport with ethnic leaders like those from the Shan, Kachin, and states had secured their tentative buy-in to a federal structure. Following the , , a senior figure in the (AFPFL), succeeded as head of the interim government and leader of the independence movement. Lacking 's military prestige and commanding presence, nonetheless maintained momentum, overseeing the final negotiations with Britain and achieving formal independence on January 4, 1948, as the Union of Burma. In the immediate aftermath, 's administration exhibited short-term continuity in pursuing the constitutional framework incorporating Panglong principles, but his relatively weaker grip on power—compared to 's—permitted emerging fissures in ethnic-central relations to widen without the same forceful mediation. The assassination marked a causal disruption in Panglong implementation, as Aung San's death eroded the personal trust and informal assurances that had bridged ethnic skepticism toward Burman-majority rule. Ethnic leaders had relied on Aung San's credibility to interpret and enforce the agreement's spirit of , provisions that remained ambiguously drafted in the ensuing ; his absence shifted dynamics toward centralizing impulses under less authoritative leadership, foreshadowing non-fulfillment of federal commitments. While independence proceeded, the loss of Aung San's unifying influence undermined the fragile consensus, contributing to early doubts among frontier states about the union's viability.

Failures in Fulfillment

Centralization Under U Nu

Following independence in January 1948, Prime Minister U Nu's administration pursued policies emphasizing national integration and centralized control to consolidate the newly formed Union of Burma, often at the expense of the autonomy promised in the Panglong Agreement and the 1947 Constitution. The constitution had outlined provisions for elected state councils in frontier areas like the Shan, Kachin, and Chin states to manage local affairs, but formation and empowerment of these bodies were delayed amid ongoing insurgencies and the government's priority on military unification. Efforts to disband ethnic militias and incorporate them into a national army under central command met resistance, as many groups viewed this as undermining their self-governance rights, leading to prolonged administrative centralization from Rangoon. U Nu's adoption of democratic socialist economic measures from 1948 onward, including state-led of key industries and reforms, aimed at equitable development but exacerbated disparities in frontier regions. These policies centralized and extraction, with frontier areas—rich in timber, minerals, and —receiving limited infrastructure investment while facing increased taxation and requisitioning for national needs, fostering perceptions of exploitation without reciprocal benefits. By the mid-1950s, , exceeding 50% annually in some years, and rice export declines disproportionately burdened peripheral economies, as central favored Burman-majority lowland areas over remote ethnic territories. U Nu, a devout Theravada Buddhist, actively promoted through initiatives like the 1956 Buddha Sasana Council, which allocated state funds for pagoda restorations and monastic education, signaling a cultural alignment with Burman traditions. This emphasis alienated non-Burman, non-Buddhist populations in frontier areas, where Christian converts among Kachin and groups (comprising over 80% in some districts) and animist practices among Shan subgroups viewed such favoritism as eroding the secular pluralism implied in Panglong. By prioritizing Buddhist institutions in national policy, U Nu's approach reinforced ethnic divides, contributing to grievances over unequal cultural representation in a multi-ethnic union.

Ethnic Autonomy Disputes

The 1947 Constitution incorporated the Panglong Agreement's pledge of "full autonomy in internal administration" for the Frontier Areas (Shan, Kachin, and ), but ambiguities in delineating the boundaries of these internal affairs enabled the central government to assert override authority on local matters. Article 92 empowered the Union Parliament to annul state laws during declared emergencies, creating a legal pathway for central vetoes on decisions involving , , or administrative appointments deemed to impact national interests. Ethnic states retained limited taxation powers under the Third Schedule, while the Union controlled key revenues, fostering disputes over the interpretation of "internal" versus union-wide competencies. Financial separations promised at Panglong—preserving the Federated ' autonomy and continuing aid to Kachin and Hills—were not realized, as post- policies directed ethnic areas' resource revenues, including and minerals, to Rangoon without proportional returns or separate budgeting mechanisms. This centralization contradicted Aung San's explicit commitment to equal financial allocation ("If Burma receives one kyat, you will also get one kyat"), reducing ethnic administrations to dependency on Union disbursements and eroding fiscal . Administrative non-compliance manifested in the dissolution of ethnic state legislatures and the appointment of centrally selected executives, limiting local legislative efficacy. Throughout the , ethnic leaders submitted petitions advocating federal amendments to enforce clearer , with Shan and Kachin representatives in demanding a restructured federal union to safeguard and jurisdictional protections. U Nu's government disregarded these calls, enacting unitary-oriented constitutional changes and policies that bolstered central oversight, such as the 1953 creation of the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs to promote assimilation and the 1961 legislative push for as , which encroached on ethnic cultural administration. By mid-decade, interventions like the June 1950 imposition of in and the progressive stripping of Sawbwas' revenue-collection powers by 1953 exemplified the administrative prioritization of Union control over promised devolution.

Resulting Armed Conflicts

Initial Insurrections

The (CPB) launched an armed insurgency on March 28, 1948, less than three months after , seizing control of parts of central Burma and prompting the to deploy ethnic minority units, including Karen and Kachin battalions from the Burma Army, to counter the threat. This reliance on ethnic forces highlighted the fragility of post- unity, as the CPB's rebellion intersected with growing ethnic grievances over the central 's reluctance to codify Panglong's assurances into , leading to defections among non-Burman soldiers who perceived systemic favoritism toward Burman . By late 1948, these tensions erupted into mutinies within the Karen Rifles, escalating into the full-scale (KNU) revolt on January 31, 1949, when Karen forces captured Insein near Rangoon and other strategic towns, explicitly citing the Burmese failure to create a Karen state and honor Panglong's pledges as a that justified armed . Similarly, Kachin discontent boiled over in February 1949 with the formation of the Pawng Yawng National Defence Organization under Lahpai Naw Seng, a former British war veteran, as Kachin leaders rebelled against the imposition of direct central rule without the promised statehood or resource-sharing outlined in Panglong, viewing it as a violation of the agreement's equality . The Burmese government, under Prime Minister , responded with intensified military operations by the , recapturing lost territories through 1949 and framing the ethnic rebels as disloyal separatists intent on fragmenting the Union, rather than negotiating Panglong's unfulfilled provisions, which further alienated frontier groups and solidified their commitment to . In the , while saophas had formally acceded to the Union at , the swift subsumption of their traditional councils into centralized administration eroded autonomy almost immediately, sowing seeds of resistance among Shan elites who invoked Panglong's safeguards but faced early pressures to dissolve hereditary roles without compensation.

Escalation to Civil War

The perceived failures to implement the Panglong Agreement's commitments fueled ethnic grievances, leading to the formation of armed insurgencies in the 1950s and early 1960s as peripheral states sought to enforce autonomy through force. The (KIA), established on February 5, 1961, exemplified this shift, with its political wing, the , explicitly demanding a federal system aligned with the "Panglong spirit" amid encroachments on ethnic self-rule. Similarly, Shan and other groups advanced federal proposals, such as the 1961 Shan Federal Proposal endorsed at the conference, highlighting persistent calls for devolved powers that Rangoon resisted. General Ne Win's military coup on March 2, 1962, marked a decisive escalation by dismantling democratic institutions and imposing a centralized, socialist regime that explicitly rejected in favor of unitary control. This shift abandoned residual autonomy arrangements, prompting intensified operations against insurgents and driving ethnic forces underground, as Bamar-dominated military leadership consolidated power without concessions to minority demands. The coup's aftermath saw a surge in armed resistance, with the prioritizing suppression over , thereby transforming sporadic revolts into sustained warfare across border regions. By the 1970s, these dynamics had proliferated over two dozen ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), operating in a cycle of tentative ceasefires often undermined by government insistence on without addressing underlying political grievances. Such agreements, including early Ne Win-era truces with groups like the Mon and Karen, frequently collapsed due to perceived betrayals—such as unfulfilled autonomy promises or renewed offensives—perpetuating Myanmar's as the world's longest-running .

Controversies and Interpretations

Promises of Secession vs. Unity

The , signed on February 12, 1947, contained no explicit clause granting ethnic Frontier Areas a unilateral right to , emphasizing instead "full in internal administration" accepted in principle and joint efforts toward from Britain. Its text focused on practical arrangements like separate elections for a , continued financial aid to Kachin and Hills, and preservation of ' fiscal , without mechanisms to enforce future separation. This vagueness left room for divergent readings, as the document subordinated ethnic participation to the broader goal of a unified Burma, stating that signatories agreed to "complete the tasks of the reconstruction of Burma even if we have to do it alone." Ethnic representatives, particularly Shan leaders like of Nyaungshwe, later cited verbal assurances from during conference negotiations as evidence of a promised option after 10 years, should the union fail to deliver equality and . These claims draw on reported exchanges where accepted Shan demands for in principle, intending their incorporation into the forthcoming , amid ethnic distrust of Burman-dominated central rule. Historical accounts from ethnic sources reference 's pledges of parity—"If the Burmese receive one kyat, the Shan will also get one kyat"—as underscoring a conditional exit right tied to unmet guarantees, though lacking written corroboration beyond the agreement's clause. Burman centralist interpretations, reflected in subsequent governments and constitutional drafting, viewed any secession prospect as inherently conditional on the union's success in fostering national cohesion, not a standalone entitlement, and denied its literal inclusion in the Panglong text. The absence of binding enforcement provisions—such as arbitration or referendum procedures—enabled post-assassination reinterpretations, as the 1947 Constituent Assembly omitted broad secession language, limiting it narrowly to Shan and Karenni State councils' resolutions after 10 years, which required central legislative approval and were never operationalized amid rising insurgencies. This gap facilitated opportunistic shifts, with official narratives prioritizing indivisible unity over ethnic opt-outs, arguing the agreement's spirit demanded sustained commitment absent proven federal failures.

Blame Attribution: Central Government vs. Ethnic Demands

Proponents of the central government's position have argued that ethnic demands for extensive or posed a existential risk of , fragmenting into unstable micro-states vulnerable to external interference and incapable of unified . This view posits that post-colonial , with its diverse ethnic mosaic and limited , required centralized authority to maintain and foster national stability, as decentralized power could devolve into warlordism or dissolution akin to post-Yugoslav fragmentation. Empirical outcomes support this caution: ethnic armed organizations' control over borderlands has accelerated territorial fracturing, with the military holding only 21% of territory by 2025 while rebels and ethnic forces control 42%, exacerbating inter-group rivalries rather than cohesive . From the ethnic minorities' standpoint, the central government's post-independence centralization under leaders like represented systematic overreach, including Burmanization policies that marginalized non-Burman languages, religions, and resource rights, violating equitable power-sharing implicit in pre-independence negotiations. Ethnic leaders contended that resource exploitation from peripheral states—such as timber, , and minerals from Kachin and Shan areas—without fair revenue distribution fueled legitimate grievances, as central authorities prioritized core Burman regions, leading to perceived and justifying armed resistance. However, this perspective overlooks instances of ethnic intransigence, where groups like the demanded outright separation rather than compromise, rejecting integration offers and contributing to cycles of through inter-ethnic clashes and rejection of national frameworks. Causal analysis of the ensuing conflicts reveals mutual escalation: central policies imposed linguistic and administrative uniformity, displacing millions and stalling growth, yet ethnic demands often hardened into separatist absolutism, preventing viable federal alternatives. By , the civil war has displaced over three million civilians and driven half the population into , with GDP contracting 12% below pre-coup levels amid intensified fighting, underscoring how unyielding positions on both sides perpetuated stagnation over hypothetical federal prosperity. While central overreach eroded trust, ethnic pursuits of de facto have fragmented resistance efforts, as seen in competing ethnic administrations that prioritize local control over unified opposition. This duality highlights that blame resides in reciprocal failures to prioritize pragmatic unity, with neither side's maximalism yielding sustainable equity or stability.

Long-Term Legacy

Contributions to National Unity

The , signed on February 12, 1947, by General and leaders from the , Kachin, and Shan regions, established a framework for collective action toward independence from British rule, presenting a unified to colonial authorities. This demonstration of ethnic solidarity was pivotal in securing Britain's recognition of a cohesive national movement, thereby expediting the transition to sovereignty as the Union of Burma on January 4, 1948, and forestalling territorial fragmentation akin to the subcontinent's partition. In the immediate post-independence period, the agreement's principles enabled ethnic participation in central institutions, including the and the nascent Burmese armed forces, where minority battalions from frontier areas were integrated alongside Burman units. Prominent ethnic figures, such as Shan Sawbwa , assumed key roles like the presidency, fostering early administrative and military cohesion across diverse groups. As a foundational document, the retains symbolic weight as an of voluntary union, invoked in historical commemorations like Union Day to underscore shared commitments to federal equality and collective , even amid later challenges.

Persistent Ethnic Tensions

The unfulfilled commitments of the 1947 , particularly regarding ethnic and equal rights within a federal structure, have sustained a cycle of distrust and armed resistance by ethnic groups against 's central authorities for over 75 years. This foundational breach eroded confidence in Burmese-led governance from independence in onward, fostering insurgencies among groups like the Karen, Shan, and Kachin, whose demands for self-rule trace directly to Panglong's "full in internal administration" clause that was never constitutionally enshrined. Empirical patterns of conflict persistence show ethnic armed organizations controlling significant border territories, with violence flaring recurrently due to perceived centralization efforts that prioritize Bamar-dominated unity over negotiated . Escalations in ethnic strife from to , amid broader instability, have revived explicit invocations of Panglong's spirit to justify campaigns, as border states experience intensified clashes over control and exclusion. These tensions manifest in territorial fragmentation, where ethnic forces hold sway in peripheral highlands and frontiers, resisting assimilationist policies that echo post-Panglong centralization under successive regimes. links this longevity to institutional failures in devolving power, creating incentives for armed self-reliance among minorities who view federal concessions as existential safeguards against marginalization. Economic imbalances compound these political grievances, with ethnic border regions like Shan, Kachin, and Rakhine states registering (HDI) scores 20-30% below national averages, driven by underinvestment and extraction of timber, jade, and minerals that flow to central economies without proportional local returns. GDP in these frontier areas lags by factors of 2-3 times compared to Yangon and divisions, fueling narratives of exploitative "internal " where autonomy promises could have enabled equitable resource governance. Such disparities, persisting despite sporadic ceasefires, reinforce ethnic solidarity against perceived economic predation, as data from multilateral assessments indicate rural-ethnic rates exceeding 50% in conflict zones versus under 20% in core regions. The resultant instability has generated protracted refugee and displacement crises, with over 1.1 million nationals seeking asylum abroad by 2023—primarily from hotspots—and internal displacements surpassing 2 million amid cross-border fighting. UNHCR operational data highlight how disputes displace populations recurrently, as communities in Kayah, Kayin, and divisions flee militarized frontiers lacking Panglong-envisaged self-protection mechanisms. United Nations fact-finding missions document bidirectional atrocities perpetuating this impasse, including junta airstrikes killing hundreds of civilians in ethnic areas and sporadic reprisals by armed groups involving village burnings and forced recruitment, both qualifying as potential war crimes under . OHCHR reports from 2024-2025 underscore how unchecked violence on multiple fronts—attributed to state forces' scorched-earth tactics and ethnic militias' territorial enforcements—entenches cycles of retaliation, undermining any resolution without revisiting Panglong's federal equity framework. While UN documentation emphasizes junta-scale abuses, verified incidents from ethnic actors highlight mutual escalatory dynamics rooted in unresolved deficits.

21st Century Panglong Revivals

Initiative Under Thein Sein and NLD

Following the establishment of President 's semi-civilian government in March 2011, pursued a nationwide as part of broader political reforms, aiming to address longstanding ethnic insurgencies through bilateral ceasefires and multilateral negotiations. This initiative built on earlier bilateral agreements but sought a comprehensive framework, culminating in the drafting of the (NCA) on March 31, 2015, by the government and representatives from 16 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), though only eight ultimately signed the accord on October 15, 2015. The NCA outlined commitments to cease hostilities, establish joint monitoring mechanisms, and transition to political dialogue, but its incomplete participation highlighted divisions, as non-signatories cited concerns over military influence and insufficient guarantees for federal autonomy. Thein Sein's administration convened an initial Union Peace Conference in January 2016 to advance dialogue on constitutional reforms and power-sharing, positioning the effort as a modern extension of historical agreements like the Panglong Conference. However, the process faced criticism for limited inclusivity, excluding key northern EAOs such as the () and (TNLA), which had not entered bilateral ceasefires with the military and were deemed ineligible by the government. After the (NLD) secured a landslide victory in the November 2015 elections, assumed de facto leadership in 2016 and relaunched the talks as the Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong, explicitly invoking her father General Aung San's 1947 Panglong legacy to emphasize unity, inclusivity, and ethnic self-determination within a federal framework. The inaugural session, held on August 31, 2016, in Naypyitaw, included NCA signatories and invited non-signatories for observer status, but persistent exclusions of groups like the AA and TNLA—part of the —limited broader buy-in, as these organizations demanded preconditions for participation amid ongoing clashes. This phase under the NLD sought to expand dialogue beyond Thein Sein's efforts, yet retained oversight via the Tatmadaw's power in key areas, reflecting the hybrid nature of Myanmar's reforms.

Conferences and Stagnation Post-2021 Coup

The Union Peace Conference—21st Century Panglong convened four sessions between August 2016 and August 2020, yielding agreements on foundational principles such as , resource sharing, and security sector reform, encapsulated in documents like the Union Accord Part III signed at the final session. However, these outcomes produced no amendments to Myanmar's 2008 , which reserves 25% of parliamentary seats for unelected appointees and grants the armed forces veto power over key reforms, effectively stalling substantive progress toward ethnic autonomy demands. The further delayed scheduled dialogues, with the third session in July 2018 marking the last pre-coup gathering amid criticisms of sluggish implementation and exclusion of non-signatory ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), widening rifts between participating and boycotting groups. The military coup on February 1, 2021, abruptly ended the conference framework, as the State Administration Council under Senior General Min Aung Hlaing dismantled the National League for Democracy-led government's peace architecture and intensified offensives against EAOs, nullifying prior ceasefires and accords. This derailment shifted ethnic strategies toward armed resistance coalitions, with groups like the Karen National Union and Kachin Independence Army aligning temporarily with pro-democracy People's Defence Forces against the junta, though without formal revival of Panglong mechanisms. Analysts attribute the stagnation to inherent structural flaws, including the military's constitutional dominance that rendered conferences tokenistic exercises in dialogue without enforceable commitments, as evidenced by persistent non-signatory exclusions and unaddressed demands for statehood rights. Escalating conflicts from 2023 onward, including launched by the in October 2023, have further eroded any residual momentum, with EAOs capturing over 40% of territory by mid-2025 and fragmenting control into ethnic enclaves rather than advancing unified federal negotiations. These gains, while weakening junta authority—which holds only 21% of land—have prioritized territorial defense over constitutional bargaining, as internecine EAO rivalries and lack of centralized opposition coordination undermine prospects for Panglong-inspired . The junta's overtures for renewed talks in 2024, amid planned elections, have been rebuffed by major EAOs, perpetuating a cycle where military vetoes and battlefield dynamics preclude the inclusive political settlement envisioned in earlier sessions.

References

  1. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d12
  2. https://www.buildmyanmarmedia.com/hidden-stories-behind-the-panglong-agreement/
  3. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/mm470212panglong20agreement.pdf
  4. https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210211-myanmar-marks-union-day-with-the-multi-ethnic-national-dream-slipping-further-away
  5. https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/on-this-day/the-original-panglong.html
  6. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249973664_Ethnicity_Conflict_and_History_in_Burma_The_Myths_of_Panglong
  7. https://www.tni.org/en/article/jump-starting-the-stalled-peace-process
  8. https://teacircleoxford.com/essay/lessons-from-panglong-part-i/
  9. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/colonial-institutions-and-civil-war/frontiers-of-empire-indirect-rule-and-insurgency-in-burma-and-pakistan/0E04A1C2F70EC2A60529C9D4250CC9FF
  10. https://www.burmalink.org/background/burma/history-since-colonisation/
  11. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=studentpub_uht
  12. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2008.48.6.889
  13. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/burma-and-world-war-ii
  14. https://fluxirr.mcgill.ca/article/view/166/131
  15. https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/on-this-day/ethnic-areas-joined-burma-proper-independence.html
  16. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1958/02/burmas-socialist-democracy/306815/
  17. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3024026
  18. https://kyotoreview.org/issue-10/the-burmese-nationalist-elites-pre-independence-exploration-of-a-national-development-road/
  19. https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/did-aung-san-lead-at-panglong-or-follow/
  20. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/overview-burmas-ethnic-politics
  21. https://www.academia.edu/116599721/The_Right_of_Secession_in_Burmas_First_Constitution
  22. https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/docs/panglong_agreement.htm
  23. https://studylib.net/doc/8653616/profile-of-a-burma-frontier-man--part-i-
  24. https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Frontier_Areas_Committee_of_Enquiry-1947-full.pdf
  25. http://constitutionnet.org/news/constitutional-implications-myanmars-peace-process
  26. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/08/myanmar-21st-century-panglong-aung-san-suu-kyi/
  27. https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/28/we-are-forgotten-people/chin-people-burma-unsafe-burma-unprotected-india
  28. http://www.myanmar-law-library.org/IMG/pdf/the_panglong_agreement.pdf
  29. https://www.burmalibrary.org/en/the-panglong-agreement-1947
  30. https://english.shannews.org/archives/12088
  31. https://constitutionnet.org/news/constitutional-implications-myanmars-peace-process
  32. https://mmpeacemonitor.org/en/en-interviews/what-did-general-aung-san-and-ethnic-leaders-do-for-the-panglong-agreement/
  33. https://english.shannews.org/archives/14720
  34. http://www.asianlii.org/mm/legis/const/1947/1.pdf
  35. https://sonar.rero.ch/documents/324272/files/32_Kelvin.pdf
  36. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-01005A000100040001-0.pdf
  37. https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/on-this-day/day-myanmars-independence-hero-assassinated.html
  38. https://www.executedtoday.com/2009/05/08/1948-u-saw-and-the-assassins-of-aung-san/
  39. https://teacirclemyanmar.com/politics/lessons-from-panglong-part-i/
  40. https://www.britannica.com/biography/U-Nu
  41. https://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/15/obituaries/u-nu-first-premier-of-independent-burma-and-democracy-advocate-dies-at-87.html
  42. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-pdf/40/4/754/13092653/ia-40-4-754.pdf
  43. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/7/19/myanmars-broken-promises
  44. https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/beyond_panglong.pdf
  45. https://digital.car.chula.ac.th/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1446&context=chulaetd
  46. https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/woocommerce_uploads/nbr_analysis_v09n3.pdf
  47. https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs3/Ethnic_Groups_in_Burma-ocr.pdf
  48. https://www.workersliberty.org/story/2022-11-29/u-nu-and-burmese-political-buddhism
  49. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA585613.pdf
  50. https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=facbooks
  51. https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/burmamyanmar-1948-present/
  52. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48505114
  53. https://www.kachinlandnews.com/?p=22647
  54. https://books.openedition.org/irasec/271?lang=en
  55. https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/on-this-day/day-myanmars-last-feudal-rulers-gave-power.html
  56. https://scholarspace.library.gwu.edu/downloads/9880vr47f?locale=en
  57. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya
  58. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2747519/myanmar-probably-needs-a-military-just-not-the-one-it-has/
  59. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/20201002-pw_169-why_burmas_peace_efforts_have_failed_to_end_its_internal_wars-pw.pdf
  60. https://www.bnionline.net/en/opinion/op-ed/item/1722-rebuttal-on-secession-clause-and-panglong-agreement.html
  61. https://english.shannews.org/archives/13555
  62. https://eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/30/myanmar-stumbling-over-non-secession/
  63. https://www.9dashline.com/article/myanmar-is-slipping-towards-balkanisation
  64. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b180-ethnic-autonomy-and-its-consequences-post-coup-myanmar
  65. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar
  66. https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/solving-myanmars-ethnic-conflicts-a-proposal/
  67. https://dissentmagazine.org/article/burmas-fault-lines-ethnic-federalism-and-the-road-to-peace/
  68. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/01/1159561
  69. https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/12/asia/myanmar-poverty-civil-war-intl-hnk
  70. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2023/04/10/aung-san-and-independent-burma/
  71. https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/places-in-history/myanmars-panglong-monument-embodies-promise-democracy-autonomy-equality.html
  72. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia-pacific/myanmar/312-identity-crisis-ethnicity-and-conflict-myanmar
  73. https://wyoscholar.uwyo.edu/bitstreams/98fbdba1-5362-4877-8794-c70dfb38f120/download
  74. https://myanmar.iiss.org/analysis/northwest
  75. https://www.tni.org/en/article/history-repeated-another-roadblock-to-political-change-in-myanmar
  76. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1053342.pdf
  77. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2018/091/article-A002-en.xml
  78. https://www.tni.org/en/publication/developing-disparity
  79. https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2024_NMR.pdf
  80. https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar
  81. https://www.unhcr.org/us/emergencies/myanmar-emergency
  82. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/09/1154111
  83. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/myanmar-military-should-be-investigated-for-war-crimes-in-response-to-operation-1027/
  84. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/myanmar-death-destruction-and-desperation-mirror-2017-atrocities-un-report
  85. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/05/1163706
  86. https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-nationwide-ceasefire-agreement-in-myanmar
  87. https://www.isdp.eu/publication/myanmars-nationwide-ceasefire-agreement/
  88. https://www.tni.org/files/2023-04/TNI_CeasefireMyanmar_web_1.pdf
  89. https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/two-peace-conferences-one-crucial-difference/
  90. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia-pacific/myanmar/b158-myanmar-violent-push-shake-ceasefire-negotiations
  91. https://www.stimson.org/2023/understanding-the-arakan-army/
  92. https://www.idea.int/news/dialogues-myanmars-peace-process
  93. https://www.tni.org/en/article/constitution-making-and-peace-process-stagnation-in-myanmar-will-a-conditional-clause-help
  94. https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202008/21/WS5f3f88a5a310834817261f1a.html
  95. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/union20accord20part20iii.pdf
  96. https://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5499
  97. https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/the-problem-with-the-21st-century-panglong-conference/
  98. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia-pacific/myanmar/319-myanmars-coup-shakes-its-ethnic-conflicts
  99. https://www.stimson.org/2022/the-karen-national-union-in-post-coup-myanmar/
  100. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-s-federal-future-cannot-be-built-junta-s-foundations
  101. https://www.straitstimes.com/world/myanmar-junta-urges-armed-opposition-to-join-political-fold-in-elections
  102. https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-armed-groups-rebuff-juntas-cooperation-appeal/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.